Two great questions front all students of the social sciences:
What happened? Why? History attempts to deal mainly with
the first. It gathers the scattered traces of events and fills the archives
of civilization with their records. Its science sifts the evidence
and prepares the story. Its art recreates the image of what
has been, and “old, forgotten, far-off things” become once more the
heritage of the present. Though no magic touch can wholly restore
the dead past, history satisfies in considerable part the curiosity
which asks, “What happened?” But “Why?” What forces have
been at work to move the latent energies of nations, to set going
the march of events? What makes our revolutions or our tory
reactions? Why did Rome fall, Christianity triumph, feudalism
arise, the Inquisition flourish, monarchy become absolute and of
divine right, Spain decline, England emerge, democracy awaken
and grow potent? Why did these things happen when or where
they did? Was it the direct intervention of an overruling Providence,
for whose purposes the largest battalions were always on the
move? Or are the ways past finding out? Do the events themselves
reveal a meaning?
These are not simply questions for philosophers. Children insist
upon them most. He is a lucky story-teller whose Jack-the-Giant-Killer
or Robin Hood is not cut through, time and again,
by the unsatisfied curiosity as to why the beanstalk grew so high,
why Jack wanted to climb, why Robin Hood lived under a greenwood
tree, etc. Many a parental Herodotus has been wrecked on
just such grounds. The problem for the philosopher or scientist
is the same as that brought forward by the child. The drama of
history unrolls before our eyes in more sober form; our Robin
Hoods become Garibaldis, our Jack-the-Giant-Killer a Napoleon,
but we still have to ask how fortune and genius so combined to
place southern Italy in the hands of the one, Europe at the feet of
the other. Not only is the problem the same, but we answer it in
the same way. Here, at once, we have a clue to the nature of interpretation.
For any one knows that you answer the child’s
“Why?” by telling another story. Each story is, in short, an explanation,
and each explanation a story. The school-boy’s excuse
for being late is that he couldn’t find his cap. He couldn’t find his
cap because he was playing in the barn. Each incident was a cause
and each cause an incident in his biography. In like manner most
of the reasons we assign for our acts merely state an event or a condition
of affairs which is in itself a further page of history. At last,
however, there comes a point where the philosopher and the child
part company. History is more than events. It is the manifestation
of life, and behind each event is some effort of mind and will,
while within each circumstance exists some power to stimulate or
obstruct. Hence psychology and economics are called upon to
explain the events themselves. The child is satisfied if you account
for the career of Napoleon by a word “genius,” but that merely
opens the problem to the psychologist. The child in us all attributes
the overthrow to the hollow squares of Waterloo, but the economist
reminds us of the Continental System and the Industrial Revolution
which made Waterloo possible.
The process of interpreting history, therefore, involves getting
as much as possible out of history, psychology and economics—using
economics in the widest possible sense as the affective material
background of life. This does not get to final causes, to be sure.
It leaves the universe still a riddle. Theologians and metaphysicians
are the only ones who attempt to deal with final causes as
with final ends. Certainly historians cannot follow them in such
speculations. The infinite lies outside experience, and experience
is the sphere of history. When we talk of the interpretation of
history, therefore, we do not mean its setting in the universe, but a
knowledge of its own inner relationships. We confine ourselves to
humanity and the theatre of its activities. But within this realm
of mystery man exists, acts and thinks—or thinks he does—which
is all the same for historians; and these thoughts and deeds
remain mostly un-understood, even by the actors themselves. Here
is mystery enough, mystery which is not in itself unknowable but
merely unknown. The social sciences do not invade the field of
religion; they have nothing to do with the ultimate; their problems
are those of the City of Man, not of the City of God. So the
interpretation of history can leave theology aside, except where
theology attempts to become historical. Then it must face the
same criticism as all other histories. If the City of God is conceived
of as a creation of the processes of civilization, it becomes as
much a theme for scientific analysis as the Roman Empire or the
Balkan Confederacy. If theology substitutes itself for science it
must expect the same treatment as science. But our search for
historic “causes” is merely a search for other things of the same
kind—natural phenomena of some sort—which lie in direct and
apparently inevitable connection. We interpret history by knowing
more of it, bringing to bear our psychology and every other
auxiliary to open up each intricate relationship between men, situations
and events.
This is our first great principle. What do we mean by the
“meaning” of anything but more knowledge of it? In physics or
chemistry we enlarge our ideas of phenomena by observing how
they work, what are their affinities, how they combine or react.
But all these properties are merely different sides of the same thing,
and our knowledge of it is the sum total of our analysis. Its meaning
has changed, as our knowledge enlarges, from a lump of dirt to
a compound of elements. No one asks what an element is, because
no one can tell—except in terms of other elements. The
interpretation, therefore, of physical phenomena is a description
of them in terms of their own properties. The same thing is true
of history, only instead of description we have narrative. For history
differs from the natural sciences in this fundamental fact,
that while they consider phenomena from the standpoint of Space,
history deals with them from the standpoint of Time. Its data
are in eternal change, moving in endless succession. Time has no
static relationships, not so much as for a second. One moment
merges into the next, and another has begun before the last is ended.
