Weismannism up to date (1893).
Hitherto we have been considering Professor
Weismann’s system as it stood prior to the publication
of his most recent works on Amphimixis and The
Germ-plasm, in 1891 and 1893 respectively. These
later and highly elaborate essays present considerable
modifications of the system, as it stood when the
foregoing criticism was written. But, for reasons
already stated in the Preface, it appears to me
desirable to leave that criticism as it was originally
constructed, and to supply this further chapter for
the purpose of dealing with the large alterations of,
and important additions to, the theory of germ-plasm,
which the maturer thought of its gifted author has led
him to announce.
A few general remarks may be most conveniently
made at the outset.
In the first place, these recent publications present
the advantage over their predecessors of being systematic
treatises, instead of more or less independent
papers. On this account they present a logical
sequence of thought, which renders the task of examination
much less difficult than it was in the case
of the first volume of the Essays.
In the second place, as a result of his more matured
reflection, Professor Weismann has himself perceived
a considerable number of the difficulties and objections
which I have set forth in the preceding chapters.
And not only has he thus anticipated many of my
criticisms; but, as a result of doing so, he has changed
not a few of the most important parts of his previous
system, with the result of greatly improving it.
But, in the third place, notwithstanding that his
remarkable power of speculative thinking is everywhere
united with adequate knowledge in the sundry
branches of biological science with which it deals,
I confess to a serious doubt whether it has not been
permitted to enjoy an undue amount of liberty. If
only they can be laced together by a thread of logical
connexion, hypotheses are added to hypotheses in
such profusion as we are acquainted with in the works
of metaphysicians, but which has rarely been approached
in those of naturalists. The whole mechanism
of heredity has been now planned out in such minuteness
of detail and assurance of accuracy, that in reading
the account one is reminded of that which is given
by Dante of the topography of Inferno. For not
only is the “sphere” of germ-plasm now composed
of nine circles (molecules, biophores, determinants, ids,
idants, idio-plasm, somatic-idioplasm, morpho-plasm,
apical-plasm), but in most of these regions our guide
is able to show us such strange and interesting phenomena,
that we return to the fields of science with
a sense of having been indeed in some other world.
Or, to change the metaphor, if it be the case that
“a true scientific judgement consists in giving a free
rein to speculation with one hand, while holding
ready the break of verification with the other,” I think
it must be admitted that, in as far as he has erred,
Professor Weismann has done so by driving a chariot
which is unprovided with any break at all.
Hence, fourthly, it is needless to follow, even in
epitome, the innumerable windings of these never-ending
speculations. For, on the one hand, it would
be impossible to do so without adding an unduly
extended chapter to our already tediously prolonged
consideration of Weismann’s views; while, on the
other hand, we should have to deal merely with matters
of comparative detail. The additions which have
been made to his theory by his most recent publications
are chiefly concerned with the matter just
alluded to—viz., a minute elaboration of the hypothetical
mechanism of heredity, in accordance with
the general theory of germ-plasm. Without question
this elaboration is everywhere thoughtful, and often
highly ingenious; but until the general theory in
question shall have been satisfactorily grounded, it
seems premature to supply so immense a design of
purely deductive construction. Beautiful though it
may be in its imposing elevation, this drawing of “the
architecture of germ-plasm” must be regarded as
a work of artistic imagination rather than as one of
scientific generalization. From the latter point of
view it is at most a temple in posse, and even if it is
ever to be realized in esse, we cannot allow the actual
building to begin until we are much more sure than
anybody is at present entitled to be touching the
foundations on which it is proposed to rear so great
an edifice.
Again, and fifthly, even if Weismann should ever be
able to satisfy us upon this matter, or fully to demonstrate
his basal proposition touching the perpetual
continuity of germ-plasm, there would still be a far cry
between accepting this sufficiently simple proposition
and supposing that there is any adequate reason for
entertaining so complex a scheme of the structure of
germ-plasm. No doubt Weismann himself would be
quite ready to admit, that from his basal proposition
of the continuity of germ-plasm it is logically possible
to construct many other designs of the architecture of
germ-plasm, besides the one which he has so beautifully
drawn. And although most of such alternative designs
would doubtless embody some one or other of the
features which are presented by his own, no one could
say which features common to any two of the designs
represent the facts. For in the case of all alike
there would be a necessary absence of verification:
the architects would all and equally have to acknowledge
that their imposing pictures of “the palace
of truth” were but imaginary. Such, in my opinion,
has been the case with all theories of the ultimate
mechanism of heredity hitherto published; but the
difference between them and Weismann’s theory in
this respect is, that while most of the others have not
gone into speculative details further than was necessary
as a means of substantiating their basal postulates,
Weismann’s, as now developed in The Germ-plasm, is
mainly concerned with such speculative details as an
end, or object, per se.
But, it may be replied, by thus constructing an
ideal mechanism of heredity Weismann is greatly
strengthening his fundamental postulate of the continuity
of germ-plasm, because he shows how all the
main facts of heredity, and allied phenomena, admit
of being explained if once the postulate be accepted.
If this were urged, however, I should have two remarks
to offer. The first is that Weismann, in constructing
his ideal mechanism, has gone very much further in
the way of elaboration than can possibly be required
for this purpose. So much further, indeed, that his
purpose has evidently been the constructing of his
ideal mechanism, as I have just said, for its own sake,
and not for the sake of substantiating its basal proposition
by showing how well the latter can be made
to work in explaining the phenomena of heredity, &c.
Moreover—and this is my second remark—however
well the basal proposition may be made to work in
this respect, we must not be deceived into supposing
that such a fact is equivalent to a substantiation of
the proposition. This proposition—the continuity of
germ-plasm—is the inverse of that which constitutes
the basis of the theory of pangenesis. For while the
latter assumes that in the last resort it is always
somatic tissues which produce the substance of
heredity, the former simply inverts the terms of this
assumption, and holds that it is always the substance
of heredity which produces the somatic tissues. Now,
in all cases where one theory consists in thus simply
inverting the terms of another, it will be found that
the facts which they both seek to explain lend
themselves equally to explanation by either, up to
some certain and usually distant point, where a crucial
test becomes possible. Take, as an example, the
geocentric and heliocentric theories of the solar
system. Here the question was whether the earth
moved round the sun, or vice versa; and so many of
the facts of observation lent themselves equally well
to either interpretation, that it was very many centuries
before the crucial tests were forthcoming. So, in the
present instance, the question is as to whether the
carriers of heredity move from body-cells to germ-cells,
or vice versa; and it is because the theory
which sustains the latter view has merely to invert
the terms of the one which takes the former, that so
many of the facts of observation lend themselves
equally well to both—as we have seen in chapter III
(pp. 56-59).
Lastly, yet another reason for not considering in
any detail Professor Weismann’s intricate speculations
on the ultimate mechanism of heredity is, that by so
doing I should have found it impossible to avoid
obscuring the main issues. For even Professor Weismann
himself, by the extreme care which he has
taken in fully presenting his scheme of this ultimate
mechanism, has not found it practicable to keep
distinctly before our view the relative insignificance
of such details, as compared with the fundamental
importance of his original postulates. Hence, I have
deemed it best in the present chapter to restrict our
attention to the changes which he has recently made
in these the foundations of his entire system.
For these reasons, then, I will mention only those
main features in the “architecture of germ-plasm”
which it is necessary to understand for the purposes of
the following criticism touching the general theory of
germ-plasm in the most recent phase of its evolution.
To begin with, Weismann has now seen the desirability
of ceasing to designate the ultimate “carriers of
heredity” by the term “molecules.” Indeed, in these
later volumes he has fully anticipated my remarks
touching the use of this term in his previous “Essays[33].”
The result of his more mature reflection may be
presented in epitome thus.
A number of “molecules,” in the proper or chemical
sense of the word, go to form a “biophore,” which is
the ultimate unit of living substance.
A number of “ biophores” go to form a “determinant,”
which is a special element in the germ-plasm,
capable of directing the ontogeny of such and such
a group of cells as is independently variable from the
germ onwards.
A number of “determinants” go to form an “id,”
which is the same hypothetical body as Weismann
has hitherto designated by the term “ancestral germ-plasm.”
That is to say, it is a group of determinants
indissolubly united in phylogeny, and therefore
transmitted by heredity as one complex whole. Ids
are, perhaps, microscopically visible; and, if so, they
probably correspond to the small granules (microsomata),
which are familiar to the histologist in the
structure of chromosomes.
