Considerations on the Peace,
As far as it is relative to the
Colonies, and the African Trade.
SINCE the preliminary articles of peace were
published by authority, we have heard
many persons in coffee-houses and other
places, censure and blame our negotiators, for
their not having obtained better terms.
They say, that our acquisitions in North America
are of little consequence: yet when these acquisitions
were in possession of our enemies, they
thought them of inestimable value. Can the
mere alienation of any property cause so sudden a diminution
of its original worth? Surely then pique
or dislike to some of our peace-makers, or private
interest to have the war continued, must have
hurried these men beyond the bounds of reason.
For if they would give themselves the least time
to reflect seriously, and judge dispassionately, they
would find, that by retaining our conquests in
North America (which are extended beyond our
most sanguine expectations) the greatest benefit
and utility must arise to this the mother-country;
inasmuch as we have put ourselves in such a situation
not only in the north, but also in the southern
parts, that it is to be hoped our inland settlers will
live in a perfect state of tranquillity; and his majesty’s
subjects carry on and cultivate that great
branch of the British commerce, without dread of
the Indians, or interruption from the subjects of
any foreign nation. This good effect surely must
be allowed to be of immense importance and advantage
to Great Britain; and would not have
been the case if we had kept the sugar colonies
ceded to France, instead of part of our continental
conquests.
What was the occasion of the war but the negotiators
of the last peace not settling the distinct
limits and boundaries of the territories we and
the French were to have in North America? We
rejoice those limits are now settled, and hope so
effectually as to prevent future disputes.
Among the many altercations concerning the
preliminary articles, and the abilities of our
negotiators, it must be allowed, with respect
to the commercial interest of this country, there is
a noble Lord in high office, and of the cabinet,
whole acknowledged capacity, great application,
and long experience, at a board where he so judiciously
and eminently presided, made him a most
competent judge what measures were proper to be
taken for the security, improvement, and extension
of the trade and commerce of Great-Britain
and her colonies. Therefore, we cannot doubt,
but his majesty has been well and faithfully advised
as to that part of our pacific negotiations;
because the patriotic spirit, honour and integrity
of that nobleman are universally known and approved.
It is not amiss to lay down as a maxim,
that in general the information of merchants is
not to be depended on by the legislature, with respect
to trade and commerce, for many other,
besides this principal reason; to wit—A trade may
be very profitable to a particular merchant, city
or town, and, at the same time, be very pernicious
to the general interest of the nation, is a most
notorious fact. Have we not heard
many falsehoods asserted, and seen many erroneous calculations
laid before the public, with an interested
view of obtaining such private ends, and of defeating
in some very essential points the public
welfare?
Whatever self-interested people may clamour to
the contrary, there cannot be a doubt but his majesty
and his ministers, in their negociations, have
given the most serious attention to the universal
good of this country, without confining their views,
or partially regarding whether North America is
more valuable than the Sugar Islands, because each
merited their notice and care, being both of inestimable
value to the mother-country, and reciprocally
so to each other; and all three so essentially
connected, that whatever happens to the disadvantage
of the one, must in proportion affect the
other. For the West India islands depend upon
North America, in a great measure, for provisions,
mill, and other timber; as well as for horses, cattle,
and many things absolutely necessary for
the use of the plantations; which are paid for in
specie, sugar, rum, melasses, and other plantation-produce:
moreover, the melasses being distilled
into rum in North America, are of great advantage
to the merchants there, in carrying on the African
trade directly from thence, which enables them to
make returns for those manufactures, &c. they
receive from hence with greater facility. All possible
care should be taken to prevent his majesty’s
subjects purchasing sugar, rum, and particularly
melasses, in the French islands, by prohibiting their
importation into North America, by laying a
higher duty upon those articles than that laid by
an act, made in the sixth year of his late majesty’s
reign, entitled, “An act for the better securing
and encouraging the trade of his majesty’s sugar
colonies, &c.” whereby such high duties were
laid on all foreign sugars, rums, and melasses, to
be imported into any of his majesty’s colonies in
America, as, it was thought, would answer all the
ends of a prohibition.
But experience has shewn that law, and also
those passed in the 12th and 15th Car. II. are too
weak to answer the purposes for which they were
designed; and that some more effectual remedies
must be found to prevent the British traders of
North America importing foreign sugar, rum,
and melasses, which was a great trade carried on
by them from the French islands before the war;
and by that means the commodities from North
America, wanted in the sugar islands, were greatly
advanced to the British planters. And as the northern
traders often refused to take any thing from them
but ready money, which drained them of almost all
their gold and silver, for want of which they were
often brought into great distress; therefore all the
money the North American traders used to receive
from the British planters, was carried to foreign
sugar colonies, and there laid out in the purchase
of sugar, rum, and melasses, which were carried
to our northern colonies, and there supplied the
place of sugar, rum, and melasses from the British
sugar islands; and consequently robbed them
not only of the consumption of so much of their
product, but also of their gold and silver too.
Whereas if the planters in the foreign colonies
were obliged to purchase what they want from the
British subjects with ready money only, and not
allowed to give their sugar, rum, and melasses in
barter for the same, it would
make the balance of
that trade for the future much more in our favour
than it has been against us; because we having so
greatly extended the British dominion on the continent
of America, the French in their sugar
islands cannot be supplied with what they want
from thence but by the English; therefore the
British traders may chuse to be paid for their merchandizes
in such manner as they shall please, which
the French will be under a necessity of complying
with.
It is well known to those who are acquainted
with the sugar islands, that the profits of the planter
depend upon the vent he finds for his rum and
melasses; for if sugar only, and no rum and melasses
could be produced from the sugar cane, it
would hardly pay the expence of culture, and manufacturing
it into sugar. Therefore as the consumption
of rum and melasses is stopped or increased,
the sugar colonies (whether English or foreign)
must respectively thrive or decline. And as
rum is not allowed to be imported into old France,
or any of its colonies (because it interferes with
brandy, which is the product of the mother-country)
this evidently shews how much it is in the
power of Great-Britain to check the progress of
the French sugar islands, and advance that of her
own. For if the bringing French rum and melasses
into any of the British dominions, can be effectually
stopped, all the profits made by rum and
melasses, in the French sugar colonies, would be
lost to them; because they could find no vent for
it in any other part of the world.
This point strictly attended, and invariably adhered
to, and the African trade secured to the British
subjects, to the extent of their natural and
undoubted right, would diminish the growth of
sugar in the French islands, and increase it in our
own; and might, with the addition of our new
acquisitions, very probably in the course of some
years, be a means of enabling the English
to undersell them at all foreign markets in Europe, and
confine them to their own consumption. Therefore
it is humbly submitted to the consideration of
the legislative power, whether this trade, so apparently
hurtful to the national interest of this kingdom,
(which will most certainly be carried on in
the same manner it was before the war) ought not
to be stopped without delay; and the importation
of foreign sugar, rum, or melasses, into any of
the British colonies in North America, prohibited
under such penalties, and with such encouragements
to inform and seize, as may be adequate to
the crime, in order to put an effectual stop to such
a pernicious and destructive commerce.
From what has been before observed, it will, it
is presumed, evidently appear how necessary it
must be for the advantage of the British sugar colonies,
to promote as much as possible the sale and
consumption of rum and melasses, upon which,
in a great measure, the well-being and prosperity
of the planters depend. On that account, and in
order to promote such desirable purpose, suppose
the duties on melasses, and the excise on rum, were
to be lowered, such procedure would favour our
plantations in their rivalship with France, and the
lessening these duties will, in a great measure,
prevent the smuggling of foreign brandy to such
a degree, as may probably augment the revenue
arising therefrom, by a greater quantity of rum and
melasses being disposed of, which consequently
must considerably encrease our navigation; and the
disadvantage to our rivals in trade will be in proportion
to our success. Besides, rum, if it can be
got at a reasonable rate, will greatly increase the
consumption of malt spirits, by mixing them in
such proportion as are suitable to the palate of an
infinite variety of people. This is evident from
the great quantities, and the various prices that
spirits are sold for under the denomination of rum,
which are from 5s. or 7s. to 10s. per gallon.
The trade carried on between Great Britain,
Ireland, North America, the West India islands
and Africa, is of greater advantage to this country,
than all our other trades whatsoever, arising
from the great exportation of British manufactures,
East India goods, provisions as well as linens from
Ireland, which are paid for with specie, sugar, tobacco,
rice, cotton, and other plantation-produce;
and with the commodities of Africa, such as gold dust,
bees wax, elephants teeth, gum Senegal, various
sorts of dying woods, and particularly Negroes for
the plantations; whence it manifestly appears, upon
the African trade, and the invaluable commerce
of our colonies, above two-thirds of the British
navigation depends; and for this very obvious reason
it may be asserted, that in the vessels employed
for said traffic, the most useful sailors for manning
his majesty’s navy (the great bulwark of this nation)
are bred; because they are inured to the
manner of living on board ships, as well in the
hot as in the cold climates; which is not the case
of sailors taken out of coasting vessels, colliers, and
traders to the north seas, as hath been frequently
experienced by the many (very useful) lives in our
expeditions to the East and West Indies being lost;
and that fatality was chiefly owing to their not
having been accustomed to live on salt provisions,
and to bear the excessive heat of the climate,
which they were unacquainted with, and unpractised
in.
To prevent the like catastrophes hereafter, when
occasion shall require, we would propose the chusing
out of the several ships that may lie in the
harbours of Great-Britain, such sailors only as shall
have been a voyage or more to the hot countries,
to man such expedition fleets for those parts of
the world, where the sun’s power is strong, as the
more probable means of preserving the lives of a
great number of those valuable sailors, who may
not have had a seasoning, and have been mostly
employed in the coasting trade and short voyages.
We have been induced to throw out this hint, in
hopes that it may engage the attention of some
more able pen, to form a scheme for such a good,
humane, and noble end, before the commencement
of another war.[1]
It must be allowed by those who have a general
knowledge of the trade and commerce of Great-Britain
and Ireland, that the Negro-trade on the
coast of Africa, is the chief and fundamental support
of the British colonies, by supplying them with
that race of useful people called Negroes, to be
employed in cultivating the lands. But when there
is either a deficiency of them, or that they are
purchaseable but at high prices, then such checks
must greatly impoverish our British planters; and
in consequence, considerably diminish the wealth,
power, trade and navigation of these kingdoms,
the encrease of which has been, in a great measure,
owing to the extensive commerce to and
from our colonies and plantations: therefore their
not being properly supplied with Negroes, must
be extremely detrimental to them; which induces
us to make some observations upon a memorial
taken notice of in the Public Ledger, of the third
of November last, wherein it was asserted, that
sir William Meredith, one of the representatives in
parliament for the town of Liverpool, had presented
a memorial to the right honourable the earl
of Egremont, one of his majesty’s principal secretaries
of state, “setting forth the great advantages
of the trade of Guadaloupe, where they received
334,605l. 11s. 2d.[2] for 12,347 slaves, the
cargoes of 41 ships, purchased in Africa with
British manufactures; praying that the possession
of that island might be thought of in the
negotiation for peace, if not incompatible with
the general scheme of affairs.” This memorial
we could not have expected from that quarter,
recollecting that the great Hardman is no more.
