THE LAST PHASE
I. LORD HOWE'S FIRST SIGNAL BOOK
II. SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR
III. NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA
IV. ADMIRAL GAMBIER, 1807
V. LORD COLLINGWOOD, 1808-1810
VI. SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE'S INSTRUCTIONS
VII. THE SIGNAL BOOK OF 1816
INTRODUCTORY
The time-worn Fighting Instructions of Russell and Rooke with their
accretion of Additional Instructions did not survive the American War.
Some time in that fruitful decade of naval reform which elapsed
between the peace of 1783 and the outbreak of the Great War they were
superseded. It was the indefatigable hand of Lord Howe that dealt
them the long-needed blow, and when the change came it was
sweeping. It was no mere substitution of a new set of Instructions,
but a complete revolution of method. The basis of the new tactical
code was no longer the Fighting Instructions, but the Signal
Book. Signals were no longer included in the Instructions, and the
Instructions sank to the secondary place of being 'explanatory' to the
Signal Book.[1]
The earliest form in which these new 'Explanatory Instructions' are
known is a printed volume in the Admiralty Library containing a
complete set of Fleet Instructions, and entitled 'Instructions for the
conduct of ships of war explanatory of and relative to the Signals
contained in the Signal Book herewith delivered.' The Signal Book is
with it.[2] Neither volume bears any date, but both are in the old
folio form which had been traditional since the seventeenth
century. They are therefore presumably earlier than 1790 when the
well-known quarto form first came into use, and as we shall see from
internal evidence they cannot have been earlier than 1782. Nor is
there any direct evidence that they are the work of Lord Howe, but the
'significations' of the signals bear unmistakable marks of his
involved and cumbrous style, and the code itself closely resembles
that he used during the Great War. With these indications to guide us
there is little difficulty in fixing with practical certainty both
date and authorship from external sources.[3]
In a pamphlet published by Admiral Sir Charles Henry Knowles in 1830,
when he was a very old man, he claims to have invented the new code of
numerical signals which Howe adopted. The pamphlet is entitled
'Observations on Naval Tactics and on the Claims of Clerk of Eldin,'
and in the course of it he says that about 1777 he devised this new
system of signals, and gave it to Howe on his arrival in the summer of
that year at Newport, in Rhode Island, 'and his lordship,' he says,
'afterwards introduced them into the Channel Fleet.' Further, he
says, he soon after invented the tabular system of flags suggested by
the chess-board, and published them in the summer of 1778. To this
work he prefixed as a preface the observations of his father, Sir
Charles Knowles, condemning the existing form of sailing order, and
recommending Pere Hoste's old form in three columns, and this
order, he says, Howe adopted for the relief of Gibraltar in September
1782. He also infers that the alleged adoption of his signals in the
Channel Fleet was when Lord Howe commanded it before he became first
lord of the admiralty for the second time—that is, before he
succeeded Keppel in December 1783. For during the peace Knowles tells
us he made a second communication to Howe on tactics, of which more
must be said later on. The inference therefore is that when Knowles
says that Howe adopted his code in the Channel Fleet it must have been
the first time he took command of it—that is, on April 2, 1782.[4]
Now if, as Knowles relates—and there is no reason to doubt this part
of his story—Howe did issue a new code of signals some time before
sailing for Gibraltar in 1782, and if at the time, as Knowles also
says, he had been studying Hoste, internal evidence shows almost
conclusively that these folios must be the Signal Book in
question. From end to end the influence of Hoste's Treatise and of
Rodney's tactics in 1782 is unmistakable.[5]
From Hoste it takes not only the sailing formation in three columns,
but re-introduces into the British service the long-discarded
manoeuvre of 'doubling.' For this there are three signals, Nos.
222-4, for doubling the van, doubling the rear, and for the rear to
double the rear. From Hoste also it borrows the method of giving
battle to a superior force, which the French writer apparently
borrowed from Torrington. The signification of the signal is as
follows: 'No. 232. When inferior in number to the enemy, and to
prevent being doubled upon in the van or rear, for the van squadron to
engage the headmost ships of the enemy's line, the rear their
sternmost, and the centre that of the enemy, whose surplus ships will
then be left out of action in the vacant spaces between our
squadrons.'
The author's obligations to the recent campaigns of Rodney and Hood
are equally clear. Signal 236 is, 'For ships to steer for independent
of each other and engage respectively the ships opposed to them in the
enemy's line,' and this was a new form of the signal, which, according
to the MS. Signal Book of 1782, was introduced by Hood.[6] Still
more significant is Signal 235, 'when fetching up with the enemy to
leeward, and on the contrary tack, to break through their line and
endeavour to cut off part of their van or rear.' This is clearly the
outcome of Rodney's famous manoeuvre, and is adopted word for word
from the signification of the signal that Hood added. Pigot, it will
be remembered, on succeeding Rodney, added two more on the same
subject, viz. (1) 'For the leading ship to cut through the enemy's
line of battle,' and (2) 'For a particular ship specified to cut
through the enemy's line of battle, and for all the other ships to
follow her in close order to support each other.' Neither of these
later signals is in the code we are considering, and the presumption
is that it was drawn up very soon after Rodney's victory and before
Pigot's signals were known at home.
Finally there is a MS. note added by Sir Charles H. Knowles to his
'Fighting and Sailing Instructions,' to the effect that in the
instructions issued by Howe in 1782 he modified Article XXI. of the
old Fighting Instructions (i.e. Article XX. of Russell's).
'His lordship in 1782,' it says, 'directed by his instructions that
the line [i.e. his own line] should not be broken until all the
enemy's ships gave way and were beaten.' And this is practically the
effect of Article XIV. of the set we are considering. In the absence
of contrary evidence, therefore, there seems good ground for calling
these folio volumes 'Howe's First Signal Book, 1782,' and with this
tentative attribution the Explanatory Instructions are printed below.
As has been already said, these instructions, divorced as they now
were from the signals, give but a very inadequate idea of the tactics
in vogue. For this we must go to the tactical signals themselves. In
the present case the more important ones (besides those given above)
are as follows:
'No. 218. To attack the enemy's rear in succession by ranging up with
and opening upon the sternmost of their ships; then to tack or veer,
as being to windward or to leeward of the enemy, and form again in the
rear.' This signal, which at first sight looks like a curious
reversion to the primitive Elizabethan method of attack, immediately
follows the signals for engaging at anchor, and may have been the
outcome of Hood's experience with De Grasse in 1782.
'No. 232. In working to gain the wind of the enemy, for the headmost
and sternmost ships to signify when they can weather them by Signal
17, p. 66; or if to windward of the enemy and on the contrary tack,
for the sternmost ship to signify when she is far enough astern of
their rear to be able to lead down out of their line of fire.'
'No. 234. When coming up astern and to windward of the enemy to engage
by inverting the line'—that is, for the ship leading the van to
engage the sternmost of the enemy, the next ship to pass on under
cover of her fire and engage the second from the enemy's rear, and so
on.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The first attempt to provide a convenient Signal Book separate
from the Instructions was made privately by one Jonathan Greenwood about
1715. He produced a small 12mo. volume dedicated to Admiral Edward
Russell, Earl of Orford, and the other lords of the admiralty who were
then serving with him. It consists of a whole series of well-engraved
plates of ships flying the various signals contained in the Sailing and
Fighting Instructions, each properly coloured with its signification
added beneath. The author says he designed the work as a pocket
companion to the Printed Instructions and for the use of inferior
officers who had not access to them. Copies are in the British Museum
and the R.U.S.I. Library.
[2] Catalogue, Nos. 252/27 and 252/26.
[3] A still earlier Signal Book attributed to Lord Howe is in the
United Service Institution, but it is no more than a condensed and
amended form of the established one. Its nature and intention are
explained by No. 10 of the 'explanatory observations' which he attached
to it. It is as follows; 'All the signals contained in the general
printed Signal Book which are likely to be needful on the present
occasion being provided for in this Signal Book, the signals as
appointed in the general Signal Book will only be made either in
conformity to the practice of some senior officer present, or when in
company for the time being with other ships not of the fleet under the
admiral's command, and unprovided with these particular signals.' It was
therefore probably issued experimentally, but what the 'present
occasion' was is not indicated. It contains none of the additional
signals of 1782-3.
[4] Knowles was of course too old in 1830 for his memory to be trusted
as to details. A note in his handwriting upon a copy of his code in
possession of the present baronet gives its story simply as follows:
'These signals were written in 1778, as an idea—altered and
published—then altered again in 1780—afterwards arranged differently
in 1787, and finally in 1794; but not printed at Sir C.H. Knowles's
expense until 1798, when they were sent to the admiralty, but they were
not published, although copies have been given to sea officers.'
[5] A partial translation of Hoste had been published by Lieutenant
Christopher O'Bryen, R.N., in 1762. Captain Boswall's complete
translation was not issued till 1834.
[6] Note that the signal differs from that which Rodney made under
Article 17 of the Additional Fighting Instructions in his action of
April 17, 1780, and which being misunderstood spoilt his whole attack.
[+Admiralty Library 252/27+.]
Instructions respecting the Order of Battle and conduct of the
fleet, preparative to and in action with the enemy.
Article I. When the signal is made for the fleet to form in order of
battle, each captain or commander is to get most speedily into his
station, and keep the prescribed distance from his seconds ahead and
astern upon the course steered, and under a proportion of sail suited
to that carried by the admiral.
But when the signal is made for tacking, or on any similar occasion,
care is to be taken to open, in succession, to a sufficient distance
for performing the intended evolution. And the ships are to close back
to their former distance respectively as soon as it has been executed.
II. In line of battle, the flag of the admiral commanding in chief is
always to be considered as the point of direction to the whole fleet,
for forming and preserving the line.
III. The squadron of the second in command is to lead when forming the
line ahead, and to take the starboard side of the centre when forming
the line abreast, unless signal is made to the contrary; these
positions however are only restrained to the first forming of the
lines from the order of sailing.
For when the fleet is formed upon a line, then in all subsequent
evolutions the squadrons are not to change their places, but preserve
the same situation in the line whatever position it may bring them
into with the centre, with respect to being in the van or the rear, on
the starboard or larboard side, unless directed so to do by signal.
Suppose the fleet sailing in line ahead on the larboard tack, the
second in command leading, and signal is made to form a line abreast
to sail large or before the wind, the second squadron in that case is
to form on the larboard side of the centre.
Again, suppose in this last situation signal is made to haul to the
wind, and form a line ahead on the starboard tack, in this case the
squadron of the third in command is to lead, that of the second in
command forming the rear.
And when from a line ahead, the squadron of the second in command
leading, the admiral would immediately form the line on the contrary
tack by tacking or veering together, the squadron of the third in
command will then become the van.
These evolutions could not otherwise be performed with regularity and
expedition.
When forming the line from the order of sailing, the ships of each
squadron are to be ranged with respect to each other in the line in
the same manner as when in order of sailing each squadron in one line;
and, as when the second in command is in the van, the headmost ship of
his squadron (in sailing order) becomes the leading ship of the line,
so likewise the headmost ship of the third squadron (in sailing order)
becomes the leading ship of the line, when the third in command takes
the van, except when the signal is made to form the line reversed.
Ships happening to have been previously detached on any service,
separate from the body of the fleet, when the signal for forming in
order of battle is made, are not meant to be comprehended in the
intention of it, until they shall first have been called back to the
fleet by the proper signal.
IV. When the fleet is sailing in line of battle ahead, the course is
to be taken from the ship leading the van upon that occasion; the
others in succession being to steer with their seconds ahead
respectively, whilst they continue to be regulated by the example of
the leading ship.[1]
V. The ships, which from the inequality of their rates of sailing
cannot readily keep their stations in the line, are not to obstruct
the compliance with the intent of the signal in others; nor to hazard
throwing the fleet into disorder by persisting too long in their
endeavours to preserve their stations under such circumstances; but
they are to fall astern and form in succession in the rear of the
line.
The captains of such ships will not be thereby left in a situation
less at liberty to distinguish themselves; as they will have an
opportunity to render essential service, by placing their ships to
advantage when arrived up with the enemy already engaged with the
other part of the fleet.
The ships next in succession in order of battle are to occupy in turn,
on this and every other similar occasion, the vacant spaces that would
be otherwise left in the line; so that it may be always kept perfect
at the appointed intervals of distance.
And when the fleet is sailing large, or before the wind, in order of
battle, and the admiral makes the signal for coming to the wind on
either tack, the ship stationed to lead the line on that tack, first,
and the others in succession, as they arrive in the wake of that ship
and of their seconds ahead respectively, are to haul to the wind
without loss of time accordingly.
And all the signals for regulating the course and motions of the fleet
by day or night, after the signal for forming in order of battle has
been made, are to be understood with reference to the continuance of
the fleet in such order, until the general signal to chase, or to form
again in order of sailing, is put abroad.
VI. When the fleet is formed on any line pointed out by the compass
signal, the relative bearing of the ships from each other is to be
preserved through every change of course made, as often as any
alteration thereof together shall be by signal directed.[2]
When, on the contrary, the signal to alter the course in succession
has been put abroad, the relative bearing of the ships from each other
will be then consequently changed; and any alteration of the course
subsequently directed to be made by the ships together will thereafter
have reference to the relative bearing last established. The same
distinction will take place so often as the alteration of course in
succession, as aforesaid, shall in future recur.
VII. If the admiral should observe that the enemy has altered his
course, and the disposition of his order of battle, one, two, three,
or any greater number of points (in which case it will be necessary to
make a suitable change in the bearing of the ships from each other in
the British fleet, supposed to be formed in such respects
correspondently to the first position of the enemy), he will make the
signal for altering course in succession, according to the nature of
the occasion. The leading ship of the line is thereupon immediately to
alter to the course pointed out; and (the others taking their places
astern of her in succession, as they arrive in the wake of that ship
and of their seconds ahead respectively) she is to lead the fleet in
line of battle ahead on the course so denoted, until farther order.
VIII. When it is necessary to shorten or make more sail whilst the
fleet is in order of battle, and the proper signal in either case has
been made, the fleet is to be regulated by the example of the frigate
appointed to repeat signals; which frigate is to set or take in the
sail the admiral is observed to do.
The ship referred to is thereupon to suit her sail to the known
comparative rate of sailing between her and the admiral's ship.
Hence it will be necessary that the captains of the fleet be very
attentive to acquire a perfect knowledge of the comparative rate of
sailing between their own and the admiral's ship, so as under whatever
sail the admiral may be, they may know what proportion to carry, to go
at an equal rate with him.
IX. When, the ships of the fleet being more in number than the enemy,
the admiral sees proper to order any particular ships to withdraw from
the line, they are to be placed in a proper situation, in readiness to
be employed occasionally as circumstances may thereafter require—to
windward of the fleet, if then having the weather-gage of the enemy,
or towards the van and ahead, if the contrary—to relieve, or go to
the assistance of any disabled ship, or otherwise act, as by signal
directed.
The captains of ships, stationed next astern of those so withdrawn,
are directly to close to the van, and fill up the vacant spaces
thereby made in the line.
When, in presence of an enemy, the admiral or commander of any
division of the fleet finds it necessary to change his station in the
line, in order to oppose himself against the admiral or commander in a
similar part of the enemy's line, he will make the signal for that
purpose; and the ships referred to on this occasion are to place
themselves forthwith against the ships of the enemy, that would
otherwise by such alteration remain unopposed.
X. When the fleet is sailing in a line of battle ahead, or upon any
other bearing, and the signal is made for the ships to keep in more
open order, it will be generally meant that they should keep from one
to two cables' length asunder, according as the milder or rougher
state of the weather may require; also that they should close to the
distance of half a cable, or at least a cable's length, in similar
circumstances, when the signal for that purpose is put abroad.
But in both cases, the distance pointed out to the admiral's second
ahead and astern, by the continuance of the flag abroad, as intimated
in the Signal Book, is to be signified from them respectively to the
ships succeeding them on either part, by signals.
These signals are to be continued either way, onward, throughout the
line if necessary.
Notice is to be taken, in the same manner, of any continued deviation
from the limited distance; and to commence between the several
commanders of private ships respectively, independent of the admiral's
previous example, when they observe their seconds ahead or astern to
be at any time separated from them, further than the regulated
distance kept by the ships next to the admiral, or that which was last
appointed.
When the admiral, being before withdrawn from the line, means to
resume his station therein, he will make the signal for the particular
ships, between which he means to place himself, to open to a greater
distance, whether it be in his former station, or in any other part of
the line, better suited for his future purpose.
XI. When any number of ships is occasionally detached from the fleet
for the same purpose, they are, during their separation from the body
of the fleet, to comply with all such signals as shall be made at any
time, whilst the signal flag appropriated for that occasion remains
abroad.
But the signals made to all ships so appointed, having the commander
of a squadron or division with them, will be under the flag
descriptive of such commander's squadron or division, whose signals
and instructions they are to obey.
XII. Great care is to be taken at all times when coming to action not
to fire upon the enemy either over or near any ships of the fleet,
liable to be injured thereby; nor, when in order of battle, until the
proper signal is made, and that the ships are properly placed in
respect to situation and distance, although the signal may have been
before put abroad.
And if, when the signal for battle is made, the ships are then
steering down for the enemy in an oblique direction from each other,
they are to haul to the wind, or to any order parallel with the enemy,
to engage them as they arrive in a proper situation and distance,
without waiting for any more particular signal or order for that
purpose: regard being only had by the several commanders in these
circumstances to the motions of the ships preceding them on the tack
whereunto the course more inclines, and upon and towards which the
enemy is formed for action, that they may have convenient space for
hauling up clear of each other.
When our fleet is upon the contrary tack to that of the enemy, and
standing towards them, and the admiral makes the signal to engage, the
van ship is then to lead close along their line, with a moderate sail,
and engage; the rest of the fleet doing the same, passing to windward
or to leeward of the enemy, as the admiral may direct.
XIII. When weathering the enemy upon the contrary tack, and signal is
made to engage their van, the leading ship is then to bear down to the
van ship of the enemy, and engage, passing along their line to
windward to the sternmost ship of their van squadron, then to haul off
close to the wind, the rest of the fleet doing the same in
succession.[3]
XIV. No ship is to separate in time of action from the body of the
fleet, in pursuit of any small number of the enemy's ships beaten out
of the line; nor until their main body be also disabled or broken: but
the captains, who have disabled or forced their opponents out of the
line, are to use their best endeavours to assist any ship of the fleet
appearing to be much pressed, or the ships nearest to them, to hasten
the defeat of the enemy, unless otherwise by signal, or particular
instruction, directed.[4]
XV. When any ship in the fleet is so much disabled as to be in the
utmost danger and hazard of being taken by the enemy, or destroyed,
and makes the signal expressive of such extremity; the Captains of the
nearest ships, most at liberty with respect to the state of their
opponents in the enemy's line, are strictly enjoined to give all
possible aid and protection to such disabled ship, as they are best
able. And the captain of any frigate (or fireship) happening to be at
that time in a situation convenient for the purpose, is equally
required to use his utmost endeavours for the relief of such disabled
ship, by joining in the attack of the ship of the enemy opposed to the
disabled ship, if he sees opportunity to place his ship to advantage,
by favouring the attempt of the fireship to lay the enemy on board, or
by taking out any of the crew of the disabled ship, if practicable and
necessary, as may be most expedient.
XVI. No captain, though much pressed by the enemy, is to quit his
station in time of battle, if possible to be avoided, without
permission first obtained from the commanding officer of his division,
or other nearest flag officer, for that purpose; but, when compelled
thereto by extreme necessity before any adequate assistance is
furnished, or that he is ordered out of the line on that account, the
nearest ships and those on each part of the disabled ship's station
are timely to occupy the vacant space occasioned by her absence,
before the enemy can take advantage thereof.
And if any captain shall be wanting in the due performance of his duty
in time of battle, the commander of the division, or other flag
officer nearest to him, is immediately to remove such deficient
captain from his post, and appoint another commander to take the
charge and conduct of the ship on that occasion.
XVII. When, from the advantage obtained by the enemy over the fleet,
or from bad weather, or otherwise, the admiral hath by signal
signified his intention to leave the captains and other commanders at
liberty to proceed at their discretion; they are then permitted to act
as they see best under such circumstances, for the good of the king's
service and the preservation of their ships, without regard to his
example. But they are, nevertheless, to endeavour at all times to gain
the appointed rendezvous in preference, if it can be done with safety.
XVIII. The ships are to be kept at all times prepared in readiness for
action. And in case of coming to an engagement with the enemy, their
boats are to be kept manned and armed, and prepared with hand and
fire-chain grapnels, and other requisites, on the off-side from the
enemy, for the purpose of assisting any ship of the fleet attempted by
the fireships of the enemy; or for supporting the fireships of the
fleet when they are to proceed on service.