A number of “ids” go to form an “idant,” which
is a chromosome, or chromatin fibre[34].
In my opinion the most important advance which
Weismann has made in his theory by means of this
scheme has reference to the third of these divisions—the
determinant. It is a matter of observation that
every cell of a multicellular organism does not vary
independently: it appears to be always the case that
in the phenomena of variation a smaller or a larger
group of cells is concerned. Now there must be
something that determines the similar and simultaneous
variation of such a whole group of cells;
and, in all cases where such a variation is congenital,
it is certain that this something must be contained
in the substance of heredity. So far, I think, we
must all agree, whether or not we regard this substance
as “germ-plasm.” In other words, whether
we regard the carriers of heredity as proceeding
centrifugally (germ-plasm) or centripetally (gemmules),
it seems to me that we ought to accept Weismann’s
doctrine of determinants. Indeed, pathologists have
already furnished a foreshadowing of such a doctrine
in regard to the phenomena presented by certain
diseases, such as cancer; but it is an important step
to have extended the idea from pathology to biology
in general—and, at the same time, to have given it
a more definite shape than it has hitherto presented.
In Weismann’s hands it serves to render more conceivable—if
not also more intelligible—that process
of marshalling cell-formations, which, be our theories
what they may, is assuredly the most distinctive and
remarkable fact of ontogenetic organization.
Again, as regards the id, I do not see how any one
can attentively read Professor Weismann’s discussion
without acknowledging that, if we once accept his
doctrine of determinants, his sequent doctrine of ids
becomes a logical necessity.
On the other hand, however, I do not see that
such is the case with respect to idants; and still less
do I see any reason for identifying the latter with
chromosomes—even assuming that chromosomes are
the visible repositories of the carriers of heredity[35].
Referring the reader to Weismann’s own exposition
for a full account of these and many other additions
to his general theory of germ-plasm, I will at once
proceed to consider the alterations or emendations of
that theory which have been published in his last two
volumes, and which, as we shall find, have in large
measure anticipated some of the most important points
in the foregoing criticism. Therefore in the following
criticism I will consider seriatim what he has now said
touching all these points, and conclude by offering
some general remarks on the resulting position of his
general system of theories up to the present date.
Pursuing the same method of criticism as that
adopted in the preceding chapters, we will first consider
the further modifications of Weismann’s theory
of heredity, and next those of his theory of organic
evolution.
First of all, Weismann has now profoundly modified
his theory of polar bodies. For, owing to certain
more recent researches of Professor O. Hertwig, he
very candidly allows:—“My previous interpretation
of the first polar body as the removal of ovogenetic
nucleo-plasm from the egg must fall to the ground:
about this there is no possible doubt[36].”
He now regards both polar bodies as concerned in
the same function of removing superfluous germ-plasm.
Therefore one-half of his previous theory is abandoned:
“the ovogenetic idio-plasm” is now supposed to be
simply absorbed in the course of ontogeny, as I had
suggested in one of the preceding chapters (pp. 42-46).
The consequence is that he has now nothing to oppose
to the view which is likewise there suggested (pp. 43-44)—viz.,
that his whole theory of polar bodies is
rendered needless and improbable by the fact that the
very mode in which ova are produced renders ample
provision for the removal of any amount of superfluous
germ-plasm which the theory of germ-plasm may
require.
It is needless to say, after what has already been
said in the pages just referred to, that in my opinion
Professor Weismann has improved his main system
of theories by dropping this part of his subordinate
and, for the most part, separate theory of polar bodies.
I only wish he could have seen his way to dropping
the whole.
Again, he has now fully considered the phenomena
of repair, regeneration, reproduction from somatic
tissues, budding, and graft-hybridization.
Touching the four former he takes the view which
I have supposed that he would (p. 53). As regards the
latter, he fully accepts the fact of an occasional transmission
of characters from one species or variety of
plant to another by mere grafting[37]. But, although the
explanation which he gives of this fact may pass
muster so far as the only case which he deals with in
detail is concerned, I do not see how it can do so
to many others. For the case which he considers is
that of Cystisus adami, where a bud of one species
of Laburnum having been inserted in the wood of
another produced a shoot which presented intermediate
characters; and these have ever since been
propagated by cuttings. Weismann’s interpretation of
the facts here is, “that they were due to an abnormal
kind of amphimixis, so that the idants of both species
were combined in the apical cell of the first shoot[38].”
Now, although this explanation may well apply to
a case of graft-hybridization by means of buds, it
obviously cannot do so to any case where hybridization
is produced by the grafting of woody tissues. For
here there is no “apical cell” in the question; and
therefore the difficulties which I have adduced on
page 82 remain. Possibly Weismann may dispute
the fact of hybridization in any of these cases; but,
as he has not expressly done so, I will not go into
the question of evidence[39].
One important addition to this side of Weismann’s
system has been made in order to meet
the class of difficulties which are presented by the
apparent inheritance of certain climatic variations, as
already mentioned on pp. 67-8. For example, his
own butterflies seemed to render definite proof of
somatogenetic variations caused by changed conditions
of life being transmitted to progeny. Therefore,
it will be remembered, Weismann candidly
admitted, “even now I cannot explain the facts
otherwise than by supposing a passive acquisition of
characters produced by the direct influence of
climate”—i.e., an exactly representative copying in
progeny of characters acquired by parents. I have
already quoted these words in order to show their
logical inadmissibility as used by Weismann. He
cannot be allowed thus to entertain the Lamarckian
factors and at the same time to maintain his theory
of germ-plasm, which excludes them as physiologically
impossible. Doubtless he was himself aware of this,
for he immediately added that “new experiments will
be necessary to afford the true explanation[40].”
The explanation, however, which he now gives is
not based on any new experiments, but on a new
suggestion to the effect that all such seemingly
conclusive instances of the inheritance of acquired
characters are, in truth, illusory. This suggestion is
that “Many climatic variations may be due wholly
or in part to the simultaneous variation of corresponding
determinants in some parts of the soma, and
in the germ-plasm of the reproductive cells.[41]” For
example, if, as Weismann now supposes, determinants
of the same kinds occur in the somatic tissues as well
as in the germ-cells, when a particular spot occurs on
a butterfly’s wing, it has been due to a particular kind
of determinant which in the course of ontogeny was
transmitted from the germ-cell for the express purpose
of controlling the size and colour of the spot. But
a residue of precisely similar determinants was reserved
in the germ-cell (germ-plasm), for the purpose
of determining a precisely similar spot in the next
generation. Hence, if a rise of temperature, or any
other external change, is capable of so acting on the
determinant in the soma as to cause it to impart an
abnormal colour to the spot when formed, a similar
change is likely to be simultaneously effected in the
corresponding determinants which are lying dormant
in the germ-plasm. Therefore, when the latter become
active in the ontogeny of the next generation, they
will produce spots presenting the same variations as
those of the preceding generation. Obviously, however,
there would not be here any transmission of
acquired characters. The change would be “specialized,”
but not “representative.”
No doubt we have here a sufficiently ingenious
method of circumventing an awkward class of facts.
But I should like to make two observations with
regard to it.
In the first place, the suggestion is highly speculative,
and has been advanced solely for the sake of
saving the theory of germ-plasm. There are no facts
adduced in its favour, and it could scarcely be entertained
as in the least degree probable by any one
who has not already accepted the theory in question.
Hence, unless we are to embark on a course of
circular reasoning, we must refuse to accept the
explanation of hereditary climatic variation now
offered, until it shall have been fully corroborated by
the experimental enquiry to which Weismann says he
is now submitting it.
My second observation is, that the suggestion is
not new; but appears to have been derived from
Professor Weismann’s recent study of Mr. Galton’s
Theory of Heredity. At all events, the suggestion is
there presented with sufficient lucidity, thus:—
It is said that the structure of an animal changes when he is
placed under changed conditions; that his offspring inherit some
of his change; and that they vary still further on their own account,
in the same direction, and so on through successive generations,
until a notable change in the congenital characteristics of the
race has been effected. Hence, it is concluded that a change
in the personal structure has reacted on the sexual elements.
