Imperfection—An Impression of Falsity implied—Two Views taken by
Philosophers—Firstly that of Voltaire, Jean Paul, Brown, the German
Idealists, Léon Dumont, Secondly that of Descartes, Marmontel and
Dugald Stewart—Whately on Jests—Nature of Puns—Effect of Custom and
Habit—Accessory Emotion—Disappointment and Loss—Practical Jokes.
Although a distinction can be drawn in humour between the sense of wrong
and the complication which accompanies it, still, as in any given case,
the two flow out of the same circumstances, there seems to be some
indissoluble link between them. It is not necessary to say that the
sense of the ludicrous is a compound feeling, to maintain that it has
the appearance of containing or being connected with something like a
feeling of disapprobation.
Moreover, all the elements contained must be perfectly fused together
before the ludicrous can be appreciated, just as Sir T. Macintosh
observes of Beauty, "Until all the separate pleasures which create it be
melted into one—as long as any of them are discerned and felt as
distinct from each other—qualities which gratify are not called by the
name of Beauty," and when we say that the humour consists of an emotion
awakened by an exercise of judgment, we do not pretend to determine how
far the emotion has been modified by judgment, and judgment directed by
emotion.
We cannot properly suppose that there is anything really wrong in
external objects brought before us, and did we recognise that everything
moves in a regular pre-ordained course, we should be obliged to consider
everything right, and conclude that the error we observe is imaginary,
and flows from our own false standard. We do so with regard to the
so-called works of Nature, and, therefore, we never laugh at a rock or a
tree—no matter how strange its form. But in the general circumstances
brought before us the reign of law is not so clear, especially when they
depend on the actions of men, which we feel able to pronounce judgment
upon, and condemn when opposed to our ideal. In humorous representations
we are actually beholding what is false; in ludicrous we think we are,
though we cannot avoid at times detecting some infirmity in our own
discernment. Thus, in the case of a child's puzzle, a person unable to
solve it sometimes exclaims, "How dull I am! I ought to be able to do
it," and people occasionally find fault with their senses, as we
sometimes see them laughing when dazzled by rapidly revolving colours.
Such instances may suggest to us that the fault we find really
originates in our own obtuseness.
But before proceeding, we must allow that philosophers and literary men
are divided in opinion as to the existence of any feeling of wrong in
the ludicrous. Voltaire, tilting against the windmills which the old
animosity school had set up, observes, "When I was eleven years old, I
read all alone for the first time the 'Amphitryon' of Molière, and I
laughed until I was on the point of falling down. Was this from
hostility?—one is not hostile when alone!" This will not seem to most
of us more conclusive reasoning than that of his opponents. We seldom
laugh when alone, although we often feel angry.
Dryden says "Wit is a propriety of words and thoughts adapted to the
subject," and Pope gives us a similar opinion in the following words—
"True wit is nature to advantage dressed,
What oft was thought, but ne'er so well expressed,
Something whose truth convinced at sight we find.
That gives us back the image to our mind."
Taking this view of the subject, we should be inclined to think the
Psalms of David especially witty, and to agree with the pretentious
young lady who, being asked what she thought of Euclid, replied at a
hazard that "It was the wittiest book she had ever read." But it seems
probable from other passages in Pope's works that he did not here intend
to give a full definition, but only some characteristics. Moreover, in
former times, Wit was not properly distinguished from Wisdom, and the
above authors probably used the word in the old sense. Young says,
"Well-judging wit is a flower of wisdom," to which we may reply in the
words of an old proverb, "Wit and Wisdom, like the seven stars, are
seldom found together."
Brown, in his lectures on "The Human Understanding," observes that in
the ludicrous we do not condemn, but admire, and he cites as an
illustration the case of some friends dining at an hotel. Boniface
smilingly inquires what wine they would like to drink. One says
Champagne, another Claret, another Burgundy, but the last one observes
knowingly that he should like that best for which he should not have to
pay. Now in this there is certainly a fault, for the answer is not
applicable to the question. Brown's theory is that the ludicrous arises
from the contemplation of incongruities, and he finds himself somewhat
puzzled when he considers that the incongruities in science—in
chemistry, for instance—do not make us laugh. He is at some trouble to
explain that the importance of the subject renders us serious. But had
he recognised the fact that the ludicrous implies condemnation, he would
have seen that we could not be amused at incongruities in science,
because we have a strong conviction that they are not real but only
apparent. Some very ignorant persons, as he observes, do occasionally
laugh at philosophic truths. I knew a lady who laughed at being told of
the great distance of the planets, and a gentleman assured me that a
friend of his, a man who had such shrewdness that he rose from the
lowest ranks and acquired £100,000, would never believe that the earth
was round!