Had he been living, it would not have been
wondered at, as he was noted for his contriving,
and being industrious at procuring and presenting,
memorials and petitions. He even influenced
some merchants of the town of Rippon in Yorkshire,
to petition the parliament, when that great
and important trade to Africa was under its consideration.
He likewise prevailed on many other
towns to petition, all as little interested and connected
with the trade of Africa, as Rippon; and
said Rippon was never famous for any other manufactory,
that we could hear of, but that of making
spurs; and the cream of the jest is, that not a
single pair, as a commercial article, was ever sent
to Africa; at the same time many other measures
were pursued, very singular methods taken, and
absolute untruths asserted as facts, to mislead the
legislature, in order, as it is supposed, to prevent
the forts and settlements being put upon a proper
establishment, that were all as inconsistent as the
Rippon petition.
It was at that period boldly advanced at the
bar of the house of Commons, and with great industry
propagated among the members, that the
forts in Africa were only useful, as marks of possession
and sovereignty; which, if true, why has 19,565l.
14s. 2d. sterling been expended in building part of
a fort at Anamaboa, to the 30th June, 1756, as appears
by the African committee’s accounts to that
time, when the further building of that fort was
put under the direction of the board of ordnance[3]?
which sum has been since paid by the public more
than the annual grant of 10,000l. then insisted as
sufficient for the support of the forts. But we have
been informed, those prevaricating advocates have
since altered their opinion, and think it a very inadequate
sum for such purpose: and it appears by
the votes of the honourable house of Commons,
application has been made to parliament to enlarge
the annual grant; and there was granted for the
year 1761, 13,000l. and for the year 1762, the
like sum, by which it is conjectured the said advocates
have found it absolutely necessary that the
forts ought to be kept in a better state than that of
marks of possession and sovereignty only.
But that cannot be done, when we consider in
what manner the money granted by parliament to
the African committee, is appropriated in Africa,
which the government never receives any account of.
The great argument made use of to the then
ministers[4], to obtain a dissolution of the late African
company, by the advocates for the present
system, was, that 10,000l. was quite adequate and
sufficient for the support and maintenance of the
forts.
This, we believe, was one of the strongest
reasons for those ministers adopting their scheme,
which had as much truth in it, as many other assertions
at that time made use of.
The late company, from their experience, insisted
that sum was very insufficient; which it really
was, even to give in presents annually to the principal
natives, to cultivate such an interest as is not
only necessary, but absolutely essential to support
and promote the honour, power, jurisdiction, and
trade of Great Britain on the coast of Africa.
However, there has been granted, since the forts
were put under the care of the present Africa
committee for their support, from 2d February,
1751, to 2d February, 1763, 136,000l. which
is 11,333l. 6s. 8d. per annum, exclusive of what
was expended in building the fort at Annamaboa.
Notwithstanding said grants, the forts have not
been kept even[5] as marks of possession and sovereignty;
which undeniable truth the
editors are ready to prove, if called upon.
Mourn! mourn! O Liverpool, for the loss of
thy great hero and champion, who was at all
times ready to enter the lists in defence of thy trade
and commerce. But, Britain rejoice; for what
may have been for the advantage of the town of
Liverpool, might be greatly detrimental and prejudicial
to the general trade and commerce of this
country and its colonies; which surely must
clearly appear from the beforementioned memorial.
For we believe it will be allowed, if we were
to encrease and extend the number of our colonies
in North America, and the West Indies, it would
be disadvantageous to Great Britain, unless they
can be supplied with a sufficient number of people
for their defence and cultivation, at as reasonable
an expence as possible; without taking the hands
that are useful and necessary in husbandry, and the
several manufactures of the mother-country.
Then surely, as Guadaloupe was surrendered by
capitulation to the British arms, no longer than
since the 4th day of May, 1759; and as the merchants
of Liverpool had imported 12,347 Negroes
into that island some months ago, which must
have been the case, or they could not have had so
exact an account; we may well conclude that a
great number of Negroes have also been carried to
Guadaloupe, and the other conquered islands, by
the merchants of London, Bristol, and other ports,
that carry on a trade to Africa, and have been
carrying negroes from the time they had the last
accounts, which we may suppose to be at least six
months preceding the merchants of Liverpool’s
memorial being presented to lord Egremont.
This must be undoubtedly of great advantage
to the French planters, and extremely detrimental
to our North American and West India colonies,
for want of the Negroes that have been sold to
those conquered islands; which must consequently
cause a scarcity, and enhance the price of those
carried to the real colonies of Great Britain. Because
the merchants of Liverpool, and others concerned
in the African trade, must be truly sensible,
that they can find beneficial markets in our colonies
for treble the number of Negroes they can purchase
with British manufactures. So that the consumption
of those manufactures is not encreased, as they
would insinuate, by their selling Negroes to the
French islands (
for so we must call them while they
have French inhabitants) when the selling such Negroes
is so apparently disadvantageous to our colonies
that are inhabited by British subjects; on
which account we submit, whether as we are to give
back to France Martinico, Guadaloupe, Marigalante,
Deserade, and St. Lucia, orders should not
be immediately sent to the governors of such
islands, to prevent British subjects selling any Negroes
to the French, which it would be impolitic
to do, even were we to have kept possession of
them.
The ships that have been fitted out, and are
upon their voyages with an intention to sell Negroes
on the French islands, may dispose of them in
the adjacent British colonies, where they will meet
with purchasers for any number, at such prices as
will make their voyages profitable. Therefore
such order will not be hurtful to the merchants,
but of great advantage to the British planters, and
consequently so to this country.
It is for that reason we insist it was our interest
to return those islands to France, to whom (if proper
steps are pursued by us) they must and will
become a continual expence, burthen and incumbrance;
nor would our retention of them have
been an advantage to us: for as the inhabitants
are French, we must always have kept a military
force there at a very great expence, of which recruiting
would be no small part. And one great
consideration ought to be, the number of British
subjects that would die in that unhealthy climate, if
they were only the soldiers that must annually be
sent to complete the regiments necessary to be kept
on that service. That service alone would be productive
of a great expence; and the loss of so
many subjects would prove very detrimental to
Great Britain.
Besides, for argument’s sake, let us suppose we
had kept Martinico, Guadaloupe, St. Lucia, Marigalante
and Deserade, it would have been highly
disadvantageous to the British planters, and must
prejudice them much in their circumstances, so as
in a short time to reduce the old British sugar
islands, now so populous and flourishing, to such a
state, that it
made us tremble to think of it; because
the British African traders would supply those
islands taken from the French with Negroes, in
preference to the old British colonies; which fully
appears by the number they have been supplied
with already; and as those islands are now ceded
to France, will be of great advantage to the planters
therein, by their having been in our possession,
on account of the Negroes they have purchased to
cultivate their plantations. And had we kept said
islands, as soon as they had been sufficiently stock’d,
they would have carried on a trade for the redundant
Negroes with their countrymen at St. Domingo.
Hence it appears, that great care must be
taken to prevent their having it in their power so
to do after those islands are restored to France; as
we do not in the least doubt, but from the intercourse
our countrymen have had with them for the
sake of profit, contracts will be made for such anti-national
purpose. And such a commerce would
enable them and the planters of St. Domingo to
cultivate sugar and other plantation-produce sufficient
to supply all Europe; and by such means
prevent Great Britain’s reaping the advantage that
she derives from the exportation of the produce of
her colonies: which is so essential a benefit to her,
and is one of the first causes of our receiving
a balance of trade from foreign countries, and in
which the landed interest, merchants and manufacturers
of Great Britain and Ireland, as also the
planters and merchants in our colonies, are so materially
concerned and interested. For the lands in
Britain must always rise and fall in proportion as
our manufactures and navigation prosper or decline,
and the national revenue encrease or diminish,
as the trade of our colonies is in a more or less
flourishing way.
Therefore is it not evident, that there is not a
man in this kingdom, who, in proportion to his
possession and property in the community, does
not partake of the benefits and advantages accruing
from the African, North American, and West
Indian trades; and who would not be a sufferer in
proportion to his situation in life, should they diminish,
by falling into the hands of people belonging
to any other nation? where, supposing it to
be the case, the profit of those valuable trades
must consequently center.
For notwithstanding the advantage the French
inhabitants would have had by our retention of
those islands, they would take nothing from us for
the use of themselves, or their plantations, but
what they were obliged to out of the greatest necessity;
as we have no wines to supply them with,
which are proper for that country: so that they
would have their wines, and every thing else they
could possibly procure, from France; having been
accustomed from their infancy to wear French,
which they would ever look on as their own native
manufactures. And
sorry we are to say, too many
of them are used in the British colonies, as well
as in this country. For which reason they would
always have a dislike to British manufactures, and
that would induce them to pursue every measure
to smuggle their own into those islands; and
for the sake of profit, many English traders would
be induced to carry them from the Isle of Man,
Guernsey, Jersey, and other places, in preference
to those of their own country, which has already
been the case. But supposing it not so, the real
profits of those islands, while possessed by French
inhabitants, would not center in Great Britain,
but in France; because, on account of the difference
in religion, they would send their children
thither for education, and make provision for themselves
to retire there, always looking upon it as
their home. Even so our planters do in regard to
Great Britain; for all those who go to the West
Indies, or are born there, have no intention to end
their days in that climate, but are always aiming
to lay by a sufficiency to go home, as they call it;
that is, the English planters to come to Great Britain,
and the French to France.
By what has hitherto been advanced, surely it
will evidently appear to every impartial reader,
that had we retain’d the French sugar islands, they
would not have been of any advantage to this
country, but on the contrary. It is not the number
of islands, where sugar, tobacco, rice, and
other plantation-products are raised, that will be
advantageous to this or any other country, without
they can be supplied with a sufficient number
of Negroes for their cultivation; the land being
all tilled by hand-labour with the hoe, as there
is no ploughing with oxen and horses in the West
Indies, except in Jamaica, where two or three
planters have used the plough to some part of their
plantations, where the soil was light, and of a sandy
nature; and all other work is done by Negroes, as
Europeans cannot do any laborious work there.
Their field labourers, sugar boilers, distillers, coopers,
mill-wrights, carpenters, masons, builders, smiths,
and house servants, are blacks; therefore it is not
the number of islands, but the greatest number of
the best Negroes that benefit the mother-country,
which sort we can make appear, the French since
the year 1729, in times of peace, to the commencement
of the present war, have been constantly
supplied with. That is one of the true
causes why they have produced such quantities of
sugar, and other plantation-product; that for several
years before the war, they were become our
rivals at foreign markets, so far as to draw from
thence a great annual balance of trade in favour
of France.[6] But this effect would have been prevented,
if proper measures had been pursued by
us for the preservation of the African trade, to that
part of Africa where the hardy Negroes, who are
inured to labour in their own country, were to be
purchased.
The French, from the year 1729, to the end of
the year 1738, carried from the Gold Coast, Popo
and Whydah, fifteen or seventeen thousand of those
valuable people annually; when four thousand, in
any one year during that period, were not carried
to the British plantations; which is the truest
reason that can be assigned for the prosperity of
the French colonies, and the main spring of the
great increase of their product. For they do not
understand the cultivation and management of a
plantation in any degree equal to the British planters:
therefore their advantage and success has
been owing, in a great measure, to the good and
hardy labourers they have had to till their land,
and manufacture the product of it.
