Paris, Sunday, May 14, 1854.
My dear Tocqueville,—I write to you in meditatione fugæ. We start for
England in an hour's time. The last news that I heard of you was the day
before yesterday from Cousin. He read me your letter, which sounded to me
like that of a man in not very bad health or hopes. I trust that the
attack of which Madame de Tocqueville wrote to us has quite passed off.
Thiers, who asked very anxiously after you to-day, is earnest that you
should be present at the election on the 18th. The Academy, he said, is
very jealous. Vous serez très-mal vu, if you do not come.
You are at last going seriously to work in the war. By the end of the
year you will have, military and naval, 700,000 men in arms.
I wish that they were nearer to the enemy.
Pray remember us most kindly to Madame de Tocqueville, and let us know
where you go as soon as you are decided.
Ever yours,
N.W. Senior.
St. Cyr, May 21, 1854.
I followed the advice which you were commissioned to give me, my dear
Senior. I have just been to Paris, but as I stayed there only twenty-four
hours I have not brought back any distinct impressions.
I saw only Academicians who talked about the Academy, and—who knew
nothing of politics. It is true that such is now the case with everyone.
Politics, which used to be transacted in open day, have now become a
secret process into which none can penetrate except the two or three
alchemists who are engaged in its preparation.
You heard of course that after your little visit, which we enjoyed so
much, I became very unwell, and my mind was only less affected than my
body. I spent a month very much out of spirits and very much tired of
myself. During the last eight or ten days I have felt much better. My
visit to our friends the Beaumonts did me a great deal of good, and I owe
a grudge to the Academy for forcing me to shorten it.
I still intend to visit Germany, but the plan depends on the state of my
health. When it is bad I am inclined to give up the journey, when I am
better I take it up again and look forward to it with pleasure. On the
whole I think that I shall go. But it is impossible for me to settle my
route beforehand. Even if I were stronger it would be difficult, for such
an expedition must always be uncertain.
I am not going to Germany to see any place in particular, but intend to
go hither and thither wherever I can find certain documents and people.
I received yesterday a letter from our friend Ampère. He is still in
Rome, still more and more enchanted with the place, and using every
argument to induce us to spend there with him the winter of 1856. His
descriptions are so attractive that we may very likely be persuaded,
especially if we had any chance of meeting you there, for you are one of
the people whose society always increases the happiness of life. However,
we have plenty of time for talking over this plan.
Adieu, dear Senior.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
Wildbad, September 19, 1854.
You gave me great pleasure, my dear Senior, by making me acquainted with
Sir George and Lady Theresa Lewis.
I must really thank you sincerely for it, for the time passed with them
has been the most agreeable part of our journey.
You have no doubt heard of the mischance which has put a stop to our
peregrinations: my wife was seized two months ago at Bonn by a violent
attack of rheumatism. The waters of Wildbad were recommended to her, and
she has been taking them for more than twenty-five days without
experiencing any relief. We are promised that the effects will be felt
afterwards; but these fine promises only half reassure us, and we shall
set out again on our travels in very bad spirits.
Our original intention was to spend the autumn in the North of Germany,
but in Madame de Tocqueville's condition it is evident that there is
nothing else to be done but to return home as fast as we can.
We are somewhat consoled by the arrival of our common friend Ampère. He
was returning from Italy, through Germany, and, hearing of our
misfortune, he has come to look after us in these wild mountains of the
Black Forest amidst which Wildbad is situated. He has been with us a
week, and I hope that he will accompany us home.
Our intention is to spend a month or six weeks with my father near
Compiègne. Towards the first week in November we shall establish
ourselves in Paris for the winter. We hope to see you there at the end of
this year or the beginning of next.
Ampère, my wife, and I constantly talk of you. If you could overhear us I
think you would not be very much dissatisfied. They insist upon being
very particularly remembered to you, and as for me I beg you to believe
in my most sincere attachment.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
Compiègne, January 22, 1855.
It was a long time since I had seen your handwriting, my dear Senior, and
I was beginning to complain of you; your letter therefore was a double
pleasure.
I see that you have resumed your intention of visiting Algiers, and I am
anxious that you should carry it into effect.
I hope that we shall be in Paris when you pass through. We put off our
departure from day to day; not that we are kept by the charms of our
present abode; the house is too small for us and scantily furnished, but
I find it such a favourable retreat for study, that I have great
difficulty in tearing myself away from it.
I hear, as you do, with great satisfaction of the mutual good feeling of
our armies in the Crimea. It far exceeds my expectations.
But I am not equally pleased with your management of the war. The English
ought to know that what has passed and is passing there has sensibly
diminished their moral force in Europe. It is an unpleasant truth, but I
ought not to conceal it from you. I see proofs of it every day, and I
have been struck by it peculiarly in a late visit to Paris, where I saw
persons of every rank and of every shade of political opinion. The heroic
courage of your soldiers was everywhere and unreservedly praised, but I
found also a general belief that the importance of England as a military
Power had been greatly exaggerated; that she is utterly devoid of
military talent, which is shown as much in administration as in fighting;
and that even in the most pressing circumstances she cannot raise a large
army.
Since I was a child I never heard such language. You are believed to be
absolutely dependent on us; and in the midst of our intimacy I see rising
a friendly contempt for you, which if our Governments quarrel, will make
a war with you much easier than it has been since the fall of Napoleon.
I grieve at all this, not only as endangering the English alliance,
which, as you well know, I cherish, but as injuring the cause of liberty.
I can pardon you for discrediting it by your adulation of our despotism,
but I wish that you would not serve despotism more efficaciously by your
own faults, and by the comparisons which they suggest.
It seems also difficult to say what may not be the results of your long
intimacy with such a Government as ours, and of the contact of the two
armies. I doubt whether they will be useful to your aristocracy.
Remember me to Lord Lansdowne and to the Lewises, who added such pleasure
to our German tour.
Compiègne, February 15, 1855.
I conclude that this frightful weather is still keeping you in London, my
dear Senior. I am comforted by the fact that I myself shall not reach
Paris before the 28th.
I do not wish to act the part of the pedagogue in the fable who preaches
to people when his sermon can no longer be of any possible use, but I
cannot help telling you that it is a great imprudence on your part to
allow yourself to be caught in this way by the winter in England. What
you now suffer from is only a trifling malady, but it may become a real
illness if you persist in preferring pleasure to health. Pray think of
this in the future and do not tempt the devil.
I have not read the article to which you refer.[1]
I can perfectly understand the reserve which was imposed upon you, and
which you were forced to impose on yourself.
I confess that I saw with great grief the sudden change in the
expressions of the majority of the English, a year ago, respecting our
Government. It was then ill consolidated, and in want of the splendid
alliance which you offered to it. It was unnecessary that you should
praise it, in order to keep it your friend. By doing so you sacrificed
honourable opinions and tastes without a motive.
Now things are changed. After you have lost your only army, and our
master has made an alliance with Austria, which suits his feelings much
better than yours did, he does not depend on you; you, to a certain
extent, depend on him. Such being now the case, I can understand the
English thinking it their duty to their country to say nothing that can
offend the master of France. I can understand even their praising him; I
reproach them only for having done so too soon, before it was necessary.
I agree with you that England ought to be satisfied with being the
greatest maritime Power, and ought not to aim at being also one of the
greatest military Powers.
But the feelings which I described to you as prevalent in France and in
Germany, arose not from your want of an army of 500,000 men. They were
excited by these two facts.
First, by what was supposed (perhaps falsely) to be the bad military
administration of your only army. Secondly, and much more, by your
apparent inability to raise another army.
According to continental notions, a nation which cannot raise as many
troops as its wants require, loses our respect. It ceases, according to
our notions, to be great or even to be patriotic. And I must confess
that, considering how difficult it is to procure soldiers by voluntary
enlistment, and how easily every nation can obtain them by other means, I
do not see how you will be able to hold your high rank, unless your
people will consent to something resembling a conscription.
Dangerous as it is to speak of a foreign country, I venture to say that
England is mistaken if she thinks that she can continue separated from
the rest of the world, and preserve all her peculiar institutions
uninfluenced by those which prevail over the whole of the Continent.
In the period in which we live, and, still more, in the period which is
approaching, no European nation can long remain absolutely dissimilar to
all the others. I believe that a law existing over the whole Continent
must in time influence the laws of Great Britain, notwithstanding the
sea, and notwithstanding the habits and institutions, which, still more
than the sea, have separated you from us, up to the present time.
My prophecies may not be accomplished in our time; but I should not be
sorry to deposit this letter with a notary, to be opened, and their truth
or falsehood proved, fifty years hence.
Compiègne, February 23, 1855.
… My object in my last letter was not by any means, as you seem to
think, to accuse your aristocracy of having mismanaged the Crimean war.
It has certainly been mismanaged, but who has been in fault?
Indeed I know not, and if I did I should think at the same time that it
would not be becoming in a foreigner to set himself up as a judge of the
blunders of any other Government than his own.
I thought that I had expressed myself clearly. At any rate what I wanted
to say, if I did not say it, is, that the present events created in my
opinion a new and great danger for your aristocracy, and that it will
suffer severely from the rebound, if it does not make enormous efforts to
show itself capable of repairing the past; and that it would be wrong to
suppose that by fighting bravely on the field of battle it could retain
the direction of the Government.
I did not intend to say more than this.
I will now add that if it persuades itself that it will easily get out of
the difficulty by making peace, I think that it will find itself
mistaken.
Peace, after what has happened, may be a good thing for England in
general, and useful to us, but I doubt whether it will be a gain for your
aristocracy. I think that if Chatham could return to life he would agree
with me, and would say that under the circumstances the remedy would not
be peace but a more successful war.
Kind regards, &c.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
[Footnote 1: An article in the North British Review, see p. 107.—ED.]
Paris, Hôtel Bedford.—Friday, March 2, 1855.—We slept on the 27th at
Calais, on the 28th at Amiens, and reached this place last night.
Tocqueville called on us this morning. We talked of the probability of
Louis Napoleon's going to the Crimea.
I said, 'that the report made by Lord John Russell, who talked the matter
over with him, was, that he certainly had once intended to go, and had
not given it up.'
'I do not value,' said Tocqueville, 'Lord John's inferences from anything
that he heard or saw in his audiences. All Louis Napoleon's words and
looks, are, whether intentionally or not, misleading. Now that his having
direct issue seems out of the question, and that the deeper and deeper
discredit into which the heir presumptive is falling, seems to put him
out of the question too, we are looking to this journey with great alarm.
We feel that, for the present, his life is necessary to us, and we feel
that it would be exposed to many hazards. He ought to incur some military
risks, if he is present at a battle or an assault, and his courage and
his fatalism, will lead him to many which he ought to avoid. But it is
disease rather than bullets that we fear. He will have to travel hard,
and to be exposed, under exciting circumstances, to a climate which is
not a safe one even to the strong.'
'But,' I said, 'he will not be exposed to it long. I have heard thirty,
or at most forty, days proposed as the length of his absence.'
'Who can say that?' answered Tocqueville. 'If he goes there, he must stay
there until Sebastopol falls. It will not do for him to leave Paris in
order merely to look at the works, pat the generals on the back,
compliment the army, and leave it in the trenches. Unless his journey
produces some great success—in short, unless it gives us Sebastopol—it
will be considered a failure; and a failure he cannot afford. I repeat
that he must stay there till Sebastopol falls. But that may be months.
And what may months bring forth in such a country as France? In such a
city as Paris? In such times as these? Then he cannot safely leave his
cousin—Jérôme Plon swears that he will not go, and I do not see how he
can be taken by force.'
'I do not understand,' I said, 'Jerôme's conduct. It seemed as if he had
the ball at his feet. The rôle of an heir is the easiest in the world.
He has only to behave decently in order to be popular.'
'Jérôme's chances,' answered Tocqueville, 'of the popularity which is to
be obtained by decent behaviour were over long before he became an heir.
His talents are considerable, but he has no principles, and no good
sense. He is Corsican to the bone. I watched him among his Montagnards in
the Constituent.
'Nothing could be more perverse than his votes, nor more offensive than
his speeches. He is unfit to conciliate the sensible portion of society,
and naturally throws himself into the arms of those who are waiting to
receive him—the violent, the rapacious, and the anarchical: this gives
him at least some adherents.'
'What do you hear,' I asked, 'of his conduct in the East?'
'I hear,' said Tocqueville, 'that he showed want, not so much of courage,
as of temper and of subordination. He would not obey orders; he would not
even transmit them, so that Canrobert was forced to communicate directly
with the officers of Napoleon's division, and at last required him to
take sick leave, or to submit to a court-martial.'
'I thought,' I said, 'that he was really ill.'
'That is not the general opinion,' said Tocqueville. 'He showed himself
at a ball directly after his return, with no outward symptoms of ill
health.'
The conversation turned on English politics.
'So many of my friendships,' said Tocqueville, 'and so many of my
sympathies, are English, that what is passing in your country, and
respecting your country, gives me great pain, and greater anxiety. To
us, whom unhappily experience has rendered sensitive of approaching
storms, your last six months have a frightfully revolutionary appearance.
'There is with you, as there was with us in 1847, a general malaise in
the midst of general prosperity. Your people seem, as was the case with
ours, to have become tired of their public men, and to be losing faith in
their institutions. What else do these complaints of what is called "the
system" mean? When you complain that the Government patronage is bartered
for political support, that the dunces of a family are selected for the
public service, and selected expressly because they could not get on in
an open profession; that as their places are a sort of property, they are
promoted only by seniority, and never dismissed for any, except for some
moral, delinquency; that therefore the seniors in all your departments
are old men, whose original dulness has been cherished by a life without
the stimulus of hope or fear, you describe a vessel which seems to have
become too crazy to endure anything but the calmest sea and the most
favourable winds. You have tried its sea-worthiness in one department,
your military organisation, and you find that it literally falls to
pieces. You are incapable of managing a line of operations extending only
seven miles from its base. The next storm may attack your Colonial
Administration. Will that stand any better? Altogether your machinery
seems throughout out of gear. If you set to work actively and fearlessly,
without reference to private interests, or to private expectations, or to
private feelings, to repair, remove and replace, you may escape our
misfortunes; but I see no proofs that you are sufficiently bold, or
indeed that you are sufficiently alarmed. Then as to what is passing
here. A year ago we probably overrated your military power. I believe
that now we most mischievously underrate it. A year ago nothing alarmed
us more than a whisper of the chance of a war with England. We talk of
one now with great composure. We believe that it would not be difficult
to throw 100,000 men upon your shores, and we believe that half that
number would walk over England or Ireland. You are mistaken if you think
that these opinions will die away of themselves, or will be eradicated by
anything but some decisive military success. I do not agree with those
who think that it is your interest that Russia should submit while
Sebastopol stands. You might save money and men by a speedy peace, but
you would not regain your reputation. If you are caught by a peace before
you have an opportunity of doing so, I advise you to let it be on your
part an armed peace. Prepare yourselves for a new struggle with a new
enemy, and let your preparations be, not only as effective as you can
make them, but also as notorious.'[1]
[Footnote 1: Note inserted by M de Tocqueville in my Journal, after
reading the preceding conversation.
'J'ai entendu universellement louer sans restriction le courage héroïque
de vos soldats, mais en même temps j'ai trouvé répandu cette croyance,
qu'on s'était trompé de l'importance de l'Angleterre dans le monde, comme
puissance militaire proprement dite, qui consiste autant à administrer
la guerre qu'à combattre, et surtout qu'il lui était impossible, ce qu'on
ne croyait pas jusque là, d'élever de grandes armées, même dans les cas
les plus pressants. Je n'avais rien entendu de pareil depuis mon enfance.
On vous croit absolument dans notre dépendance, et du sein de la grande
inimité qui règne entre les deux peuples, je vois naître des idées qui,
le jour où nos deux gouvernements cesseront d'être d'accord, nous
précipiteront dans la guerre contre vous, beaucoup plus facilement que
cela n'eut pu avoir lieu depuis la chute du premier Empire. Cela
m'afflige, et pour l'avenir de Alliance anglaise (dont vous savez que j'ai
toujours été un grand partisan), et non moins aussi, je l'avoue, pour la
cause de vos institutions libres. Ce qui se passe n'est pas de nature à
la relever dans notre esprit. Je vous pardonnerais de déconsidérer vos
principes par les louanges dont vous accablez le gouvernement absolu qui
règne en France, mais je voudrais du moins que vous ne le fissiez pas
d'une manière encore plus efficace par vos propres fautes, et par la
comparaison qu'elles suggèrent. Il me semble, du reste, bien difficile
de dire ce qui résultera pour vous même du contact intime et prolongé
avec notre gouvernement, et surtout de l'action commune et du mélange
des deux armées. J'en doute, je vous l'avouerai, que l'aristocratie
anglaise s'en trouve bien, et quoique A B ait entonné l'autre jour une
véritable hymne en l'honneur de celle ci, je ne crois pas que ce qui
passe soit de nature à rendre ces chances plus grandes dans l'avenir'—A
de Tocqueville.
'I heard universal and unqualified praise of the heroic courage of your
soldiers, but at the same time I found spread abroad the persuasion that
the importance of England had been overrated as a military Power properly
so called—a Power which consists in administering as much as in
fighting; and above all, that it was impossible (and this had never
before been believed), for her to raise large armies, even under the most
pressing circumstances. I never heard anything like it since my
childhood. You are supposed to be entirely dependent upon us, and from
the midst of the great intimacy which subsists between the two countries,
I see springing up ideas which, on the day when our two Governments cease
to be of one mind, will precipitate our country into a war against you,
much more easily than has been possible since the fall of the first
Empire. This grieves me, both on account of the duration of the English
Alliance (of which you know that I have always been a great partisan),
and no less, I own, for the sake of your free institutions. Passing
events are not calculated to raise them in our estimation. I forgive you
for discrediting your principles by the praise which you lavish on the
absolute government which reigns in France, but I would have you at least
not to do so in a still more efficacious manner by your own blunders and
by the comparisons which they suggest. It seems to me, however, very
difficult to predict the result to yourselves of the long and intimate
contact with, our Government, and, above all, of the united action and
amalgamation of the two armies. I own that I doubt its having a good
effect on the future of the English aristocracy, and although A.B. struck
up the other day a real hymn in its praise, I do not think that present
events are of a nature to increase its chance in the future.']
Paris, Saturday, March 3.—Tocqueville called on us soon after
breakfast.
We talked of the loss and gain of Europe by the war. We agreed that
Russia and England have both lost by it. Russia probably the most in
power, England in reputation. That Prussia, though commercially a gainer,
is humiliated and irritated by the superiority claimed by Austria and
conceded to her.
'You cannot,' said Tocqueville, 'estimate the opinions of Germany without
going there. There is a general feeling among the smaller Powers of
internal insecurity and external weakness, and Austria is looked up to as
the supporter of order against the revolutionists, and of Germany against
Russia. Austria alone has profited by the general calamities. Without
actually drawing the sword she has possession of the Principalities, she
has thrust down Prussia into the second rank, she has emancipated herself
from Russia, she has become the ally of France and of England, and even
of her old enemy Piedmont, she is safe in Italy. Poland and Hungary are
still her difficulties, and very great ones, but as her general strength
increases, she can better deal with them.'
