The marriage of the Princess Royal with the son of
Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange, on May 12, 1641,
took place at an ominous time. Ten days later
Strafford was executed. There can be little or no
doubt, that the eagerness of the King and Queen for
the accomplishment of this union was due to the desire
to secure the goodwill of the Stadholder, and through
him of the States, in the troublous times which they
saw before them. It fulfilled two objects. It gave
satisfaction to the Puritan party in England as being
a Protestant alliance, and it was accompanied by secret
assurances on the part of Frederick Henry of friendly
support to the King in his coming conflict with his
subjects. These assurances, we may well believe, were
very guarded and strictly personal, for no one knew
better than the Stadholder the limitations of his actual
power. The following passage from a letter in the
hand of Sommelsdijk, written March 5 in the name of
the envoys to Frederick Henry, puts the matter very
clearly:
'We have found so much frankness and affection
on the part of the King and Queen for the furtherance
of the marriage, that we have no fear in recommending
your Highness to hasten the departure of Monseigneur
the Prince your son, as much as possible, so as to put
everything in security; for their Majesties have resolved
to push forward without allowing themselves to be
stopped by any machinations to the contrary from
whatever part they come, and whatever they write to
you, upon the good faith and confidence of Mr. de
Heenvliet, remains secret without anything of it escaping
either here or there, for fear lest the cognizance
of it should come to the knowledge of the Parliament.'[46]
William returned to Holland at the end of May
alone, leaving his child-bride for awhile in her parents'
home. But the Grand Remonstrance, the impeachment
of the five members, and other events now
followed in rapid succession, and soon it was seen that
the issues which divided King and Parliament admitted
of no accommodation by peaceful means. Heenvliet,
who was still in England, became the trusted confidant
of the distracted King and Queen, and his letters to
Frederick Henry at this time show how anxious Charles
was to avoid a civil war, if by any concessions that did
not utterly despoil him—'le dèpouiller tout-à-fait'—he
could come to terms with the Parliament. In private
interviews Henrietta Maria was urgent with Heenvliet
to use his good offices, and many times expressed
the hope that should matters come to an extremity
'the Prince would not allow the King to perish'. In
reply the Stadholder impressed upon their Majesties
not to have recourse to arms, for victory was uncertain.
A reconciliation on whatever terms could not but be
to the profit and advantage of the King. Unfortunately
such advice was already too late to be of any avail
(February, 1642).
At the beginning of March Henrietta Maria accompanied
the Princess Royal to Holland. Her real object
was to collect funds and to secure, if possible, the
active assistance of the Prince of Orange. She was
received with much distinction and magnificence, but
her thoughts were not upon the shows of state.
Letter upon letter passed from her to the Stadholder
in his camp, begging him to help her in procuring
supplies of money, arms, men, and munitions of war for
her husband's service. She tried to borrow upon her
jewels, but the Jews would give her nothing without
the guarantee of the Prince. Lords Jermyn and Digby
hurried backwards and forwards upon her confidential
missions, and she had many interviews with Heenvliet,
with whom she had become so intimate during his
sojourn in London. What a picture of the feverish
state of anxiety to which her troubles had brought the
once gay and buoyant Henrietta Maria, is contained
in a report of one of her conversations with him sent
by Heenvliet to the Prince of Orange.
'I confess that this interview has troubled me not a
little. The Queen did not speak to me on the subject
without trembling, and she kept asking me so piteously,
if there were not any hope that by any means your
Highness could be persuaded to assist her, that I am
still troubled at it.'
Frederick Henry did his very best to give all the
help he could, both in his private and official capacity.
He allowed the English officers serving in his army to
return home and join the King's forces, where their services
were of great value. He gave the guarantee she
required for a loan upon the Crown jewels, he advanced
a considerable sum of money out of his private purse,
and he connived at arms and ammunition being secretly
bought and sent to England from Dutch ports; but he
was unable to promise any assistance from the States,
nor indeed could he venture even to suggest it. The
bulk of the Dutch people in the opening stages of the
Civil War took the side of the Parliament, more especially
the Hollanders. The Prince's influence could
still command the support of a majority in the States-General,
but he, like all the Stadholders of his House,
had constantly to struggle with the opposition of the
aristocratic burgher-regents of the towns of Holland,
who controlled the States of that dominant province.