We doubt not but the merchants trading to
Africa will say, they have imported since the year
1729, more Negroes into the British sugar islands,
than the French have to theirs in time of peace (to
the commencement of the present war). We admit
they have, of Negroes from Gambia, Calabar, Boney,
Benin, the windward coast, and Angola. But
we take upon us to assert, they cannot with
truth say, they have imported to the colonies as
many Negroes from the Gold Coast, Popo, and Whidah,
which are the most valuable for the laborious
cultivation of the sugar cane, and other plantation-product,
and manufacturing it into sugar and
rum, for the following seasons.
The Gold Coast, Popo, and Whidah Negroes are
born in a part of Africa that is very barren; a
small bullock carried thither from another part,
when fatted, will sell for near 32l. a sheep for
20s. four small fowls for 4s. sterling, and all other
provisions in proportion, except fish; and their
coarse kind of bread, which is their chief food.
On that account, when able to take the hoe in
hand, they are obliged to go and cultivate the
land for their subsistance. They also live hardily;
so that when they are carried to our plantations (as
they have been used to hard labour from their infancy)
they become a strong, robust people, and
can live upon the sort of food the planters allow
them; which is, bread made of Indian corn, and
fish, such as herrings and pilchards sent from Britain,
and dried fish from North America, being
such food as they lived upon in their own country.
Indeed they live better in general in our plantations;
and they are always ready, on their arrival
there, to go to the hard work necessary in
planting and manufacturing the sugar cane.
On the other hand, the Gambia, Calabar, Boney,
and Angola Negroes are brought from those parts
of Africa, that are extremely fertile, where every
thing grows almost spontaneously; and where a
bullock may be bought for less than 20s. a sheep
for 1s. and a dozen of fowls for the same. They
have every other necessary of life in great plenty.
On that account, the men never work, but lead an
indolent life, and are in general of a lazy disposition
and tender constitution; for the necessary work
among them is done by the women, which is little
more than fetching wood to dress their victuals:
so that when those people are carried to our sugar
islands, they are obliged to be nursed, to be taken
great care of, and brought to work by degrees.
The planters, when the Gold Coast and Whidah
Negroes were carried to the sugar colonies, before
the French interfered in that trade, found
there was not a sufficient number to extend their
cultivation, by carrying on all the different planting
business, and therefore were accustomed to purchase
those tender (the worst sort of) Negroes, and
employ them for
household servants, to raise corn,
aloes, look after cattle, bring them up to trades
and easy labour, knowing them unfit for the
hard work necessary in sugar-plantations.
The Negroes of the river Gambia are better than
the last-mentioned; both of which are much more
proper for the North American planters, as they
have plenty of provisions at a small expence, and,
on that account, can use them to gentle labour,
and inure them, by degrees, to work with the same
sort of food they were accustomed to in their own
country.
But that is not the case of the planters in the
sugar islands; which sufficiently proves how disadvantageous
it must be to have such imported there,
in preference to those that would be so immediately
useful and serviceable, or to let the French
purchase the better sort.
Yet such has been the case, it being for the interest
of the African merchants to supply the British
planters with the inferior sort, as each Negro
costs much less on the coast of Angola, &c. than
those from the Gold Coast, &c. which saves a great
deal in the outset of the cargoes sent to Africa,
and consequently greatly encreases the net profit
on the voyages, as the tender and worst sort of
Negroes will sell in the sugar islands for near as
great a price each as the best, provided there is
none of the latter at market; and a greater number
of the former being subject to die, must encrease
the demand.
This we thought proper to take notice of, to shew
how necessary it will be for the interest of this
country, that the French should not for the future
be allowed to trade in Africa, at cape Appollonia,
or between it and the river Volta, where, and at
Popo and Whidah, to the eastward of that river,
the valuable Negroes beforementioned, adapted by
their natural constitution for cultivating the sugar
plantations, are to be purchased; otherwise in times
of peace, they will be constantly making encroachments
as heretofore; so that when the late
company’s governor at Cape Coast Castle saw a
French vessel upon the Gold Coast, he used to order
an officer to go on board with a message to
the following purport.
“You are ordered on board the French vessel,
to tell the master, the governor and council do
not make trade with the subjects of France,[7]
nor do they suffer the natives to trade with them.
But as there subsists a good friendship and alliance
between the king of Great Britain and the
French king, if the master should be distressed
for water, or such like necessaries, he might
have it upon application, by admitting an officer
on board, to prevent his having intercourse
with the natives, or others, till he should have
received such supplies; but that he should not
be allowed to trade to the westward of the river
Volta, which if he attempted, proper measures
would be taken to prevent and obstruct his commerce.
Therefore, should he neglect those orders,
and receive any damage thereby, it would
be his own fault; as the governor and council
held the trade of the Gold Coast, the indubitable
right and property of the Royal African
company of England.”
This warning sometimes had the desired effect;
at others, the governor and council were obliged
to arm vessels to drive them off, which occasioned
the masters of French ships to protest against the
said governor and council. The protests were sent
to them by the chevalier Glandeuves, commodore
of le Content and Oriflamme, two French men of
war, in his letters dated Annamaboa Road, the 9th
and 12th of February, 1751, wherein he insisted
that the French had an undoubted right to trade
to any part of Africa, out of gun-shot of any European
fort.
How far the then governor and council were
justifiable, in arming private ships to defend and
preserve the trade and commerce under their care
in time of peace, or any future council may be
for exerting themselves in a like manner, we will
not undertake to say; but are fully satisfied the
French will go thither, and that the governor of
the fort at Annamaboa will not be able to prevent
their having intercourse with the natives, but by
arming vessels to see them to the eastward of the river
Volta. For we are of opinion, property and right
are not to be tamely given up in that part of the
world, in hopes of relief from our administration
at home; it being so remote from the giving of
immediate redress, and distant from appeal; or at
least, it has happened so in all complaints made to
former ministers. Many instances thereof can be
given, which
induced us to lay before the public
the foregoing observations, as the present seems
the most proper time to have such rights settled, to
prevent future disputes between the subjects of
both nations, which if not prevented in an effectual
manner, by putting the forts upon an establishment,
that the officers commanding them may
be in such situation, as to protect the trade under
their care from the encroachments of any foreigners,
will inevitably happen.
It is also necessary to remark, that the French
should not be permitted to re-settle a factory they
had before the war at Abreda, about a league below
James Fort, in the river Gambia, which was
destroyed by that gallant sea officer, and brave
commander Sir George Pocock, in the year 1744,
but settled again after the peace; and again destroyed
this war by Capt. Marsh, commander of
his majesty’s ship Harwich.
If they are not permitted to re-establish that
factory, and the trade of Gambia and Senegal rivers
are pursued in a proper manner, Goree will be of no
consequence, but an expence to France, for many
good reasons we think it improper at present to enlarge
upon; knowing there is a work in hand that
will soon be published, wherein all the advantages of
the African trade are fully considered from the
time LETTERS PATENT were granted by king
Charles the second, the 27th day of September,
1672, to establish and incorporate the late royal
African company of England; shewing how the
trade was carried on by that company, and the
true cause of their having been rendered unable
to support their forts and settlements without the
aid of government, with the ill consequences that
attended the decay of that valuable branch of British
commerce, on which the prosperity of our colonies,
and so many branches of our manufactures,
depend; followed by observations on the qualities
of manufactures sent thither, and the regulations
that it is necessary should be made regarding the
same. To which will be added, a plan to revive
and extend that trade to the inland parts of Africa,
so as the most valuable Negroes may be secured
for the British planters, as the only means to prevent
the growth of the French colonies, or at least
to make them extremely expensive and burthensome
to their mother-country; and, on the contrary,
ours to become of the greatest benefit and
advantage to Great Britain and Ireland.
Senegal is most certainly a great and valuable acquisition
to this country, if put upon a proper establishment,
as it will secure to us all the gum trade,
so useful in our manufactures, and will greatly
encrease the slave, gold and ivory trades in Gambia
river. For when Senegal was in possession of the
French, by means of a fort they had at Gallam,
about five hundred miles from the sea up that river
(since the decline of the late Africa company,
by no factory being kept at Fatatenda, about the
same distance up Gambia river) intercepted the
greatest part of the slave, ivory and gold trades,
that came from the several inland countries to the
north east of those rivers: therefore, if proper steps
are taken, those trades may be greatly encreased
and extended at an inconsiderable expence, not
having the subjects of any foreign nation to
interest themselves against such a scheme.
The African merchants, to vindicate themselves
in carrying on the trade for the worst Negroes in
preference to the other, give out, that the better
sort are not to be come at. But there is no other
grounds for such an
assertion, than that the roads to
those great and populous inland countries lying at
the back of the forts and settlements on the Gold
Coast, have been stopt since the year 1738, which
has prevented all intercourse with the natives, except
those who live within about fifty miles of the
sea-coast; whereby a stop was put to that great
trade which came down, when the roads were kept
open by the power and influence of the company’s
officers, and by their alliance and friendship with
the several princes and people in power, living in
the different countries near, and in the towns on the
said roads, that were opened and settled by the
late company’s officers at a very great expence.
One great reason for the decline of their power
and influence was, by the masters of private trading
vessels putting in practice every measure they
could invent to
vilify and render the company’s
officers insignificant and contemptible to the inland
people and Negroes under their command.
By which sinister machinations, they lost that
weight and authority so necessary for them to act
as protectors of the injured, and mediators in adjusting
and deciding disputes that frequently happen
between African princes; which if the company’s
officers cannot accomplish by policy, presents,
or amicable measures, they should be maintained
in such a respectable situation, as to be able
to join the injured party, and to compel the refractory
to accommodate matters[8], so as to procure
peace, and bring the country to a state of tranquillity.
For it is a mistaken notion, that the company’s
officers (during their command) created wars between
the African chiefs, in order to purchase the
prisoners, which should be made on either side.
This falsehood was propagated also at a certain
time, to serve particular purposes. On the contrary,
slaves are bred in the inland parts of Africa,
and sent for sale, according to the want those people
are in for European manufactures; the same as
an ox or horse is taken to market, when a farmer
in England wants money to pay his rent, or for
other purposes. Every man in Africa is looked
upon to be a man of property and power in proportion
to the number of Negroes he is possessed
of.
When such disputes as above glanced at happen,
the consequence is an immediate stoppage of the
roads by those people nearest the sea-side, to prevent
their adversaries getting guns, powder, or
any other necessaries for war; which in 1738 occasioned
the king of Warsaw, and his allies, to draw
a discriminating line along the Gold Coast for that
intent; and this hath ever since prevented all
intercourse and trade with the inland natives in the
direct way; as also any gold or slaves for sale coming
from them, except a few stolen away by the
king of Warsaw’s soldiers, with a little gold; and
an inconsiderable number of slaves brought from
the great kingdom of Ashantee, in a very difficult
and dangerous way, by the traders of that country,
in order to purchase guns and powder at the British,
Dutch, and Danish forts at Acra.