For my part, I object to so general a conclusion, for the following
reasons. It is universally admitted that the primary
agents in the processes of growth, nutrition, and reproduction
are the same, and that a true theory of heredity must so regard
them. In other words, they are all due to the development
of some germinal matter, variously located. Consequently, when
similar germinal matter is everywhere affected by the same
conditions, we should expect that it would be everywhere
affected in the same way. The particular kind of germ whence
the hair sprang, that was induced to throw out a new variety
in the cells nearest to the surface of the body under certain
changed conditions of climate and food, might be expected to
throw out a similar variety in the sexual elements at the same
time. The changes in the germs would everywhere be collateral,
although the moments when any of the changed germs happened
to receive their development might be different[42].
This allusion to Mr. Galton’s Theory of Heredity
leads me to consider what Professor Weismann has
said with regard to it in this latest publication,
where, for the first time, he has dealt with it.
In my opinion he has done but scant justice to the
views of his predecessor, and therefore I will occupy
some considerable space in seeking to justify this
opinion.
As already stated, from the time that Mr. Galton
published his theory I have felt that in its main contention
it presents a probably true solution of the main
problem of heredity—viz., to account for the contrast
between congenital and acquired characters in respect
of transmissibility. And this solution, as likewise
already stated, was substantially identical with that
which Professor Weismann published in the next
decade. Indeed, the only important difference between
these two theories of heredity is, that while
Weismann’s excludes on deductive grounds the
physiological possibility of the inheritance of acquired
characters, Galton’s more judiciously leaves to be
determined, by subsequent enquiry of the inductive
kind, the question whether acquired characters are
ever transmitted in faint degrees, or whether they are
never transmitted at all. In addition to this important
difference, however, there are certain others which
seem to me of very little consequence, inasmuch as
they have reference to speculations on the ultimate
mechanism of heredity, or the intimate morphology
and physiology of the carriers of heredity—speculations
which it would be absurd to suppose can be
other than purely conjectural. Therefore in my
previous criticism I did not allude to these subordinate
points of difference, but stated merely, in general
terms, that Galton’s view of the ultimate mechanism
in question was such as to leave room for the possibility
of the occasional transmission of acquired
characters. And in this respect, it still seems to me,
his theory has an advantage over that of Weismann.
No doubt the latter is a much more elaborate and
highly finished piece of work; but beauty of ideal
construction is no guarantee of scientific truth—as we
shall presently find exemplified in a striking manner
with regard to Weismann’s theory of evolution. And
if his theory of heredity, in its final shape, is a much
more precise, detailed, and logically coherent structure
than any which has ever been framed in this department
of biological thought, there is all the more reason
to scan critically the fundamental postulate on which
it rests. Hence I cannot help feeling that it will be
time enough to consider minor differences between
the two theories when the physiological possibility of
the occasional transmission of acquired characters, as
entertained by Galton’s theory, shall have been ruled
out as demonstrably opposed to fact.
Seeing, however, that Professor Weismann thinks
otherwise, and appears to attach as much importance
to differences concerning deductive minutiae as he
does to those concerning fundamental principles,
I will here contrast the two theories somewhat more
in detail than heretofore, and with special reference
to what he has now himself said touching their
relationship.
It will be remembered that the primary or fundamental
difference just alluded to is, that while the
theory of germ-plasm postulates an absolute continuity,
the theory of stirp postulates but a partial continuity,
of the substance of heredity. Hence, according
to Weismann’s view, we must go back to
the unicellular organisms for the origin of this substance
in the multicellular; and we must regard use-inheritance
as physiologically impossible. On the
other hand, according to Galton’s view, there is no
necessity for us to do either of these things. The
origin of stirp is to be found in the somatic tissues of
the multicellular organisms themselves. Nevertheless,
this theory differs greatly from pangenesis, in that the
former supposes the origin of hereditary substance to
be mainly given in the phylogeny of any group of
multicellular organisms, while the latter supposes it to
be given mainly in each ontogeny, Galton’s theory is,
that in each ontogeny only a small part of the stirp
derived from parents is consumed in making the
new organism—the larger part being handed over in
trust for passing on to the next generation, in the
same way as Weismann supposes to be the case with
germ-plasm. Darwin’s theory, on the other hand,
does not entertain any such notion of “continuity”
in the substance of heredity from germ-cell to germ-cell
of parent and offspring; it supposes that in
each successive generation the germ-cells are wholly
supplied with their germinal material from somatic-cells
of each individual organism. Or, adopting our
previous terminology, the three theories may be
ranked thus.
The particulate elements of heredity all proceed
centripetally from somatic-cells to germ-cells (gemmules):
the inheritance of acquired characters is
therefore habitual.
These particulate elements proceed for the most
part, though not exclusively, from germ-cells to
somatic-cells (stirp): the inheritance of acquired
characters is therefore but occasional.
The elements in question proceed exclusively in
the centrifugal direction last mentioned (germ-plasm):
the inheritance of acquired characters is therefore
impossible[43].
Such being the fundamental points of difference
between these three theories of heredity, we have now
to consider more particularly those which obtain
between Galton’s and Weismann’s.
The general doctrine of gemmules (i. e. somatic-cell-germs)
is accepted by Galton; but instead of
supposing, as Darwin supposed, that these minute
bodies freely circulate through all the body tissues,
so that some of them are absorbed from all the
somatic-cells by the germ-cells, and there constitute
the entire mass of hereditary material out of which
the offspring will afterwards be formed, Galton supposes
that gemmules circulate with comparative difficulty,
and that only comparatively few of them gain
access to the germ-cells in each generation. Hence,
characters acquired in the individual lifetime are
much less heritable than those which are called congenital.
For congenital characters are due to the
“continuity” of stirp through numberless generations
in the phylogeny of the organism; hence such
characters are represented by a vastly greater number
of equivalent hereditary elements. Weismann, on the
other hand, rejects the doctrine of gemmules in toto.
Again, according to Galton’s view, “individual
[congenital] variation depends upon two factors;
the one is the variability of the germ[44] and of its
progeny; the other is that of all kinds of external
circumstances, in determining which out of many
competing germs, of nearly equal suitability, shall be
the one that becomes developed. The variability
of germs under changed conditions, and that of their
progeny, may be small, but it is indubitable; absolute
uniformity being scarcely conceivable in the condition
and growth, and, therefore, in the reproduction of any
organism. The law of heredity goes no further than
to say, that like tends to produce like; the tendency
may be very strong, but it cannot be absolute[45].”
Here, of course, there is a wide difference between
stirp and germ-plasm. For while Galton does not
entertain amphimixis among the “factors” of congenital
variation, Weismann, as we are now well
aware, has hitherto regarded it as the sole cause
of such variation. Nevertheless, as we shall presently
find, Weismann has now greatly modified his views
upon this point, and does entertain, in The Germ-plasm,
both the “factors” mentioned by Galton. Hence, the
difference between the two theories in question with
regard to this matter is not nearly so wide as it was
prior to the publication of Weismann’s last work.
The next most important point of difference
between the theories of stirp and germ-plasm has
reference to the mechanism of ontogeny. According
to Galton, this is simply a struggle between all the
carriers of heredity composing the stirp of a fertilized
ovum. It is not, however, a struggle for existence,
but what may be called a struggle for development.
In the fertilized ovum all the carriers of heredity are,
to begin with, in a “latent” condition; but of this
enormous multitude of “germs” or “gemmules,” only
a very small proportional number are destined to
become “patent”—i. e., developed into the tissue-cells
composing the new organism. The vast majority
of the gemmules, or those which fail to be thus developed,
go to constitute the stirp of the new organism
when this has been formed by the development of the
comparatively few successful gemmules. Thus much
understood, the following quotation will be fully
intelligible.
My argument is this: Of the two groups of germs, the
one consisting of those that succeed in becoming developed
and in forming the bodily structure, and the other consisting of
those that remain continually latent, the latent vastly preponderates
in number. We should expect the latent germs to
exercise a corresponding predominance in matters of heredity,
unless it can be shown that, on the whole, the germ that is
developed into a cell becomes thereby more fertile than if it had
remained latent. But the evidence points the other way. It
appears both that the period of fertility is shorter, and the
fecundity even during that period is less in the germ that
becomes developed into a cell, than they are in the germ that
remains latent. Much less then would the entire bodily
structure, which consists of a relatively small number of these
comparatively sterile units, successfully compete in matters of
heredity with the total effect of the much more numerous and
more prolific units which are in a latent form[46].
