Before entering upon the question which presented itself
at the conclusion of the last chapter—that of endeavouring
to ascertain whether the estimated net available
income of Garden City (£50,000 per annum) would be
sufficient for its municipal needs, I will very shortly state
how it is proposed to raise the money required for commencing
operations. The money would be borrowed on
“B” debentures,[9] and would be secured by a charge upon
the “rate-rent,” subject, of course, to the payment of
interest and sinking fund in respect of the “A” debentures
on which the purchase money of the estate is raised.
It is, perhaps, superfluous to remark that, though in the
case of the land purchase it might be requisite to raise
the whole, or at least some very considerable part of the
purchase money before possession would be given of the
estate, or operations upon it commenced, yet in regard to
public works to be carried out upon the estate, the case
is quite different, and it would be by no means necessary
or advisable to defer the commencement of operations
until the whole sum which might be ultimately required
should be raised. Probably no town was ever built on
such onerous conditions as would be involved in the
raising at the outset of such a very considerable sum as
would defray the cost of all its public works; and though
the circumstances under which Garden City is to be
built may be unique, there is, as will by and by be seen,
not only no need for making an exception of the town in
respect of initial capital, but quite exceptional reasons
will become more and more apparent which make the
overlaying of the enterprise with superabundant capital
altogether unnecessary, and therefore inexpedient; although,
of course, there must be a sufficient sum to enable
all real economies to be readily effected.
Perhaps it may be well in this connection to draw a
distinction as to the amount of capital required between
the case of the building of a town and the building, let us
say, of a large iron bridge across an estuary. In the case
of the bridge it is highly expedient to raise the entire sum
required before commencing operations, for the simple
reason that the bridge is not a bridge until the last rivet
is driven home, nor, until its entire completion and its
connection with the railways or roadways at either end,
has it any revenue-earning power. Except, therefore, on
the assumption that it is to be fully completed, it offers
very little security for the capital sunk upon it. Hence
it would be very natural for those who are asked to
invest to say, “We will not put any money into this
enterprise until you show us that you can get enough to
complete it.” But the money which it is proposed to
raise for the development of Garden City site leads to
speedy results. It is to be expended upon roads, schools,
etc. These works will be carried out with due regard to
the number of lots which have been let to tenants, who
undertake to build as from a certain date; and, therefore,
the money expended will very soon begin to yield a return
in the shape of a rate-rent, representing, in reality, a
greatly-improved ground-rent; when those who have
advanced money on the “B” debentures will have a
really first-class security, and further sums should be
easily obtainable, and at a reduced rate of interest.
Again, it is an important part of the project that each
ward, or one-sixth part of the city, should be in some
sense a complete town by itself, and thus the school
buildings might serve, in the earlier stages, not only as
schools, but as places for religious worship, for concerts,
for libraries, and for meetings of various kinds, so that all
outlay on expensive municipal and other buildings might
be deferred until the later stages of the enterprise. Work,
too, would be practically completed in one ward before
commencing on another, and the operations in the various
wards would be taken up in due and proper sequence, so
that those portions of the town site on which building
operations were not in progress would also be a source of
revenue, either as allotments, cow-pastures, or, perhaps,
as brickfields.
Let us now deal with the subject immediately before
us. Will the principles on which Garden City is to be
built have any bearing on the effectiveness of its municipal
expenditure? In other words, will a given revenue yield
greater results than under ordinary conditions? These
questions will be answered in the affirmative. It will
be shown that, pound for pound, money will be more
effectively spent than elsewhere, and that there will be
many great and obvious economies which cannot be expressed
in figures with much accuracy, but which would
certainly represent in the aggregate a very large sum.
The first great economy to be noticed is that the item
of “landlord’s rent,” which, under ordinary conditions,
largely enters into municipal expenditure, will, in Garden
City, scarcely enter at all. Thus, all well-ordered towns
require administrative buildings, schools, swimming
baths, libraries, parks; and the sites which these and
other corporate undertakings occupy are usually purchased.
In such cases the money necessary for the purchase
of the sites is generally borrowed on the security
of the rates; and thus it is that a very considerable part
of the total rates levied by a municipality are ordinarily
applied, not to productive works, but either to what
we have termed “landlord’s rent,” in the shape of
interest on money borrowed to effect the purchase, or
to the provision of a sinking fund in payment of the
purchase money of the land so acquired, which is landlord’s
rent in a capitalised form.
