Belgian Army Notices on the Outlasting War Sites

The old tower of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke has not been able to resist to the amount of projectiles poured upon it by the Germans, throughout the whole campaign. Its emplacement however, and the concrete bloc which has taken its place are interesting as marking the extreme advance of the enemy in the region, it also brings back to memory the terrific bombardments and fights which that corner of Flanders witnessed.

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Dixmude.—Aerial photo (Mai 26^th 1917).

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Dixmude.—Their Majesties King and Queen at the “Death trench”. (June 1^st 1917).

Dixmude.—Their Majesties King and Queen at the Riderswork. (June 1^st 1917).

The Queen examining private J. Vermeire’s helmet, which had just been pierced by a German bullet.

33At the end of the Yser battle, after the 29^th of October 1914, Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was only occupied for a few days by weak German detachements, whilst our line of defence had been brought back upon the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line and rejoining the Yser at the kilometer 16 by a line running through Roode-Poort farm and the houses of the Burg.

Then the flood forced the foe to withdraw up to the bank of the river.

On the 3^rd of November 1914, the Belgian G. H. Q. ordered to push forward reconnaitring parties all along our army front; advanced posts were then placed which, little by little were multiplied untill they formed a complete defence line of advanced guards, acting as outposts screen to the whole defence scheme. The main-guards were all on duty beyond the inundations, the mean of access to the main-guards being long duck boards placed on threstle stuck in the soil. The one leading to Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was particularly dangerous because the Germans had aimed a fixed rifle on it, which was sweeping its whole length. The losses there sustained have been very heavy, mainly when relieves were on. To cut the casualties down the 4^th line Regiment erected concrete shields against bullets and shell splinters.

The main-guard of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was protecting the left flanc of the organization of the Dixmude sector and that by keeping under its fire the whole of the ground stretching itself in front of their advanced posts. Besides, the hamlet which was situated on a little knoll, was thus affording great advantages for the creation of observation-posts.

In connection with this “War-Site” there is a name which is closely associated with every details of its life. Known as the “Burgomaster of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke”, R. Father Martial Lekeux, Artillery Commander, spent the first years of the war in the tower, then when latter tumbled down, he moved in the gable front of a farm where he organized a remarkable observation-post. The name of 34Martial Lekeux deserves to be mentioned here, because his dogged determination and pluck, unidentified themselves with that main-guard of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke.

Three momentous German posts, were facing it, i. e. the farms n^o 1, “den Toren and Van de Woude”, which owed many a tragic days to the keen eyes of the Belgian observer.

For four years on end of trench warfare the main-guard of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke held fast. It held under storms of iron, it held against assailants who, at renewed attempts endeavoured to overrun it. These different rushes, the one of March 1918 against our cyclist carabiniers and the 1^st foot jagers as well as that of June of the same year against the 22^nd line regiment have disclosed the stubborn energy and enthusiastic courage which moved our men of 1918, classing them amongst the best fighting elements of the great allied armies.

When the battle of the Yser was over, our first front line was running along the river in front of Dixmude in a direction due North-West up to the kilometer 16. There the river Yser, makes a sudden bend and our front was leaving the river side to prolonge itself westward, leaning on the Roode-Poort farm thus joining the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line.

That particular point of kilometer n^o 16, which ought to have been on the early days of stabilized warfare, a stronghold of our defensive scheme, struck our high command, as being rather weak. The decision was then taken to strengthen it.

A line of main-guards already covered the Belgian positions from Nieuport up to Oud-Stuyvekenskerke, when General Jacquet decided, in order to cover himself at the 35kilometer n^o 16, to prolonge that line by adding to it an element, the advanced posts of which would be placed along the river Reigersvliet and that right up to its mouth.

To carry that mission through it was thought necessary to rush the petrol tanks, the mystery of which, more than their power had already given to the sector a fair renown.

Death trench and Riders’work-Operations which took place from up May to October 1915 North and East of kilometer 16 of the river Yser.

The 1^st foot jagers, shouldered by the 3^rd divisional 36artillery and accompanied by detachements of pioneers, tried the operations.

A keen fight developed for three long days, from up the 9^th to the 12^th May 1915^[2], in a horrible ground, the main part being under water, and cut up by deep and broad ditches and shell holes full of water, offering no shelter whatever to the rafales of machine-guns and the harassing fires of the artillery which were hacking our gallant boys down. The attack failed in spite of their courage, and the losses endured.

The 1^st foot jagers alone had lost in that action 10 officers and five hundred and fifty men, killed or wounded. The plan was not given up, but tactics was changed. The ground which had been captured was hurriedly fitted up, while a platoon of a tunneling company was set at task on the bank of the Yser to resume the advance by sap-work. The mining was progressing satisfactorily when it was realized that on the German side a similar work was on, which, in less than a fortnights time reduced to few yards the distance separating the Belgian saphead from the enemy’s.