'Has not France, I said, 'been also a gainer, by becoming head of the
coalition against Russia?'
'Whatever we have gained,' answered Tocqueville, 'has been dearly
purchased, so far as it has consolidated this despotism. For a whole year
we have felt that the life, and even the reign, of Louis Napoleon was
necessary to us. They will continue necessary to us during the remainder
of the war. We are acquiring habits of obedience, almost of resignation.
His popularity has not increased. He and his court are as much shunned by
the educated classes as they were three years ago; we still repeat "que
ça ne peut pas durer," but we repeat it with less conviction.'
We passed the spring in Algeria, and returned to Paris the latter part of
May.
_Paris, May 26,_1855.—After breakfast I went to the Institut.
M. Passy read to us a long paper on the Art of Government. He spoke so
low and so monotonously that no one attended. I sat next to Tocqueville,
and, as it was not decent to talk, we conversed a little in writing. He
had been reading my Algiers Journal, and thus commented upon it:—
'Il y a tout un côté, particulièrement curieux, de l'Algérie, qui vous a
échappé parce que vous n'avez pu ou voulu vous imposer l'ennui de causer
souvent avec les colons, et que ce côté-là ne se voit pas en parlant
avec les gouvernants; c'est l'abus de la centralisation. L'Afrique peut
être considérée comme le tableau le plus complet et le plus
extraordinaire des vices de ce système.
'Je suis convaincu que seul, sans les Arabes, le soleil, le désert, et la
fièvre, il suffirait pour nous empêcher de coloniser. Tout ce que la
centralisation laisse entrevoir de défauts, de ridicules et absurdités,
d'oppression, de paperasseries en France, est grossi en Afrique au
centuple. C'est comme un pou vu dans un microscope.'
'J'ai causé,' I answered, 'avec Vialar et avec mon hôte aux eaux
ferrugineuses. Mais ils ne se sont pas plaints de la centralisation.'
'Ils ne se sont pas plaints,' he answered, 'du mot que, peut-être, ils ne
connaissaient pas. Mais si vous les aviez fait entrer dans les détails de
l'administration publique, ou même de leurs affaires privées, vous auriez
vu que le colon est plus gêné dans tous ses mouvements, et plus gouverné
pour son plus grand bien que vous ne l'avez été quand il s'est agi de
votre passeport.
'Violar faisait allusion à cela quand il vous a dit que les chemins
manquaient parce que le Gouvernement ne voulait pas laisser les gouvernés
s'en mêler.'[1]
[Footnote 1: 'One whole side, and that a very curious one, of Algeria,
has escaped you, because you could not, or would not, inflict on yourself
the bore of talking frequently with the colonists, and this side cannot
be seen in conversing with officials—it is the abuse of centralisation.
Africa may be considered as the most complete and most extraordinary
picture of the vices of this system. I am convinced that it alone,
without the Arabs, the sun, the desert and the fever, would be enough to
prevent us from colonising. All the defects of centralisation, its
oppressions, its faults, its absurdities, its endless documents, which
are dimly perceived in France, become one hundred times bigger in Africa.
It is like a louse in a microscope.'
'I conversed,' I answered, 'with Violar and with my landlord at the
mineral waters, and they did not complain of centralisation.' 'They did
not complain,' he answered, 'of the word, which perhaps is unknown to
them. But if you had made them enter into the details of the public
administration, or even of their own private affairs, you would have seen
that the colonist is more confined in all his movements, and more
governed, for his good, than you were with regard to your passport.
'This is what Violar meant when he told you that roads were wanting,
because the Government would not permit its subjects to interfere in
making them.']
Monday, May 28.—Tocqueville called on me.
I asked him for criticisms on my article on the State of the Continent in
the 'North British Review' of February 1855.[1]
[Footnote 1: See p. 107.]
'Of course,' I said, 'it must be full of blunders. No one who writes on
the politics of a foreign country can avoid them. I want your help to
correct a few of them.'
'Since you ask me,' he answered, 'for a candid criticism, I will give you
one. I accuse you rather of misappreciation than of misstatement. First
with respect to Louis Napoleon. After having described accurately, in the
beginning of your paper, his unscrupulous, systematic oppression, you end
by saying that, after all, you place him high among our sovereigns.'
'You must recollect,' I answered, 'that the article was written for the
"Edinburgh Review," the organ of our Government, edited by Lord
Clarendon's brother-in-law—and that the editor thought its criticisms of
Louis Napoleon so severe, that after having printed it, he was afraid to
publish it. I went quite as far as I prudently could. I accused him, as
you admit, of unscrupulous oppression, of ignorance of the feelings of
the people, of being an idle administrator, of being unacquainted with
business himself, and not employing those who understand it, of being
impatient of contradiction, of refusing advice and punishing censure—in
short, I have praised nothing but his foreign policy—and I have
mentioned two errors in that.'
'But I have a graver accusation to bring against you,' replied
Tocqueville. 'You couple as events mutually dependent the continuance of
the Imperial Government and the continuance of the Anglo-Gallic Alliance.
I believe this opinion not only to be untrue, but to be the reverse of
the truth. I believe the Empire and the Alliance to be not merely, not
mutually dependent, but to be incompatible, except upon terms which you
are resolved never to grant The Empire is essentially warlike—and war in
the mind of a Bonaparte, and of the friends of a Bonaparte, means the
Rhine. This war is merely a stepping stone. It is carried on for purposes
in which the mass of the people of France take no interest. Up to the
present time its burthens have been little felt, as it has been supported
by loans, and the limits of the legal conscription have not been
exceeded. But when the necessity comes for increased taxation and
anticipated conscriptions, Louis Napoleon must have recourse to the real
passions of the French bourgeoisie and peasantry—the love of conquest,
et la haine de l'Anglais. Don't fancy that such feelings are dead, they
are scarcely asleep. They might be roused in a week, in a day, and they
will be roused as soon as he thinks that they are wanted.
'What do you suppose was the effect in France of Louis Napoleon's triumph
in England?
'Those who know England attributed it to the ignorance and childishness
of the multitude. Those who thought that the shouts of the mob had any
real meaning either hung down their heads in shame at the
self-degradation of a great nation, or attributed them to fear. The
latter was the general feeling. "Il faut," said all our lower classes,
"que ces gens-là aient grande peur de nous."
'You accuse, in the second place, all the Royalist parties of dislike of
England.
'Do you suppose that you are more popular with the others? That the
Republicans love your aristocracy, or the Imperialists your freedom? The
real friends of England are the friends of her institutions. They are
the body, small perhaps numerically, and now beaten down, of those who
adore Constitutional Liberty. They have maintained the mutual good
feeling between France and England against the passions of the
Republicans and the prejudices of the Legitimists. I trust, as you trust,
that this good feeling is to continue, but it is on precisely opposite
grounds. My hopes are founded, not on the permanence, but on the want of
permanence, of the Empire. I do not believe that a great nation will be
long led by its tail instead of by its head. My only fear is, that the
overthrow of this tyranny may not take place early enough to save us from
war with England, which I believe to be the inevitable consequence of its
duration.'
We left Paris soon after this conversation.
[The following are a few extracts from the article in the 'North British
Review.'—ED.]
'The principal parties into which the educated society of Paris is
divided, are the Imperialists, Royalists, Republicans, and
Parliamentarians.
'The Royalists maybe again subdivided into Orleanists, Legitimists, and
Fusionists; and the Fusionists into Orleanist-Fusionists, and
Legitimist-Fusionists.
'The Imperialists do not require to be described. They form a small party
in the salons of Paris, and much the largest party in the provinces.
'Those who are Royalists without being Fusionists are also comparatively
insignificant in numbers. There are a very few Legitimists who pay to the
elder branch the unreasoning worship of superstition; who adore Henri
V. not as a means but as an end; who pray for his reign, not for their
own interests, not for the interests of France, but for his own sake; who
believe that he derives his title from God, and that when the proper time
comes God will restore him; and that to subject his claims to the
smallest compromise—to admit, for instance, as the Fusionists do, that
Louis Philippe was really a king, and that the reign of Henri V. did not
begin the instant that Charles X. expired—would be a sinful contempt
of Divine right, which might deprive his cause of Divine assistance.
'There are also a very few Orleanists who, with a strange confusion of
ideas, do not perceive that a title founded solely on a revolution was
destroyed by a revolution; that if the will of the people was sufficient
to exclude the descendants of Charles X., it also could exclude the
descendants of Louis Philippe; and that the hereditary claims of the
Comte de Paris cannot be urged except on the condition of admitting the
preferable claims of the Comte de Chambord.
'The bulk, then, of the Royalists are Fusionists; but though all the
Fusionists agree in believing that the only government that can be
permanent in France is a monarchy, and that the only monarchy that can be
permanent is one depending on hereditary succession; though they agree in
believing that neither of the Bourbon branches is strong enough to seize
the throne, and that each of them is strong enough to exclude the other,
yet between the Orleanist-Fusionists and the Legitimist-Fusionists the
separation is as marked and the mutual hatred as bitter, as those which
divide the most hostile parties in England.
'The Orleanist-Fusionists are generally roturiers. They feel towards
the noblesse the hatred which has accumulated during twelve centuries
of past oppression and the resentment excited by present insolence. Of
all the noble families of France the most noble is that of Bourbon. The
head of that house has always called himself le premier gentilhomme de
France. The Bourbons therefore suffer, and in an exaggerated degree,
the odium which weighs down the caste to which they belong. It was this
odium, this detestation of privilege and precedence and exclusiveness,
or, as it is sometimes called, this love of equality, which raised the
barricades of 1830. It was to flatter these feelings that Louis Philippe
sent his sons to the public schools and to the National Guard, and tried
to establish his Government on the narrow foundation of the
bourgeoisie. Louis Philippe and one or two of the members of his
family, succeeded in obtaining some personal popularity, but it was only
in the comparatively small class, the pays légal, with which they
shared the emoluments of Government, and it was not sufficient to raise a
single hand in their defence when the masses, whom the Court could not
bribe or caress, rose against it. The Orleanist-Fusionists are
Bourbonists only from calculation. They wish for the Comte de Paris for
their king, not from any affection for him or for his family, but because
they think that such an arrangement offers to France the best chance of
a stable Government in some degree under popular control: and they are
ready to tolerate the intermediate reign of Henri V. as an evil, but one
which must be endured as a means of obtaining something else, not very
good in itself but less objectionable to them than a Bonapartist dynasty
or a Republic.
* * * * *
'The Legitimists have been so injured in fortune and in influence, they
have been so long an oppressed caste, excluded from power, and even from
sympathy, that they have acquired the faults of slaves, have become
timid, or frivolous, or bitter. Their long retirement from public life
has made them unfit for it. The older members of the party have forgotten
its habits and its duties, the younger ones have never learnt them. Their
long absence from the Chambers and from the departmental and municipal
councils, from the central and from the local government of France, has
deprived them of all aptitude for business. The bulk of them are
worshippers of wealth, or ease, or pleasure, or safety. The only
unselfish feeling which they cherish is attachment to their hereditary
sovereign. They revere Henri V. as the ruler pointed out to them by
Providence: they love him as the representative of Charles X. the
champion of their order, who died in exile for having attempted to
restore to them the Government of France. They hope that on his
restoration the canaille of lawyers, and littérateurs, and
adventurers, who have trampled on the gentilshommes ever since 1830,
will be turned down to their proper places, and that ancient descent will
again be the passport to the high offices of the State and to the society
of the Sovereign. The advent of Henri V., which to the Orleanist branch
of the Fusionists is a painful means, is to the Legitimist branch a
desirable end. The succession of the Comte de Paris, to which the
Orleanists look with hope, is foreseen by the Legitimists with
misgivings. The Fusionist party is in fact kept together not by common
sympathies but by common antipathies; each branch of it hates or
distrusts the idol of the other, but they co-operate because each
branch hates still more bitterly, and distrusts still more deeply, the
Imperialists and the Republicans.
'Among the educated classes there are few Republicans, using that word to
designate those who actually wish to see France a republic. There are
indeed, many who regret the social equality of the republic, the times
when plebeian birth was an aid in the struggle for power, and a
journeyman mason could be a serious candidate for the Presidentship, but
they are alarmed at its instability. They have never known a republic
live for more than a few years, or die except in convulsions. The
Republican party, however, though small, is not to be despised. It is
skilful, determined, and united. And the Socialists and the Communists,
whom we have omitted in our enumeration as not belonging to the educated
classes, would supply the Republican leaders with an army which has more
than once become master of Paris.
'The only party that remains to be described is that to which we have
given the name of Parliamentarians. Under this designation—a designation
that we must admit that we have invented ourselves—we include those who
are distinguished from the Imperialists by their desire for a
parliamentary form of government; and from the Republicans, by their
willingness that that government should be regal; and from the Royalists,
by their willingness that it should be republican. In this class are
included many of the wisest and of the honestest men in France. The only
species of rule to which they are irreconcilably opposed is despotism. No
conduct on the part of Louis Napoleon would conciliate a sincere
Orleanist, or Legitimist, or Fusionist, or Republican. The anti-regal
prejudices of the last, and the loyalty of the other three, must force
them to oppose a Bonapartist dynasty, whatever might be the conduct of
the reigning emperor. But if Louis Napoleon should ever think the time,
to which he professes to look forward, arrived—if he should ever grant
to France, or accept from her, institutions really constitutional;
institutions, under which the will of the nation, freely expressed by a
free press and by freely chosen representatives, should control and
direct the conduct of her governor—the Parliamentarians would eagerly
rally round him. On the same conditions they would support with equal
readiness Henri V. or the Comte de Paris, a president elected by the
people, or a president nominated by an Assembly. They are the friends of
liberty, whatever be the form in which she may present herself.'
* * * * *
'Although our author visits the Provinces, his work contains no report of
their political feelings. The explanation probably is, that he found no
expression of it The despotism under which France is now suffering is
little felt in the capital. It shows itself principally in the subdued
tone of the debates, if debates they can be called, of the Corps
Législatif, and the inanity of the newspapers. Conversation is as free in
Paris as it was under the Republic. Public opinion would not support the
Government in an attempt to silence the salons of Paris. But Paris
possesses a public opinion, because it possesses one or two thousand
highly educated men whose great amusement, we might say whose great
business, is to converse, to criticise the acts of their rulers, and to
pronounce decisions which float from circle to circle, till they reach
the workshop, and even the barrack. In the provinces there are no such
centres of intelligence and discussion, and, therefore, on political
subjects, there is no public opinion. The consequence is, that the action
of the Government is there really despotic; and it employs its
irresistible power in tearing from the departmental and communal
authorities all the local franchises and local self-government which they
had extorted from the central power in a struggle of forty years.
'Centralisation, though it is generally disclaimed by every party that is
in opposition, is so powerful an instrument that every Monarchical
Government which has ruled France since 1789 has maintained, and even
tried to extend it.
'The Restoration, and the Government of July, were as absolute
centralisers as Napoleon himself. The local power which they were forced
to surrender they made over to the narrow pays légal, the privileged
ten-pounders, who were then attempting to govern France. The Republic
gave the election of the Conseils généraux to the people, and thus
dethroned the notaries who governed those assemblies when they
represented only the bourgeoisie. The Republic made the Maires
elective; the Republic placed education in the hands of the local
authorities. Under its influence the communes, the cantons, and the
departments were becoming real administrative bodies. They are now
geographical divisions. The Préfet appoints the Maires; the Préfet
appoints in every canton a Commissaire de Police, seldom a respectable
man, as the office is not honourable; the Gardes champêtres, who are the
local police, are put under his control; the Recteur, who was a sort of
local Minister of Education in every department, is suppressed; his
powers are transferred to the Préfet; the Préfet appoints, promotes, and
dismisses all the masters of the écoles primaires. The Préfet can
destroy the prosperity of every commune that displeases him. He can
displace the functionaries, close its schools, obstruct its public works,
and withhold the money which the Government habitually gives in aid of
local improvement. He can convert it, indeed, into a mere unorganised
aggregation of individuals, by dismissing every communal functionary, and
placing its concerns in the hands of his own nominees. There are many
hundreds of communes that have been thus treated, and whose masters are
now uneducated peasants. The Préfet can dissolve the Conseil général of
his department, and although he cannot actually name their successors, he
does so virtually. No candidate for an elective office can succeed unless
he is supported by the Government. The Courts of law, criminal and civil,
are the tools of the executive. The Government appoints the judges, the
Préfet provides the jury, and la Haute Police acts without either. All
power of combination, even of mutual communication, except from mouth to
mouth, is gone. The newspapers are suppressed or intimidated, the
printers are the slaves of the Préfet, as they lose their privilege if
they offend; the secrecy of the post is habitually and avowedly violated;
there are spies in every country town to watch and report conversation;
every individual stands defenceless and insulated, in the face of this
unscrupulous executive, with its thousands of armed hands and its
thousands of watching eyes. The only opposition that is ventured is the
abstaining from voting. Whatever be the office, and whatever be the man,
the candidate of the Préfet comes in; but if he is a man who would have
been unanimously rejected in a state of freedom, the bolder electors show
their indignation by their absence.
'In such a state of society the traveller can learn little. Even those
who rule it, know little of the feelings of their subjects. The vast
democratic sea on which the Empire floats is influenced by currents, and
agitated by ground swells which the Government discovers only by their
effects. It knows nothing of the passions which influence these great
apparently slumbering masses. Indeed, it takes care, by stifling their
expression, to prevent their being known.
'We disapprove in many respects of the manner in which Louis Napoleon
employs his power, as we disapprove in all respects of the means by which
he seized it; but, on the whole, we place him high among the sovereigns
of France. As respects his foreign policy we put him at the very top. The
foreign policy of the rulers of mankind, whether they be kings, or
ministers, or senates, or demagogues, is generally so hateful, and at the
same time so contemptible, so grasping, so irritable, so unscrupulous,
and so oppressive—so much dictated by ambition, by antipathy and by
vanity, so selfish, often so petty in its objects, and so regardless of
human misery in its means, that a sovereign who behaves to other nations
with merely the honesty and justice and forbearance which are usual
between man and man, deserves the praise of exalted virtue. The
sovereigns of France have probably been as good as the average of
sovereigns. Placed indeed at the head of the first nation of the
Continent, they have probably been better; but how atrocious has been
their conduct towards their neighbour! If we go back no further than to
the Restoration, we find Louis XVIII. forming the Holy Alliance, and
attacking Spain without a shadow of provocation, for the avowed purpose
of crushing her liberties and giving absolute power to the most
detestable of modern tyrants. We find Charles X. invading a dependence
of his ally, the Sultan, and confiscating a province to revenge a tap on
the face given by the Bey of Algiers to a French consul. We find Louis
Philippe breaking the most solemn engagements with almost wanton
faithlessness; renouncing all extension of territory in Africa and then
conquering a country larger than France—a country occupied by tribes who
never were the subjects of the Sultan or of the Bey, and who could be
robbed of their independence only by wholesale and systematic massacre;
we find him joining England, Spain, and Portugal in the Quadruple
Alliance, and deserting them as soon as the time of action had arrived;
joining Russia, Prussia, Austria and England, in the arrangement of the
Eastern question, on the avowed basis that the integrity of the Ottoman
empire should be preserved, and then attempting to rob it of Egypt. We
find him running the risk of a war with America, because she demanded,
too unceremoniously, the payment of a just debt, and with England because
she complained of the ill-treatment of a missionary. We find him trying
to ruin the commerce of Switzerland because the Diet arrested a French
spy, and deposing Queen Pomare because she interfered with the sale of
French brandies; and, as his last act, eluding an express promise by a
miserable verbal equivocation, and sowing the seeds of a future war of
succession in order to get for one of his sons an advantageous
establishment in Spain.