Jean Paul, taking the same admiration view, observes that "women laugh
more than men, and the haughty Turk not at all." But are not these facts
referable to comparative excitability and apathy, and also to the
multiplicity and variety of female ideas compared with the dulness of
the Moslem's apprehension. Jean Paul proceeds to say that the more
people laugh at our joke, the better we are pleased, and that this does
not seem as though the enjoyment came from a feeling of triumph. But
what is really laughed at is the humour, and not the humorist, and as a
man wishes the beauty of a poem he has written to be generally
acknowledged, so he desires to see the point of his satire appreciated
by as many as possible.
A fruitful source of error in the investigation of humour arises from
the difficulty in determining where it lies—of localizing it, if I may
be allowed the expression. We hear a very amusing observation, and at
once join heartily in the laugh, but cannot say whether we are laughing
at a circumstance or a person, at a representation or a reality.
We come now to the most important authority on this side of the
question. The systems which the German philosophers have propounded are
more serviceable to themselves than edifying to the ordinary reader.
High abstractions afford but a very vague and indefinite idea to the
mind, nor can their application be fully understood but by those who
have ascended the successive stages by which each philosopher has
himself mounted. On the present subject, their opinions seem to have
been influenced by their views on other subjects. As we have already
observed, Kant and several of the leading German idealists are in favour
of considering the ludicrous as a "resolution" or a "deliverance of the
absolute, captive by the finite," an opinion which reminds us of
Hobbes' old theory of "glorying over others." The difference between
their views and that of most authorities is not so great as it at first
appears; they admit a "negation" of truth and beauty, but found the
ludicrous, not upon this, but upon the rebirth which follows. This step
in advance, taken in accordance with their general philosophy, may be
correct, but it does not seem warranted by the mere examination of the
subject itself. Can we say that at the instant of laughter we regard not
that something is wrong, but that the reverse of it is right? When
humour is brought before us, do we feel in any way instructed? This
rebirth from a negation must seem somewhat visionary. What, for
instance, is the truth to be gathered from the following. "I wish," said
a philanthropic orator, "to be a friend to the friendless, a father to
the fatherless, and a widow to the widowless."
Probably, the philosopher who formed the rebirth theory had looked at
ludicrous events rather than humorous stories—and it may be urged that
we laugh at the former when we are set right, and are convinced of
having been really mistaken. But at the moment what excites mirth is
something that seems wrong. We meet a friend, for instance, in a place
where we little expected to see him, and perhaps smile at the meeting.
Had we known all his movements we should not have been thus surprised,
but we were ignorant of them. Here we may say our views are corrected,
and our amusement comes from a resolution or rebirth. But reflection
will show that whatever our final conclusion may be, we laugh at what
seems to us, at the moment, unaccountable and wrong; and as soon as we
begin to correct ourselves, and to see how the event occurred, our
merriment disappears.
Many instances will occur to us in which what is really right may appear
wrong. Most of us have heard the proverb "If the day is fine take an
umbrella, if it rains do as you like." It may give good advice, but we
should be much inclined to laugh at anyone who adopted it.
Léon Dumont, the latest writer who has added considerably to our
knowledge on this subject, does not admit the existence of imperfection
in the ludicrous. But the arguments which he adduces do not seem to be
conclusive. He says, for instance, that we laugh at love and amatory
adventures because they abound in deceptions! But deception always
implies ignorance or falsity, and the extravagant phraseology of love,
the fanciful names, the griefs and ecstasies, are not only ridiculous
in themselves, but lead us to regard lovers generally as bereft of
reason.