These traders are obliged to come and return in
arm’d bodies, many miles round about through
strange countries, where they are afraid of being
plundered by the natives of their European goods,
and are themselves in danger of being seized upon,
and sold as slaves, which prevents their bringing
the trade down as usual.
Consequently, whenever the proper roads are
open, and protection given, there will be a great
number of slaves, gold dust and elephants teeth
brought down to the sea-side, to purchase British
manufactures for supplying the inhabitants of those
extensive countries, that have stood in need of them
so many years.
The obstructing of such intercourse has occasioned
our planters being deprived of fifteen or
twenty thousand of the best and most useful Negroes
yearly for their plantations,[9] and Great Britain
has thereby also been prevented from receiving
fifty or sixty thousand ounces of gold dust,[10] besides
thirty or forty tons of elephants teeth annually.[11]
It is highly probable that Africa abounds with
gold mines, richer than those in the Brazil, or in
any other country; for the late African company,
in the infancy of their trade, imported from their
settlements on that coast, from the year 1675 to the
year 1690, as much gold as was coined at the
Tower into 400,000 guineas[12], exclusive of what
was sent and brought home by their officers and
servants, who were always paid their salaries and
commissions upon the trade they made in that commodity,
which must have been no inconsiderable
quantity; because, as the company extended their
forts and settlements upon the Gold Coast, their
gold trade increased so much, that they were used
to take in exchange for British manufactures, and
East India goods in Africa, upwards of two thousand
ounces of gold weekly, which can be proved
from authentic vouchers, and continued so to do
until such time as the private traders made incroachments
upon them, and overstocked the country
with goods by their competitions with each
other, which the natives took the advantage of,
and insisted upon the traders lowering the price of
European merchandize, and raising
those of Africa,
by keeping their slaves, gold and ivory up to an
exorbitant price, and thereby getting as great a
quantity of goods, for a few slaves, as was sufficient
for their consumption; and was the cause of fewer
being brought from the inland countries, as by the
high prices, before observed, the Negroes got what
goods they wanted for the small number sold, which
also prevented their bringing gold to market, and
by which means that valuable branch of the African
trade, of such importance to this country, was in a
great measure destroyed, and the profits thereof
centered with the natives of Africa.
We believe the private traders will admit they
have not altogether imported from Africa into these
kingdoms two thousand ounces of gold annually[13];
and that since the act of parliament for dissolving
the late company, and putting the forts and settlements
under the management of the committee of
the company of merchants trading to Africa, the
officers commanding there, have not taken gold
sufficient to pay the annual salaries of their servants,
though they are fewer in number than
those that were kept by the late company.
From what has been stated, we conjecture it will
appear, that the British forts in Africa are not upon
a proper plan; if they were, the commanding officers
for the committee of the company of merchants
trading to Africa, would, in eleven years and upwards,
have opened those roads (which have been
so long stopt) that the colonies and mother-country
might receive those great benefits and advantages
beforementioned, by having the trade brought
down to the forts without interruption, from the
remotest parts of Africa, as it was in the time of the
late company’s prosperity; but that has not been
done, and as the British traders declined that trade
many years before the French seized the opportunity
of stepping in, and reaped so great advantages
thereby, as to have carried to their colonies, not
fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand of those
useful people, from the year 1729 to the year 1739.
This induces us to think, that the British merchants
forsook that trade, and made the opposition
they did to the late company, to get the forts and
settlements under their management, to prevent
other people putting them upon a proper establishment,
that might hinder the French making the
encroachments they have made in time of peace
(and consequently carrying to their plantations those
most useful people) in order to follow their more
favourite trades to Benin, Calabar, and the coast of
Angola, because there they can purchase three hundred
Negroes with a cargo of 3600l. value, when
that number upon the Gold Coast would cost in
March last 4950l.[14]. Therefore we fear the private
interest of said opposers rather gained an ascendency
over them, to the great prejudice and disadvantage
of the British colonies and the mother-country,
and to the great emolument of the French;
which we thought proper to observe at this juncture,
and to hint also, that it will be more fully set
forth in the description of the African trade beforementioned.
We hope to see a minister at the head of the administration
in this country, devoid of faction and
corruption, that no private pique or prejudice
against person or party will so far influence him, as
not to pay a due and impartial attention to what is
laid before the legislative power, relative to that
valuable branch of British commerce, the African
trade.
We shall rejoice that such enquiries will not for
the future be prevented by ministerial direction, as
happened at a certain period, when it had cost great
pains and expence to bring a matter of the utmost
importance to this country to a hearing, which was
frustrated, by putting a previous question in a great
assembly on purpose to prevent such enquiry; notwithstanding
several persons had been examined
with respect to the African trade, as well as the expenditure
of public money[15]; and for no other reason,
as we could learn, or can conceive, than[15] that
one of the greatest planters in the world (who at
this time so worthily fills the first office in this metropolis)
promoted said enquiry; which, under a
wise and able minister, would have been a sufficient
reason for examining minutely into an affair of
such national consequence.
For what must be prejudicial to that planter’s interest,
must in proportion be so to every other in
the sugar colonies: and those of small property
must feel the effects of being supplied with the worst
sort of Negroes at exorbitant prices, more than
those of affluent circumstances.
We have the honour to know that gentleman
well, and are fully satisfied he was induced to exert
himself in behalf of that enquiry, not from a motive
of private interest, but for the general good of
all those interested in, and concerned for the prosperity
of the British colonies.
We therefore hope he will long live to employ
his great abilities in promoting all good, and opposing
all bad measures, with that zeal and
spirit he hath always done, as also to prevent,
to the utmost of his power, any minister (hereafter)
daring to smuggle accounts into a certain assembly,
although great objections had been made to them,
before those objections were canvassed and cleared
up; and that he will ever oppose the issuing public
money intended for other services, till a satisfactory
account is given, which has been the case[16]. However,
we shall not at present enlarge further upon
this head, because we know an abstract of the report
of the committee, appointed by the honourable
house of commons, will soon be published, to
which we beg leave to refer our readers.
When the enquiry, relative to the African trade,
was under consideration before the honourable
house of commons in the year 1758, Mr. Pitt, that
wise, great and able statesman, who has done his
king and country so many eminent and good services,
was pleased to declare, that he believed the
then method of carrying on the African trade
wanted alteration and amendment. He also added,
that when we should be so happy as to have a peace,
he would be at all times ready to examine into it,
and give all the assistance in his power to put it
upon such a footing, that our plantations might be
supplied with the best and most valuable Negroes
at reasonable rates. We doubt not but he will
make good his promise to lend his able assistance,
and also to recommend it to the administration to
begin such an enquiry, and continue it, in order to
amend the present, or form such other plan, as will
preserve and secure that valuable trade to the British
subjects, as the only and certain means to encrease
the produce of the British, and lessen that of the
French colonies. For, with the islands we already
possess, and those which it appears by the preliminaries
are to be ours, we shall have a sufficient
number to raise sugar, &c. for the consumption of
all Europe, if our British planters are properly supplied
with the best sort of Negroes for their cultivation.
When that gentleman has assisted in doing this
further service to his country, we sincerely wish
him a long series of uninterrupted health, to enjoy
the fruits of an honourable and permanent peace;
and that he may be held in that esteem, reverence
and honour, he so justly merits from all lovers of
this country.
Should
such an enquiry be made, we hope some
method will be found out, to examine all persons
at the bar of the house of commons upon oath;
for if that could be done, it would save the house
a deal of trouble, and prevent their receiving false
information in matters of the utmost consequence
to this nation and its commerce. Because we have
heard people assert at that bar, what, to our knowledge,
they at the same time knew to be intirely
false; which we most sincerely wish could be remedied;
or at least that persons examined there,
upon matters of importance, should be informed
they will be examined with respect to the same matter
upon oath, at the bar of the house of lords,
which we presume may be done; and if done, will
be attended with great and good consequences to
the whole community.
We cannot omit observing; that it was industriously
reported, propagated, and even urged as an
argument in a great assembly, when the state of the
sugar islands was under their consideration in the
year 1758, that the British planters had formed a
scheme for a monopoly, by agreeing only to cultivate
such part of their lands as would produce but
a certain quantity of sugar, in order to raise the
price, and exactingly to obtain as much for a little
as a great quantity; which was as true and likely
to be the case, as if the farmers of Great Britain,
Ireland, France, Sweden, Poland and Denmark were
to enter into a combination to leave such parts of
their lands uncultivated, with an unfair intent of
raising the price of grain; which we believe any
person will readily admit can never be brought
about, although a correspondence may be easier,
and in much less time carried on between the farmers
of those nations, than the planters of our sugar colonies,
as those of Jamaica cannot correspond
with Barbadoes, or any other part of the sugar
islands, sooner than by way of Great Britain or
North America, which would at least be six months
before they could hear from each other; that impediment
alone is sufficient to shew, that people thus
separated, though ever so well inclined, can never
form a monopoly.
Besides, would it not be absurd, even to suppose
that the farmers of Great Britain, and other
nations, who inhabit corn countries, do not raise
as much grain upon their farms as they possibly
can procure servants at reasonable wages, and can
stock them with horses, cattle, &c. at a cheap
rate?
But if they are obliged to pay great wages to
their servants, and extravagant prices for their
stock, they can then only put in execution the cultivation
of their lands by degrees, which is exactly
the case of the British planters; for had they a sufficient
supply of the proper sort of Negroes at reasonable
rates, they would not let any of their land
lie idle that was worth being cultivated.
Therefore the true reason why some lands may
lie unplanted in the sugar islands is, it would
greatly prejudice any planter in their circumstances,
to attempt to make new plantations with those
tender sort of Negroes, who have been carried to
them in great numbers for several years past, and
sold at the extravagant prices from 50l. to 54l.
and upwards each; whereas the best sort of Negroes,
at the time the late company cultivated and
preserved the trade on the Gold Coast, Popo, and
Whidah, so as to prevent the French carrying the
best sort of Negroes to their plantations, who
therefore were sold in ours at the moderate prices
of 20l. to 25l. a head the highest; which was a
very great encouragement to the planters to clear
their lands, and cultivate new plantations, enabling
them thereby greatly to improve and encrease the
product of the islands, which it must be their interest
to do to the very extent of their power, if their
lands are situated with any sort of convenience for
water, or other carriage, to convey the product of
their plantation to the sea-ports, notwithstanding
what was at that time advanced to the contrary, to
serve particular purposes, and in order to divert
the attention of the legislature from the real causes.
For whatever people may think, who are not well
acquainted with the colonies, because they see some
of our planters come to settle here in great opulence;
that is no reason why those remaining in the
colonies are all rich; for if they were, few of them
would stay there: on the contrary, they are obliged
to cultivate their lands with the greatest pains and
industry, in order to raise as much sugar and other
product as they possibly can, to pay the debts they
owe: for there is not a sugar island but what is
considerably indebted to Great Britain; so that
whatever disadvantages the planters of our colonies
labour under, they must terminate by being prejudicial
to this country.