Maurice had crushed by force in 1618 the attempt
of Oldenbarneveldt to claim for each province of the
Union independent sovereign rights, but the spirit of
Oldenbarneveldt survived, and the Hollanders, conscious
of the power of the purse that they possessed,
were ready to thwart the plans and policy of the
Stadholders, though these were supported by the other
provinces, and indeed did thwart them by raising difficulties
in the way of obtaining supplies. Frederick
Henry, during the first decade of his Stadholderate,
exercised a larger personal authority in the direction of
the affairs of the Republic than any of his predecessors
or successors. But during the last years of his life,
prematurely worn out by constant campaigning, he had
continually to confront the bitter opposition of the
town corporations of Holland to that vigorous prosecution
of the war that he desired. The Prince of Orange
then was not his own master, and could not in face of
the strong leanings of a large part of the population, in
Holland particularly, towards the Parliamentary cause
in the Civil War give effect to his own inclination to
lend the King active support in his efforts to suppress
rebellion by armed force.
Matters came to a crisis when, at the end of August,
a special envoy from the Parliament, Walter Strickland,
appeared at the Hague with instructions to protest
against the dispatch of warlike stores to the King from
Dutch ports, and the permitting of officers in the Dutch
service to join his army. The Queen was highly indignant.
The English resident ambassador, Boswell, at
her bidding immediately presented himself before the
States-General to protest and demand that Strickland
should not be received or acknowledged. To the Prince
she wrote, September 6, 1642, begging him to prevent
such an affront being offered to the King, 'for assuredly',
to quote her actual words, 'it would be so great, that
he could never have any friendship with these States
after this; and, God be thanked, he is not yet in such
a state as to be despised.' But although the majority
of the States-General were ready to refuse Strickland
any audience, they were forced by the insistance of the
States of Holland to make a compromise. They would
not admit him to the assembly of the States-General,
but they agreed to send two deputies to confer with him.
The result was, again by the pressure of Holland, that
the States-General declared for strict neutrality, and
forbade the export to either side in the Civil War of
arms or munitions of war. Despite this prohibition,
by the connivance of the Stadholder, friends of the
royal cause contrived to dispatch ammunition and
other stores to Dunkirk, and from thence to ship it to
England. Strickland, having heard of this, ventured
to make a written complaint to the States-General of
the Prince's conduct. Frederick Henry thereupon declared
that such an aspersion was an insult to his person
and demanded satisfaction. The States-General, May 7,
1643, declared thereupon the accusation of Strickland
to be false, and broke off all relations with him.
Henrietta Maria had returned to England the previous
February, never ceasing to the end her tireless
efforts on her husband's behalf. Before leaving she
had broached the project of a second alliance between
the families, that of the Prince of Wales with the eldest
daughter of the Stadholder. It was not a mere ephemeral
project, for the following year a certain Dr. Goff,
who had been chaplain to one of the English regiments
in the Dutch service, was sent over by the Queen, with
a letter in which she says 'from me you will only know
that the King my lord has given me full and authentic
powers to negotiate and to conclude the marriage of my
son the Prince of Wales with Mademoiselle d'Orange.'
With these powers Dr. Goff was entrusted. In his
instructions were contained the onerous conditions,
which must be the price paid for the honour of such
a match. The States were to break with France unless
the latter would consent to give armed assistance to the
King, or in default of this to make peace with Spain,
one of the conditions of such a peace being a promise
of help to Charles. It is needless to say that the proposal
was not acceptable, for the simple reason that
Frederick Henry had no power to comply with the
conditions, even if he had wished. The negotiations,
however, went on all through 1645, although the desperate
state of the King's affairs after the battle of
Naseby rendered any successful issue impossible.
Louise of Nassau became shortly afterwards the wife
of the Great Elector.
In 1644 two envoys, William Boreel and Jan van Rheede,
were sent to England to attempt to mediate between the
King and the Parliament. Their instructions, containing
fifty-seven articles, are dated October 6, 1643, but they
did not actually set out until January 15 following. They
had interviews with Lord Denbigh, Sir Harry Mildemay,
and Sir William Strickland, representing the Parliament,
and afterwards, February 19, an audience with the King
in the hall of Christ Church at Oxford. During the
whole of the year 1644 they remained in England, and
took part in the abortive negotiations of Uxbridge, which
came to an end February 22, 1645. It became now
evident to the ambassadors that they could do no further
good, more especially as the Parliament more and more
showed a disinclination to accept foreign mediation.