Dumont observes, in support of his theory, that "when a small man bobs
his head in passing under a door, we laugh." But if a puppet or a
pantaloon were to do so we should scarcely be amused, for we could
account for it, and see nothing wrong in his action. He goes on to ask
how the other view is applicable in the case of Ariosto's father, who
rates his son at the very moment when the latter is wanting a model of
an enraged parent to complete his comedy. It is our general idea that
the anger of a father is something alarming and painful to endure, but
here we see it regarded as a most fortunate occurrence. The man is
producing the contrary effect to what he supposes, he is not effecting
what he is intending; here is a strange kind of failure or ignorance.
Suppose we had known that the father was only simulating anger, we
should probably not have laughed, or if we were amused, it would be at
Ariosto's expense, who was being deceived in his model of parental
indignation.
Léon Dumont defines the laughable to be that of which the mind is forced
to affirm and to deny the same thing at the same time. He attributes it
to two distant ideas being brought together. We might thus conclude that
there was something droll in such expressions as "eyes of fire," "lips
of dew."
Everyone is aware that humour is generally evanescent, the feeling goes
almost as soon as it arrives; and the same spell, if repeated, has lost
its charm. It may be said that all repetition is, in its nature,
wearisome, because it is not in accordance with the progress of the
human mind, but we must admit that it is less damaging to poetry in
which there is a perpetual spring and rebirth, and to proverbs which
have ever fresh and useful application.
"Nothing," writes Amelot, "pleases less than a perpetual pleasantry,"
and we all know that a jest-book is dull reading. Humour seems the more
fugitive, because we do not know by what means to reproduce and continue
it. We can, almost at will, call up emotions of love, hatred or sorrow,
and when we feel them we can aggravate them to any extent, but humour is
not thus under our command. We cannot invent or summon it. When we have
heard a "good thing" said, we shall find that the mere repetition of the
words originally uttered are more fully successful in reproducing and
prolonging our mirth than all the attempts we usually make to develop it
and come closer to the point. Sydney Smith was of opinion that much
might be effected by perseverance, and this is the reason that he was
often guilty of that bad and overstrained wit which led Lord Brougham to
call him "too much of a Jack pudding."
We cannot by calculation and design produce anything worthy of the name
of humour. It is generally true that any kind of reflection is inimical
to it. But no doubt the great cause of its evanescence is that it leads
to nothing, and adds nothing to our information. The most fleeting
humour is that which is on unimportant subjects, as in comic poems and
squibs, which may show considerable ingenuity, but have no interest. It
is the nugatory and negative character of humour that makes it so
short-lived. Hence, also, it is best at intervals, and in small
quantities. The fact that when any attempt is made to explain a jest and
glean any information from it the humour vanishes, seems much opposed to
its containing any principle of rebirth.
Many of the philosophers, who have discarded the idea of there being
condemnation in the ludicrous, have been misled either by not
distinguishing between the ludicrous and the gift of humour, or by
regarding the grain of truth which is imbedded in all wit as the entire
or principal cause of our amusement. To form the complication necessary
for humorous sayings there must be, of course, some element of truth to
oppose the falsity in them. The course in forming witty sayings is
generally the following. We remark some real resemblance between things
which has hitherto been unnoticed. We then, upon this foundation, make a
false statement, deriving so much colour from the truth that we cannot
easily disengage one from the other. The resemblance must be something
striking and unusual, or it would not support a statement which opposes
our ordinary experience. As in the ludicrous there is reality, so in
humour there must be some element of truth, or we should regard the
invention as simple falsehood. To this extent we are prepared to agree
with Boileau that "the basis of all wit is truth," but the result and
general impression it gives is falsity.
Addison's Genealogy of Humour:—
| | Truth | |
| | Good Sense | |
| Wit | | Mirth |
| | Humour |
at first seems to be erroneous, but he does not really mean to say that
there is no falsehood in it, but that it does not approach nonsense, and
often contains useful instruction.
Holms exhibits the nature of humour in a passage remarkable for
philosophy and elegance:
"There is a perfect consciousness in every kind of wit that its
essence consists in a partial and incomplete view of whatever it
touches. It throws a single ray separated from the rest, red,
yellow, blue, or any intermediate shade upon an object, never white
light. We get beautiful effects from wit, all the prismatic
colours, but never the object is in fair daylight. Poetry uses the
rainbow tints for special effects, but always its essential object
is the purest white light of truth."