On the 27^th of May 1915, during the relieve, and taking the advantage of a pitch dark night and protected by a violent bombardment, a group of Germans jumped in our trench placing a machine-gun section in it. The enfilading fire of those guns caused heavy casualties to the 9^th line regiment which delivered a counter-attack.

After useless efforts, the only alternative left was to push actively forward the organization of the remaining portion of the trench so as to render it able to resist, notwithstanding 37the achievement of the previous object, it is to say the strengthening of the Yser salient at kilometer 16.

From time to time, the enemy tried to attack the trench but each time was repulsed by spontaneous counter-strokes. The enormous casualties suffered, either by the bombardments or by the numerous raids, carried out by the enemy, against the trench, made it deserve the name of: “Death Trench”. (Boyau de la Mort.)

In September 1915, the more urgent works of the Death Trench were nearly finished and could easely suffice to the defence of the left bank of the river at kilometer n^o 16. The attention of the engineers was then driven on to the construction of the “Cavalier”, work which was to complete the above mentioned defence, by securing it against all attempts of the enemy to cross the river.

The characteristic features of the “Cavalier” comes from the working condition it had to be submitted to, it is to say, to combine the defence as to fit or better to match in the most perfect way to the one of the “Death trench” thus forming a center of the highest possible resistance.

The “Cavalier” in itself presents two different and parallel lines, the first one on the level with the ground, to serve the purpose of round way and communication line, the second, above level thus dominating the whole region. The latter trench is the firing one, the overlooking position of which permitting to carry out enfilading and plunging fires upon the two banks of the river Yser as well as in the Death Trench itself, and on the enemy’s organization round kilometer n^o 16.

The dead angles of that position were under machine-gun fire and later, automatic rifles were placed at the entrance of the Death Trench, and also in the one connecting it with the “Cavalier”.

The building up of the “Cavalier” was long and cost to our sappers and infantrymen many a toilsome days and many a casualties. Seeing those provoking works, the German indeed did not remain inactive, they frequently 38ruined our works with their artillery and minenwerfers, inflicting to our troops awful losses.

The close of 1915 marked the end of the grounding of the accessory defences. The emplacements for trench mortars, machine-guns pits were rising little by little, the dug-out for the officer in Command of the “Cavalier” sector, was gradually coming to shape, and the shelters were rising from out the soil.

It was then decided to reduce the occupation of the “Death Trench”.

On October 11^th 1915, the bank of the Yser was blown up by a mine at about 275 meters in front of kilometer 16, thus opening a gap 6 or 8 meters in length, which connected the Yser to the flooded area. The Northern portion of the trench was filled up and then abandoned.

Three bombing teams, garrisoned by day time the thus shortened line.

Our men had become first class bomb throwers and feeling themselves well shouldered by the Van Deuren mortars (Belgian Stokes Guns) were full of confidence and never feared their opponents.

In 1916 the organization of the “Cavalier” completes itself and becomes a real redoubt. The two flights of the work is provided with offensive and defensive weapons, as well as with liaison material of the most diverse nature. Concrete shelters for the men have taken the place of those built with logs, which so often were bombed to ruins by the enemy. A post of visual signalling was placed so as to maintain a constant contact with the commander of the sector.

May 1916 was to be a tragic month for the kilometer 16 sector.

From up the 2^nd on to the 22^nd, the German switched on the “Death Trench” a fire of the most terrific power, and hurling troops forward they managed to get a foot-hold in our position, but nothing daunted, a counter-attack winged them at once back, by dint of grenades fights and sharp 39hand to hand struggles.... The enemy fled, he had not even had time to take his dead and wounded back with him.

In July 1916, an artillery observation-post was established at the “Cavalier”. The camouflage section came and erected there a strong steel cabin, loopholed towards the enemy side, and also provided with a periscope. A telephone wire was connecting that post to the Divisional Artillery Commander.

But the month of may with its hard and bloody days the men had to contend with, were not to be forgotten, and a keen wish for vengeance was nursed by every one.

Was the No “One” enemy trench not presenting itself to us in a similar way as our “Death Trench” to him? In fact, we were on the bridge-head on the right bank. The attack and destruction of that line was decided.

