This being the day appointed by law for the
meeting of Congress, the following members of
the House of Representatives appeared, and
took their seats, to wit:
From New Hampshire—Samuel Dinsmoor, Obed
Hall, and John A. Harper.
From Massachusetts—Abijah Bigelow, Elijah Brigham,
Richard Cutts, Wm. Ely, Isaiah L. Green,
Ebenezer Seaver, William M. Richardson, Charles
Turner, jr., Laban Wheaton, Leonard White, Wm.
Widgery.
From Rhode Island—Richard Jackson, jr.
From Connecticut—Epaphroditus Champion, John
Davenport, jr., Lyman Law, and Jonathan O. Mosely.
From Vermont—Martin Chittenden, Wm. Strong.
From New York—Daniel Avery, Harmanus Bleecker,
James Emott, Asa Fitch, Sam. L. Mitchill, Benjamin
Pond, Thomas Sammons, Pierre Van Cortlandt,
jr.
From New Jersey—Adam Boyd, Lewis Condict,
Jacob Hufty, and Thomas Newbold.
From Pennsylvania—Wm. Anderson, David Bard,
Robert Brown, William Crawford, William Findlay,
Abner Lacock, Aaron Lyle, Jonathan Roberts, Wm.
Rodman, Adam Seybert, John Smilie, Geo. Smith,
and Robert Whitehill.
From Maryland—Stevenson Archer, Charles Goldsborough,
Joseph Kent, Philip B. Key, Peter Little,
Alexander McKim, Samuel Ringgold, Philip Stuart,
and Robert Wright.
From Virginia—John Baker, Burwell Bassett,
Matthew Clay, John Dawson, Thomas Gholson,
Peterson Goodwyn, Aylett Hawes, Joseph Lewis, jr.,
William McCoy, Hugh Nelson, Thomas Newton,
James Pleasants, jr., and John Roane.
From North Carolina—Willis Alston, jr., William
Blackledge, Meshack Franklin, Nathaniel Macon,
Archibald McBryde, and Joseph Pearson.
From South Carolina—William Butler, John C.
Calhoun, Elias Earle, William Lowndes, Thos. Moore,
and Richard Wynn.
From Georgia—William W. Bibb, Geo. M. Troup.
From Kentucky—Henry Clay, Speaker, Joseph
Desha, and Stephen Ormsby.
From Tennessee—Felix Grundy, John Rhea, and
John Sevier.
From Ohio—Jeremiah Morrow.
From Indiana Territory—Jona. Jennings, Delegate.
A quorum, consisting of a majority of the
whole House, being present, it was ordered that
the Clerk do acquaint the Senate therewith.
On motion of Mr. Dawson, a committee was
appointed on the part of the House, jointly with
such committee as may be appointed on the part
of the Senate, to wait on the President of the
United States, and inform him that a quorum of
the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive
any communication he may be pleased to
make to them.
Mr. Dawson and Mr. Bleecker were appointed
the committee on the part of the House.
Several other members, to wit: From Massachusetts,
Francis Carr; from Connecticut,
Timothy Pitkin, jr.; from Vermont, Samuel
Shaw; from New York, Arunah Metcalf,
Silas Stow, and Uri Tracy; from Pennsylvania,
John M. Hyneman; from Virginia, John
Smith, and Thomas Wilson; from North Carolina,
Richard Stanford; from S. Carolina,
Langdon Cheves, and David R. Williams;
and, from Kentucky, Richard M. Johnson,
appeared, and took their seats.
A message from the Senate informed the
House that a quorum of the Senate is assembled,
and ready to proceed to business. They have appointed
a committee on their part, jointly with
the committee on the part of this House, to inform
the President of the United States that a
quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and
ready to receive any communications he may
be pleased to make to them.
Mr. Dawson, from the joint committee appointed
to wait on the President of the United
States, reported that the committee had performed
the service assigned to them, and that
the President answered that he would make a
communication to the two Houses of Congress
to-morrow at 12 o'clock.
And then the House adjourned.
Several other members, to wit: From Vermont,
James Fisk; from North Carolina, Wm.
R. King and Israel Pickens; from Georgia,
Bolling Hall; and from Kentucky, Anthony
New, appeared, and took their seats.
A Message was received from the President
of the United States. [For which, see Senate
proceedings of this date, ante, page 567.]
The Message having been read was referred,
with the documents accompanying it, to the
Committee of the whole House on the state of
the Union.