We cannot help once more observing, it is not
having the most sugar islands that will be the
greatest benefit and advantage to the mother-country,
unless such islands can be supplied with a sufficient
number of the best Negroes for their cultivation;
therefore as Great Britain, France, Spain,
Holland and Denmark have encreased their number,
and extended their colonies to such a degree, that
Africa cannot sufficiently supply them all with Negroes,
including those that the Portuguese want
and carry off. On that account, in our humble
opinion, the contest ought to be, not who has
the most islands, but who can secure the trade to
those parts of Africa, where the best and greatest
number of those useful people are to be procured,
as the only means to promote the interest and prosperity
of their colonies who may be so lucky to
succeed in doing it, but will be very disadvantageous
to their competitors.
From what has been before observed,
we presume it will be admitted that every equitable
method ought to be pursued and put in practice
by Great Britain, to secure to herself as much as
possible the African trade, in order to prevent the
French purchasing Negroes. For the same reason
we take all the measures we possibly can, to hinder
the smuggling of wool, or any of our artificers and
manufacturers going to France. It cannot be too
much insisted on that the Negroes are of as much
consequence and use for the cultivation of our colonies,
as the wool is to our manufactory, for these
obvious reasons; that the Negroes are the artificers,
manufacturers, and labourers in the colonies; because
the whole process, from clearing and preparing
the ground to plant the sugar cane, and
manufacturing it into sugar and rum, and the putting
it on board the ships, is the work of Negroes;
therefore it surely must be very prejudicial to our
interest to sell any of those useful people to the
French, even were they to pay gold or silver for
them: there are, besides, much more cogent reasons
to be given why we should exert ourselves to
prevent the French, as much as we can, carrying
them from Africa.
If there should at any time be more Negroes
brought to the British colonies than are necessary
for the cultivation there, which
we have great reason
to believe is seldom, or perhaps will never be the
case, then such Negroes may be sold to the Spaniards
or Portuguese, because they would pay gold
or silver for them; and moreover, the slaves so
disposed of, would be employed in the mines of
America, and not in cultivating sugar and other
plantation produce, as would be the consequence if
the French were allowed to be the purchasers; by
which means they would be effectually enabled to
become our rivals in trade, as well on account of
their national encouragement and advantages peculiar
to them, by which they may be capacitated to
sell the product of their plantations considerably
cheaper than we can ours at foreign markets[17].
In order to remove the prejudices of many worthy
and tender-minded persons against the Negro-trade,
which from a delicacy natural to civilized nations,
they declare to be quite contrary to all dictates of
humanity, and a disgrace to the professors of the
christian religion, we shall lay before them and the
public a true state of the case. As there is no occasion
to enlarge how essentially and absolutely necessary
it is to have Negroes for the cultivation of our
colonies, which is explained in the foregoing sheets;
therefore we shall only beg leave to observe, by
the best information that could be obtained, Africa
in general is divided into little kingdoms and states,
which, when at peace, the natives thereof breed
slaves for sale, as our farmers do stock on their
farms, and sell them as their necessity requires,
which was a traffic carried on among themselves before
Europeans traded thither; and when overstocked,
their practice was putting to death (often
with great torture) the prisoners taken in war. Those
that are bred slaves, are always very desirous to be
purchased by white people, as they are infinitely better
used than by their black masters, who allow
them but a bare subsistance, and treat them with
the greatest barbarity; and were used to put several
to death through custom, when they buried
persons above the common rank, and oftentimes
merely through wantonness, which is prevented by
their having found an advantageous and lucrative
market for them.
Those Negroes taken in war, or prisoners for feloniously
committing
crimes in despite of the laws,
made by the officers commanding the European
forts, such laws having been agreed to by the natives
under their command and protection, also by
those laws made by the kings and princes in the inland
countries, are now sold, but often unwilling to
go on board ships; perhaps, on account of having
lived in a better situation in their own country than
those who have been bred up in slavery from their
infancy; therefore they often contrive to make
their escape, and by speaking the language, persuade
others to join and assist them to take the ship
from the Europeans, of which we have had too many
fatal instances, and is entirely owing to their ignorance
in not knowing the place they are destined
to; and also that they will be much better treated
and looked after in our colonies than they ever
were in their country; so that when bought by Europeans,
they are in a manner rescued from a state
of misery as to treatment; for in the colonies,
when they are sick, they have great care taken of
them, and physicians to administer proper medicines
for their relief; which, on a similar occasion,
their black masters would give themselves no care
or concern about them.
Besides, many of them are instructed in the
principles of religion, and become christians and
men of property, which, from experience, we know
to be true, having talked with several who had no
desire to see their own country, living much more
comfortably in our colonies. And we think it
would be politic to send two or three Negroes on
board every ship that goes to Africa, that can talk
the different languages of the countries the master
of such ship intends to trade to, that they might
inform their countrymen how they had
been treated.
Such measures, we are convinced, would prevent
the loss of many lives, by the Negroes being satisfied
they were going where they would be better
treated than in their own country; and, at the
same time, to eradicate that opinion many of them
have, that they are going to be fed and eaten,
which, if effected, would be a means to quiet their
minds, so as not to attempt rising on board of
ships.
In all fluctuating societies, such as merchants
trading to a country so remote and little known as
Africa, many more than the majority are liable to
be imposed on, even in the trade they intend to
support, a misfortune owing to the want of local
knowledge, and personal experience.
What chance for truth do those merchants in general
stand, whose ears few other accounts reach,
than the imperfect relation of some master of a
ship, mariner or traditionalist, little to be credited,
and less to be depended upon? As to the former (if
capable) he has little time or opportunity to speculate
into the trade, manners, customs, and temper of
the natives, which they are seldom long enough at
a place to do; and who, from motives of immediate
profit, pursue measures they think most conducive
to make a quick voyage, which is all they
turn their minds to; yet many of them, when
they arrive in Europe, will take upon themselves
to give information in the most interesting matters;
which, without having lived in the country for a
considerable length of time, it is impossible for
them to do with accuracy and any degree of truth,
notwithstanding such impositions being propagated,
have in general prevailed and influenced the minds
of people to such a degree, that those of certain
boroughs, far from having, as has been before observed,
the least connection, interest, or so much
as acquainted in the most minute manner with the
African trade, presented their petitions to the honourable
house of commons to lay open the same;
though many of the said boroughs have not since
sent the most trifling adventure to Africa, which at
that time, and before, when the forts were under
the direction of the late royal African company,
the trade was much more free and open than it has
been since under the management of the committee
of the company of merchants trading to Africa,
which we conjecture will appear from the following
extract of letters, certificates and affidavits[18],
we think it highly necessary, and even our duty,
to lay before the public, thereby to shew how far
they have been imposed on by false pretenders to
knowledge.
Extract of a letter from on board the Fly sloop at
Bristol, Alexander Graham, master, dated 16
March, 1750, to the late royal African company’s
governor at Cape Coast Castle.
“I write this to acquaint you, that the French
vessels sailed two days ago; I acknowledge myself
obliged to you for the method you have
taken to send them off, am very much obliged
to you for your advice; have sent my armourer
to alter some handcuffs, your permission will
much oblige, &c.”
Extract of a letter from six British masters of vessels,
dated on board the Polly in Annamaboa
Road, 20 March, 1750. To the same.
“Your favour of yesterday we received, and
thank you for the promise of assistance, in protecting
the privileges of the British subjects trading
to this place, too much invaded by the
French, and too little protected from home, but
at this time shall have no occasion to trouble
you. The French ship is sailed, &c.”
Extract of a letter from Richard Haskins, master
of a ship from Bristol; dated Annamaboa Road,
27 Dec. 1750. To the same.
“Am much obliged to you for your kind intelligence,
and all other favours; I shall be obliged
to you to dispatch the carpenter as soon as possible,
being in great want of him. I am, &c.”
Extract of a letter from John Jepson, master of
a snow from Rhode-Island, dated Annamaboa
Road, 3 July, 1751. To the same.
“I am sorry you are going off the coast:
but however, as I can do no more for you,
beg to return you my hearty and sincere thanks
for your many favours from time to time, not
only from your willingness to supply us with
any thing in your power of tradesmen’s work,
or any other thing; but also for your pains
and vigilance in protecting the trade, &c.
which will always be justifiable, and hope will
redound to your honour and credit, which is the
sincere wish, &c.”
Extract of two letters from Henry Ellis, master of
the ship Hallifax, from Bristol, dated Annamaboa
Road, the 13th, and 28th July, 1751.
To the same.
“The boards you sent me were of real service;
I hope you will not omit charging any expence
I put you to, as I can discharge that, though
not so easily your good offices: we cannot help
the death of the slaves, they are mortal; but do
not think it adviseable to give them rice, as that
kind of diet first gave them a swelling.”
N. B. He landed all his sickly slaves, which
were kept and taken care of in the castle.
“We are not a little astonished at the pains
these new agents take to prejudice the shipping
here, by settling factories ashore to intercept the
trade, and by giving equal prices with us, in
order to distress us the more; it has already been
some money out of the merchants pockets; we
have been obliged to raise the price, or lie idle,
under the hardships we endure. I cannot help
observing the chagrin of the Liverpool captains,
who loudly complain of the new management.”
“I entirely join issue with you, that this new-fram’d
project will become an errand job, though
but for a season; for I look upon it, the physic
of commerce, which, though it may disorder,
as at present, will in the end work its cure. I
am, &c.”
Extract of a certificate of eight British masters of
vessels, dated Annamaboa Road, 3 July, 1751.
To the same.
“We being informed that a report hath been
spread, that the late royal African company’s
governor commanding on this coast, hath, during
his command, acted in an arbitrary tyrannic
manner, both to Europeans and natives on
this coast; do hereby, in justice to the reputation
of that gentleman, voluntarily certify, that
we never heard of, or experienced, any part of
his character or behaviour but what was humane
and good, tending to promote the British interest
and trade in these parts. And farther, that
he has, from time to time, readily assisted us
with all things each or any of us stood in need
of at cape Coast Castle, during his command
there, to the utmost of his power, as we sincerely
believe. In witness whereof we have set
our hands, &c.”
Certificate from Capt. Thomas Derbyshire, of Liverpool,
relating to the use granted him of
Tantumquery fort.
“This is to certify whom it may concern, that
during my making a voyage to the Gold Coast
of Africa, and my lying at Annamaboa, I settled
a factory at Lagoe; where from a disturbance
there seemed likely to be in the country, I
did not think my goods safe in the factory-house
I had taken: and on my being at cape
Coast Castle in the year 1750, and intimating
the same to the then governor, he offered me
the use of Tantumquery fort to carry on trade
therein, which I accepted; and ordered my
gunner to take my goods from the factory at
Lagoe, and lodge them in Tantumquery fort,
which he did, and continued in the same for
upwards of three months to carry on his trade.
And Mr. John Clifton, chief of said fort, had
orders to render him every service and good
office in his power, without fee or reward; neither
did the said governor receive any benefit,
profit or advantage in any shape or manner, in
consideration for my having the use of the fort
aforesaid. To certify which, I set my hand this
16 Aug. 1751, &c.”
Extract of a certificate, dated 28 Dec. 1753, from
seven masters of ships, that in the late company’s
time traded to the coast of Africa.
“That the late company’s governor, during
the continuance of his authority and command
on the coast of Africa, did every thing in his
power to promote the British interest and trade
there: and from time to time assisted in doing
us such service as our occasions required. In
witness whereof we set our hands, &c. &c.”