After farewell audiences they reached the Hague again,
May 4, 1645, and made their report to the States-General.
It was unfavourable to the attitude of the Parliament.
On being informed of this by their representative,
Strickland, who was again at the Hague, the Parliament
requested him to appear before the States-General and
offer a justification on their behalf in reply to Boreel
and Van Rheede. The States-General, by the votes of
Utrecht, Groningen, Zeeland, and Overyssel against
Holland, Gelderland, and Friesland, refused him admission,
while at the same time they permitted the King's
resident, Boswell, to appear in their assembly and
address them. The Parliament on this had their justification
printed in English and Dutch, and secretly distributed
throughout the Provinces. It was eagerly read,
the mass of the people being in favour of what they
regarded as the cause of civil and religious freedom
against despotic rule, especially as there were many
points of resemblance between the struggle in England
and their own long drawn out struggle against Spanish
tyranny. This marked division of opinion in the Netherlands
effectually prevented any further steps being
taken to interfere in English affairs during the two
next years.
Events, however, had been moving fast during that
interval. On March 14, 1647, Frederick Henry died.
At the very end of his life he had deserted the French
alliance, of which he had so long been a strong advocate,
and had joined his great influence to that of the Province
of Holland in bringing about a separate peace with
Spain. With the increasing growth of the military
strength of France, the project of a division of the
Spanish Netherlands with that power ceased to have
attractions for him. At the time of his death all the
conditions of peace with Spain had been practically
settled, the terms being virtually those dictated by the
Dutch. By the treaty which was actually signed at
Munster, January 30, 1648, Spain, after eighty years of
strife, was at last compelled to recognize the independence
of the United Provinces, and all the conquests
made by Frederick Henry in Flanders, Brabant, and
Limburg remained in the hands of the Dutch, as prizes
of war. At this proud moment in commerce, in sea-borne
trade, in finance, in colonial expansion and enterprise,
in arts and in letters, the Dutch Republic had
reached the zenith of its prosperity. The Civil War in
England had paralysed the energies of its chief rival
upon the seas, and left the way clear for the United
Provinces to step into the very first rank of maritime
powers.
Frederick Henry was succeeded in his posts and
dignities by his son. William II, Prince of Orange, had
only reached his twenty-second year at the time of his
father's death, but he was full of talent and energy, fired
with ambition, eager to emulate the great deeds of his
ancestors, and, if possible, to excel them. His wife,
Mary of England, was still a girl. Haughty in manner,
and exceedingly tenacious of her royal rank, she preferred
always to be styled the Princess Royal, rather
than Princess of Orange. The relations between the
youthful pair were, however, thoroughly sympathetic,
and William was ever ready to lend a helping hand to
his English relations and never made any secret of his
zeal in their cause. His hospitality to them was unbounded,
and his purse open. First, the Duke of York
made his escape from England to Holland, April, 1648,
and he was followed by the Prince of Wales in July.
As the Queen of Bohemia was still residing at the Hague
with her daughters, quite a family party were assembled
at the Court of William and Mary. The Prince of
Wales, who was courteously received by a deputation
of the States-General, found a loyal squadron assembled
at Hellevoetsluys, of which he assumed command. He
also raised some troops for his service in the islands of
Borkum and Juist. There was at one time danger of a
collision in Dutch waters between the royal ships and
a Parliamentary squadron under the Earl of Warwick.
The Parliament dispatched an envoy, Dr. Doreslaar,
a native of Enkhuysen, who had settled in England and
had become Professor of History at Cambridge, to protest
against the protection and assistance accorded to
the royalists. The States-General refused to grant him
an audience. Towards the close of the year, Walter
Strickland was again sent to the Hague, furnished with
fresh credentials, to join Dr. Doreslaar and demand in
the name of the Parliament that the royal fleet should
not be furnished with arms and stores in Dutch harbours.
He was escorted by Lord Warwick, with a fleet of
twenty-one ships. The States-General took steps to
prevent a hostile encounter between the rival fleets, but
could not be moved even to give a hearing to the
Parliament's request. The States of Holland, however,
received Doreslaar, and passed a resolution forbidding
the royal ships and stores to remain in the harbours
of that province.