Constitution and the Guerriere.
Mr. Dawson rose and said:—Mr. Speaker, I
take this early moment to present to you a resolution
which I feel pleasure and pride in believing
will meet the general approbation, not
only of this House, but of the nation.
The President of the United States, in his
Message, which was read on yesterday, has, in
terms eloquent and appropriate, made mention
of an engagement which has taken place between
an American frigate and one of His Britannic
Majesty's, which has rendered to the
officers and crew of our frigate that justice
which they so justly merited; an engagement
in which American tars have proven to the
world, that when commanded by officers of
skill, valor, and fidelity, they are capable of
contending with, and of vanquishing, those of
any nation on the earth, upon any element—even
on that element where British skill has so
justly acquired so much celebrity, and that the
American flag, when authorized by the constituted
authorities of our country, will command
respect on the high road of nations. Far, very
far be it from me to boast—it ill becomes an individual
or a nation, and is never the concomitant
of true courage; but on the present occasion
it seems to me proper that we should express
our sentiments—our feelings, and thereby
the feelings of the nation. I shall, therefore,
without further comment, offer you the following
resolution, observing that the facts stated
have been ascertained at the proper department,
and the proofs are on my table:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That the President of the United States be, and he is
hereby, requested to present, in the name of Congress,
to Captain Isaac Hull, a gold medal, with suitable
emblems and devices; and that the sum of ——
thousand dollars be, and the same is hereby, appropriated,
to be distributed as prize money to the officers
and crew of the United States' frigate the Constitution,
of forty-four guns, according to the provisions
of the act for the better government of the
Navy of the United States; in testimony of the high
sense entertained by Congress of the gallantry, good
conduct, and services of Captain Hull, the officers,
and crew, of the said frigate Constitution, in attacking,
vanquishing, and capturing the British frigate
the Guerriere, mounting fifty-four carriage guns,
thereby exhibiting an example highly honorable to
the American character, and instructive to our rising
Navy.
Some conversation passed on the proper mode
of disposing of this subject, in the course of
which
Mr. Seybert suggested the propriety of also
giving some distinctive or medals to the crew
of the Constitution, who he thought were too
generally overlooked in such cases.
Mr. Wright approved the spirit of the resolution,
but hoped the other officers would receive
swords, and the men suitable rewards;
and confidently hoped a gold medal would be
voted to the nearest relative of Lieutenant William
Bush of the marines, a young gentleman
from his district, who fell gallantly fighting in
that action, covered with wounds and glory;
he, therefore, for that purpose, moved that the
resolution be referred to a select committee.
The resolution was eventually ordered to lie
on the table till a committee should be appointed
to whom it should be referred.
Several other members, to wit: from New
Jersey, George C. Maxwell; from Massachusetts,
Ezekiel Bacon; from Connecticut, Lewis
B. Sturges; and from Pennsylvania, James Milnor,
appeared, and took their seats.
George Poindexter, the Delegate from the
Mississippi Territory, also appeared, and took
his seat.
Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts,
Samuel Taggart; from Connecticut,
Benjamin Tallmadge; from New York, Ebenezer
Sage, and Thomas R. Gold; from Pennsylvania,
Roger Davis; from Delaware, Henry
M. Ridgely; and from Virginia, John Taliaferro,
appeared, and took their seats.
Encouragement to Privateers.
Mr. Mitchill presented a petition of sundry
owners and agents of privateers in the city of
New York, praying for a reduction of the duties
on prizes and prize goods; that prize property,
on condemnation, may be delivered to them to
be disposed of and distributed; that the time
necessary to procure condemnations may be
shortened; that the fees of the officers of prize
courts may be limited to a certain sum, and
that prize owners and their agents be authorized
to order prizes arrived in one port to any other
port, at their discretion, at any time before the
actual libelling of such prizes.
Exemption of Soldiers from Arrest for Debt.
Mr. Bacon stated that, under the present law,
exempting from arrest of privates in the Army
of the United States in certain cases of debt,
frauds had been, and more extensively might be,
committed; inasmuch as a soldier who was tired
of the service, by giving his bond for a feigned
debt for an amount greater than twenty dollars,
could procure himself to be arrested and kept
out of service, &c. Mr. B. further illustrated
the evasions to which the present law is liable,
and concluded by moving the following resolution:
Resolved, That the Committee on Military Affairs
be instructed to inquire into the expediency of providing
by law for exempting altogether from liability
to arrest, or being taken in execution for debt, of any
non-commissioned officer, musician, or private, belonging
to the Army of the United States, or to any
volunteer corps, when called into service pursuant to
to law.