We think it unnecessary to trouble the public
with any further proofs relative to the conduct of
the late royal African company and their officers,
to shew that they did every thing in their power
to promote the trade of the British subjects in
Africa, as we shall reserve them for a work that is
in hand; therefore will only state some facts regarding
the African committee, their governors,
and officers by them appointed to have the command
and management on the Gold Coast and
Whydah in Africa, for the public to form their
judgment from.
That by an act of parliament, passed in the 23d
year of the reign of his late majesty, the trade to
Africa was intended to be made free and open to
all his majesty’s subjects, without distinction or
preference. But contrary to the intentions of the
said act, that trade has been engrossed and monopolized
by the officers of the committee on the
Gold Coast and Whydah, by their entering into a
confederacy or joint stock, and intermixing the
government supplies with their own merchandize,
and by that means assorted themselves so as to
command said traffic.
Those officers have many other great advantages
over free merchants and traders, such as having a
considerable part of their private merchandize sent
to them freight free, their extraordinary influence
over the natives, by the command of the several
castles to deposit their effects in, salaries, maintenance,
European servants, artificers, doctors,
castle-slaves, canoe-men, canoes, medicines,
stores and necessaries of all sorts, being under
their management and direction. Besides, the
presents to princes, caboceers, and great men of
the countries, being defrayed by the public, together
with the said benefits arising from the government
supplies; and many other advantages which
they have taken, whereby they acquired such
a superiority over the free traders, as obliged the
merchants of Bristol and Liverpool to apply by
memorial in the year 1753, stating therein the
foregoing facts to the lords commissioners of trade
and plantation for redress, which will appear by
said memorial, supported by the following affidavits.
“Affidavit of William Brown, master of the
Bristol, sworn 16 June, 1753, saith, that when
he was last in Africa carrying on trade, was informed
by Brew, chief of Tantumquery, and Withers,
chief of Winnebah, that they were engaged
in partnership in the slave trade with Melvil,
Young, and the other officers at cape Coast Castle.”
“That Melvil and others told deponent, they
expected a ship from Holland with a Dutch
cargo, which ship they had some time before
sent to Jamaica with slaves.”
“That he was in company with Dacres, chief of
Accra, who informed him Young was coming
to turn him out of the fort, by reason he would
not enter into partnership with Melvil and
Young; that Dacres declared he should have
been glad to have continued his employ, but
rather than be uneasy he would quit it, and
soon after did so. That deponent could not
purchase from the chiefs of forts, slaves under
an ounce and half, or two ounces a head more
than he gave for those of equal goodness to the
Negro traders, occasioned by the trade being
carried on by the chiefs of the forts.”
“That deponent was informed by the Negroes
at Annamaboa, if he wanted to trade under the
forts, he must take canoes and canoe-men; for
the canoe-men under the forts were overawed
by the chiefs, and they durst not assist him in
trading; and deponent did so, and should have
been under difficulties if he had not so done;
and deponent found the Negroe traders under
said forts, cautious and fearful of trading with
him, lest the chiefs should know thereof, and
sent to deponent in a private manner, when they
had slaves to dispose of.”
“That cape Coast, Tantumquery, Winnebah
and Accra were used by the chiefs as repositories
for their market slaves, and saw them
lodged in said castle and forts; that Negroes
will bear a high price as long as the chiefs are
permitted to trade in them, which will destroy
the trade with all persons, but the chiefs and
those settled at the forts.”
“Affidavit of James Hamilton, chief mate of
the Polly of Bristol, sworn the same day as above.
Swears to the same purport and effect as above
set forth by Brown, in regard to the chiefs copartnership
conversation with Dacres, and his
being displaced, and the high price of slaves,
and the reasons, &c. And then saith, that during
his voyage, he hired a factory at Lagoe, and
endeavoured to purchase slaves; on which Brew
sent Negro traders and goods thither to oppose
deponent; and Brew told deponent, it was impossible
for him to trade to same advantage as
Brew could, as he had so good assortment of
goods; that if deponent gave eight ounces a
head for slaves[19], Brew would give eight and
half; and to intimidate deponent, declared he
would send the servants of the forts up the paths,
and prevent the trade coming down, and accordingly
did send them with liquor, and carried the
traders to his own fort. That Brew refused to
sell deponent slaves; and his reason was, Melvil
had wrote him not to sell, as he could get a
better price at cape Coast. That Young at Winnebah
refused deponent slaves at ten ounces per head,
unless deponent would give him the very best of
his cargo, which would have unsorted him.”
“That Young refused him water for fifteen
slaves, and deponent was obliged to give the
natives fifteen shillings for forty gallons. That
he went on shore with his gold
taker at Succondee
to trade, carried some checks with him:
that Hippesly, the chief there, took the gold
taker on one side, whispered him, and threatened
to whip him if he ever saw him bring
goods there to trade with the natives.”
“That the natives and canoe-men at all the forts
were fearful of trading with deponent, and declared
they were afraid of being seen by the
chiefs; that the forts were used as repositories
for slaves, and that the trade will be hurt by
the chiefs trading, as set forth by Brown.”
“Affidavit of Alexander Graham, master of
the Fly, sworn the same day, saith, that when
he and Jenkins, commander of the Silvia, were
trading at Annamaboa, they at first bought
slaves at five ounces and half, and from thence
to seven and a half per head, and went on in a
good way. On a sudden found a stagnation, enquired
the occasion, and were informed the
prices were raised at the neighbouring forts;
and this deponent was obliged to give an advanced
price; that if the chiefs trade, the prices
will be high, and the trade hurt.”
On the foregoing affidavits, and other allegations
and facts, “the merchants of Bristol and
Liverpool presented a memorial to the lords of
trade, setting forth among other things,
“That an act was passed in the year 1750, for
making the trade to Africa free and open, for
which end the management of the forts and affairs
were trusted to the care of nine persons, a
committee, as there set forth; that the said committee
had the power of appointing officers and
servants for managing their affairs in Africa,
and discharging them at pleasure for not obeying
their orders, or other misdemeanors; and
they were to take care that the orders given
their servants did not extend to public detriment,
or the hurt of the free traders.”
“That officers were appointed, and leave given
to trade (but not with foreigners, except Portuguese,
for gold and tobacco) so that they became
the regulators of the market.
The committee, by the act, are annually to lay before the
general meeting of the company of the chambers
of London, all resolutions, orders and instructions
given their servants previous to such
meeting, and copies to be sent to Bristol and
Liverpool; but they have not so done.”
“That the committee’s chief agents, instead of
regarding the interest of their constituents, have
acted opposite thereto, as soon as in power. Instead
of assisting the free trader, they entered
into a joint stock copartnership, and attempted
a monopoly more formidable than any could
have been at home, as they were on the spot,
and had the whole power.”
“That the merchants of Bristol had advice
of the chief proceedings from their commanders,
which on their return they found too
true; and that by the attempts of the chiefs to
engross the trade, the prices of slaves were raised
much higher than ever known. Also that the
commanders were denied what strangers were
always before assisted with, viz. canoes, canoe-men,
wood, water, &c.”
“That a memorial was laid before the committee
for their relief, but, to their great surprize,
they found their complaints were treated
as groundless surmizes, and unjust aspersions of
the character of their officers, arising only from
personal prejudice and party interest; a second
and several repeated applications were made,
and the committee at last informed
the managers, that they had referred the matter to the
lords of trade.” Accordingly their lordships
heard the matters in dispute between the merchants
of Bristol and Liverpool, and that of the
committee.
“And were of opinion, that the officers and
servants employed by the committee,
ought not to be allowed to trade for Negroe-slaves
further than the amount of
the salaries allowed them by the committee;
and that such slaves should be
disposed of for ivory, gold, bills of exchange,
or other proper returns to England
only.”
The committee paid no regard to their lordships
opinion, consequently we conjecture, no regulation
or orders has since been given by them to their servants;
or if there has, the execution of such orders
have not been enforced; for it is a truth which cannot
be contradicted, that governor Melvil to his death,
and the other officers of the committee, during his
command, carried on the Negroe trade, and sent
them from Africa to America for their own accounts,
without the least reserve or restraint; also
that governor Senior, and the officers under his
command, did the same; and that governor Bell,
who commanded at cape Coast Castle, when the
last advice came from thence, did carry on a trade
for Negroes, and continues to send the Negroes so
purchased, to America, in the same manner his
predecessors had done; which the gentlemen of
the African committee must know was, and is the
practice; and also that it is most certainly contrary
to the true spirit, meaning and intention of the act
of parliament, passed in the 23d year of his late
majesty’s reign, for extending and improving the trade
to Africa (by which the African
company was established) and the opinion of the lords of trade
and plantation; for the legislative power could
mean no other than to put all his majesty’s subjects
upon an equal footing.
But lest the gentlemen of the African committee’s
memories should fail, we will remind them of
some things that surely could not have happened
without their knowledge; (to wit) the committee
appointed Mr. Richard Brew in the year 1761, to
the command of Annamaboa fortress; although at
the same time they could not but know that he
had fitted out the Brew, a large ship at Liverpool,
and another in the river Thames; the former with
a large cargo for Africa; the latter went to Holland
for Dutch merchandize, to compleat her
cargo, to the manifest disadvantage of this country,
because it prevents so much of our manufactures
and East India goods being exported; and
the Dutch brandy and Geneva interfere with the
exportation of British spirits, besides being of
great disadvantage to the rum trade from the British
colonies to Africa. Said ship returned from Holland,
and arrived at Portsmouth in or about the
month of July 1761, where Mr. Brew went on
board; and also Messrs. Westgate and Flemming,
who had been in the committee’s service upon the
coast of Africa: but, as we have been informed, they
are now gone out in partnership with said Brew. We
have also been informed, that the cargoes of the
said ships were landed in Africa, and deposited in
the fort of Annamaboa; and that Negroes were
purchased with said cargoes, and sent from thence
to Jamaica for the account of Mr. Brew, and those
concerned with him.
It is also as true that Mr. Samuel Smith, merchant,
in the Old Jury in London, one of the
committee of the company of merchants trading
to Africa, was the acting agent for Messrs. Brew,
Westgate and Flemming, during their residence
in Africa; that he received their consignments from
thence, and acted for them by commission after
their arrival in England; likewise during their
stay there, and since their arrival in Africa; and
also that Mr. Smith lately fitted in the river Thames
a large ship with a great cargo: and we have reason
to believe from good authority, that said ship
and cargo was fitted out for the account of Mr.
Brew, and others concerned with him; which ship
is now on a voyage to Annamaboa; but whether
any of the African committee are concerned or interested
in said ship, besides Mr. Smith, we cannot
take upon us to say.
We conjecture it never was intended by those
gentlemen who prepared the act of parliament,
which appointed there should be a committee of
nine persons, who were to have the care of the
forts in Africa, with the charge and application
of the monies granted by parliament for their support,
that any one of those persons should supply
merchandize to be paid for with the public money
under their care and management. However, such
has been the case, as appears by the committee’s
accounts laid before parliament. The following is
an abstract of their last account for the year 1761,
so far as it relates to any of the committee-men
furnishing merchandize; by that our readers may
form a judgment on their other annual accounts,
they being nearly the same as to the amount of
what the African committee supplied the public with.