On July 18^th 1916, after that several reconnaissances had made during the preceding nights, and thorough destruction fire switched on to the trench, a detachment of n^o 4 company of the IV^th Bat. of the 2^nd line Regiment, under the command of Lieutenants Loyse and Desenfans stormed it. The object of the raid was not to remain there, but the duty of the raiding-party was to “clean the place up” and keep it free of Germans a sufficient length of time to blow all the concrete shelters up, to render them unhabitable. The “cleaning up” was thoroughly done, but unfortunately Lieutenant Loyse having been dangerously wounded, could not give the signal which was to start the blowing of the charges, that sapper sergeant Billiet had placed, after having himself taken an ample share in the first part of the show.

This raid is recorded as an example of the kind. All the dead and wounded of the party were brought back to our lines.

The enthusiasm was at its highest, the confidence kindled, the regiment avenged.

The sector was calm for a good while.

40The 17^th of October 1916, the German, roused once again, opened on our line, at kilometer 16, the most powerful bombardment, foreboding a new attack. But our gunners were on the watch, they directed at once a counter-bombardment so violently efficient that it must have taken out from the enemy’s mind the slightest wish to jump out of his haunts.

Ten days later, the 2^d line regiment decided to do away with the “One” enemy trench, for good and all. From up the 27^th on to the 31^st of October detachment raided by night the accursed trench, they undertook the destruction of the shelters, turning the whole of No “One” line into real havoc.

In the course of the years 1917 and 1918, the life at the kilometer 16 quietened down, the intervals between the bombardments and mortar duals lengthened, and were replaced by intermittant artillery and hand grenades fights.

The “Cavalier and Death Trench” received then their final improvements. The first observation cabin having been demolished by gun fire, on April the 4^th 1917, a new one in concrete took its place, the upper trench became a platform, the liaison and signal post provided with ground telegraphy. The automatic rifles and bomb throwers multiplied.

The Death Trench was provided with an alternative straight communication line. A light wooden railway track was layed, to enable transport and evacuation by means of the small trucks. Numerous “concrete-brick” shelters were created.

Finally the head of the trench was turned into a deathtrap, surrounded by wolf’s holes and barbed wires, that point was only manned by day time by snipers sheltered in a small concrete sentry box.

The trap was separated from the death trench by a monolithe concrete dug-out of a rather peculiar shape. That shelter was fitted with a heavy steel door, and loopholed to enable hand grenade throwing and automatic rifle’s 41firing. A vibrating connected the little redoubt with the Commander of the “Cavalier”.

In case that the enemy managed to enter the trap or to reach our trench, the garrison of the fortlet was to shut itself up in it and resist from within during a length of time sufficient to be relieved by a counter-attack delivered by the “Cavalier” which had been alerted by the buzzer.

During the Franco-British offensive of October 1917 numerous fires were carried out by our artillery to prepare the eventual cooperation of the Belgian forces. That artillery action brought on to us energetic retaliations which did a lot of damages to the line at Roode-Poort.

The numerous raids of our troops in the German lines proved the efficiency of our fire, which had reduced the enemy’s trenches to mere ruins.

When the 1917 offensive was stopped the life resumed its normal and dull course; the 5^th infantry division was set at work to repair the damages and restore to our positions their former power.

Our attack of September 1918 had a repercussion upon the whole sector overlooked by the Cavalier.

The first battle had brought the Belgian Army on the Clercken ridge. The intention to hinge the new front to the old one including the Dixmude town, induced the 5^th line Regiment to get hold of Trench “One”, “111”, as well as of the first work North of Dixmude. And this was to be the only alteration brought on the front round kilometer 16.

From the 15^th to the 17^th of October, under the victorious onrush of the second battle, the front was split up from Nieuport to Dixmude and the Germans were compelled to a hurried retreat.

The front of the Yser was definitively cleared, the Rider and the Death Trench had ended their glorious mission.

It is important to note the powerful organizations of the enemy, facing the “Death Trench”, notably the enormous concrete of German sap-heads on the leftbank of the Yser, 42with their iron-plated loopholes and firing ranges, overlooking all the surrounding districts.

The Rider is a work of the greatest interest. It may be considered as a small museum concerning the trench warfare. In the minimum space it utilized in a most judicious way all defensive and offensive implement such as accessory defences and all kinds of liaison systems, which were coordinated to bring the highest efficiency.

It was also the witness of the magnificent and sustained stoïcism on the part numerous Belgian soldiers who succeeded each other to defend it.

The Death Trench is a sacred spot, sacred by the acts of courage and heroism that were accomplished there, and sacred by the blood that was shed here, it is the tomb of hundreds of brave heroes.

These two shelters mark out the portion of the Belgian front which suffered the most by German bombardment with trench-mortars shells and bombs.