The ships appointed to protect and cover these last, or which may be
otherwise in a situation to countenance their operations, are to take
on board their crews occasionally, and proceed before them down, as
near as possible, to the ships of the enemy they are destined to
attempt.
The captains of such ships are likewise to be particularly attentive
to employ the boats they are provided with, as well to cover the
retreat of the fireships boat, as to prevent the endeavours to be
expected from the boats of the enemy to intercept the fireship, or in
any other manner to frustrate the execution of the proposed
undertaking.[5]
XIX. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag
officer may embark on board any private ship that he sees fit, for
carrying on the service: but it is to be of his own squadron or
division in preference when equally suitable for his purpose.
XX. The flag officers, or commanders of divisions, are on all
occasions to repeat generally, as well as with reference to their
respective divisions, the signals from the admiral, that they may be
thereby more speedily communicated correspondent to his intentions.
And the purpose of all signals for the conduct of particular divisions
is then only meant to be carried into execution when the signal has
been repeated, or made by the commanders of such particular divisions
respectively. In which circumstances they are to be always regarded
and complied with by the ships or divisions referred to, in the same
manner as if such signals had been made by the admiral commanding in
chief.
XXI. When ships have been detached to attack the enemy's rear, the
headmost ship of such detachment, and the rest in succession, after
having ranged up their line as far is judged proper, is then to fall
astern; and (the ship that next follows passing between her and the
enemy) is to tack or wear as engaged to windward or leeward, and form
in the rear of the detachment.
XXII. When the fleet is to tack in succession, the ship immediately
following the one going in stays should observe to bear up a little,
to give her room; and the moment for putting in stays is that when a
ship discovers the weather quarter of her second ahead, and which has
just tacked before her.
On this and every other occasion, when the fleet is in order of
battle, it should be the attention of each ship strictly to regulate
her motions by those of the one preceding her; a due regard to such a
conduct being the only means of maintaining the prescribed distance
between the ships, and of preserving a regular order throughout the
line.
XXIII. As soon as the signal is made to prepare for battle, the
fireships are to get their boarding grapnels fixed; and when in
presence of an enemy, and that they perceive the fleet is likely to
come to action, they are to prime although the signal for that purpose
should not have been made; being likewise to signify when they are
ready to proceed on service, by putting abroad the appointed signal.
They are to place themselves abreast of the ships of the line, and not
in the openings between them, the better to be sheltered from the
enemy's fire, keeping a watchful eye upon the admiral, so as to be
prepared to put themselves in motion the moment their signal is made,
which they are to answer as soon as observed.
A fireship ordered to proceed on service is to keep a little ahead and
to windward of the ship that is to escort her, to be the more ready to
bear down on the vessel she is to board, and to board if possible in
the fore shrouds. By proceeding in this manner she will not be in the
way of preventing the ship appointed to escort her from firing upon
the enemy, and will run less risk of being disabled herself; and the
ship so appointed and the two other nearest ships are to assist her
with their boats manned and armed.
She is to keep her yards braced up, that when she goes down to board,
and has approached the ship she is to attempt, she may have nothing to
do but to spring her luff.
Captains of fireships are not to quit them till they have grappled the
enemy, and have set fire to the train.
XXIV. Frigates have it in particular charge to frustrate the attempts
of the enemy's fireships, and to favour those of our own. When a
fireship of the enemy therefore attempts to board a ship of the line,
they are to endeavour to cut off the boats that attend her, and even
to board her, if necessary.
XXV. The boats of a ship attempted by an enemy's fireship, with those
of her seconds ahead and astern, are to use their utmost efforts to
tow her off, the ships at the same time firing to sink her.
XXVI. In action, all the ships in the fleet are to wear red ensigns.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] This and Article II. appear to be the first mention of working the
fleet by 'guides.'
[2] The original has here the following erasure: 'The same is to be
understood of the bearing indicated, though the admiral should shape his
course from the wind originally when the signal for forming upon a line
of bearing is made.'
[3] It was Nelson's improvement on this unscientific method of attack
that is the conspicuous feature of his Memorandum, 1803, but it must be
remembered that Howe had not yet devised the manoeuvre of breaking the
line in all parts on which Nelson's improvement was founded.
[4] Cf. note 1, p. 224.
[5] Howe's insistence on these points both here and in Articles
XXII.-XXV. is curious in view of the fact that the use of fireships in
action had gone out of fashion. From 1714 to 1763 only one English
fireship is known to have been 'expended,' and that was by Commander
Callis when he destroyed the Spanish galleys at St. Tropez in 1742. At
the peace of 1783 the Navy List contained only 17 fireships out of a
total of 468 sail. Howe had two fireships on the First of June, 1794,
but did not use them.
INTRODUCTORY
The second form in which the new Fighting Instructions, originated by
Lord Howe, have come down to us, is that which became fixed in the
service after 1790; that is, instead of two folio volumes with the
Signals in one and the Explanatory Instructions in the other, we have,
at least after 1799, one small quarto containing both, and entitled
'Signal Book for Ships of War.' The earliest known example, however,
of the new quarto form is a Signal Book only, which refers to a set of
Instructions apparently similar to those of 1799. These have not been
found, but presumably they were in a separate volume. The Signal Book
is in the Admiralty Library labelled in manuscript '1792-3(?),' but,
as before, no date or signature appears in the body of it. From
internal evidence, however, as well as from collateral testimony,
there is little difficulty in identifying it as Lord Howe's second
code issued in 1790.
The feature of the book that first strikes us is that, though the bulk
of it is printed, all the most important battle signals, as well as
many others, have been added in MS., while at the end are the words,
'Given on board the Queen Charlotte, to Capt. ——, commander of his
majesty's ship the ——, by command of the admiral.' It is thus
obvious that the original printed form, which contains many further
unfilled blanks for additional signals, was used as a draft for a
later edition. No such edition is known to exist in print, but both
the original signals and the additions correspond exactly with the
MS. code which was used by Lord Howe in his campaign of 1794. In
editing this code for the Society in his Logs of the Great Sea
Fights, Admiral Sturges Jackson hazarded the conjecture that it
had not then been printed, but was supplied to each ship in the fleet
in MS. The admiralty volume goes far to support his conjecture, and it
is quite possible that we have here the final draft from which the
MS. copies were made.
As to the actual date at which the code was completed there is not
much difficulty. The Queen Charlotte was Howe's flagship in the
Channel fleet from 1792-4, but it was also his flagship in 1790 at the
time of the 'Spanish Armament,' when he put to sea in immediate
expectation of war with Spain. While the tension lasted he is known
to have used the critical period in exercising his fleet in tactical
evolutions, in order to perfect it in a new code of signals which he
had been elaborating for several years.[1] It is probable therefore
that this Signal Book belongs to that year, and that it is one of
several copies which Howe had printed with the battle signals blank
for his own use while he was elaborating his system by practical
experiment. This conjecture is brought to practical certainty by a
rough and much-worn copy of it in the United Service Institution. It
was made by Lieut. John Walsh, of H.M.S. Marlborough, one of Howe's
fleet, and inside the cover he has written 'Earl Howe's signals by
which the Grand Fleet was governed 1790, 1791, and 1794.'
It was upon the tactical system contained in this book that all the
great actions of the Nelson period were fought. The alterations which
took place during the war were slight. The codes used by Howe himself
in 1794, and by Duncan at Camperdown in 1797, follow it exactly. A
slightly modified form was issued by Jervis to the Mediterranean
fleet, and was used by him at St. Vincent in 1797. No copy of this is
known to exist, but from the logs of the ships there engaged it would
appear that, though the numbering of the code had been changed, the
principal battle signals remained the same. In 1799 a new edition was
printed in the small quarto form. In this the Signal Book and the
Instructions were bound together, and were issued to the whole navy,
but here again, though the numbers were changed, the alterations were
of no great importance.[2] Reprints appeared in 1806 and 1808, but
the code itself continued in use till 1816. In that year an entirely
new Signal Book based on Sir Home Popham's code was issued with a
fresh set of Explanatory Instructions, or, as they had come to be
called, 'Instructions relating to the line of battle and the conduct
of the fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an
enemy.'[3] Both these sets of 'Explanatory Instructions' are printed
below, but, as we have seen, they throw but little light by themselves
on the progress of tactical thought during the great period they
covered. They were no longer 'Fighting Instructions' in the old sense,
unless read with the principal battle signals, and to these we have to
go to get at the ideas that underlay the tactics of Nelson and his
contemporaries.
Now the most remarkable feature of Howe's Second Signal Book, 1790, is
the apparent disappearance from it of the signal for breaking the line
which in his first code, 1782, he had borrowed from Hood in
consequence of Rodney's manoeuvre. The other two signals introduced
by Hood and Pigot for breaking the line on Rodney's plan are equally
absent. In their stead appears a signal for an entirely new manoeuvre,
never before practised or even suggested, so far as is known, by
anyone. The 'signification' runs as follows: 'If, when having the
weather-gage of the enemy, the admiral means to pass between the ships
of their line for engaging them to leeward or, being to leeward, to
pass between them for obtaining the weather-gage. N.B.—The different
captains and commanders not being able to effect the specified
intention in either case are at liberty to act as circumstances
require.' In the Signal Book of 1799 the wording is changed. It there
runs 'To break through the enemy's line in all parts where
practicable, and engage on the other side,' and in the admiralty copy
delivered to Rear-Admiral Frederick there is added this MS. note, 'If
a blue pennant is hoisted at the fore topmast-head, to break through
the van; if at the main topmast-head, to break through the centre; if
at the mizen topmast-head, to break through the rear.'[4]
This form of the signification shows that the intention of the signal
was something different from what is usually understood in naval
literature by 'breaking the line.' By that we generally understand the
manoeuvre practised by Lord Rodney in 1782, a manoeuvre which was
founded on the conception of 'leading through' the enemy's line in
line ahead, and all the ships indicated passing through in succession
at the same point. Whereas in Lord Howe's signal the tactical idea is
wholly different. In his manoeuvre the conception is of an attack by
bearing down all together in line abreast or line of bearing, and each
ship passing through the enemy's line at any interval it found
practicable; and this was actually the method of attack which he
adopted on June 1, 1794. In intention the two signals are as wide as
the poles asunder. In Rodney's case the idea was to sever the enemy's
line and cut off part of it from the rest. In Howe's case the idea of
severing the line is subordinate to the intention of securing an
advantage by engaging on the opposite side from which the attack is
made. The whole of the attacking fleet might in principle pass through
the intervals in the enemy's line without cutting off any part of
it. In principle, moreover, the new attack was a parallel attack in
line abreast or in line of bearing, whereas the old attack was a
perpendicular or oblique attack in line ahead.
Nothing perhaps in naval literature is more remarkable than the fact
that this fundamental difference is never insisted on, or even, it may
be said, so much as recognised. Whenever we read of a movement for
breaking the line in this period it is almost always accompanied with
remarks which assume that Rodney's manoeuvre is intended and not
Howe's. Probably it is Nelson who is to blame. At Trafalgar, after
carefully elaborating an attack based on Howe's method of line
abreast, he delivered it in line ahead, as though he had intended to
use Rodney's method. His reasons were sound enough, as will be seen
later. But as a piece of scientific tactics it was as though an
engineer besieging a fortress, instead of drawing his lines of
approach diagonally, were to make them at right angles to the
ditch. When the greatest of the admirals apparently (but only
apparently) confused the two antagonistic conceptions of breaking the
line, there is much excuse for civilian writers being confused in
fact.
The real interest of the matter, however, is to inquire, firstly, by
what process of thought Howe in his second code discarded Rodney's
manoeuvre as the primary meaning of his signal after having adopted it
in his first, and, secondly, how and to what end did he arrive at his
own method.
On the first point there can be little doubt. Sir Charles H. Knowles
gives us to understand that Howe still had Hoste's Treatise at his
elbow, and with Hoste for his mentor we may be sure that, in common
with other tactical students of his time, he soon convinced himself
that Rodney's manoeuvre was usually dangerous and always
imperfect. Knowles himself in his old age, though a devout admirer of
Rodney, denounced it in language of characteristic violence, and
maintained to the last that Rodney never intended it, as every one now
agrees was the truth. Nelson presumably also approved Howe's cardinal
improvement, or even in his most impulsive mood he would hardly have
called him 'the first and greatest sea officer the world has ever
produced.'[5]
As to the second point—the fundamental intention of the new
manoeuvre—we get again a valuable hint from Knowles. Upon his second
visit to the admiralty, after Howe had succeeded Keppel at the end of
1783, Knowles brought with him by request a tactical treatise written
by his father, as well as certain of his own tactical studies, and
discussed with Howe a certain manoeuvre which he believed the French
employed for avoiding decisive actions. He showed that when engaged to
leeward they fell off by alternate ships as soon as they were hard
pressed, and kept reforming their line to leeward, so that the British
had continually to bear up, and expose themselves to be raked aloft in
order to close again. In this way, as he pointed out, the French were
always able to clip the British wings without receiving any decisive
injury themselves. In a MS. note to his 'Fighting and Sailing
Instructions,' he puts the matter quite clearly. 'In the battle off
Granada,' he says, 'in the year 1779 the French ships partially
executed this manoeuvre, and Sir Charles [H.] Knowles (then 5th
lieutenant of the Prince of Wales of 74 guns, the flagship of the
Hon. Admiral Barrington) drew this manoeuvre, and which he showed
Admiral Lord Howe, when first lord of the admiralty, during the
peace. His lordship established a signal to break through the enemy's
line and engage on the other side to leeward, and which he executed
himself in the battle of the 1st of June, 1794.' The note adds that
before Knowles drew Howe's attention to the supposed French manoeuvre
he had been content with his original Article XIV., modifying Article
XXI. of the old Fighting Instructions as already explained. Whether
therefore Knowles's account is precisely accurate or not, we may take
it as certain that it was to baffle the French practice of avoiding
close action by falling away to leeward that Howe hit on his brilliant
conception of breaking through their line in all parts.
No finer manoeuvre was ever designed. In the first place it developed
the utmost fire-face by bringing both broadsides into play. Secondly,
by breaking up the enemy's line into fragments it deprived their
admiral of any shadow of control over the part attacked. Thirdly, by
seizing the leeward position (the essential postulate of the French
method of fighting) it prevented individual captains making good their
escape independently to leeward and ensured a decisive melee,
such as Nelson aimed at. And, fourthly, it permitted a concentration
on any part of the enemy's line, since it actually severed it at any
desired point quite as effectually as did Rodney's method. Whether
Howe ever appreciated the importance of concentration to the extent it
was felt by Nelson, Hood and Rodney is doubtful. Yet his invention
did provide the best possible form of concentrated attack. It had over
Rodney's imperfect manoeuvre this inestimable advantage, that by the
very act of breaking the line you threw upon the severed portion an
overwhelming attack of the most violent kind, and with the utmost
development of fire-surface. Finally it could not be parried as
Rodney's usually could in Hoste's orthodox way by the enemy's standing
away together upon the same tack. By superior gunnery Howe's attack
might be stopped, but by no possibility could it be avoided
except by flight. It was no wonder then that Howe's invention was
received with enthusiasm by such men as Nelson.
Still it is clear that in certain cases, and especially in making an
attack from the leeward, as Clerk of Eldin had pointed out, and where
it was desirable to preserve your own line intact, Rodney's manoeuvre
might still be the best. Howe's manoeuvre moreover supplied its chief
imperfection, for it provided a method of dealing drastically with the
portion of the enemy's line that had been cut off. Thus, although it
is not traceable in the Signal Book, it was really reintroduced in
Howe's third code. This is clear from the last article of the
Explanatory Instructions of 1799 which distinguishes between the two
manoeuvres; but whether or not this article was in the Instructions of
1790 we cannot tell. The probability is that it was not, for in the
Signal Book of 1790 there is no reference to a modifying instruction.
Further, we know that in the code proposed by Sir Charles H. Knowles
the only signal for breaking the line was word for word the same as
Howe's. This code he drew up in its final form in 1794, but it was not
printed till 1798. The presumption is therefore that until the code of
1799 was issued Howe's method of breaking the line was the only one
recognised. In that code the primary intention of Signal 27 'for
breaking through the enemy's line in all parts' is still for Howe's
manoeuvre, but the instruction provides that it could be modified by a
red pennant over, and in that case it meant 'that the fleet is to
preserve the line of battle as it passes through the enemy's line, and
to preserve it in very close order, that such of the enemy's ships as
are cut off may not find an opportunity of passing through it to
rejoin their fleet.' This was precisely Rodney's manoeuvre with the
proviso for close order introduced by Pigot. The instruction also
provided for the combining of a numeral to indicate at which number in
the enemy's line the attempt was to be made. No doubt the distinction
between manoeuvres so essentially different might have been more
logically made by entirely different signals.[6] But in practice it
was all that was wanted. It is only posterity that suffers, for in
studying the actions of that time it is generally impossible to tell
from the signal logs or the tactical memoranda which movement the
admiral had in mind. Not only do we never find it specified whether
the signal was made simply or with the pennant over, but admirals seem
to have used the expressions 'breaking' and 'cutting' the line, and
'breaking through,' 'cutting through,' 'passing through,' and 'leading
through,' as well as others, quite indiscriminately of both forms of
the manoeuvre. Thus in Nelson's first, or Toulon, memorandum he speaks
of 'passing through the line' from to-windward, meaning presumably
Howe's manoeuvre, and of 'cutting through' their fleet from to-leeward
when presumably he means Rodney's. In the Trafalgar memorandum he
speaks of 'leading through' and 'cutting' the line from to-leeward,
and of 'cutting through' from to-windward, when he certainly meant to
perform Howe's manoeuvre. Whereas Howe, in his Instruction XXXI. of
1799, uses 'breaking the line' and 'passing through it' indifferently
of both forms.
All we can do is generally to assume that when the attack was to be
made from to-windward Howe's manoeuvre was intended, and Rodney's when
it was made from to-leeward. Yet this is far from being safe
ground. For the signification of the plain signal without the red
pennant over—i.e. 'to break through … and engage on the other
side'—seems to contemplate Howe's manoeuvre being made both from
to-leeward and from to-windward.
The only notable disappearances in Howe's second code (1790) are the
signals for 'doubling,' probably as a corollary of the new
manoeuvre. For, until this device was hit upon, Rodney's method of
breaking the line apparently could only be made effective as a means
of concentration by doubling on the part cut off in accordance with
Hoste's method. This at least is what Clerk of Eldin seems to imply
in some of his diagrams, in so far as he suggests any method of
dealing with the part cut off. Yet in spite of this disappearance
Nelson certainly doubled at the Nile, and according to Captain Edward
Berry, who was captain of his flagship, he did it deliberately. 'It is
almost unnecessary,' he wrote in his narrative, 'to explain his
projected mode of attack at anchor, as that was minutely and precisely
executed in the action…. These plans however were formed two months
before, … and the advantage now was that they were familiar to the
understanding of every captain in the fleet.' Nelson probably felt
that the dangers attending doubling in an action under sail are
scarcely appreciable in an action at anchor with captains whose
steadiness he could trust. Still Saumarez, his second in command,
regarded it as a mistake, and there was a good deal of complaint of
our ships having suffered from each other's fire.[7]
Amongst the more important retentions of tactical signals we find that
for Hoste's method of giving battle to a numerically superior force by
leaving gaps in your own line between van, centre and rear. The
wording however is changed. It is no longer enjoined as a means of
avoiding being doubled. As Howe inserted it in MS. the signification
now ran 'for the van or particular divisions to engage the headmost of
the enemy's van, the rear the sternmost of the enemy's rear, and the
centre the centre of the enemy. But with exception of the flag
officers of the fleet who should engage those of the enemy
respectively in preference.'[8] This signification again is
considerably modified by the Explanatory Instructions. Article XXIV.,
it will be seen, says nothing of engaging the centre or of leaving
regular gaps. The leading ship is to engage the enemy's leading ship,
and the rearmost the rearmost, while the rest are to select the
largest ships they can get at, and leave the weaker ones alone till
the stronger are disabled. It was in effect the adoption of Hoste's
fifth rule for engaging a numerically superior fleet instead of his
first, and it is a plan which he condemns except in the case of your
being individually superior to your enemy, as indeed the English
gunnery usually made them.
The curious signal No. 218 of 1782 for attacking the enemy's rear in
succession by 'defiling' on the Elizabethan plan was also retained. In
the Signal Book of 1799 it ran, 'to fire in succession upon the
sternmost ships of the enemy, then tack or wear and take station in
rear of the squadron or division specified (if a part of the fleet is
so appointed) until otherwise directed.'