Abstract of the beforementioned account as follows:
| Messrs. Touchett and company |
l. |
s. |
d. |
| for Manchester goods |
1774 |
14 |
9 |
| Smith and company for Irish linen |
|
|
|
| and provisions |
796 |
12 |
11 |
| Aufere and company for East |
|
|
|
| India goods |
349 |
1 |
6 |
| Cust and company for ditto ditto |
250 |
2 |
6 |
| Mr. William Boden for tobacco |
39 |
0 |
6 |
|
|
|
3209 |
12 |
2 |
The following are clauses of the act of parliament
that provides for the election of the African
committee.
“Page 550. And it is hereby further enacted,
by the authority aforesaid, that in all future
elections, the said committee of nine persons
shall annually, on the third day of July in every
year, be nominated and chosen as follows; that
is to say, three of the said committee shall be
nominated and chosen by the major part of the
freemen of the said company, admitted to the
freedom of the said company in London, who
shall assemble for that purpose at London; three
other persons to be of the said committee, shall
be chosen and nominated by the major part of
the freemen of the said company, admitted to
the freedom of the said company in Bristol, who
shall assemble for that purpose at Bristol; and
three other persons to be of the said committee,
shall be chosen and nominated by the major part
of the freemen of the said company, admitted
to the freedom of the said company in the town
of Liverpool, who shall assemble for that purpose
at Liverpool.”
“Page 554. And be it further enacted, by the
authority aforesaid, that no person shall be capable
of being chosen, or acting as a committee-man
above three years successively.”
By the foregoing clauses it was most certainly
intended that the election for committee-men
should be free and uninfluenced, but that has not
happened; for there was great interest made by
those who were chosen committee-men the first
year after the act passed, for establishing the company
of merchants trading to Africa. After which,
the several tradesmen employed by the African
committee in London, and by their friends in Bristol
and Liverpool, took up their freedom of the
new company, in order to vote for committee-men;
so that, at the expiration of the first year,
when the committee-men that had been chosen for
London, Bristol and Liverpool for the preceding
year, could act no longer, then, or at the expiration
of the three years (which we cannot now
take upon us to say) three new committee-men
were chosen instead of three that went out, which
nine committee-men so chosen, continued to act
for three years, when the three other were again
elected; by which means there are twelve persons
who take it by rotation alternatively, to be of the
committee or not, as they agree among themselves;
on which account it is a folly for any person,
not being one of the twelve, to attempt getting
elected a committee-man for either London,
Bristol, or Liverpool; there having been as great
interest made against such persons who have offered
themselves, as hath happened on some occasions
preceding the election of a member of parliament;
therefore we have the greatest reason to
believe, there is not any person who will again
attempt to stand a candidate in opposition to
one of the twelve persons who have had the direction
and management so long, of which number
those gentlemen are, we have mentioned in the
account of the merchandize supplied by the
committee-men, page 51.
The several articles of merchandize purchased
in Holland, are paid for in money, or bills of exchange,
which is very disadvantageous to this
country; and such goods may serve to make an
assortment with those paid for by the government,
and sent to Africa for the support of the forts
there; which has been proved to have been the
case before, consequently may be so again. That
fact being admitted, and indeed it would be folly
to think otherwise; what chance can any private
traders have, when the committee’s servants have
such a glaring emolument, besides so many other
advantages over them? Were there any reason to
ground the least supposition, that all things in
Africa are carried on upon the square, and no methods
practiced by the officers that command the
several forts to monopolize the trade; can any one
think even in such case, that private merchants,
or matters of ships, who are obliged to pay customs,
house and warehouse rents, servants, and all
sorts of other contingent expences, can possibly
carry on a trade in any degree of equality with
those persons, who are, as hath been before observed,
exonerated from every article of expence?
The committee’s servants having such advantages,
can it be supposed any private trader can
stand any chance in trade with them, as said trader
must settle in a negroe town, in a mud house covered
with thatch, there being no other sort of
dwelling to be got, without carrying tradesmen of
all sorts from Europe to build it, which would be
attended with too great an expence and risk for any
private adventure to undertake? Therefore, on account
of the frequent fires that happen in negroe
towns, persons well acquainted with them, would
not insure any property lodged therein for twenty-five
per cent. annually. That alone is sufficient to
deter any one from settling, except some of the
old or new companies discarded servants, whose
narrow circumstances discourage them from returning
to Europe, not knowing what else to do
with themselves; for there has not one of the
young men from Bristol or Liverpool, &c. that
were to have been intrusted with cargoes by their
relations and friends, to go and settle under the
protection of the British forts in Africa, has yet
made a single attempt to do it, though that was
made use of as an argument, and enforced with
great energy by gentlemen, to obtain a dissolution
of the late royal African company (and in
which they succeeded). But no such boasted consequence
has taken place, because the people of
those places were not to be lulled on to adventure
their property, under the notion of a free trade.
They very well knew what hardships must attend
those who
were necessitated to settle in a negroe
town, from a knowledge, as soon as they did, they
must become subservient in a manner, and brother
citizens with the negroes. It is a joke to think
they can make use of the forts to lodge and defend
their properties in; for the very persons who
(we should imagine) by the spirit and intention of
the act of parliament, ought to be their defenders,
will take every measure, in proportion as they rival
them, and curtail their trade, to exercise
their power over the natives, to prevent the private
trader succeeding with them, which will create
disputes between the officers commanding the
forts and the towns people under them, in which
every private trader must bear a part; for no man
can settle in a negroe town without paying his
freedom, and entering into a league to become a
native, and partake of that township’s misfortunes,
advantages and customs. Is there any difference then
between a European trader and an African?
None! one is a native black Negroe, and the
other is become a white one: so that whenever a
dispute happens between the natives and the officers
aforesaid, the
indenizened European will be
under the compulsive necessity of joining his black
fellow townsmen against his countrymen and fortress,
which the British nation intended for his preservation
in time of danger, and last resort.
From what we have before advanced, our readers
may naturally wonder if the trade to Africa,
where the forts are situated, is carried on so much
to the disadvantage of the British traders, and so
greatly for the benefit of the officers of the African
committee, why said traders do not continue their
complaints, in order to have their grievances redressed.
We conjecture one reason for their not
doing so, is the difficulties they had to encounter
when they presented their former complaint to obtain
satisfaction, which arose from the opposition
raised against them by the African committee, who
refused to give their officers such orders, as would
have obliged them to put in execution the lords of
trade and plantations opinion. Being defeated in
their first attempt, it is natural to suppose they
were fearful of applying again to the legislative
power, lest the methods pursued to carry on that
valuable branch of commerce, since it has been
under the management of the African committee,
should be maturely and attentively enquired into;
for there has been, and is now, as much reason for
such examination, as there was in the year 1753,
1755, 1756 and 1758. But then it began to
become too serious; and if continued fairly, might
have been a means of putting the forts upon a new
and respectable establishment, such as would have
enabled the officers commanding them, to have
secured the natives under their protection from
the danger they may be in from enemies of
their own colour, and the arbitrary injustice often
imposed upon them by the officers of our
good friends and allies. The Dutch residing in
Africa, to have prevented said Dutch officers, by
their superior power, from wresting violently and
unfairly any part of the territories belonging to
the British forts, or detaining and imprisoning any
of the natives living under their protection, both
which they have illegally done since the decline of
the late company’s power, and confined a number
of them, notwithstanding all remonstrances made
by the British officers, till that noble and gallant
commander, the present honourable lord How arrived
in his majesty’s ship Glory, with the Swan
sloop under his command, upon the Gold Coast, in
the year 1751, who soon after his arrival, did examine
with the greatest attention, all the original
papers relative to the cause of the dispute that happened
between the officers of the English and
Dutch companies. After such examination, he demanded
from the Dutch general the prisoners he
had confined during said dispute in the castle of
St. George’s D. Elmina, the principal Dutch fort
upon the coast of Africa in that noble manner which
it has everbeen the invariable rule of that judicious,
worthy, and great commander to pursue in the
service of his country[20].
It is to be hoped that the British forts will be put
upon such an establishment, that the officers commanding
them will be sufficiently empowered to
hinder the Dutch officers from exercising that arbitrary
power they have done, and continued to
do, over the Portugueze upon the Gold Coast of
Africa, to prevent their trading at the British settlements,
in open violation of a treaty concluded
between the English and Dutch principal officers
in Africa, and ratified by both companies in Europe[21].
If the African committee has not represented
that affair in a true light to the government, we are
surprized they have neglected it, as it is a very
valuable commerce now wholly engrossed by the
Dutch; who will not suffer the master or supercargo
of any Portugueze vessel to trade at the English
forts, or with the British subjects, notwithstanding
the beforementioned treaty, which, perhaps,
might be deemed obsolete, since the dissolution
of the late company. If that should be the
case, then, in our humble opinion, it ought to be
renewed, as well as many other regulations made
between the English and Dutch in Africa.
If the British officers should once again obtain
that influence and power so essentially necessary for
them to have, in order to open the trading roads
to the most distant inland countries of Africa, so
long stopped, which would be of immense advantage
to this country, and, at the same time, to
prevent the subjects of France hereafter carrying
to their colonies the most valuable Negroes, as we
have observed they did before the war, and which
will in a great measure be proved, by the extracts
of the following letters from the captains Strange
and Wyndham, commanders of two of his majesty’s
ships war, dated Africa, 20th Sept. 1740,
and 30th Aug. 1742.
Capt. Strange writes to the following purport:
“The French, by the advantages of their
goods, especially Brandies, occasions a great
price they give for their slaves, which has
brought the English and Dutch trade to the
lowest ebb.”
Capt. Wyndham writes as follows:
“This concludes the present state of the royal
African factories; and as to the Dutch factories,
they, as far as I can learn, make no great
hand of their trade any more than the English;
the French, who has ten ships on the coast to
our one, seem to flourish and carry all before
them.”
We think it necessary here to observe, that notwithstanding
almost all the trade had been for
some years before, and at that time, carried on by
the French on that part of the coast where the
most valuable Negroes were to be got; the separate
British traders made no application to the legislative
power to prevent such pernicious commerce,
though several remonstrances were made
for that purpose by the late royal African company
to the government; who also did lay before the
public, in several letters inserted in the daily papers,
as well as by pamphlets, the danger of the
French incroachments.
Yet as soon as the private traders found the said
company applying to parliament for money, to
put their forts upon a proper and respectable footing,
to prevent foreign innovations upon the territory
and trade under their care, they took the
alarm, awaked from their lethargy, strained
every nerve, and put every scheme in execution
their invention pointed out, to prevent the company’s
succeeding, and to obtain their dissolution,
which they compleated in the year 1750. But how
far the African trade has been improved thereby,
in upwards of twelve years that the African committee
have had it under their direction and management,
will appear from the facts and truths
we have before stated, to which we beg leave to
refer, and to the judgment of our readers.