'The greatest blot in the foreign policy of Louis Napoleon is the
invasion of Rome, and for that he is scarcely responsible. It was
originally planned by Louis Philippe and Rossi. The expedition which
sailed from Toulon in 1849 was prepared in 1847. It was despatched in the
first six months of his presidency, in obedience to a vote of the
Assembly, when the Assembly was still the ruler of France; and Louis
Napoleon's celebrated letter to Ney was an attempt, not, perhaps
constitutional or prudent, but well-intentioned, to obtain for the Roman
people liberal and secular institutions instead of ecclesiastical
tyranny.
'His other mistake was the attempt to enforce on Turkey the capitulations
of 1740, and to revive pretentions of the Latins in Jerusalem which had
slept for more than a century. This, again, was a legacy from Louis
Philippe. It was Louis Philippe who claimed a right to restore the dome,
or the portico, we forget which, of the Holy Sepulchre, and to insult the
Greeks by rebuilding it in the Latin instead of the Byzantine form. Louis
Napoleon has the merit, rare in private life, and almost unknown among
princes, of having frankly and unreservedly withdrawn his demands, though
supported by treaty, as soon as he found that they could not be conceded
without danger to the conceding party.
'With these exceptions, his management of the foreign relations of France
has been faultless. To England he has been honest and confiding, to
Russia conciliatory but firm, to Austria kind and forbearing, and he has
treated Prussia with, perhaps, more consideration than that semi-Russian
Court and childishly false and cunning king deserved. He has been
assailed by every form of temptation, through his hopes and through his
fears, and has remained faithful and disinterested. Such conduct deserves
the admiration with which England has repaid it.
'We cannot praise him as an administrator. He is indolent and
procrastinating. He hates details, and therefore does not understand
them. When he has given an order he does not see to its execution;
indeed, he cannot, for he does not know how it ought to be executed. He
directed a fleet to be prepared to co-operate with us in the Baltic in
the spring. Ducos, his Minister of Marine, assured him that it was ready.
The time came, and not a ship was rigged or manned. He asked us to
suspend the expedition for a couple of months. We refused, and sailed
without the French squadron. If the Russians had ventured out, and we
either had beaten them single-handed, or been repulsed for want of the
promised assistance, the effect on France would have been frightful. We
have reason to believe that it was only in the middle of February that he
made up his mind to send an army to Bulgaria. They arrived by driblets,
without any plan of operations, and it was not until August that their
battering train left Toulon. It ought to have reached Sebastopol in May.
In time, however, he must see the necessity of either becoming an active
man of business himself, or of ministering, like other sovereigns,
through his Ministers. Up to the present time many causes have concurred
to occasion him to endeavour to be his own Minister, and to treat those
to whom he gives that name as mere clerks. He is jealous and suspicious,
fond of power, and impatient of contradiction. With the exception of
Drouyn de l'Huys, the eminent men of France, her statesmen and her
generals, stand aloof from him. Those who are not in exile have retired
from public life, and offer neither assistance nor advice. Advice,
indeed, he refuses, and, what is still more useful than advice, censure,
he punishes.
'But the war, though it must last longer, and cost, more in men and in
money than it would have done if it were managed with more intelligence
and activity, must end favourably. Ill managed as it has been by
France, it has been worse managed by Russia. It is impossible that that
semi-barbarous empire, with its scarcely sane autocrat, its corrupt
administration, its disordered finances, and its heterogeneous
populations, should ultimately triumph over the two most powerful nations
of Europe, flanked by Austria, and disposing of the fanatical valour of
Turkey. If Louis Napoleon pleases the vanity of France by military glory,
and rewards her exertions by a triumphant peace; if he employs his
absolute power in promoting her prosperity by further relaxing the
fetters which encumber her industry; if he takes advantage of the
popularity which a successful war, an honourable peace, and internal
prosperity must confer on him, to give to her a little real liberty and a
little real self-government; if he gradually subsides from a [Greek:
Týrannos] to a [Greek: Basileús]; if he allows some liberty of the
press, some liberty of election, some liberty of discussion, and some
liberty of decision; he may pass the remainder of his agitated life in
the tranquil exercise of limited, but great and secure power, the ally of
England, and the benefactor of France.
'If this expectation should be realised—and we repeat, that among many
contingencies it appears to us to be the least improbable—it affords to
Europe the best hope of undisturbed peace and progressive civilisation
and prosperity. An alliance with England was one of the favourite dreams
of the first Napoleon. He believed, and with reason, that England and
France united could dictate to all Europe. But in this respect, as indeed
in all others, his purposes were selfish. Being master of France, he
wished France to be mistress of the world. All that he gave to France was
power, all that he required from Europe was submission. The objects for
which he desired our co-operation were precisely those which we wished to
defeat. The friendship from which we recoiled in disgust, almost in
terror, was turned into unrelenting hatred; and in the long struggle
which followed, each party felt that its safety depended on the total
ruin of the other.
'The alliance which the uncle desired as a means of oppressing Europe,
the nephew seeks for the purpose of setting her free. The heavy continued
weight of Russia has, ever since the death of Alexander, kept down all
energy and independence of action, and even of thought, on the Continent.
She has been the patron of every tyrant, the protector of every abuse,
the enemy of every improvement. It was at her instigation that the
Congress of Verona decreed the enslavement of Spain, and that in the
conferences of Leybach it was determined to stifle liberty in Italy.
Every court on the Continent is cursed with a Russian party; and woe be
to the Sovereign and to the Minister who is not at its head: all the
resources of Russian influence and of Russian corruption are lavished to
render his people rebellious and his administration unsuccessful. From
this peine forte et dure we believe that Europe will now be relieved;
and if the people or the sovereigns of the Continent, particularly those
of Germany and Italy, make a tolerable use of the freedom from foreign
dictation which the weakness of Russia will give to them, we look forward
to an indefinite course of prosperity and improvement. Unhappily,
experience, however, forbids us to be sanguine. Forty years ago, an
event, such as we are now contemplating, occurred. A Power which had
deprived the Continent of the power of independent action fell, and for
several years had no successor. Germany and Italy recalled or
re-established their sovereigns, and entrusted them with power such as
they had never possessed before. How they used it may be inferred from
the general outbreak of 1848. A popular indignation, such as could have
been excited only by long years of folly, stupidity, and tyranny, swept
away or shook every throne from Berlin to Palermo. The people was
everywhere for some months triumphant; and its abuse of power produced a
reaction which restored or introduced despotism in every kingdom except
Prussia and Piedmont, and even in Prussia gave to the King power
sufficient to enable him, up to the present moment, to maintain a policy,
mischievous to the interests, disgusting to the sympathies, and injurious
to the honour of his people. But while the Anglo-Gallic alliance
continues, the Continent will be defended from the worst of all evils,
the prevention of domestic improvement, and the aggravation of domestic
disturbance, by foreign intervention. That alliance has already preserved
the liberty of Piedmont. If it had been established sooner, it might have
preserved that of Hesse, and have saved Europe from the revolting
spectacle of the constitutional resistance of a whole people against an
usurping tyrant and a profligate minister crushed by brutal, undisguised
violence.
'We repeat that we are not sanguine, that we do not expect the tranquil,
uninterrupted progress which would be the result of the timely concession
on the part of the sovereigns, and of the forbearance and moderation on
the part of their subjects, which, if they could profit by the lessons of
history, would be adopted by both parties. The only lesson, indeed, which
history teaches is, that she teaches none either to subjects or to
sovereigns. But we do trust that when the ruler and his people are
allowed to settle their own affairs between one another, they will come
from time to time to coarse and imperfect, but useful arrangements of
their differences. Rational liberty may advance slowly and unequally; it
may sometimes be arrested, it may sometimes be forced back, but its march
in every decennial period will be perceptible. Like an oak which has
grown up among storms, its durability will be in proportion to the
slowness of its progress.'
Tocqueville, June 30, 1855.
I have only just arrived here, my dear Senior, after wandering for nearly
a month from friend to friend all through the Touraine and the Maine. As
you may think, I am, on returning home after so long an absence,
overpowered with trifling business. I cannot, therefore, comply to-day
with your request and write to you the letter you ask for: I will write
it after much thought and at length. The subject is well worthy of the
trouble. Shall I at the same time send back to you the conversation which
I have corrected, and in what way? The post would be very unsafe and
expensive. Give me, therefore, your instructions on this point. But above
all, give us news of yourselves and of all our friends.
My wife has borne the journey better than I expected, and the delight we
feel in finding ourselves here once more will completely restore her.
This delight is really very great and in proportion to the annoyance of
wandering about as we have done for three years without ever finding a
place which entirely suited us.
As to public news, I have heard none since I left Paris. The only spot
which a single ray of light can ever reach is Paris. All the rest is in
profound darkness. If you hear anything important, pray tell me.
Adieu, dear Senior. Remember me to Mrs. and Miss Senior, and believe in
our long and very sincere affection,
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
Tocqueville, July 25, 1855.
I wrote to you yesterday, my dear Senior, a long letter according to my
promise.
But when I read it over I felt that it was absurd to send such a letter
by the post, especially to a foreigner, and I burnt it.
Since the assault of the 18th,[1] the interference of the police in
private correspondence has become more active. Many of my friends as well
as I myself have perceived it. More letters have been kept back and more
have been stopped. Two of mine have been lost. You may remember that two
letters from me failed to reach you, three years ago. The danger is
greater in the country, where handwritings are known, than in Paris. You
advise me to put my letters into a cover directed to your Embassy, which
will forward them. But this is no security. If a letter be suspected, it
is easy to open and re-seal it, and still easier simply to suppress it.
And, in fact, after all, you have lost little. I wrote to you only what I
have a hundred times said to you. We have lived so much together, and
with such perfect mutual confidence, that it is difficult for either of
us to say anything new to the other.
Besides, on reading over again, with attention, your note of our last
conversation,[2] I have nothing to alter. All that I could do would be to
develope a little more my opinions, and to support them by additional
arguments. I feel more and more their truth, and that the progress
of events will confirm them much more than any reasonings of mine can do.
We are annoyed and disturbed, having the house full of workmen. I am
trying to warm it by hot air, and am forced to bore through very old and
very thick walls; but we shall be repaid by being able to live here
during the winter.
I am amusing myself with the letters which our young soldiers in the
East, peasants from this parish, write home to their families, and which
are brought to me. This correspondence should be read in order to
understand the singular character of the French peasant. It is strange to
see the ease with which these men become accustomed to the risks of
military life, to danger and to death, and yet how their hearts cling to
their fields and to the occupations of country life. The horrors of war
are described with simplicity, and almost with enjoyment. But in the
midst of these accounts one finds such phrases as these: "What crop do
you intend to sow in such a field next year?" "How is the mare?" "Has
the cow a fine calf?" &c. No minds can be more versatile, and at the same
time more constant. I have always thought that, after all, the peasantry
were superior to all other classes in France. But these men are
deplorably in want of knowledge and education, or rather the education to
which they have been subjected for centuries past has taught them to make
a bad use of their natural good qualities.
It seems to me that Lord John's resignation will enable your Cabinet to
stand, at least for some time. All that has passed in England since the
beginning of the war grieves me deeply. Seen from a distance, your
Constitution appears to me an admirable machine which is getting out of
order, partly from the wearing out of its works, partly from the
unskilfulness of its workers. Such a spectacle is useful to our
Government.
I asked you some questions, which you have not answered. Is Mrs. Grote
returned from Germany? Is she well? Has she received my letter addressed
to her at Heidelberg? The last question is always doubtful when one
writes from France.
I send you a letter from the Count de Fénelon, which I think will
interest you. You will give it me back when we meet.
I am very curious to know what you will think of Egypt; and I hope that
we shall be established in Paris when you return.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
[Footnote 1: On the 18th June, 1855, the French and English made an
unsuccessful assault on Sebastopol.—ED.]
[Footnote 2: That of the 28th May, 1855.—ED.]
Tocqueville, September 19, 1855.
Your letter, my dear Senior, of the 26th of August, has much interested
me. I see that you are resolved on your great journey. I could say like
Alexander, if the comparison were not too ambitious, that I should wish
to be in your place if I were not in my own; but I cannot get satiated
with the pleasure of being at home after so long an absence. Everything
is pleasure in this country life, among my own fields. Even the solitude
is charming; but were I anywhere else, I should envy you your tour.
Everything in Egypt is curious: the past, the present, and the future. I
hope to learn much from your Journal, which I trust that I shall have. We
shall certainly meet you in Paris.
The noise made by the fall of Sebastopol has echoed even to this distant
corner of France. It is a glorious event, and has delighted every
Frenchman of every party and of every opinion, for in these matters we
are one man.
I fear that the victory has been bought dearly. There is not a
neighbouring village to which the war has not cost some of its children.
But they bear it admirably. You know, that in war we show the best side
of our character. If our civilians resembled our soldiers we should long
ago have been masters of Europe.
This war has never been popular, nor is it popular, yet we bear all its
cost with a cheerfulness admirable when you consider the sorrows which it
occasions, aggravated by the distress produced by the dearness of bread.
If, instead of the Crimea, the seat of war had been the Rhine, with a
definite purpose, the whole nation would have risen, as it has done
before.
But the object of the war is unintelligible to the people. They only know
that France is at war, and must be made, at any price, to triumph.
I must confess, that I myself, who understand the object for which all
this blood is shed, and who approve that object, do not feel the interest
which such great events ought to excite; for I do not expect a result
equal to the sacrifice.
I think, with you, that Russia is a great danger to Europe. I think so
more strongly, because I have had peculiar opportunities of studying the
real sources of her power, and because I believe these sources to be
permanent, and entirely beyond the reach of foreign attack. (I have not
time now to tell you why.) But I am deeply convinced that it is not by
taking from her a town, or even a province, nor by diplomatic
precautions, still less by placing sentinels along her frontier, that the
Western Powers will permanently stop her progress.
A temporary bulwark may be raised against her, but a mere accident may
destroy it, or a change of alliances or a domestic policy may render it
useless.
I am convinced that Russia can be stopped only by raising before her
powers created by the hatred which she inspires, whose vital and constant
interest it shall be to keep themselves united and to keep her in. In
other words, by the resurrection of Poland, and by the re-animation of
Turkey.
I do not believe that either of these means can now be adopted. The
detestable jealousies and ambitions of the European nations resemble, as
you say in your letter, nothing better than the quarrels of the Greeks in
the face of Philip. Not one will sacrifice her passions or her objects.
About a month ago I read some remarkable articles, which you perhaps have
seen, in the German papers, on the progress which Russia is making in the
extreme East. The writer seems to be a man of sense and well informed.
It appears that during the last five years, Russia, profiting by the
Chinese disturbances, has seized, not only the mouth of the Amoor, but a
large territory in Mongolia, and has also gained a considerable portion
of the tribes which inhabit it. You know that these tribes once overran
all Asia, and have twice conquered China. The means have always been the
same—some accident which, for an instant, has united these tribes in
submission to the will of one man. Now, says the writer, very plausibly,
the Czar may bring this about, and do what has been done by Genghis Khan,
and, indeed, by others.
If these designs are carried out, all Upper Asia will be at the mercy of
a man, who, though the seat of his power be in Europe, can unite and
close on one point the Mongols.
I know more about Sir G. Lewis's book[1] than you do. I have read it
through, and I do not say, as you do, that it must be a good book, but
that it is a good book. Pray say as much to Sir George when you see
him, as a letter of mine to Lady Theresa on the subject may have
miscarried.
It is as necessary now for friends to write in duplicate from town to
town, as it is if they are separated by the ocean and fear that the ship
which carries their letters may be lost. I hear that our friend John Mill
has lately published an excellent book. Is it true? at all events
remember me to him.
Adieu, my dear Senior. Do not forget us any more than we forget you.
Kindest regards to Mrs. Senior, and Miss Senior, and Mrs. Grote.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
[Footnote 1: The work referred to was probably that on the Early History
of Rome.—ED.]
Paris, April 1, 1856.
I write a few lines to you at Marseilles, my dear Senior, as you
wished.[1] I hope that you will terminate your great journey as
felicitously as you seem to me to have carried it on from the beginning.
The undertaking appears to have been a complete success. I wish that it
might induce you next year to cross over the ocean to America. I should
be much interested in hearing and reading your remarks upon that society.
But perhaps Mrs. Senior will not be so ready to start off again; so, that
I may not involve myself in a quarrel with her, I will say no more on the
subject.
I am longing to see you, for beside our old and intimate friendship I
shall be delighted to talk with such an interesting converser, and, above
all, to find myself again in the company of (as Mrs. Grote calls you)
'the boy.' You will find me, however, in all the vexations of correcting
proofs and the other worries connected with bringing out a book.[2] It
will not appear till the end of this month.
I can tell you no more about politics than you may learn from the
newspapers. Peace, though much desired has caused no public excitement
The truth is that just now we are not excitable. As long as she remains
in this condition France will not strike one of those blows by which she
sometimes shakes Europe and overturns herself.
Reeve has been and Milnes still is here. We have talked much of you with
these two old friends. Good bye, or rather, thank God, à bientôt.
A thousand kind remembrances to Mrs. Senior.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
[Footnote 1: Mr. Senior was on his return from Egypt.—ED.]
[Footnote 2: The Ancien Régime.]
Paris, May 16.—M. de Tocqueville has scarcely been visible since my
return to Paris. Madame de Tocqueville has been absent. She returned
yesterday, and they spent this evening with us.
Tocqueville is full of his book, which is to appear in about a week. His
days and nights are devoted to correcting the press and to writing
notes—which he thought would be trifling, but which grow in length and
importance.
The object of the work is to account for the rapid progress of the
Revolution, to point out the principal causes which enabled a few
comparatively obscure men to overthrow in six weeks a Monarchy of many
centuries.
'I am inclined,' I said, 'to attribute the rapidity with which the old
institutions of France fell, to the fact that there was no lex loci in
France. That the laws, or rather the customs, of the different provinces
were dissimilar, and that nothing was defined. That as soon as the
foundations or the limits of any power were examined, it crumbled to
pieces; so that the Assembly became omnipotent in the absence of any
authority with ascertained rights and jurisdiction.'