Now, in Garden City, all such expenditure, with such
exceptions as road sites on the agricultural estate, has
been already provided for. Thus, the 250 acres for public
parks, the sites for schools and other public buildings,
will cost the ratepayers nothing whatever, or, to put it
more correctly, their cost, which was really £40 per acre,
has been covered, as we have seen, by the annual average
contribution of 1s. 1d. per head, which each person is
supposed to make in discharge of landlord’s rent; and
the revenue of the town, £50,000, is the net revenue after
all interest and sinking fund in respect of the whole site
has been deducted. In considering, therefore, the question
whether £50,000 is a sufficient revenue, it must be
remembered that in no case has any cost of municipal
sites to be first deducted from that amount.
Another item in which a great economy will be
effected will be found in a comparison between Garden
City and any old city like London. London wishes to
breathe a fuller municipal spirit, and so proceeds to construct
schools, to pull down slums, to erect libraries,
swimming baths, etc. In these cases, it has not only to
purchase the freeholds of the sites, but also has usually
to pay for the buildings which had been previously
erected thereon, and which are purchased solely, of
course, with a view to their demolition and to a clearing
of the ground, and frequently it has also to meet claims
for business-disturbance, together with heavy legal expenses
in settling claims. In this connection it may be
remarked that the inclusive cost of sites of schools purchased
by the London School Board since its constitution,
i.e., the cost, including old buildings, business-disturbance,
law charges, etc., has already reached the enormous
sum of £3,516,072,[10] and the exclusive cost of the sites
(370 acres in extent) ready for building by the Board is
equal, on the average, to £9,500 per acre.
At this rate the cost of the 24 acres of school sites
for Garden City would be £228,000, so that another
site for a model city could be purchased out of what
would be saved in Garden City in respect of school sites
alone. “Oh, but,” it may be said, “the school sites of
Garden City are extravagantly large, and would be out
of the question in London, and it is altogether unfair to
compare a small town like Garden City with London, the
wealthy capital of a mighty Empire.” I would reply,
“It is quite true that the cost of land in London would
make such sites extravagant, not to say prohibitive—they
would cost about £40,000,000 sterling—but does not this
of itself suggest a most serious defect of system, and that
at a most vital part? Can children be better taught
where land costs £9,500 an acre than where it costs £40?
Whatever may be the real economic value of the London
site, for other purposes—as to which we may have something
to say at a later stage—for school purposes, wherein
lies the advantage that the sites on which its schools are
built are frequently surrounded by dingy factories or
crowded courts and alleys? If Lombard Street is an
ideal place for banks, is not a park like the Central
Avenue of Garden City an ideal place for schools?—and
is not the welfare of our children the primary consideration
with any well-ordered community?” “But,” it
may be said, “the children must be educated near their
homes, and these homes must be near the places where
their parents work.” Precisely; but does not the scheme
provide for this in the most effective manner, and in that
respect also are not the school sites of Garden City
superior to those of London? The children will have to
expend less than an average amount of energy in going
to school, a matter, as all educationists admit, of immense
importance, especially in the winter. But further, have
we not heard from Professor Marshall (see heading to
Chapter III.) that “150,000 people, in London, engaged
in the clothes-making trades, are doing work which it is
against all economic reason to have done where ground-rent
is high”—in other words, that these 150,000 people
should not be in London at all; and does not the consideration
that the education of the children of such
workers is carried on at once under inferior conditions
and at enormous cost add weight and significance to the
Professor’s words? If these workers ought not to be in
London, then their homes, for which, insanitary as they
are, they pay heavy rents, ought not to be in London; a
certain proportion of the shopkeepers who supply their
wants should not be in London; and various other
people to whom the wages earned by these persons in the
clothes-making trade give employment should not be in
London. Hence, there is a sense—and a very real one—in
which it is fair to compare the cost of school sites in
Garden City with the cost of school sites in London;
because obviously if these people do, as suggested by
Professor Marshall, migrate from London, they can at
once effect (if they make, as I have suggested, proper provision
beforehand) not only a great saving in respect of
ground-rent for their workshops, but also a vast saving
in respect of sites for homes, schools, and other purposes;
and this saving is obviously the difference between what
is now paid and what would be paid under the new conditions,
minus the loss incurred (if any), and plus the
numerous gains secured as the result of such removal.