Thus far we can undertake to say with truth,
notwithstanding the great noise and clamour raised
at that time by the African merchants for an open
trade; it was then much more open and free for
all British subjects trading thither, than it has been
since under the direction of the African committee,
and the national grants of money more regularly
and fairly accounted for, as the late company had,
for some years before, sent no ship to Africa, but
freighted the merchandize, stores and provisions
purchased with the money granted by parliament
on board private ships; nor were their officers or
servants permitted to trade otherwise than to barter
to the best advantage. The merchandize purchased
with the public money for the better support
of the forts, out of which said servants could
neither make embezzlement or advantage to themselves,
according to the established rules laid down
by the company, and the method by which their
principal officers and other servants were to account
for the same, who were obliged to give ample
and sufficient security, strictly to adhere and
conform to such rules. All persons in the late
company’s service, of what station soever, that
were entrusted with any of their or the government’s
effects, whether the value was much or
little, they were obliged to keep a true account
of all their receipts and disbursements in writing,
and at the end of every two months at farthest, to
render to the council, which presides at the principal
fort,
two originals signed by said person so
intrusted, and attested to be true by some other
of the company’s servants, who had been privy to
his transactions. That the then accountant residing
at the principal fort, examined and made his
remarks upon the account so rendered; and required
vouchers in writing for such transactions as
were therein mentioned to have been had with Europeans,
it being impracticable to have written
vouchers for dealings with the natives[22].
That said accountant laid all accounts so rendered,
with his remarks thereon, before the said
council, who examined, allowed, or disallowed
such accounts, &c. made such deductions or abatements
to as they saw cause. That afterwards every
such account was returned to the accountant as one
of the vouchers from which he was to compose the
general books to be sent home to the company.
That by general Books is meant, journals and
ledgers, where the collections, arising from the
vouchers beforementioned, were reduced into order
and method. That the council abroad had not
power to pass, or allow any account or voucher
finally; every thing being subject to the company’s
future examination and approbation in England.
That each journal and ledger contained the accounts
of six months, which after having been
duly
stated and balanced abroad, they were sent
home to the company by the first conveyance, together
with all the original vouchers from which
they were composed and signed; duplicates thereof
were deposited in the principal forts, in case of loss
or accident. That as soon as possible after the
arrival of the said journals and ledgers in England,
they were compared by the company’s accountant
general (who was one of the first accountants in
Europe) with the vouchers, and the said vouchers
themselves were examined; that objections and
deductions were thereupon made by the company,
when due cause was found for so doing. It must
now surely clearly appear, that so many examinations
of the books and accounts, made by persons
whose private interest had not the least connexions
with each other, must render it extreamly difficult
for the late company’s servants to embezzle or
misapply any of the effects committed to their
charge with impunity, or without being detected.
That after the examinations aforesaid of the accounts,
they were delivered to the auditor of his
majesty’s imprest, and after they were examined
and compared by the deputy-auditor with the
vouchers, and certified by him they were right,
then the company obtained a quietus to discharge
them from any sum or sums of money so accounted
for, that they had received from the public; having
first sworn to the truth of such part of said
accounts as had been transacted under their own
inspection, in Europe before one of the barons of
his majesty’s exchequer.
The following is the copy of a clause from the
act of parliament for extending and improving the
trade to Africa, directing in what manner
the committee are to account for the monies they receive
from the public for the support of the forts
in Africa. In page 556.
“It is enacted that the committee shall, within
one month after the expiration of the year, for
or during which they shall have been chosen
committee-men, lay before the cursitor baron
of the exchequer, an account of all the money
received by the committee during the preceding
year, and of the application thereof, upon
oath. And the said cursitor baron shall, within
one month after the said account shall be laid
before him, examine, pass, and audit the same;
and for the better discovering of the truth of
such account, the said cursitor baron is hereby
empowered to examine any of the said committee-men,
and such other person or persons as
he shall judge necessary, upon oath, touching
the articles or particulars in such account expressed,
or such of them as the said cursitor baron
shall think fit; which account, so audited
and passed by the cursitor baron, shall be
final and conclusive, and shall be a full and
absolute discharge to the said committee-men,
without their being compelled to give or render
any further or other account thereof.”
By the foregoing clause, the African committee
is only obliged to account for the application in
Europe of any monies they receive from government,
or otherwise, for the support of the African
forts, by laying their annual account before the
cursitor baron, how they have appropriated said
monies, whether by purchasing and shipping merchandizes,
stores, and other supplies for the use of
the forts, or of any other manner they might have
disposed of the same[23].
By said clause, the cursitor baron is obliged to
audit and pass the committee’s account in one
month after it is laid before him; though he should
have objections thereto, as he had to their accounts
for years 1754, 1755 and 1756. However, he
passed them, but submitted it to the house of commons
to allow some charges in said accounts, or not,
that he certainly thought were charged contrary to
act of parliament, or he would not have objected
to them. But that would have appeared as well as
many other facts, with respect to their management
and accounts, if the report, consisting of 87 pages,
of the committee, appointed by the honourable house
of commons to examine into the state and condition
of the forts in Africa in the year 1758, had
been examined into. All we can take upon us to
say with respect to that affair is, said report was
prevented being taken into consideration by the
house, in consequence of a motion being made and
seconded for such purpose, by the African committee’s
friends.
We can with truth undertake to say, that many
irregularities in the African committee’s accounts
were pointed out during the examination before
the several committee’s appointed by the house;
upon which they desired leave to bring in subsequent
accounts to clear up such objections as had
been made, one of which was presented to the committee
the 22d April, 1756, wherein the African
committee deducted
from the balance of a former
account they had presented 1891l. sterling. We shall
only quote this one instance, to shew how necessary it is
that the African committee and their servants should
be accountable to the public in the same manner the
late African company was, for any monies they are
intrusted with by government, for the application of
said monies on the coast of Africa, before they
should obtain a discharge for the same, which
would lay them under a necessity to examine minutely
into the accounts they receive from their officers
in Africa, of the application of said monies
there; which, as they are now no-ways accountable
for, we may, we hope without being thought severe,
presume is not done; which will, in a great
measure, appear by the subsequent account before
quoted: besides, we fear people, who have accounts
of their own to look after, seldom give themselves
much trouble about those of the public, unless
obligated thereto.
When the officers, who have the application of the
public money in Africa, are once satisfied that their
accounts will undergo a strict examination by the
committee, and also at the auditor of the imprests
office; that it will induce them to be careful how
they dispose of the merchandize, &c. committed to
their charge; as such officers and their sureties will
be liable to make good any deduction there,
may be made from their accounts. It will likewise
be very advantageous to the inferior servants of the
committee; for such good purpose, a method can be
pointed out to prevent the merchandize purchased
with the public money being made use of by the
superior officers in trade, for their own account and
emolument, to the great injury of the others, many
instances of which we have to produce; also that
the soldiers, under-servants, and company’s slaves
have been paid out of the refuse goods that the
commanding officers had taken in the course of
their trade.
A single instance of such inhumanity to the inferior
servants we think sufficient to trouble the
public with, which happened during governor Melvil’s
command; and that we should not now particularly
take notice of, but as it fell under our observation
when we were upon the spot. It also was
a charge urged against Mr. Melvil when living,
which he never attempted to contradict, to wit,
that John Sweidger, a Prussian, and Gardiner at
Cape Coast, desired his discharge, wanting to go to
his own country. Mr. Melvil, the then governor
and treasurer at Cape Coast Castle, whose business
it was to give written orders upon the warehouse
(or storekeeper) to pay the servants, gave said
Sweidger a note upon the warehouse-keeper, for
wages due to him, amounting to 28l. gold value,
which is about 27l. 2s. 6d. sterling, which said
warehouse-keeper offered to pay in guns, that would
not even purchase the poor man a little fresh provisions
for his voyage. After repeated applications to
the governor and warehouse-keeper, finding he could
not obtain any thing else, he offered the governor’s
note for 28 l. to sale to several of the servants in the
castle; and at last sold it to James Hinch, the
overseer of the slaves, for eight pounds. That oppressive
transaction fully points out how necessary it
is that some other method of accounting for the
government’s supplies should be adopted, and carried
into execution, which surely there cannot be
the least objection to.
For example, we will suppose any gentleman in
England to have an estate in Africa, and that he
was to order Messrs. Trueman and company, or
any other respectable merchants in the city of London,
to send out a steward to superintend and take
care of the
improvement of such estate; and that
they were to take security from said steward for the
value of any monies or merchandize, &c. that he
may be entrusted with, to pay the servants residing
thereupon, and other expences; also charges of
building and repairs. Is it to be supposed said
gentlemen, notwithstanding he had the greatest faith
in, and opinion of the integrity and honesty of said
merchants, would be satisfied with their giving him
an account only of their having sent such steward,
merchandize, stores and provisions to his estate,
without an account from the steward, properly
vouched, of the application thereof in Africa?
Surely no! then if a private person thinks it necessary
to have such an authenticated account, we
submit it to the judgment of our readers to determine,
whether they think it reasonable the public
should expect the same or not. We, for our own
parts, are inclined to believe, that people intrusted
with the application of public monies, at so great
a distance as Africa, when they can make such
immense advantage of it as the
committee’s officers can, will be induced to embrace the opportunity,
however disadvantageous it may be to their country,
when they are satisfied little care will be taken
how they account for the same.
We shall conclude this pamphlet, with inserting
a copy of a petition, signed by the planters of
the island of Barbadoes, in the year 1710. The reasons
and observations contained therein, in our
humble opinion, fully point out, that they foresaw
what has in effect since happened; therefore
we beg leave to submit it to our readers to form
their own judgment upon.
To the queen’s most excellent majesty,
The humble petition of several planters and others,
inhabitants of your majesty’s island of Barbadoes,
Sheweth,
“That the tender care and regard your majesty
hath constantly had of all your subjects, encourages
your petitioners, who are deeply concerned
in the trade to Africa. The constant
supply of Negroes at moderate prices, being the
chief support of this colony; whereby we can
only be enabled to preserve the staple of sugar, and
other commodities, and to afford them in greater
quantities, and cheaper than other nations; most
humbly beg leave to lay before your majesty,
that for many years, while the royal African
company had the sole management of that trade,
this island was duly supplied with a sufficient
number of Negroes at moderate prices, from
10 l. to 20 l. per head the highest, which was a
very great encouragement; and enabled us
greatly to improve the manufacture of this island.
But for several years past, since the trade has
been laid open, the number of Negroes imported
by the royal African company, and separate
traders together, have not been sufficient
to supply this island; and those which have been
imported, have been sold at extravagant prices,
from 20 l. to 40 l. per head, especially those
which are tolerably good; which your petitioners
conceive to have been occasioned by the different
interests of the separate traders, each bidding
upon the other; of which the natives upon the
coast taking advantage, have raised the price of
their own commodities, and sunk the price of
those of Great Britain, and this island; which
is an unspeakable damage, and discouragement
to your petitioners, tends to the ruin of this
trade, the lessening your majesty’s revenue, and
the navigation of Great Britain.”
“Therefore your petitioners humbly pray,
that the British interest on the coast of
Africa may be preserved; and the trade
put upon such a foot, that a sufficient
number of Negroes may be had upon
the coast, on moderate terms, and your
petitioners supplied at reasonable rates
here.
“And your petitioners, as in duty bound, shall
ever pray.”
Barbadoes,
Aug. 1, 1710.
“Robert Vaughan,
“Thomas Carney, &c. &c. &c.”
FINIS.
ERRATA.
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l. 10, for committee, r. company; p. 56, in note, l. 1, for this
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