Philosophy is more closely connected with religion in India than in
Europe. It is not a dispassionate scientific investigation but a
practical religious quest. Even the Nyâya school, which is concerned
chiefly with formal logic, promises that by the removal of false
knowledge it can emancipate the soul and give the bliss of salvation.
Nor are the expressions system or school of philosophy, commonly used
to render darśana, altogether happy. The word is derived from the
root dṛiś, to see, and means a way of looking at things. As such a
way of looking is supposed to be both comprehensive and orderly, it is
more or less what we call philosophical, but the points of view are so
special and so various that the result is not always what we call a
philosophical system. Mádhava's[736] list of Darśanas includes
Buddhism and Jainism, which are commonly regarded as separate
religions, as well as the Pâśupata and Śaiva, which are sects of
Hinduism. The Darśana of Jaimini is merely a discussion of general
questions relating to sacrifices: the Nyâya Darśana examines logic and
rhetoric: the Pâṇiniya Darśana treats of grammar and the nature of
language, but claims that it ought to be studied "as the means for
attaining the chief end of man."[737]
Six of the Darśanas have received special prominence and are often
called the six Orthodox Schools. They are the Nyâya and Vaiśeshika,
Sâṅkhya and Yoga, Pûrva and Uttara Mîmâṃsâ, or Vedânta. The rest are
either comparatively unimportant or are more conveniently treated of
as religious sects. The six placed on the select list are sufficiently
miscellaneous and one wonders what principle of classification can
have brought them together. The first two have little connection with
religion, though they put forward the emancipation of the soul as
their object, and I have no space to discuss them. They are however
important as showing that realism has a place in Indian thought in
spite of its marked tendency to idealism.[738] They are concerned
chiefly with an examination of human faculties and the objects of
knowledge, and are related to one another. The special doctrine of the
Vaiśeshika is the theory of atoms ascribed to Kaṇâda. It teaches that
matter consists of atoms (aṇu) which are eternal in themselves though
all combinations of them are liable to decompose. The Sâṅkhya and
Yoga are also related and represent two aspects of the same system
which is of great antiquity and allied to Buddhism and Jainism. The
two Mîmâṃsâs are consecutive expositions of the teaching scattered
throughout the Vedic texts respecting ceremonial and the knowledge of
God respectively. The second Mîmâṃsâ, commonly called the Vedânta, is
by far the more interesting and important.
The common feature in these six systems which constitutes their
orthodoxy is that they all admit the authority of the Veda. This
implies more than our phrases revelation or inspiration of the Bible.
Most of the Darśanas attach importance to the pramâṇas, sources or
standards of knowledge. They are variously enumerated, but one of the
oldest definitions makes them three: perception (pratyaksha),
inference (anumâna) and scripture (śabda). The Veda is thus formally
acknowledged to have the same authority as the evidence of the senses.
With this is generally coupled the doctrine that it is eternal. It was
not composed by human authors, but is a body of sound existing from
eternity as part of Brahman and breathed out by him when he causes the
whole creation to evolve at the beginning of a world period. The
reputed authors are simply those who have, in Indian language, seen
portions of this self-existent teaching. This doctrine sounds more
reasonable if restated in the form that words are the expression of
thought, and that if thought is the eternal essence of both Brahman
and the soul, a similar eternity may attach to words. Some such idea
is the origin of the Christian doctrine of the Logos, and in many
religions we find such notions as that words have a creative
efficacy,[739] or that he who knows the name of a thing has power over
it. Among Mohammedans the Koran is supposed to be not merely an
inspired composition but a pre-existing book, revealed to Mohammed
piecemeal.
It is curious that both the sacred texts—the Veda and the Koran—to
which this supernatural position is ascribed should be collections of
obviously human, incongruous, and often insignificant documents
connected with particular occasions, and in no way suggesting or
claiming that they are anterior to the ordinary life of man on earth.
It is still more extraordinary that systems of philosophy should
profess to base themselves on such works. But in reality Hindu
metaphysicians are not more bound by the past than their colleagues in
other lands. They do not take scripture and ask what it means, but
evolve their own systems and state that they are in accordance with
it. Sometimes scripture is ignored in the details of argument. More
often the metaphysician writes a commentary on it and boldly proves
that it supports his views, though its apparent meaning may be
hostile. It is clear that many philosophic commentaries have been
written not because the authors really drew their inspiration from the
Upanishads or Bhagavad-gîtâ but because they dared not neglect such
important texts. All the Vedântist schools labour to prove that they
are in harmony not only with the Upanishads but with the
Brahma-sûtras. The philosophers of the Sâṅkhya are more detached from
literature but though they ignore the existence of the deity, they
acknowledge the Veda as a source of knowledge. Their recognition,
however, has the air of a concession to Brahmanic sentiment. Isolated
theories of the Sâṅkhya can be supported by isolated passages of the
Upanishads, but no impartial critic can maintain that the general
doctrines of the two are compatible. That the Brahmans should have
been willing to admit the Sâṅkhya as a possible form of orthodoxy is
a testimony both to its importance and to their liberality.
It is remarkable that the test of orthodoxy should have been the
acceptance of the authority of the Veda and not a confession of some
sort of theism. But on this the Brahmans did not insist. The Vedânta
is truly and intensely pantheistic or theistic, but in the other
philosophies the Supreme Being is either eliminated or plays a small
part. Thus while works which seem to be merely scientific treatises
(like the Nyâya) set before themselves a religious object, other
treatises, seemingly religious in scope, ignore the deity. There is a
strong and ancient line of thought in India which, basing itself on
the doctrine of Karma, or the inevitable consequences of the deed once
done, lays stress on the efficacy of ceremonies or of asceticism or of
knowledge without reference to a Supreme Being because, if he exists,
he does not interfere with the workings of Karma, or with the power of
knowledge to release from them.
Even the Vedânta, although in a way the quintessence of Indian
orthodoxy, is not a scholastic philosophy designed to support
recognized dogma and ritual. It is rather the orthodox method of
soaring above these things. It contemplates from a higher level the
life of religious observances (which is the subject of the Pûrva
Mîmâṃsâ) and recognizes its value as a preliminary, but yet rejects
it as inadequate. The Sannyâsi or adept follows no caste observances,
performs no sacrifices, reads no scriptures. His religion is to
realize in meditation the true nature, and it may be the identity, of
the soul and God. Good works are of no more importance for him than
rites, though he does well to employ his time in teaching. But Karma
has ceased to exist for him: "the acts of a Yogi are neither black nor
white," they have no moral quality nor consequences. This is dangerous
language and the doctrine has sometimes been abused. But the point of
the teaching is not that a Sannyâsi may do what he likes but that he
is perfectly emancipated from material bondage. Most men are bound by
their deeds; every new act brings consequences which attach the doer
to the world of transmigration and create for him new existences. But
the deeds of the man who is really free have no such trammelling
effects, for they are not prompted by desire nor directed to an
object. But since to become free he must have suppressed all desire,
it is hardly conceivable that he should do anything which could be
called a sin. But this conviction that the task of the sage is not to
perfect any form of good conduct but to rise above both good and evil,
imparts to the Darśanas and even to the Upanishads a singularly
non-ethical and detached tone. The Yogi does no harm but he has less
benevolence and active sympathy than the Buddhist monk. It was a
feeling that such an attitude has its dangers and is only for the few
who have fought their way to the heights where it can safely be
adopted, that led the Brahmans in all ages to lay stress on the
householder's life as the proper preparation for a philosophic old
age. Despite utterances to the contrary, they never as a body approved
the ideal of a life entirely devoted to asceticism and not occupied
with social duties during one period. The extraordinary ease with
which the higher phases of Indian thought shake off all formalities,
social, religious and ethical, was counterbalanced by the
multitudinous regulations devised to keep the majority in a
law-abiding life.