'There is much truth in that,' answered Tocqueville, 'but there is also
much truth in what looks like an opposite theory—namely, that the
Monarchy fell because its power was too extensive and too absolute.
Nothing is so favourable to revolution as centralisation, because whoever
can seize the central point is obeyed down to the extremities. Now the
centralisation of France under the old Monarchy, though not so complete
as its Democratic and Imperial tyrants afterwards made it, was great.
Power was concentrated in Paris and in the provincial capitals. The
smaller towns and the agricultural population were unorganised and
defenceless. The 14th of July revealed the terrible secret that the
Master of Paris is the Master of France.'
Paris, May 18.—I spent the day at Athy, the country-seat of M.
Lafosse,[1] who had been my companion in our Egyptian journey.
'What do you hear,' I asked, 'of the Empress?'
'Nothing,' he answered, 'but what is favourable; all her instincts and
prejudices are good. Lesseps, who is nearly related to her, has many of
her letters, written during the courtship, in which she speaks of her
dear Louis with the utmost affection, and dwells on the hope that if ever
she should become his wife, she may be able to induce him to liberalise
his Government.'
'And now,' he said, 'tell me what you heard in England about our Canal?'
'I heard nothing,' I answered, 'except from Maclean. He told me that he
thought that the Maritime Canal, if supplied from the sea, would become
stagnant and unwholesome, and gradually fill. That that plan was formed
when the levels of the two seas were supposed to differ, so that there
would be a constant current.
'"Now that the equality of their levels has been ascertained," he said to
me, "the only mode of obtaining a current is to employ the Nile instead
of the sea." "But can the Nile spare the water?" I asked. "Certainly,"
he answered. "An hour a day of the water from the Nile, even when at its
lowest, would be ample." "And what do the other engineers say?" I asked.
"Randall," he replied, "agrees with me. The others are at present for the
salt water. But we are to meet in time and discuss it thoroughly."'
'It is not the opinion of the engineers,' answered Lafosse, 'that I want,
but that of the politicians.
'We are told that Lord Palmerston threatens to prevent it as long as he
is Minister. This makes us very angry. We think that we perceive in his
opposition his old hatred of France and of everything that France
supports or even favours—feelings which we hoped the Alliance had cured.
'The matter,' he continued, 'was to have been brought before the
Congress. Buol had promised to Nigrelli to do so, and Cavour to Lesseps
and Paleocapa. But after the occupation of Italy, and the Belgian press,
and the rights of Neutrals had been introduced, the Congress got
impatient, and it was thought inexpedient to ask them to attend to
another episodical matter. The Emperor, however, did something. He asked
Ali Pasha, the Turkish Minister, what were the Sultan's views. "They
will be governed," said Ali Pasha, "in a great measure by those of his
allies." "As one of them," said the Emperor, "I am most anxious for its
success." "In that case," replied Ali Pasha, "the Sultan can have no
objection to it in principle, though he may wish to annex to his firman
some conditions—for instance, as to the occupation of the forts at each
end by a mixed garrison of Turks and Egyptians." The Emperor then turned
to Lord Clarendon. "What are your views," he asked, "as to the Suez
Canal?" "It is a grave matter," answered Lord Clarendon, "and one on
which I have no instructions. But I believe it to be impracticable."
"Well," replied the Emperor, "but supposing for the sake of the argument,
that it is practicable, what are your intentions?" "I cannot but think,"
answered Lord Clarendon, "that any new channel of commerce must be
beneficial to England. The real difficulty is the influence which the
Canal may have in the relations of Egypt and Turkey." "If that be the
only obstacle," replied the Emperor, "there is not much in it, for Ali
Pasha has just told me that if we make no objection the Sultan makes
none. We cannot be more Turkish than the Turk."'
'I am most anxious,' added Lafosse, 'that this stupid opposition of yours
should come to an end. Trifling as the matter may seem, it endangers the
cordiality of the Alliance. The people of England, who do not know how
jealous and passionnés we are, cannot estimate the mistrust and the
irritation which it excites. That an enterprise on which the French,
wisely or foolishly, have set their hearts, should be stopped by the
caprice of a wrong-headed Englishman, hurts our vanity; and everything
that hurts our vanity offends us much more than what injures our serious
interests.
'If the engineers and the capitalists decide in favour of the scheme, you
will have to yield at last. You had much better do so now, when you can
do it with a good grace. Do not let your acquiescence be extorted.'
[Footnote 1: M. Lafosse died many years ago. He was a friend of M. de
Lesseps, by whom he and Mr. Senior were invited to join the expedition to
Egypt—ED.]
Paris, May 19.—After breakfast I spent a couple of hours with Cousin.
'You have been in England,' he said, 'since you left Egypt. What is the
news as to our Canal? Will Palmerston let us have it? You must stay a few
weeks in Paris to estimate the effect of your opposition to it. We
consider Palmerston's conduct as a proof that his hatred of France is
unabated, and the acquiescence of the rest of your Cabinet as a proof
that, now we are no longer necessary to you, now that we have destroyed
for you the maritime power of Russia, you are indifferent to our
friendship.
'I know nothing myself as to the merits of the Canal. I distrust Lesseps
and everything that he undertakes. He has much talent and too much
activity, but they only lead him and his friends into scrapes. I daresay
that the Canal is one, and that it will ruin its shareholders; but as I
am anxious we should not quarrel with England, I am most anxious that
this silly subject of dispute should be removed.'
'Louis Napoleon,' he continued, 'professed to wish that you should allow
the Sultan to give his consent; but I doubt whether he is sincere. I am
not sure that he is not pleased at seeing the Parisians occupied by
something besides his own doings, especially as it promotes the national
dislike of England. Now that the war is over we want an object. He tries
to give us one by launching us into enormous speculations. He is trying
to make us English; to give us a taste for great and hazardous
undertakings, leading to great gains, great losses, profuse expenditure,
and sudden fortunes and failures. Such things suit you; they do not
suit us. Our habits are economical and prudent, perhaps timid. We like
the petty commerce of commission and detail, we prefer domestic
manufactures to factories, we like to grow moderately rich by small
profits, small expenditure, and constant accumulation. We hate the
nouveaux riches, and scarcely wish to be among them. The progress for
which we wish is political progress—not within, for there we are
satisfied to oscillate, and shall be most happy if in 1860 we find
ourselves where we were in 1820—but without. I believe that our master's
sortie against Belgium was a pilot balloon. He wished to see what
amount of opposition he had to fear from you, and from Belgium, and how
far we should support him. He has found the two former greater than he
expected. I am not sure that he is dissatisfied with the last.'
I spent the morning at H.'s. He too attacked me about the Canal.
'Do entreat,' he said, 'your public men to overrule their ill-conditioned
colleague. I told you a year ago, the mischief that you were doing, but I
do not think that you believed me. You may find too late that I was
right.'
I repeated to him Ellice's opinion that the commerce of England would not
use the canal.
'I have heard that,' he said, 'from Ellice himself, but I differ from
him. I agree with him, indeed, that your sailing vessels will not use the
canal, but I believe that a few years hence you will have no purely
sailing vessels, except for the small coasting trade. Every large ship
will have a propeller; and with propellers, to be employed occasionally,
and sails for ordinary use, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea are very
manageable. I believe that the canal will be useful, and particularly
to you. But whatever be the real merits of the scheme, for God's sake let
it be tried. Do not treat us like children, and say, "We know better what
is good for you than you do yourselves. You shall not make your canal
because you would lose money by it."'
'What did you hear,' I said, 'about the Congress?'
'I heard,' he answered, 'that Clarendon was very good, and was the best,
and that Walewski was very bad, and was the worst.'
'Can you tell me,' I said, 'the real history of the Tripartite Treaty?'
'I can,' he answered. 'There was an old engagement between the three
Powers, entered into last spring, that if they succeeded in the war, they
would unite to force Russia to perform any conditions to which she might
submit.
'This engagement had been allowed to sleep; I will not say that it was
forgotten, but no one seemed disposed to revert to it. But after the
twenty-second Protocol, when Piedmont was allowed to threaten Austria,
and neither England nor France defended her, Buol got alarmed. He feared
that Austria might be left exposed to the vengeance of Russia on the
north and east, and to that of the Italian Liberals on the South. An
alliance with France and England, though only for a specified purpose, at
least would relieve Austria from the appearance of insulation. She would
be able to talk of the two greatest Powers in Europe as her allies, and
would thus acquire a moral force which might save her from attack. He
recalled, therefore, the old engagement to the recollection of Clarendon
and Louis Napoleon, and summoned them to fulfil it. I do not believe that
either of them was pleased. But the engagement was formal, and its
performance, though open to misconstruction, and intended by Austria to
be misconstrued, was attended by some advantages, though different ones,
to France and to England. So both your Government and ours complied.'
Tuesday, May 20.—The Tocquevilles and Rivet drank tea with us.
I mentioned to Tocqueville the subject of my conversations with Cousin
and H.
'I agree with Cousin,' he said. 'The attempt to turn our national
activity into speculation and commerce has often been made, but has never
had any permanent success. The men who make these sudden fortunes are not
happy, for they are always suspected of friponnerie, and the Government
to which they belong is suspected of friponnerie. Still less happy are
those who have attempted to make them, and have failed. And those who
have not been able even to make the attempt are envious and sulky. So
that the whole world becomes suspicious and dissatisfied.
'And even if it were universal, mere material prosperity is not enough
for us. Our Government must give us something more: must gratify our
ambition, or, at least, our vanity.'
'The Government,' said Rivet, 'has been making a desperate plunge in
order to escape from the accusation of friponnerie. It has denounced in
the "Moniteur" the faiseurs; it has dismissed a poor aide-de-camp of
Jérôme's for doing what everybody has been doing ever since the coup
d'état. When Ponsard's comedy, which was known to be a furious satire on
the agioteurs, was first played, Louis Napoleon took the whole
orchestra and pit stalls, and filled them with people instructed to
applaud every allusion to the faiseurs. And he himself stood in his
box, his body almost out of it, clapping most energetically every attack
on them.'
'At the same time,' I said, 'has he not forced the Orleans Company and
the Lyons Company to buy the Grand Central at much more than its worth?
And was not that done in order to enable certain faiseurs to realise
their gains?'
'He has forced the Orleans Company,' said Rivet, 'to buy up, or rather to
amalgamate the Grand Central; but I will not say at more than its value.
The amount to be paid is to depend on the comparative earnings of the
different lines, for two years before and two years after the purchase.'
'But,' I said, 'is it not true, first, that the Orleans Company was
unwilling to make the purchase? and, secondly, that thereupon the Grand
Central shares rose much in the market?'
'Both these facts,' answered Rivet, 'are true.'
'Do you believe,' I said to Tocqueville, 'H.'s history of the Tripartite
Treaty?'
'I do,' he answered. 'I do not think that at the time when it was made we
liked it. It suited you, who wish to preserve the statu quo in Europe,
which keeps us your inferiors, or, at least, not your superiors. You
have nothing to gain by a change. We have. The statu quo does not suit
us. The Tripartite Treaty is a sort of chain—not a heavy one, or a
strong one—but one which we should not have put on if we could have
avoided it.'
'Do you agree,' I asked Tocqueville, 'with Lafosse, Cousin, and H. as to
the effect in Paris of our opposition to the Suez Canal?'
'I agree,' he answered, 'in every word that they have said. There is
nothing that has done you so much mischief in France, and indeed in
Europe.
'I am no engineer; I should be sorry to pronounce a decided opinion as to
the feasibility or the utility of the canal; but your opposition makes us
believe that it is practicable.'
'Those among us,' I answered, 'who fear it, sometimes found their fear on
grounds unconnected with its practicability. They say that it is a
political, not a commercial, scheme. That the object is to give to French
engineers and French shareholders a strip of land separating Egypt from
Syria, and increasing the French interest in Egypt.'
'What is the value,' answered Tocqueville, 'of a strip of land in the
desert where no one can live? And why are the shareholders to be French?
The Greeks, the Syrians, the Dalmatians, the Italians, and the Sicilians
are the people who will use the canal, if anybody uses it. They will form
the bulk of the shareholders, if shareholders there are.
'My strong suspicion is, that if you had not opposed it, there never
would have been any shareholders, and that if you now withdraw your
opposition, and let the scheme go on until calls are made, the
subscribers, who are ready enough with their names as patriotic
manifestations against you as long as no money is to be paid, will
withdraw en masse from an undertaking which, at the very best, is a
most hazardous one.
'As to our influence in Egypt, your journal shows that it is a pet
project of the Viceroy. He hopes to get money and fame from it. You
imitate both his covetousness and his vanity, and throw him for support
upon us.'
Paris, May 21—The Tocquevilles and Chrzanowski[1] drank tea with us.
We talked of the French iron floating batteries.
'I saw one at Cherbourg,' said Tocqueville, 'and talked much with her
commander. He was not in good spirits about his vessel, and feared some
great disaster. However, she did well at Kinburn.'
'She suffered little at Kinburn,' said Chrzanowski, 'because she ventured
little. She did not approach the batteries nearer than 600 metres. At
that distance there is little risk and little service. To knock down a
wall two metres thick from a distance of 600 metres would require at
least 300 blows. How far her own iron sides would have withstood at that
distance the fire of heavy guns I will not attempt to say, as I never saw
her. The best material to resist shot is lead. It contracts over the ball
and crushes it.'
'Kinburn, however,' said Tocqueville, 'surrendered to our floating
batteries.'
'Kinburn surrendered,' said Chrzanowski, 'because you landed 10,000 men,
and occupied the isthmus which connects Kinburn with the main land. The
garrison saw that they were invested, and had no hope of relief. They
were not Quixotic enough, or heroic enough, to prolong a hopeless
resistance. Scarcely any garrison does so.'
We talked of Malta; and I said that Malta was the only great
fortification which I had seen totally unprovided with earth-works.
'The stone,' said Chrzanowski, 'is soft and will not splinter.'
'I was struck,' I said, 'with the lightness of the armament; the largest
guns that I saw, except some recently placed in Fort St. Elmo, were
twenty-four pounders.'
'For land defence,' he answered, 'twenty-four pounders are serviceable
guns. They are manageable and act with great effect within the short
distance within which they are generally used. It is against ships that
large guns are wanted. A very large ball or shell is wasted on the
trenches, but may sink a ship. The great strength of the land defences of
Malta arises from the nature of the ground on which Valetta and Floriana
are built, indeed of which the whole island consists. It is a rock
generally bare or covered with only a few inches of earth. Approaches
could not be dug in it. It would be necessary to bring earth or sand in
ships, and to make the trenches with sand-bags or gabions.'
I asked him if he had read Louis Napoleon's orders to Canrobert,
published in Bazancourt's book?
'I have,' he answered. 'They show a depth of ignorance and a depth of
conceit, compared to which even Thiers is modest and skilful. Canrobert
is not a great general, but he is not a man to whom a civilian, who
never saw a shot fired, ought to give lectures on what he calls "the
great principles" or "the absolute principles of war." He seems to have
taken the correspondence between Napoleon and Joseph for his model,
forgetting that Canrobert is to him what Napoleon was to Joseph. Then he
applies his principles as absurdly as he enunciates them. Thus he orders
Canrobert to send a fleet carrying 25,000 men to the breach at Aboutcha,
to land 3,000 of them, to send them three leagues up the country, and not
to land any more, until those first sent have established themselves
beyond the defile of Agen. Of course those 3,000 men would be useless if
the enemy were not in force, or destroyed if they were in force. To
send on a small body and not to support them is the grossest of faults.
It is the fault which you committed at the Redan, when the men who had
got on to the works were left by you for an hour unsupported, instead of
reinforcements being poured in after them as quickly as they could be
sent.
'In fact,' he continued, 'the horrible and mutual blunders of that
campaign arose from its being managed by the two Emperors from Paris and
from St. Petersburg, Nicholas and Alexander were our best friends. Louis
Napoleon was our worst enemy.
'There is nothing which ought to be so much left to the discretion of
those on the spot as war. Even a commander-in-chief actually present in a
field of battle can do little after the action, if it be really a great
one, has once begun.
'If we suppose 80,000 men to be engaged on each side, each line will
extend at least three miles. Supposing the general to be in the centre,
it will take an aide-de-camp ten minutes to gallop to him from one of
the wings, and ten minutes to gallop back. But in twenty minutes all may
be altered.'
[Footnote 1: 'Chrzanowski has passed thirty years fighting against or for
the Russians. He began military life in 1811 as a sous lieutenant of
artillery in the Polish corps which was attached to the French army. With
that army he served during the march to Moscow, and the retreat. At the
peace, what remained of his corps became a part of the army of the
kingdom of Poland. He had attained the rank of major in that army when
the insurrection on the accession of Nicholas broke out. About one
hundred officers belonging to the staff of the properly Russian army were
implicated, or supposed to be implicated, in that insurrection, and were
dismissed, and their places were supplied from the army of the kingdom of
Poland. Among those so transferred to the Russian army was Chrzanowski.
He was attached to the staff of Wittgenstein, and afterwards of Marshal
Diebitsch, in the Turkish campaigns of 1828 and 1829. In 1830 he took
part with his countrymen in the insurrection against the Muscovites, and
quitted Poland when it was finally absorbed in the Russian Empire. A few
years after a quarrel was brewing between England and Russia. Muscovite
agents were stirring up Persia and Affghanistan against us, and it was
thought that we might have to oppose them on the shores of the Black Sea.
Chrzanowski was attached to the British Embassy at Constantinople and was
employed for some years in ascertaining what assistance Turkey, both in
Europe and in Asia, could afford to us. In 1849 he was selected by
Charles Albert to command the army of the kingdom of Sardinia.
'That army was constituted on the Prussian system, which makes every man
serve, and no man a soldier. It was, in fact, a militia. The men were
enlisted for only fourteen months, at the end of that time they were sent
home, and were recalled when they were wanted, having forgotten their
military training and acquired the habits of cottiers and artisans. They
had scarcely any officers, or even sous officers, that knew anything of
their business. The drill sergeants required to be drilled. The generals,
and indeed the greater part of the officers, were divided into hostile
factions—Absolutists, Rouges, Constitutional Liberals, and even
Austrians—for at that time, in the exaggerated terror occasioned by the
revolutions of 1848, Austria and Russia were looked up to by the greater
part of the noblesse of the Continent as the supporters of order against
Mazzini, Kossuth, Ledru Rollin, and Palmerston. The Absolutists and the
Austrians made common cause, whereas the Rouges or Mazzinists were
bitterest against the Constitutional Liberals. Such an army, even if
there had been no treason, could not have withstood a disciplined enemy.
When it fell a victim to its own defects, and to the treachery of
Ramorino, Chrzanowski retired to Paris.'—(Extracted from Mr. Senior's
article in the 'North British Review.')
Chrzanowski died several years ago.—ED.]
Kensington, August 20, 1856.