Bacon went further, and considered that even the beauty of poetry and
the pleasures of imagination were derived from falsehood.
"This truth is a naked and open daylight, which doth not show the
masques and mummeries and triumphs of the world half so stately and
daintily as candle light. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a
pearl that showeth well by day, but it will not rise to the price
of a diamond or carbuncle that shineth best in varied lights. A
mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt that if
there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering
hopes, false valuations, imagination, and the like, but that it
would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things full
of melancholy indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves."
Mr. Dallas goes so far as to say that "it is impossible that laughter
should be an unmixed pleasure, seeing it arises from some aspect of
imperfection or discordance." The fact that many people would undergo
almost any kind of suffering rather than be exposed to ridicule,
indicates that it contains some very unpleasant reflection. We sometimes
feel uncomfortable even when we hear laughter around us, the cause of
which we do not know, fearing that we may be ourselves the object of
it—even dogs dislike to be laughed at. Our ordinary modes of speech
seem to point to some imperfection or error in humour, as when we say
"there is many a true word spoken in jest," or "life is a jest,"
signifying its unreality. Sometimes we say that an observation "must be
a joke," implying that it is false. I have even heard of a man who never
laughed at humour because he hated falsehood, and we sometimes say of an
untrue statement that it must be taken with a "grain of salt."
It is so very common for men to flinch under ridicule, that it is said
to be a good test of courage. An old English poet says,
"For he who does not tremble at the sword,
Who quails not with his head upon the block,
Turn but a jest against him, loses heart.
The shafts of wit slip through the stoutest mail;
There is no man alive that can live down
The unextinguishable laughter of mankind."
Aristotle defines the ludicrous to be "a certain error and turpitude
unattended with pain, and not destructive," a statement which may refer
to moral or physical defects. Cicero and Quintilian, looking probably at
satire, consider it to be mostly directed against the shortcomings and
offences of men. Bacon in his "Silva Silvarum" says the objects of
laughter are deformity, absurdity, and misfortune, in which we trace a
certain severity, although he speaks of "jocular arts" as "deceptions of
the senses," such as in masks, and other exhibitions, were much in
fashion in his day. Descartes says that we only laugh at those whom we
deem worthy of reproach; but Marmontel, the celebrated pupil of
Voltaire, takes a view which bespeaks greater cultivation and a progress
in society. "A fault in manner," he says, "is laughable; a false
pretension is ridiculous, a situation which exposes vice to detestation
is comic, a bon mot is pleasant."
Dugald Stewart proceeds so far as almost to exclude vice, for he only
specifies "slight imperfections in the character and manners, such as do
not excite any moral indignation." He says that it is especially excited
by affectation, hypocrisy, and vanity.
We trace in these successive opinions of philosophers an improvement in
humour, proportionate to the progress of mankind. As men of literature,
they drew general conclusions, and from the higher and more cultivated
classes, probably much from books. Had they taken a wider range, their
catalogues would have been more comprehensive.
But the amelioration we have traced is as much in the general tone of
feeling as in humour itself, if not more. Bitter reflections upon the
personal or moral defects of others are not so acceptable now as
formerly; the "glorying" over the downfall of our neighbours is less
common.
Thus we mark an improvement in the sentiments which accompany the
ludicrous, and which many philosophers seem to have mistaken for the
ludicrous itself. Neither hostility, indelicacy, nor profanity can
create the ludicrous, but where they do not disgust they vivify and make
it more effective. It will be observed that in all of them there is
something we condemn and disapprove. The joy of gain and advantage was
in very early times sufficient to quicken humour in that childlike mirth
which flowed chiefly from delight and exultation, but the "laughter of
pleasure" has passed away, perhaps we require something more keen or
subtle in the maturer age of the world. The accessory emotions are not
at present either so joyous or so offensive as they were in bygone
times. The "faults in manners" of Marmontel, and the "slight
imperfections" of Dugald Stewart, showed that the objectionable
stimulants of the ludicrous were assuming a much milder form.