The old Greeks already pointed out that one could never put his
foot twice into the same waters of a running stream, and never has
philosophy insisted more eloquently upon this fluid nature of Time
than in the writings of Professor Bergson. But whatever Time
may be in the last analysis it is clear that whereas physics states
the meaning of the phenomena with which it deals in descriptions,
history must phrase its interpretations in narrative—the narrative
which runs with passing time.
Hence history and its interpretation are essentially one, if we
mean by history all that has happened, including mind and matter
in so far as they relate to action. Any other kind of interpretation
is unscientific. It eludes analysis because it does not itself analyze,
and hence it eludes proof. So theological dogma, which may or
may not be true, and speculation in metaphysics are alike outside
our problem. Indeed, when we come down to it, there is little difference
between “What has happened?” and “Why?” The
“Why?” only opens up another “What?” Take for example a
problem in present history: “Why has the price of living gone
up?” The same question might be asked another way: “What
has happened to raise prices?” The change in the form of sentence
does not solve anything, for who knows what has happened? But
it puts us upon a more definite track toward our solution. We
test history by history.
The earliest historical narrative is the myth. It is at the same
time an explanation. It is no mere product of imagination, of the
play of art with the wayward fancies of childlike men. Myths,
real genuine myths—not Homeric epics composed for sophisticated,
critical audiences—are statements of “facts” to the believer.
They are social outputs, built up out of experience and
fitted to new experiences. The long canoes are swept to sea by
the north-east hurricane, and year by year in the winter nights at
the camp-fires of those who go by long canoes the story is repeated,
over and over again, until the sea is left behind or a new race brings
triremes with machinery in the inside. So long as the old society
exists under the old conditions the myth perpetuates itself; but
it also gathers into it the reflex of the changing history. It therefore
embodies the belief of the tribe, and this gives it an authority
beyond the reach of any primitive higher criticism. Appealed to as
the “wisdom of our fathers,” as the universally accepted and therefore
true—quod semper quod ab omnibus—it becomes a sort of creed
for its people. More than a creed, it is as unquestioned as the
world around and life itself. The eagle of Prometheus or of the
Zuñi myths is as much a part of the world to Greeks and Zuñis as
the eagle seen yonder on the desert-rim. The whole force of society
is on the side of myth. The unbeliever is ostracized or put to
death. What would have happened to the man who should have
dared to question the literal narrative of Genesis in the thirteenth
century, has happened in some form in every society. The Inquisition,
we are told, was merely a refinement of lynch law. In
any case it would never have been effective without popular support.
The heretics of all ages suffer because the faith they challenged
is the treasured possession of their society, a heritage in which
resides the mysterious efficacy of immemorial things.
Now it is a strange fact that most of our beliefs begin in prior
belief. It does not sound logical, but it remains true that we get
to believing a thing from believing it. Belief is the basic element in
thought. It starts with consciousness itself. Once started, there
develops a tendency—“a will”—to keep on. Indeed it is almost
the strongest tendency in the social mind. Only long scientific
training can keep an individual alert with doubt, or, in other words,
keep him from merging his own beliefs in those of his fellows. This
is the reason that myth has so long played so momentous a rôle in
the history of the human intelligence—by far the largest of any
one element in our whole history. Science was born but yesterday.
Myths are millenniums old. And they are as young today as in
the glacial period. Heroes and victims share the stage of the drama
of history with those uncanny Powers that mock at effort or exalt
the weak, and trick with sudden turns the stately progress of society.
Wherever the marvellous event is explained by causes more
marvellous still, where the belief is heightened by basing it upon
deeper mysteries, we are following the world-old method of explaining
by the inexplicable.
Myths are unsatisfactory as explanations for various reasons,
but the main one is that human events are subordinated to the supernatural
in which they are set. This means that normal events of
daily life are generally passed unnoticed, and attention is concentrated
upon the unusual and abnormal. It is in these that the
divine or diabolic intervenes. They are preëminently—as we
still say of railway accidents—acts of God. So the myth neither
tells a full story, with all the human data involved, nor directs to
any natural sequence of events. Sickness and consequent catastrophe
are not attributed to malarial mosquitoes—such as filled
the temples of Æsculapius with suppliants and depleted Greece
of citizens. All misfortune is due to broken taboos. When Roman
armies are defeated the question is, “Who has sinned and how?”
When death comes to the Australian bushman, there is always
black magic to account for it. And pontiffs and medicine men
elaborate the mythology which explains and justifies the taboos.
That is not to say that myths are the creations of priests. The
creation is the work of the society itself. The priest merely elaborates.