It has been already said that the alterations in the edition of 1799
were not of great importance, but one or two additions must be
noticed. The most noteworthy is a new signal for carrying out the
important rule of Article IX. of the Instructions of 1782 (Article
X. of 1799), providing for the formation of a corps de reserve
when you are numerically superior to the enemy, as was done by
Villeneuve on Gravina's advice in 1805, although fortunately for
Nelson it was not put in practice at Trafalgar.
The other addition appears in MS. at the end of the printed signals.
It runs as follows: 'When at anchor in line of battle to let go a
bower anchor under foot, and pass a stout hawser from one ship to
another, beginning at the weathermost ship,' an addition which would
seem to have been suggested by what had recently occurred at the Nile.
Nelson's own order was as follows: 'General Memorandum.—As the
wind will probably blow along shore, when it is deemed necessary to
anchor and engage the enemy at their anchorage it is recommended to
each line-of-battle ship of the squadron to prepare to anchor with the
sheet cable in abaft and springs, &c.'[9] Another copy of the signal
book has a similar MS. addition to the signal 'Prepare for battle and
for anchoring with springs, &c.'[10] It runs thus: 'A bower is to be
unbent, and passed through the stern port and bent to the anchor,
leaving that anchor hanging by the stopper only.—Lord Nelson, St.
George, 26 March, 1801. If with a red pennant over with a spring
only.—Commander-in-chiefs Order Book, 27 March, 1801.' These
therefore were additions made immediately before the attack on the
Danish fleet at Copenhagen.
No other change was made, and it may be said that Howe's new method of
breaking the line was the last word on the form of attack for a
sailing fleet. How far its full intention and possibilities were
understood at first is doubtful. The accounts of the naval actions
that followed show no lively appreciation on the part of the bulk of
British captains. On the First of June the new signal for breaking
through the line at all points was the first Howe made, and it was
followed as soon as the moment for action arrived by that 'for each
ship to steer for, independently of each other, and engage
respectively the ship opposed in situation to them in the enemy's
line.' The result was an action along the whole line, during which
Howe himself at the earliest opportunity passed through the enemy's
line and engaged on the other side, though as a whole the fleet
neglected to follow either his signal or his example.
In the next great action, that of St. Vincent, the circumstances were
not suitable for the new manoeuvre, seeing that the Spaniards had not
formed line. Jervis had surprised the enemy in disorder on a hazy
morning after a change of wind, and this was precisely the 'not very
probable case' which Clerk of Eldin had instanced as justifying a
perpendicular attack. Whether or not Jervis had Clerk's instance in
his mind, he certainly did deliver a perpendicular attack. The signal
with which he opened, according to the signification as given in the
flagship's log, was 'The admiral intends to pass through the enemy's
line.'[11] There is nothing to show whether this meant Howe's
manoeuvre or Rodney's, for we do not know whether at this time the
instruction existed which enabled the two movements to be
distinguished by a pennant over.
What followed however was that the fleet passed between the two
separated Spanish squadrons in line ahead as Clerk advised. The next
thing to do, according to Clerk, was for the British fleet to wear or
tack together, but instead of doing so Jervis signalled to tack in
succession, and then repeated the signal to pass through the enemy's
line although it was still unformed. It was at this moment that Nelson
made his famous independent movement that saved the situation, and
what he did was in effect as though Jervis had made the signal to tack
together as Clerk enjoined. Thereupon Jervis, with the intention
apparently of annulling his last order to pass through the line, made
the signal, which seems to have been the only one which the captains
of those days believed in—viz. to take suitable stations for mutual
support and engage the enemy on arriving up with them in
succession. In practice it was little more than a frank relapse to the
methods of the early Commonwealth, and it was this signal and not that
for breaking the line which made the action general.
Again, at the battle of Camperdown, Duncan, while trying to form
single line from two columns of sailing, began with the signal for
each ship to steer independently for her opponent. This was
followed—the fleet having failed to form line parallel to the enemy,
and being still in two disordered columns—by signals for the lee or
van division to engage the enemy's rear, and as some thought the
weather division his centre; and ten minutes later came the new signal
for passing through the line. The result was an action almost exactly
like that of Nelson at Trafalgar—that is, though the leading ships
duly acted on the combination of the two signals for engaging their
opposites and for breaking the line, each at its opposite interval,
the rest was a melee; for, since what was fundamentally a
parallel attack was attempted as a perpendicular one, it could be
nothing but a scramble for the rear ships.
In none of these actions therefore is there any evidence that Howe's
attempt to impress the service with a serious scientific view of
tactics had been successful, and the impression which they made upon
our enemies suggests that the real spirit that inspired British
officers at this time was something very different from that which
Howe had tried to instil. Writing of the battle of St. Vincent, Don
Domingo Perez de Grandallana, whose masterly studies of the French and
English naval systems and tactics raised him to the highest offices of
state, has the following passage: 'An Englishman enters a naval action
with the firm conviction that his duty is to hurt his enemies and help
his friends and allies without looking out for directions in the midst
of the fight; and while he thus clears his mind of all subsidiary
distractions, he rests in confidence on the certainty that his
comrades, actuated by the same principles as himself, will be bound by
the sacred and priceless law of mutual support. Accordingly, both he
and all his fellows fix their minds on acting with zeal and judgment
upon the spur of the moment, and with the certainty that they will not
be deserted. Experience shows, on the contrary, that a Frenchman or a
Spaniard, working under a system which leans to formality and strict
order being maintained in battle, has no feeling for mutual support,
and goes into action with hesitation, preoccupied with the anxiety of
seeing or hearing the commander-in-chief's signals for such and such
manoeuvres…. Thus they can never make up their minds to seize any
favourable opportunity that may present itself. They are fettered by
the strict rule to keep station, which is enforced upon them in both
navies, and the usual result is that in one place ten of their ships
may be firing on four, while in another four of their comrades may be
receiving the fire of ten of the enemy. Worst, of all, they are denied
the confidence inspired by mutual support, which is as surely
maintained by the English as it is neglected by us, who will not learn
from them.'[12]
This was probably the broad truth of the matter; it is summed up in
the golden signal which was the panacea of British admirals when in
doubt: 'Ships to take station for mutual support and engage as they
come up;' and it fully explains why, with all the scientific
appreciation of tactics that existed in the leading admirals of this
time, their battles were usually so confused and haphazard. The truth
is that in the British service formal tactics had come to be regarded
as a means of getting at your enemy, and not as a substitute for
initiative in fighting him.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Dictionary of National Biography, sub voce 'Howe,' p. 97.
[2] A copy of this is in the Admiralty Library issued to 'Thomas Lenox
Frederick esq., Rear-Admiral of the Blue,' and attested by the
autographs of Vice-Admiral James Gambier, Vice-Admiral James Young, and
another lord of the admiralty, and countersigned by William Marsden, the
famous numismatist and Oriental scholar, who was 'second secretary' from
1795 to 1804. Another copy, also in the Admiralty Library, is attested
by Gambier, Sir John Colpoys and Admiral Philip Patton, and
countersigned by the new second secretary, John Barrow, all of whom came
to the admiralty under Lord Melville on Pitt's return to office in 1804.
Two other copies are in the United Service Institution.
[3] Sir Home Popham's code had been in use for many years for
'telegraphing.' It was by this code Nelson's famous signal was made at
Trafalgar.
[4] In one of the United Service Institution copies the signal has
been added in MS. and the note is on a slip pasted in. In the other both
signal and note are printed with blanks in which the distinguishing
pennants have been written in.
[5] Nelson to Howe, January 8, 1799. Nicolas, iii. 230.
[6] Sir Charles H. Knowles did modify his code in this way some time
after 1798. For his original signal he substituted two in MS. with the
following neatly worded significations: 'No. 32. To break through the
enemy's line together and engage on the opposite side. No. 33. To break
through the enemy's line in succession and engage on the other side.'
Had these two lucid significations been adopted by Howe there would have
been no possible ambiguity as to what was meant.
[7] Laughton, Nelson's Letters and Despatches, p. 151. Ross, Memoir
of Lord de Saumarez, vol. i.
[8] This last mediaeval proviso was omitted in the later editions. It
is not found in Hoste.
[9] Ross, Memoir of Saumarez, i. 212. Nelson refers to 'Signal 54,
Art. XXXVII. of the Instructions,' which must have been a special and
amplified set issued by Jervis. There is no Art. XXXVII. in Howe's set.
[10] In the United Service Institution.
[11] Logs of the Great Sea Fights, i. 210. The log probably only
gives an abbreviation of the signification. Unless Jervis had changed
it, its exact wording was 'The admiral means to pass between the ships
of their line for engaging them to leeward,' &c. See supra, p. 255.
[12] Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola, viii. 111.
[+Signal Book, 1799+.[1]]
Instructions for the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their
engaging, and when engaged, with an enemy.
I. When the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle,
each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as
expeditiously as possible, and to keep in close order, if not
otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that
carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the
line when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it.
II. The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle
are: that the ships may be able to assist and support each other in
action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships
greater in number than themselves; and that every ship may be able to
fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own
fleet.
III. If, after having made a signal to prepare to form the line of
battle on either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the preparative
flag flying, should make several signals in succession, to point out
the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals are to be
carefully written down, that they may be carried into execution, when
the signal for the line is hoisted again; they are to be executed in
the order in which they were made, excepting such as the admiral may
annul previously to his hoisting again the signal for the line.
IV. If any part of the fleet should be so far to leeward, when the
signal is made for the line of battle, that the admiral should think
it necessary to bear up and stand towards them, he will do it with the
signal No. 105 hoisted.[2] The ships to leeward are thereupon to
exert themselves to get as expeditiously as possible into their
stations in the line.
V. Ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet, on any
separate service, are not to obey the signal for forming the line of
battle, unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by
signal.
VI. Ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as
directed in Article 9 of the General Instructions, though in the
presence of an enemy.[3] The captains of such ships will not thereby
be prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have
opportunities of rendering essential service, by placing their ships
advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with
the other part of the fleet.
VII. When the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is
made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to
place themselves in such a manner that if they were to haul to the
wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed,
they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. To do this,
every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the
line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compass on
which the line of battle would sail, viz., on that point of the
compass which is seven points from the direction of the wind, or six
points if the signal is made to keep close to the wind.
As the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to
form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or
squadron flags, shown with the signal for such a line, will refer to
the forming of the line of battle; that division or squadron whose
flag is uppermost (without considering whether it do or do not form
the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station
which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind and
form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is undermost is
to place itself in that station in which it would become the rear if
by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be formed.[4]
VIII. When a line of bearing has been formed, the ships are to
preserve that relative bearing from each other, whenever they are
directed to alter the course together; but if they are directed to
alter the course in succession, as the line of bearing will by that be
destroyed, it is no longer to be attended to.
IX. If the signal to make more or less sail is made when the fleet is
in line of battle, the frigate appointed to repeat signals will set
the same sails as are carried by the admiral's ship; the ships are
then in succession (from the rear if to shorten, or the van, if to
make more, sail) to put themselves under a proportion of sail
correspondent to their comparative rate of sailing with the admiral's
ship.
To enable captains to do this it will be necessary that they acquire a
perfect knowledge of the proportion of sail required for suiting their
rate of sailing to that of the admiral, under the various changes in
the quantity of sail, and state of the weather; which will enable
them, not only to keep their stations in the line of battle, but also
to keep company with the fleet on all other occasions.
When the signal to make more sail is made, if the admiral is under his
topsails he will probably set the Foresail.
If the signal is repeated, or if the foresail is set he will probably
set Jib and staysails.
If the foresail, jib, and staysails are set, he will set the
Topgallant-sails.
Or in equally weather Mainsail.
When the signal to shorten sail is made, he will probably take in sail
in a gradation the reverse of the preceding.
X. Ships which are ordered by signal to withdraw from the line are to
place themselves to windward of the fleet if it has the weather-gage
of the enemy, or to leeward and ahead if the contrary; and are to be
ready to assist any ship which may want their assistance, or to act in
any other manner as directed by signal.
If the ships so withdrawn, or any others which may have been detached,
should be unable to resume their stations in the line when ordered by
signal to do so, they are to attack the enemy's ships in any part of
the line on which they may hope to make the greatest impression.[5]
XI. If the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or
which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the
ships which, at either extremity of the line, are thereby left without
opponents may, after the action is begun, quit the line without
waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or
assist the ships of the fleet, in the best manner that circumstances
will allow.
XII. When any number of ships, not having a flag officer with them,
are detached from the fleet to act together, they are to obey all
signals which are accompanied by the flag appropriated to detachments,
and are not to attend to any made without that flag. But if a flag
officer, commanding a squadron, or division, be with such detachment,
all the ships of it are to consider themselves, for the time, as
forming part of the division, or squadron, of such flag officer; and
they are to obey those signals, and only those, which are accompanied
by his distinguishing flag.
XIII. Great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy,
either over, or very near to, any ships of the fleet; nor, though the
signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is
placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy.
XIV. If, when the signal for battle is made, the ships are steering
down for the enemy, they are to haul to the wind, or to any course
parallel to the enemy, and are to engage them when properly placed,
without waiting for any particular signal; but every ship must be
attentive to the motions of that ship which will be her second ahead,
when formed parallel to the enemy, that she may have room to haul up
without running on board of her. The distance of the ships from each
other during the action must be governed by that of their respective
opponents on the enemy's line.
XV. No ship is to Separate from the body of the fleet, in time of
action, to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have
been beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some
other flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled
their opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to assist any
ship of the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their
attack till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled; unless
by signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act
otherwise.
XVI. If any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of
being destroyed, or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal,
expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are
the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her
immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a
situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the
enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate, that may be near, is to
use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off,
or by joining in the attack of the enemy, or by covering the fireship;
or, if necessity require it, by taking out the crew of the disabled
ship; or by any other means which circumstances at the time will
admit.[6]
XVII. Though a ship be disabled, and hard pressed by the enemy in
battle, she is not to quit her station in the line, if it can possibly
be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do
from the commander of the squadron, or division, to which he belongs,
or from some other flag officer. But if he should be ordered out of
the line, or should be obliged to quit it, before assistance can be
sent to him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the space
become vacant, to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it.
XVIII. If there should be found a captain so lost to all sense of
honour and the great duty he owes his country, as not to exert himself
to the utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy
them when engaged; the commander of the squadron, or division, to
which he belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from
his command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship,
till the admiral's pleasure shall be known.
XIX. When, from the advantage obtained by the enemy over the fleet, or
from bad weather, or from any other cause, the admiral makes the
signal for the fleet to disperse, every captain will be left to act as
he shall judge most proper for the preservation of the ship he
commands, and the good of the king's service; but he is to endeavour
to go to the appointed rendezvous, if it may be done with safety.
XX. The ships are to be kept at all times as much prepared for battle
as circumstances will admit; and if the fleet come to action with an
enemy which has the weather-gage, boats, well armed, are to be held in
readiness, with hand and fire-chain grapnels in them; and if the
weather will admit, they are to be hoisted out, and kept on the
offside from the enemy, for the purpose of assisting any ships against
which fireships shall be sent; or for supporting the fireships of the
fleet, if they should be sent against the enemy.[7]
XXI. The ships appointed to protect and cover fireships, when ordered
on service, or which, without being appointed, are in a situation to
cover and protect them, are to receive on board their crews, and,
keeping between them and the enemy, to go with them as near as
possible to the ships they are directed to destroy. All the boats of
those ships are to be well armed, and to be employed in covering the
retreat of the fireship's boats, and in defending the ship from any
attempts that may be made on her by the boats of the enemy.
XXII. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag
officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not
already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper; but he is to
hoist it in one of his own squadron or division if there be one near,
and fit for the purpose.
XXIII. If a squadron or any detachment be directed by signal to gain
or keep the wind of the enemy, the officer commanding it is to act in
such manner as shall in his judgment be the most effectual for the
total defeat of the enemy; either by reinforcing those parts of the
fleet which are opposed to superior force, or by attacking such parts
of the enemy's line as, by their weakness, may afford reasonable hopes
of their being easily broken,
XXIV. When the signal (30) is made to extend the line from one
extremity of the enemy's line to the other, though the enemy have a
greater number of ships, the leading ship is to engage the leading
ship, and the sternmost ship the sternmost of the enemy; and the other
ships are, as far as their situation will admit, to engage the ships
of greatest force, leaving the weaker ships unattacked till the
stronger shall have been disabled.[8]
XXV. If the admiral, or any commander of a squadron or division, shall
think fit to change his station in the line, in order to place himself
opposite to the admiral or the commander of a similar squadron or
division in the enemy's line, he will make the Signal 47 for quitting
the line in his own ship, without showing to what other part of the
line he means to go; the ships ahead or astern (as circumstances may
require) of the station opposed to the commander in the enemy's line
are then to close and make room for him to get into it. But if the
admiral, being withdrawn from the line, should think fit to return to
any particular place in it, he will make the signal No. 269 with the
distinguishing signal of his own ship, and soon after he will hoist
the distinguishing signal of the ship astern of which he means to
take, his station. And if he should direct by signal any other ship to
take a station in the line, he will also hoist the distinguishing
signal of the ship astern of which he would have her placed, if she is
not to take the station assigned her in the line of battle given out.
XXVI. When the Signal 29 is made for each ship to steer for her
opponent in the enemy's line, the ships are to endeavour, by making or
shortening sail, to close with their opponents and bring them to
action at the same time; but they must be extremely careful not to
pass too near each other, nor to do anything which may risk their
running on board each other: they may engage as soon as they are well
closed with their opponents, and properly placed for that purpose.
XXVII. When the Signal 28 is made, for ships to form as most
convenient, and attack the enemy as they get up with them; the ships
are to engage to windward or to leeward, as from the situation of the
enemy they shall find most advantageous; but the leading ships must be
very cautious not to suffer themselves to be drawn away so far from
the body of the fleet as to risk the being surrounded and cut off.
XXVIII. When Signal 14 is made to prepare for battle and for
anchoring, the ships are to have springs on their bower anchors, and
the end of the sheet cable taken in at the stern port, with springs on
the anchor to be prepared for anchoring without winding if they should
go to the attack with the wind aft. The boats should be hoisted out
and hawsers coiled in the launches, with the stream anchor ready to
warp them into their stations, or to assist other ships which may be
in want of assistance. Their spare yards and topmasts, if they cannot
be left in charge of some vessel, should in moderate weather be lashed
alongside, near the water, on the off-side from the battery or ship to
be attacked. The men should be directed to lie down on the off side of
the deck from the enemy, whenever they are not wanted, if the ship
should be fired at as they advance to the attack.
XXIX. When the line of battle has been formed as most convenient,
without regard to the prescribed form, the ships which happen to be
ahead of the centre are to be considered, for the time, as the
starboard division, and those astern of the centre as the larboard
division of the fleet; and if the triangular flag, white with a red
fly, be hoisted, the line is to be considered as being divided into
the same number of squadrons and divisions as in the established line
of battle. The ship which happens at the time to lead the fleet is to
be considered as the leader of the van squadron, and every other ship
which happens to be in the station of the leader of the squadron or
division is to be considered as being the leader of that squadron or
division, and the intermediate ships are to form the squadrons or
divisions of such leaders, and to follow them as long as the
triangular flag is flying, and every flag officer is to be considered
as the commander of the squadron or division in which he may be
accidentally placed.
XXX. If the wind should come forward when the fleet is formed in line
of battle, or is sailing by the wind in a line of bearing, the leading
ship is to continue steering seven points from the wind, and every
other ship is to haul as close to the wind as possible, till she has
got into the wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought
it on the proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come aft,
the sternmost ship is to continue steering seven points from the wind,
and the other ships are to haul close to the wind till they have
brought the sternmost ship into their wake, or on the proper point of
bearing.
XXXI. If Signal 27, to break through the enemy's line, be made without
a 'red pennant' being hoisted, it is evident that to obey it the line
of battle must be entirely broken; but if a 'red pennant' be hoisted
at either mast-head, that fleet is to preserve the line of battle as
it passes through the enemy's line, and to preserve it in very close
order, that such of the enemy's ships as are cut off may not find an
opportunity of passing through it to rejoin their fleet.
If a signal of number be made immediately after this signal, it will
show the number of ships of the enemy's van or rear which the fleet is
to endeavour to cut off. If the closing of the enemy's line should
prevent the ships passing through the part pointed out, they are to
pass through as near to it as they can.