Thus, Galton’s theory of the mechanism of geny
is a theory of struggle; and this constitutes
a point of difference on which Weismann lays much
stress in his latest work. For, as we know, Weismann
regards the mechanism of ontogeny as characterized
by a peaceful succession of “stages,” which are “pre-determined
from the germ onwards”; and in his latest
work this idea of orderly sequence has been further
elaborated in his doctrine of “determinants.” In
short, to adopt their own metaphors, while Galton
tells us that the mechanism of ontogeny is like that
of a political election, where rival candidates compete
to “represent” the nation (stirp) in Parliament (individual
organism); Weismann likens it to the mechanism
of a well-drilled army, where ultimate carriers
of heredity (privates) are banded together in companies,
regiments, battalions, &c., under the command
of corresponding officers (determinants).
Lastly, there is yet one further point of difference
between stirp and germ-plasm, which is thus stated
by Weismann:—
Galton’s idea is only conceivable on the presupposition of the
occurrence of sexual reproduction, while the theory of the
continuity of the germ-plasm is entirely independent of any
assumption as to whether each primary constituent is present in
the germ singly or in numbers. According to my idea, the
active and the reserve germ-plasm contain precisely similar
primary constituents, gemmules, or determinants; and on this
the resemblance of a child to its parent depends. The theory
of the continuity of the germ-plasm, as I understand it, is not
based on the fact that each “gemmule” necessary for the construction
of the soma is present many times only, so that a residue
remains from which the germ-cells of the next generation may be
formed: it is founded on the view of the existence of a special
adaptation, which is inevitable in the case of multicellular organisms,
and which consists in the germ-plasm of the fertilized
egg-cell becoming doubled primarily, one of the resulting portions
being reserved for the formation of germ-cells[47].
These being the main points of difference between
the theories of stirp and of germ-plasm to which
Professor Weismann has alluded, I will now proceed to
consider them separately, in reverse order to that in
which they have been here stated.
The point of difference last mentioned need not
detain us long, because it seems to me one of very
little importance. “Whether each primary constituent
is present in the germ singly or in numbers” cannot
greatly signify, so long as both theories agree that,
sooner or later, they must be present plurally.
Galton supposes them to be thus present from the
first (i. e. in the unfertilized ovum), while Weismann
supposes them to be so only as a result of their self-multiplication
at a somewhat later stage (i. e. in
the segmenting ovum, and onwards throughout the
procreative life of the individual). Doubtless Weismann
does not suppose that they ever become so
numerous as Galton imagines; but the whole question
is so highly speculative that I do not see how any
useful purpose can be served by debating it. Nor do
I see why Weismann should conclude that “Galton’s
idea is only conceivable on the presupposition of the
occurrence of sexual reproduction.” It is true that
Galton has discussed exclusively the case of sexual
reproduction; but I cannot perceive that any of his
ideas are inapplicable to a-sexual.
Touching the question whether the phenomena of
ontogeny had best be ascribed to a competition
among a vast number of “germs,” or to a strictly
ordered evolution of a comparatively small number
of “determinants,” a considerable array of arguments
might be adduced in support of either view. Thus,
Galton might well maintain that his interpretation
of the observable facts is most in accordance with the
general analogies supplied by organic nature as a
whole. The ancient aphorism of Heraclitus, “Struggle
is the father, king, and lord of all things,” has been in
large measure justified by Darwin and his followers,
at any rate within the range of biology. Not only
have we the “struggle for existence” where “the
origin of species” is concerned; but Roux has well
argued, in his remarkable work on Der Kampf der
Theile im Organismus, that the principle of “struggle”
is concerned to an equally important extent as
between all the constituent parts of the same individual.
But if this is so—if every tissue-cell of the
organism owes its maintenance to success in a general
contest for nutriment, &c.,—do we not find at least
a probability that it owes its origin as a visible
cell to a similar success in a similarly general contest
among the invisible elements from which tissue-cells
are developed? Nay, does it not seem well nigh
incredible that when this selection-principle is seen to
be the governing cause of evolution everywhere else,
it should cease to play any part at all just at the
place where we are unable to see what is going on?
As we are agreed that this “father of all things”
is of prime importance in phylogeny—to say nothing
of physiology, psychology, and sociology,—must we
not deem it absurd to suppose that it is supplanted
in ontogeny by the opposite principle of absolute
peace?
On the other hand, Weismann adduces many
forcible considerations per contra; so that, in the
result, I deem it best to dispose of the question with
two general remarks. The first is, that the rival views
are not necessarily incompatible. Each may present
one aspect of the truth. Weismann’s doctrine of
determinants may be—and, to the best of my judgement,
must be—sound; but this does not hinder that
Galton’s doctrine of struggling “germs” may be so
likewise. For, as we have already seen, these germs
present the same compound character which belong
to determinants; in fact I do not suppose that Galton
would object to identifying them with determinants.
On the other hand, I do not see why Weismann
should object to supposing that similar determinants
compete among themselves for ontogenetic development.
Indeed, he has already argued, in his
suggestive theory of “germ-tracts,” that it is usually
only one among a number of similar determinants
which does succeed in achieving such development—or,
as he expresses it, which “becomes active.” But
what is it that causes this activity? Surely it must be
some superiority on the part of the active determinant
over its passive companions. And, if so, it is the
selection-principle that is here at work. In fact, he
has himself laid no small stress on what he calls “the
struggle of the determinants of the two parents in
ontogeny,” and has even supplied a long section on
“the Struggle of the Ids in Ontogeny.” Therefore
I do not see why he should so emphatically dissent
from Galton’s view upon this matter as he does
in his work on The Germ-plasm[48].
My second remark is a brief one—viz., that the
whole question is of so very speculative a character,
that I cannot see the smallest use in debating it.
The only remaining point of difference between
strip and germ-plasm is the one referring to stability.
Needless to say, Galton is at one with Weismann in
recognizing a high degree of stability on the part of
the substance of heredity; but the agreement extends
only so far as is necessitated by the facts of atavism,
&c. Indeed, he does not even mention—although he
perhaps implies—what Weismann has called amphimixis
as among the factors of individual congenital
variation. Weismann, on the other hand, has hitherto
regarded amphimixis as the sole cause of all such
variations. But, as we shall presently find, in his
recent work on The Germ-plasm he has now greatly
modified his views upon this subject, and, in fully
recognizing the “factors” of variability to which
Galton alludes, has correspondingly lessened the
difference between germ-plasm and stirp. But this is
a point which can be better dealt with when we come
to consider the important modifications which in this
respect the theory of germ-plasm has undergone.
The only other matter which has to be mentioned
in connexion with Weismann’s theory of heredity is,
that in The Germ-plasm he has for the first time given
us his views upon the influence of a previous sire on
the progeny of a subsequent one by the same dam.
The phenomena in question, which I have already
detailed in pp. 77-9, 110, he designates by the term
“telegony.” The analogous phenomena in plants he
calls, following Focke, “xenia.”
With regard to telegony, he adopts, almost precisely,
the position which I surmised that he would.
That is to say, he first disputes the alleged facts, and
then argues that, even if they be facts, they admit of
being explained on the theory of germ-plasm by
supposing that some of the germ-plasm from the
first sire penetrates the unripe ova which are afterwards
fertilized by the second[49]. The only difference
between his views and my own upon this matter is,
therefore, as follows.
Supposing that the phenomena alleged ever occur
in fact, I have said that the only way of explaining
them would seem to be, “that the life of ‘germ-plasm’
is not conterminous with that of the spermatozoa which
convey it, and hence that, if the carriers of heredity,
after the disintegration of their containing spermatozoa,
should ever penetrate an unripe ovum, the
germ-plasm thus introduced might remain dormant
in the ovum until the latter becomes mature, and is
then fertilized by another sire. In this way it is conceivable
that the hitherto dormant germ-plasm of the
previous sire might exercise some influence on the
ontogeny of the embryo[50].”