The initial belief resides in the nerves of primitive men, the
fear of the uncanny, the vague apprehension which still chills us
in the presence of calamity. Social suggestion is responsible for
much of it—we tremble when we see the rigid fear on the faces of
those beside us. When some one whispers in the dark, “Isn’t it
awful?” “It” suddenly thrills into being, like a ghost. Voltaire
was wrong to attribute the origin of these beliefs of superstition to
priestcraft. The priest merely took hold of the universal beliefs
of his people and gave them form and consistency, as the minstrel
wove them into poetry. The scruple about entering the dark
wooded slopes beyond the village grain-fields is enough to people
it, for most of us, with all uncanny things. If you are the kind of
person to have scruples about entering a wood by night, you are
the kind to appreciate the possibilities of lurking danger in its
shadows and moving presences in its thickets. So on a night, when
the moon is high and the wind is still, you may hear the hounds and
the wolf-packs of the wild hunters—of Diana and Mars. It needs
no priestly college to convince us of that. The wood and the
wolves and our own nerves are enough. But the priestly college
develops the things of night into the stuff for history; and centuries
after the howling wolves have disappeared from the marshes
around Rome the city cherishes, to the close of its history, the myth
of its founding.
Men first tell stories. Then they think about them. So from
mythology, the ancients proceeded to philosophy. Now philosophy
is a wide word. For some of us it means keen criticism of fundamental
things. For others it is a befuddled consideration of unrealities.
But whatever it may be now, philosophy came into the
antique world as science, critical analysis, and history was but
another name for it. The “inquiry” of those Ionian logographoi
who began to question Homer, in the sixth century before Christ,
was a challenge and interpretation of myth. So, all through its
history, history has demanded of its students denial rather than
acceptance, skepticism rather than belief, in order that the story of
men and empires be more than a myth. But the tendency to believe
and accept is so strongly impressed upon us from immemorial social
pressures that few have risen to the height of independent judgment
which was the Greek ideal. Criticism, in the full sense of the word,
is an interpretation. To reject a story means that one constructs
another in its place. It establishes that certain things did not
happen because certain other ones did. So the Greeks corrected
myths, and in doing this made history more rational. Man came
into the story more and the gods receded.
One may distinguish two phases of philosophic interpretation
of history, that in which the philosophy is in reality a theology and
that in which it is natural science. In the first phase we are still
close to myth. Myth places the cause of events in Mystery of
some sort—deities, demons, the Fates or Fortune. Early philosophy
proceeds upon these assumptions, which also penetrate most
antique histories. Even Polybius, hard-headed, much-experienced
man of the world, cannot quite attribute to natural causes the rise
of Rome. Fortune, that wayward goddess of Cæsar, had something
to do with it—how much it would be hard to say. Livy
had this myth-philosophy to the full; every disaster had its portent,
every triumph its omen. This was the practical philosophy
of all but the few calm thinkers whose skepticism passed into the
second phase, which reached all the way from an open question
whether or not the gods interfered in human affairs to the positive
denial of their influence. The great source-book for such interpretations
of history is Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, where
one may find in the guise of a theological discussion a résumé of
the various pagan philosophies of history. For the philosophies
of history were more frankly philosophy than history; the question
at issue was the intruding mystery rather than the circumstances
of the intrusion, and one denied or affirmed mainly on a priori
grounds. The denial was not historical criticism and the philosophy
of doubt hardly more genuine historical interpretation than
the philosophy of belief. Its conclusions more nearly coincide
with the demands of scientific research; that is all. But mythology
was not lightly to be got rid of, even among philosophers, and as
for the populace, it merely exchanged one myth for another, until
finally it could take refuge in theology. The bold infidelity of a
Lucretius was too modern for the age which was to give birth to
Christianity, and the Voltaires of antiquity were submerged in a
rising sea of faith.
Moreover there were two reasons why antique philosophy could
not accomplish much. It lacked the instruments by which to penetrate
into the two centres of its problem: psychology, to analyze the
mind, and experimental laboratories, to analyze the setting of life
or life itself. It had some knowledge of psychology, to be sure,
and some experimental science, but relatively little; and it never
realized the necessity for developing them. It sharpened the reason
to an almost uncanny degree, and played, like a grown athlete,
with ideas. But it followed the ideas into their ideal world and
left this world unaccounted for. Above all, it knew practically
nothing of economic and material elements in history. Even a
Thucydides has no glimpse of the intimate connection between
the forces of economics and of politics. History for him is made
by men, not by grain-fields and metals. It was not until the nineteenth
century—just the other day—that economic factors in
historical causation were emphasized as playing a rôle comparable
to that of man himself. Thucydides did not realize how commercial
and industrial competition could rouse the rivals of Athens to
seek her overthrow. Polybius felt that Fortune was a weak excuse
to offer for Rome’s miraculous rise and fell back upon the peculiar
excellence of her constitution. Both were rationalists of a high
order, but they never extended their history—and therefore their
interpretation—beyond politics. The gods tend to disappear,
and mankind to take their place. But it is an incomplete mankind,
rational beings moved by ideas and principles; not economic animals
moved by blind wants and fettered by the basest limitations.