If any of the ships should find it impracticable, in either of the
above cases, to pass through the enemy's line, they are to act in the
best manner that circumstances will admit of for the destruction of
the enemy.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Similar but not identical instructions are referred to in the
Signal Book of 1790. The above were reproduced in all subsequent
editions till the end of the war.
[2] 'Ships to leeward to get in the admiral's wake.'
[3] The instructions referred to are the 'General Instructions for the
conduct of the fleet.' They are the first of the various sets which the
Signal Book contained, and relate to books to be kept, boats, keeping
station, evolutions and the like. Article IX. is 'If from any cause
whatever a ship should find it impossible to keep her station in any
line or order of sailing, she is not to break the line or order by
persisting too long in endeavouring to preserve it; but she is to quit
the line and form in the rear, doing everything she can to keep up with
the fleet.'
[4] See at p. 235, as to the new sailing formation in three columns.
[5] It should be noted that this is an important advance on the
corresponding Article IX. of the previous instructions, and that it
contains a germ of the organisation of Nelson's Trafalgar memorandum.
[6] The continued insistence on fireship tactics in this and Articles
XX. and XXI. should again be noted, although from 1793 to 1802 the
number of fireships on the Navy List averaged under four out of a total
that increased from 304 to 517.
[7] It should be remembered that at this time there were no davits and
no boats hoisted up. They were all carried in-board.
[8] This is a considerable modification of the signification of the
signal; see supra, p. 263.
INTRODUCTORY
The first of these often quoted memoranda is the 'Plan of Attack,'
usually assigned to May 1805, when Nelson was in pursuit of
Villeneuve, and it is generally accompanied by two erroneous diagrams
based on the number of ships which he then had under his command. But,
as Professor Laughton has ingeniously conjectured, it must really
belong to a time two years earlier, when Nelson was off Toulon in
constant hope of the French coming out to engage him.[1] The
strength and organisation of Nelson's fleet at that time, as well as
the numbers of the French fleet, exactly correspond to the data of the
memorandum. To Professor Laughton's argument may be added another,
which goes far actually to fix the date. The principal signal which
Nelson's second method of attack required was 'to engage to leeward.'
Now this signal as it stood in the Signal Book of 1799 was to some
extent ambiguous. It was No. 37, and the signification was 'to engage
the enemy on their larboard side, or to leeward if by the wind,' while
No. 36 was 'to engage the enemy on their starboard side if going
before the wind, or to windward if by the wind.' Accordingly we find
Nelson issuing a general order, with the object apparently of removing
the ambiguity, and of rendering any confusion between starboard and
larboard and leeward and windward impossible. It is in Nelson's order
book, under date November 22, 1803, and runs as follows:
'If a pennant is shown over signal No. 36, it signifies that ships are
to engage on the enemy's starboard side, whether going large or upon a
wind.
'If a pennant is shown in like manner over No. 37, it signifies that
ships are to engage on the enemy's larboard side, whether going large
or upon a wind.
'These additions to be noted in the Signal Book in pencil only.'[2]
The effect of this memorandum was, of course, that Nelson had it in
his power to let every captain know, without a shadow of doubt, under
all conditions of wind, on which side he meant to engage the enemy.
To the evidence of the Signal Book may be added a passage in Nelson's
letter to Admiral Sir A. Ball from the Magdalena Islands, November 7,
1803. He there writes: 'Our last two reconnoiterings: Toulon has
eight sail of the line apparently ready for sea … a seventy-four
repairing. Whether they intend waiting for her I can't tell, but I
expect them every hour to put to sea.'[3] He was thus expecting to
have to deal with eight or nine of the line, which is the precise
contingency for which the memorandum provides. There can be little
doubt therefore that it was issued while Nelson lay at Magdalena, the
first week in November 1803.[4]
The second memorandum, which Nelson communicated to his fleet, soon
after he joined it off Cadiz, is regarded by universal agreement as
the high-water mark of sailing tactics. Its interpretation however,
and the dominant ideas that inspired it, no less than the degree to
which it influenced the battle and was in the mind of Nelson and his
officers at the time, are questions of considerable uncertainty. Some
of the most capable of his captains, as we shall see presently, even
disagreed as to whether Trafalgar was fought under the memorandum at
all. From the method in which the attack was actually made, so
different apparently from the method of the memorandum, some thought
Nelson had cast it aside, while others saw that it still applied. A
careful consideration of all that was said and done at the time gives
a fairly clear explanation of the divergence of opinion, and it will
probably be agreed that those officers who had a real feeling for
tactics saw that Nelson was making his attack on what were the
essential principles of the memorandum, while some on the other hand
who were possessed of less tactical insight did not distinguish
between what was essential and what was accidental in Nelson's great
conception, and, mistaking the shadow for the substance, believed that
he had abandoned his carefully prepared project.
For those who did not entirely grasp Nelson's meaning there is much
excuse. We who are able to follow step by step the progress of
tactical thought from the dawn of the sailing period can appreciate
without much difficulty the radical revolution which he was setting on
foot. It was a revolution, as we can plainly see, that was tending to
bring the long-drawn curve of tactical development round to the point
at which the Elizabethans had started. Surprise is sometimes expressed
that, having once established the art of warfare under sail in
broadside ships, our seamen were so long in finding the tactical
system it demanded. Should not the wonder be the converse: that the
Elizabethan seamen so quickly came so near the perfected method of the
greatest master of the art? The attack at Gravelines in 1588 with four
mutually supporting squadrons in echelon bears strong elementary
resemblance to that at Trafalgar in 1805. It was in dexterity and
precision of detail far more than in principle that the difference
lay. The first and the last great victory of the British navy had
certainly more in common with each other than either had with Malaga
or the First of June. In the zenith of their careers Nelson and Drake
came very near to joining hands. Little wonder then if many of
Nelson's captains failed to fathom the full depth of his profound
idea. Naval officers in those days were left entirely without
theoretical instruction on the higher lines of their profession, and
Nelson, if we may judge by the style of his memoranda, can hardly have
been a very lucid expositor. He thought they all understood what with
pardonable pride he called the 'Nelson touch.' The most sagacious and
best educated of them probably did, but there were clearly some—and
Collingwood, as we shall see, was amongst them—who only grasped some
of the complex principles which were combined in his brilliant
conception.
An analysis of the memorandum will show how complex it was. In the
first and foremost place there is a clear note of denunciation against
the long established fallacy of the old order of battle in single
line. Secondly, there is in its stead the reestablishment of the
primitive system of mutually supporting squadrons in line
ahead. Thirdly, there is the principle of throwing one squadron in
superior force upon one end of the enemy's formation, and using the
other squadrons to cover the attack or support it if need
arose. Fourthly, there is the principle of concealment—that is,
disposing the squadrons in such a manner that even after the real
attack has been delivered the enemy cannot tell what the containing
squadrons mean to do, and in consequence are forced to hold their
parrying move in suspense. The memorandum also included the idea of
concentration, and this is often spoken of as its conspicuous
merit. But in the idea of concentration there was nothing new, even if
we go back no further than Rodney. It was only the method of
concentration, woven out of his four fundamental innovations, that was
new. Moreover, as Nelson delivered the attack, he threw away the
simple idea of concentration. For a suddenly conceived strategical
object he deliberately exposed the heads of his columns to what with
almost any other enemy would have been an overwhelming superiority. On
the other hand, by making, as he did, a perpendicular instead of a
parallel attack, as he had intended, he accentuated—it is true at
enormous risk—the cardinal points of his design; that is, he departed
still further from the old order of battle, and he still further
concealed from the enemy what the real attack was to be, and after it
was developed what the containing squadron was going to do.
Concentration in fact was only the crude and ordinary raw material of
a design of unmatched subtlety and invention.
The keynote of his conception, then, was his revolutionary
substitution of the primitive Elizabethan and early seventeenth
century method for the fetish of the single line. For some time it is
true the established battle order had been blown upon from various
quarters, but no one as yet had been able to devise any system
convincing enough to dethrone it. It will be remembered that at least
as early as 1759 an Additional Instruction had provided for a battle
order in two lines, but it does not appear ever to have been
used.[5] Rodney's manoeuvre again had foreshadowed the use of parts
of the line independently for the purpose of concentration and
containing. In 1782 Clerk of Eldin had privately printed his
Essay, which contained suggestions for an attack from to-windward,
with the line broken up into echeloned divisions in close
resemblance to the disposition laid down in Nelson's memorandum. In
1790 this part of his work was published. Meanwhile an even more
elaborate and well-reasoned assault on the whole principle of the
single line had appeared in France. In 1787 the Vicomte de Grenier, a
French flag officer, had produced his L'Art de la Guerre sur
Mer, in which he boldly attacked the law laid down by De Grasse,
that so long as men-of-war carried their main armament in broadside
batteries there could never be any battle order but the single line
ahead. In Grenier's view the English had already begun to discard it,
and he insists that, in all the actions he had seen in the last two
wars, the English, knowing the weakness of the single line, had almost
always concentrated on part of it without regular order. The radical
defects of the line he points out are: that it is easily thrown into
disorder and easily broken, that it is inflexible, and too extended a
formation to be readily controlled by signals. He then proceeds to
lay down the principle on which a sound battle order should be framed,
and the fundamental objects at which it should aim[6]. His
postulates are thus stated:
'1. De rendre nulle une partie des forces de l'ennemi afin de
reunir toutes les siennes contre celles qui l'on attaque, ou qui
attaquent; et de vaincre ensuite le reste avec plus de facilite et
de certitude.
'2. De ne presenter a l'ennemi aucune partie de son armee qui
ne soit flanquee et ou il ne put combattre et vaincre s'il
vouloit se porter sur les parties de cette armee reconnues faibles
jusqu'a present.'
Never had the fundamental intention of naval tactics been stated with
so much penetration, simplicity, and completeness. The order, however,
which Grenier worked out—that of three lines of bearing disposed on
three sides of a lozenge—was somewhat fantastic and cumbrous, and it
seems to have been enough to secure for his clever treatise complete
neglect. It had even less effect on French tactics than had Nelson's
memorandum on our own. This is all the more curious, for so
thoroughly was the change that was coming over English tactics
understood in France that Villeneuve knew quite well the kind of
attack Nelson would be likely to make. In his General Instructions,
issued in anticipation of the battle, he says: 'The enemy will not
confine themselves to forming a line parallel to ours…. They will
try to envelope our rear, to break our line, and to throw upon those
of our ships that they cut off, groups of their own to surround and
crush them.' Yet he could not get away from the dictum of De Grasse,
and was able to think of no better way of meeting such an attack than
awaiting it 'in a single line of battle well closed up.'
In England things were little better. In spite of the fact that at
Camperdown Duncan had actually found a sudden advantage by attacking
in two divisions, no one had been found equal to the task of working
out a tactical system to meet the inarticulate demands of the tendency
which Grenier had noticed. The possibilities even of Rodney's
manoeuvre had not been followed up, and Howe had contented himself
with his brilliant invention for increasing the impact and decision of
the single line. It was reserved for Nelson's genius to bring a
sufficiently powerful solvent to bear on the crystallised opinion of
the service, and to find a formula which would shed all that was bad
and combine all that was good in previous systems.[7]
The dominating ideas that were in his mind become clearer, if we
follow step by step all the evidence that has survived as to the
genesis and history of his memorandum. As early as 1798, when he was
hoping to intercept Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, he had adopted a
system which was not based on the single line, and so far as is known
this was the first tactical order he ever framed as a fleet
commander. It is contained in a general order issued from the Vanguard
on June 8 of that year, and runs as follows, as though hot from the
lesson of St. Vincent: 'As it is very probable the enemy will not be
formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my
command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by
separate divisions. In which case the commanders of divisions are
strictly enjoined to keep their ships in the closest possible order,
and on no account whatever to risk the separation of one of their
ships.'[8] The divisional organisation follows, being his own
division of six sail and two others of four each. 'Had he fallen in
with the French fleet at sea,' wrote Captain Berry, who was sent home
with despatches after the Nile, 'that he might make the best
impression upon any part of it that should appear the most vulnerable
or the most eligible for attack, he divided his force into three
sub-squadrons [one of six sail and two of four each]. Two of these
sub-squadrons were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to
pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it
could.'[9] The exact manner in which he intended to use this
organisation he had explained constantly by word of mouth to his
captains, but no further record of his design has been found. Still
there is an alteration which he made in his signal book at the same
time that gives us the needed light. We cannot fail to notice the
striking resemblance between his method of attack by separate
divisions on a disordered enemy, and that made by the Elizabethan
admirals at Gravelines upon the Armada after its formation had been
broken up by the fireships. That attack was made intuitively by
divisions independently handled as occasion should dictate, and
Nelson's new signal leaves little doubt that this was the plan which
he too intended. The alteration he ordered was to change the
signification of Signal 16, so that it meant that each of his flag
officers, from the moment it was made, should have control of his own
division and make any signals he thought proper.
But this was not all. By the same general order he made two other
alterations in the signal book in view of encountering the French in
order of battle. They too are of the highest interest and run as
follows: 'To be inserted in pencil in the signal book. At
No. 182. Being to windward of the enemy, to denote I mean to attack
the enemy's line from the rear towards the van as far as thirteen
ships, or whatsoever number of the British ships of the line may be
present, that each ship may know his opponent in the enemy's line.'
No. 183. 'I mean to press hard with the whole force on the enemy's
rear.'[10]
Thus we see that at the very first opportunity Nelson had of enforcing
his own tactical ideas he enunciated three of the principles upon
which his great memorandum was based, viz. breaking up his line of
battle into three divisional lines, independent control by divisional
leaders, and concentration on the enemy's rear. All that is wanting
are the elements of surprise and containing.
These, however, we see germinating in the memorandum he issued five
years later off Toulon. In that case he expected to meet the French
fleet on an opposite course, and being mainly concerned in stopping it
and having a slightly superior force he is content to concentrate on
the van. But, in view of the strategical necessity of making the
attack in this way, he takes extra precautions which are not found in
the general order of 1798. He provides for preventing the enemy's
knowing on which side his attack is to fall; instead of engaging an
equal number of their ships he provides for breaking their line, and
engaging the bulk of their fleet with a superior number of his own;
and finally he looks to being ready to contain the enemy's rear before
it can do him any damage.
Thus, taking together the general order of 1798 and the Toulon
memorandum of 1803, we can see all the tactical ideas that were
involved at Trafalgar already in his mind, and we are in a position to
appreciate the process of thought by which he gradually evolved the
sublimely simple attack that welded them together, and brought them
all into play without complication or risk of mistake. This process,
which crowns Nelson's reputation as the greatest naval tactician of
all time, we must now follow in detail.
Shortly before he left England for the last time, he communicated to
Keats, of the Superb, a full explanation of his views as they then
existed in his mind, and Keats has preserved it in the following paper
which Nicolas printed.
'Memorandum of a conversation between Lord Nelson and Admiral Sir
Richard Keats, the last time he was in England before the battle of
Trafalgar.[11]
'One morning, walking with Lord Nelson in the grounds of Merton,
talking on naval matters, he said to me, "No day can be long enough to
arrange a couple of fleets and fight a decisive battle according to
the old system. When we meet them" (I was to have been with
him), "for meet them we shall, I'll tell you how I shall fight them. I
shall form the fleet into three divisions in three lines; one division
shall be composed of twelve or fourteen of the fastest two-decked
ships, which I shall keep always to windward or in a situation of
advantage, and I shall put them under an officer who, I am sure, will
employ them in the manner I wish, if possible. I consider it will
always be in my power to throw them into battle in any part I choose;
but if circumstances prevent their being carried against the enemy
where I desire, I shall feel certain he will employ them effectually
and perhaps in a more advantageous manner than if he could have
followed my orders" (he never mentioned or gave any hint by which I
could understand who it was he intended for this distinguished
service).[12] He continued, "With the remaining part of the fleet,
formed in two lines, I shall go at them at once if I can, about one
third of their line from their leading ship." He then said, "What do
you think of it?" Such a question I felt required consideration. I
paused. Seeing it he said, "But I will tell you what I think
of it. I think it will surprise and confound the enemy. They won't
know what I am about. It will bring forward a pell-mell battle, and
that is what I want."[13]
Here we have something roughly on all-fours with the methods of the
First Dutch War. There are the three squadrons, the headlong 'charge'
and the melee. The reserve squadron to windward goes even
further back, to the treatise of De Chaves and the Instructions of
Lord Lisle in 1545. It was no wonder it took away Keats's breath. The
return to primitive methods was probably unconscious, but what was
obviously uppermost in Nelson's mind was the breaking up of the
established order in single line, leading by surprise and concealment
to a decisive melee. He seems to insist not so much upon
defeating the enemy by concentration as by throwing him into
confusion, upsetting his mental equilibrium in accordance with the
primitive idea. The notion of concentration is at any rate secondary,
while the subtle scheme for 'containing' as perfected in the
memorandum is not yet developed. As he explained his plan to Keats, he
meant to attack at once with both his main divisions, using the
reserve squadron as a general support. There is no clear statement
that he meant it as a 'containing' force, though possibly it was in
his mind.[14]
There is one more piece of evidence relating to this time when he was
still in England. According to this story Lord Hill, about 1840, when
still Commander-in-Chief, was paying a visit to Lord Sidmouth. His
host, who, better known as Addington, had been prime minister till
1804, and was in Pitt's new cabinet till July 1805, showed him a table
bearing a Nelson inscription. He told him that shortly before leaving
England to join the fleet Nelson had drawn upon it after dinner a plan
of his intended attack, and had explained it as follows: 'I shall
attack in two lines, led by myself and Collingwood, and I am confident
I shall capture their van and centre or their centre and rear.'
'Those,' concluded Sidmouth, 'were his very words,' and remarked how
wonderfully they had been fulfilled.[15] Hill and Sidmouth at the
time were both old men and the authority is not high, but so far as it
goes it would tend to show that an attack in two lines instead of one
was still Nelson's dominant idea. It cannot however safely be taken as
evidence that he ever intended a concentration on the van, though in
view of the memorandum of 1803 this is quite possible.
Finally, there is the statement of Clarke and McArthur that Nelson
before leaving England deposited a copy of his plan with Lord Barham,
the new first lord of the admiralty. This however is very
doubtful. The Barham papers have recently been placed at the disposal
of the Society, in the hands of Professor Laughton, and the only copy
of the memorandum he has been able to find is an incomplete one
containing several errors of transcription, and dated the Victory,
October 11, 1805. In the absence of further evidence therefore no
weight can be attached to the oft-repeated assertion that Nelson had
actually drawn up his memorandum before he left England.
Coming now to the time when he had joined the fleet off Cadiz, the
first light we have is the well-known letter of October 1 to Lady
Hamilton. In this letter, after telling her that he had joined on
September 28, but had not been able to communicate with the fleet till
the 29th, he says, 'When I came to explain to them the Nelson
touch it was like an electric shock. Some shed tears and all
approved. It was new—it was singular—it was simple.' What he meant
exactly by the 'Nelson touch' has never been clearly explained, but he
could not possibly have meant either concentration or the attack on
the enemy's rear, for neither of these ideas was either new or
singular.
On October 3 he writes to her again: 'The reception I met with on
joining the fleet caused the sweetest sensation of my life…. As
soon as these emotions were past I laid before them the plan I had
previously arranged for attacking the enemy, and it was not only my
pleasure to find it generally approved, but clearly perceived and
understood.'[16]
The next point to notice is the 'Order of Battle and Sailing' given by
Nicolas. It is without date, but almost certainly must have been drawn
up before Nelson joined. It does not contain the Belleisle, which
Nelson knew on October 4 was to join him.[17] It also does include
the name of Sir Robert Calder and his flagship, and on September 30
Nelson had decided to send both him and his ship home.[18]
The order is for a fleet of forty sail, but the names of only
thirty-three are given, which were all Nelson really expected to get
in time. The remarkable feature of this order is that it contains no
trace of the triple organisation of the memorandum. The 'advanced
squadron' is absent, and the order is based on two equal divisions
only.
Then on October 9, after Calder had gone, there is this entry in
Nelson's private diary: 'Sent Admiral Collingwood the Nelson touch.'