During the dreadful days of May 1916, our first line, facing Dixmude was subjected to awful firing; the embankment of the Yser, behind which our men were sheltered, was overthrown, the shelters broken down, the relief posts destroyed. All the work of the trenches which had taken eighteen months of patient toil to erect was annihilated in a few days and transformed into a horrible chaos. Hundreds of brave soldiers were torn to pieces by the bursting of German trench mortar shells, the effects of which were 43so terrible that in falling they dug craters of 10 meters diameter, thus smashing up the strongest shelters, and crushing and burying under the ruins all those who had taken refuge there. After the storm calmed down (and it was only calmed when our mortars arrived, affording us then the opportunity to juggle with those of the adversary), the Belgian soldiers with their habitual tenacity, undertook to rebuild their defensive works. Night and day, they worked patiently and obstinately on, and in the face of the enemy which was watching them from the opposite side of the bank, managed ruins out of the ruins that were accumulated there, to erect new lines of defence, stronger and better established than the first. They were composed, besides firing parapets for infantrymen, of numerous shelters for snipers and machine-gunners, rest and waiting shelters, relief posts, fighting battle posts for unit commanders, etc.... Earth, wood, iron, concrete, all were put together and used to constitute a formidable entrenched line, which was held till the end of the war.

From amongst these numerous shelters, two have been preserved: the first at the South of the Bridge-rail of Dixmude, is situated in the centre of the bend formed by the Yser in front of the town. The second was used as a fighting post for the commander of the company entrusted to defend the portion of the embankment, situated in front of the Handzaeme Canal. That particular point was specially momentous and to be watched, because it meant there to forbid the inroad in our lines of the Germans troops, which, under the cover of the Handzaeme canal banks, could, mounted on little boats berthed at Dixmude, try a landing on the West bank of the river Yser.

The fighting posts and shelters established after the battle of the Yser, in the ruins of the small buildings along the embankment, saw little by little their walls relined with a strong interior casing of concrete, and their lost roofs, replaced by thick concrete layers also. The house of the 54Joconde (so called, because of the good old proprietress, Mieke Bœuf, who during long weeks of trench warfare still occupied it and who became quite legendary with our soldiers), served as a lodging to the Commander of the company at the bridge-head, till a better appropriated shelter was built. It was occupied after, by the men of the Royal engineers, who were charged to keep in good order, the foot bridges giving access to the bridge-head.

The next house to the one of the Joconde’s served as C. P. to the major on guard.

After the organization of the bridge-head (see notice n^o 20), an allround plan fortifying the sector was elaborated. They foresaw the construction of little forts or redoubts with a distance of 600 meters between each and utilizing the embankment as a parapet and the Yser as obstacle.

It was with the redoubts Albert and Elisabeth that they began. They were finished in December 1915. The reason of their existence, was to protect the bridge-head against enfilading fire; but that was not the only part they played. These two redoubts completed and formed with the part of the embankment which bound them together a kind of curtain which had to hold good, whatever happened.

The system and assemblage of fires which shot out from the numerous loop holes and “embrasures” of their shelters for machine-guns and rifles gave them an enormous capacity of resistance.

The redoubts Albert and Elisabeth were the work of the engineers of 2^d army division.

When the Belgian front was stabilized (November 1914), it was in part covered by floods, before which our posts soon became powerful main-guards.

55Two well distinctive floods had been spread; the first during the battle of the Yser, was extended between the river and the railway line Nieuport-Dixmude having the paved road Oostkerke kilometer 16 of the Yser as Southern limit; the second, subsequent to the fall of Dixmude was created at the request of the French troops from the 14^th of November 1914. All the land situated at the East of the Yser, between the Houtensluisvaart and the road embankment of Knocke to Drie Grachten was flooded (this was realised, thanks to the great difference of water level of the two river-banks. The one on the right bank being inferior to the one on the left).

Between the kilometer 16 of the Yser and Houtensluisvaart the obstacle of water did not exist. The enemy, at Dixmude occupied the right bank of the Yser, which alone separated the adversary lines. At the South of the railway line of Dixmude to Zarren, the German positions followed a course almost parallel to the road of Woumen, comprising the strongly organized points such as the cemetery of Dixmude, the Castle of kilometer 19 and several farms. Our troops continued to follow the left bank of the river.

After the victory of the Yser, the constant idea of our staff was to reconquer the most ground possible. The Belgian army built on all practicable spots; posts of various degrees of importance, and this principle was applied to the sector of Nieucappelle on a very large scale.