The news of the impending trial of Charles I for
high-treason caused consternation in the States, and
especially in Orangist circles. The Prince of Wales
himself, who had now handed over the command of
his fleet to Prince Rupert and was residing with his
brother-in-law at the Hague, appeared in person before
the States-General to ask them to intercede for his
father. All parties concurred in granting his request,
and it was unanimously resolved that an extraordinary
embassy should be sent to London, and in order to
strip it of any appearance of partisanship, the chosen
envoy was not an Orangist, but Adrian Pauw, lord of
Heemstede, the veteran leader of the Aristocratic-Hollander
party. With him was associated Albert
Joachimi, who through the whole of the Civil War
had remained at his post, as resident ambassador in
London. Besides his credentials, Pauw carried with
him letters for Fairfax, Cromwell, and other Parliamentary
leaders. The embassy was received with
courtesy Feb. 5/Jan. 26, 1649, and Pauw pressed for
an immediate audience. It was too late. On the
following day the death sentence was pronounced.
The envoys now approached, Sunday, Feb. 7/Jan. 28,
Fairfax, Cromwell, and others privately, asking for
a respite of the sentence, but failed to get any definite
answer. On the Monday they were granted an
audience at a special sitting of the House of Commons,
and in the name of the States-General, Pauw and
Joachimi read an address interceding for the King's
life, and setting out the reasons for the course for
which they were pleading. A general answer was
given, that what they had said should be considered.
In reality the decision had already been taken for
the public execution of the King the next morning,
Tuesday, Feb. 9/Jan. 30. The ambassadors had their
address translated from French into English, and on
seeing the preparations in Whitehall, again made an
effort to obtain an immediate audience, but they found
the way barred by troops, and knew that the object of
their mission could no longer be achieved.
Not till February 25/15 was an official answer given
to Pauw and Joachimi, in which, after thanking the
States for their friendly intentions, the Parliament
declined to discuss the question of the King's execution.
But at the same time an earnest desire was expressed
for the establishment of a firm peace, a right understanding
and good correspondence between the governments
of the two countries, which had so many common
interests. 'We shall', they said, 'be ever ready not
only to hear but to contribute with them all good
means and offices to fulfil such works as shall be
necessary for the general good of Christendom, as well
as our own.' There can be no doubt that Cromwell's
influence may be seen in this friendly overture.
Cromwell had already given Pauw an assurance in
a private interview of his wish for the establishment
of close relations of friendship with the Dutch, and
had spoken of a proposal being made for giving the
Netherlanders the same commercial privileges in
England as the inhabitants of the country. Already
there was floating before his eyes that idea, which he
was afterwards in a position to try and realize, of
effecting such a close union between the two republics
as would make them into one State.
In 1649 any thought of such a thing was a mere
dream. The news of the King's execution caused
a wave of horror and indignation to sweep over the
Netherlands without distinction of class or party.
The States-General decided unanimously to offer their
condolences to the Prince of Wales and also to congratulate
him on his accession. The Orangists would
have liked his full title to have been given to him of
King of Great Britain and Ireland, but the States of
Holland and Zeeland, who were the most interested
in trade and shipping, opposed this, as they were
afraid of the resentment of the new government in
England. So it was agreed that he should be addressed
simply as King Charles II. To this title he had an
undoubted right, as he had been proclaimed king in
Scotland on his father's death. The States of Holland
separately also sent a deputation to him for the same
purpose. The number of broadsheets and pamphlets
that issued from the press are a proof of how deeply
moved the whole country was at the tragic death of
the English King. What was most remarkable was
the fact recorded by Clarendon[47] as to the change of
attitude among the preachers, who had hitherto been
strongly on the side of the Parliament. 'The body of
the clergy', he writes, 'in a Latin oration delivered
by the chief preacher of the Hague, lamented the
misfortune in terms of as much asperity, and detestation
of the actors, as unworthy the name of Christians,
as could be expressed.' Nevertheless, in order to
avoid an open breach with the Commonwealth, as it
was now styled, Joachimi was allowed to remain, as
the States' resident ambassador in London.
The English Council of State, on their part, determined
to send over once more Dr. Isaac Doreslaar to
join Strickland at the Hague, with instructions to propose
to the States-General the knitting together in
closer relations of the common interests of the two
countries. He arrived May 9. Doreslaar was especially
hateful to the royalists, who were gathered at that
time in large numbers in the Dutch capital, as he had
taken part in the King's trial, and rumour had even
designated him as the masked headsman. It was an
unhappy choice, which had serious consequences.