It was enclosed in a letter in which Nelson says: 'I send you my Plan
of Attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain
position the enemy may be found in. But, my dear friend, it is to
place you perfectly at your ease respecting my intentions and to give
full scope to your judgment for carrying them into effect.' The same
day Collingwood replies, 'I have a just sense of your lordship's
kindness to me, and the full confidence you have reposed in me
inspires me with the most lively gratitude. I hope it will not be long
before there is an opportunity of showing your lordship that it has
not been misplaced.' On these two letters there can be little doubt
that the 'Plan of Attack' which Nelson enclosed was that of the
memorandum. The draft from which Nicolas printed appears to have been
dated October 9, and originally had in one passage 'you' and 'your'
for the 'second in command,' showing that Nelson in his mind was
addressing his remarks to Collingwood, though subsequently he altered
the sentence into the third person. Only one other copy was known to
Nicolas, and that was issued in the altered form to Captain Hope, of
the Defence, a ship which in the order of battle was in Collingwood s
squadron, but Codrington tells us it was certainly issued to all the
captains.[19]
So far, then, we have the case thus—that whatever Nelson may have
really told Lord Sidmouth, and whatever may have been in his mind when
he drew up the dual order of battle and sailing, he had by October 9
reverted to the triple idea which he had explained to Keats. Meanwhile,
however, his conception had ripened. There are marked changes in
organisation, method and intention. In organisation the reserve
squadron is reduced from the original twelve or fourteen to eight, or
one fifth of his hypothetical fleet instead of about one third—reduced,
that is, to a strength at which it was much less capable of important
independent action. In method we have, instead of an attack with the
two main divisions, an attack with one only, with the other covering
it. In intention we have as the primary function of the reserve
squadron, its attachment to one or other of the other two main
divisions as circumstances may dictate.
The natural inference from these important changes is that Nelson's
conception was now an attack in two divisions of different strength,
the stronger of which, as the memorandum subsequently explains, was to
be used as a containing force to cover the attack of the other, and
except that the balance of the two divisions was reversed, this is
practically just what Clerk of Eldin had recommended and what actually
happened in the battle. It is a clear advance upon the original idea
as explained to Keats, in which the third squadron was to be used on
the primitive and indefinite plan of De Chaves and Lord Lisle as a
general reserve. It also explains Nelson's covering letter to
Collingwood, in which he seems to convey to his colleague that the
pith of his plan was an attack in two divisions, and, within the
general lines of the design, complete freedom of action for the second
in command. How largely this idea of independent control entered into
the 'Nelson touch' we may judge from the fact that it is emphasised in
no less than three distinct paragraphs of the memorandum.
Such, then, is the fundamental principle of the memorandum as
enunciated in its opening paragraphs. He then proceeds to elaborate
it in two detailed plans of attack—one from to-leeward and the other
from to-windward. It was the latter he meant to make if possible. He
calls it 'the intended attack,' and it accords with the opening
enunciation. The organisation is triple, but no special function is
assigned to the reserve squadron. The actual attack on the enemy's
rear is to be made by Collingwood, while Nelson with his own division
and the reserve is to cover him. In the event of an attack having to
be made from to-leeward, the idea is different. Here the containing
movement practically disappears. The fleet is still to attack the rear
and part of the centre of the enemy, but now in three independent
divisions simultaneously, in such a way as to cut his line at three
points, and to concentrate a superior force on each section of the
severed line. To none of the divisions is assigned the duty of
containing the rest of the enemy's fleet from the outset. It is to be
dealt with at a second stage of the action by all ships that are still
capable of renewing the engagement after the first stage. 'The whole
impression,' as Nelson put it, in case he was forced to attack from
to-leeward, was to overpower the enemy's line from a little ahead of
the centre to the rearmost ship. He does not say, however, that this
was to be 'the whole impression' of the intended attack from
to-windward. 'The whole impression' there appears to be for
Collingwood to overpower the rear while Nelson with the other two
divisions made play with the enemy's van and centre; but the
particular manner in which he would carry out this part of the design
is left undetermined.
The important point, then, in considering the relation between the
actual battle and the memorandum, is to remember that it provided for
two different methods of attacking the rear according to whether the
enemy were encountered to windward or to leeward. The somewhat
illogical arrangement of the memorandum tends to conceal this highly
important distinction. For Nelson interpolates between his explanation
of the windward attack and his opening enunciation of principle his
explanation of the leeward attack, to which the enunciation did not
apply. That some confusion was caused in the minds of some even of his
best officers is certain, but let them speak for themselves.
After the battle Captain Harvey, of the Temeraire, whom Nelson
had intended to lead his line, wrote to his wife, 'It was noon before
the action commenced, which was done according to the instructions
given us by Lord Nelson…. Lord Nelson had given me leave to lead and
break through the line about the fourteenth ship,' i.e. two or
three ships ahead of the centre, as explained in the memorandum for
the leeward attack but not for the windward.
On the other hand we have Captain Moorsom, of the Revenge, who was in
Collingwood's division, saying exactly the opposite. Writing to his
father on December 4, he says, 'I have seen several plans of the
action, but none to answer my ideas of it. A regular plan was laid
down by Lord Nelson some time before the action but not acted on. His
great anxiety seemed to be to get to leeward of them lest they should
make off to Cadiz before he could get near them.' And on November 1,
to the same correspondent he had written, 'I am not certain that our
mode of attack was the best: however, it succeeded.' Here then we have
two of Nelson's most able captains entirely disagreeing as to whether
or not the attack was carried out in accordance with any plan which
Nelson laid down.
Captain Moorsom's view may be further followed in a tactical study
written by his son, Vice-Admiral Constantine Moorsom.[20] His remarks
on Trafalgar were presumably largely inspired by his father, who lived
till 1835. In his view there was 'an entire alteration both of the
scientific principle and of the tactical movements,' both of which he
thinks were due to what he calls the morale of the enemy's
attitude—that is, that Nelson was afraid they were going to slip
through his fingers into Cadiz. The change of plan—meaning presumably
the change from the triple to the dual organisation—he thinks was not
due to the reduced numbers which Nelson actually had under his flag,
for the ratio between the two fleets remained much about the same as
that of his hypothesis.
The interesting testimony of Lieutenant G.L. Browne, who, as Admiral
Jackson informs us, was assistant flag-lieutenant in the Victory and
had every means of knowing, endorses the view of the Moorsoms.[21]
After explaining to his parents the delay caused by the established
method of forming the fleets in two parallel lines so that each had an
opposite number, as set forth in the opening words of the memorandum,
he says, 'but by his lordship's mode of attack you will clearly
perceive not an instant of time could be lost. The frequent
communications he had with his admirals and captains put them in
possession of all his plans, so that his mode of attack was well known
to every officer of the fleet. Some will not fail to attribute
rashness to the conduct of Lord Nelson. But he well considered the
importance of a decisive naval victory at this time, and has
frequently said since we left England that, should he be so fortunate
as to fall in with the enemy, a total defeat should be the result on
the one side or the other.'
Next we have what is probably the most acute and illuminating
criticism of the battle that exists, from the pen of 'an officer who
was present.' Sir Charles Ekin quotes it anonymously; but from
internal evidence there is little difficulty in assigning it to an
officer of the Conqueror, though clearly not her captain, Israel
Pellew, in whose justification the concluding part was written.
Whoever he was the writer thoroughly appreciated and understood the
tactical basis of Nelson's plan, as laid down in the memorandum, and
he frankly condemns his chief for having exposed his fleet
unnecessarily by permitting himself to be hurried out of delivering
his attack in line abreast as he intended. It might well have been
done, so far as he could see, without any more loss of time than
actually occurred in getting the bulk of the fleet into action. Loss
of time was the only excuse for attacking in line ahead, and the only
reason he could suppose for the change of plan. If they had all gone
down together in line abreast, he is sure the victory would have been
more quickly decided and the brunt of the fight more equally
borne. Nothing, he thinks, could have been better than the plan of the
memorandum if it had only been properly executed. An attack in two
great divisions with a squadron of observation—so he summarises the
'Nelson touch'—seemed to him to combine every precaution under all
circumstances. It allows of concentration and containing. Each ship
can use her full speed without fear of being isolated. The fastest
ships will break through the line first, and they are just those which
from their speed in passing are liable to the least damage, while
having passed through, they cause a diversion for the attack of their
slower comrades. Finally, if the enemy tries to make off and avoid
action, the fleet is well collected for a general chase. But as Nelson
actually made the attack in his hurry to close, he threw away most of
these advantages, and against an enemy of equal spirit each ship must
have been crushed as she came into action. Instead of doubling
ourselves, he says, we were doubled and even trebled on. Nelson in
fact presented the enemy's fleet with precisely the position which the
memorandum aimed at securing for ourselves—that is to say, he
suffered a portion of his fleet, comprising the Victory,
Temeraire, Royal Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus, and
Bellerophon, to be cut off and doubled on.[22]
The last important witness is Captain Codrington, of the Orion. No one
seems to have kept his head so well in the action, and this fact,
coupled with the high reputation he subsequently acquired, gives
peculiar weight to his testimony. It is on the question of the
advanced or reserve squadron that he is specially interesting. On
October 19 at 8 P.M., just after they had been surprised and rejoiced
by Nelson's signal for a general chase, and were steering for the
enemy, as he says, 'under every stitch of sail we can set,' he sat
down to write to his wife. In the course of the letter he tells her,
'Defence and Agamemnon are upon the look out nearest to
Cadiz; … Colossus and Mars are stationed next. The above four and as
many more of us are now to form an advanced squadron; and I trust by
the morning we shall all be united and in sight of the enemy.'
Clearly then Nelson must have issued some modification of the dual
'order of battle and sailing.' Many years later in a note upon the
battle which Codrington dictated to his daughter, Lady Bourchier, he
says that on the 20th, in spite of Collingwood's advice to attack at
once, Nelson 'continued waiting upon them in two columns according to
the order of sailing and the memorable written instruction which was
given out to all the captains.'[23] Later still, when a veteran of
seventy-six years, he gave to Sir Harris Nicolas another note which
shows how in his own mind he reconciled the apparent discrepancy
between the dual and the triple organisation. It runs as follows: 'In
Lord Nelson's memorandum of October 9, 1805, he refers to "an advanced
squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships" to be added
to either of the two lines of the order of sailing as may be required;
and says that this advanced squadron would probably have to cut
through "two, three or four ships of the enemy's centre so as to
ensure getting at their commander-in-chief, on whom every effort must
be made to capture";[24] and he afterwards twice speaks of the
enemy's van coming to succour their rear. Now I am under the
impression that I was expressly instructed by Lord Nelson (referring
to the probability of the enemy's van coming down upon us), being in
the Orion, one of the eight ships named, that he himself would
probably make a feint of attacking their van in order to prevent or
retard it.' Here then would seem to be still further confusion, due
to a failure to distinguish between the leeward and windward form of
attack. According to this statement Codrington believed the advanced
squadron was in either case to attack the centre, while Nelson with
his division contained the van. But curiously enough in a similar
note, printed by Lady Bourchier on Nicolas's authority, there is a
difference in the wording which, though difficult to account for,
seems to give the truer version of what Codrington really said. It is
there stated that Codrington told Nicolas he was strongly impressed
with the belief 'that Lord Nelson directed eight of the smaller and
handier ships, of which the Orion was one, to be ready to haul out of
the line in case the enemy's van should appear to go down to the
assistance of the ships engaged to meet and resist them: that to
prevent this manoeuvre on the part of the enemy Lord Nelson intimated
his intention of making a feint of hauling out towards their van,'
&c. There is little doubt that we have here the true distribution of
duties which Nelson intended for the windward attack—that is, the
advanced squadron was to be the real containing force, but he intended
to assist it by himself making a feint on the enemy's van before
delivering his true attack on the centre.[25]
From Codrington's evidence it is at any rate clear that some time
before the 19th Nelson had told off an 'advanced squadron' as provided
for in his memorandum, and that the ships that were forming the
connection between the fleet and the frigates before Cadiz formed part
of it. Now Nelson had begun to tell off these ships as early as the
4th. On that day he wrote to Captain Duff, of the Mars, 'I have to
desire you will keep with the Mars, Defence and Colossus from three to
four leagues between the fleet and Cadiz in order that I may get
information from the frigates stationed off that port as expeditiously
as possible.' On the 11th, writing to Sir Alexander Ball at Malta, he
speaks of having 'an advanced squadron of fast sailing ships between
me and the frigates.' The Agamemnon (64) was added on the 14th, the
day after she joined. On that day Nelson entered in his private diary,
'Placed Defence and Agamemnon from seven to ten leagues west of Cadiz,
and Mars and Colossus four leagues east of the fleet,' &c,[26] On the
15th he wrote to Captain Hope, of the Defence: 'You will with the
Agamemnon take station west from Cadiz from seven to ten leagues, by
which means if the enemy should move I hope to have constant
information, as two or three ships will be kept as at present between
the fleet and your two ships.'[27]
On the 12th he writes to Collingwood, of the Belleisle, the fastest
two-decker in the fleet, as though she too were an advanced ship, and
on the morning of the 19th he tells him the Leviathan was to relieve
the Defence, whose water had got low. Later in the day, when Mars and
Colossus had passed on the signal that the enemy was out, he ordered
'Mars, Orion, Belleisle, Leviathan, Bellerophon and Polyphemus to go
ahead during the night.'[28] On the eve of the battle therefore these
six ships, with Colossus and Agamemnon, made up the squadron of eight
specified on the memorandum.
The conclusion then is that, though some of the ships destined to form
the advanced squadron had not arrived by the 9th when the memorandum
was issued, Nelson had already taken steps to organise it, and that on
the evening of the 19th, the first moment he had active contact with
the enemy, it was detached from the fleet as a separate unit. Up to
this moment it would look as though he had intended to use it as his
memorandum directed. Since with the exception of the Agamemnon and
the Leviathan, which had only temporarily replaced the Defence while
she watered, the whole of the ships named belonged to Collingwood's
division, the resulting organisation would have been, lee-line nine
ships, weather-line eight ships, and eight for the advanced
squadron—an organisation which in relative proportion was almost
exactly that which he had explained to Keats. It would therefore still
have rendered Nelson's original plan of attack possible, although it
did not preserve the balance of the divisions prescribed in the
memorandum.
There can be little doubt, however, that Nelson on the morning of the
battle did abandon the idea of the advanced squadron altogether. Early
on the 20th it was broken up again. At 8 o'clock in the morning of
that day the captains of the Mars, Colossus and Defence (which
apparently was by this time ready again for service) were called on
board the Victory and ordered out to form a chain as before between
the admiral and his frigates.[29] The rest presumably resumed their
stations in the fleet. Even if he had not actually abandoned this part
of his plan, it is clear that in his hurry to attack Nelson would not
spend time in reforming the squadron as a separate unit, but chose
rather to carry out his design, so far as was possible, with two
divisions only. So soon as he sighted the enemy's fleet at daylight on
the 21st, he made the signal to form the line of battle in two
columns, and with one exception the whole of the advanced ships took
station in their respective divisions according to the original order
of battle and sailing.'[30] The exception was Codrington's ship, the
Orion. No importance however need be attached to this, for although he
was originally in Collingwood's division he may well have been
transferred to Nelson's some time before. It is only worthy of remark
because Codrington, of all the advanced squadron captains, was the
only one, so far as we know, who still considered the squadron a
potential factor in the fleet and acted accordingly. While Belleisle,
Mars, Bellerophon and Colossus rushed into the fight in the van of
Collingwood's line, Orion in the rear of Nelson's held her fire even
when she got into action, and cruised about the melee, carefully
seeking points where she could do most damage to an enemy, or best
help an overmatched friend—well-judged piece of service, on which he
dwells in his correspondence over and over again with pardonable
complacency. He was thus able undoubtedly to do admirable service in
the crisis of the action.
That the bulk of his colleagues thought all idea of a reserve squadron
had been abandoned by Nelson is clear, and the resulting change was
certainly great enough to explain why some of the captains thought the
plan of the memorandum had been abandoned altogether. For not only was
the attack made in two divisions instead of one, and in line ahead
instead of line abreast, but its prescribed balance was entirely
upset. Instead of Nelson having the larger portion of the fleet for
containing the van and centre, Collingwood had the larger portion for
the attack on the rear. In other words, instead of the advanced
squadron being under Nelson's direction, the bulk of it was attached
to Collingwood. If some heads—even as clear as Codrington's—were
puzzled, it is little wonder.
As to the way in which this impulsive change of plan was brought
about, Codrington says, 'They [the enemy] suddenly wore round so as to
have Cadiz under their lee, with every appearance of a determination
to go into that port. Lord Nelson therefore took advantage of their
confusion in wearing, and bore down to attack them with the fleet in
two columns.' This was in the note dictated to Lady Bourchier, and in
a letter of October 28, 1805, to Lord Garlies he says, 'We all
scrambled into battle as soon as we could.'[31]
Codrington's allusion to Nelson's alleged feint on the enemy's van
brings us to the last point; the question, that is, as to whether,
apart from the substitution of the perpendicular for the parallel
attack, and in spite of the change of balance, the two lines were
actually handled in the action according to the principles of the
memorandum for the intended attack from to-windward.
Lady Bourchier's note continues, after referring to Nelson's intention
to make a feint on the van, 'The Victory did accordingly haul to port:
and though she took in her larboard and weather studding sails, she
kept her starboard studding sails set (notwithstanding they had become
the lee ones and were shaking), thus proving that he proposed to
resume his course, as those sails would be immediately wanted to get
the Victory into her former station.' The note in Nicolas is to the
same effect, but adds that Codrington had no doubt that having taken
in his weather studding sails he kept the lee ones 'set and shaking in
order to make it clear to the fleet that his movement was merely a
feint, and that the Victory would speedily resume her course and
fulfil his intention of cutting through the centre.' And in admiration
of the movement Codrington called his first lieutenant and said, 'How
beautifully the admiral is carrying his design into effect!' Though
all this was written long after, when his memory perhaps was fading,
it is confirmed by a contemporary entry in his log: 'The Victory,
after making a feint as of attacking the enemy's van, hauled to
starboard so as to reach their centre.'[32] This is all clear enough
so far, but now we have to face a signal mentioned in the log of the
Euryalus which, as she was Nelson's repeating frigate, cannot be
ignored. According to this high authority Nelson, about a quarter of
an hour before making his immortal signal, telegraphed 'I intend to
push or go through the end of the enemy's line to prevent them from
getting into Cadiz.' It is doubtful how far this signal was taken in,
but those who saw it must have thought that Nelson meant to execute
Howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's leading ships. At this time,
according to the master of the Victory, he was standing for the
enemy's van. Nelson also signalled to certain ships to keep away a
point to port. The Victory's log has this entry: 'At 4 minutes past 12
opened our fire on the enemy's van, in passing down their line.' At 30
minutes past 12 the Victory got up with Villeneuve's flagship and then
broke through the line. Now at first sight it might appear that Nelson
really intended to attack the van and not the centre, on the principle
of Hoste's old manoeuvre which Howe had reintroduced into the Signal
Book for attacking a numerically superior fleet—that is, van to van
and rear to rear, leaving the enemy's centre unoccupied.[33] For the
old signal provided that when this was done 'the flag officers are, if
circumstances permit, to engage the flag officers of the enemy,' which
was exactly what Nelson was doing. On this supposition his idea would
be that his ships should attack the enemy ahead of Villeneuve as they
came up. And this his second, the Temeraire, actually did.
But, as we have seen by Instruction XXIV. of 1799, the old rule of
1790 had been altered, and if Nelson intended to execute Hoste's plan
of attack he, as 'leading ship,' would or should have engaged the
enemy's 'leading ship,' leaving the rest as they could to engage the
enemy of 'greatest force.' The only explanation is that, if he really
intended to attack the van, he again changed his mind when he fetched
up with Villeneuve, and could not resist engaging him. More probably,
however, the signal was wrongly repeated by the Euryalus, and as made
by Nelson it was really an intimation to Collingwood that he meant to
cover the attack on the rear and centre by a feint on the van.[34]
However this may be, the French appear to have regarded Nelson's
movement to port as a real attack. Their best account (which is also
perhaps the best account that exists) says that just before coming
into gun-shot the two British columns began to separate. The leading
vessels of Nelson's column, it says, passed through the same interval
astern of the Bucentaure, and then it tells how 'les vaisseaux de
queue de cette colonne, au contraire, serrerent un peu le vent,
comme pour s'approcher des vaisseaux de l'avant-garde de la flotte
combinee: mais apres avoir recu quelques bordees de ces
vaisseaux ils abandonnerent ce dessein et se porterent vers les
vaisseaux places entre le Redoutable et la Santa Anna ou vinrent
unir leurs efforts a ceux des vaisseaux anglais qui combattaient
deja le Bucentaure et la Santisima Trinidad.'[35] This is to
some extent confirmed by Dumanoir himself, who commanded the allied
van, in his official memorandum addressed to Decres, December 30,
1809. In defending his failure to tack sooner to Villeneuve's relief,
he says, 'Au commencement du combat, la colonne du Nord [i.e.