Now, this is substantially the position which Weismann
takes up: only instead of supposing that it is
the “carriers of heredity” of the first sire which gain
access to the unripe ovum “after the disintegration
of their containing spermatozoa,” he supposes that it
is one of the spermatozoa which does so before its
disintegration has commenced. Of course there is
here no difference in principle, but only a question
touching the mode in which the access is presumably
effected. But, as regards this question, I retain my
original opinion. For, while I can see no theoretical
difficulty in supposing that “the carriers of heredity,”
when set free by the disintegration of their containing
spermatozoa, may reach the unripe ova while still
embedded in the depths of the ovary, I do see a
difficulty, amounting almost to a physiological impossibility,
in supposing that a whole spermatozoon
can perform such a feat. From all that we know
about the powers and functions of spermatozoa in the
vertebrata, it appears simply absurd to imagine that
these bodies are able to penetrate the dense coating of
an ovary, and then delve their way through the stroma.
There is, indeed, a remarkable investigation which
was published a year or two ago by Mr. Whitman[51]
which appears to prove that in certain leeches the male
injects his seminal fluid into any part of the body of
the female, and that the spermatozoa then reach the
ova by wandering about her general tissues until some
of them happen to hit upon her ovary. But in this
case the spermatozoa are specially adapted to perform
such acts of penetration—being spear-like bodies
provided with a sharp point. Hence, if Weismann
should quote this instance, it would not tend to
support his view, seeing that the spermatozoa of
mammals do not exhibit any such specializations of
structure; and therefore, before any one of them can
effect fertilization, must wait for the ovum to mature,
reach the surface of the ovary, and rupture its follicle.
But, as already observed, it does not signify, so
far as we are here concerned with the matter, in what
precise manner the telegonous influence may be
supposed to be exercised—provided that it may be
so directly, and not necessarily through first having
to influence the whole material organism. Therefore
I quite agree with Weismann that the facts—supposing
them to be facts—are quite as explicable by
the theory of germ-plasm as by that of pangenesis[52].
Again, with respect to xenia, Weismann writes:—
As such eminent botanists as Focke, and more recently
De Vries, have expressed much doubt with regard to these observations—or
rather interpretations—we must wait until these
cases have been critically re-investigated before attempting to
account for them theoretically. The chief difficulty we should
meet with in any such explanation would be due to the fact that
we are here concerned with the influence of the germ-plasm of the
sperm-cell on a tissue of another plant which only constitutes
a part of this plant. It would thus be necessary to assume that
all the determinants of this germ-plasm are not active, and that
only those take effect which determine the nature of the fruit.
Now, it does not appear that De Vries has looked
into the matter on his own account, as he merely
refers to what Focke has said. And this amounts
merely to showing the dubious character of some
half-dozen cases which Focke gives as those which
alone have fallen within his cognizance. Why he
does not mention any of the numerous cases which
are quoted by Darwin, I do not understand. Nor
can I understand why he does not consider what seem
to be the particularly conclusive facts given on
p. 80,—i. e., where xenia appears to constitute “a
needful preliminary to fertilization.” But the whole
matter is one for botanists to deal with, and if any
doubt attaches to it, at least the grounds of such
doubt should be fully stated. Still more, in my
opinion, should the matter be freed from any such
doubt. The question—if there be a question—is one
of great interest from a merely physiological point
of view, while in relation to the fundamental
problems of heredity its importance is immense.
Surely, then, any competent botanist who disputes
the facts ought to test them by way of experiment.
But, be this as it may, I must call prominent
attention to the following very remarkable words
wherewith Weismann concludes the passage above
quoted. For he there says, that even supposing there
were no doubt as to the facts or their interpretation,
“the chief difficulty” which they would oppose to
the theory of germ-plasm would be, “that we are
here concerned with the influence of the germ-plasm
of the sperm-cell on a tissue of another plant which
only constitutes a part of this plant.” In other words,
Weismann now freely entertains the possibility of a
direct action of germ-plasm on the somatic tissues,
even though these belong to another individual!
Thus he now concedes the only point for the
establishment of which I adduced the phenomena
of xenia, in Chapter III: the whole of one side
of that “reciprocal action between the sphere of
germinal-substance and the sphere of body-substance,”
which I contended for on pp. 76-85, is now
conceded; and although it is the less important
side, its surrender goes far to weaken the doctrine
of a perpetual isolation of germinal-substance to
a “sphere” of its own. If we suppose that the
germinal substance of one organism may thus
directly act upon the somatic tissues of another,
and that changed conditions of life are able to
produce simultaneously an acquired character in
the soma and a precisely identical character as
congenital in the germ (pp. 129-30), we are plainly
inviting ourselves to abandon the complex explanation
of living material in “two kinds,” where one is
capable in all sorts of ways of communicating with
the other, while the possibility of any reciprocal action
is excluded. For the simpler hypothesis of living
material as all of one kind encounters no such
antinomies. So long as one kind of this material
was supposed to be as distinct from the other as a
parasite is distinct from its host, there was not so
much to choose between the theory of germ-plasm
and that of gemmules in this respect of simplicity.
But the more that the former theory has had to be
adjusted to facts, the greater has its complexity
become, until now its own author is obliged to make
so many additional assumptions for the purpose
of mantaining it, that we begin to wonder how long
it can continue to support the weight of its accumulating
difficulties.
So much for the main modifications which have
this year been made in Weismann’s postulate of the
perpetual continuity of germ-plasm. We must next
consider the changes which he has effected in his
companion postulate of the absolute stability of
germ-plasm.
Of far more importance than any of the alterations
which Professor Weismann has recently made in his
theory of heredity, are those whereby he has modified
his sequent theory of evolution. For while,
as we have just seen, his work on The Germ-plasm
leaves the former theory substantially unaltered,—although
largely added to in matters of detail,—it
so profoundly modifies the latter that careful readers
will find no small difficulty in ascertaining how much
of it has been allowed to remain. I will consider
only the main modifications, and these I will take
separately.
It will be remembered that one distinctive feature
in Weismann’s theory of evolution has hitherto been,
that the unicellular organisms differ from the multicellular
in the following important particulars.
1. There being no division in unicellular organisms
between germ-cells and somatic-cells, there is no
possibility in them of the occurrence of amphimixis.
2. Consequently, there is no possibility in them of
congenital variations, in the sense that these occur
in multicellular organisms.
3. Hence the only causes of individual variation
and of the origin of species in the unicellular organisms
are the Lamarckian factors, just as in the multicellular
the only cause of these things is natural
selection.
4. Hence, also, the unicellular organisms are potentially
immortal, while the multicellular have acquired
mortality for certain adaptive reasons.
But now, with the exception of No. 4, all these
positions have been abandoned. For, chiefly on
account of the beautiful researches of Maupas, Weismann
has come to perceive that no real distinction
can be drawn between an act of sexual union in
the multicellular organisms, and an act of conjugation
in the unicellular. Amphimixis, therefore, is
now held by him to occur equally in both these
divisions of organic nature, with the consequence
that the Protozoa and Protophyta owe their individual
variations, and therefore the origin of their
innumerable species, as exclusively to the action
of natural selection as is the case with the Metazoa
and Metaphyta. In fact, the term “amphimixis” has
been coined in express relation to these very points.
It will be seen, however, that this important change
of view merely postpones the question as to the
origin of amphimixis, if the object of this process be
that which Weismann supposes—viz., the providing of
material in the way of congenital variations on which
natural selection can act. Therefore he is obliged
to assume that there now are, or once have been,
organisms of a less organized character than even the
lowest of the unicellular forms—organisms, that is
to say, which possess no nucleus, but are wholly
composed of undifferentiated bioplasm. These most
primitive organisms it must have been that were not
subject to any process of natural selection, but, in virtue
of an exclusive action of the Lamarckian factors upon
their protoplasmic substance, gave rise to individual
variations which subsequently gave rise to a unicellular
progeny—when the process of natural selection was
immediately inaugurated, and thereafter entirely
superseded the Lamarckian factors. Or, to state the
matter in Weismann’s own words:—
My earlier views on unicellular organisms as the source of
individual differences, in the sense that each change called forth
in them by external influences, or by use and disuse, was
supposed to be hereditary, must therefore be dismissed to some
stage less distant from the origin of life. I now believe that
such reactions under external influences can only obtain in the
lowest organisms which are without any distinction between
nucleus and cell-body. All variations which have arisen in
them, by the operation of any causes whatever, must be inherited,
and their hereditary individual variability is due to the
direct influence of the external world.... If I am correct in
my view of the meaning of conjugation as a method of amphimixis,
we must believe that all unicellular organisms possess it,
and that it will be found in numerous low organisms, in which
it has not yet been observed[53].