My dear Tocqueville,—A few weeks after my return to London your book
reached me—of course from the time that I got it, I employed all my
leisure in reading it.
Nothing, even of yours, has, I think, so much instructed and delighted
me. Much of it, perhaps, was not quite so new to me as to many others; as
I had had the privilege of hearing it from you—but even the views which
were familiar to me in their outline were made almost new by their
details.
It is painful to think how difficult it is to create a Constitutional
Government, and how difficult to preserve one, and, what is the same, how
easy to destroy one.
* * * * *
Mrs. Senior is going to Wales and to Ireland, where I join her, after
having paid a long-promised visit to Lord Aberdeen.
I like the conversation of retired statesmen, and he is one of our
wisest. Thiers has just left us. I spent two evenings with him, but on
the first he was engrossed by Lord Clarendon, and on the second by the
Duc d'Aumale and by Lord Palmerston. They were curious rapprochements,
at least the first and third. It was the first meeting of Palmerston and
Duc d'Aumale. I am very much pleased with the latter. He is sensible,
well informed, and unaffected.
Kindest regards, &c.
A.W. SENIOR.
Tocqueville, September 4, 1856.
I have read, my dear Senior, your letter with great pleasure. Your
criticism delights me, for I rely on your judgment and on your sincerity.
I am charmed that you have found in my book more than you had learned
from our conversations, on my view of our history. We have known one
another so long, we have conversed so much and so unreservedly, that it
is difficult for either of us to write anything that the other will think
new. I was afraid that what may appear original to the public might seem
trite to you.
The Reeves have been with us; we have passed together an agreeable
fortnight. I had charged Reeve to bring you, whether you would or not.
Did he make the attempt? I am sure that you would have enjoyed your
visit, and we should have rejoiced to have under our roof two such old
friends as you and Reeve.
I am glad that you have printed your article; pray try to send it to me.
It seems that you intend this winter to anchor in Rome. It increases my
regret that I cannot be there. It is out of the question. My wife's
health and mine are so much improved that the journey is not necessary,
and business of all kinds keeps us at home. If you push on to Naples, you
will, perhaps, enjoy the absence of the rascally king whom you and I
found there five years ago. I applaud the virtuous indignation of the
English against this little despot, and their sympathy with the unhappy
wretches whom he detains arbitrarily to die slowly in his prisons, which,
though not placed in the African deserts or the marshes of Cayenne, are
bad enough. The interest which your great nation takes in the cause of
humanity and liberty, even when that cause suffers in another country,
delights me. What I regret is that your generous indignation is directed
against so petty a tyrant.
I must say that America is a puer robustus. Yet I cannot desire, as
many persons do, its dismemberment. Such an event would inflict a great
wound on the whole human race; for it would introduce war into a great
continent from whence it has been banished for more than a century.
The breaking up of the American Union will be a solemn moment in the
history of the world. I never met an American who did not feel this, and
I believe that it will not be rashly or easily undertaken. There will,
before actual rupture, be always a last interval, in which one or both
parties will draw back. Has not this occurred twice?
Adieu, dear Senior. Do not be long without letting us hear from you, and
remember us affectionately to Mrs. Senior and to your daughter.
Ashton House, near Phoenix Park, Dublin, September 26, 1856.
My dear Tocqueville,—Your letter found me at Haddo House, Aberdeenshire,
where we have been spending a fortnight with Lord Aberdeen.
It has been very interesting. Lord Aberdeen is one of our wisest
statesmen.
* * * * *
I found Lord Aberdeen deprecating the war, notwithstanding its success,
utterly incredulous as to the aggressive intentions attributed to
Nicholas, and in fact throwing the blame of the war on Lord Stratford
and, to a certain degree, on Louis Napoleon.
I found him also much disturbed by our Naples demonstration, believing it
to be an unwarranted interference with an independent Government.
* * * * *
Ever yours,
A.W. SENIOR.
Tocqueville, November 2, 1856.
I am grateful to you, my dear Senior, for your kindness in telling me
what I most wished to hear. The judgments of such men as those with whom
you have been living, while they delight me, impose on me the duty of
unrelaxed efforts.
Your fortnight at Lord Aberdeen's amused me exceedingly, and not the
least amusing part were the eccentricities of A.B.
There is one point in which the English seem to me to differ from
ourselves, and, indeed, from all other nations, so widely that they form
almost a distinct species of men. There is often scarcely any connection
between what they say and what they do.
No people carry so far, especially when speaking in public, violence of
language, outrageousness of theories, and extravagance in the inference
drawn from those theories. Thus your A.B. says that the Irish have not
shot half enough landlords. Yet no people act with more moderation. A
quarter of what is said in England at a public meeting, or even round a
dinner-table, without anything being done or intended to be done, would
in France announce violence, which would almost always be more furious
than the language had been.
We Frenchmen are not so different from our antipodes as we are from a
nation, partly our own progeny, which is separated from us by only a
large ditch.
I wonder whether you have heard how our illustrious master is relieving
the working-people from the constant rise of house-rent. When they are
turned out of their lodgings he re-establishes them by force; if they are
distrained on for non-payment of rent, he will not allow the tribunals to
treat the distress as legal. What think you, as a political economist, of
this form of outdoor relief?
What makes the thing amusing is, that the Government which uses this
violent mode of lodging the working classes, is the very same Government
which, by its mad public works, by drawing to Paris suddenly a hundred
thousand workmen, and by destroying suddenly ten thousand houses, has
created the deficiency of habitations. It seems, however, that the
systematic intimidation and oppression of the rich in favour of the poor,
is every day becoming more and more one of the principles of our
Government.
I read yesterday a circular from the prefect of La Sarthe, a public
document, stuck up on the church-doors and in the market-places, which,
after urging the landed proprietors of the department to assess
themselves for the relief of the poor, adds, that their insensibility
becomes more odious when it is remembered that for many years they have
been growing rich by the rise of prices, which is spreading misery among
the lower orders.
The real character of our Government, its frightful mixture of socialism
and despotism, was never better shown.
I have said enough to prevent your getting my letter. If it should
escape the rogue who manages our post-office, let me know as soon as you
can.
Kindest remembrances,
A. DE. TOCQUEVILLE.
Tocqueville, February 11, 1857.
I must ask you, my dear Senior, to tell me yourself how you have borne
this long winter. I suppose that it has been the same in England as in
Normandy, for the two climates are alike.
Here we have been buried for ten or twelve days under a foot of snow, and
it froze hard during the whole time. How has your larynx endured this
trial? I assure you that we take great interest in that larynx of yours.
Give us therefore some news of it.
Your letter gave us fresh pleasure by announcing your intention of
passing April and May in Paris. We shall certainly be there at the same
time, and perhaps before. I hope that we shall see you continually. We
are, you know, among the very many people who delight in your society;
besides, we have an excellent right to your friendship.
I am looking forward with great pleasure to your Egypt. What I already
know of that country leads me to think that of all your reminiscences it
will afford the most novelty and interest.
I do not think that your visit to Paris will be a very valuable addition
to your journals. If I may judge by the letters which I receive thence,
society there has never been flatter, nor more insipid, nor more entirely
without any dominant idea. I need not tell you that your opinion of our
statesmen is the same as that which prevails in Paris, but it is of such
an ancient date, and is so obvious, that it cannot give rise to
interesting discussions.
A-propos of statesmen, we cannot understand how a man who made, inter
pocula, the speech of —— on his travels can remain in a government. I
think that even ours, though so long-suffering towards its agents, could
not tolerate anything similar even if it should secretly approve.
Absolute power has its limits. The Prince de Ligne, in a discourse which
you have doubtless read, seems to me to have described it in one word by
saying that it was the speech of a gamin.
I am, however, ungrateful to criticise it, for I own that it amused me
extremely, and that I thought that Morny especially was drawn from life;
but I think that if I had the honour of being Her Britannic Majesty's
Prime Minister, I should not have laughed so heartily. How could so
clever a man be guilty of such eccentricities?
In my last letter to our excellent friend Mrs. Grote, I ventured to say
that there was one person who wrote even worse than I did, and that it
was you. Your last letter has filled me with remorse, for I could
actually read it, and even without trouble. I beg, therefore, to make an
amende honorable, and envy you your power of advancing towards
perfection.
* * * * *
I still think of paying a little visit to England in June. Adieu, dear
Senior. Do not be angry with me for not writing on politics. Indeed I
could tell you nothing, for I know nothing, and besides, just now
politics are not to be treated by Frenchmen, in letters.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
Tocqueville, March 8, 1857.
I still write to you, my dear Senior, from hence. We cannot tear
ourselves away from the charms of our retreat, or from a thousand little
employments. We shall scarcely reach Paris, therefore, before you. You
will, therefore, yourself bring me the remainder of your curious journal.
What I have already seen makes me most anxious to read the rest. I have
never read anything which gave me more valuable information on Egypt
and Oriental politics in general. As soon as I possibly can, I look
forward to continuing its perusal.
The papers tell us that your Ministry has been beaten on the Chinese War.
It seems to me to have been an ill-chosen battle-field. The war was,
perhaps, somewhat wantonly begun, and very roughly managed; but the
fault lay with distant and subordinate agents. Now that it has begun, no
Cabinet can avoid carrying it on vigorously. The existing Ministry will
do as well for this as any other. As there is no line of policy to be
changed, the upsetting is merely to put in the people who are now
out.
If the Ministry falls, the man least to be pitied will be our friend
Lewis. He will go out after having obtained a brilliant triumph on his
own ground, and he will enjoy the good fortune, rare to public men, of
quitting power greater than he was when he took it, and with the enviable
reputation of owing his greatness, not merely to his talents, but also to
the respect and the confidence which he has universally inspired.
All this delights me; for I feel towards him, and towards all his family,
a true friendship.
To return to China.
It seems to me that the relations between that country and Europe are
changed, and dangerously changed.
Till now, Europe has had to deal only with a Chinese government—the most
wretched of governments. Now you will find opposed to you a people; and a
people, however miserable and corrupt, is invincible on its own
territory, if it be supported and impelled by common and violent
passions.
Yet I should be sorry to die before I have seen China open to the eyes as
well as to the arms of Europe.
Do you believe in a dissolution? If so, when?
A thousand regards to Mrs. Grote, to the great historian, to the Reeves,
and generally to all who are kind enough to remember my existence.
I delight in the prospect of meeting you in Paris; yet I fear that you
will find it dull. All that I hear from the great town shows me that
never, at least during the last two hundred years, has intellectual life
been less active.
If there be talent in the official circles, it is not the talent of
conversation, and among those who formerly possessed that talent, there
is so much torpidity, such want of interest on public affairs, such
ignorance as to what is passing, and so little wish to hear about it,
that no one, I am told, knows what to talk about or to take interest in.
Your conversation, however, is so agreeable and stimulating that it is
capable of reanimating the dead. Come and try to work this miracle.
A thousand remembrances.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
Paris, Hotel Bedford, April 9, 1857.—We reached this place last night.
The Tocquevilles are in our hotel. I went to them in the evening.
Tocqueville asked me how long I intended to remain.
'Four weeks,' I answered.
'I do not think,' he replied, 'that you will be able to do so. Paris has
become so dull that no one will voluntarily spend a month here. The
change which five years have produced is marvellous.
'We have lost our interest not only in public affairs, but in all serious
matters.'
'You will return then to the social habits of Louis Quinze,' I said. 'You
were as despotically governed then as you are now; and yet the salons
of Madame Geoffrin were amusing.'
'We may do so in time,' he answered, 'but that time is to come. At
present we talk of nothing but the Bourse. The conversation of our
salons resembles more that of the time of Law, than that of the time of
Marmontel.'
I spent the evening at Lamartine's. There were few people there, and the
conversation was certainly dull enough to justify Tocqueville's fears.
April 10.—Tocqueville drank tea with us.
We talked of the Empress, and of the possibility of her being Regent of
France.
'That supposes,' I said, 'first, that Celui-ci holds his power until
his death; and, secondly, that his son will succeed him.'
'I expect both events,' answered Tocqueville. 'It is impossible to deny
that Louis Napoleon has shown great dexterity and tact. His system of
government is detestable if we suppose the welfare of France to be his
object; but skilful if its aim be merely the preservation of his own
power.
'Such being his purpose, he has committed no great faults. Wonderful,
almost incredible, as his elevation is, it has not intoxicated him.'
'It has not intoxicated him,' I answered, 'because he was prepared for
it—he always expected it.'
'He could scarcely,' replied Tocqueville, 'have really and soberly
expected it until 1848.
'Boulogne and Strasbourg were the struggles of a desperate man, who
staked merely a life of poverty, obscurity, and exile. Even if either of
them had succeeded, the success could not have been permanent. A
surprise, if it had thrown him upon the throne, could not have kept him
there. Even after 1848, though the Bourbons were discredited, we should
not have tolerated a Bonaparte if we had not lost all our self-possession
in our terror of the Rouges. That terror created him, that terror
supports him; and habit, and the dread of the bloodshed and distress, and
the unknown chances of a revolution, will, I think, maintain him during
his life.
'The same feelings will give the succession to his heir. Whether the heir
will keep it, is a different question.'
Sunday, April 12.—Tocqueville drank tea with us. I asked him if he had
seen the Due de Nemours' letter.
'I have not seen it,' he answered. 'In fact, I have not wished to see it.
I disapprove of the Fusionists, and the anti-Fusionists, and the
Legitimists, and the Orleanists-in short, of all the parties who are
forming plans of action in events which may not happen, or may not
happen in my time, or may be accompanied by circumstances rendering those
plans absurd, or mischievous, or impracticable,'
'But though you have not read the letter,' I said, 'you know generally
what are its contents.'
'Of course I do,' he replied. 'And I cannot blame the Comte de Chambord
for doing what I do myself—for refusing to bind himself in
contingencies, and to disgust his friends in the hope of conciliating his
enemies.'
'Do you believe,' I asked, 'that the mere promise of a Constitution would
offend the Legitimists?'
'I do not think,' he answered, 'that they would object to a Constitution
giving them what they would consider their fair share of power and
influence.
'Under Louis Philippe they had neither, but it was in a great measure
their own fault.
'They have neither under this Government, for its principle is to rest on
the army and on the people, and to ignore the existence of the educated
classes.
'You see that in its management of the press. 'Montalembert, or Guizot,
or Falloux, or I may publish what we like. We are not read by the soldier
or by the proletaire.[1] But the newspaper press is subject to a
slavery to which it was never reduced before. The system was first
elaborated in Austria, and I daresay will be copied by all the
Continental autocrats, for no inventions travel so quickly as despotic
ones.
'The public avertissements are comparatively unimportant. Before a
journal gets one of those its suppression has probably been decided on.
Every day there are communications between the literary police and the
different editors. Such or such a line of argument is altogether
forbidden, another is allowed to be used to a certain extent. Some
subjects are tabooed, others are to be treated partially.
'As the mental food of the lower orders is supplied by the newspapers,
this paternal Government takes care that it shall not be too exciting.'
[Footnote 1: The lowest class.—ED.]
Paris, Monday, April 13.—Tocqueville, Jobez, Marcet, St.-Hilaire,[1]
Charles Sumner, and Lord Granville breakfasted with us.
The conversation turned on public speaking.
'Very few indeed of our speakers,' said Tocqueville, 'have ever ventured
to improvise: Barrot could do it. We have told him sometimes that a
speech must be answered immediately; and when he objected that he had
nothing to say, we used to insist, and to assure him that as soon as he
was in the tribune, the ideas and the words would come; and so they did.
I have known him go on under such circumstances for an hour; of course
neither the matter nor the form could be first rate, but they were
sufficient.'
'In fact,' said Lord Granville, 'much of what is called improvisation is
mere recollection. A man who has to speak night after night, gets on most
subjects a set of thoughts, and even of expressions, which naturally pour
in on him as soon as his argument touches the train which leads to them.
'One of our eminent speakers,' he continued, 'Lord Grey, is perhaps best
when he has not had time to prepare himself. He is so full of knowledge
and of inferences, that he has always enough ready to make an excellent
speech. When he prepares himself, there is too much; he gives the House
more facts and more deductions than it can digest.'
'Do you agree with me,' I asked, 'in thinking that Lord Melbourne was
best when he improvised?'
'I agree with you,' answered Lord Granville, 'that his set speeches were
cold and affected. He was natural only when he was quite careless, or
when he was much excited, and then he was admirable.'
'Did not Thiers improvise?' I asked.
'Never,' answered Tocqueville. 'He prepared himself most carefully. So
did Guizot. We see from the "Revue rétrospective" that he even prepared
his replies. His long experience enabled him to foresee what he should
have to answer. Pasquier used to bring his speech ready written. It lay
on the desk before him, but he never looked at it.'
'That seems to me,' I said, 'very difficult. It is like swimming with
corks. One would be always tempted to look down on the paper.'
'It is almost equally difficult,' said Tocqueville, 'to make a speech of
which the words are prepared. There is a struggle between the invention
and the memory. You trust thoroughly to neither, and therefore are not
served thoroughly by either.'
'Yet that,' said Marcet, 'is what our Swiss pastors are required to do.
They are forbidden to read, and forbidden to extemporise, and by practice
they speak from memory—some well, all tolerably.'
'Brougham,' said Lord Granville, 'used to introduce his most elaborately
prepared passages by a slight hesitation. When he seemed to pause in
search of thoughts, or of words, we knew that he had a sentence ready cut
and dried.'
'Who,' I asked Sumner, 'are your best speakers in America?'
'The best,' he said, 'is Seward; after him perhaps comes Winthrop.'
'I should have thought it difficult,' I said, 'to speak well in the
Senate, to only fifty or at most sixty members.'
'You do not speak,' answered Sumner, 'to the Senators. You do not think
of them. You know that their minds are made up. Except as to mere
executive questions, such as the approval of a public functionary, or the
acceptance or modification of a treaty, every senator comes in pledged to
a given, or to an assumed, set of opinions and measures. You speak to the
public. You speak in order that 500,000 copies of what you say, as was
the case with my last speech, may be scattered over the whole Union.'
'That,' I said, 'must much affect the character of your oratory. A speech
meant to be read must be a different thing from one meant to be heard.
Your speeches must in fact be pamphlets, and that I suppose accounts for
their length.'
'That is true,' replied Sumner. 'But when you hear that we speak for a
day, or for two days, or, as I have sometimes done, for three days, you
must remember that our days are days of only three hours each.'
'How long,' I asked, 'was your last speech?'
'About five hours,' he answered. 'Three hours the first day and two hours
the second.'
'That,' I said, 'is not beyond our remotest limit. Brougham indeed, on
the amendment of the law, spoke for six hours, during the greater part of
the time to an audience of three. The House was filled with fog, and
there is an H.B. which represents him gesticulating in the obscurity and
the solitude.'
'He,' said Lord Granville, 'put his speech on the Reform Bill at the
top.'
'The speech,' I said, 'at the end of which he knelt to implore the Peers
to pass the bill, and found it difficult to rise.'