Nelson's] se dirigea sur l'avant-garde qui engagea avec elle pendant
quarante minutes.'[36] In partial corroboration of this there is the
statement in the log of the Temeraire, the ship that was
immediately behind Nelson, that she opened her fire on the
Santisima Trinidad and the two ships ahead of her; that is, she
engaged the ships ahead of where Nelson broke the line, so that
Captain Harvey as well as Dumanoir may have believed that Nelson
intended his real attack to be on 'the end of the line.'
In the face of these facts it is impossible to say categorically that
Nelson intended nothing but a feint on the van. It is equally
impossible to say he intended a real attack. The point perhaps can
never be decided with absolute certainty, but it is this very
uncertainty that brings out the true merit and the real lesson of
Nelson's attack. As we now may gather from his captains' opinions, its
true merit was not that he threw his whole fleet on part of a superior
enemy—that was a commonplace in tactics. It was not concentration on
the rear, for that also was old; and what is more, as the attack was
delivered, so far from Nelson concentrating, he boldly, almost
recklessly, exposed himself for a strategical object to what should
have been an overwhelming concentration on the leading ships of his
two columns. The true merit of it above all previous methods of
concentration and containing was that, whether, as planned or as
delivered, it prevented the enemy from knowing on which part of their
line Nelson intended to throw his squadron, just as we are prevented
from knowing to this day. 'They won't know what I am about' were his
words to Keats.
The point is clearer still when we compare the different ways in which
Nelson and Collingwood brought their respective columns into
action. Collingwood in his Journal says that shortly before 11
o'clock, that is, an hour before getting into action, he signalled
'for the lee division to form the larboard line of bearing.' The
effect and intention of this would be that each ship in his division
would head on the shortest course to break the enemy's line in all
parts. It was the necessary signal for enabling him to carry out
regularly Howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's rear, and his object was
declared for all to see.[37] Nelson, on the other hand, made no such
signal, but held on in line ahead, giving no indication of whether he
intended to perform the manoeuvre on the van or the centre, or whether
he meant to cut the line in line ahead. Until they knew which it was
to be, it was impossible for the enemy to take any step to concentrate
with either division, and thus Nelson held them both immobile while
Collingwood flung himself on his declared objective.
Nothing could be finer as a piece of subtle tactics. Nothing could be
more daring as a well-judged risk. The risk was indeed enormous,
perhaps the greatest ever taken at sea. Hawke risked much at Quiberon,
and much was risked at the Nile. But both were sea-risks of the class
to which our seamen were enured. At Trafalgar it was a pure
battle-risk—a mad, perpendicular attack in which every recognised
tactical card was in the enemy's hand. But Nelson's judgment was
right. He knew his opponent's lack of decision, he knew the individual
shortcomings of the allied ships, and he knew he had only to throw
dust, as he did, in their eyes for the wild scheme to succeed. As
Jurien de la Graviere has most wisely said 'Le genie de Nelson
c'est d'avoir compris notre faiblesse.'
Yet when all is said, when even full weight is given to the
strategical pressure of the hour and the uncertainty of the weather,
there still remains the unanswerable criticism of the officer of the
Conqueror: that by an error of judgment Nelson spoilt his attack by
unnecessary haste. The moral advantage of pushing home a bold attack
before an enemy is formed is of course very great; but in this case
the enemy had no intention of avoiding him, as they showed, and he
acknowledged, when they boldly lay-to to accept action. The confusion
of their line was tactically no weakness: it only resulted in a
duplication which was so nicely adapted for meeting Howe's manoeuvre
that there was a widespread belief in the British fleet, which
Collingwood himself shared, that Villeneuve had adopted it
deliberately.[38] Seeing what the enemy's accidental formation was,
every ship that pierced it must be almost inevitably doubled or
trebled on. It was, we know, the old Dutch manner of meeting the
English method of attack in the earliest days of the line.[39] Had he
given Villeneuve time for forming his line properly the enemy's battle
order would have been only the weaker. Had he taken time to form his
own order the mass of the attack would have been delivered little
later than it was, its impact would have been intensified, and the
victory might well have been even more decisive than it was, while the
sacrifice it cost would certainly have been less, incalculably less,
if we think that the sacrifice included Nelson himself.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Nelson's Letters and Despatches, p. 382.
[2] Nicolas, Nelson's Despatches, v. 287, note. It is also given in
vol. vii. p. ccxvi, apparently from a captain's copy which is undated.
[3] Ibid. v. 283.
[4] Professor Laughton pointed out (op. cit.) that the conditions
will fit June to August 1804, but that it might have been 'earlier,
certainly not later.'
[5] It is very doubtful whether this formation was ever intended for
anything but tactical exercises. Morogues has a similar signal and
instruction (Tactique Navale, p. 294, ed. 1779), 'Partager l'armee en
deux corps, ou mettre l'armee sur deux colonnes; et representation d'un
combat.' Anson certainly used it for manoeuvring one half of his fleet
against the other during his tactical exercises in 1747. Warren to
Anson, Add. MSS. 15957, p. 172.
[6] Mathieu-Dumas, Precis des Evenements Militaires, xiii. 193.
[7] Captain Boswall, in the preface to his translation of Hoste, says
Grenier's work was translated in 1790. If this was so Nelson may well
have read it, but I have not been able to find a copy of the translation
either in the British Museum or elsewhere.
[8] Ross, Memoir of Saumarez, i. 212.
[9] Laughton, Nelson's Letters and Despatches, 150.
[10] No. 182 as it stood in the signal book meant, Ships before in tow
to proceed to port. No. 183. When at anchor to veer to twice the length
of cable. No. 16. Secret instructions to be opened.
[11] It was in the handwriting, Nicolas says, of Edward Hawke Locker,
Esq., the naval biographer and originator of the naval picture gallery
at Greenwich. He endorsed it, 'Copy of a paper communicated to me by Sir
Richard Keats, and allowed by him to be transcribed by me, 1st October,
1829.'
[12] It was certainly not Keats himself, though afterwards Nelson meant
to offer him command of the squadron he intended to detach into the
Mediterranean. In the expected battle Keats, had he arrived in time, was
to have been Nelson's 'second' in the line. Nelson to Sir Alexander
Ball, October 15, 1805.
[13] Nelson's Despatches, vii. 241, note.
[14] Nelson's 'advance squadron' must not be confused with the idea of
a reserve squadron which Gravina pressed on Villeneuve at the famous
Cadiz council of war before Trafalgar. Gravina's idea was nothing but
the old one of a reserve of superfluous ships after equalising the line,
as provided by the old English Fighting Instructions and recommended by
Morogues.
[15] Sidney, Life of Lord Hill, p. 368.
[16] Clarke and McArthur say the letter was to Lady Hamilton. Nicolas,
reprinting from the Naval Chronicle, has the addressee's name blank.
[17] Nelson to Captain Duff, October 4. The order to take her under his
command was despatched on September 20. Same to Marsden, October 10.
[18] Same to Lord Barham, September 30.
[19] See the note on Trafalgar dictated by him in Memoirs of Sir
Edward Codrington, edited by Lady Bourchier, 1873.
[20] On the Principles of Naval Tactics, 1846.
[21] Great Sea Fights, ii. 196, note.
[22] See post, p. 357 Appendix, where this interesting paper is set
out in full.
[23] Life of Codrington, ii. 57-8.
[24] It should be noted that the memorandum only enjoins this for an
attack from to-leeward, and not for the 'intended attack' from
to-windward.
[25] See Nelson's Despatches, vii. 154; Life of Codrington, ii. 77.
[26] Nicolas, vii. 122. Before this Mars and Colossus had had the
inside station. See Nelson to Collingwood, October 12.
[27] Ibid., vii. 122.
[28] Nicolas, vii. 115, 129, 133.
[29] Memorandum and Private Diary, Nicolas, pp. 136-7.
[30] Some doubt has been expressed as to the signals with which Nelson
opened at daybreak on the 21st. But their actual numbers are recorded in
the logs of the Mars, Defiance, Conqueror and Bellerophon, and all but
the first in the log of the Euryalus repeating frigate. They were No.
72: 'To form order of sailing in two columns or divisions of the fleet,'
which, by the memorandum was also to be the order of battle; No. 76,
with compass signal ENE, 'when lying by or sailing by the wind to bear
up and sail large on the course pointed out'; No. 13, Prepare for
battle. Collingwood has in his journal: 'At 6.30 the commander-in-chief
made the signal to form order of sailing in two columns, and at 7.0 to
prepare for battle. At 7.40 to bear up east.'
[31] Life of Codrington, ii. 59, 60.
[32] Great Sea Fights, ii. 278.
[33] A veteran French officer of the old wars took this view of
Nelson's threat in a study of the battle which he wrote. 'Nelson,' he
says, 'a d'abord feint de vouloir attaquer la tete et la queue de
l'armee. Ensuite il a rassemble ses forces sur son centre, et a
abandonne le sort de la bataille a l'intelligence de ses capitaines.'
Mathieu-Dumas, Precis des Evenements Militaires, xiv. 408.
[34] The only trace of notice having been taken by anyone of a signal
from Nelson at the time stated was Collingwood's impatient remark when
Nelson began to telegraph 'England expects,' &c. 'I wish Nelson would
stop signalling,' he is reported to have said. 'We all know well enough
what we have to do,' as though Nelson had been signalling something just
before.
[35] Monuments des Victoires et Conguetes des Francais from Nicolas,
vii. 271. It was also adopted by Mathieu-Dumas (op. cit. xiii. p. 178)
as the best and most impartial account. He says it was written by a
French naval officer called Parisot.
[36] Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres Maritimes, ii. 220, note.
[37] This highly important signal appears to have been generally
overlooked in accounts of the action. Yet Collingwood's journal is so
precise about signals that there can be no doubt he made it. Agamemnon
in Nelson's column answered it under the impression it was general. Her
log says, 'Answered signal No. 50'—that is, 'To keep on the larboard
line of bearing though then on the starboard tack. Ditto starboard
bearing if on larboard tack.' Captain Moorsom also says, 'My station was
sixth ship in the rear of the lee column; but as the Revenge sailed well
Admiral Collingwood made my signal to keep a line of bearing from him
which made me one of the leading ships through the enemy's line.' No
other ship records the signal. Probably few saw it, for in the
memorandum which Collingwood issued two years later he lays stress on
the importance of captains being particularly watchful for the signals
of their divisional commander. See post, pp. 324 and 329.
[38] Collingwood to Marsden, October 22. same to Parker, November 1.
Same to Pasley, December 16, 1805.
[39] See supra, p. 119. Villeneuve saw this. In his official despatch
from the Euryalus, November 5, he says 'Notre formation s'effectuait
avec beaucoup de peine; mais dans le genre d'attaque que je prevoyais
que l'ennemi allait nous faire, cette irregularite meme dans notre ligne
ne me paraissait pas un inconvenient.'—Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres
Maritimes, ii. 384.
[+Clarke and McArthur, Life of Nelson, ii. 427+.[1]]
Plan of Attack.
The business of a commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy's
fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean that
of laying his ships close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as
possible, and secondly, to continue them there without separating
until the business is decided), I am sensible beyond this object it is
not necessary that I should say a word, being fully assured that the
admirals and captains of the fleet I have the honour to command will,
knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply
any deficiency in my not making signals, which may, if extended beyond
those objects, either be misunderstood, or if waited for very probably
from various causes be impossible for the commander-in-chief to
make. Therefore it will only be requisite for me to state in as few
words as possible the various modes in which it may be necessary for
me to obtain my object; on which depends not only the honour and glory
of our country, but possibly its safety, and with it that of all
Europe, from French tyranny and oppression.
If the two fleets are both willing to fight, but little manoeuvring is
necessary, the less the better. A day is soon lost in that
business. Therefore I will only suppose that the enemy's fleet being
to leeward standing close upon a wind, and that I am nearly ahead of
them standing on the larboard tack. Of course I should, weather
them. The weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale
of wind the manoeuvring of both fleets is but of little avail, and
probably no decisive action would take place with the whole
fleet.[2]
Two modes present themselves: one to stand on just out of gun-shot,
until the van ship of my line would be about the centre ship of the
enemy; then make the signal to wear together; then bear up [and]
engage with all our force the six or five van ships of the enemy,
passing, certainly if opportunity offered, through their line. This
would prevent their bearing up, and the action, from the known bravery
and conduct of the admirals and captains, would certainly be
decisive. The second or third rear ships of the enemy would act as
they please, and our ships would give a good account of them, should
they persist in mixing with our ships.
The other mode would be to stand under an easy but commanding sail
directly for their headmost ship, so as to prevent the enemy from
knowing whether I should pass to leeward or to windward of him. In
that situation I would make the signal to engage the enemy to leeward,
and cut through their fleet about the sixth ship from the van, passing
very close. They being on a wind and you going large could cut their
line when you please. The van ships of the enemy would, by the time
our rear came abreast of the van ship, be severely cut up, and our van
could not expect to escape damage. I would then have our rear
ship and every ship in succession wear [and] continue the action with
either the van ship or the second as it might appear most eligible
from her crippled state; and this mode pursued I see nothing to
prevent the capture of the five or six ships of the enemy's van. The
two or three ships of the enemy's rear must either bear up or wear;
and in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably
than our two van ships (now the rear), yet they would be separated and
at a distance to leeward, so as to give our ships time to refit. And
by that time I believe the battle would, from the judgment of the
admiral and captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from
these moments are useless when every man is disposed to do his
duty. The great object is for us to support each other, and to keep
close to the enemy and to leeward of him.
If the enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be
to engage the enemy on arriving up with them; and the other ships to
pass on for the second, third, &c., giving if possible a close fire
into the enemy on passing, taking care to give our ships engaged
notice of your intention.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] From the original in the St. Vincent Papers. Also in Nicolas,
Despatches and Letters, vi. 443. Obvious mistakes in punctuation have
been corrected in the text.
[2] Cf. the similar remark of De Chaves, supra, p. 5.
[+Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vii.+[1]]
Memorandum.
Secret. Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805.
Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the
line into line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other
circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the
opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in
such a manner as to make the business decisive; I have therefore made
up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the
exception of the first and second in command), that the order of
sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines
of sixteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the
fastest sailing two-decked ships, which will always make, if
wanted, a line of twenty-four sail on whichever line the
commander-in-chief may direct.
The second in command will,[2] after my intentions are made
known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the
attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are
captured or destroyed.
If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and
that the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them,[3] they
will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their
rear.
I should therefore probably make the second in command's[4] signal,
to lead through about the twelfth ship from the rear (or wherever
he[5] could fetch, if not able to get as far advanced). My line
would lead through about their centre; and the advanced squadron to
cut two, three, or four ships ahead of their centre, so far as to
ensure getting at their commander-in-chief on whom every effort must
be made to capture.
The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from
two to three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief, supposed to be
in the centre, to the rear of their fleet. I will suppose twenty sail
of the enemy's line to be untouched; it must be some time before they
could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force compact to attack any
part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships;
which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with the ships
engaged.[6]
Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight
beyond all others. Shots will carry away the masts[7] and yards of
friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a victory
before the van of the enemy could succour their rear;[8] and then
the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty
sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make
off.
If the van of the enemy tacks, the captured ships must run to leeward
of the British fleet; if the enemy wears, the British must place
themselves between the enemy and the captured and disabled British
ships; and should the enemy close, I have no fears as to the result.
The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the
movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the
circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular
line as their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen
nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places
his ship alongside that of an enemy.
Of the intended attack from to-windward, the enemy in the line of
battle ready to attack.
[Illustration][9]
The divisions of the British fleet[10] will be brought nearly within
gunshot of the enemy's centre. The signal will most probably be made
for the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even
steering sails[11] in order to get as quickly as possible to the
enemy's line and to cut through, beginning from the twelfth ship from
the enemy's rear.[12] Some ships may not get through their exact
place; but they will always be at hand to assist their friends; and if
any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually
complete the business of twelve sail of the enemy.[13]
Should the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the
twelve ships, composing in the first position the enemy's rear, are to
be the object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise
directed by the commander-in-chief; which is scarcely to be expected,
as the entire management of the lee line, after the intention of the
commander-in-chief is signified, is intended to be left to the
judgment of the admiral commanding that line.
The remainder of the enemy's fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left
to the management of the commander-in-chief, who will endeavour to
take care that the movements of the second in command are as little
interrupted as possible.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Sir Harris Nicolas states that he took his text from an 'Autograph
[he means holograph] draught in the possession of Vice-Admiral Sir
George Mundy, K.C.B., except the words in italics which were added by
Mr. Scott, Lord Nelson's secretary: and from the original issued to
Captain Hope of the Defence, now in possession of his son, Captain Hope,
R.N.'
[2] Lord Nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'in fact command his
line and.'—Nicolas.
[3] Lord Nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'I shall suppose
them forty-six sail in the line of battle.'—Nicolas.
[4] Originally 'your' but deleted.—Ibid.
[5] Originally 'you' but deleted.—Ibid.
[6] In the upper margin of the paper Lord Nelson wrote and Mr. Scott
added to it a reference, as marked in the text—'the enemy's fleet is
supposed to consist of 46 sail of the line, British fleet 40. If either
be less, only a proportionate number of enemy's ships are to be cut off:
B. to be 1/4 superior to the E. cut off.—Ibid.
[7] The Barham copy reads 'a mast.'
[8] Originally 'friends.'—Nicolas.
[9] This is the only diagram found in either of Nelson's memoranda. It
is not in the Barham copy.
[10] Nelson presumably means the two main divisions as distinguished
from the 'advanced squadron.' This distinction is general in the
correspondence of his officers and accords with the arrangement as shown
in the diagram. The Barham copy has 'division' in the singular, as
though Nelson intended to specify one division only. It is probably a
copyist's error.
[11] In the upper margin of the paper, and referred to by Lord Nelson
as in the text 'Vide instructions for signal yellow with blue fly. Page
17, Eighth Flag, Signal Book, with reference to Appendix.'—Nicolas.
Steering-sail, according to Admiral Smyth (Sailors' Word-Book, p.
654), was 'an incorrect name for a studding sail,' but it seems to have
been in common use in Nelson's time.
[12] The Barham copy reads 'their rear.'
[13] The Barham copy ends here. The second sheet has not been found.
INSTRUCTIONS AFTER TRAFALGAR
INTRODUCTORY
The various tactical memoranda issued after Trafalgar by flag officers
in command of fleets are amongst the most interesting of the whole
series. The unsettled state of opinion which they display as the
result of Nelson's memorandum is very remarkable; for with one
exception they seem to show that the great tactical principles it
contained had been generally misunderstood to a surprising extent.
The failure to fathom its meaning is to be accounted for largely by
the lack of theoretical training, which made the science of tactics,
as distinguished from its practice, a sealed book to the majority of
British officers. But the trouble was certainly intensified by the
fact—as contemporary naval literature shows—that by Nelson's success
and death the memorandum became consecrated into a kind of sacred
document, which it was almost sacrilege to discuss. The violent
polemics of such men as James, the naval chronicler, made it appear
profanity so much as to consider whether Nelson's attack differed in
the least from his intended plan, and anyone who ventured to examine
the question in the light of general principles was likely to be
shouted down as a presumptuous heretic. Venial as was this attitude of
adulation under all the circumstances, it had a most evil influence on
the service. The last word seemed to have been said on tactics; and
oblivious of the fact that it is a subject on which the last word can
never be spoken, and that the enemy was certain to learn from Nelson's
practice as well as ourselves, admirals were content to produce a
colourable imitation of his memorandum, and everyone was satisfied not
to look ahead any further. To no one did it occur to consider how the
new method of attack was to be applied if the enemy adopted Nelson's
formation. They simply assumed an endless succession of Trafalgars.
The first outcome of this attitude of mind is an 'Order of Battle and
Sailing,' accompanied by certain instructions, issued by Admiral
Gambier from the Prince of Wales in Yarmouth Roads, on July 23, 1807,
when he was about to sail to seize the Danish fleet.[2] His force
consisted of thirty of the line, and its organisation and stations of
flag officers were as follows:
VAN SQUADRON
Division 1. Commodore Hood (No. 1 in line).
Division 2. Vice-Admiral Stanhope (No. 6).
CENTRE DIVISION
Division 1.} Admiral Gambier (No. 15).
Division 2.}
REAR SQUADRON
Division 1. Rear-Admiral Essington (No. 25).
Division 2. Commodore Keats (No. 30).
Gambier's fleet was thus organised in three equal squadrons (the
centre one called 'the centre division') and six equal subdivisions.