None of the six Darśanas concern themselves with ethics. The more
important deal with the transcendental progress of sages who have
avowedly abandoned the life of works, and even those which treat of
that lower life are occupied with ritual and logic rather than with
anything which can be termed moral science. We must not infer that
Indian literature is altogether unmoral. The doctrine of Karma is
intensely ethical and ethical discussions are more prominent in the
Epics than in Homer, besides being the subject of much gnomic and
didactic poetry. But there is no mistaking the fact that the Hindu
seeks for salvation by knowledge. He feels the power of deeds, but it
is only the lower happiness which lies in doing good works and
enjoying their fruits. The higher bliss consists in being entirely
free from the bondage of deeds and Karma.
All the Darśanas have as a common principle this idea of Karma with
the attendant doctrines that rebirth is a consequence of action and
that salvation is an escape from rebirth. They all treat more or less
of the sources and standards of knowledge, and all recognize the Veda
as one of them. There is not much more that can be said of them all in
common, for the Vedânta ignores matter and the Sâṅkhya ignores God,
but they all share a conviction which presents difficulties to
Europeans. It is that the state in which the mind ceases to think
discursively and is concentrated on itself is not only desirable but
the summum bonum. The European is inclined to say that such a
state is distinguished from non-existence only by not being permanent.
But the Hindu will have none of this. He holds that mind and thought
are material though composed of the subtlest matter, and that when
thought ceases, the immaterial soul (purusha or âtman) far from being
practically non-existent is more truly existent than before and enjoys
untroubled its own existence and its own nature.
Of the three most important systems, the Sâṅkhya, Yoga and Vedânta,
the first and last are on most points opposed: both are ancient, but
perhaps the products of different intellectual centres. In one sense
the Yoga may be described as a theistic modification of the Sâṅkhya:
from another and perhaps juster point of view it appears rather as a
very ancient science of asceticism and contemplation, susceptible of
combination with various metaphysical theories.
We may consider first of all the Sâṅkhya.[740] Tradition ascribes its
invention to Kapila, but he is a mere name unconnected with any date
or other circumstance. It is probable that the principal ideas of the
Sâṅkhya germinated several centuries before our era but we have no
evidence whatever as to when they were first formulated in Sûtras. The
name was current as the designation of a philosophical system fairly
early[741] but the accepted text-books are all late. The most
respected is the Sâṅkhya-pravacana,[742] attributed to Kapila but
generally assigned by European critics to the fourteenth century A.D.
Considerably more ancient, but still clearly a metrical epitome of a
system already existing, is the Sâṅkhya-Kârikâ, a poem of seventy
verses which was translated into Chinese about 560 A.D. and may be a
few centuries older. Max Müller regarded the Tattva-samâsa, a short
tract consisting chiefly of an enumeration of topics, as the most
ancient Sâṅkhya formulary, but the opinion of scholars as to its age
is not unanimous. The name Sâṅkhya is best interpreted as signifying
enumeration in allusion to the predilection of the school for numbered
lists, a predilection equally noticeable in early Buddhism.
The object of the system set forth in these works is strictly
practical. In the first words of the Sâṅkhya-pravacana, the complete
cessation of suffering is the end of man, and the Sâṅkhya is devised
to enable him to attain it. Another formula divides the contents of
the Sâṅkhya into four topics—(a) that from which man must liberate
himself, or suffering, (b) liberation, or the cessation of
suffering, (c) the cause of suffering, or the failure to
discriminate between the soul and matter, (d) the means of
liberation, or discriminating knowledge. This division obviously
resembles the four Truths of Buddhism. The object proposed is the same
and the method analogous, though not identical, for Buddhism speaks as
a religion and lays greater stress on conduct.
The theory of the Sâṅkhya, briefly stated, is this. There exist,
uncreated and from all eternity, on the one side matter and on the
other individual souls. The world, as we know it, is due entirely to
the evolution of matter. Suffering is the result of souls being in
bondage to matter, but this bondage does not affect the nature of the
soul and in one sense is not real, for when souls acquire
discriminating knowledge and see that they are not matter, then the
bondage ceases and they attain to eternal peace.
The system is thus founded on dualism, the eternal antithesis between
matter and soul. Many of its details are comprised in the simple
enumeration of the twenty-five Tattvas or principles[743] as given in
the Tattva-samâsa and other works. Of these, one is Purusha, the soul
or self, which is neither produced nor productive, and the other
twenty-four are all modifications of Prakṛiti or matter, which is
unproduced but productive. Prakṛiti means the original ground form of
external existence (as distinguished from Vikṛiti, modified form). It
is uncreated and indestructible, but it has a tendency to variation or
evolution. The Sâṅkhya holds in the strictest sense that ex nihilo
nihil fit. Substance can only be produced from substance and properly
speaking there is no such thing as origination but only manifestation.
Causality is regarded solely from the point of view of material
causes, that is to say the cause of a pot is clay and not the action
of the potter. Thus the effect or product is nothing else than the
cause in another shape: production is only manifestation and
destruction is the resolution of a product into its cause. Instead of
holding like the Buddhists that there is no such thing as existence
but only becoming, the Sâṅkhya rather affirms that there is nothing
but successive manifestations of real existence. If clay is made into
a pot and the pot is then broken and ground into clay again, the
essential fact is not that a pot has come into existence and
disappeared but that the clay continuously existing has undergone
certain changes.
The tendency to evolution inherent in matter is due to the three
guṇas. They are sattva, explained as goodness and happiness;
rajas, as passion and movement; and tamas, as darkness, heaviness
and ignorance. The word Guṇa is not easy to translate, for it seems
to mean more than quality or mode and to signify the constituents of
matter. Hence one cannot help feeling that the whole theory is an
attempt to explain the unity and diversity of matter by a phrase, but
all Hinduism is permeated by this phrase and theory. When the three
guṇas are in equilibrium then matter—Prakṛiti—is quiescent,
undifferentiated and unmanifested. But as soon as the equilibrium is
disturbed and one of the guṇas becomes preponderant, then the process
of differentiation and manifestation begins. The disturbance of
equilibrium is due to the action of the individual Purushas or souls
on Prakṛiti, but this action is mechanical and due to proximity not
to the volition of the souls and may be compared to the attraction of
a magnet for iron.[744] Thus at the beginning of the evolutionary
process we have quiescent matter in equilibrium: over against this are
souls innumerable, equally quiescent but exerting on matter a
mechanical force. This upsets the equilibrium and creates a movement
which takes at first the form of development and later of decay and
collapse. Then matter returns to its quiescent state to be again
excited by the Purushas and commence its world-making evolution anew.