From the views of Archbishop Whately set forth in his "Logic," we might
suppose that pleasantries, although not devoid of falsity, were usually
of a truly innocuous character—"Jests," he writes, "are mock fallacies,
i.e. fallacies so palpable as not to be able to deceive anyone, but
yet bearing just the resemblance of argument which is calculated to
amuse by contrast." Farther on we read again: "There are several
different kind of jokes and raillery, which will be found to correspond
with the different kinds of fallacy." On this we may observe that some
jests, generally of the "manufactured" class, are founded on a false
logical process, but in most cases the error arises more from the matter
than from the form, and often from mistakes of the senses. Although
nearly every misconception may be represented under the form of false
ratiocination, the imperfection almost always lies in one of the
premises, and it is seldom that there is plainly a fault of argument in
humour. If we claim everything as a fallacy of which there is no
evidence, though there seems to be some, we shall embrace a large
area—part of which is usually assigned to falsity, and if we consider
every mistake to come from wrong deduction, we shall convict mankind of
being so full of fallacies as not to be a rational, but a most illogical
animal. Whately says, "The pun is evidently in most instances a mock
argument founded on a palpable equivocation of the middle term—and
others in like manner will be found to correspond to the respective
fallacies."
A pun is the nearest approach to a mere mock fallacy of form, and we see
what poor amusement it generally affords. To feign that because words
have the same sound, they convey the same thoughts or meanings is a
fiction as transparent as it is preposterous. A word is nothing but an
arbitrary sign, and apart from the thought connected with it, it is an
empty unmeaning sound. The link is too slight in puns, the disparity
between the things they represent as similar, too great—there is too
much falsity. The worst kind of them is where the words are unlike in
spelling, and even somewhat so in sound, and where the same reference
cannot be made to suit both. Such are puns of the "atrocious" or
"villainous" class—a fertile source of bad riddles. For instance, "Why
is an old shoe like ancient Greece?" "Because it had a sole on (Solon)."
Here the words are very dissimilar and the allusion is imperfect—the
description of an old shoe being wrong and forced.
The founders of many of our great families have shown how much this kind
of humour was once appreciated by using it in their mottoes. Thus Onslow
has "Festina lente" and Vernon more happily "Ver non semper floret."
Some puns are amusingly ingenious when the reference hinges well on both
words, some additional verbal or other connection is shown, and the
words are exactly alike. When there are not two words, but one is used
in two senses, there is still greater improvement. Thus the Rev. R. S.
Hawker—a man of such mediæval tastes that he was claimed, falsely, I
believe, as a Roman Catholic—made an apt reply to a nobleman who had
told him in the heat of religious controversy that he would not be
priest-ridden—
"Priest-ridden thou! it cannot be
By prophet or by priest,
Balaam is dead, and none but he
Would choose thee for his beast!"
We also consider that the mendicant deserved a coin, who, knowing the
love of wit in Louis XIV., complained sadly to him, Ton image est
partout—excepté dans ma poche. In such cases the pun is sometimes
transformed, for it only invariably exists where the words are equivocal
and where the allusion is peculiarly applicable to the double meaning
the falsity vanishes, and the verbal coincidence becomes an effective
ornament of style. It has been so used by the most successful writers,
and it is still under certain conditions approved; but more
discrimination is required in such embellishments than was anciently
necessary. And when the allusion becomes not only elegant but
iridescent, reflecting beautiful and changing lights, it rises into
poetical metaphor.
Falsity is necessary to constitute a pun; if no great identity is
assumed between the two words, and they are not introduced in a somewhat
strained manner, we do not consider the term applicable. If the use of
merely similar words in sentences were to be so viewed, we should be
constantly guilty of punning. Wordsworth was not guilty of a pun on that
hot day in Germany when, his friends having given him some hock, a wine
he detested, he exclaimed:
"In Spain, that land of priests and apes
The thing called wine doth come from grapes,
But where flows down the lordly Rhine
The thing called gripes doth come from wine."
No doubt he intended to show a coincidence in coupling together two
words of nearly the same sound, but he represented the two things
signified as cause and effect, not as identical, so as to form a pun.