In short, a political man is the farthest analysis one gets. But
even Aristotle never knew how many things there were in politics
besides politics. The extent of the interplay of material forces
upon psychological lay outside his ken.
Upon the whole, then, there is almost nothing to learn from
antique interpretations of history. They interest us because of
their antiquity and their drift from the supernatural to the natural.
But they did not achieve a method which would open up the natural
and let us see its working. They are of no service to us in our own
interpretations.
Christianity dropped all this rationalist tone of the Greeks, and
turned the keen edge of Greek philosophy to hew a structure so
vast in design, so simple in outline, that the whole world could understand.
History was but the realization of religion—not of various
religions, but of one; the working out of one divine plan. It was
a vast, supernatural process, more God’s than man’s. It was no
longer a play of rival forces, the gods of Rome against those of Veii
or the Baalim against Jahveh. But from all eternity the drama
had been determined by the Wisdom that was infinite, and it was
being wrought out by an almighty arm. Baal and Jupiter are
creatures and puppets, like mere men. History has only one interpretation.
Rome—city and empire—is the spoil of the barbarian,
the antique world is going to pieces, all its long heritage
of culture, its millenniums of progress, its arts and sciences are
perishing in the vast, barbaric anarchy: why? There is one answer,
sufficient, final—God wills it. No uncertain guesses as to
the virtue of peoples, weights of battalions, resources of countries,
pressures of populations, wasteful administrations, black deaths,
impoverished provinces. There is sin to be punished. The pagan
temples of the ancient world, with their glories of art shining on
every acropolis, are blasphemy and invite destruction. Philosophers
and poets whose inspiration had once seemed divine now
seem diabolic. Those who catch the vision of the new faith, shake
off the Old World as one shakes off a dream. Talk of revolutions!
No doctrines of the rights of man have caught the imagination with
such terrific force as these doctrines of the rights of God, which
from Paul to Augustine were clothed with all the convincing logic
of Hellenic genius and Roman realism. It is hard for us Christians
to realize the amount of religion which Christianity injected into
the world; not merely among the credulous populace, on the religious
qui vive, but among thinking men. It saturated philosophy
with dogma and turned speculation from nature to the supernatural.
The earliest Christians cherished the belief that the world was
soon to end and lived under the shadow of the day of doom. As
time went on, this millennial hope seemed to grow fainter; but in
reality it merely took a more rigid form. It became the structural
heart of the new theology. The pageant of history, which had
seemed so gloriously wonderful, so inspiring to a Polybius back in
the old heroic days, was now a worn and sorry thing. It had no
glory nor even any meaning except in the light of the new dispensation.
On the other hand the new patria, the Civitas Dei, transcending
all earthly splendor, was absorbing, not merely the present
and the future, but the past as well. For all the tragic lines of war
and suffering were now converging. All the aimless struggling was
now to show its hidden purpose. In Christianity, the story of
nations, of politics, economics, art, war, law—in short of civilization—culminated,
and ceased!
Such was the thought which underlay all Christian apologetic
theology from the first. But it received its classic statement in
the City of God by Augustine, written when the city of Rome had
fallen, and—if it were not for the heretics and the barbarians—the
claims of theology seemed almost realizable. For a thousand
years and more it was the unquestioned interpretation of the meaning
of history, easily adaptable to any circumstance because it
covered all. It still is found wherever pure theology satisfies historical
curiosity. That includes—or has included—not merely
theologians but most other people, for however slight has been
the interest in theology it has been greater than the interest in
scientific history, at least until recent times. Religion has supplied
the framework of our thought, and the picture of our evolution.
The most influential historians of Europe have been the parish
priests. In every hamlet, however remote, for the lowly as for
those of high degree, they have repeated the story week after week,
century after century. Greek writers and thinkers, mediæval
minstrels and modern journalists can hardly match their influence
upon the mind of the mass of men. Their tale itself was an unrivalled
epic, dark with the supreme central tragedy upon which
Christendom itself rested, rising to the keenest voicing of the hopes
of life. Its very element was miracle. No fairy story could rival
its devious turns, while at the same time the theme swept over the
whole path of history—so far as they knew or cared. It was the
story of a chosen people, of divine governance from creation to the
founding of their own church, guarded in a sacred book and interpreted
from a sacred tongue.
Slowly, however, the setting of the Church had changed. The
vision of the day of judgment died away almost altogether. Men
who dared to dream apocalypses—like Joachim of Flora—or
their followers were judged heretics by a church which had planted
itself in sæculo and surrounded itself with all the pomp and circumstance
of temporal power. There was still a lingering echo of the
older faith, heard most often in the solemn service for the dead.