The doctrine that evolution, dissolution and quiescence succeed one
another periodically is an integral part of the Sâṅkhya.[745]
The unmodified Prakṛiti stands first on the list of twenty-five
principles. When evolution begins it produces first Buddhi or
intellect, secondly Ahaṃkâra, which is perhaps best rendered by
individuality, and next the five Tanmâtras or subtle elements.
Buddhi, though meaning intellect, is used rather in the sense of
ascertaining or perception. It is the faculty by which we distinguish
objects and perceive what they are. It differs also from our
conception of intellect in being, like Ahaṃkâra and all the
subsequent developments of Prakṛiti, material, and must not be
confused with the immaterial Purusha or soul. It is in fact the organ
of thought, not in the sense of the brain or anything tangible, but a
subtle substratum of all mental processes. But in what sense is it
possible to say that this Buddhi exists apart from individuals, who
have not come into being at this stage of cosmic evolution? This
difficulty is not met by talking, as some commentators do, of cosmic
as well as individual Buddhi, for even if all Prakṛiti is illuminated
by Buddhi at this stage it is difficult to see what result can occur.
To make the process of development coherent we must think of it not as
a series of chronologically successive stages but rather as a
logically connected series and an analysis of completely evolved
beings, just as we might say that bones are covered with flesh and
flesh with skin, without affirming that the bones have a separate and
prior existence. Ahaṃkâra, which is, like Buddhi, strictly speaking a
physical organ, means Ego-maker and denotes the sense of personality
and individuality, almost the will. In the language of Indian
philosophy it is the delusion or misconception which makes the soul
imagine itself a personal agent and think, I see, I hear, I
slay, I am slain, whereas the soul is really incapable of action and
the acts are those of Prakṛiti.
The five subtle elements are the essences of sound, touch, colour,
savour and odour conceived as physical principles, imperceptible to
ordinary beings, though gods and Yogis can perceive them. The name
Tanmâtra which signifies that only indicates that they are concerned
exclusively with one sense. Thus whereas the gross elements, such as
earth, appeal to more than one sense and can be seen, felt and smelt,
the subtle element of sound is restricted to the sense of hearing. It
exists in all things audible but has nothing to do with their
tangibility or visibility. There remain sixteen further modifications
to make up the full list of twenty-four. They are the five organs of
sense,[746] the five organs of action,[747] Manas or mind, regarded as
a sixth and central sense, and also as the seat of will, and the five
gross elements—earth, water, light, air and ether. The Sâṅkhya
distinguishes between the gross and the subtle body. The latter,
called lingaśarîra, is defined in more than one way, but it is
expressly stated in the Kârikâs[748] that it is composed of "Buddhi
and the rest, down to the subtle elements." It practically corresponds
to what we call the soul, though totally distinct from Purusha or soul
in the Sâṅkhya sense. It constitutes the character and essential
being of a person. It is the part which transmigrates from one gross
body to another, and is responsible for the acts committed in each
existence. Its union with a gross body constitutes birth, its
departure death. Except in the case of those who attain emancipation,
its existence and transmigration last for a whole world-period at the
end of which come quiescence and equilibrium. In it are imprinted the
Saṃskâras,[749] the predispositions which pass on from one existence
to another and are latent in the new-born mind like seeds in a field.
By following the evolution of matter we have now accounted for
intellect, individuality, the senses, the moral character, will, and a
principle which survives death and transmigrates. It might therefore
be supposed that we have exhaustively analysed the constitution of a
human being. But that is not the view of the Sâṅkhya. The evolution
of Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra, the subtle body and the gross body is a physical
process and the result is also physical, though parts of it are of so
fine a substance that ordinary senses cannot perceive them. This
physical organism becomes a living being (which term includes gods and
animals) when it is connected with a soul (purusha) and consciousness
depends on this connection, for neither is matter when isolated
conscious, nor is the soul, at least not in our sense of the word.
Though the soul is neither the life which ends at death (for that is
the gross body) nor yet the life which passes from existence to
existence (for that is the subtle body) yet it is the vitalizing
element which renders life possible.
The Sâṅkhya like Jainism regards souls as innumerable and distinct
from one another. The word Purusha must have originally referred to
the manikin supposed to inhabit the body, and there is some reason to
think that the earliest teachers of the Sâṅkhya held that it was
infinitely small. But in the existing text-books it is described as
infinitely large. It is immaterial and without beginning, end, parts,
dimensions, or qualities, incapable of change, motion, or action.
These definitions may be partly due to the influence of the Vedânta
and, though we know little about the historical development of the
Sâṅkhya, there are traces of a compromise between the old teaching of
a soul held in bondage and struggling for release and later
conceptions of a soul which, being infinite and passionless, hardly
seems capable of submitting to bondage. Though the soul cannot be said
to transmigrate, to act, or to suffer, still through consciousness it
makes the suffering of the world felt and though in its essence it
remains eternally unchanged and unaffected, yet it experiences the
reflection of the suffering which goes on. Just as a crystal (to use
the Indian simile) allows a red flower to be seen through it and
remains unchanged, although it seems to become red, so does the soul
remain unchanged by sorrow or joy, although the illusion that it
suffers or rejoices may be present in the consciousness.
The task of the soul is to free itself from illusion, and thus from
bondage. For strictly speaking the bondage does not exist: it is
caused by want of discrimination. Like the Vedânta, the Sâṅkhya
regards all this troubled life as being, so far as the soul is
concerned, mere illusion. But while the Vedânta bids the soul know its
identity with Brahman, the Sâṅkhya bids it isolate itself and know
that the acts and feelings which seem to be its own have really
nothing to do with it. They are for the soul nothing but a spectacle
or play originating in its connection with Prakṛiti, and it is
actually said,[750] "Wherefore no soul is bound, or is liberated or
transmigrates. It is Prakṛiti, which has many bodily forms, which is
bound, liberated and transmigrates." It is in Buddhi or intellect,
which is a manifestation of Prakṛiti, that the knowledge of the
difference between the soul and Prakṛiti must arise. Thus though the
Sâṅkhya reposes on a fundamental dualism, it is not the dualism of
good and evil. Soul and matter differ not because the first is good
and the second bad, but because the first is unchangeable and the
second constantly changing. Matter is often personified as a woman.
Her motives are unselfish and she works for the liberation of the
soul. "As a dancer after showing herself on the stage ceases to dance,
so does Prakṛiti cease when she has made herself manifest to the
soul." That is to say, when a soul once understands that it is
distinct from the material world, that world ceases to exist for that
particular soul, though of course the play continues for others.
"Generous Prakṛiti, endowed with Guṇas, causes by manifold means
without benefit to herself, the benefit of the soul, which is devoid
of Guṇas and makes no return."[751] The condition of the liberated
soul, corresponding to the mokska and nirvâṇa of other systems,
is described as Kaivalya, that is, complete separation from the
material world, but, as among Buddhists and Vedântists, he who has
learnt the truth is liberated even before death, and can teach others.