Three days after his arrival, Doreslaar, as he sat at
table in his hotel, was attacked by five or six men, and
assassinated. The assassins, their work accomplished,
walked off undisturbed. The body was sent back to
England, and was honoured with a public interment in
Westminster Abbey. 'Though all who were engaged
in this enterprise', writes Clarendon, 'went quietly
away, and so out of the town, insomuch as no one of
them was ever apprehended or called in question, yet
they kept not their own counsel so well (believing they
had done a very heroic act) but that it was generally
known that they were all Scottish men, and most of them
servants or dependents upon the Marquis of Montrose.'
The States of Holland, as soon as news reached
them of what had happened, made great efforts to
track the murderers, but in vain, and Joachimi was
commissioned to express their horror at the act, and
to try and appease the Parliament. The Parliament,
on their side, did not feel themselves sufficiently secure
to take decisive action, and Strickland was instructed
to approach the States-General once more with offers
of friendship. But the influence of the Prince of
Orange in the States-General was paramount, and
Strickland was refused an audience. On the other
hand, despite Strickland's protest, the Scottish envoy,
Macdowell, sent by Charles II to announce his accession
to the throne of the northern kingdom, was received
by them. The English Council of State were unable
to regard this conduct in any other light than as
a deliberate insult to them and their representative.
Strickland was recalled, and Joachimi was informed
that unless he was provided with fresh letters of credit
to the Republican Government within a fixed time he
must leave the land. Strickland left Holland, July 22,
1650. Joachimi received orders to quit London,
September 26. All this time the States of Holland
had been doing their utmost to effect an accommodation.
The trade interests of the province with England
were so great that they were most anxious to avoid
a breach with the new Commonwealth. They on
their own authority received Strickland in a public
audience, and even ventured so far as to send a commissary,
Gerard Schaep by name, to London, January 22.
This high-handed act of independence only had the
effect, however, of stiffening the backs of the States-General.
All the efforts of Holland to change their
attitude towards England failed.
The acute differences of view in regard to this
particular line of policy between the self-willed province
and the Stadholder were but the signs of a general
estrangement; and the struggle for predominance was
destined to come to a head at the very time of the
return of Joachimi. The Prince of Orange had been
altogether opposed to the abandonment of the French
alliance and the conclusion of a separate treaty with
Spain in 1648. The peace of Munster had carried
into effect the policy of the States of Holland, and
William II was determined, as soon as he got the
reins of power firmly into his hands, to reverse it.
He entered into secret negotiations with Mazarin for
a renewal of a French alliance against Spain, with the
aim of conquering and partitioning the Spanish Netherlands.
Devotedly attached to the Stuart cause, it was
his intention with French help to try to overthrow the
English Commonwealth and establish Charles II on
his father's throne. His generosity to his wife's exiled
relations was so great that he impoverished himself
and had to raise large loans on his estates. With
ambitious schemes of war and conquest filling his brain,
he found himself speedily in disagreement with the
merchant burghers of the Province of Holland. The
chief interest of the Hollanders was peace, which would
reduce taxation and increase commerce. They had
long grudged the heavy charges of the war, and the
Provincial States, as soon as peace was concluded,
clamoured for the disbanding of a large number of
the regiments, which, though they formed part of the
federal army, were in the pay of the Province of
Holland. William, as Captain-General of the Union,
opposed this, and was supported by the States-General.
Into the details of this contest for supremacy it is
needless to enter here. It was to a certain extent
a repetition of that between Maurice and Oldenbarneveldt.
Armed with the authority of the States-General,
William in the summer of 1650, at the head of a strong
body of troops, forced the States of Holland to submission.
In the previous year Charles, on his departure
for Scotland, had begged the support of the States-General,
and had promised in return to settle favourably
the long-standing differences about Amboina
and Pulo Run in the East Indies, and other questions,
but owing to the opposition of Holland and
Zeeland no active assistance was given. The States-General,
however, as a mark of sympathy and goodwill,
assembled in a body to bid him farewell. The
royal cause had at first prospered in Scotland, until
September 13/3, 1650, when the battle of Dunbar
shattered Charles's fair prospects. But at this very
time his brother-in-law had just brought his contest
with the Province of Holland to a triumphant issue.
William II was now in a position to bring about that
active intervention of the States in alliance with France
in support of the Stuart cause, and for the expulsion
of the Spaniards from the Southern Netherlands, on
which his heart was set. To the Prince of Orange
therefore the eyes of the English royalist party were
turned, as their chief hope in the hour when it seemed
as if nothing could stem the tide of Cromwell's victories.