So long as the universe was ptolemaic—the world of Dante and of
Milton—the heavy chord of dies iræ would cut in upon the growing
interest in the world itself. But once the crystalline sphere was
shattered by Copernicus and Galileo, and the infinite spaces were
strewn with stars like our own, the old idea of a world to “shrivel
like a parched scroll” had to be revised and readjusted, and with
it the simple conception of the divine purpose, centred upon the
centre of things, and working by direct intervention through constant
miracle. There was no sudden revolution, the old ideas were
too firmly fixed for that. Moreover, science began to challenge
the theological history of the universe before it challenged the
theological history of man himself. But when geology began to
bring in evidence of the age of our residence, and physics achieved
the incredible feat of weighing the forces and determining the conditions
which held the worlds together, then the details of the scheme
of Augustine had to be recast as well. From Augustine to Bossuet
one may trace an almost unbroken line of theological interpretations.
But some, at least, of the generation which listened to Bossuet were
also to watch Bolingbroke and Voltaire whetting the weapons of
rationalist attack.
Now what is the weakness of the theological interpretation of
history? It is of the same character as that we have seen in the
myth. The interpretation is outside of history altogether. Grant
all that theology claims, that Rome fell and England arose, that
America was discovered, or was so long undiscovered, because
“God wills it.” That does not enlarge our knowledge of the process.
It satisfies only those who believe in absolutely unqualified
Calvinism—and they are becoming few and far between. If man
is a free agent, even to a limited degree, he can find the meaning
of his history in the history itself—the only meaning which is of
any value as a guide to conduct or as throwing light upon his actions.
Intelligent inquiry has free scope within a universe of ever-widening
boundaries, where nature, and not supernature, presents its sober
phenomena for patient study.
This patient study, however, had not yet been done when the
eighteenth-century deists attacked the theological scheme, and
their philosophy shares to some extent the weakness of the antique,
in its ignorance of data. Natural law took the place of an intervening
Providence; history was a process worked out by the forces
of nature moving uniformly, restless but continuous, unchecked,
inevitable. The process comprised all mankind; no chosen people,
implying injustice to those not chosen; no miracles disturbing the
regularity of nature. This was an advance toward future understanding
because it concentrated attention upon nature and the
method of evolution, yet in itself it cast but little light upon the
problem. For it did not explain details. One sees its failure most
where it risked hypotheses with most assurance, in its treatment of
religion. It would not do for philosophers to admit that religion—at
least of the old, historic type—was itself one of the laws of
nature, implanted in humanity from the beginning. Consequently
it was for them a creation of priestcraft. No dismissal of its claims
could be more emphatic. Yet the old theologies have since proved
that they have at least as many natural rights in society as the
criticism of them, and now, with our new knowledge of primitive
life, dominated by religion as we see it to be, we cast aside the rationalist
conception as a distortion of history almost as misleading as
those of the mythology it tried to dispose of.
But the work of Voltaire and his school, in disrupting the old
authority of Church and Bible—bitterly denounced and blackly
maligned as it has been—is now recognized by all thinking minds,
at least by all leaders of thought, to have been an essential service
in the emancipation of the human intellect. The old sense of
authority could never afterwards, as before, block the free path of
inquiry; and the Era of Enlightenment, as it was fondly termed,
did enlighten the path which history was to take if it was to know
itself. The anti-clerical bias of Hume and Gibbon is perhaps all
the casual reader perceives in them. But where among all previous
historians does one find the attitude so genuinely historical? Moreover,
in Hume we have the foundations of psychology, and a criticism
of causality which was of the first importance. It would be
tempting to linger over these pioneers of the scientific spirit, who
saw but could not realize the possibilities of naturalism. Their
own achievement, however, was so faulty in just this matter of
interpretation, that it was not difficult for the reaction of the early
nineteenth century to poke holes in their theories, and so discredit—for
the time being—their entire outlook.
Before Voltaire had learned in England the main lines of his
philosophy, a German-Scottish boy had been born in Königsberg,
in Prussia, who was destined to exercise as high if not as extended a
sovereignty over the intellect of the nineteenth century. Immanuel
Kant, however, was of a different type. He fought no ringing
fights with the old order. He simply created a new realm in metaphysics,
where one could take refuge and have the world as his own.
The idea dominates. Space and time, the a priori forms of all
phenomena, lie within us. Mathematics is vindicated because the
mind can really master relationships, and the reason emerges from
its critique to grapple with the final problem of metaphysics. This
at first sight has little to do with interpreting history, but it proved
to have a great deal to do with it. The dominance of ideas became
a fundamental doctrine among those who speculated concerning
causation in history, and metaphysics all but replaced theology as
an interpreter.