He goes on living, just as the wheel continues to revolve for some
time after the potter has ceased to turn it. After death, complete
liberation without the possibility of rebirth is attained. The
Sâṅkhya manuals do not dwell further on the character of this
liberation: we only know that the eternal soul is then completely
isolated and aloof from all suffering and material things. Liberation
is compared to profound sleep, the difference being that in dreamless
sleep there is a seed, that is, the possibility of return to ordinary
life, whereas when liberation is once attained there is no such
return.
Both in its account of the world process and in its scheme of
salvation the Sâṅkhya ignores theism in the same way as did the
Buddha. Indeed the text-books go beyond this and practically deny the
existence of a personal supreme deity. We are told[752] that the
existence of God cannot be proved, for whatever exists must be either
bound or free and God can be neither. We cannot think of him as bound
and yet he cannot be free like an emancipated soul, for freedom
implies the absence of desire and hence of the impulse to create.
Similarly[753] the consequences of good and evil deeds are due to
Karma and not to the government of God. Such a ruler is inconceivable,
for if he governs the world according to the action of Karma his
existence is superfluous, and if he is affected by selfish motives or
desire, then he cannot be free. It is true that these passages speak
of there being no proof of God's existence and hence commentators both
Indian and European who shrink from atheism represent the Sâṅkhya as
suspending judgment. But if a republican constitution duly describes
the President and other authorities in whom the powers of government
are vested, can we argue that it is not unmonarchical because it does
not expressly say there is no king? In the Sâṅkhya there is no more
place for a deity than for a king in a republican constitution.
Moreover, the Sûtras endeavour to prove that the idea of God is
inconceivable and self-contradictory and some commentaries speak
plainly on this subject.[754] Thus the Sâṅkhya-tattva-kaumudi
commenting on Kârikâ 57 argues that the world cannot have been created
by God, whether we suppose him to have been impelled by selfishness or
kindness. For if God is perfect he can have no need to create a world.
And if his motive is kindness, is it reasonable to call into existence
beings who while non-existent had no suffering, simply in order to
show kindness in relieving them from suffering? A benevolent deity
ought to create only happy creatures, not a mixed world like the one
we see.[755]
Arguments like this were not condemned by the Brahmans so strongly as
we should expect, but they did not like them and though they did not
excommunicate the Sâṅkhya in the same way as Buddhism, they greatly
preferred a theistic variety of it called Yoga.
The Yoga and Sâṅkhya are mentioned together in the Śvetâśvatara
Upanishad,[756] and the Bhagavad-gîtâ[757] says that he sees truly who
sees them as one. The difference lies in treatment rather than in
substance. Whereas the Sâṅkhya is mainly theoretical, the principal
topic of the Yoga is the cultivation of that frame of mind which leads
to emancipation and the methods and exercises proper to this end.
Further, the Yoga recognizes a deity. This distinction may seem of
capital importance but the god of the Yoga (called Îśvara or the
Lord) is not its foundation and essence as Brahman is of the
Vedânta.[758] Devotion to God is recognized as one among other methods
for attaining emancipation and if this particular procedure, which is
mentioned in relatively few passages, were omitted, the rest of the
system would be unaffected. It is therefore probable that the theistic
portions of the Yoga are an addition made under Brahmanic influence.
But taking the existing Sûtras of the two philosophies, together with
their commentaries, it may be said that the Yoga implies most of the
Sâṅkhya theory and the Sâṅkhya most of the Yoga practice, for though
it does not go into details it prescribes meditation which is to be
perfected by regulating the breathing and by adopting certain
postures. I have already spoken of the methods and discipline
prescribed by the Yoga and need not dwell further on the topic now.
That Buddhism has some connection with the Sâṅkhya and Yoga has often
been noticed.[759] Some of the ideas found in the Sâṅkhya and some of
the practices prescribed by the Yoga are clearly anterior to Gotama
and may have contributed to his mental development, but circumspection
is necessary in the use of words like Yoga, Sâṅkhya and Vedânta. If
we take them to mean the doctrinal systems contained in certain
sûtras, they are clearly all later than Buddhism. But if we assume, as
we may safely do, that the doctrine is much older than the manuals in
which we now study it, we must also remember that when we leave the
texts we are not justified in thinking of a system but merely of a
line of thought. In this sense it is clear that many ideas of the
Sâṅkhya appear among the Jains, but the Jains know nothing of the
evolution of matter described by the Sâṅkhya manuals and think of the
relation of the soul to matter in a more materialistic way. The notion
of the separate eternal soul was the object of the Buddha's persistent
polemics and was apparently a popular doctrine when he began
preaching. The ascetic and meditative exercises prescribed by the Yoga
were also known before his time and the Piṭakas do not hide the fact
that he received instruction from two Yogîs. But though he was
acquainted with the theories and practices which grew into the Yoga
and Sâṅkhya, he did not found his religion on them for he rejected
the idea of a soul which has to be delivered and did not make
salvation dependent on the attainment of trances. If there was in his
time a systematic Sâṅkhya philosophy explaining the nature of
suffering and the way of release, it is strange that the Piṭakas
contain no criticism of it, for though to us who see these ancient
sects in perspective the resemblance of Buddhism to the Sâṅkhya is
clear, there can be little doubt that the Buddha would have regarded
it as a most erroneous heresy, because it proposes to attain the same
objects as his own teaching but by different methods.
Sâṅkhya ideas are not found in the oldest Upanishads, but they appear
(though not in a connected form) in those of the second stratum, such
as the Śvetâśvatara and Kaṭhâ. It therefore seems probable, though
not proven, that the origin of these ideas is to be sought not in the
early Brahmanic schools but in the intellectual atmosphere
non-theistic, non-sacerdotal, but audaciously speculative which
prevailed in the central and eastern part of northern India in the
sixth century B.C. The Sâṅkhya recognizes no merit in sacrifices or
indeed in good works of any kind, even as a preliminary discipline,
and in many details is un-Brahmanic. Unlike the Vedânta Sûtras, it
does not exclude Śûdras from higher studies, but states that there are
eight classes of gods and five of animals but only one of men. A
teacher must have himself attained emancipation, but there is no
provision that he must be a Brahman. Perhaps the fables and parables
which form the basis of the fourth book of the Sâṅkhya Sûtras point
to some more popular form of instruction similar to the discourses of
the Buddha. We may suppose that this ancient un-Brahmanic school took
shape in several sects, especially Jainism and Buddhism, and used the
Yoga discipline. But the value and efficacy of that discipline were
admitted almost universally and several centuries later it was
formulated in the Sûtras which bear the name of Patañjali in a shape
acceptable to Brahmans, not to Buddhists. If, as some scholars think,
the Yoga sûtras are not earlier than 450 A.D.[760] it seems probable
that it was Buddhism which stimulated the Brahmans to codify the
principles and practice of Yoga, for the Yogâcâra school of Buddhism
arose before the fifth century. The Sâṅkhya is perhaps a somewhat
similar brahmanization of the purely speculative ideas which may have
prevailed in Magadha and Kosala.[761] Though these districts were not
strongholds of Brahmanism, yet it is clear from the Piṭakas that they
contained a considerable Brahman population who must have been
influenced by the ideas current around them but also must have wished
to keep in touch with other Brahmans. The Sâṅkhya of our manuals
represents such an attempt at conciliation. It is an elaboration in a
different shape of some of the ideas out of which Buddhism sprung but
in its later history it is connected with Brahmanism rather than
Buddhism. When it is set forth in Sûtras in a succinct and isolated
form, its divergence from ordinary Brahmanic thought is striking and
in this form it does not seem to have ever been influential and now is
professed by only a few Pandits, but, when combined in a literary and
eclectic spirit with other ideas which may be incompatible with it in
strict logic, it has been a mighty influence in Indian religion,
orthodox as well as unorthodox. Such conceptions as Prakṛiti and the
Guṇas colour most of the post-Vedic religious literature. Their
working may be plainly traced in the Mahâbhârata, Manu and the
Purâṇas,[762] and the Tantras identify with Prakṛiti the goddesses
whose worship they teach. The unethical character of the Sâṅkhya
enabled it to form the strangest alliances with aboriginal beliefs.