It was decided to establish on the right bank of the Yser, at the South of Dixmude, towards kilometer 19, to the close contact of the enemy a bridge-head which would be afterwards widened, in order to create a starting position to permit our army to take and offensive. It was Major Panhuys who was charged with this perilous operation, with a group composed of his own battalion (the 1^st battalion of the 2^d foot jagers), re-enforced with a company of machine-gunners and a company of cyclists. It was important to take the enemy unawares. All was put in action 56to that end, each one having his definite mission to accomplish. During the night of the 21^st to the 22^d of December 1914, a night cold and dark, the group crossed the river in two places and managed to instal itself on a position uniting the little wood of the peninsula of kilometer 19.500 with a bend to the North, facing the cemetery of Dixmude. The enemy being taken by surprise, could not till dawn offer an efficient resistance: but already our troops had organized the ground and maintained their positions in spite of firing, counter-attacks and severe bombardments.

Bridge-head of kilometer 19.500 of the river Yser in June 1915.

57The heroïc group, who had performed the operation with such valour and spirit, was mentioned in despatches by decision of the H. M. the King.

It was of the utmost importance to strengthen the occupation, but there could be no question of working by day, the enemy holding the watch and sway over the land, and especially over the knoll of Woumen (castle of kilometer 19). So our troops were kept to the task without respite.

Afterwards the extension of the bridge-head to the South, for months saw added to the companies on guard, picket companies and detachments of pioneers, nightly erecting parapets and communication trenches, building shelters, casting footbridges over muddy ground, covering the positions with wire netting work, regulating the current of the waters at Sparken and Waalevaardeken by locks and dams, multiplying and rebuilding the footbridges on the river etc., in a word executing the thousand and one labours required by an advanced position to render it strong and powerful, durable if not comfortable and give to the troops of the principal resisting position real and positive security.

Then, arose the question of progressing towards the East and towards the North. The works of extension were commenced, but it was soon realised what a great effort and incessant sacrifice such an enterprise would demand, that about Mai 1915 the bridge-head was brought back to its former line. During the course of the war, the evolution of fighting methods altered and likewise the mission of the advanced positions and the effective forces of the garrisons which held them. For this reason, when the bridge-head of kilometer 19.500 was created, and which had to resist to the utmost, it required more than one battalion to guard 58it; and in 1918, a few posts of section or squad sufficed, the mission of the advanced ones having simply become at this place, for watching purposes in case of a defensive, or kick off in the case of an offensive.

To give one an exact idea of the enormous effort that the bridge-head of the kilometer 19 cost, one needed to see the development and extension it had taken in May 1915 and be equally penetrated with the idea, that all the work had been done at the price of heavy losses, although it had been done by night, under the bullets and shrapnells, in bad weather and often with reduced means. This bridge-head contributed greatly to maintain an offensive spirit in the minds of the infantrymen, it served also as a base to many patrols towards the enemy’s organizations and notably to a famous raid on the castle of kilometer 19 on the night of the 28^th to the 29^th of October 1917, which was a brilliant success, led by Captain Dendal, who brought back materials and prisoners.

Several times the Germans tried to rush the bridge-head of kilometer 19, but without any result whatever.

And then during the offensive of September 1918, it served as a starting trench to the troops of the Belgian 4^th division, for the victorious assault which ended by the liberation of Dixmude.

Clercken Ridge was very precious to the enemy to whom it gave the opportunity to establish a lot of natural observation-posts which had not the vulnerability of the confined kite balloons and which assured more stability to the observation. Many of these posts were destroyed during the war, especially by the destructive fires which preceded the great offensive in Flanders on the 28^th of September 1918. Others, such as the mill of Clercken, are already rebuilt, so offer no longer any historical interest.

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German observation-post near the church of Clercken.

Sketch showing the directions of the villages seen from this observation-post.

60However the one which is situated near the church of Clercken, and still exists in the same state as when abandoned by the Germans (see sketch), shows how easily the enemy could see into our lines, in spite of all the efforts made by the Belgian Army to counteract their observations, such as: diverse dissimulations, plantations of all kinds, artificial masks in linen, sandbags, reeds and straw, etc....

The southern part of the Belgian front may be classed as one of the most agitated sectors of the Western front. The short communications of the press which announced in their brief laconic style: “Bombing actions at het Sas and at Steenstraat; duel of artillery in the region of Noordschote”, said nothing of the horror of certain days of guard where the blood marked the ground of trenches, a hundred times turned over and as many times reestablished and always defended by our heroical troops. Drie Grachten, le Passeur, Steenstraat, Merckem, all these names resound, like as many bugle calls proclaiming the heroism of our soldiers and the glory of our arms.

It was in July-October 1917 that the Franco-British offensive gave us back, in that region, a corner of Belgian land. A few Belgian units participated on the 27^th of October to the last assault which drove the enemy back beyond Luyghem, Kippe, Aschoop and reached, on the right, the outskirts of Houthulst forest. The effort had to be followed up, our troops had to extend to the North of Dixmude, the 61progression of the Allies; our artillery preparation was ended, the Belgian army only waited for the signal!