They were doomed to a terrible disappointment.
William, in the very midst of secret negotiations with
France, suddenly fell sick of the small-pox, and after
a week's illness died, November 6, 1650. He was
but twenty-four, and in him Charles II lost a chivalrous
and true-hearted friend. Eager for fame, gifted with
uncommon abilities, William, had he lived, was undoubtedly
prepared to have put his far-reaching plans
into execution, and to have risked much for the upholding
of his kinsman's rights.
His decease brought about a revolution in the
United Provinces. He left no one of his family to take
his place. His only child was not born until a week
after his death. The Province of Holland straightway
seized the opportunity to assert that predominance
in the Union for which it had been striving so long.
Its leaders at once took steps to call an extraordinary
assembly, known as the 'Great Gathering', to take
into consideration the state of the Union, of religion,
and military affairs. The Great Gathering met at
the Hague, January 18, 1651. The office of Stadholder
was abolished, in all the provinces but Friesland, as
were also the posts of Captain-General and Admiral-General
of the Union. The population and the wealth
of Holland gave henceforth to the States of that
province a position of supremacy in the federation,
and, as in the days of Oldenbarneveldt, all the threads
of administration and the conduct of foreign affairs
passed during the Stadholderless period into the hands
of its chief functionary, the Raad-Pensionaris or Grand
Pensionary.
This complete change in the system of government
of the United Provinces caused much satisfaction in
London. The aristocratic burgher oligarchy, who were
now in power at the Hague, had no special sympathy
for Charles II. Indeed it was embittered against him
at this time, since Prince Rupert's ships from their
head-quarters in the Scilly Islands had been plundering
Dutch merchantmen in their passage up channel. The
Parliament therefore determined to send a special
embassy to propose that close alliance between the
two neighbouring republics, almost amounting to a
political union, which Cromwell had already set before
him as an end to be aimed at for the mutual advantage
of both States. The States-General on their side had,
on the proposal of the States of Holland, determined,
January 28, 1651, to recognize the English Commonwealth
as a free republic, and to receive its envoys,
and Joachimi again went to London to take up his old
post as the resident ambassador of the States.
The English ambassadors were Oliver St. John
and Walter Strickland, the latter of whom, as we have
seen, had spent many years in Holland without being
able to obtain an audience with the States-General.
The Parliament were now determined that their representatives
should make their state entry into the
Hague with a splendour befitting the envoys of so
mighty a power. They were accompanied by a suite
of some 250 persons in brilliant uniforms and liveries,
and travelled in twenty-five state coaches. On
March 27, 1651, the solemn entry took place. The
ambassadors were, however, to pass through the ordeal
of an unpleasant experience. As the procession made
its way through the crowded streets, St. John and
Strickland were greeted with loud cries of 'Regicides',
'Executioners', 'Cromwell's bastards', and other
abusive epithets. No doubt there were many royalist
refugees in the Hague, but though these may have
given the lead to the mob, there can be little question
of the general hostility at this time of the masses of
the people, even in Holland itself, to the Parliament.
It is a common mistake to suppose that the Orangist
was the aristocratic, the republican, or so-called
'States' party, the popular party in the United Provinces.
The States of Holland, which was the stronghold
of the republican party, was entirely in the
hands of the close oligarchic corporations of the chief
towns of the province. In each town a few aristocratic
burgher families monopolized all offices and authority,
the rest of the townsmen had no votes or representation,
and the country people were ignored altogether.
The great influence and executive powers of the
Stadholders of the house of Orange were therefore
a check upon the domination of these burgher oligarchies,
and so by them resented accordingly. On
the other hand, the Princes of Orange were loved and
respected by the people, alike for their high qualities
and the great services they had rendered to the
country, and there was scarcely any time when they
had not the enthusiastic support of the great majority
of those classes, the bulk of the population, who were
excluded from any share in the government of the
State. A knowledge of these facts is absolutely
necessary to a right understanding of what the 'Stadholderless'
régime in the time of John de Witt really
meant.
The parliamentary ambassadors were really alarmed,
remembering the fate of Doreslaar, at this hostile
reception. Neither they nor their attendants dared to
venture into the streets but in parties of five or six and
sword in hand; and everywhere they were followed by
the cry of 'Regicides'. On March 29, St. John and
Strickland presented their credentials before the 'Great
Gathering', and in a long speech expressed the desire of
the English Government for the establishment of good
relations of enduring friendship between the two republics.