Unlike the Sâṅkhya, the Vedânta is seen in its most influential and
perhaps most advantageous aspect when stated in its most abstract
form. We need not enquire into its place of origin for it is clearly
the final intellectual product of the schools which produced the
Upanishads and the literature which preceded them, and though it may
be difficult to say at what point we are justified in applying the
name Vedânta to growing Brahmanic thought, the growth is continuous.
The name means simply End of the Veda. In its ideas the Vedânta shows
great breadth and freedom, yet it respects the prejudices and
proprieties of Brahmanism. It teaches that God is all things, but
interdicts this knowledge to the lower castes: it treats rites as a
merely preliminary discipline, but it does not deny their value for
certain states of life.
The Vedânta is the boldest and the most characteristic form of Indian
thought. For Asia, and perhaps for the world at large, Buddhism is
more important but on Indian soil it has been vanquished by the
Vedânta, especially that form of it known as the Advaita. In all ages
the main idea of this philosophy has been the same and may be summed
up in the formula that the soul is God and that God is everything. If
this formula is not completely accurate[763]—and a sentence which
both translates and epitomizes alien metaphysics can hardly aspire to
complete accuracy—the error lies in the fact to which I have called
attention elsewhere that our words, God and soul, do not cover quite
the same ground as the Indian words which they are used to translate.
Many scholars, both Indian and European, will demur to the high place
here assigned to the Advaita philosophy. I am far from claiming that
the doctrine of Śaṅkara is either primitive or unchallenged. Other
forms of the Vedânta existed before him and became very strong after
him. But so far as a synthesis of opinions which are divergent in
details can be just, he gives a just synthesis and elaboration of the
Upanishads. It is true that his teaching as to the higher and lower
Brahman and as to Mâyâ has affinities to Mahayanist Buddhism, and that
later sects were repelled by the severe and impersonal character of
his philosophy, but the doctrine of which he is the most thorough and
eminent exponent, namely that God or spirit is the only reality and
one with the human soul, asserts itself in almost all Hindu sects,
even though their other doctrines may seem to contradict it.
This line of thought is so persistent and has so many ramifications,
that it is hard to say what is and what is not Vedânta. If we take
literature as our best guide we may distinguish four points of
importance marked by the Upanishads, the Brahma-Sûtras, Śaṅkara and
Râmânuja.
I have said something elsewhere of the Upanishads. These works do not
profess to form a systematic whole (though later Hinduism regards
them as such) and when European scholars speak of them collectively,
they generally mean the older members of the collection. These may
justly be regarded as the ancestors of the Vedânta, inasmuch as the
tone of thought prevalent in them is incipient Vedântism. It rejects
dualism and regards the universe as a unity not as plurality, as
something which has issued from Brahman or is pervaded by Brahman and
in any case depends on Brahman for its significance and existence.
Brahman is God in the pantheistic sense, totally disconnected with
mythology and in most passages impersonal. The knowledge of Brahman is
salvation: he who has it, goes to Brahman or becomes Brahman. More
rarely we find statements of absolute identity such as "Being Brahman,
he goes to Brahman."[764] But though the Upanishads say that the soul
goes to or is Brahman, that the world comes from or is Brahman, that
the soul is the whole universe and that a knowledge of these truths is
the one thing of importance, these ideas are not combined into a
system. They are simply the thoughts of the wise, not always agreeing
in detail, and presented as independent utterances, each with its own
value.
One of the most important of these wise men is Yâjñavalkya,[765] the
hero of the Bṛihad Âranyaka Upanishad and a great name, to whom are
ascribed doctrines of which he probably never heard. The Upanishad
represents him as developing and completing the views of Śâṇḍilya
and Uddâlaka Âruṇi. The former taught[766] that the Âtman or Self
within the heart, smaller than a grain of mustard seed, is also
greater than all worlds. The brief exposition of his doctrine which we
possess starts from and emphasizes the human self. This self is
Brahman. The doctrine of Uddâlaka[767] takes the other side of the
equation: he starts with Brahman and then asserts that Brahman is the
soul. But though he teaches that in the beginning there was one only
without a second, yet he seems to regard the subsequent products of
this Being as external to it and permeated by it. But to Yâjñavalkya
is ascribed an important modification of these doctrines, namely, that
the Âtman is unknowable and transcendental.[768] It is unknowable
because since it is essentially the knowing subject it can be known
only by itself: it can never become the object of knowledge and
language is inadequate to describe it. All that can be said of it is
neti, neti, that is no, no: it is not anything which we try to
predicate of it. But he who knows that the individual soul is the
Âtman, becomes Âtman; being it, he knows it and knows all the world:
he perceives that in all the world there is no plurality. Here the
later doctrine of Mâyâ is adumbrated, though not formulated. Any
system which holds that in reality there is no plurality or, like some
forms of Mahayanist Buddhism, that nothing really exists implies the
operation of this Mâyâ or illusion which makes us see the world as it
appears to us. It may be thought of as mere ignorance, as a failure to
see the universe as it really is: but no doubt the later view of Mâyâ
as a creative energy which fashions the world of phenomena is closely
connected with the half-mythological conceptions found in the
Pâncarâtra and Śaiva philosophy which regard this creative illusion as
a female force—a goddess in fact—inseparably associated with the
deity.