But a run of unfavourable circumstances: the russian defection, the Caporetto incidents and the continual rain obliged the allies’ chief staff to suspend the offensive. One had to be resigned and wait, but it was a great deception to the Belgian soldier.

The 11^th of November 1917, the 4^th army division relieved a French division at Merckem. The state of the field after the battle, is depicted in the following extract from the order of the division commander dated the 14^th of November. “In order to avoid, during the relieves, the sinking of the men in the excavations which are hollowed out all over the track, it is advised to gather the men in groups of five, holding one to one another with a rope and thus lending each other mutual help.”

Nineteen hundred and seventeen was, in fact, the year of offensives with long artillery preparations, which transformed the battle fields into masterpieces of devastation. The soil ploughed up by thousands of projectiles formed a vast field of hollows, filled with water by the autumn rains. Nothing else was seen in this desolate landscape but a few cut down trunks of trees and the monstrous concretes of the Germans, which were sometimes demolished and overturned.

However, it was absolutely necessary to remain on the chaotic ground. The positions had to be established strong enough to repulse the counter-attacks. At first it was only a system of shell holes surrounded by blocks of concrete which had been deserted by the enemy. It was a dreadful hard winter for the 4^th army division. When the engineers and infantrymen at the price of terrible labour, had repaired and rebuilt the roads and tracks which facilitated and rendered possible the relieves, the rational and defensive organization of the sector was undertaken. Successive lines showed themselves, and were bound between by 62intermediate lines and a well organized plan of defence was able to be applied.

The “Grand-Père” (Grand-father) concrete dug-out, the remains of which have been preserved, was one of the posts best known among of the advanced positions of Merckem. It formed a rather prominent salient which was always a temptation to the enemy and provoked him to many sudden attacks, generally preceded by violent artillery fires demolishing all the surroundings.

The 4^th army division managed to repulse two attempts and that at two days’ interval: one on the night 26–27 and the other 28–29 of November 1917. They were more like trials on the part of the enemy to stake out our advanced positions.

During the occupation of the sector by the 3^d army division, the raids became real attacks to reconquer the “Grand-father”. The 15^th of February 1918, the enemy was thrown back in his own lines; but on the 7^th of March, he managed to take a footing and bring machine-guns in the concrete shelter, from where our counter-attacks drove him out on the evening of the 8^th.

It was decided then, to rectify the advanced line by suppressing the salient of the grand-father, and also the one, constituted by three little posts of Aschoop, which also was subjected to the enemy’s fires.

The last german raid on the “Grand-father” was on the 27^th of March 1918, which hastened the decision, taken on the 29^th of the same month, to abandon after destruction the salients of the Grand-father and Aschoop.

The “Grand-father” was again occupied by our troops the 9^th of September 1918 after the taking of the german position of Kwaebeek brook. A centre of resistance was established there and was occupied till the offensive of the 28^th of September 1918.

The name of Castel Britannia was given to the place occupied by the enemy’s batteries which oppressed up till 631917 our positions of the sector of Steenstraat. Thick concrete masses protected them. They served under the Belgian occupation as observation-posts and battle posts.

The cross road of Hoekske is situated at the crossing of Steenstraat to Dixmude road with the road of Merckem. It marks nearly the centre of the subsector which bears its name, and is celebrated by the numerous bombardments it has been subjected to. Heavy pieces of german artillery have been sunk in its vicinity.

These three sites are destined to perpetuate the remembrance of the defence of Merckem sector, organized by the 4^th army division at the price of the greatest difficulties during the winter of 1917, and brilliantly defended by the 3^d army division in April 1918, and the gallant fields of action of the 1^st army division at the time preceding the offensive of the 28^th of September. These sites will remain it that region, the witnesses of the battle of Merckem, which was fought the 17^th of April 1918 in the neighbourhood of Kippe near Langemark, and where the 3^d army division, under general Jacques, and the 4^th army division, under general Michel, were covered with glory.

The Germans, who were in immediate contact with the 3^d army division at Kippe, made a sudden and abrupt irruption in the lines of this division and advanced up to the front of the Merckem and Hoekske trenches, where they were stopped.

Brilliant and heroical counter-attacks cleverly upheld by the artillery, drove them back disabled in their positions.

On the side of the 4^th army division, the enemy, who, before approaching the front had to descend the slope at the North-East-bank of the Broenbeek and although vigorously welcomed by infantry and artillery fires, managed to push through a corner between the main-guards of Champaubert and Montmirail, whose wings were turned over to form a hook. Held in that way, the efforts of the 64Germans to open the breach further were vain. Crushed by violent musketry fires and the precise firing of the artillery, the enemy could not hold the positions reached and had to retire.