The commander-in-chief was in the centre and had no other flag in his
division, Similarly each junior flag officer was in the centre of his
squadron and led his subdivision, but he had a commodore to lead his
other subdivision. These two commodores also led the fleet on either
tack. So far all is plain, but when we endeavour to understand by the
appended instruction what battle formation Gambier intended by his
elaborate organisation it is very baffling. Possibly we have not got
the instruction exactly as Gambier wrote it; but as it stands it is
confused past all understanding, and no conceivable battle formation
can be constructed from it. All we can say for certain is that he
evidently believed he was adopting the principles of Trafalgar, and
perhaps going beyond them. The sailing order is to be also the battle
order, but whether in two columns or three is not clear. Independent
control of divisions and squadrons is also there, and even the
commodores are to control their own subdivisions 'subject to the
general direction' of their squadronal commanders, but whether the
formation was intended to follow that of Nelson the instruction
entirely fails to disclose.
The next is a tactical memorandum or general order, issued by Lord
Collingwood for the Mediterranean fleet in 1808, printed in
Mr. Newnham Collingwood's Correspondence of Lord Collingwood.
No order of battle is given; but two years later, in issuing an
additional instruction, he refers to his general order as still in
force. In this case we have the battle order, and it consists of
twenty of the line in two equal columns, with the commander-in-chief
and his second in command, second in their respective divisions. There
were no other flag officers in the fleet.[3] The memorandum which is
printed below will be seen to be an obvious imitation of Nelson's, and
nothing can impress us more deeply with the merit of Nelson's work
than to compare it with Collingwood's. Like Nelson, Collingwood begins
with introductory remarks emphasising the importance of 'a prompt and
immediate attack' and independent divisional control; and in order to
remedy certain errors of Trafalgar, he insists in addition on close
order being kept throughout the night and the strictest attention
being paid to divisional signals, thinking no doubt how slowly the
rear ships at Trafalgar had struggled into action, and how his signal
for line of bearing had been practically ignored. Then, after stating
broadly that he means with the van or weather division to attack the
van of the enemy, while the lee or larboard division simultaneously
attacks the rear, he differentiates like Nelson between a weather and
a lee attack. For the attack from to-windward he directs the two
divisions to run down in line abreast in such a way that they will
come into action together in a line parallel to the enemy; but,
whatever he intended, nothing is said about concentrating on any part
of the enemy, or about breaking the line in all parts or otherwise.
The attack from to-leeward is to be made perpendicularly in line
ahead. In this formation his own (the weather column) is to break the
line, so as to cut off the van quarter of the enemy's line from the
other three quarters, and the lee column is to sever this part of the
enemy's line a few ships in rear of their centre. So soon as the
leading ships have passed through and so weathered the enemy, they are
to keep away and lead down his line so as to engage the rear three
fourths to windward. This is of course practically identical with the
lee attack of Nelson's memorandum. The only addition is the course
that is to be taken after breaking the line. One cannot help wondering
how far the leading ships after passing the line would have been able
to lead down it before they were disabled, but the addition is
interesting as the first known direction as to what was to be done
after breaking the line in line ahead after Rodney's method. Seeing
the grave and obvious dangers of the movement it is natural that, like
Nelson, Collingwood hoped not to be forced to make it; what he desired
was a simple engagement on similar tacks. His 'intended attack' as in
Nelson's case is clearly that from to-windward.
Turning then again to the windward attack, we see at once its
superficial resemblance to Nelson's, but so entirely superficial is it
that it is impossible to believe Collingwood ever penetrated the
subtleties of his great chiefs design. The dual organisation is there
and the independent divisional control, but nothing else. The advance
squadron has gone, and with it all trace of a containing
movement. There is not even the feint—the mystification of the van.
Concentration too has gone, and instead of the sound main attack on
the rear, he is most concerned with attacking the van. True, he may
have meant what Nelson meant, but if he had really grasped his fine
intention he surely must have let some hint of it escape him in his
memorandum. But for the windward attack at least there is no trace of
these things, and Nelson's masterly conception sinks in Collingwood's
hands into a mere device for expediting the old parallel attack in
single line—that is to say, the line is to be formed in bearing down
instead of waiting to bear down till the line was complete. We can
only conclude, then, that both Collingwood and Gambier could see
nothing in the 'Nelson touch' but the swift attack, the dual
organisation, and independent divisional control.
There is a third document, however, which confirms us in the
impression already formed that there were officers who saw more
deeply. It is a tactical memorandum issued by Admiral the Hon. Sir
Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane, Bart., G.C.B., uncle of the more
famous Earl of Dundonald. It is printed by Sir Charles Ekin, in his
Naval Battles, from a paper which he found at the end of a book
in his possession containing 'Additional Signals, Instructions, &c.,'
issued by Sir A.I. Cochrane to the squadron under his command upon the
Leeward Islands station.' He commanded in chief on this station from
1805 to 1814, but appears never to have been directly under Nelson's
influence except for a few weeks, when Nelson came out in pursuit of
Villeneuve and attached him to his squadron. He was rather one of
Rodney's men, under whom he had served in his last campaigns, and this
may explain the special note of his tactical system. His partiality
for Rodney's manoeuvre is obvious, and the interesting feature of his
plan of attack is the manner in which he grafts it on Nelson's system
of mutually supporting squadrons. He does not even shrink from a very
free use of doubling which his old chiefs system entailed, and he
provides a special signal of his own for directing the execution of
the discarded manoeuvre. The 'explanation' of another of his new
signals for running aboard an enemy 'so as to disable her from getting
away' is also worthy of remark, as a recognition of Nelson's favourite
practice disapproved by Collingwood.
Yet, although we see throughout the marks of the true 'Nelson touch,'
Cochrane's memorandum bears signs of having been largely founded on an
independent study of tactical theory. His obligations to Clerk of
Eldin are obvious. There are passages in the document which seem as
though they must have been written with the Essay on Naval
Tactics at his elbow, while his expression 'an attack by forcing
the fleet from to-leeward' is directly borrowed from Morogues' 'Forcer
l'ennemi au combat elant sous le vent.' On the other hand certain
movements are entirely his own, such as his excellent device of
inverting the line after passing through the enemy's fleet, a great
improvement on Collingwood's method of leading down it in normal
order.
The point is of some interest, for although Cochrane's memorandum is
over-elaborate and smells of the lamp, yet it seems clear that his
theoretical knowledge made him understand Nelson's principles far
better than most of the men who had actually fought at Trafalgar and
had had the advantage of Nelson's own explanations. All indeed that
Cochrane's memorandum seems to lack is that rare simplicity and
abstraction which only the highest genius can achieve.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The signature does not occur to the draught but was affixed to the
originals issued to the admirals and captains of the fleet. To the copy
signed by Lord Nelson, and delivered to Captain George Hope, of the
Defence, was added: 'N.B.—When the Defence quits the fleet for England
you are to return this secret memorandum to the Victory' Captain Hope
wrote on that paper: 'It was agreeable to these instructions that Lord
Nelson attacked the combined fleets of France and Spain off Cape
Trafalgar on the 21st of October, 1805, they having thirty-three of the
line and we twenty-seven,'—Nicolas.
The injunction to return the memorandum may well have been added to all
copies issued, and this may account for their general disappearance.
[2] For this document the Society is indebted to Commander G.P.W.
Hope, R.N., who has kindly placed it at my disposal.
[3] For this document the Society is again indebted to Commander Hope,
R.N.
[+MS. of Commander Hope, R.N. Copy+.]
Order of Battle and Sailing.[1]
The respective flag officers will have the immediate direction of the
division in which their ships are placed, subject to the general
direction of the admiral commanding the squadron to which they belong.
The ships in order of battle and sailing are to keep at the distance
of two cables' length from and in the wake of each other, increasing
that distance according to the state of the weather.[2]
The leading ship of the starboard division is to keep the admiral two
points on her weather bow. The leading ship of the lee division is
when sailing on a wind to keep the leader of the weather column two
points before her beam; when sailing large, abreast of her.
(Signed) J. GAMBIER.
Prince of Wales, Yarmouth Roads:
23 July, 1807.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] For the actual order to which the instructions are appended see
Introductory Note, supra, p. 322.
[2] The normal distance was then a cable and a half. See post, p.
330 note.
[+Correspondence of Collingwood, p. 359+.]
From every account received of the enemy it is expected they may very
soon be met with on their way from Corfu and Tarentum, and success
depends on a prompt and immediate attack upon them. In order to which
it will be necessary that the greatest care be taken to keep the
closest order in the respective columns during the night which the
state of the weather will allow, and that the columns be kept at such
a sufficient distance apart as will leave room for tacking or other
movements, so that in the event of calm or shift of wind no
embarrassment may be caused.
Should the enemy be found formed in order of battle with his whole
force, I shall notwithstanding probably not make the signal to form
the line of battle; but, keeping in the closest order, with the van
squadron attack the van of the enemy, while the commander of the lee
division takes the proper measures, and makes to the ships of his
division the necessary signals for commencing the action with the
enemy's rear, as nearly as possible at the same time that the van
begins. Of his signals therefore the captains of that division will be
particularly watchful.
If the squadron has to run to leeward to close with the enemy, the
signal will be made to alter the course together, the van division
keeping a point or two more away than the lee, the latter carrying
less sail; and when the fleet draws near the enemy both columns are to
preserve a line as nearly parallel to the hostile fleet as they can.
In standing up to the enemy from the leeward upon a contrary tack the
lee line is to press sail, so that the leading ship of that line may
be two or three points before the beam of the leading ship of the
weather line, which will bring them to action nearly at the same
period.
The leading ship of the weather column will endeavour to pass through
the enemy's line, should the weather be such as to make that
practicable, at one fourth from the van, whatever number of ships
their line may be composed of. The lee division will pass through at a
ship or two astern of their centre, and whenever a ship has weathered
the enemy it will be found necessary to shorten sail as much as
possible for her second astern to close with her, and to keep away,
steering in a line parallel to the enemy's and engaging them on their
weather side.
A movement of this kind may be necessary, but, considering the
difficulty of altering the position of the fleet during the time of
combat, every endeavour will be made to commence battle with the enemy
on the same tack they are; and I have only to recommend and direct
that they be fought with at the nearest distance possible, in which
getting on board of them may be avoided, which is alway
disadvantageous to us, except when they are flying.[1]
Additional Instruction.[2]
When the signal No. 43 or 44[3] is made to form the order, the fleet
is to form in one line, the rear shortening sail to allow the van to
take their station ahead. If such signal should not be made the
captains are referred to the general order of 23 March, 1808.
COLLINGWOOD.
Ville de Paris, 4th January, 1810.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The remaining clauses of the memorandum do not relate to tactics.
[2] From the original in the possession of Commander Hope, R.N. It is
attached to an order of battle in two columns. See supra, p. 323.
[3] Sig. 43: 'Form line of battle in open order.' Sig. 44: 'Form line
of battle in close order at about a cable and a half distant'; with a
white pennant, 'form on weather column'; with a blue pennant, 'form on
lee column.'
[+Printed in Skin's Naval Battles, pp. 394 seq. (First edit.)+]
Modes of Attack from the Windward, &c.
When an attack is intended to be made upon the enemy's rear, so as to
endeavour to cut off a certain number of ships from that part of their
fleet, the same will be made known by signal No. 27, and the numeral
signal which accompanies it will point out the headmost of the enemy's
ships that is to be attacked, counting always from the van, as stated
in page 160, Article 31 (Instructions).[1] The signal will
afterwards be made for the division intended to make the attack, or
the same will be signified by the ship's pennants, and the pennants of
the ship in that division which is to begin the attack, with the
number of the ship to be first attacked in the enemy's line. Should it
be intended that the leading ship in the division is to attack the
rear ship of the enemy, she must bear up, so as to get upon the
weather quarter of that ship; the ships following her in the line will
pass in succession on her weather quarter, giving their fire to the
ship she is engaged with; and so on in succession until they have
closed with the headmost ship intended to be attacked.
The ships in reserve, who have no opponents, will break through the
enemy's line ahead of this ship, so as to cut off the ships engaged
from the rest of the enemy's fleet.
When it is intended that the rear ship of the division shall attack
the rear ship of the enemy's line, that ship's pennants will be shown;
the rest of the ships in the division will invert their order,
shortening sail until they can in succession follow the rear ship,
giving their fire to the enemy's ships in like manner as above stated;
and the reserve ships will cut through the enemy's line as already
mentioned.
When this mode of attack is intended to be put in force, the other
divisions of the fleet, whether in order of sailing or battle, will
keep to windward just out of gun-shot, so as to be ready to support
the rear, and prevent the van and centre of the enemy from doubling
upon them. This manoeuvre, if properly executed, may force the enemy
to abandon the ships on his rear, or submit to be brought to action on
equal terms, which is difficult to be obtained when the attack is made
from to-windward.
When the fleet is to leeward, and the commanding officer intends to
cut through the enemy's line, the number of the ship in their line
where the attempt is to be made will be shown as already stated.
If the ships after passing the enemy's line are to tack, and double
upon the enemy's ships ahead, the same will be made known by a blue
pennant over the Signal 27; if not they are to bear up and run to the
enemy's line to windward, engaging the ship they first meet with; each
succeeding ship giving her fire, and passing on to the next in the
rear. The ships destined to attack the enemy's rear will be pointed
out by the number of the last ship in the line that is to make this
movement, or the pennants of that ship will be shown; but, should no
signal be made, it is to be understood that the number of ships to
bear up is equal in number to the enemy's ships that have been cut
off; the succeeding ships will attack and pursue the van of the enemy,
or form, should it be necessary to prevent the enemy's van from
passing round the rear of the fleet to relieve or join their cut-off
ships.
If it is intended that the ships following those destined to engage
the enemy's rear to windward shall bear up, and prevent the part of
their rear which has been cut off from escaping to leeward, the same
will be made known by a red pennant being hoisted over the Signal
21,[2] and the number of ships so ordered will be shown by numeral
signals or pennants. If from the centre division, a white pennant will
be hoisted over the signal.
If the rear ships are to perform this service by bearing up, the same
will be made known by a red pennant under. The numeral signal or
pennants, counting always from the van, will show the headmost ship to
proceed on this service.[3] The ships not directed by those signals
are to form in close order, to cover the ships engaged from the rest
of the enemy's fleet.
When the enemy's ships are to be engaged by both van and centre, the
rear will keep their wind, to cover the ships engaged from the enemy
to windward, as circumstances may require.
When the signal shall be made to cut through the enemy's van from
to-leeward, the same will be made known by Signal 27, &c. In this
case, if the headmost ships are to tack and double upon the enemy's
van, engaging their ships in succession as they get up, the blue
pennant will be shown as already stated, and the numeral signal
pointing out the last ship from the van which is to tack, which in
general will be equal in number to the enemy's ships cut through. The
rest of the ships will be prepared to act as the occasion may require,
either by bearing up and attacking the enemy's centre and rear, or
tacking or wearing to cut off the van of the enemy from passing round
the rear of the fleet to rejoin their centre. And on this service, it
is probable, should the enemy's ships bear up, that some of the rear
ships will be employed—the signal No. 21 will be made accompanied
with the number or pennants of the headmost ship—upon which she, with
the ships in her rear, will proceed to the attack of the enemy.
When an attack is likely to be made by an enemy's squadron, by forcing
the fleet from to-leeward, Signal 109 will be made with a blue pennant
where best seen;[4] upon which each ship will luff up upon the
weather quarter of her second ahead, so as to leave no opening for the
leading ship of the enemy to pass through: this movement will expose
them to the collected fire of all that part of the fleet they intended
to force.[5]
It has been often remarked that Nelson founded no school of tactics,
and the instructions which were issued with the new Signal Book
immediately after the war entirely endorse the remark. They can be
called nothing else but reactionary. Nelson's drastic attempt to break
up the old rigid formation into active divisions independently
commanded seems to have come to nothing, and the new instructions are
based with almost all the old pedantry on the single line of
battle. Of anything like mutually supporting movements there is only a
single trace. It is in Article XIV., and that is only a resurrection
of the time-honoured corps de reserve, formed of superfluous
ships after your line has been equalised with that of a numerically
inferior enemy. The whole document, in fact, is a consecration of the
fetters which had been forged in the worst days of the seventeenth
century, and which Nelson had so resolutely set himself to break.
The new Signal Book in which the instructions appear was founded on
the code elaborated by Sir Home Riggs Popham, but there is nothing to
show whether or not he was the author of the instructions. He was an
officer of high scientific attainments, but although he had won
considerable distinction during the war, his service had been entirely
of an amphibious character in connection with military operations
ashore, and he had never seen a fleet action at sea. He reached flag
rank in 1814, and was one of the men who received a K.C.B. on the
reconstitution of the order in 1815. Of the naval lords serving with
Lord Melville at the time none can show a career or a reputation which
would lead us to expect from them anything but the colourless
instructions they produced. The controlling influence was undoubtedly
Lord Keith. The doyen of the active list, and in command of the
Channel Fleet till he retired after the peace of 1815, he was
all-powerful as a naval authority, and his flag captain, Sir Graham
Moore, had just been given a seat on the board. A devout pupil of
St. Vincent and Howe, correct rather than brilliant, Keith represented
the old tradition, and notwithstanding the patience with which he had
borne Nelson's vagaries and insubordination, the antipathy between the
two men was never disguised. However generously Keith appreciated
Nelson's genius, he can only have regarded his methods as an evil
influence in the service for ordinary men, nor can there be much doubt
that his apprehensions had a good deal to justify them.
The general failure to grasp the whole of Nelson's tactical principles
was not the only trouble. There are signs that during the later years
of the war a very dangerous misunderstanding of his teaching had been
growing up in the service. In days when there was practically no
higher instruction in the theory of tactics, it was easy for officers
to forget how much prolonged and patient study had enabled Nelson to
handle his fleets with the freedom he did; and the tendency was to
believe that his successes could be indefinitely repeated by mere
daring and vehemence of attack. The seed was sown immediately after
the battle and by Collingwood himself. 'It was a severe action,' he
wrote to Admiral Parker on November 1, 'no dodging or manoeuvring.'
And again on December 16, to Admiral Pasley, 'Lord Nelson determined
to substitute for exact order an impetuous attack in two distinct
bodies.' Collingwood of course with all his limitations knew well
enough it was not a mere absence of manoeuvring that had won the
victory. In the same letter he had said that although Nelson
succeeded, as it were, by enchantment, it was all the effect of system
and nice combination.' Yet such phrases as he and others employed to
describe the headlong attack, taken from their context and repeated
from mouth to mouth, would soon have raised a false impression that
many men were only too ready to receive. So the seed must have grown,
till we find the fruit in Lord Dundonald's oft-quoted phrase, 'Never
mind manoeuvres: always go at them.' So it was that Nelson's teaching
had crystallised in his mind and in the mind perhaps of half the
service. The phrase is obviously a degradation of the opening
enunciations in Nelson's memoranda, a degradation due to time, to
superficial study, and the contemptuous confidence of years of
undisputed mastery at sea.
The conditions which brought about this attitude to tactics are
clearly seen in the way others saw us. Shortly after Trafalgar a
veteran French officer of the war of American Independence wrote some
Reflections on the battle, which contain much to the point. 'It
is a noteworthy thing,' he says in dealing with the defects of the
single-line formation, 'that the English, who formerly used to employ
all the resources of tactics against our fleets, now hardly use them
at all, since our scientific tacticians have disappeared. It may
almost be said that they no longer have any regular order of sailing
or battle: they attack our ships of the line just as they used to
attack a convoy.'[6] But here the old tactician was not holding up
English methods as an example. He was citing them to show to what
easy victories a navy exposed itself in which, by neglect of
scientific study and alert observation, tactics had sunk into a mere
senile formula. 'They know,' he continues, 'that we are in no state to
oppose them with well-combined movements so as to profit by the kind
of disorder which is the natural result of this kind of attack. They
know if they throw their attack on one part of a much extended line,
that part is soon destroyed.' Thus he arrives at two fundamental laws:
'1. That our system of a long line of battle is worthless in face of
an enemy who attacks with his ships formed in groups (reunis en
pelotons), and told off to engage a small number of ships at
different points in our line. 2. That the only tactical system to
oppose to theirs is to have at least a double line, with reserve
squadrons on the wings stationed in such a manner as to bear down most
easily upon the points too vigorously attacked.' The whole of his
far-sighted paper is in fact an admirable study of the conditions
under which impetuous attacks and elaborate combinations are
respectively called for. But from both points of view the single line
for a large fleet is emphatically condemned, while in our instructions
of 1816 not a hint of its weakness appears. They resume practically
the same standpoint which the Duke of York had reached a century and a
half before.