One sees this already in the work of the historian’s historian of
the nineteenth century, Leopold von Ranke. To him each age and
country is explicable only if one approaches it from the standpoint
of its own Zeitgeist. But the spirit of a time is more than the temporal
environment in which events are set. It is a determining
factor, clothed with the creative potency of mind. Ranke did not
develop this philosophic background of history, he accepted it and
worked from rather than towards it. His Zeitgeist was a thing for
historians to portray, not to speculate about. History should concern
itself with the preservation of phenomena as they had actually
existed in their own time and place. It should recover the lost data
of the past, not as detached specimens such as the antiquary places
in his museum, but transplanted like living organisms for the preservation
of the life as well as of the organs. Now, where else should
one look for the vital forces of history than in the mind of the actors?
So if the historic imagination can restore events, not simply as they
seem to us but as they seemed to those who watched them taking
place, we shall understand them in so far as history can contribute
to their understanding. In any case this is the field of the historian.
If he injects his own theories into the operation he merely
falsifies what he has already got. Let the past stand forth once
more, interpreted by itself, and we have the truth—incomplete,
to be sure, but as perfect as we shall ever be able to attain. For,
note the point, in that past, the dominating thing was the Zeitgeist
itself—a thing at once to be worked out and working out, a programme
and a creative force. Why, therefore, should one turn
aside to other devices to explain history, since it explained itself if
once presented in its own light?
Ranke developed no further the implications of his theory than
to ensure a reproduction of a living past, as perfect as with the
sources at his disposal and the political instincts of his time it was
possible to secure. But this high combination of science and art
had its counterpart in the philosophy of Hegel. At first sight
nothing could be more absurd than the comparison of these two
men, the one concrete, definite, searching for minute details, maintaining
his own objectivity by insisting upon the subjectivity of
the materials he handles, the other theoretic, unhistorical, creating
worlds from his inner consciousness, presenting as a scheme of
historical interpretation a programme of ideals, unattained and,
for all we know, unattainable. It would be difficult to imagine a
philosophy of history more unhistorical than this of Hegel. Yet
he but emphasized the Idea which Ranke implicitly accepted.
Hegel was a sort of philosophic Augustine, tracing through history
the development of the realm of the spirit. The City of God
is still the central theme, but the crude expectations of a miraculous
advent are replaced by the conception of a slow realization of its
spiritual power, rising through successive stages of civilization.
So he traces, in broad philosophic outlines, the history of this
revelation of the Spirit, from its dawn in the Orient, through its
developing childhood in Asia, its Egyptian period of awakening,
its liberation in Greece, its maturity in the Roman balance of the
individual and the State, until finally Christianity, especially in
the German world, carries the spirit life to its highest expression.
In this process the Absolute reveals itself—that Absolute which
had mocked the deists with its isolation and unconcern. And it
reveals itself in the Idea which Kantian critique had placed in the
forefront of reality and endowed with the creative force of an élan
vital. So theology, skepticism and metaphysics combined to explain
the world and its history—as the working out of an ideal
scheme.
As a series of successive ideals the Hegelian scheme may offer
some suggestions to those who wish to characterize the complex
phenomena of an age or an empire in a single phrase. But it is no
statement of any actual process. The ideals which it presents remain
ideals, not realities. History written to fit the Hegelian metaphysics
would be almost as vigorous a distortion as that which
Orosius wrote to fit Augustinian theology. The history of practical
Christianity, for instance, is a vastly different thing from the
history of its ideals. It is an open question whether the ideal
could ever be deduced from the practice, and not less questionable
whether we are any nearer realization than at the start. There
has been little evidence in outward signs of any such determinant
change in the nature of politics or in the stern enforcement of economic
laws during the history of western Europe. We find ourselves
repeating in many ways experiences of Rome and Greece—pagan
experiences. Society is only partly religious and only
slightly self-conscious. How, then, can it be merely the manifestation
of a religious ideal? Surely other forces than ideals or
ideas must be at work. The weakness of Hegel’s interpretation
of history is the history. He interprets it without knowing what
it is. His interest was in the other side of his scheme, the Absolute
which was revealing itself therein. The scheme, indeed, was a
sort of afterthought. But before historians directed any sufficient
criticism against his unhistoricity, skepticism in philosophy had
already attacked his Absolute. It was the materialistic Feuerbach,
with his thoroughgoing avowal that man is the creature of
his appetite and not of his mind (Der Mench ist was er isst), who
furnished the transition to a new and absolutely radical line of historical
interpretation—the materialistic and the economic.
Materialism has a bad name. It has partly earned it, partly had
it thrust upon it. But whatever one may think of its cruder dogmatic
aspects, the fact remains that interpretation of history owes at
least as much to it as to all the speculations which had preceded it.