The battle of Merckem which had not procured to the Germans one atom of land, nor advantage, cost them many dead and wounded, eight hundred prisoners and the loss of numerous material, which was left in the hands of the 3^d army division. The order of Leopold was granted to the 9^th regiment of the line and to the 1^st jagers.

The inscription of “Merckem” on the regimental Colours of the 3^d army division, and on those of the 13^th and 19^th of the line (4^th army division) and also on the shields of the guns, rewarded the bravery of the troops who won the battle.

As regards the moral point of view, the victory of the 17^th of April in which our regiments had overthrown whole divisions of enemies, revealed to the General Staff, the offensive worth and power of our army and gave to it the full due, of its conscientiousness and strength and the ardent desire to go forward.

From the 17^th of April, our soldiers at Merckem felt themselves masters of the sector. Patrols and audacious raids were undertaken, sometimes on Kloostermolen, sometimes on the trenches of the Kwaebeek position or on the Little-son and on Italy, Portugal and Epernon farms.

The numerous prisoners brought back from these expeditions supplied our Staff with informations, which were the more interesting because, at that time, the allied armies had begun to drive back the enemy from the French front.

At last, on the 9^th of September, at dawn, a brilliant attack was executed without great loss by the 3^d line regiment. The position of Kwaebeek, entirely taken, was organized, and, when a few days later, the enemy who had recovered, attempted with the aid of great reinforcement to drive back our troops in their former 65lines, the success was of short duration, for the enemy had to let go.

It was from the position of Kwaebeek, that the 1st Infantry division, started the 28^th of September 1918 to the signal for the great liberating offensive.

Not having succeeded, in spite of their brutal effort and the use of asphyxiating gas, which till then had never been made use of, to pierce the front at Steenstraat, in April 1915, the Germans who had foreseen every thing, began to bombard Dunkirk, this permitted to their press to hide the check, to cry out loudly “Victory, our artillery is bombarding Dunkirk”.

A marine gun of 380 mm. installed in a public house called “In het Predikboom” (kilometer 12^th, road Dixmude-Poelcappelle) had just started, to execute its first shot. That was on the 26^th of April 1915.

A powerful counter-battery action was soon organized and proved a success. Twice the gun was disabled, the first time for a period of forty two days and the second time for forty eight. The 9^th of August 1915 registered its last shot.

Nevertheless the counter-battery maintained its firing in order to prevent the Germans rebuilding the place and arming it.

In October 1916, an extraordinary activity was shown at the former emplacement of Predikboom. Numerous and deliberate firings were executed by the counter-batteries; and one might well ask if this German activity was not a new dodge. Another place, in fact was being built at Leugenboom (3200 meters to the North of Couckelaere).

The emplacement of Leugenboom was noted for the first 66time the 7^th of May 1917 by Captain Jaumotte while making one of his aerial reconnoitrings. He took a photograph of it, which clearly showed the advanced state of the works, the switch line, grafted on a point to a normal gauge, thus forming the junction at Eerneghem, to the state railway line Ostend-Thourout.

Without a doubt the firing on Dunkirk was going to begin again.

The Belgian artillery staff, started at once a plan of action against that urgent threat. The said staff obtained of the 36^th French army corps, which was operating on the Belgian front the aid of two guns of A. L. V. F. (artillerie lourde sur voie ferrée, i. e. Heavy railway battery) two magnificent naval guns of 305 (12 inch.).

These two pieces will be the soul of the counter-battery, they will be upheld in their action by a special group of numerous heavy batteries which will make opposition on all german batteries opening fire on the two heavy guns.

The plan was prepared, but to realise it, important and preliminary works had to be executed, which took five days after Captain Jaumotte’s reconnoitring.

These works consisted thus: first of all, the building of firing emplacements for the heavy artillery; establishing many telephone connections, needed since the creation of the special group, connections which had to perform not only the centralisation of the command, but also a perfect understanding between the director of the firing, the batteries and the observation-posts and the cross registering section, as well as the creation of antennas to receive the messages of aerial observations.

The railway battalion, pushed on after three days of splendid and extraordinary efforts, the works sufficiently far to render the point of Eggewaertscappelle capable of bearing the firing of the heavy guns. The group of telegraphists and telephonists accomplished at the same time, grand and important works of liaison, which altogether constituted the tool of the firing director.

67A firing program was elaborated, a program which led the action on Leugenboom and on the Tirpitz battery (see site n^o 4) at the same time. The firing on the Tirpitz was assured by two heavy guns of 305 in position on the point of Coxyde-Bains.