'It is the wish of the Parliament to conclude',
they said, 'a closer union of the two States, which would
be for both more advantageous than heretofore, since it
would not be dependent upon the life and will and
private interests of a single individual.' Six commissioners
were appointed by the Assembly to discuss
their proposals, and a conference was opened on April 4.
The grounds on which the English proposed to the
Netherlanders that 'a more strict and intimate Alliance
and Union bee entred into by them, whereby there
may bee a more intrinsecall and mutual interest of
each other, than hath hitherto beene for the good
of both', were: (1) community of religion, (2) community
of political liberty, (3) community of interest in freedom
of trade and navigation. The Dutch, however, showed
themselves very wary. They had no intention of
giving their consent to any general propositions before
informing themselves of their precise meaning. There
was considerable variety of opinion in the different
provinces and much indecision. On April 6, the commissioners
were only empowered to reply, that the
States were willing 'not only to renew the ancient
friendship between the two nations, but also to conclude
a treaty for common interests'. This response
did not satisfy the English envoys, who rejoined that
'the union for common interests' they had in view
'was one closer than at any previous time'. These
words required explanation, but it seemed that they
could only point to an alliance so intimate and binding
as to be another term for coalition. Such was indeed
its meaning in the minds of those who proposed it,
and so the Dutch interpreted it. To them, however,
not unnaturally, the only idea suggested by a coalition
with the English Commonwealth was the loss by the
smaller republic of its independence, and its practical
absorption in the larger. Such an idea was simply
unthinkable to men who had just won the recognition
of their independence after eighty years of heroic
struggle. The reply of the Assembly was not hurriedly
given. At last, on April 26, it came, and was so far
unsatisfactory that, while expressing their readiness for
a closer union, the reservation was made that it must
be one 'in which both States could better promote their
interests for themselves and for the common welfare'.
St. John and Strickland now went a step further, and
gave a hint that if an offensive and defensive confederation
such as they had in mind could be accomplished,
it would be accompanied by many advantageous
concessions to the Dutch. At this point the
negotiations came to an end. The Parliament did not
believe that in the present temper of the Dutch their
proposals were likely to be received in the spirit in
which they were offered, and the ambassadors were
recalled. They and their attendants were constantly
insulted by Royalists and Orangists whenever they
showed themselves out of doors, and though the provincial
authorities strictly forbade such outrages on
pain of severe penalties, and urged the citizens to
assist in the protection of the representatives of a
foreign power, they effected little. Some of the offenders
were of high rank[48], and they openly braved the
threats of the magistracy and remained unpunished.
Earnest representations were now made to the English
Parliament on behalf of the States of Holland by their
agent, Gerard Schaep, who was still residing in London,
that they would allow the envoys of the Commonwealth
to remain awhile longer and continue the negotiations.
The Parliament, however, would only consent to do this
on condition that full satisfaction be made to St. John and
Strickland for all that they had endured, and that the
attacks upon them should cease. The States of Holland
promised to do this. Prince Edward of the Palatine
and other prominent offenders were summoned before
a court of justice, and warned; some of their servants
were punished. It was a sorry piece of business. But
it was an index to the real feeling of the populace that
such a state of things should have been possible in a
town like the Hague.
The negotiations were accordingly renewed by the
presentation of fresh proposals, May 10, by St. John
and Strickland. There was now no mention of coalition,
only of an offensive and defensive alliance, but
there was an ominous addition: both States were
required to bind themselves severally not to permit
the sojourn on their soil of declared enemies of the
other. This was especially directed against the adherents
of the Stuarts and the members of the Orange
and Palatinate families. The great desire of the party
now in power in the Netherlands was the maintenance
of peace. The Hollanders were willing to conclude
a treaty extending their trade privileges, but they were
anxious not to be drawn into the war in Scotland, and
in face of the popular affection for the house of Orange
they dared not venture at the dictation of a foreign
power to treat the young prince and his mother
harshly. They responded therefore, after some delay,
by counter proposals for the renewal of the Treaty
of 1496, the Magnus Intercursus, but revised in favour
of the Dutch to suit present-day conditions. Complete
freedom of trade, navigation, and fishery without pass,
toll, or other hindrances in each other's domains was
what was aimed at. No mention was made of the
English proposal to banish from the Netherlands those
who gave help to the Stuart cause. With such differences
of view there was of course no prospect of any
agreement being reached. The English embassy
accordingly left the Hague, July 31, 1651, and returned
home.