For it supplied one half the data—the material half! Neither
theology nor metaphysics had really ever got down to earth. They
had proceeded upon the theory that the determination of history
is from above and from within mankind, and had been so absorbed
with working out their scheme from these premises that the possibility
of determination from around did not occur to them, until the
physical and biological sciences and the new problems of economics
pressed it upon their attention. To the old philosophies, this world
was at best a theatre for divine or psychic forces; it contributed
no part of the drama but the setting. Now came the claim that the
environment itself entered into the play and that it even determined
the character of the production. It was a claim based upon a study
of the details from a new standpoint, that of the commonplace, of
business, and of the affairs of daily life. The farmer’s work depends
upon his soil, the miner’s upon the pumps which open up the
lower levels. Cities grow where the forces of production concentrate,
by harbors or coal-fields. A study of plains, river valleys or
mountain ranges tends to show that societies match their environment;
therefore the environment moulds them to itself. So the
nature of the struggle for existence, out of which emerges intelligence,
is determined by the material conditions under which it is
waged.
This is innocent enough. One might have expected that philosophers
would have welcomed the emphasis which the new thinkers
placed upon the missing half of their speculations. For there was
no getting around the fact that the influences of environment upon
society had been largely or altogether ignored before the scientific
era forced the world upon our view. But no. The dogmatic
habits had got too firmly fixed. If one granted that the material
environment might determine the character of the drama of history,
why should it not determine whether there should be any drama
at all or not? There were extremists on both sides, and it was
battle royal—Realism and Nominalism over again. One was to
be either a Hegelian, booted and spurred, sworn, cavalier-like, to the
defence of the divine right of the Idea, or a regicide materialist with
a Calvinistic creed of irreligion! The total result was that their
mutual opinion of each other brought both into ill repute. Philosophies
of history became at least as discredited as the materialism
they attacked.
Now the materialistic interpretation of history does not necessarily
imply that there is nothing but materialism in the process, any
more than theology implies that there is nothing but spirit. It will be
news to some that such was the point of view of the most famous advocate
of the materialistic interpretation of history, H. T. Buckle.
His History of Civilization in England (1857-1861) was the first attempt
to work out the influences of the material world upon the formation
of societies. Every one has heard of how he developed,
through a wealth of illustration, the supreme importance of food, soil
and the general aspect of nature. But few apparently have actually
read what he says, or they would find that he assigns to these three
factors an ever-lessening function as civilization advances, that he
postulates mind as much as matter, and, with almost Hegelian
vision, indicates its ultimate control. He distinctly states that
“the advance of European civilization is characterized by a diminishing
influence of physical laws and an increasing influence of
mental laws,” and that “the measure of civilization is the triumph
of the mind over external agents.” If Buckle had presented his
scheme politely, right side up, as it were, it could hardly have had
a sermon preached at it! But he prefaced it with his opinion of
theologians and historians—and few, apparently, have ever got
beyond the preface. It was not encouraging reading for historians—a
class of men who, in his opinion, are so marked out by “indolence
of thought” or “natural incapacity” that they are fit for
nothing better than writing monastic annals. There was, of course,
a storm of aggrieved protest. But now that the controversy has
cleared away, we can see that, in spite of his too confident formulation
of his laws, the work of Buckle remains as that of a worthy
pioneer in a great, unworked field of science.
Ten years before Buckle published his History of Civilization,
Karl Marx had already formulated the “economic theory of history.”
Accepting with reservations Feuerbach’s materialist attack
upon Hegel, Marx was led to the conclusion that the motive causes
of history are to be found in the conditions of material existence.
Already in 1845 he wrote, of the young-Hegelians, that to separate
history from natural science and industry was like separating the
soul from the body, and “finding the birthplace of history, not in
the gross material production on earth, but in the misty cloud
formation of heaven.”[2] In his Misère de la philosophie (1847) he
lays down the principle that social relationships largely depend
upon modes of production, and therefore the principles, ideas,
categories, which are thus evolved are no more eternal than the
relations they express, but are historical and transitory products.
From these grounds, Marx went on to socialism, which bases its
militant philosophy upon this interpretation of history. But the
truth or falseness of socialism does not affect the theory of history.
In the famous manifesto of the Communist party (1848) the theory
was applied to show how the Commercial and Industrial Revolutions,
with the attendant growth of capital, had replaced feudal
by modern conditions. This, like all history written to fit a theory,
is inadequate history, although much nearer reality than Hegel ever
got, because it dealt more with actualities. But we are not concerned
here with Marx’s own history-writing any more than with
his socialism. What we want to get at is the standpoint for interpretation.
Marx himself, in the preface to the first edition of
Capital, says that his standpoint is one “from which the evolution
of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural
history.” This sounds like the merest commonplace. Human
history is thrown in line with that of the rest of nature. The scope
is widened to include every factor, and the greatest one is that
which deals with the maintenance of life and the attainment of
comfort. So far so good. But Marx had not been a pupil of Hegel
for nothing. He, too, went on to absolutes, simply turning Hegel’s
upside down. With him “the ideal is nothing else than the material
world reflected by the human mind.”[3] The world is the thing,
not the idea. So he goes on to make man, the modifier of nature,
with growing control over it, but a function of it—a tool of the
tool, just when he has mastered it by new inventions.
But strange as it may seem, Marx’s scheme, like Buckle’s, culminates
in mind, not in matter. The first part is economic purely.