The philosophy of the Upanishads, like all religious thought in India,
is avowedly a quest of happiness and this happiness is found in some
form of union with Brahman. He is perfect bliss, and whatever is
distinct from him is full of suffering.[769] But this sense of the
suffering inherent in existence is less marked in the older Upanishads
and in the Vedânta than in Buddhism and the Sâṅkhya. Those systems
make it their basis and first principle: in the Vedânta the
temperament is the same but the emphasis and direction of the thought
are different. The Sâṅkhya looks at the world and says that salvation
lies in escape into something which has nothing in common with it. But
the Vedântist looks towards Brahman, and his pessimism is merely the
feeling that everything which is not wholly and really Brahman is
unsatisfactory. In the later developments of the system, pessimism
almost disappears, for the existence of suffering is not the first
Truth but an illusion: the soul, did it but know it, is Brahman and
Brahman is bliss. So far as the Vedânta has any definite practical
teaching, it does not wholly despise action. Action is indeed inferior
to knowledge and when knowledge is once obtained works are useless
accessories, but the four stages of a Brahman's career, including
household life, are approved in the Vedânta Sûtras, though there is a
disposition to say that he who has the necessary religious aptitudes
can adopt the ascetic life at any time. The occupations of this
ascetic life are meditation and absorption or samâdhi, the state in
which the meditating soul becomes so completely blended with God on
whom it meditates, that it has no consciousness of its separate
existence.[770]
As indicated above the so-called books of Śruti or Vedic literature
are not consecutive treatises, but rather responsa prudentium,
utterances respecting ritual and theology ascribed to poets,
sacrificers and philosophers who were accepted as authorities. When
these works came to be regarded as an orderly revelation, even
orthodoxy could not shut its eyes to their divergences, and a
comprehensive exegesis became necessary to give a conspectus of the
whole body of truth. This investigation of the meaning of the Veda as
a connected whole is called Mîmâṃsâ, and is divided into two
branches, the earlier (pûrva) and the later (uttara). The first is
represented by the Pûrva-mîmâṃsâ-sûtras of Jaimini[771] which are
called earlier (pûrva) not in the chronological sense but because they
deal with rites which come before knowledge, as a preparatory stage.
It is interesting to find that Jaimini was accused of atheism and
defended by Kumârila Bhaṭṭa. The defence is probably just, for
Jaimini does not so much deny God as ignore him. But what is truly
extraordinary, though characteristic of much Indian literature about
ritual, is that a work dealing with the general theory of religious
worship should treat the deity as an irrelevant topic. The
Pûrva-mîmâṃsâ discusses ceremonies prescribed by an eternal
self-existing Veda. The reward of sacrifice is not given by God. When
the result of an act does not appear at once, Jaimini teaches that
there is all the same produced a supersensuous principle called
apûrva, which bears fruit at a later time, and thus a sacrifice
leads the offerer to heaven. This theory is really tantamount to
placing magic on a philosophic basis.
Bâdarâyaṇa's sûtras, which represent the other branch of the
Mîmâṃsâ, show a type of thought more advanced and profound than
Jaimini's. They consist of 555 aphorisms—less than a fifth of
Jaimini's voluminous work—and represent the outcome of considerable
discussion posterior to the Upanishads, for they cite the opinions of
seven other teachers and also refer to Bâdarâyaṇa himself by name.
Hence they may be a compendium of his teaching made by his pupils.
Their date is unknown but Śaṅkara evidently regards them as ancient
and there were several commentators before him.[772] Like most sûtras
these aphorisms are often obscure and are hardly intended to be more
than a mnemotechnic summary of the doctrine, to be supplemented by
oral instruction or a commentary. Hence it is difficult to define the
teaching of Bâdarâyaṇa as distinguished from that of the Upanishads
on the one hand, and that of his commentators on the other, or to say
exactly what stage he marks in the development of thought, except that
it is the stage of attempted synthesis.[773] He teaches that Brahman
is the origin of the world and that with him should all knowledge,
religion and effort be concerned. By meditation on him, the soul is
released and somehow associated with him. But it is not clear that we
have any warrant for finding in the sûtras (as does Śaṅkara) the
distinction between the higher and lower Brahman, or the doctrine of
the unreality of the world (Mâyâ) or the absolute identity of the
individual soul with Brahman. We are told that the state of the
released soul is non-separation (avibhâga) from Brahman, but this is
variously explained by the commentators according to their views.
Though the sûtras are the acknowledged text-book of Vedântism, their
utterances are in practice less important than subsequent explanations
of them. As often happens in India, the comment has overgrown and
superseded the text.
The most important of these commentators is Śankarâcarya.[774] Had he
been a European philosopher anxious that his ideas should bear his
name, or a reformer like the Buddha with little respect for antiquity,
he would doubtless have taken his place in history as one of the most
original teachers of Asia. But since his whole object was to revive
the traditions of the past and suppress his originality by attempting
to prove that his ideas are those of Bâdarâyaṇa and the Upanishads,
the magnitude of his contribution to Indian thought is often
under-rated. We need not suppose that he was the inventor of all the
ideas in his works of which we find no previous expression. He
doubtless (like the Buddha) summarized and stereotyped an existing
mode of thought but his summary bears the unmistakeable mark of his
own personality.
Śaṅkara's teaching is known as Advaita or absolute monism. Nothing
exists except the one existence called Brahman or Paramâtman, the
Highest Self. Brahman is pure being and thought (the two being
regarded as identical), without qualities. Brahman is not intelligent
but is intelligence itself. The human soul (jîva) is identical with
the Highest Self, not merely as a part of it, but as being itself the
whole universal indivisible Brahman. This must not be misunderstood as
a blasphemous assertion that man is equal to God. The soul is
identical with Brahman only in so far as it forgets its separate human
existence, and all that we call self and individuality. A man who has
any pride in himself is ipso facto differentiated from Brahman as
much as is possible. Yet in the world in which we move we see not only
differentiation and multiplicity but also a plurality of individual
souls apparently distinct from one another and from Brahman. This
appearance is due to the principle of Mâyâ which is associated with
Brahman and is the cause of the phenomenal world. If Mâyâ is
translated by illusion it must be remembered that its meaning is not
so much that the world and individual existences are illusory in the
strict sense of the word, as phenomenal. The only true reality is
self-conscious thought without an object. When the mind attains to
that, it ceases to be human and individual: it is Brahman. But
whenever it thinks of particular objects neither the thoughts nor the
objects of the thoughts are real in the same sense. They are
appearances, phenomena. This universe of phenomena includes not only
all our emotions and all our perceptions of the external world, but
also what might be supposed to be the deepest truths of religion, such
as the personality of the Creator and the wanderings of the soul in
the maze of transmigration. In the same sense that we suffer pain and
pleasure, it is true that there is a personal God (Îśvara) who emits
and reabsorbs the world at regular intervals, and that the soul is a
limited existence passing from body to body. In this sense the soul,
as in the Sâṅkhya philosophy, is surrounded by the upâdhis, certain
limiting conditions or disguises, which form a permanent psychical
equipment with which it remains invested in all its innumerable
bodies. But though these doctrines may be true for those who are in
the world, for those souls who are agents, enjoyers and sufferers,
they cease to be true for the soul which takes the path of knowledge
and sees its own identity with Brahman. It is by this means only that
emancipation is attained, for good works bring a reward in kind, and
hence inevitably lead to new embodiments, new creations of Mâyâ. And
even in knowledge we must distinguish between the knowledge of the
lower Brahman or personal Deity (Îśvara) and of the higher
indescribable Brahman.[775] For the orthodox Hindu this distinction is
of great importance, for it enables him to reconcile passages in the
scriptures which otherwise are contradictory. Worship and meditation
which make Îśvara their object do not lead directly to emancipation.
They lead to the heavenly world of Îśvara, in which the soul, though
glorified, is still a separate individual existence. But for him who
meditates on the Highest Brahman and knows that his true self is that
Brahman, Mâyâ and its works cease to exist. When he dies nothing
differentiates him from that Brahman who alone is bliss and no new
individual existence arises.