The report made to Parliament created a bad impression
in England, and led to all the old complaints
against the Dutch being raked up once more: the
massacre of Amboina, the seizure of Pulo Run and other
high-handed acts in the East Indies, their monopoly of
the fisheries on the British coasts, their attacks on the
English whalers off Spitzbergen, and their attempts to
drive out English trade from the Baltic, from Russia,
and elsewhere. Then on the top of this the shameful
treatment to which the parliamentary envoys had been
persistently exposed was angrily recalled, the refusal
of the States-General for years to admit Strickland to
an audience, the murder of Doreslaar, and lastly the
insults offered to the latest embassy. All these things
formed a formidable bill of indictment. As the efforts
of the Parliament to effect a close union between the
republics for their common interest had failed, it became
the clear duty of the English Government to take
measures to protect the national interests against unscrupulous
rivals. There was no delay in taking drastic
action.
On October 9, 1651, the famous Navigation Act was
passed, which forbade the importation of foreign goods
and products into English harbours save in English
bottoms, or those of the countries from whence the goods
and products came. A deadly blow was thus struck at
the Netherlanders, who had at that time almost a monopoly
of the most important branches of sea-borne trade
and were the carriers of the world. Scarcely less serious
was the prohibition to foreigners to fish in British waters.
Every infringement of this edict would be punished by
the confiscation of the offending vessels. It has already
been seen in previous lectures of what vital importance
these fisheries were to the welfare of Holland.
The States-General now determined to make a serious
effort to resume the negotiations which had been broken
off, and Jacob Cats, Gerard Schaep, and Paulus van
der Perre were sent on a special embassy to England.
They reached London, December 27. Their task was
a difficult one. They pressed for the revocation of the
Navigation Act and of the embargo upon fishing, and
for the release of the confiscated ships, and proposed
that negotiations should again be set on foot for the
conclusion of a treaty based upon the Magnus Intercursus.
The news at this critical moment that the
Dutch were fitting out 150 new war vessels for the
protection of free navigation did not tend to smooth
the way to an understanding. It was regarded in
England as a threat. The English now formulated
their demands. These were such as they must have
known would never be conceded. They required the
payment of the arrears of toll due for the fishing on
the British coasts, the surrender of the Spice Islands,
the punishment of the survivors of those concerned in
the Amboina massacre, satisfaction for the murder of
Doreslaar, and the payment of the indemnities due for
losses sustained by Englishmen at the hands of the
Dutch in various parts of the world. It is clear that
these demands were practically an ultimatum. The
Netherlanders were required to choose between coalition
or humiliation, and in case neither were accepted,
war. Both sides were, however, averse to taking the
final step, and conferences and negotiations still dragged
on for some months, while strenuous preparations were
at the same time being made on both sides of the
Channel for hostilities. It was a dangerous situation,
and was made wellnigh desperate by a conflict which
took place off Folkestone, May 19, 1652, between the
Dutch fleet under Tromp and an English squadron
under Blake, through a misunderstanding about the
question of striking the flag. This event excited public
opinion in England to fever pitch, and made war practically
inevitable. The Dutch Government, however,
knew that they were not prepared for such a mighty
conflict. The peace party in Holland had insisted on
the disbanding of a large part of the land forces after
the death of William, and the navy had been neglected
and was far from being as formidable as a few years
before. In all haste therefore the experienced Adrian
Pauw, now holding the important post of Grand Pensionary
of Holland, was sent over to London to join
Cats, Schaep, and van Perre, and endeavour even at
the last moment to avoid a final breach between the two
nations. His efforts proved vain, for the English would
not give way in their demands for conditions too humiliating
for the Netherlanders to accept. The 'States' party
in power had, in fact, not a free hand, even had they
been inclined to preserve peace at the cost of submission
to English dictation, for the Orangists were delighted
at the thought of trying conclusions with the
hated Commonwealth, and they had strong support
throughout the country. The fear of a revolution
compelled the States-General to refuse the only terms
by which war could be avoided. The die was cast.
The Dutch ambassadors left England, June 30, and
the struggle between the two maritime powers for
supremacy, which had been so frequently imminent
but so long delayed, at last began.