It is not very clear, at first sight, how Professor
Weismann, after having thus abandoned the propositions
1, 2, and 3, as above stated, manages to retain
his former view as given in No. 4. Nevertheless he
does so, by representing that a unicellular organism,
even though it present such a considerable degree of
organization as we meet with in the higher Protozoa,
still resembles a germ-cell of a multicellular organism,
in that it consists of all the essential constituents of
a germ-cell, including germ-plasm in its nucleus. And
inasmuch as a germ-cell is potentially immortal, so it
must be with a unicellular organism; in the one
case, as in the other, the design of the structure is
that its contained germ-plasm shall fuse with the germ-plasm
contained in the nucleus of another individual
cell, when the life of both will be preserved. For
my own part, however, I cannot see that in either
case the cell, as distinguished from its contained germ-plasm,
is thus shown to be potentially immortal. On
the contrary, it appears to me a mere accident of
the case that in a unicellular organism the immortal
substance (germ-plasm) is contained in a single cell,
which is at the same time a free cell, and, as such, is
denominated an “organism.” We might just as well
call a germ-cell an “organism,” whether as an ovum
it happens to be embedded in a mass of somatic-cells,
or as a locomotive spermatozoon it happens to be
free. In fact Weismann himself appears to recognize
this. But, if so, it is surely a distinction without
a difference to say that unicellular organisms are
immortal, while multicellular are mortal. For in
neither case is the organism immortal, while in both
cases it is the germ-plasm (i.e., the substance of heredity)
that is so. Where the cell containing the germ-plasm
happens to be a free cell, it is called an “organism”;
but whether it be a germ-cell or a protozoan, it alike
ceases to be a cell when it has given origin to a
multitude of other cells, whether these happen to be
other germ-cells (plus somatic-cells) or other protozoan
cells. In short, quâ cell, all cells are mortal:
it is only the substance of heredity which some cells
contain that can be said, in any sense of the term, to
be immortal. For the immortality in question does
not belong to unicellular organisms as such, but to the
germ-plasm which they contain. And from this it
follows that, as the immortality of germ-plasm is
one and the same thing as the continuity of germ-plasm,
by alleging an immortality as belonging to
the unicellular organisms, Weismann is merely restating
his fundamental postulate. Hence, also, he
is but denying, in a somewhat round-about way, the
occurrence of spontaneous generation.
I conclude, therefore, that his sole remaining
distinction between the unicellular and the multicellular
organisms is but illusory, or unreal. And,
with regard to the great change which he has thus
effected in his system by expressly abolishing all the
other distinctions, I have only to say that in my
opinion he has thereby greatly improved his system.
For he has thus relieved it of all the formidable
difficulties which he had needlessly created for himself,
and which I have already enumerated in the
foregoing pages (88-89). In his ever-shifting drama
of evolution the unicellular organisms have left the
stage en masse, and, so far as they are concerned,
we are all as we were before the curtain rose.
But of even more importance than this fundamental
change of view with regard to the unicellular
organisms, is a further and no less fundamental
change with regard to the multicellular. That such
is the case will immediately become apparent by
a simple statement of the fact, that Weismann has
now expressly surrendered his postulate of the absolute
stability of germ-plasm!
We have already seen that, even in the first volume
of his Essays, there were some passages which gave
an uncertain sound with regard to this matter. But
as they seemed attributable to mere carelessness on
the part of their author, after quoting a sample
of them, I showed it was necessary to ignore such
inconsistent utterances—necessary, that is, for the
purpose of examining the theory of germ-plasm as
even so much as a logically coherent system of ideas[54].
For we have seen that if any doubt were to be
entertained touching the absolute stability of germ-plasm
“since the first origin of sexual propagation,”
a corresponding measure of doubt would be cast on
Weismann’s theory of congenital variation as solely
due to amphimixis, with the result that his whole
theory of evolution would be similarly rendered
dubious. Since then, however, he has gone very
much further in this direction. First, in reply to
Professor Vines he says (1890):—
I am at present inclined to believe that Professor Vines is
correct in questioning whether sexual reproduction is the only
factor which maintains Metazoa and Metaphyta in a state of
variability. I could have pointed out in the English edition
of my “Essays” that my views on this point had altered since
their publication; my friend Professor de Bary, too early lost to
science, had already called my attention to those parthenogenetic
Fungi which Professor Vines justly cites against my views; but
I desired, on grounds already mentioned, to undertake no alteration
in the essays[55].
Next, in his essay on Amphimixis (1892), there are
several passages to somewhat the same effect; while,
lastly, in his Germ-plasm (1893), the fundamental
postulate in question is, as I have said, expressly
surrendered. For example, we have in the following
words the final conclusions of his recent arguments.
Speaking of amphimixis, he says:—
It is not the primary cause of hereditary variation. By its
means those specific variations which already exist in a species
may continually be blended in a fresh manner, but it is incapable
of giving rise to new variations, even though it often
appears to do so.... The cause of hereditary variation must lie
deeper than this. It must be due to the direct effects of external
influences on the biophores and determinants.[56]
These quotations are enough to show that Weismann
has now abandoned his original theory of
congenital variations being exclusively due to amphimixis,
and adopts in its stead the precisely opposite
view—viz., that the origin of all such variations must
be ascribed to the direct influence of causes acting on
germ-plasm from without. Up to the present year
the very essence of the whole Weismannian theory
of evolution has been that, owing to the stability
of germ-plasm since the first origin of sexual propagation,
“the origin of hereditary individual variations
cannot indeed be found in the higher organisms,
the Metazoa and Metaphyta; but is to be sought
for in the lowest—the unicellular organisms,” because
“the formation of new species, which among the
lower Protozoa could be achieved without amphigony,
could only be attained by means of this process in
the Metazoa and Metaphyta. It was only in this
way that hereditary individual differences could arise
and persist[57].”
But about the beginning of the present year we
have this fundamental doctrine directly contradicted
in such words as:—
The origin of a variation is equally independent of selection
and amphimixis, and is due to the constant occurrence of slight
inequalities of nutrition in the germ-plasm[58].
This complete reversal of his previous doctrine
brings Weismann into line with Darwin, who long
ago gave very good reasons for the following conclusion:—
Those authors who, like Pallas, attribute all variability to the
crossing either of distinct races, or to distinct individuals belonging
to the same race but somewhat different from each other,
are in error; as are those authors who attribute all variability
to the mere act of sexual union [amphimixis][59].
And again:—
These several considerations alone render it probable that
variability of every kind is directly or indirectly caused by
changed conditions of life. Or, to put it under another point
of view, if it were possible to expose all the individuals of a
species during many generations to absolutely uniform conditions
of life, there would be no variability[60].
Hence, Darwin was disposed to find the main,
if not the only, causes of congenital variations in
circumstances depending for their efficacy on the
instability of what Weismann calls germ-plasm. And
the noteworthy fact is, that Weismann has now
adopted this view, to the destruction of his originally
fundamental postulate touching the stability of germ-plasm
since the first origin of sexual propagation.
By such a right-about-face manœuvre, Weismann
has placed his critics in a somewhat difficult position.
For, in the first place, it is only towards the close
of The Germ-plasm that the manœuvre is executed,
and then only in a few sentences such as I have just
quoted—italicized, it is true, but otherwise so slightly
emphasized that, as Professor Hartog has observed,
no one of his reviewers has noticed it[61]. In the
second place, he nowhere expressly recognizes the
effects upon his theory of evolution, which necessarily
follow from the change. And, lastly, the manner in
which he endeavours to underpin that theory after
having thus removed its logical foundation in his
former postulate of the absolute stability of germ-plasm,
is so peculiar that it is hard to epitomize his
reasoning with due regard to brevity.
Speaking for myself, I can only say that my first
impulse, after reading the sentences above quoted,
was to cancel the whole of Chapter IV, as well as all
those parts of Chapters I and III where the Weismannian
theory of evolution is alluded to; and then
to start anew with a bare statement that this theory
had now been wholly discarded by its author. But
after due consideration it seemed desirable to leave
the criticism as it was originally written, not only on
account of the reasons already stated in the Preface,
but still more because I found it would be impracticable
to start a new criticism of the greatly modified
theory of evolution without introducing many and
lengthy parts of the old one, for the purpose of
showing how the most recent theory had been arrived
at. Hence, seeing that my previous criticism was
far from having been rendered obsolete by the large
changes which had taken place in Weismann’s system
of theories, I concluded that it was best to retain
what I had written, and add the present paragraphs
for the purpose of dealing exclusively with the
changes in question.