Spanish tacticians seem also to have shared the opinion that Trafalgar
had really done nothing to dethrone the line. One of the highest
reputation, on December 17, 1805, had sent to his government a
thoughtful criticism of the action, and his view of Nelson's attack
was this: 'Nothing,' he says, 'is more seamanlike or better tactics
than for a fleet which is well to windward of another to bear down
upon it in separate columns, and deploy at gun-shot from the enemy
into a line which, as it comes into action, will inflict at least as
much damage upon them as it is likely to suffer. But Admiral Nelson
did not deploy his columns at gun-shot from our line, but ran up
within pistol-shot and broke through it, so as to reduce the battle to
a series of single-ship actions. It was a manoeuvre in which I do not
think he will find many imitators. Where two fleets are equally well
trained, that which attacks in this manner must be defeated.'[7]
So it was our enemies rightly read the lesson of Trafalgar. The false
deductions therefore which grew up in our own service are all the more
extraordinary, even as we find them in the new instructions and the
current talk of the quarter-deck. But this is not the worst. It is not
till we turn to the Signal Book itself that we get a full impression
of the extent to which tactical thought had degenerated and Nelson's
seed had been choked. The movements and formations for which signals
are provided are stubbornly on the old lines of 1799. The influence of
Nelson, however, is seen in two places. The first is a group of
signals for 'attacking the enemy at anchor by passing either outside
them or between them and the land,' and for 'anchoring and engaging
either within or outside the enemy.' Here we have a rational
embodiment of the experience of the Nile. The second is a similar
attempt to embody the teaching of Trafalgar, and the way it is done
finally confirms the failure to understand what Nelson meant. So
extraordinary is the signification of the signal and its explanatory
note that it must be given in full.
'Signal.—Cut the enemy's line in the order of sailing in two
columns.
'Explanatory Note.—The admiral will make known what number of
ships from the van ship of the enemy the weather division is to break
through the enemy's line, and the same from the rear at which the lee
division is to break through their line.
'To execute this signal the fleet is to form in the order of sailing
in two columns, should it not be so formed already; the leader of each
column steering down for the position pointed out where he is to cut
through the enemy's line.
'If the admiral wishes any particular conduct to be pursued by the
leader of the division, in which he happens not to be, after the line
is broken, he will of course point it out. If he does not it is to be
considered that the lee division after breaking through the line is
left to its commander.
'In performing this evolution the second astern of the leader in each
column is to pass through the line astern of the ship next ahead
[sic] of where her leader broke through, and so on in succession,
breaking through all parts of the enemy's line ahead [sic] of
their leaders as described in the plate.'
The plate represents the two columns bearing down to attack in a
strictly formed line ahead, and the ships, after the leaders have cut
through, altering course each for its proper interval in the enemy's
line, and the whole then engaging from to-leeward. The note proceeds:
'By this arrangement no ship will have to pass the whole of the
enemy's line. If however, in consequence of any circumstance, the rear
ships should not be able to cut through in their assigned places, the
captains of those ships, as well as of the ships that are deprived of
opponents in the enemy's line by this mode of attack, are to act to
the best of their judgment for the destruction of the enemy, unless a
disposition to the contrary has been previously made.
'It will be seen that by breaking the line in this order the enemy's
van ships will not be able to assist either their centre or rear
without tacking or wearing for that purpose.'
This from cover to cover of the Signal Book is the sole trace to be
found of the great principles for which Nelson had lived and
died. That Lord Keith or anyone else could have believed that it
adequately represented the teaching of Trafalgar is almost incredible.
To begin with, the wording of the note contains an inexplicable
blunder. The last paragraph shows clearly that the idea of the signal
is an attack on the rear and centre, as at Trafalgar; yet the ships of
each column as they come successively into action are told to engage
the enemy's ship ahead of the point where their leaders broke
through, a movement which would resolve itself into an attack on their
centre and van, and leave the rear free to come into immediate action
with an overwhelming concentration on the lee division.
That so grave an error should have been permitted to pass into the
Signal Book is bad enough, but that such a signal even if it had been
correctly worded should stand for Nelson's last word to the service is
almost beyond belief. The final outcome of Nelson's genius for tactics
lay of course in his memorandum, and not in the form of attack he
actually adopted. Yet this remarkable signal ignores the whole
principle of the memorandum. The fundamental ideas of concentration
and containing by independent squadrons are wholly missed; and not
only this. It distorts Nelson's lee attack into a weather attack, and
holds up for imitation every vice of the reckless movement in spite of
which Nelson had triumphed. Not a word is said of its dangers, not a
word of the exceptional circumstances that alone could justify it, not
a word of how easily the tables could be turned upon a man who a
second time dared to fling to the winds every principle of his art. It
is the last word of British sailing tactics, and surely nothing in
their whole history, not even in the worst days of the old Fighting
Instructions, so staggers us with its lack of tactical sense.[8]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] I.e. the Instructions of 1799, supra, p. 278. For Signal 27
see p. 255.
[2] 'To attack on bearing indicated.'
[3] In Ekin's text the punctuation of this sentence is obviously wrong
and destroys the sense. It should accord, as I have ventured to amend
it, with that of the previous paragraph.
[4] Signal 109, 'To close nearer the ship or ships indicated.'
[5] Sir Charles Elkin adds, 'In the same work he has also a signal
(No. 785) under the head "Enemy" to "Lay on board," with the following
observation:—
'"N.B.—This signal is not meant that your people should board the enemy
unless you should find advantage by so doing; but it is that you should
run your ship on board the enemy, so as to disable her from getting
away."'
[6] Mathieu-Dumas, Precis des Evenements Militaires: Pieces
Justificatives, vol. xiv. p. 408.
[7] Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola, viii. 353.
[8] The anonymous veteran of the old French navy, cited by
Mathieu-Dumas, explains exactly how Villeneuve might have turned the
tables on Nelson by forming two lines himself. 'There is,' he concludes,
'no known precedent of a defensive formation in two lines; but I will
venture to assert that if Admiral Villeneuve had doubled his line at the
moment he saw Nelson meant to attack him in two lines, that admiral
would never have had the imprudence of making such an
attack.'—Evenements Militaires, xiv. 411.
[+Signal Book, United Service Institution+.]
Instructions relating to the Line of Battle and the Conduct of the
Fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an
enemy.
I. The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle
are, that the ships may be able, to assist and support each other in
action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships
greater in number than themselves, and that every ship may be able to
fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own
fleet.
II. On whichever tack the fleet may be sailing, when the line of
battle is formed, the van squadron is to form the van, the centre
squadron the centre, and the rear squadron the rear of the line,
unless some other arrangement be pointed out by signal. But if a
change of wind, or tacking, or wearing, or any other circumstance,
should alter the order in which the line of battle was formed, the
squadrons are to remain in the stations in which they may so happen to
be placed, till the admiral shall direct them to take others.
III. When the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle,
each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as
expeditiously as possible; and to keep in close order, if not
otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that
carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the
line, when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it.
IV. In forming the line of battle, each ship should haul up a little
to windward rather than to leeward of her second ahead, as a ship a
little to leeward will find great difficulty in getting into her
station, if it should be necessary to keep the line quite close to the
wind; and it may also be better to form at a distance a little
greater, rather than smaller, than the prescribed distance, as it is
easier to close the line than to extend it.
V. If the admiral should haul out of the line, the ships astern of him
are to close up to fill the vacancy he has made, and the line is to
continue on its course, and to act in the same manner as if the
admiral had not left it All signals made to the centre will be
addressed to the senior officer remaining in it, who, during the
absence of the admiral, is to be considered as the commander of the
centre squadron.
VI. The repeating frigates are to be abreast of the commanders of the
squadrons to which they belong, and the fireships and frigates to
windward of their squadrons, if no particular station be assigned to
them.
VII. When the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is
made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to
place themselves in such a manner that, if they were to haul to the
wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed,
they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. To do this,
every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the
line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compass on
which the line of battle would sail, viz. on that point of the compass
which is six points from the direction of the wind.
As the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to
form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or
squadron flags, shown with the signals for such a line, will refer to
the forming the line of battle; that division or squadron whose flag
is uppermost (without considering whether it do or do not form
the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station
which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind, and
form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is
undermost is to place itself in that station in which it would
become the rear if by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be
formed.
VIII. When a line of bearing has been formed the ships are to preserve
their relative bearing from each other, whenever they are directed to
alter their course together; but if they are directed to alter their
course in succession, as the line of bearing would by that
circumstance be destroyed, it is to be no longer attended to.
IX. If after having made the signal to prepare to form the line of
battle, or either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the
preparative flag flying, should make several signals in succession to
point out the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals
are to be carefully written down, that they may be carried into
execution, when the signal for the line is hoisted again. They are to
be executed in the order in which they are made, excepting such as the
admiral may annul previously to his again hoisting the signal for the
line.
X. If the wind should come forward when the fleet is formed in
line of battle, or is sailing by the wind on a line of bearing, the
leading ship is to steer seven points from the wind, and every ship is
to haul as close to the wind as possible till she has got into the
wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought it on the
proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come aft, the
ships are to bear up until they get into the wake, or on the proper
point of bearing from the leading ship.
XI. Ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet on any
separate service are not to obey the signal for forming the line of
battle unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by
signal.
XII. Ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as
directed in Article XIX. in the General Instructions, though in the
presence of an enemy. The captains of such ships will not thereby be
prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have the
opportunities of rendering essential service by placing their ships
advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with
the other part of the fleet.
XIII. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag
officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not
already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper, but he is to
hoist it in one of his own squadron or division, if there be one near
and fit for the purpose.
XIV. If the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or
which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the
ships, which at either extremity of the line are thereby left without
opponents, may, after the action is begun, quit the line, without
waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or
assist the ships of the fleet in the best manner that circumstances
will allow.
XV. Great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy
either over or very near to any ships of the fleet, nor, though the
signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is
placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy.
XVI. No ship is to separate from the body of the fleet in time of
action to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have been
beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some other
flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled their
opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to assist any ship of
the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their attack
till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled, unless by
signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act
otherwise.
XVII. If any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of
being destroyed or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal
expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are
the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her
immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a
situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the
enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate that may be near is to
use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off,
or by joining in the attack on the enemy, or by covering the fireship,
or, if necessity requires it, by taking out the crew of the disabled
ship, or by any other means which circumstances at the time will
admit.
XVIII. Though a ship be disabled and hard pressed by the enemy in
battle, she is not to quit her station in the line if it can possibly
be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do
from the commander of the division or squadron to which he belongs, or
from some other flag officer. But if he should be ordered out of the
line, or should be obliged to quit it before assistance can be sent to
him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the space become
vacant to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it.
XIX. If there should be a captain so lost to all sense of honour and
the great duty he owes his country as not to exert himself to the
utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy them
when engaged, the commander of the squadron or division to which he
belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from the
command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship till
the admiral's pleasure shall be known.
FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE TRAFALGAR FIGHT
[+Sir Charles Ekin's Naval Battles, pp. 271 et seq. Extract+.]
The intelligent officer to whom the writer is indebted for this
important manuscript was an eye-witness of what he has so ably
related, and upon which he has reasoned with so much judgment.[1]
'The combined fleet, after veering from the starboard to the larboard
tack, gradually fell into the form of an irregular crescent; in which
they remained to the moment of attack. Many have considered that the
French admiral intended this formation of the line of battle; but from
the information I obtained after the action, connected with some
documents found on board the Bucentaur, I believe it was the intention
to have formed a line ahead, consisting of twenty-one sail—the
supposed force of the British fleet—and a squadron of observation
composed of twelve sail of the line, under Admiral Gravina, intended
to act according to circumstances after the British fleet were
engaged. By wearing together, the enemy's line became inverted, and
the light squadron which had been advanced in the van on the starboard
tack, was left in the rear after wearing; and the ships were
subsequently mingled with the rear of the main body. The wind being
light, with a heavy swell, and the fleet lying with their main
topsails to the mast, it was impossible for the ships to preserve
their exact station in the line; consequently scarce any ship was
immediately ahead or astern of her second. The fleet had then the
appearance, generally, of having formed in two lines, thus: so that
the ship to leeward seemed to be opposite the space left between two
in the weather-line.
[Illustration]
'In the rear, the line was in some places trebled; and this
particularly happened where the Colossus was, who, after passing the
stern of the French Swiftsure, and luffing up under the lee of the
Bahama, supposing herself to leeward of the enemy's line, unexpectedly
ran alongside of the French Achille under cover of the smoke. The
Colossus was then placed between the Achille and the Bahama, being on
board of the latter; and was also exposed to the fire of the
Swiftsure's after-guns. All these positions I believe to have been
merely accidental; and to accident alone I attribute the concave
circle of the fleet, or crescent line of battle. The wind shifted to
the westward as the morning advanced; and of course the enemy's ships
came up with the wind, forming a bow and quarter line. The ships were
therefore obliged to edge away, to keep in the wake of their leaders;
and this manoeuvre, from the lightness of the wind, the unmanageable
state of the ships in a heavy swell, and, we may add, the inexperience
of the enemy, not being performed with facility and celerity,
undesignedly threw the combined fleets into a position, perhaps the
best that could have been planned, had it been supported by the
skilful manoeuvring of individual ships, and with efficient practice
in gunnery.
'Of the advantages and disadvantages of the mode of attack adopted by
the British fleet, it may be considered presumptuous to speak, as the
event was so completely successful; but as the necessity of any
particular experiment frequently depends upon contingent
circumstances, not originally calculated upon, there can be no
impropriety in questioning whether the same plan be likely to succeed
under all circumstances, and on all occasions.
'The original plan of attack, directed by the comprehensive mind of
our great commander, was suggested on a supposition that the enemy's
fleet consisted of forty-six sail of the line and the British forty;
and the attack, as designed from to-windward, was to be made under the
following circumstances:
'Under a supposition that the hostile fleet would be in a line ahead
of forty-six sail, the British fleet was to be brought within gun-shot
of the enemy's centre, in two divisions of sixteen sail each, and a
division of observation consisting of the remaining eight.
'The lee division was by signal to make a rapid attack under all
possible sail on the twelve rear ships of the enemy. The ships were to
break through the enemy's line; and such ships as were thrown out of
their stations were to assist their friends that were hard
pressed. The remainder of the enemy's fleet, of thirty-four sail, were
to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief.'
This able officer then proceeds to describe, by a figure, the plan of
attack as originally intended; bearing a very close resemblance to
that already given in Plate XXVIII. fig. 1; but making the enemy's
fleet, as arranged in a regular line ahead, to extend the distance of
five miles; and the van, consisting of sixteen ships, left unoccupied;
the whole comprising a fleet of forty-six sail of the line. He then
observes:
'If the regulated plan of attack had been adhered to, the English
fleet should have borne up together, and have sailed in a line abreast
in their respective divisions until they arrived up with the
enemy. Thus the plan which consideration had matured would have been
executed, than which perhaps nothing could be better; the victory
would have been more speedily decided, and the brunt of the action
would have been more equally felt, &c.
'With the exception of the Britannia, Dreadnought, and Prince, the
body of the fleet sailed very equally; and I have no doubt could have
been brought into action simultaneously with their leaders. This
being granted, there was no time gained by attacking in a line ahead,
the only reason, I could suppose, that occasioned the change.
'The advantages of an attack made in two great divisions, with a
squadron of observation, seem to combine every necessary precaution
under all circumstances.
'The power of bringing an overwhelming force against a particular
point of an enemy's fleet, so as to ensure the certain capture of the
ships attacked, and the power of condensing such a force afterwards
[so] as not only to protect the attacking ships from any offensive
attempt that may be made by the unoccupied vessels of the hostile
fleet, but also to secure the prizes already made, will most probably
lead to a victory; and if followed up according to circumstances, may
ultimately tend to the annihilation of the whole, or the greater part
of the mutilated fleet.
'Each ship may use her superiority of sailing, without being so far
removed from the inferior sailing ships as to lose their support.
'The swifter ships, passing rapidly through the enemy's fire, are less
liable to be disabled; and, after closing with their opponents, divert
their attention from the inferior sailers, who are advancing to
complete what their leaders had begun. The weather division, from
being more distant, remain spectators of the first attack for some
little time, according to the rate of the sailing; and may direct
their attack as they observe the failure or success of the first
onset, either to support the lee division, if required, or to extend
the success they may appear to have gained, &c.
'If the enemy bear up to elude the attack, the attacking fleet is well
collected for the commencement of a chase, and for mutual support in
pursuit.
'The mode of attack, adopted with such success in the Trafalgar
action, appears to me to have succeeded from the enthusiasm inspired
throughout the British fleet from their being commanded by their
beloved Nelson; from the gallant conduct of the leaders of the two
divisions; from the individual exertions of each ship after the attack
commenced, and the superior practice of the guns in the English fleet.
'It was successful also from the consternation spread through the
combined fleet on finding the British so much stronger than was
expected; from the astonishing and rapid destruction which followed
the attack of the leaders, witnessed by the whole of the hostile
fleets, inspiring the one and dispiriting the other and from the loss
of the admiral's ship early in the action.
'The disadvantages of this mode of attack appear to consist in
bringing forward the attacking force in a manner so leisurely and
alternately, that an enemy of equal spirit and equal ability in
seamanship and gunnery would have annihilated the ships one after
another in detail, carried slowly on as they were by a heavy swell and
light airs.
'At the distance of one mile five ships, at half a cable's length
apart, might direct their broadsides effectively against the head of
the division for seven minutes, supposing the rate of sailing to have
been four miles an hour; and within the distance of half a mile three
ships would do the same for seven minutes more, before the attacking
ship could fire a gun in her defence.
'It is to be observed that, although the hull of the headmost ship
does certainly in a great measure cover the hulls of those astern, yet
great injury is done to the masts and yards of the whole by the fire
directed against the leader; and that, if these ships are foiled in
their attempt to cut through the enemy's line, or to run on board of
them, they are placed, for the most part, hors de combat for
the rest of the action.
'Or should it fall calm, or the wind materially decrease about the
moment of attack, the van ships must be sacrificed before the rear
could possibly come to their assistance.
'In proceeding to the attack of October 21, the weather was exactly
such as might have caused this dilemma, as the sternmost ships of the
British were six or seven miles distant. By the mode of attacking in
detail, and the manner in which the combined fleet was drawn up to
receive it, instead of doubling on the enemy, the British were, on
that day, themselves doubled and trebled on; and the advantage of
applying an overwhelming force collectively, it would seem, was
totally lost.
'The Victory, Temeraire, Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus
and Bellerophon were placed in such situations in the onset, that
nothing but the most heroic gallantry and practical skill at their
guns could have extricated them. If the enemy's vessels had closed up
as they ought to have done, from van to rear, and had possessed
a nearer equality in active courage, it is my opinion that even
British skill and British gallantry could not have availed. The
position of the combined fleet at one time was precisely that in which
the British were desirous of being placed; namely, to have part of an
opposing fleet doubled on, and separated from the main body.
'The French admiral, with his fleet, showed the greatest passive
gallantry; and certainly the French Intrepide, with some others,
evinced active courage equal to the British; but there was no nautical
management, no skilful manoeuvring.
'It may appear presumptuous thus to have questioned the propriety of
the Trafalgar attack; but it is only just, to point out the advantages
and disadvantages of every means that may be used for the attainment
of great results, that the probabilities and existing circumstances
may be well weighed before such means are applied. A plan, to be
entirely correct, must be suited to all cases. If its infallibility is
not thus established, there can be no impropriety in pointing out the
errors and dangers to which it is exposed, for the benefit of others.
'Our heroic and lamented chief knew his means, and the power he had to
deal with; he also knew the means he adopted were sufficient for the
occasion; and that sufficed.
'The Trafalgar attack might be followed under different circumstances,
and have a different result: it is right, therefore, to discuss its
merits and demerits. It cannot take one atom from the fame of the
departed hero, whose life was one continued scene of original ability,
and of superior action.'
FOOTNOTE:
[1] The concluding part of the MS. is devoted to a detailed account of
the part played in the action by the Conqueror and her two seconds,
Neptune and Leviathan, with the special purpose of showing that
Villeneuve really struck to the Conqueror. In a note the author says, 'I
have been thus particular, as the capture of the French admiral has been
unblushingly attributed to others without any mention being made of the
ship that actually was the principal in engaging her, wishing to do
justice to a gallant officer who on that day considered his task not
complete until every ship was either captured or beyond distance of
pursuit.' The inference is that the author was an officer of the
Conqueror, defending his captain, Israel Pellew, younger brother of the
more famous Edward, Lord Exmouth. It is possible therefore, and even
probable, that this criticism of Trafalgar represents the ideas of the
Pellews.