[Footnote 1: Barthélemy de St-Hilaire is now Thiers' private secretary
and right hand.—ED.]
Tuesday, April 14.—Z., Sumner, Lord Granville, Tocqueville, M.
Circourt, St.-Hilaire, and Corcelle breakfasted with us.
The conversation took the same turn as yesterday.
'May I venture,' said Lord Granville to Z., 'to ask whom of your
opponents you feared the most?'
'Beyond all comparison,' answered Z., 'Thiers.'
'Was not D.' I asked, 'very formidable?'
'Certainly,' said Z. 'But he had not the wit, or the entraînement of
Thiers. His sentences were like his action. He had only one gesture,
raising and sinking his right arm, and every time that right arm fell, it
accompanied a sentence adding a link to a chain of argument, massive and
well tempered, without a particle of dross, which coiled round his
adversary like a boa constrictor.'
'And yet,' said M., 'he was always languid and embarrassed at starting;
it took him ten minutes to get en train.'
'That defect,' said Lord Granville, 'belonged to many of our good
speakers—to Charles Fox—to Lord Holland. Indeed Fox required the
excitement of serious business to become fluent. He never made a
tolerable after-dinner speech.'
'Among the peculiarities of D.,' said M., 'are his perfect tact and
discretion in the tribune, and his awkwardness in ordinary life. In
public and in private he is two different men.'
'It is impossible,' said Tocqueville, 'to deny that D. was great in a
deliberative body, but his real scene of action is the bar. He was only
among the best speakers in the Constituent Assembly. He is the
greatest advocate at the bar.'
'Although,' said M——, 'at the bar, where he represents only his client,
one of the elements of his parliamentary success, his high moral
character, does not assist him. Do you remember how, on the debate of
the Roman expedition, he annihilated by one sentence Jules Favre who had
ventured to assail him? "Les injures," he said, "sont comme les corps
pesants, dont la force dépend de la hauteur d'où ils tombent."'
'One man,' said Z., 'who enjoys a great European reputation, I could
never think of as a serious adversary, that is Lamartine.
'He appeared to me to treat the sad realities of political life as
materials out of which he could compose strange and picturesque scenes,
or draw food for his imagination and his vanity. He seemed always to be
saying to himself: "How will the future dramatist or poet, or painter,
represent this event, and what will be my part in the picture, or in the
poem, or on the stage?"
'Il cherchait toujours à poser.—He could give pleasure, he could give
pain—he could amuse, and he could irritate,—but he seldom could
persuade, and he never could convince. Even before the gate of the Hôtel
de Ville, the most brilliant hour of his life, he owed his success rather
to his tall figure, his fine features, attractive as well as commanding,
his voice, his action—in short, to the assemblage of qualities which the
Greeks called [Greek: hupokrisis] than to his eloquence.'
'Was not,' I said, 'his contrast between the red flag and the tricolor
eloquent?'
'It was a fine bit of imagery,' said Z., 'and admirably adapted to the
occasion. I do not deny to him the power of saying fine things—perhaps
fine speeches, but he never made a good speech—a speech which it was
difficult to answer.'
'If anyone,' he continued, 'ever takes the trouble to look into our
Parliamentary debates, Lamartine will hold a higher comparative rank than
he is really entitled to. Most of us were too busy to correct the reports
for the "Moniteur." Lamartine not only corrected them but inserted whole
passages.'
'He inserted,' said M, 'not only passages but facts. Such as
"applaudissements," "vive émotion," "hilarité," often when the speech
had been received in silence, or unattended to.'
'I remember,' said Corcelle, 'an insertion of that kind in the report of
a speech which was never delivered. It was during the Restoration, when
written speeches were read, and sometimes were sent to the "Moniteur" in
anticipation of their being read. Such had been the case with respect to
the speech in question. The intended orator had inserted, like Lamartine,
"vifs applaudissements," "profonde sensation," and other notices of the
effect of his speech. The House adjourned unexpectedly before it was
delivered, and he forgot to withdraw the report.'
'Could a man like Lord Althorp,' I asked, 'whom it was painful to hear,
hold his place as leader of a French Assembly?'
'Impossible,' said Tocqueville, 'unless he were a soldier. We tolerate
from a man who has almost necessarily been deprived of a careful
education much clumsiness and awkwardness of elocution. Soult did not
speak much better than the Duke of Wellington, but he was listened to. He
had, like the Duke, an air of command which imposed.'
'Was there,' I said, 'any personal quarrel between Soult and Thiers?'
'Certainly there was,' said Z., 'a little one. I will not say that Soult
was in Spain a successful commander, or an agreeable colleague, or an
obedient subordinate, but whenever things went wrong there, Soult was the
man whom the Emperor sent thither to put them to rights. Great as Thiers
may be as a military critic, I venture to put him below Napoleon.'
'I have been reading,' I said, 'Falloux's reception speech, and was
disappointed by it.'
'In his speech and Brifault's,' said Circourt, 'you may compare the
present declamatory style and that of thirty years ago. Brifault has, or
attempts to have, the légèreté and the prettiness of the Restoration.
Falloux is grandiose and emphatic, as we all are now.'
'Falloux,' said Z., 'made an excellent speech the first time that he
addressed the Chamber of Deputies. The next time he was not so
successful, and after that he ceased to be listened to.
'But in the Constituent Assembly, and indeed in the Legislative, he
acquired an ascendency. In those Assemblies, great moral qualities and a
high social position were rarer than they were among the Deputies, and in
the dangers of the country they were more wanted. Falloux possesses them
all. He is honest and brave, and in his province employs liberally and
usefully a large fortune.'
'Were those the merits,' I asked, 'which opened to him the doors of the
Academy?'
'Certainly,' answered Z. 'As a man of letters he is nothing, as a
statesman not much. We elected him in honour of his courage and his
honesty, and perhaps with some regard to his fortune. We are the only
independent body left, and we value in a candidate no quality more than
independence.'
'I am told,' I said, 'that Falloux is now an ultra-Legitimist.'
'That is not true,' said Z. 'He is a Legitimist, but a liberal one. He
would tolerate no Government, whatever were its other claims, that was
not constitutional.'
'Your Academic ceremonies,' I said 'seem to me not very well imagined.
There is something fade, almost ridiculous, in the literary minuet in
which the récipiendaire and the receiver are trotted out to show their
paces to each other and to the Academy. The new member extolling the
predecessor of whom he is the unworthy successor, the old member lauding
his new colleague to his face, and assuring him that he, too, is one of
the ornaments of the Society.'
'Particularly,' said ——, 'when, as was the case the other day, it is
notorious that neither of them has any real respect for the idol which he
is forced to crown. Then the political innuendoes, the under-currents of
censure of the present conveyed in praise of the past, become tiresome
after we have listened to them for five years. We long to hear people
talk frankly and directly, instead of saying one thing for the mere
purpose of showing that they are thinking of another thing. The Emperor
revenged himself on Falloux by his antithesis: "que le désordre les
avait uni, et que l'ordre les avait séparé.'"
'How did Falloux reply to it?' I asked.
'Feebly,' said ——. 'He muttered something about l'ordre having no
firmer adherent than himself. In these formal audiences our great man has
the advantage. He has his mot ready prepared, and you cannot discuss
with him.'
We talked of the French spoken by foreigners. 'The best,' said Circourt,
'is that of the Swedes and Russians, the worst that of the Germans.'
'Louis Philippe,' said Z., 'used to maintain that the best test of a
man's general talents was his power of speaking foreign languages. It was
an opinion that flattered his vanity, for he spoke like a native French,
Italian, English, and German.'
'It is scarcely possible,' said Tocqueville, 'for a man to be original in
any language but his own; in all others he is forced to say what he can,
and that is generally something that he recollects.'
'I was much struck by that,' said Z., 'when conversing with Narvaez. He
had been talking sensibly but rather dully in French, I begged him to
talk Spanish, which I understand though I cannot speak. The whole man was
changed. It was as if a curtain had been drawn up from between us.
Instead of hammering at commonplaces, he became pointed, and spirited,
and eloquent.'
'Is he an educated man?' I asked.
'For a Spaniard,' answered Z., 'yes. He has the quickness, the finesse,
and the elegance of mind and of manner which belong to the South. The
want of book-learning contributes to his originality.'
'The most wonderful speaker in a foreign language,' said Sumner, 'was
Kossuth. He must have been between forty and fifty before he heard an
English word. Yet he spoke it fluently, eloquently, and even
idiomatically. He would have made his fortune among us as a stump-orator.'
Tuesday, April 28.—Tocqueville drank tea with us.
We talked rather of people than of things.
'Circourt,' said Tocqueville, 'is my dictionary. When I wish to know what
has been done or what has been said on any occasion, I go to Circourt. He
draws out one of the drawers in his capacious head, and finds there all
that I want arranged and ticketed.
'One of the merits of his talk, as it is of his character, is its
conscientiousness. He has the truthfulness of a thorough gentleman, and
his affections are as strong as his hatreds. I do not believe he would
sacrifice a friend even to a good story, and where is there another man
of whom that can be said?'
'What think you of Mrs. T——-?' I inquired.
'I like her too,' he replied, 'but less than I do Circourt. She has
considerable talent, but she thinks and reads only to converse. She has
no originality, no convictions. She says what she thinks that she can say
well; like a person writing a dialogue or an exercise. Whether the
opinion which she expresses be right or wrong, or the story that she
tells be true or false, is no concern of hers, provided it be bien
dit.'
'The fault of her conversation,' I said, 'seems to me to be, that while
she is repeating one sentence she is thinking of the next, and that while
you are speaking to her, she is considering what is to be her next topic.
I have noticed this fault in other very fluent conversers. They are so
intent on the future that they neglect the present.'
'It is rather a French than an English fault,' said Tocqueville. 'The
English have more curiosity and less vanity, than we have; more desire to
hear and less anxiety to shine. They are often, therefore, better
causeurs than we are. Le grand talent pour le silence, or, in other
words, the power of listening which has been imputed to them, is a great
conversational virtue. I do not believe that it was said ironically or
epigrammatically. The man who bestowed that praise knew how rare a merit
silence is.'
'May we not owe that merit,' I asked, 'to our bad French? We shine most
when we listen.'
'A great talker,' I continued, 'Montalembert, is to breakfast with us.
Whom shall I ask to meet him?'
'Not me,' said Tocqueville, 'unless you will accept me as one of the
chorus. I will not take a premier rôle, or any prominent rôle, in a
piece in which he is to act. I like his society; that is, I like to sit
silent and hear him talk, and I admire his talents; and we have the
strong bond of common hatreds, though perhaps we hate on different, or
even opposite grounds, and I do not wish for a dispute with him, of
which, if I say anything, I shall be in danger. If we differed on only
one subject, instead of differing, as we do, on all but one, he would
pick out that single subject to attack me on. I am not sure that even as
host you will be safe. He is more acute in detecting points of opposition
than most men are in finding subjects of agreement. He avoids meeting you
on friendly or even on neutral ground. He chooses to have a combat en
champ clos.
'Take care,' he added, 'and do not have too many sommités. They watch
one another, are conscious that they are watched, and a coldness creeps
over the table.'
'We had two pleasant breakfasts,' I said, 'a fortnight ago. You were
leader of the band at one, Z. at the other, and the rest left the stage
free to the great actor.'
'As for me,' he answered, 'I often shut myself up, particularly after
dinner, or during dinner if it be long. The process of digestion, little,
as I can eat, seems to oppress me.
'Z. is always charming. He has an aplomb, an ease, a verve arising
from his security that whatever he says will interest and amuse. He is a
perfect specimen of an ex-statesman, homme de lettres, and père de
famille, falling back on literature and the domestic affections. As for
me, I have intervals of sauvagerie, or rather the times when I am not
sauvage are the intervals. I have many, perhaps too many, acquaintances
whom I like, and a very few friends whom I love, and a host of relations.
I easily tire of Paris, and long to fly to the fields and woods and
seashore of my province.'
We passed to the language of conversation.
'There are three words,' said Tocqueville, 'which you have lost, and
which I wonder how you do without,—Monsieur, Madame, and Mademoiselle.
You are forced always to substitute the name. They are so mixed in all
our forms that half of what we say would appear abrupt or blunt without
them.
'Then the tutoyer is a nuance that you want. When husband and wife
are talking together they pass insensibly, twenty times perhaps in an
hour, from the vous to the tu. When matters of business or of serious
discussion are introduced, indeed whenever the affections are not
concerned, it is vous. With the least soupçon of tenderness the tu
returns.'
'Yet,' I said, 'you never use the tu before a third person.'
'Never,' he answered, 'in good company. Among the bourgeoisie always.
It is odd that an aristocratic form, so easily learned, should not have
been adopted by all who pretend to be gentry. I remember being present
when an Englishman and his wife, much accustomed to good French society,
but unacquainted with this nuance, were laboriously tutoyering each
other. I relieved them much by assuring them that it was not merely
unnecessary, but objectionable.'
May 2.—Tocqueville dined with us.
A lady at the table d'hôte was full of a sermon which she had heard at
the Madeleine. The preacher said, sinking his voice to an audible
whisper, 'I will tell you a secret, but it must go no farther. There is
more religion among the Protestants than with us, they are better
acquainted with the Bible, and make more use of their reading: we have
much to learn from them.'
I asked Tocqueville, when we were in our own room, as to the feelings of
the religious world in France with respect to heretics.
'The religious laity,' he answered, 'have probably little opinion on the
subject. They suppose the heretic to be less favourably situated than
themselves, but do not waste much thought upon him. The ignorant priests
of course consign him to perdition. The better instructed think, like
Protestants, that error is dangerous only so far as it influences
practice.
'Dr. Bretonneau, at Tours, was one of the best men that I have known, but
an unbeliever. The archbishop tried in his last illness to reconcile him
to the Church: Bretonneau died as he had lived. But the archbishop, when
lamenting to me his death, expressed his own conviction that so excellent
a soul could not perish.
'You recollect the duchesse in St.-Simon, who, on the death of a sinner
of illustrious race, said, "On me dira ce qu'on voudra, on ne me
persuadera pas que Dieu n'y regarde deux fois avant de damner un homme de
sa qualité." The archbishop's feeling was the same, only changing
qualité into virtue.
'There is something amusing,' he continued, 'when, separated as we are
from it by such a chasm, we look back on the prejudices of the Ancien
Régime. An old lady once said to me, "I have been reading with great
satisfaction the genealogies which prove that Jesus Christ descended from
David. Ça montre que notre Seigneur était Gentilhomme."'
'We are somewhat ashamed,' I said, 'in general of Jewish blood, yet the
Lévis boast of their descent from the Hebrew Levi.'
'They are proud of it,' said Tocqueville, 'because they make themselves
out to be cousins of the Blessed Virgin. They have a picture in which a
Duc de Lévi stands bareheaded before the Virgin. "Couvrez-vous donc, mon
cousin," she says. "C'est pour ma commodité," he answers.'
The conversation passed to literature.
'I am glad,' said Tocqueville, 'to find that, imperfect as my knowledge
of English is, I can feel the difference in styles.'
'I feel strongly,' I said, 'the difference in French styles in prose, but
little in poetry.'
'The fact is,' said Tocqueville, 'that the only French poetry, except
that of Racine, that is worth reading is the light poetry. I do not think
that I could now read Lamartine, though thirty years ago he delighted
me.'
'The French taste,' I said, 'in English poetry differs from ours. You
read Ossian and the "Night Thoughts."'
'As for Ossian,' he answered, 'he does not seem to have been ever popular
in England. But the frequent reference to the "Night Thoughts," in the
books and letters of the last century, shows that the poem was then in
everybody's memory. Foreigners are in fact provincials. They take up
fashions of literature as country people do fashions of dress, when the
capital has left them off. When I was young you probably had ceased to be
familiar with Richardson. We knew him by heart. We used to weep over the
Lady Clementina, whom I dare say Miss Senior never heard of.
'During the first Empire, we of the old régime abandoned Paris, as we
do now, and for the same reasons. We used to live in our châteaux, where
I remember as a boy hearing Sir Charles Grandison and Fielding read
aloud. A new novel was then an event. Madame Cottin was much more
celebrated than George Sand is now. For all her books were read, and by
everybody. Notwithstanding the great merits of George Sand's style, her
plots and her characters are so exaggerated and so unnatural, and her
morality is so perverted, that we have ceased to read her.'
We talked of Montalembert, and I mentioned his sortie the other day
against the clergy.
'I can guess pretty well,' said Tocqueville, 'what he said to you, for it
probably was a résumé of his article in the "Correspondant." Like most
men accustomed to public speaking, he repeats himself. He is as honest
perhaps as a man who is very passionné can be; but his oscillations are
from one extreme to another. Immediately after the coup d'état, when he
believed Louis Napoleon to be Ultramontane, he was as servile as his
great enemy the "Univers" is now. "Ce sont les nuances qui se querellent,
non les couleurs;" and between him and the "Univers" there is only a
nuance. The Bishop of Agen has oscillated like him, but began at the
other end. The other day the Bishop made a most servile address to the
Emperor. He had formerly been a furious anti-Bonapartist. "How is it
possible," said Montalembert, "that a man can rush so completely from one
opinion to another? On the 4th of December in 1851 this same Bishop
denounced the coup d'état with such violence that the President sent me
to the Nuncio to request his interference. Now he is on his knees before
him. Such changes can scarcely be honest." Montalembert does not see that
the only difference between them is that they have trod in opposite
directions the very same path.'
Thursday, May 5.—Tocqueville and I dined with M. and Madame de Bourke,
and met there General Dumas and Ary Scheffer.
We talked of Delaroche's pictures, and Scheffer agreed with me in
preferring the smaller ones. He thought that Delaroche improved up to the
time of his death, and preferred his Moses, and Drowned Martyr, painted
in 1853 and 1855, to the other large ones, and his Girondins, finished in
1856, to the earlier small ones.
We passed on to the increased and increasing population of Paris.
'The population of Paris,' I said, 'is only half that of London, while
that of the British Islands is not three-fourths that of France. If you
were to double the population of Paris, therefore, it would still be
proportionally less than that of London.'
'That is true,' said Tocqueville, 'but yet there are many circumstances
connected with the Parisian population each of which renders it more
dangerous than the London one. In the first place, there is the absence
of any right to relief. The English workman knows that neither he nor his
family can starve. The Frenchman becomes anxious as soon as his
employment is irregular, and desperate when it fails. The English workmen
are unacquainted with arms, and have no leaders with military experience.
The bulk of the Frenchmen have served, many of them are veterans in civil
war, and they have commanders skilled in street-fighting. The English
workmen have been gradually attracted to London by a real and permanent
demand for their labour. They have wives and children. At least 100,000
men have been added to the working population of Paris since the coup
d'état. They are young men in the vigour of their strength and passions,
unrestrained by wives or families. They have been drawn hither suddenly
and artificially by the demolition and reconstruction of half the town,
by the enormous local expenditure of the Government, and by the fifty
millions spent in keeping the price of bread in Paris unnaturally low.