The crux of this doctrine is in the theory of Mâyâ. If Mâyâ appertains
to Brahman, if it exists by his will, then why is it an evil, why is
release to be desired? Ought not the individual souls to serve
Brahman's purpose, and would not it be better served by living gladly
in the phenomenal world than by passing beyond it? But such an idea
has rarely satisfied Indian thinkers. If, on the other hand, Mâyâ is
an evil or at least an imperfection, if it is like rust on a blade or
dimness in a mirror, if, so to speak, the edges of Brahman are weak
and break into fragments which are prevented by their own feebleness
from realizing the unity of the whole, then the mind wonders uneasily
if, in spite of all assurances to the contrary, this does not imply
that Brahman is subject to some external law, to some even more
mysterious Beyond. But Śaṅkara and the Brahma-sûtras will not
tolerate such doubts. According to them, Brahman in making the world
is not actuated by a motive in the ordinary sense, for that would
imply human action and passion, but by a sportive impulse:[776] "We
see in every-day life," says Śaṅkara, "that certain doings of
princes, who have no desires left unfulfilled, have no reference to
any extraneous purpose but proceed from mere sportfulness. We further
see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without
reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its
own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed
to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature without reference to
any purpose."[777] This is no worse than many other explanations of
the scheme of things and the origin of evil but it is not really an
explanation. It means that the Advaita is so engrossed in ecstatic
contemplation of the omnipresent Brahman that it pays no attention to
a mere by-product like the physical universe. How or why that universe
with all its imperfections comes to exist, it does not explain.
Yet the boldness and ample sweep of Śaṅkara's thought have in them
something greater than logic,[778] something recalling the grandeur of
plains and seas limited only by the horizon, nay rather those abysses
of space wherein on clear nights worlds and suns innumerable are
scattered like sparks by what he would call God's playfulness.
European thought attains to these altitudes but cannot live in them
for long: it demands and fancies for itself just what Śaṅkara will
not grant, the motive of Brahman, the idea that he is working for some
consummation, not that he was, is and will be eternally complete,
unaffected by the drama of the universe and yet identical with souls
that know him.
Even in India the austere and impersonal character of Śaṅkara's
system provoked dissent: He was accused of being a Buddhist in
disguise and the accusation raises an interesting question[779] in the
history of Indian philosophy to which I have referred in a previous
chapter. The affinity existing between the Mâdhyamika form of Buddhist
metaphysics and the earlier Vedânta can hardly be disputed and the
only question is which borrowed from the other. Such questions are
exceedingly difficult to decide, for from time to time new ideas arose
in India, permeated the common intellectual atmosphere, and were
worked up by all sects into the forms that suited each best. In the
present instance all that can be said is that certain ideas about the
unreality of the world and about absolute and relative truth appear in
several treatises both Brahmanic and Buddhist, such as the works of
Śaṅkara and Nâgârjuna and the Gauḍa-pâdakârikâs, and of these the
works attributed to Nâgârjuna seem to be the oldest. It must also be
remembered that according to Chinese accounts Bodhidharma preached at
Nanking in 520 a doctrine very similar to the advaita of Śaṅkara
though expressed in Buddhist phraseology.
Of other forms of Vedântism, the best known is the system of Râmânuja
generally called Viśishṭâdvaita.[780] It is an evidence of the
position held by the Vedânta philosophy that religious leaders made a
commentary on the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa the vehicle of their most
important views. Unlike Śaṅkara, Râmânuja is sectarian and identifies
his supreme deity with Vishṇu or Nârâyaṇa, but this is little more
than a matter of nomenclature. His interpretation is modern in the
sense that it pursues the line of thought which leads up to the modern
sects. But that line of thought has ancient roots. Râmânuja followed a
commentator named Bodhâyaṇa who was anterior to Śaṅkara, and in the
opinion of so competent a judge as Thibaut he gives the meaning of
Bâdarâyaṇa in many points more exactly than his great rival. On the
other hand his interpretation often strains the most important
utterances of the Upanishads.
Râmânuja admits no distinction between Brahman and Îśvara, but the
distinction is abolished at the expense of abolishing the idea of the
Higher Brahman, for his Brahman is practically the Îśvara of Śaṅkara.
Brahman is not without attributes but possessed of all imaginable good
attributes, and though nothing exists apart from him, like the
antithesis of Purusha and Prakṛiti in the Sâṅkhya, yet the world
is not as in Śaṅkara's system merely Mâyâ. Matter and souls (cit
and acit) form the body of Brahman who both comprises and pervades
all things, which are merely modes of his existence.[781] He is the
inner ruler (antaryâmin) who is in all elements and all human
souls.[782] The texts which speak of Brahman as being one only without
a second are explained as referring to the state of pralaya or
absorption which occurs at the end of each Kalpa. At the conclusion of
the period of pralaya he re-emits the world and individual souls by an
act of volition and the souls begin the round of transmigration.
Salvation or release from this round is obtained not by good works but
by knowledge and meditation on the Lord assisted by his grace. The
released soul is not identified with the Lord but enjoys near him a
personal existence of eternal bliss and peace. This is more like
European theism than the other doctrines which we have been
considering. The difference is that God is not regarded as the creator
of matter and souls. Matter and souls consist of his substance. But
for all that he is a personal deity who can be loved and worshipped
and whereas Śaṅkara was a religious philosopher, Râmânuja was rather
a philosophic theologian and founder of a church. I have already
spoken of his activity in this sphere.
The epics and Purâṇas contain philosophical discussions of
considerable length which make little attempt at consistency. Yet the
line of thought in them all is the same. The chief tenets of the
theistic Sâṅkhya-Yoga are assumed: matter, soul and God are separate
existences: the soul wishes to move towards God and away from matter.
Yet when Indian writers glorify the deity they rarely abstain from
identifying him with the universe. In the Bhagavad-gîtâ and other
philosophical cantos of the Mahâbhârata the contradiction is usually
left without an attempt at solution. Thus it is stated
categorically[783] that the world consists of the perishable and
imperishable, i.e., matter and soul, but that the supreme spirit is
distinct from both. Yet in the same poem we pass from this antithesis
to the monism which declares that the deity is all things and "the
self seated in the heart of man." We have then attained the Vedantist
point of view. Nearly all the modern sects, whether Śivaite or
Vishnuite, admit the same contradiction into their teaching, for they
reject both the atheism of the Sâṅkhya and the immaterialism of the
Advaita (since it is impossible for a practical religion to deny the
existence of either God or the world), while the irresistible tendency
of Indian thought makes them describe their deity in pantheistic
language. All strive to find some metaphysical or theological formula
which will reconcile these discrepant ideas, and nearly all Vishnuites
profess some special variety of the Vedânta called by such names as
Viśishṭâdvaita, Dvaitâdvaita, Śuddhâdvaita and so on. They differ
chiefly in their definition of the relation existing between the soul
and God. Only the Mâdhvas entirely discard monism and profess duality
(Dvaita) and even Madhva thought it necessary to write a commentary on
the Brahma-sûtras to prove that they support his doctrine and the
Śivaites too have a commentator, Nîlakanṭ̣ḥa, who interprets them in
harmony with the Śaiva Siddhânta. There is also a modern commentary
by Somanaradittyar which expounds this much twisted text agreeably to
the doctrines of the Lingâyat sect.