The difference between poetical and humorous comparisons may be
generally stated to be that the former are upward towards something
superior, the latter downwards towards something inferior. Tennyson
calls Maud a "queen rose," and when we sing—
"Happy fair,
Thine eyes are load stars, and thy tongue sweet air,"
the comparison is inspiring, but, when Washington Irving speaks of a
"vinegar-faced woman," we feel inclined to laugh. There are, however,
exceptions to this rule. Socrates says that to compare a man to
everything excellent is to insult him. Sometimes also a dwarf is
compared to a giant for the purpose of calling attention to his
insignificance. This is often seen in irony. So also, we at times laugh
at the sagacity shown by the lower animals, which seems not so much to
raise them in our estimation as to lower them by occasioning a
comparison with the superior powers of man.
Sometimes in comparisons between things very different, we cannot say
one thing is not as good as another, but, with regard to a certain use,
purpose, or design, there may be an evident inferiority. Thus
comparisons are so often odious, that Wordsworth speaks of the blessing
of being able to look at the world without making them. We may observe
generally that when an idea is brought before us, which, instead of
elevating and enlarging our previous conception, clashes and jangles
with it, there is an approach towards the laughable.
We cannot say that enthusiasm in Art or Science should not exist, and
yet a manifestation of it seems absurd when we do not sympathise in it.
The most amiable and beneficent of men, it has been remarked, "have
always been a favourite subject of ridicule for the satirist and
jester." Personal deformities seem absurd to some, but those who have
made them their study see nothing extraordinary in them. Sometimes our
laughter shows us that something seems wrong, which our highest ideal
would approve. I remember seeing an aged man tottering along a rough
road in France, with a heavy bag of geese on his back. One of his
countrymen, who by the way have not too much reverence for age, came
behind him and jovially exclaimed, "Courage, mon ami, vous êtes sur le
chemin de Paradis." The old man ought to have been glad to have been on
the road to heaven, but our laughter reminds us that most would prefer
to stay on earth.
It must be admitted that our feelings with regard to right and wrong are
very shifting and changeable, and that we condemn others for doing what
we should ourselves have done under the same circumstances. We have also
an especial tendency to adopt the view that what we are accustomed to is
right. We sometimes observe this in morals, where it causes a
considerable amount of confusion, but it holds greater sway over such
light matters as awaken the sense of the ludicrous. When anything is
presented to us different from what we have been long accustomed to,
unless it is evidently better, we are inclined to consider it worse. In
the same way, things which at first we consider wrong, we finally come
to think unobjectionable.
In taste and our sense of the ludicrous, we find ourselves greatly under
the influence of habit. What seems to be a logical error is often found
to be merely something to which we are unaccustomed; thus the double
negative, which sounds to us absurd and equivalent to an affirmation, is
used in many languages merely to give emphasis.
How ridiculous do the manners of our forefathers now seem, their
pig-tails, powder, and patches, the large fardingales, and the stiff and
pompous etiquette. I remember a gentleman, a staunch admirer of the old
school, who, lamenting over the lounging and lolling of the present day,
said that his grandmother, even when dying, refused to relax into a
recumbent posture. She was sitting erect even to her very last hour, and
when the doctor suggested to her that she would find herself easier in a
reposing posture, she replied, "No, sir, I prefer to die as I am," and
she breathed her last, sitting bolt upright in her high-backed chair. So
great indeed is the power of custom that it almost leads us to view
artificial things as natural productions—to commit as great an error as
that of the African King who said that "England must be a fine country,
where the rivers flow with rum."
Speaking theoretically, we may say that the opposition of either custom
or morale is sufficient to extinguish the ludicrous, and that we do not
laugh at what is wrong if we are used to it; or at what is unusual if we
think it right. When there is a collision, we may regard the two as
neutralizing each other. Still, for this to hold good, neither must
predominate, and it will practically be found from the constitution of
our minds, a small amount of custom will overcome a considerable amount
of morale. In illustration of the above remarks, we might appropriately
refer to those strange articles of wearing apparel called hats, the
shape of which might suggest to those unaccustomed to them, that we were
carrying some culinary utensil upon our head; and yet, if we saw a
gentleman walking about bare-headed, like the Ancients, we should feel
inclined to laugh.[24] But we will rather consider the recent fashion of
wearing expanded dresses—those extraordinary "evening bells" which,
until lately, occupied so much public attention, and consumed so many
tons of iron. An octogenarian who could remember the tight skirts at the
end of Queen Charlotte's reign, and had formed his taste upon that
model, might have laughed heartily, if not too much offended at the
change. But by degrees, custom would have asserted its sway to such an
extent that, although he did not approve of them, they would not provoke
his mirth; and yet, when he saw some of the ladies re-introducing tight
dresses, he might not be able to laugh at them, as he still retained his
early notions with regard to their propriety. But most of us are so
influenced by the fashion of the day in dress, that the rights of the
case would not have prevented our laughing at the shrimp-like appearance
of those who first tried to bring in the present reform, and perhaps
some of the stanch supporters of the more natural style could not have
quite maintained their gravity, had one of their antiquated ideals been
suddenly introduced among the wide-spreading ladies of the late period.