The 40,000 men collected in Paris by the construction of the
fortifications are supposed to have mainly contributed to the revolution
of 1848. What is to be expected from this addition of 100,000? Then the
repressive force is differently constituted and differently animated. In
England you have an army which has chosen arms as a profession, which
never thinks of any other employment, and indeed is fit for no other, and
never expects any provision except its pay and its pension. The French
soldier, ever since 1789, is a citizen. He serves his six years because
the law and the colonel force him to do so, but he counts the days until
he can return to his province, his cottage, and his field. He sympathises
with the passions of the people. In the terrible days of June, the army
withstood the cries, the blessings, the imprecations and the seductions
of the mob, only because they had the National Guards by their side.
Their presence was a guarantee that the cause was just. The National
Guards never fought before as they did in those days. Yet at the Château
d'Eau, the miraculous heroism and the miraculous good luck of Lamoricière
were necessary to keep them together. If he had not exposed himself as no
man ever did, and escaped as no man ever did, they would have been
broken.'
'I was there,' said Scheffer, 'when his fourth horse was killed under
him. As the horse was sinking he drew his feet out of the stirrups and
came to the ground without falling; but his cigar dropped from his mouth.
He picked it up, and went on with the order which he was giving to an
aide-de-camp.
'I saw that,' said Tocqueville. 'He had placed himself immediately behind
a cannon in front of the Château d'Eau which fired down the Boulevard du
Temple. A murderous fire from the windows in a corner of the Rue du
Temple killed all the artillerymen. The instant that Lamoricière placed
himself behind it, I thought that I saw what would happen. I implored him
to get behind some shelter, or at least not to pose as a mark.
"Recollect," I said, "that if you go on in this way you must be killed
before the day is over-and where shall we all be?"'
'"I see the danger of what I am doing," he answered, "and I dislike it as
much as you can do; but it is necessary. The National Guards are shaking;
if they break, the Line follows. I must set an example that everyone can
see and can understand. This is not a time for taking precautions. If I
were to shelter myself, they would run."'
'How does Lamoricière,' I asked, 'bear exile and inactivity in Brussels?'
'Very ill,' said Scheffer. 'He feels that he has compromised the
happiness of his wife, whom he married not long before the coup
d'état.'
'Changarnier at Malins, who lives alone and has only himself to care for,
supports it much better.'
Tocqueville and I walked home together.
'Scheffer,' he said, 'did not tell all that happened at the Château
d'Eau. Men seldom do when they fight over their battles.'
'The insurgents by burrowing through walls had got into a house in the
rear of our position. They manned the windows, and suddenly fired down on
us from a point whence no danger had been feared. This caused a panic
among the National Guards, a force of course peculiarly subject to
panics. They turned and ran back 250 yards along the Boulevard St.
Martin, carrying with them the Line and Lamoricière himself. He
endeavoured to stop them by outcries, and by gesticulations, and indeed
by force. He gave to one man who was trying to run by him a blow with his
fist, so well meant and well directed that it broke his collar bone.'
'At length he stopped them, re-formed them, and said: "Now you shall
march, I at your head, and the drummer beating the charge, as if you were
on parade, up to that house." They did so. After a few discharges, which
miraculously missed Lamoricière, the men in the house deserted it.'
'What were you doing at the Château d'Eau?' I asked.
'We were marching,' he said, 'with infantry and artillery on the
Boulevard du Temple, across which there was a succession of barricades,
which it was necessary to take one by one.
'As we advanced in the middle, our sappers and miners got into the houses
on each side, broke through the party walls, and killed the men at the
windows.'
'Those three days,' he continued, 'impress strongly on my mind the
dangers of our present state.'
'It is of no use to take up pavements and straighten streets, and pierce
Paris by long military roads, and loop-hole the barracks, if the
Executive cannot depend on the army. Ditches and bastions are of no use
if the garrison will not man them.'
'The new law of recruitment, however, may produce a great change. Instead
of 80,000 conscripts, 120,000 are to be taken each year. This is about
all that are fit for service. They are required to serve for only two
years. If the change ended there our army would be still more a militia
than it is now. It would be the Prussian Landwehr. But those entitled to
their discharge are to be enticed by higher pay, promotions, bounties,
and retiring pensions—in short, by all means of seduction, to re-enter
for long periods, for ten, or fifteen, or perhaps twenty years. It is
hoped that thus a permanent regular army may be formed, with an esprit
de corps of its own, unsympathising with the people, and ready to keep
it down; and such will, I believe, be the result. But it will take nine
or ten years to produce such an army—and the dangers that I fear are
immediate.'
'What are the motives,' I asked, 'for the changes as to the conscription,
the increase of numbers, and the diminution of the time of service?'
'They are parts,' he answered, 'of the system. The French peasant, and
indeed the ouvrier, dislikes the service. The proportion of conscripts
who will re-enlist is small. Therefore the whole number must be large.
The country must be bribed to submit to this by the shortness of the
term. The conscript army will be sacrificed to what is to be the regular
army. It will be young and ill-trained.'
'But your new regular army,' I said, 'will be more formidable to the
enemy than your present force.'
'I am not sure of that,' he answered. 'The merit of the French army was
the impetuosity of its attack, the "furia Francese," as the Italians
called it. Young troops have more of this quality than veterans. The
Maison du Roi, whose charge at Steenkirk Macaulay has so well described,
consisted of boys of eighteen.'
'I am re-editing,' I said, 'my old articles. Among them is one written in
1841 on the National Character of France, England, and America,[1] as
displayed towards foreign nations. I have not much to change in what I
have said of England or of America. As they have increased in strength
they have both become still more arrogant, unjust, and shameless.
'England has perhaps become a little more prudent America a little less
so. But France seems to me to be altered. I described her as a soldier
with all the faults of that unsocial character. As ambitious, rapacious,
eager for nothing but military glory and territorial aggrandisement. She
seems now to have become moderate and pacific, and to be devoted rather
to the arts of peace than to those of war.'
'France is changed,' answered Tocqueville, 'and when compared with the
France of Louis XIV., or of Napoleon, was already changed when you wrote,
though the war-cry raised for political purposes in 1840 deceived
you. At the same time, I will not deny that military glory would, more
than any other merit, even now strengthen a Government, and that
military humiliation would inevitably destroy one. Nor must you overrate
the unpopularity of the last war. Only a few even of the higher classes
understood its motives. "Que diable veut cette guerre?" said my country
neighbour to me; "si c'était contre les Anglais—mais avec les Anglais,
et pour le Grand Turc, qu'est-ce que cela peut signifier?" But when they
saw that it cost only men, that they were not invaded or overtaxed, and
that prices rose, they got reconciled to it.
'It was only the speculators of Paris that were tired of it. And if,
instead of the Crimea, we had fought near our own frontiers, or for some
visible purpose, all our military passions, bad and good, would have
broken out.'
[Footnote 1: This article is republished in the Historical and
Philosophical Essays. Longmans: 1865.—ED.]
Wednesday, May 13.—Tocqueville came in after breakfast, and I walked
with him in the shade of the green walls or arcades of the Tuileries
chestnuts.
We talked of the Montijos, which led our conversation to Mérimée and V.
'Both of them,' said Tocqueville, 'were the friends of
Countess Montijo, the mother.
'V. was among the last persons who knew Eugénie as Countess Théba. He
escorted her to the Tuileries the very evening of her marriage. There he
took his leave of her. "You are now," he said, "placed so high that I can
only admire you from below." And I do not believe that they have met
since.
'Mérimée took a less sentimental view of the change. He acknowledged his
Empress in his former plaything, subsided from a sort of stepfather into
a courtier, and so rose to honour and wealth, while V. is satisfied to
remain an ex-professor and un homme de lettres.'
* * * * *
We met Henri Martin, and I asked Tocqueville what he thought of his
History.
'It has the merit of selling,' he said, 'which cannot be said of any
other History of France. Martin is laborious and conscientious, and does
not tell a story ill; but he is a partisan and is always biassed by his
own likings and dislikings. He belongs to the class of theorists,
unfortunately not a small one, whose political beau idéal is the
absence of all control over the will of the people-who are opposed
therefore to an hereditary monarchy-to a permanent President—to a
permanent magistracy-to an established Church—in short, to all
privileged classes, bodies, or institutions. Equality, not liberty or
security, is their object. They are centralisers and absolutists. A
despotic Assembly elected by universal suffrage, sitting at most for a
year, governing, like the Convention, through its committees, or a single
despot, appointed for a week, and not re-eligible, is the sort of ruler
that they would prefer. The last five years have perhaps disgusted Martin
with his Asiatic democracy, but his earlier volumes are coloured
throughout by his prejudices against all systems implying a division of
power, and independent authorities controlling and balancing one
another.'
We talked of the Secret Police.
'It has lately,' said Tocqueville, 'been unusually troublesome, or rather
it has been troublesome to a class of persons whom it seldom ventures to
molest. A friend of mine, M. Sauvaire Barthélemy, one of Louis Philippe's
peers, was standing at the door of his hotel reading a letter. A
gentleman in plain clothes addressed him, announced himself as an agent
de police, and asked him if the letter which he was reading was
political. "No," said Barthélemy, "you may see it. It is a _billet de
mariage." "I am directed," said the agent, "to request you to get into
this carriage." They got in and drove to Mazas. There Barthélemy was
shown into a neat room with iron bars to the windows, and ordered to
wait. After some time Louis Pietri, the Préfet de Police, arrived.
'"I am grieved," he said, "at giving you so much trouble, but I have been
commanded to see you in this place, and to inform you that the Emperor
cannot bear that a man in your high position should systematically
misrepresent him.
'"L'Empereur fait tout ce qu'il peut pour le bonheur de la France, et il
n'entend pas supporter une opposition aussi constante et aussi violente.
Effectivement il ne veut pas d'opposition. Voulez-vous le tenir pour
dit, Monsieur, et recevoir de nouveau mes excuses du dérangement que j'ai
dû vous causer? Pour le présent vous êtes libre."'
[Mr. Senior left Paris on the next day.
M. de Tocqueville paid his promised visit to England in June, and was
received with a perfect ovation.—ED.]
London, July 10, 1857.
I was too ill, my dear friend, to go to you yesterday. Dr. Ferguson tells
me that I have been doing too much, and prescribes perfect rest.
I have already read half your journal of 1857. It is very curious; but I
am glad that you have disguised me.
It is terrible to be in London, and to see so little of you; but the
force of circumstances is greater than the force of wishes.
Ever yours,
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
Tocqueville, August 6, 1857.
You may already have had news of me through some of our common friends,
my dear Senior, but I wish, besides, to give you some myself, and to
thank you again for the kind welcome I received from you and in your
house during my stay in London.
I regret only that I was unable to be more with you, and that, in spite
of myself, I was drawn into a whirlpool which carried me away and
prevented me from following my inclinations.
I have returned, however, full of gratitude for the marks of
consideration and affection showered upon me in England. I shall never
forget them.
I found my wife already installed here, and in good health; and I have
resumed my busy and peaceful life with a delight which does honour to my
wisdom. For I had been so spoiled in England that I might have been
afraid of finding my retreat too much out of the way and too quiet. But
nothing of the sort has happened. The excitement of the past month
appears to have added charms to the present.
Nevertheless, I have not yet set to work again, but I am full of good
resolutions, which I hope to execute as soon as I have completely
returned to my usual habits. These first days have been devoted to
putting everything into its regular order.
In France we are almost as much interested as you in England in the
affairs of India. Everyone, even in the country, asks me for news of what
is going on there.
There is a natural disposition to exaggerate the evil and to believe that
your dominion is overturned. For my part, I am waiting with the utmost
and most painful anxiety for the development of the drama, for no good
can possibly result from it; and there is not one civilised nation in the
world that ought to rejoice in seeing India escape from the hands of
Europeans in order to fall back into a state of anarchy and barbarism
worse than before its conquest.
I am quite sure that you will conquer. But it is a serious business.
A military insurrection is the worst of all insurrections, at least in
the beginning. You have to deal with barbarians, but they possess the
arms of civilised people given to them by yourselves.
My wife, who has preserved her English heart, is particularly affected by
the spectacle which Bengal at present affords.
If you have any more particular news than is to be found in the
newspapers, you will give us great pleasure by communicating them.
Remember me to Mrs. and Miss Senior, and to your daughter-in-law.
My wife sends many kind regards to them, as well as to you.
Adieu, dear Senior. Believe in my sincere affection.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
P.S.—I fancy that the first effect of the Indian affair will be to draw
still closer the alliance between England and France.
Tocqueville, November 15, 1857.
I am somewhat angry with you, my dear Senior, for not having yet given us
your news.[1] It is treating our friendship unfairly, I have not written
to you because I doubted your following exactly your intended route, but
I will write to you at Athens, as I think that you must now be there. If
you have followed your itinerary your travels must have been most
interesting to you, and they will be equally curious to us. I conclude
that you only passed quickly through the Principalities in following the
course of the Danube. I, however, had depended on you for furnishing me
with clear ideas of a country which is at present so interesting to
Europe, and which I think is destined to play an important part in the
future. And what say you of our friends the Turks? Was it worth while to
spend so much money and to shed so much blood in order to retain in
Europe savages who are ill disguised as civilised men? I am impatient to
talk to you, and almost equally so to read you.
I shall have little to tell you. I have not stirred from home since I
left England, and am leading the life of a gentleman-farmer; a life which
pleases me more and more every day, and would really make me happy, if my
wife were not suffering from an obstinate neuralgic affection in the
face. I fear that she may have to go to some mineral waters, which she
would be sorry to do; for, as you know, she hates travelling, and does no
justice to the reputation for wandering possessed by the English race.
I can tell you nothing on politics which you will not find in the
newspapers. The great question at present for all civilised Governments
seems to be the financial. The crisis from which America and England are
suffering will probably extend everywhere. As for India, you are out, not
perhaps of your difficulties, but of your greatest dangers. This affair,
and that of the Crimea, show how little sympathy there is for England
abroad. There was everything to interest us in your success—similarity
of race, of religion, and of civilisation. Your loss of India could have
served no cause but that of barbarism. Yet I venture to affirm that the
whole Continent, though it detested the cruelties of your enemies, did
not wish you to triumph.
Much of this is, without doubt, to be attributed to the evil passions
which make men always desire the fall of the prosperous and the strong.
But much belongs to a less dishonourable cause—to the conviction of all
nations that England considers them only with reference to her own
greatness; that she has less sympathy than any other modern nation; that
she never notices what passes among foreigners, what they think, feel,
suffer, or do, but with relation to the use which England can make of
their actions, their sufferings, their feelings, or their thoughts; and
that when she seems most to care for them she really cares only for
herself. All this is exaggerated, but not without truth.
Kindest regards from us both to you and to Mrs. Senior.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
[Footnote 1: Mr. Senior was at this time in the East.—ED.]
Tocqueville, February 10, 1858.
I was delighted, my dear Senior, to receive a letter from you dated
Marseilles. You are right in remaining till the spring in the South. We
trust to meet you in Paris in March.
I say no more, for I cannot write to you on what would most interest
you—French politics. Much is to be said on them; but you will understand
my silence if you study our new Law of Public Safety, and remember who is
the new Home Minister.[1] For the first time in French history has such a
post been filled by a general—and what a general!
I defer, therefore, until we meet, the expression of feelings and
opinions which cannot be safely transmitted through the post, and only
repeat how eager I am for our meeting.
Kind regards to Mrs. Senior.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
[Footnote 1: General Espinasse.]
Tocqueville, February 21, 1858.
I received your letters with great pleasure, my dear Senior, and I think
with still greater satisfaction that I shall soon be able to see you.
I shall probably arrive in Paris, with my wife, at about the same time as
you will, that is to say, about the 19th of next month. I should have
gone earlier if I were not occupied in planting and sowing, for I am
doing a little farming to my great amusement.
I am delighted that you intend again to take up your quarters at the
Hôtel Bedford, as I intend also to stay there if I can find apartments.
I hope that we shall be good neighbours and see each other as frequently
as such old friends ought to do. A bientôt!
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
[Mr. Senior ran over to England for a few weeks instead of remaining in
Paris. The meeting between the two friends did not, therefore, take place
till April.—ED.]
Paris, Saturday, April 17, 1858.—We had a discussion at the Institut
to-day as to a bust to fill a niche in the anteroom. Rossi was proposed.
His political merits were admitted, but he was placed low as to his
literary claims as an economist and a jurist. Dupin suggested Talleyrand,
which was received with a universal groan, and failed for want of a
seconder. Ultimately the choice fell on Dumont.
'Nothing that is published of Talleyrand's,' said Tocqueville to me as we
walked home, 'has very great merit, nor indeed is much of it his own. He
hated writing, let his reports and other state papers be drawn up by
others, and merely retouched them. But in the archives of the Affaires
étrangères there is a large quarto volume containing his correspondence
with Louis XVIII during the Congress of Vienna. Nothing can be more
charming. The great European questions which were then in debate, the
diplomatic and social gossip of Vienna, the contemporary literature—in
short, all that one clever homme du monde could find to interest and
amuse another, are treated with wit, brilliancy, and gaiety, supported by
profound good sense. When that volume is published his bust will be
placed here by acclamation.'
Monday, April 19.—I dined with Lanjuinais, and met Tocqueville, Rivet,
Dufaure, Corcelle, Freslon, and one or two others.
They attacked me about the change of sentiment in England with respect to
Louis Napoleon.
'While he was useful to you,' they said, 'you steadily refused to admit
that he was a tyrant, or even an usurper. You chose to disbelieve in the
3,000 men, women, and children massacred on the Boulevards of Paris—in
the 20,000 poisoned by jungle fever in Cayenne—in the 25,000 who have
died of malaria, exposure, and bad food, working in gangs on the roads
and in the marshes of the Metidja and Lambressa.'
'We did not choose', I answered, 'to disbelieve any thing. We were
simply ignorant. I knew all these facts, because I have passed a part
of every year since 1847 in Paris; because I walked along the Boulevards
on the 20th of December 1851, and saw the walls of every house, from the
Bastille to the Madeleine, covered with the marks of musket-balls;
because I heard in every society of the thousands who had been massacred,
and of the tens of thousands who had been déportés; but the untravelled
English, and even the travelled English, except the few who live in
France among the French, knew nothing of all this. Your press tells
nothing. The nine millions of votes given to Louis Napoleon seemed to
prove his popularity, and therefore the improbability of the tyranny of
which he was accused by his enemies. I knew that those nine millions of
votes were extorted, or stolen by violence or fraud. But the English
people did not know it. They accepted his election as the will of the
nation, and though they might wonder at your choice, did not presume to
blame it.'
'The time,' they answered, 'at which light broke in upon you is
suspicious. Up to the 14th of January 1858 the oppression under which
thirty-four millions of people within twenty-four miles of your coast,
with whom you are in constant intercourse, was unknown to you. Their
ruler insults you, and you instantly discover that he is an usurper and a
tyrant. This looks as if the insult, and the insult alone, opened your
eyes.'