In most fundamental principles the Śivaite and Śâktist schools agree
with the Viśishṭâdvaita but their nomenclature is different and their
scope is theological rather than philosophical. In all of them are
felt the two tendencies, one wishing to distinguish God, soul and
matter and to adjust their relations for the purposes of practical
religion, the other holding more or less that God is all or at least
that all things come from God and return to him. But there is one
difference between the schools of sectarian philosophy and the Advaita
of Śaṅkara which goes to the root of the matter. Śaṅkara holds that
the world and individual existences are due to illusion, ignorance and
misconception: they vanish in the light of true knowledge. Other
schools, while agreeing that in some sense God is all, yet hold that
the universe is not an illusion or false presentment of him but a
process of manifestation or of evolution starting from him.[784] It is
not precisely evolution in the European sense, but rather a rhythmic
movement, of duration and extent inexpressible in figures, in which
the Supreme Spirit alternately emits and reabsorbs the universe. As a
rule the higher religious life aims at some form of union or close
association with the deity, beyond the sphere of this process. In the
evolutionary process the Vaishṇavas interpolate between the Supreme
Spirit and the phenomenal world the phases of conditioned spirit known
as Saṅkarshaṇa, etc.; in the same way the Śivaite schools increase
the twenty-four tattvas of the Sânkhya to thirty-six.[785] The first
of these tattvas or principles is Śiva, corresponding to the highest
Brahman. The next phase is Sadâśiva in which differentiation commences
owing to the movement of Śakti, the active or female principle. Śiva
in this phase is thought of as having a body composed of mantras.
Śakti, also known as Bindu or Śuddhamâyâ, is sometimes regarded as a
separate tattva but more generally as inseparably united with Śiva.
The third tattva is Îśvara, or Śiva in the form of a lord or
personal deity, and the fourth is Śuddhavidyâ or true knowledge,
explained as the principle of correlation between the experiencer and
that which is experienced. It is only after these that we come to
Mâyâ, meaning not so much illusion as the substratum in which Karma
inheres or the protoplasm from which all things grow. Between Mâyâ and
Purusha come five more tattvas, called envelopes. Their effect is to
enclose and limit, thus turning the divine spirit into a human soul.
Śâktist accounts of the evolutionary process give greater prominence
to the part played by Śakti and are usually metaphysiological, if the
word may be pardoned, inasmuch as they regard the cosmic process as
the growth of an embryo, an idea which is as old as the Vedas.[786] It
is impossible to describe even in outline these manifold cosmologies
but they generally speak of Śakti, who in one sense is identical with
Śiva and merely his active form but in another sense is identified
with Prakṛiti, coming into contact with the form of Śiva called
Prakâśa or light and then solidifying into a drop (Bindu) or germ
which divides. At some point in this process arise Nâda or sound, and
Śabda-brahman, the sound-Brahman, which manifests itself in various
energies and assumes in the human body the form of the mysterious
coiled force called Kuṇḍalinî.[787] Some of the older Vishnuite
writings use similar language of Śakti, under the name of Lakshmî, but
in the Viśishṭâdvaita of Râmânuja and subsequent teachers there is
little disposition to dwell on any feminine energy in discussing the
process of evolution.
Of all the Darśanas the most extraordinary is that called Raseśvara
or the mercurial system.[788] According to it quicksilver, if eaten or
otherwise applied, not only preserves the body from decay but delivers
from transmigration the soul which inhabits this glorified body.
Quicksilver is even asserted to be identical with the supreme self.
This curious Darśana is represented as revealed by Śiva to Śakti and
it is only an extreme example of the tantric doctrine that spiritual
results can be obtained by physical means. The practice of taking
mercury to secure health and long life must have been prevalent in
medieval India for it is mentioned by both Marco Polo and
Bernier.[789]
A people among whom the Vedânta could obtain a large following must
have been prone to think little of the things which we see compared
with the unseen of which they are the manifestation. It is, therefore,
not surprising if materialism met with small sympathy or success among
them. In India the extravagances of asceticism and of mystic
sensualism alike find devotees, but the simple philosophy of Let us
eat and drink for to-morrow we die, does not commend itself.
Nevertheless it is not wholly absent and was known as the doctrine of
Brihaspati. Those who professed it were also called Cârvâkas and
Lokâyatikas.[790] Brihaspati was the preceptor of the gods and his
connection with this sensualistic philosophy goes back to a legend
found in the Upanishads[791] that he taught the demons false knowledge
whose "reward lasts only as long as the pleasure lasts" in order to
compass their destruction. This is similar to the legend found in the
Purâṇas that Vishṇu became incarnate as Buddha in order to lead
astray the Daityas. But though such words as Ćârvâka and Nâstika are
used in later literature as terms of learned abuse, the former seems
to denote a definite school, although we cannot connect its history
with dates, places or personalities. The Cârvâkas are the first system
examined in the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, which is written from the
Vedântist standpoint, and beginning from the worst systems of
philosophy ascends to those which are relatively correct. This account
contains most of what we know about their doctrines,[792] but is
obviously biassed: it represents them as cynical voluptuaries holding
that the only end of man is sensual enjoyment. We are told that they
admitted only one source of knowledge, namely perception, and four
elements, earth, water, fire and air, and that they held the soul to
be identical with the body. Such a phrase as my body they considered
to be metaphorical, as apart from the body there was no ego who owned
it. The soul was supposed to be a physical product of the four
elements, just as sugar combined with a ferment and other ingredients
produces an intoxicating liquor. Among verses described as "said by
Brihaspati" occur the following remarkable lines:
"There is no heaven, no liberation, nor any soul in another world,
Nor do the acts of the âśramas or castes produce any reward.
If the animal slain in the Jyotishtoma sacrifice will go to heaven,
Why does not the sacrificer immolate his own father?
While life remains let a man live happily: let him feed on butter even
if he runs into debt.
When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return?"
The author of the Dabistân, who lived in the seventeenth century, also
mentions the Cârvâkas in somewhat similar terms.[793]
Brahmanical authors often couple the Cârvâkas and Buddhists. This
lumping together of offensively heretical sects may be merely
theological animus, but still it is possible that there may be a
connection between the Cârvâkas and the extreme forms of Mahayanist
nihilism. Schrader[794] in analysing a singular work, called the
Svasaṃvedyopanishad, says it is "inspired by the Mahayanist doctrine
of vacuity (śûnya-vâda) and proclaims a most radical agnosticism by
asserting in four chapters (a) that there is no reincarnation
(existence being bubble-like), no God, no world: that all traditional
literature (Śruti and Sṃriti) is the work of conceited fools;
(b) that Time the destroyer and Nature the originator are the
rulers of all existence and not good and bad deeds, and that there is
neither hell nor heaven; (c) that people deluded by flowery speech
cling to gods, sacred places, teachers, though there is in reality no
difference at all between Vishṇu and a dog; (d) that though all
words are untrue and all ideas mere illusions, yet liberation is
possible by a thorough realization of Bhâvâdvaita." But for this
rather sudden concession to Hindu sentiment, namely that deliverance
is possible, this doctrine resembles the tenets attributed to the
Cârvâkas.