The industrial proletarians—“the workers,” as socialism fondly
terms them—are, like capitalism, the product of economic forces.
The factory not only binds the shackles upon the wage-slaves of today,
it even fills the swarming ergastula of city slums by the stimulation
of child labor. So the process continues until the proletariat,
as a last result of its economic situation, acquires a common consciousness.
Then what happens? The future is not to be as the
past. Consciousness means intelligence, and as soon as the proletariat
understands, it can burst shackles, master economics, and so
control, instead of blindly obeying, the movement of its creative
energy. Whether socialism would achieve the object of its faith
and hope is not for us to consider, but the point remains, that in
the ultimate analysis, even the economic interpretation of history
ends uneconomically. It ends in directing intelligence, in ideals of
justice, of social and moral order.
Where are we? We have passed in review the mythological,
theological, philosophical, materialistic and economic interpretations
of history, and have found that none of these, stated in
its extremest form, meets the situation. Pure theology or
metaphysics omits or distorts the history it is supposed to explain;
history is not its proper business. Materialism and economics,
while more promising because more earthly, cannot be pressed
beyond a certain point. Life itself escapes their analysis. The
conclusion is this: that we have two main elements in our problem
which must be brought together—the psychic on the one hand,
the material on the other. Not until psychology and the natural
and economic sciences shall have been turned upon the problem,
working in coöperation as allies, not as rivals, will history be able
to give an intelligent account of itself. They will need more data
than we have at present. The only economics which can promise
scientific results is that based upon the statistical method, for, in
spite of Bergson, brilliant guesses can hardly satisfy unless they
are verified. The natural sciences are only beginning to show the
intimate relation of life to its environment, and psychology has
hardly begun the study of the group. But one sees already a growing
appreciation of common interests, a desire on the part of economists
to know the nature of the mechanism of the universe whose
working they attempt to describe; an inquiry from the biologist
as to the validity of un-eugenic social reform.
Now the interpretation of history lies here, with these coöperative
workers upon the mystery of life and of its environment, and
their interplay. That does not mean that history is to be explained
from the outside. More economics means more history—if it is
good economics. Marx, for instance, attempted to state both
facts and processes of industrial history, Malthus of population,
Ricardo of wages, etc. Both facts and processes are the stuff of
history. The statement of a process may be glorified into a “law,”
but a “law” merely means a general fact of history. It holds good
under certain conditions, which are either historical or purely
imaginary, and it is only in the latter case that it lies outside the
field of history. It is the same with psychology as with economics.
It supplies an analysis of action, and action is history. Explanation
is more knowledge of the same thing. All inductive study
of society is historical.
The interpretations of history are historical in another sense.
Looking back over the way we have come, from Greek philosophers
to modern economists and psychologists, one can see in every case
that the interpretation was but the reflex of the local environment,
the expression of the dominant interest of the time. History became
critical in that meeting place of East and West, the Ionian
coast of Asia Minor, where divergent civilizations were opened up
for contrast with each new arrival from the south and west and
where travellers destroyed credulity. In the same way, as we have
traced it, the isolated landed society of the Middle Ages, with its
absence of business and its simple relationships, could rest complacent
with an Augustinian world-view. Nothing else was demanding
explanation. When business produced a Florence and Florence a
Machiavelli, we have a gleam of newer things, just as Voltaire and
Hume mirror the influences of Galileo, and the voyages to China.
With the nineteenth century the situation becomes more complicated,
and yet one can see the interpretation of history merely projecting
into the past—or drawing out of it—the meaning of each
present major interest. Kant and Hegel fit into the era of
ideologues and nationalist romanticists; and their implications are
developed under the reaction following the French Revolution.
Buckle draws his inspiration from the trend of science which produced—in
the same year—the Origin of Species. Marx is the
interpreter of the Industrial Revolution.
But this does not mean that interpretations of history are
nothing more than the injection into it of successive prejudices.
It means progressive clarification. Each new theory that forces
itself upon the attention of historians brings up new data for their
consideration and so widens the field of investigation. The greater
knowledge of our world today reveals the smallness of our knowledge
of the past, and from every side scholars are hastening to
make the content of history more worthy of comparison with the
content of science. From this point of view, therefore, interpretation,
instead of assuming the position of a final judge of conduct
or an absolute law, becomes only a suggestive stimulus for
further research.
We have, therefore, an historical interpretation of interpretations
themselves. It accepts two main factors, material and
psychical, not concerning itself about the ultimate reality of either.
It is not its business to consider ultimate realities, though it may
be grateful for any light upon the subject. Less ambitious than
theological, philosophical or even economic theories, it views itself
as part of the very process which it attempts to understand.
If it has no ecstatic glimpses of finality, it shares at least to the full
the exhilaration of the scientific quest. It risks no premature fate
in the delusive security of an inner consciousness. When you ask
it “Why?” it answers “What?”