The 13^th of May, the two heavy guns of 305 were brought to the place of firing which had been chosen—the switch-point of Eggewaertscappelle—and a nice clear day was waited to open action. That beautiful day was longed for right up to the 20^th of May 1917.

The execution of the genuine program was preceded by an independant firing directed on the German observation-post installed in the belfry of Eessen, with a 240 (10 inch.) gun in position at the East of Burg Molen, upheld by the special group. The tower was partially demolished.

About 11 o’clock, the heavy guns of 305 of Eggewaertscappelle fired their first shot on Leugenboom, while the gun of Burg Molen continued its demolishing and blinding work on the enemy’s observation-post. A little while after the guns of Coxyde-Bains entered in action in their turn against Tirpitz battery. The observation of these firings were both terrestrial and aerial.

The firing program was continued the following days when the weather was favourable for observation.

On the 25^th of May, an aerial photograph of Leugenboom position was taken. It did not disclose the least damage to the concrete block, but its clearness sufficiently noted the gun carriage not yet armed, in the centre of the honeycomb which formed the platform.

In order to parry, as might be the case, to a more accurate enemy counter-battery, the railway battalion built or layed out sucessively several sites for heavy artillery firing. It is so, that two sites on the switch point of Eggewaertscappelle, a third at the station of Moerhoek and a fourth on the point of Isenberghe, served as reserve, and were occupied in turns.

The Leugenboom heavy gun entered in action the 27^th of 68June 1917. Between 5 and 10 o’clock, it bombarded Malo-on-sea and Dunkirk. This first action made numerous victims. The shells were of 380 mm.

One shell, amongst others, the first, it is thought, fell on the Casino of Malo, where the general staff of the XV^th British army corps was established: it made twenty four victims, eleven dead and thirteen wounded.

In July 1917, there were several bombardments to be noted on different objectives: Furnes, Dunkirk, Coxyde, Forthem and Alveringhem.

The bombardments of Dunkirk, threatening to become very frequent, alarmed the authorities, and it was decided from the 19^th of July 1917 to create two direct telephone lines at different courses which would join Dunkirk to the Pervyse railway station observation-post, which was particularly well situated.

The starting shots of Leugenboom, heard at the railway station at Pervyse, were in that way instantly communicated to Dunkirk, where the reception posts gave the alert to the town by powerful horns and other alarm engines, thus permitting the population to take refuge in the concrete shelters specially built for that purpose.

In spite of the well studied counter-battery, the Leugenboom gun still continued firing. The lulls, which lasted often long time, gave the hope that a positive result had been obtained. Then after a lapse of one and sometimes two months, the rage of the Germans revived and Dunkirk was again subjected to further attacks.

In 1918, bombardments were very frequent. At certain times, they became even daily, but Dunkirk was not always the objective. In May and notably in June, the firing of Leugenboom was directed on Klein-Leysele and the 27^th of September 1918 on Bergues.

The offensive of Flanders, at last lights up. But the enraged Germans will hold on till the last minute.

It is only on the 16^th of October at 20 minutes to three 69that the heavy cannon of Leugenboom is for ever silenced. In its last spasms of agony it dealt terrible blows to the localities situated behind the front of attack.

At last on the 17^th of October the monster of Leugenboom belongs to us. Our troops neared it, and, passing by it, threw a slightly haughtly look, but certainly encouraged by their grand trophy. Pressed by our soldiers, the Germans had hastily attempted to put their cannon out of action. It was loaded and levelled horizontally, and so it remains to the present day. In that position they hoped that the projectile would touch the concrete mass before being entirely shot out of the tube, and that its bursting would blow up the flight. But their anticipations were not realised; the projectile, instead of being stopped by the mass of concrete, passed through it, making a breach and burst about 800 meters further.

It was a Krupp marine gun of 380 mm. (15 inch), type 1914, n^o 154, of a total length of 17 m. 13 placed on a gun carriage, formed by two formidable tanks, tap rooted in the centre of a concrete pit. This pit has a special shape because, of the conditions the constructors imposed themselves to give it a field of fire of 157°, the axis of which passes by Dunkirk.

The total weight of the piece is 77630 kilos.

The breech has an outer diameter of one meter, the manœuvre is electrical but there exists handles for hand manœuvring. The artillery men were entirely protected by a cabin joined to the gun carriage, built in strong sheet of iron of a thickness of about 50 mm.

The cannon fired a projectile of 750 kilogrammes.

The two heavy guns of Predikboom and Leugenboom subjected Dunkirk to thirty two bombardments, the four hundred and eleven 15 inches shells of which killed one hundred and fourteen persons and wounded one hundred and eighty five.

70

Couckelaere.—Heavy 15 inch gun at Leugenboom.

71

Caeskerke.—Arched communication trench and light railway line (1916).