Let us for the sake of clearness make the comparison
in another way. The people of London have paid a
capital sum representing, when spread over the whole
population of London (this being taken at 6,000,000),
upwards of 11s. 6d. per head of population for school sites
held by the London School Board, a sum which is, of
course, exclusive of the sites for voluntary schools. The
population of Garden City, 30,000 in number, have
entirely saved that 11s. 6d. per head, making a total
saving of £17,250, which at 3 per cent. involves an
annual saving of £517 in perpetuity. And besides thus
saving £517 a year as interest on cost of sites for schools,
Garden City has secured sites for its schools incomparably
better than those of London schools—sites which afford
ample accommodation for all the children of the town,
and not, as in the case of the London School Board,
accommodation for only half of the children of the
municipality. (The sites of the London School Board
are 370 acres in extent, or about 1 acre to every 16,000 of
the population, while the people of Garden City have
obtained 24 acres or 1 acre for every 1,250.) In other
words, Garden City secures sites which are larger, better
placed, and in every way more suitable for educational
purposes, at a mere fraction of the cost which in London
is incurred for sites vastly inferior in every respect.
The economies with which we have thus dealt are, it
will be seen, effected by the two simple expedients we
have referred to. First, by buying the land before a new
value is given to it by migration, the migrating people
obtain a site at an extremely low figure, and secure the
coming increment for themselves and those who come
after them; and secondly, by coming to a new site,
they do not have to pay large sums for old buildings, for
compensation for disturbance, and for heavy legal
charges. The practicability of securing for the poor
workers of London the first of these great advantages
appears to have been for the moment overlooked by Professor
Marshall in his article in the Contemporary
Review,[11] for the Professor remarks “Ultimately all
would gain by the migration, but most” (the italics are
my own) “the landowners and the railroads connected
with the colony.” Let us then adopt the expedient here
advocated of securing that the landowners, “who ...
will gain most” by a project specially designed to benefit
a class now low down in the social scale, shall be those
very people themselves, as members of a new municipality,
and then a strong additional inducement will be held out
to them to make a change, which nothing but the lack of
combined effort has hitherto prevented. As to the benefit
to be derived by the railways, while no doubt the building
up of the town would specially benefit the main line of
railway which passed through the estate, it is also true
that the earnings of the people would not be diminished
to the usual extent by railway freights and charges. (See
Chap. ii., also Chap. v., page 60.)
We now come to deal with an element of economy which
will be simply incalculable. This is to be found in the
fact that the town is definitely planned, so that the whole
question of municipal administration may be dealt with
by one far-reaching scheme. It is not by any means necessary,
and it is not, humanly speaking, possible, that the
final scheme should be the work of one mind. It will no
doubt be the work of many minds—the minds of
engineers, of architects and surveyors, of landscape
gardeners and electricians. But it is essential, as we
have said, that there should be unity of design and
purpose—that the town should be planned as a whole,
and not left to grow up in a chaotic manner as has been
the case with all English towns, and more or less so with
the towns of all countries. A town, like a flower, or a
tree, or an animal, should, at each stage of its growth,
possess unity, symmetry, completeness, and the effect of
growth should never be to destroy that unity, but to give
it greater purpose, nor to mar that symmetry, but to
make it more symmetrical; while the completeness of the
early structure should be merged in the yet greater completeness
of the later development.
Garden City is not only planned, but it is planned
with a view to the very latest of modern requirements;[12]
and it is obviously always easier, and usually far more
economical and completely satisfactory, to make out of
fresh material a new instrument than to patch up and
alter an old one. This element of economy will be
perhaps best dealt with by a concrete illustration, and
one of a very striking nature at once presents itself.
In London the question of building a new street
between Holborn and the Strand has been for many
years under consideration, and at length a scheme is
being carried out, imposing an enormous cost on the
people of London. “Every such change in the street
geography of London displaces thousands of the poor”—I
quote from the Daily Chronicle of July 6, 1898—“and
for many years all public or quasi-public schemes have
been charged with the liability to re-house as many of
them as possible. This is as it should be; but the difficulty
begins when the public is asked to face the music
and pay the bill. In the present case some three
thousand souls of the working population have to be
turned out. After some searching of heart, it is decided
that most of them are so closely tied to the spot by their
employment that it would be a hardship to send them
more than a mile away. The result, in cash, is that
London must spend in re-housing them about £100 a
head—or £300,000 in all. As to those who cannot fairly
be asked to go even a mile away—hangers-on to the
market, or others tethered to the spot—the cost will be
even higher. They will require to have parcels of the
precious land cleared by the great scheme itself, and the
result of that will be to house them at the handsome
figure of £260 a-piece, or some £1,400 for every family of
five or six. Financial statements convey little to the
ordinary mind. Let us make it a little more intelligible.