To take another illustration. It would perhaps be in accordance with our
highest desires that instinct should approach to reason as nearly as
possible, and that all animals should act in the most judicious and
beneficial way. Naturalists would be inclined to agree in this, and if
this were the view we adopted, we should not laugh at dogs showing signs
of intelligence; neither should we at their acting irrationally,
because experience teaches us that they are not generally guided by
reflection. But most of us are accustomed to consider reason the
prerogative and peculiarity of man. And if we take the view that the
lower animals have it not, we shall be inclined to smile when any of
them show traces of it—any such exhibition seeming out of place, and
leading us to compare them with men. But when we are accustomed to see a
monkey taking off his hat, or playing a tambourine, or even smoking a
pipe, we by degrees see nothing laughable in the performance.
As our emotions are only excited with reference to human affairs, some
have thought that all laughter must refer to them. Pope says, "Laughter
implies censure, inanimate and irrational beings are not objects of
censure, and may, therefore, be elevated as much as you please, and no
ridicule follows." Addison writes to the same purpose. His words
are:—"I am afraid I shall appear too abstract in my speculations if I
shew that when a man of wit makes us laugh, it is by betraying some
address or infirmity in his own character, or in the representation he
makes of others, and that when we laugh at a brute, or even at an
inanimate thing, it is by some action or incident that bears a remote
analogy to some blunder or absurdity in reasonable creatures." It may
be questioned whether we always go so far as to institute this
comparison. Ludicrous events and circumstances seem often such as the
individuals concerned have no control over whatever, and betray no
infirmity. When we see a failure in a work of art, do we always think of
the artist? A lady told me last autumn that when she was walking in a
country town with her Italian greyhound, which was dressed in a red coat
to protect it from cold, the tradespeople and most others passed it
without notice, or merely with a passing word of commendation; but, on
meeting a country bumpkin, he pointed to it, burst out laughing, and
said, "Look at that daug, why, it's all the world like a littl' oss."
Beattie thinks that the derision is not necessarily aimed at human
beings, and probably it is not directly, but indirectly there seems to
be some reference to man. Léon Dumont tells us that he once laughed on
hearing a clap of thunder; it was in winter, and it seemed out of place
that it should occur in cold weather. There can be nothing legitimately
ludicrous in such occurrences. But, perhaps, lusus naturæ are not
regarded as truly natural. Of course, they are really so, but not to us,
for we have an ideal variously obtained of how Nature ought to act, and
thus a man is able for the moment to imagine that something produced by
Nature is not natural—just as we sometimes speak of "unnatural
weather." But we seldom or ever laugh at such phenomena.
We all have a certain resemblance to the old Athenians in wishing to
hear something new. It generally pleases, and always impresses us.
Novelty is in proportion to our ignorance, and can scarcely be said to
exist at all absolutely, for although there is some change always in
progress, it advances too slowly and certainly to produce anything
startling or exciting. Novelty especially affects us with regard to the
ludicrous, and some have, therefore, hastily concluded that it is
sufficient to awaken this feeling.
The strength and vividness of new emotions and impressions are
especially traceable in their outward demonstrations. A very slight
change occurring suddenly will often cause an ejaculation of alarm or
admiration, especially among those of nervous temperament; but upon a
repetition the excitement is less, and the nerves are scarcely affected.