In now proceeding to do this, I think it is needless
to occupy space by giving the reasons which have
caused Weismann thus to abandon his doctrine of the
universal stability of germ-plasm since the first origin
of sexual propagation, and to substitute the precisely
opposite doctrine of its universal instability. It is
enough to say that these reasons all arise by way
of logical necessity from the further working out in
The Germ-plasm of his theory of heredity—or, more
correctly, from the additions which he has there made
to his previous views on the mechanism of heredity.
Thus he has reversed his former doctrine touching
the absolute stability of germ-plasm, not so much
on account of any of the general considerations or
particular facts which I have adduced against it in
Chapter IV, as because it would not tally with the
recent additions which he has made to other parts
of his system. Any one who cares to follow this
matter will find the reasons in question fully and
lucidly stated in Chapter XIV of The Germ-plasm[62].
It is of more importance to consider the means
whereby Weismann seeks to save his theory of evolution
after he has thus removed its foundation in his
former postulate of the absolute stability of germ-plasm.
As far as I can understand, he seeks to do so
as follows.
In the first place, it must be noted that after
his changes of view with regard to polar bodies,
unicellular organisms, and the significance of sexual
reproduction, nothing remains of his original theory
of evolution save what he can manage to retain of his
original theory of variation as due to amphimixis.
But, as we have just seen, he has surrendered this
latter theory also. Therefore, at first sight it appears
that no part of the former can possibly remain.
Beginning at the apex, he has removed, stone by
stone, his doctrine of descent, and, on arriving at
its fundamental postulate—the absolute stability of
germ-plasm—simply turns it upside down. Surely,
therefore, it may be thought, there is here as complete
a destruction as well could be of all this side of
Weismann’s system. Such, however, he endeavours
to show is not the case. He regards it as still possible
to retain so much of his theory of descent as is
presented by what he can save of his theory of variation,
thus:—
Although he now represents that the instability of
germ-plasm is such that in no case can amphimixis
have had anything to do with the origin of congenital
variations, he continues to regard the stability of
germ-plasm sufficiently great to necessitate, in all
cases, the occurrence of amphimixis in order to
promote the development of congenital variations. In
other words, notwithstanding that he now thinks all
congenital variations must be begun by external
conditions acting directly on an unstable germ-plasm,
he also thinks that the amount of variation thus
produced is likely to be exceedingly minute, and
must therefore be increased by subsequent amphimixis
in order to fall within the range of natural
selection. So that, although powerless to initiate
congenital variation, amphimixis must still play an
indispensable part in the process of evolution, as in
all cases a necessary condition to the occurrence of
natural selection. External conditions first cause
slight changes in the determinants of a species; but
these are so slight that they have to be augmented by
amphimixis before they constitute material on which
natural selection can act, and hence before they can
become of any significance either in ontogeny or
phylogeny.
Such, I take it, is what Professor Weismann would
now have us to understand; for otherwise I should
have expected from him as frank a surrender of his
theory of evolution (or the remnant thereof in his
theory of variation) as he has made of its fundamental
postulate. But, if such is his meaning, I may
mention the reasons which appear to me to render
it nugatory.
In the first place, it is evident that in thus
minimizing the possible range of congenital variation
due to the action of external conditions on a non-absolutely
stable substance of heredity, Weismann
is making a wholly gratuitous assumption, for the
sole purpose of saving what remains of his theory
of evolution—i. e., the doctrine of the immense importance
of amphimixis.
We have already seen in the foregoing chapter
that his original assumption of the absolute stability
of germ-plasm was a gratuitous one, made for the
purpose of supplying a foundation for constructing
his theory of evolution. But still more gratuitous
is the assumption which he has now substituted, for
the purpose of saving as much of this theory as
is left—the assumption, namely, that germ-plasm,
although universally unstable, nevertheless everywhere
presents only a certain low degree of instability,
which serves to accommodate his modified theory
of heredity on the one hand, and all that is possible
of his previous theory of evolution on the other. His
original assumption, untenable though it was, furnished
at least a logical basis for the necessary conclusion
that amphimixis was the only possible cause
of congenital variations. But there is not so much as
any logical sequence in the now substituted assumption,
that (A) all congenital variations are ultimately due
to the universal instability of germ-plasm, and (B) that
nevertheless they are all more proximately due to such
a high degree of stability of germ-plasm as necessitates
amphimixis as the only means whereby variations can
be made “perceptible.” These statements are as
independent of one another as any two statements
can well be; and, therefore, if the second of them is to
be substantiated, it can only be so by some totally
distinct line of reasoning. The first statement does not
even tend to suggest the second; in fact it tends to
suggest the precise contrary. For, obviously, there is
nothing in the logic of the matter to show why, if
all congenital variations depend for their origin on
the instability of germ-plasm, such instability must
nevertheless be always so slight that the variations
due to it must afterwards depend on amphimixis for
their development to the point where they become
“perceptible.” As above indicated, it is surely little
short of absurd thus to assume that a universally
unstable germ-plasm universally presents only that
particular degree of instability which will serve to
accommodate Professor Weismann’s newer theory of
heredity, and at the same time to save thus much
of his previous theory of evolution.
But now, in the second place, not only is this
assumption wholly gratuitous, but there are many
considerations which render it in the highest degree
improbable, while there are not wanting facts which
appear to demonstrate that it is false. For, unquestionably,
most of the considerations which have already
been advanced in the preceding chapter against the assumption
of an absolute stability of germ-plasm, are
here equally available against the assumption of an
imperceptibly small amount of instability[63]. Similarly,
all the facts there given with regard to the a-sexual
origin of species—and even genera—of parthenogenetic
organisms, bud-variation[64], &c., amply demonstrate
that congenital variations due to the
instability of germ-plasm alone, or apart from amphimixis,
are sometimes enormous. Hence, we cannot
accept the gratuitous suggestion that in all other
cases they are too insignificant to count for anything
till they have been augmented by amphimixis, even
although we may be prepared to agree that amphimixis
is probably one important factor in the production
of congenital variations. What degree of
importance it presents in this connexion, however,
we have not at present any means of determining;
all we can conclude with certainty is, that in some
cases it is demonstrably very much less than Weismann
supposes, while it is extremely improbable that
it is ever in any case the sole and necessary antecedent
to the operation of natural selection.
This extreme improbability is shown, not only by
what I have already said in the previous chapter, and
need not here repeat; but likewise by the “several
considerations” which Darwin has adduced with
regard to this very point, and which, as he says,
“alone render it probable that variability of every
kind is directly or indirectly caused by changed
conditions of life,” with the consequence that “those
authors who attribute all variability to the mere act
of sexual union are in error.” I have already quoted
these words further back in the present chapter, in
order to show that by now attributing the origin
of all congenital variations to the direct action of
external conditions, Weismann has brought himself
into line with Darwin so far as this fundamental
point of doctrine is concerned. But I here re-quote
the words in order to show that by further attributing
the development of congenital variations “to the mere
act of sexual union,” Weismann is again falling out
of line with Darwin. So to speak, he first performs
a right-about-face movement as regards his original
position towards the “stability of germ-plasm,” and
immediately afterwards makes a half-turn back again.
Now, it is this half-turn to which I object as unwarranted
in logic and opposed to fact.
In a previous chapter (pp. 66-7) I presented to him
the dilemma, that germ-plasm must be either absolutely
stable or else but highly stable, and that in
the former case his theory of amphimixis as the sole
cause of congenital variations would be valid, while
in the latter case the theory would collapse. But it
did not then occur to me that Weismann might seek
a narrow seat between the horns of this dilemma, by
representing that germ-plasm is universally unstable
up to a certain very low degree of instability—viz.,
exactly that degree which is required for starting
a congenital variation by means of external causes,
without its being possible for the variation to become
perceptible unless afterwards increased by means of
amphimixis. And now that this extremely sophistical
position has been adopted, I cannot see any
imaginable reason for adopting it other than a last
endeavour to save as much as possible of his former
theory of evolution. There can be nothing in the
nature of things thus to limit, within the narrowest
possible range, the instability of a universally unstable
germ-plasm—distributed, as this most complex of
known substances is, throughout all species of plants
and animals, and exposed to inconceivably varied
conditions of life in all quarters of the globe. And
these considerations are surely of themselves enough
to dispose of the assumption as absurd, without again
rehearsing the facts of congenital variation which
definitely prove it to be false.