A sum of £1,400 means, in the house market, a rental of
nearly £100 a year. It would buy an excellent, in fact a
sumptuous, house and garden at Hampstead, such as the
better middle-class delight in. It would purchase anywhere
in the nearer suburbs such houses as men with
£1,000 a year inhabit. If one went further afield, to the
new neighbourhoods which the City clerk can easily reach
by rail, a £1,400 house represents actual magnificence.”
But on what scale of comfort will the poor Covent Garden
labourer with a wife and four children live? The £1,400
will by no means represent a fair standard of comfort, to
say nothing of magnificence. “He will live in three
rooms sufficiently small in a block at least three storeys
high.” Contrast this with what might be done on a new
area, by carefully planning a bold scheme at the outset.
Streets of greater width than this new street would be
laid out and constructed at a mere fraction of the cost,
while a sum of £1,400, instead of providing 1 family with
“three rooms sufficiently small in blocks at least three
storeys high,” would provide 7 families in Garden City
with a comfortable six-roomed cottage each, and with a
nice little garden; and, manufacturers being concurrently
induced to build on the sites set apart for them, each
breadwinner would be placed within easy walking
distance of his work.
There is another modern need which all towns and
cities should be designed to meet—a need which has
arisen with the evolution of modern sanitation, and which
has of recent years been accentuated by the rapid growth
of invention. Subways for sewerage and surface drainage,
for water, gas, telegraph and telephone wires, electric
lighting wires, wires for conveying motive power,
pneumatic tubes for postal purposes, have come to
be regarded as economic if not essential. But if
they would be a source of economy in an old city,
how much more so in new ones; for on a clean sheet it
will be easy to use the very best appliances for their construction,
and to avail ourselves to the fullest extent of
the ever-growing advantages which they possess as the
number of services which they accommodate increases.
Before the subways can be constructed, trenches somewhat
wide and deep must be excavated. In making these
the most approved excavating machinery could be employed.
In old towns this might be very objectionable,
if not, indeed, quite impossible. But here, in Garden
City, the steam navvy would not make its appearance in
the parts where people were living, but where they were
coming to live after its work in preparing the way had
been completed. What a grand thing it would be if the
people of England could, by an actual illustration under
their very eyes, be convinced that machinery can be so
used as to confer not only an ultimate national benefit,
but a direct and immediate advantage, and that not only
upon those who actually own it or use it, but on others
who are given work by its magic aid. What a happy day
it would be for the people of this country, and of all
countries, if they could learn, from practical experience,
that machinery can be used on an extended scale to give
employment as well as to take it away—to implace labour
as well as to displace it—to free men as well as to enslave
them. There will be plenty of work to be done in Garden
City. That is obvious. It is also obvious that, until a
large number of houses and factories are built, many of
these things cannot be done, and that the faster the
trenches are dug, the subways finished, the factories and
the houses built, and the light and the power turned on,
the sooner can this town, the home of an industrious and
a happy people, be built, and the sooner can others start
the work of building other towns, not like it, but
gradually becoming as much superior to it as our present
locomotives are to the first crude attempts of the pioneers
of mechanical traction.
We have now shown four cogent reasons why a given
revenue should, in Garden City, yield vastly greater
results than under ordinary conditions.
(1) That no “landlord’s rent” or interest in respect
of freeholds would be payable other than the small
amount which has been already provided for in estimating
net revenue.
(2) That the site being practically clear of buildings
and other works, but little expenditure would be incurred
in the purchase of such buildings, or compensation for
business-disturbance, or legal and other expenses in connection
therewith.
(3) The economy arising out of a definite plan, and
one in accordance with modern needs and requirements,
thus saving those items of expenditure which are incurred
in old cities as it is sought to bring them into harmony
with modern ideas.
(4) The possibility, as the whole site will be clear for
operations, of introducing machinery of the very best and
most modern type in road-making and other engineering
operations.
There are other economies which will become apparent
to the reader as he proceeds, but, having cleared the
ground by discussing general principles, we shall be
better prepared to discuss the question as to the sufficiency
of our estimates in another chapter.