'What opened our eyes,' I answered, 'was not the insult but the loi de
sûreté publique. It was the first public act which showed to England the
nature of your Government.
'When we found, erected in every department, a revolutionary tribunal,
empowered to banish and transport without trial; when we found a rude
soldier made Home Minister, and the country divided into five districts
to be each governed by a marshal, we saw at once that France was under a
violent military despotism. Until that law was passed the surface was
smooth. There was nothing in the appearance of France to show to a
stranger that she was not governed by a Monarch, practically, indeed,
absolute, but governing as many absolute Monarchs have done, mildly and
usefully.
'Of course we might have found out the truth sooner if we had inquired.
And perhaps we ought to have inquired. We busy ourselves about our own
affairs, and neglect too much those of other countries. In that sense
you have a right to say that we chose to be ignorant, since our conduct
was such as necessarily to make us ignorant. But it was not because Louis
Napoleon was our ally that we chose to be ignorant, but because we
habitually turn our eyes from the domestic affairs of the Continent, as
things in which we have seldom a right to interfere, and in which, when
we do interfere, we do more harm than good.'
We talked of the manner in which the loi de sûreté publique has been
carried out. And I mentioned 600 as the number of those who had suffered
under it, as acknowledged to me by Blanchard in the beginning of March.
'It is much greater now,' said Lanjuinais. 'Berryer on his return from
Italy, a week ago, slept in Marseilles. He was informed that more than
900 persons had passed through Marseilles, déportés under the new law
to Algeria. They were of all classes: artisans and labourers mixed with
men of the higher and middle classes. To these must be added those
transported to Cayenne, who were sent by way of Havre. As for the number
expulsés and internés there are no data.'
'In the Department of Var, a man was found guilty in 1848 of joining in
one of the revolutionary movements of that time. His complete innocence
was soon proved; he was released, and has lived quietly on his little
estate ever since. He was arrested under the new law and ordered to be
déporté to Algeria. His friends, in fact all his neighbours,
remonstrated, and sent to Paris the proof that the original conviction
was a mistake. "Qu'il aille tout de même," was Espinasse's answer.
'In Calvados the Préfet, finding no one whom he could conscientiously
arrest, took hold of one of the most respectable men in the department.
"If," he said, "I had arrested a man against whom there was plausible
ground for suspicion, he might have been transported. This man must be
released."'
'Has he been released?' I asked.
'I have not heard,' was the answer. 'In all probability he has been.'
'In my department,' said Tocqueville, 'the sous-préfet, ordered by the
Préfet to arrest somebody in the arrondissement, was in the same
perplexity as the Préfet of Calvados. "I can find no fit person," he said
to me. I believe that he reported the difficulty to the Préfet, and that
the vacancy was supplied from some other arrondissement.
'What makes this frightful,' he added, 'is that we now know that
deportation is merely a slow death. Scarcely any of the victims of 1851
and 1852 are living.'
'I foretold that,' I said, 'at the time, as you will find if you look at
my article on Lamartine, published in the "Edinburgh Review."'[1]
[Footnote 1: See Journals in France and Italy.—ED.]
April 20.—We talked of the political influence in France of the
hommes de lettres.
'It began,' said Tocqueville, 'with the Restoration. Until that time we
had sometimes, though very rarely, statesmen who became writers, but
never writers who became statesmen,'
'You had hommes de lettres,' I said, 'in the early Revolutionary
Assemblies—Mirabeau for instance.'
'Mirabeau,' he answered, 'is your best example, for Mirabeau, until he
became a statesman, lived by his pen. Still I should scarcely call a man
of his high birth and great expectations un homme de lettres. That
appellation seems to belong to a man who owes his position in early life
to literature. Such a man is Thiers, or Guizot, as opposed to such men as
Gladstone, Lord John Russell, or Montalembert.'
Wednesday, April 21.—I dined with D. and met, among several others,
Admiral Matthieu the Imperial Hydrographer, and a general whose name I
did not catch. I talked to the general about the army.
'We are increasing it,' he said, 'but not very materially. We are rather
giving ourselves the means of a future rapid increase, than making an
immediate augmentation. We are raising the number of men from 354,000 to
392,400, in round numbers to 400,000; but the principal increase is in
the cadres, the officers attached to each battalion. We have increased
them by more than one third. So that if a war should break out we can
instantly—that is to say in three months, increase our army to 600,000
or even 700,000 men. Soldiers are never wanting in France, the difficulty
always is to find officers.'
'I hear,' I said, 'that you are making great improvements in your
artillery.'
'We are,' he answered. 'We are applying to it the principle of the Minié
musket, and we are improving the material. We hope to make our guns as
capable of resisting rapid and continued firing as well and as long as
the English and the Swedish guns, which are the best in Europe, can do.
And we find that we can throw a ball on the Minié principle with equal
precision twice as far. This will double the force of all our batteries.'
'Are you,' he asked me, 'among those who have taken shares in the
Russian railways?'
'No,' I said. 'They are the last that I wish to encourage.'
'Englishmen or Frenchmen,' he answered, 'who help Russia to make
railways, put me in mind of the Dutch who sold powder to their besiegers.
'The thinness of her population—that is, the vast space over which it is
scattered—alone prevents Russia from being the mistress of Europe. If
her 64,000,000 were as concentrated as our 34,000,000 are, she would be
irresistible. She loses always far more men in marching than in
fighting.'
'The events of the war,' I said, 'lead me to believe that the goodness of
the Russian soldier is exaggerated. They were always beaten, often by
inferior numbers.'
'In the first place,' he answered, 'those who were beaten at Sebastopol
were not the best Russian soldiers. They were short small men, generally
drawn from the neighbouring provinces. The Russian Imperial Guards and
the Russian Army in Poland are far superior to any that we encountered in
the Crimea. In the second place, they were ill commanded. The
improvements of weapons, of science and of discipline, have raised the
privates of all the great military nations to about the same level.
Success now depends on numbers and on generalship. With railways Russia
will be able to bring quickly a preponderating force to any point on her
frontier. Her officers are already good, and for money she can import the
best generals; indeed, I do not see why she should not breed them. Russia
is civilised enough to produce men of the highest military qualities.'
I asked Admiral Matthieu about the naval preparations of France.
'The "Moniteur,"' I said, 'denies that you are making any.'
'The "Moniteur,"' he answered, 'does not tell the truth. We are
augmenting largely, both the number and the efficacy of our fleet.
'Four years ago, at the beginning of the Russian war, we resolved to
build a steam fleet of 150 steam ships of different sizes for fighting,
and 74 steam ships for the transfer service, and to carry fuel and
stores. Though we set about this in the beginning, as we thought, of a
long war, we have not allowed the peace to interrupt it. We are devoting
to it sixty-five millions a year (2,600,000_l_.) of which from fifteen to
seventeen millions are employed every year in building new ships, and
from forty to forty-two in adding steam power to the old ones. We hope to
finish this great work in fourteen years.'
'What,' I asked, 'is the amount of your present fleet of steamers?'
'We have thirty-three screws,' he answered, 'fifty-seven paddles, and
sixty-two sailing vessels in commission, and seventy-three, mostly
steamers, en réserve, as you would say, in ordinary.'
'Manned by how many men?' I asked.
'By twenty-five thousand sailors,' he answered, 'and eleven thousand
marines. But our inscription maritime would give us in a few months or
less one hundred thousand more. Since the times of Louis XVI. the French
Navy has never been so formidable, positively or relatively.'
'How,' I asked, 'has your "Napoleon" succeeded?'
'Admirably,' he answered. 'I have not seen the "Wellington," but she is a
much finer ship than the Agamemnon. Her speed is wonderful. A month ago
she left Toulon at seven in the morning, and reached Ajaccio by four in
the evening. But the great improvement is in our men. Napoleon knew
nothing and cared nothing about sailors. He took no care about their
training, and often wasted them in land operations, for which landsmen
would have done as well.
'In 1814 he left Toulon absolutely unguarded, and sent all the sailors to
join Augereau. You might have walked into it.
'In 1810 or 1811 I was on board a French corvette which fought an action
with an English vessel, the "Lively." We passed three times under her
stern, and raked her each time. We ought to have cleared her decks. Not a
shot touched her. The other day at Cherbourg I saw a broadside fired at a
floating mark three cables off, the usual distance at which ships engage.
Ten balls hit it, and we could see that all the others passed near enough
to shake it by their wind.
'A ship of eighty guns has now forty canonniers and forty maîtres de
pièces. All practical artillerymen, and even the able seamen, can point
a gun. Nelson's manoeuvre of breaking the line could not be used against
a French fleet, such as a French fleet is now. The leading ships would be
destroyed one after another, by the concentrated fire. Formerly our
officers dreaded a maritime war. They knew that defeat awaited them,
possibly death. Now they are confident, and eager to try their hands.'
In the evening L. took me into a corner, and we had a long conversation.
He had been reading my 'Athens Journal.'
'What struck me,' he said, 'in every page of it, was the resemblance of
King Otho to Louis Napoleon.'
'I see the resemblance,' I answered, 'but it is the resemblance of a
dwarf to a giant.'
'No,' he replied. 'Of a man five feet seven inches high to one five feet
eleven inches. There are not more than four inches between them. There is
the same cunning, the same coldness, the same vindictiveness, the same
silence, the same perseverance, the same unscrupulousness, the same
selfishness, the same anxiety to appear to do everything that is done,
and above all, the same determination to destroy, or to seduce by
corruption or by violence, every man and every institution favourable to
liberty, independence, or self-government. In one respect Otho had the
more difficult task. He found himself, in 1843, subject to a Constitution
carefully framed under the advice of England for the express purpose of
controlling him. He did not attempt to get rid of it by a coup d'état,
or even to alter it, but cunningly and skilfully perverted it into an
instrument of despotism. Louis Napoleon destroyed the Constitution which
he found, and made a new one, copied from that which had been gradually
elaborated by his uncle, which as a restraint is intentionally powerless
and fraudulent.
'A man,' he continued, 'may acquire influence either by possessing in a
higher degree the qualities which belong to his country and to his time,
or by possessing those in which they are deficient.
'Wellington is an example of this first sort. His excellences were those
of an Englishman carried almost to perfection.
'Louis Napoleon belongs to the second. If his merits had been impetuous
courage, rapidity of ideas, quickness of decision, frankness, versatility
and resource, he would have been surrounded by his equals or his
superiors. He predominated over those with whom he came in contact
because he differed from them. Because he was calm, slow, reserved,
silent, and persevering. Because he is a Dutchman, not a Frenchman.'
'He seems,' I said, 'to have lost his calmness.'
'Yes,' answered L. 'But under what a shock! And observe that though the
greatest risk was encountered by him, the terror was greatest among his
entourage. I do not believe that if he had been left to himself he
would have lost his prudence or his self-possession. He did not for the
first day. Passions are contagious. Everyone who approached him was
agitated by terror and anger. His intrepidity and self-reliance, great as
they are, were disturbed by the hubbub all round him. His great defects
are three. First, his habit of self-contemplation. He belongs to the men
whom the Germans call subjective, whose eye is always turned inwardly;
who think only of themselves, of their own character, and of their own
fortunes. Secondly, his jealousy of able men. He wishes to be what you
called him, a giant, and as Nature has not made him positively tall, he
tries to be comparatively so, by surrounding himself with dwarfs. His
third defect is the disproportion of his wishes to his means. His desires
are enormous. No power, no wealth, no expenditure would satisfy them.
Even if he had his uncle's genius and his uncle's indefatigability, he
would sink, as his uncle did, under the exorbitance of his attempts. As
he is not a man of genius, or even a man of remarkable ability, as he is
ignorant, uninventive and idle, you will see him flounder and fall from
one failure to another.
'During the three years that Drouyn de L'Huys was his minister he was
intent on home affairs—on his marriage, on the Louvre, on the artillery,
on his bonnes fortunes, and on the new delights of unbounded
expenditure. He left foreign affairs altogether to his minister. When
Drouyn de L'Huys left him, the road before him was plain—he had only to
carry on the war. But when the war was over, the road ended; neither
he nor Walewski nor any of his entourage know anything of the country
in which they are travelling. You see them wandering at hazard. Sometimes
trying to find their way to Russia, sometimes to England. Making a treaty
with Austria, then attempting to injure her, and failing; attempting to
injure Turkey, and failing; bullying Naples, and failing; threatening
Switzerland, threatening Belgium, and at last demanding from England an
Alien Bill, which they ought to know to be incompatible with the laws and
hateful to the feelings of the people.
'He is not satisfied with seeing the country prosperous and respected
abroad. He wants to dazzle. His policy, domestic and foreign, is a policy
of vanity and ostentation—motives which mislead everyone both in private
and in public life.
'His great moral merits are kindness and sympathy. He is a faithful
attached friend, and wishes to serve all who come near him.
'His greatest moral fault is his ignorance of the difference between
right and wrong; perhaps his natural insensibility to it, his want of the
organs by which that difference is perceived—a defect which he inherits
from his uncle.'
'The uncle,' I said, 'had at least one moral sense—he could understand
the difference between pecuniary honesty and dishonesty, a difference
which this man seems not to see, or not to value.'
'I agree with you,' said L. 'He cannot value it, or he would not look
complacently on the peculation which surrounds him. Every six months some
magnificent hotel rises in the Champs Élysées, built by a man who had
nothing, and has been a minister for a year or two.'
On my return I found Tocqueville with the ladies. I gave him an outline
of what L. had said.
'No one,' he said, 'knows Louis Napoleon better than L.'
'My opportunities of judging him have been much fewer, but as far as they
have gone, they lead to the same conclusions. L. perhaps has not dwelt
enough on his indolence. Probably as he grows older, and the effects of
his early habits tell on him, it increases. I am told that it is
difficult to make him attend to business, that he prolongs audiences
apparently to kill time.
'One of the few of my acquaintances who go near him, was detained by him
for an hour to answer questions about the members of the Corps
législatif. Louis Napoleon inquired about their families, their
fortunes, their previous histories. Nothing about their personal
qualities. These are things that do not interest him. He supposes that
men differ only in externals. "That the fond is the same in everyone."'
April 26.—Tocqueville spent the evening with us.
We talked of Novels.
'I read none,' he said, 'that end ill. Why should one voluntarily subject
oneself to painful emotions? To emotions created by an imaginary cause
and therefore impelling you to no action. I like vivid emotions, but I
seek them in real life, in society, in travelling, in business, but above
all in political business. There is no happiness comparable to political
success, when your own excitement is justified by the magnitude of the
questions at issue, and is doubled and redoubled by the sympathy of your
supporters. Having enjoyed that, I am ashamed of being excited by the
visionary sorrows of heroes and heroines.
'I had a friend,' he continued, 'a Benedictine, who is now ninety-seven.
He was, therefore, about thirteen when Louis XVI. began to reign. He is a
man of talents and knowledge, has always lived in the world, has attended
to all that he has seen and heard, and is still unimpaired in mind, and
so strong in body that when I leave him he goes down to embrace me, after
the fashion of the eighteenth century, at the bottom of his staircase.'
'And what effect,' I asked, 'has the contemplation of seventy years of
revolution produced in him? Does he look back, like Talleyrand, to the
ancien régime as a golden age?'
'He admits,' said Tocqueville, 'the material superiority of our own age,
but he believes that, intellectually and morally, we are far inferior to
our grandfathers. And I agree with him. Those seventy years of revolution
have destroyed our courage, our hopefulness, our self-reliance, our
public spirit, and, as respects by far the majority of the higher
classes, our passions, except the vulgarest and most selfish ones—vanity
and covetousness. Even ambition seems extinct. The men who seek power,
seek it not for itself, not as the means of doing good to their country,
but as a means of getting money and flatterers.
'It is remarkable,' he continued, 'that women whose influence is
generally greatest under despotisms, have none now. They have lost it,
partly in consequence of the gross vulgarity of our dominant passions,
and partly from their own nullity. They are like London houses, all built
and furnished on exactly the same model, and that a most uninteresting
one. Whether a girl is bred up at home or in a convent, she has the same
masters, gets a smattering of the same accomplishments, reads the same
dull books, and contributes to society the same little contingent of
superficial information.
'When a young lady comes out I know beforehand how her mother and her
aunts will describe her. "Elle a les goûts simples. Elle est pieuse. Elle
aime la campagne. Elle aime la lecture. Elle n'aime pas le bal. Elle
n'aime pas le monde, elle y ira seulement pour plaire à sa mère." I try
sometimes to escape from these generalities, but there is nothing behind
them.'
'And how long,' I asked, 'does this simple, pious, retiring character
last?'
'Till the orange flowers of her wedding chaplet are withered,' he
answered. 'In three months she goes to the messe d'une heure.'
'What is the "messe d'une heure?"' I asked.
'A priest,' he answered, 'must celebrate Mass fasting; and in strictness
ought to do so before noon. But to accommodate fashionable ladies who
cannot rise by noon, priests are found who will starve all the morning,
and say Mass in the afternoon. It is an irregular proceeding, though
winked at by the ecclesiastical authorities. Still to attend it is rather
discreditable; it is a middle term between the highly meritorious
practice of going to early Mass, and the scandalous one of never going at
all.'
'What was the education,' I asked, 'of women under the ancien régime?'
'The convent,' he answered.
'It must have been better,' I said, 'than the present education, since
the women of that time were superior to ours.'
'It was so far better,' he answered, 'that it did no harm. A girl at that
time was taught nothing. She came from the convent a sheet of white
paper. Now her mind is a paper scribbled over with trash. The women of
that time were thrown into a world far superior to ours, and with the
sagacity, curiosity, and flexibility of French women, caught knowledge
and tact and expression from the men.
'I knew well,' he continued, 'Madame Récamier. Few traces of her former
beauty then remained, but we were all her lovers and her slaves. The
talent, labour, and skill which she wasted in her salon, would have
gained and governed an empire. She was virtuous, if it be virtuous to
persuade every one of a dozen men that you wish to favour him, though
some circumstance always occurs to prevent your doing so. Every friend
thought himself preferred. She governed us by little distinctions, by
letting one man come five minutes before the others, or stay five minutes
after. Just as Louis XIV. raised one courtier to the seventh heaven by
giving him the bougeoir, and another by leaning on his arm, or taking
his shirt from him.
'She said little, but knew what each man's fort was, and placed from
time to time a mot which led him to it. If anything were peculiarly
well said, her face brightened. You saw that her attention was always
active and always intelligent.
'And yet I doubt whether she really enjoyed conversation. Tenir salon
was to her a game, which she played well, and almost always successfully,
but she must sometimes have been exhausted by the effort. Her salon was
perhaps pleasanter to us than it was to herself.
'One of the last,' he continued, 'of that class of potentates was the
Duchesse de Dino. Her early married life was active and brilliant, but
not intellectually. It was not till about forty, when she had exhausted
other excitements, that she took to bel esprit. But she performed her
part as if she had been bred to it.'
This was our last conversation. I left Paris the next day, and we never
met again.