For reasons stated at the commencement of this
chapter, I have restricted its subject-matter almost
exclusively to a consideration of the more fundamental
changes which Professor Weismann has wrought in
his general system of theories by the publication of
his most recent works. In other words, I have purposely
avoided considering those immensely elaborate
additions to his theory of heredity which constitute
by far the largest portion of his essays on Amphimixis
and The Germ-plasm, and which have for their object
an ideal construction of “the architecture of germ-plasm.”
The fundamental changes to which allusion has
just been made are as follows.
Professor Weismann has to a large extent abandoned
his theory of polar bodies, and in my opinion would
have done well had he taken a further step and
surrendered the theory in toto.
Similarly, he has withdrawn his previous distinctions
between the unicellular and multicellular organisms.
The Protozoa and Protophyta are now included by
him in the same category as the Metazoa and Metaphyta,
as regards all matters of individual variation,
reproduction, subjection to the law of natural selection,
and so forth. The only difference which he continues
to allege is the somewhat metaphysical one touching
mortality and immortality. But I have given what
appears to me sufficiently good reasons for ignoring
this distinction; and therefore, as it seems to me,
every one of Weismann’s previous doctrines respecting
unicellular organisms have vanished—very much to
the benefit of his system as a whole.
By far the greatest change, however, which he has
made in this general system is that which he has
effected by surrendering the postulate of the absolute
stability of germ-plasm. The rift in his lute which
has been noticed with regard to this matter has
now been widened to an extent which does prevent
any further harping on the theme of evolution. It
is true that Weismann endeavours to retain as far as
possible the general character of his former postulate
of the universal stability of germ-plasm, with the
consequent “significance of sexual reproduction” as
the sole cause of congenital variation. For although
he now reverses both these doctrines by saying that
germ-plasm is universally unstable, and that sexual
reproduction is in no case the sole cause of congenital
variation, he seeks at the same time to minimize the
logical consequences of such reversal by making an
ingenious assumption, the possibility of which I had
not foreseen when writing the previous chapters.
The assumption is, that although germ-plasm is
universally unstable, the degree of its instability is
everywhere restricted within the narrowest possible
limits; so that sexual propagation is still necessary
for the purpose of developing congenital variations to
the point where they can fall within the range of
natural selection, notwithstanding that they must all
have been originated by external causes acting
directly on a germ-plasm universally unstable within
the narrow limits assumed. But clearly this assumption
is arbitrary to the last degree, and, no less
clearly, it is made by Weismann for the sole purpose
of saving as much as he can of his previous theory of
variation. His more recent speculations touching
the mechanism of heredity are incompatible with his
former view of amphimixis as the sole cause of congenital
variations, and therefore he makes this arbitrary
assumption for the purpose of representing that amphimixis
may nevertheless still be regarded as
a necessary con-cause. I need not here repeat what
has so recently been said touching the sophistry of this
assumption in theory, or the demonstrable falsity of it
in fact. It is enough to remark, in conclusion, that
the game is not worth the candle. It was originally
well worth Weismann’s while to sustain his fundamental
postulate of the absolute stability of germ-plasm,
because he was able to rear upon it his whole
theory of evolution. But the only part of this theory
which he has now left standing, or which he can now
save by his newer postulate of a germ-plasm both stable
and unstable at the same time, is his doctrine of
variation. So to speak, it is his desire to reserve as
much as is speculatively possible from the general
ruin of his theory of descent, that causes him to go so
far to attempt so little. For I cannot suppose that he
himself will expect any of his readers to entertain
so arbitrary, fanciful, and demonstrably false an
assumption as the one in question. Surely it would
have been better to have surrendered in toto this
“Weismannian theory of variation,” rather than to
have attempted its rescue by means so plainly
nugatory. It might still have been held that amphimixis
plays a large and important part as one of the
causes of variation, and therefore also as one of the
factors of organic evolution. After having reversed
his postulate of amphimixis being the sole cause of
variability, and therefore having agreed with Darwin
that “those writers are in error who attribute all
variability to the mere act of sexual union,” he might
well have questioned Darwin’s further statement as to
its being “probable that variability of every kind is
directly or indirectly caused by changed conditions
of life.” But by now assuming that variations due to
any causes other than amphimixis must be “imperceptible”
until they have been augmented by amphimixis,
Weismann is shutting out, with a futile hypothesis,
the important question as to whether, or how
far, amphimixis really is a cause of variation. Observe,
the case is not as it might have been were there no
reasons assignable for the occurrence of sexual propagation,
other than that of assisting in the production
of congenital variations. The theory of “rejuvenescence,”
for example, is prima facie a more probable
one than that which ascribes to sexual propagation
the function of causing variability[65]; while Galton’s
hypothesis, which supposes the object of this form of
propagation to be that of conserving the “germs”
(= “determinants”) of the phyla, has a good deal
to say for itself[66]. Of course such alternative hypotheses
touching “the significance of sexual reproduction”
are not necessarily exclusive of one another:
the process may subserve two or more adaptive
purposes[67]. But he would be a bold man who, in the
present state of our knowledge, could accept unreservedly
the particular view of this process which
Darwin so emphatically rejected; and I think he
must be a biased man who could entertain for
an instant the modification of this view which Weismann
has now substituted.
Thus, the Weismannian theory of evolution has
entirely fallen to pieces with the removal of its
fundamental postulate—the absolute stability of
germ-plasm. It only remains to mention once more
the effects of this removal upon the other side of his
system—viz., the companion postulate of the uninterrupted
continuity of germ-plasm, with its superstructure
in his theory of heredity.
Briefly, these effects are as follows:—
1. Germ-plasm ceases to be continuous in the
sense of having borne a perpetual record of congenital
variations from the first origin of sexual
propagation.
2. On the contrary, as all such variations have
been originated by the direct action of external
conditions, the continuity of germ-plasm in this sense
has been interrupted at the commencement of every
inherited change during the phylogeny of all plants
and animals, unicellular as well as multicellular.
3. But germ-plasm remains continuous in the
restricted, though still highly important sense, of
being the sole repository of hereditary characters of
each successive generation, so that acquired characters
can never have been transmitted to progeny “representatively,”
even although they have frequently
caused those “specialized” changes in the structure
of germ-plasm which, as we have seen, must certainly
have been of considerable importance in the history
of organic evolution.
4. By surrendering his doctrine of the absolute
stability of germ-plasm on the one hand, and of its
perpetual[68] continuity on the other, Weismann has
greatly improved his theory of heredity. For, whatever
may be thought of his recent additions to this
theory in the way of elaborate speculation touching
the ultimate mechanism of heredity, it is a great
gain to have freed his fundamental postulate of the
continuity of germ-plasm from the two further
postulates which have just been mentioned, and the
sole purpose of which was to provide a basis for his
untenable theory of evolution.
5. In my opinion it only remains for him to
withdraw the last remnant of his theory of evolution
by cancelling his modified and even less tenable
views on amphimixis, in order to give us a theory of
heredity which is at once logically intact and biologically
probable.
6. The theory of germ-plasm would then resemble
that of stirp in all points of fundamental importance,
save that while the latter leaves the question open as
to whether acquired characters are ever inherited in
any degree, the former would dogmatically close it,
chiefly on the grounds which I have considered in
Appendix II. It seems to me that in the present
state of our knowledge it is more prudent to follow
Galton in suspending our judgement with regard to
this question, until time shall have been allowed for
answering it by the inductive methods of observation
and experiment.
7. Hence, in conclusion, we have for the present
only to repeat what Weismann himself has said in
one of the wisest of his utterances,—“The question
as to the inheritance of acquired characters remains,
whether the theory of germ-plasm be accepted or
rejected.”
It is now close upon twenty years that I accepted
the substance of this theory under the name of stirp;
and since that time the question as to the inheritance
of acquired characters remains exactly where it was.
No new facts, and no new considerations of much
importance, have been forthcoming to assist us in
answering it. Therefore, as already stated in the
Preface, I intend to deal with this question hereafter
as a question per se, or one which is not specially
associated with the labours of Professor Weismann.