This peculiar law of the nervous system will account for the absence of
laughter on the relation of any old or well-known story. Both pleasure
and facial action are absent; but when we no longer feel the emotion of
humour, we still have some notion that certain ideas awakened it, and
would still do so under favourable circumstances,—that is when persons
first conceived them. Here then we can recognise humour apart from
novelty; but it is dead, its magic is no more. On the same principle, to
laugh before telling a good story lessens its force, just as to break
gradually melancholy tidings enables the recipient to bear them better.
But nothing so effectually damps mirth as to premise that we are going
to say something very laughable. Bacon observes, "Ipsa titillatio si
præmoneas non magnopere in risum valet." Novelty is necessary to produce
what Akenside felicitously calls "the gay surprise," but they are wrong
who maintain that this is the essence of the ludicrous. An ingenious
suggestion has been made that the reason why we cannot endure the
repetition of a humorous story is that on a second relation the element
of falsehood becomes too strong in proportion to that of truth. Such an
explanation can scarcely be correct, for in many instances people would
not be able to show what was the falsity contained. A man may often form
a correct judgment as to the general failure of an attempt, without
being able to show how it could be corrected. Probably after having
heard a humorous story once we are prepared for something whimsical, and
are therefore less affected on its repetition.
We have already observed that certain emotions and states of mind are
adverse to the ludicrous, and we now pass on to those which, like
novelty, are favourable to it and have been at times considered elements
of the ludicrous, but are really only concomitant and accessory. As we
have observed, indelicacy, profanity, or a hostile joy at the downfall
or folly of others is not in itself humorous. Pleasantry without pungent
seasoning may be seen in those "facetious" verbal conceits which our
American cousins, and especially "yours trooly," Artemus Ward, have been
fond of framing. But accessory emotions are necessary to render humour
demonstrative. They are generally unamiable, censorious, or otherwise
offensive, perhaps in keeping with the disapproval excited by falsity.
In some cases the two feelings of wrong are almost inextricably
connected, but in others we can separate them without much difficulty.
In the following instances the presence of an accessory emotion can
easily be traced:—
"'What have you brought me there?' asks a French publisher of a young
author, who advances with a long roll under his arm. 'Is it a
manuscript?' 'No, Sir,' replies the man of letters, pompously, 'a
fortune!' 'Oh, a fortune! Take it to the publisher opposite, he is
poorer than I am.'"
(The disappointment of the author here adds considerably to our
amusement at the ingenious answer of the publisher.)
Two men, attired as a bishop and chaplain, entered one of the great
jewellery establishments in Bond Street and asked to be shown some
diamond rings. The bishop selected one worth a hundred pounds, but said
he had only a fifty-pound note with him, and that he wished to take the
ring away. The foreman took the note, and the bishop gave his address;
but he had scarcely left when a policeman rushed in and asked where the
two swindlers had gone. The foreman stood aghast, but said he had at
least secured a fifty-pound note. The policeman asked to see it, and
saying it was a flash note and that he would have it tested, left the
shop and never returned.
The amusement afforded by practical jokes is also largely dependent upon
the discomfort of the victims. This kind of humour, happily now little
known in this country, has been much in favour with Italian bandits, who
occasionally unite whimsical fancy with great personal daring. A
Piedmontese gentleman told me an instance in which two Counts, who were
dining at an albergo, met a strange-looking man whom they took to be a
sportsman like themselves. The conversation turned upon bandits, and the
Counts expressed a hope that they might meet some, as they were well
armed and would teach them a lesson. Their companion left before them,
and walking along the road they were to take, ordered a labouring man
whom he met to stand in an adjoining vineyard and hold up a vine-stake
to his shoulder like a gun. As soon as the Counts' carriage came to the
place the bandit rushed out, seized the horses, and called upon the
Counts to deliver up their arms or he would order his men, whom they
could see in the vineyard, to fire. The Counts not only obeyed the
summons, but began to accuse one another of keeping something back.
Shortly afterwards, on a doctor boasting in the same way, the bandit
went out before him and stuck a bough in the road on which he hung a
lantern. The doctor called out who's there? and was taking a deadly aim
with his gun, when he was seized from behind and pinioned. The bandit
said he should teach him a different lesson from that he deserved, and
only deprived him of his gun.