The resolution was agreed to.
Another member, to wit, from Virginia,
James Breckenridge, appeared, and took his
seat.
Mounted Troops.
Mr. Richard M. Johnson observed that he
had draughted a resolution for the consideration
of the House, the object of which was to authorize
an expedition of mounted volunteers against
the several Indian tribes hostile to the United
States. He said the people of the United States
had the power and the will to break up and
to extirpate those hostile savages, to desolate
their country, or compel them to surrender at
discretion, as the Miamies had done lately when
they beheld the strong arm of the Government
uplifted and ready to fall upon them heavily.
And it was the imperious duty of Congress so
to organize this power, and so to direct this will,
as to make it effectual and most destructive to
the enemy in the line of its operation. Mr. J.
said a winter campaign of mounted men well
selected, well organized, and well conducted for
sixty days, would close an Indian war, which
was restrained on their part by no ties of religion,
by no rules of morality, by no suggestions
of mercy, by no principles of humanity. Sir, said
he, you well know that we cannot so guard any
part of our extended line of frontier as to prevent
entirely the incursions of savages, so long as
they have a place of safety or hiding place upon
our borders; by reason of which a few desperate
savages, well armed with their rifles, tomahawks,
and scalping knives, and paid for the
scalps of our citizens, may travel in the night,
watch their place of assassination undiscovered,
and fall upon our infant settlements thus exposed
and massacre them without distinction of
age or sex, and not leave even an infant to lisp
the sad tale of sorrow to the passing stranger.
Such has been the fact in many places on our
frontier since the battle of Tippecanoe; and
such was the melancholy fact near the Ohio
river, in Indiana, when upwards of twenty persons
were horribly murdered in cold blood,
without the opportunity of resistance; the most
of these unfortunate victims were women and
children, whose heads were roasted by the fire,
and in this cruel mode tortured to death, and
under circumstances which would blacken and
dye with deeper disgrace the most infamous and
abandoned set of beings on earth. Since the defeat
of Braddock, Mr. J. observed, the conflict
with the Indians had always been an unequal
one, and the United States had never carried on
such a campaign against them as would bring
them to their reason. He observed, that a winter
campaign of mounted men would place us on
an equality in our contest with the Indians; and
he pledged himself for the efficacy of such an expedition,
if sanctioned and authorized by Congress,
and left to the Executive of Kentucky, so
far as the forces were taken from that State.
On such a campaign they must meet us in
battle, or surrender at discretion; they could
not avoid our search nor evade our pursuit—the
season would furnish certain means of discovery;
their strongholds would be broken up;
their squaws and children would fall into our
hands, and remain sure pledges against savage
ferocity and barbarity. Nothing do they so
much fear as to have their squaws taken prisoners.
Their winter quarters would be discovered
and their stock of winter provisions would be
destroyed; and once since the Revolution the
friend of his country would enjoy the satisfaction
of seeing our savage enemies humbled in
the dust and solely at our mercy, notwithstanding
all the arts of British intrigue to the contrary.
On the contrary, we want no additional
evidence, no train of reasoning, nor a particular
detail of facts, to convince us that any other
kind of force, and at any other period, will only
give us a partial remedy. Upon any other principle
we give the savage foe every advantage.
When threatened and pursued by a force sufficient
to chastise them, no warriors can be
found—they scatter through the woods like the
wild beasts of the forest. Send a small party,
and they are immediately surrounded and cut
off by superior numbers. In fact, sir, they will
not meet at their own doors and firesides equal
numbers in honorable combat—they must always
have some great and decided advantage.
In the several attacks made upon Fort Wayne,
Fort Harrison, and Bellevue—at which places
our officers and soldiers acted with a firmness
and gallantry deserving the highest praises of
their country—the Indians retreated at the approach
of assistance, and could not be found.
We witnessed the same scene when our army
penetrated their country from Fort Wayne, who
burnt their towns and destroyed their crops.
In short, sir, late in the spring, in the summer,
and in the fall, every thicket, every swamp—nay,
every brush-heap surrounded with weeds
furnishes a hiding place; and it is in vain to
search after Indians at such a time, if they are
not disposed to be seen. Mr. J. said, with this
imperfect picture before us, which, however,
contained undeniable facts, Congress could not
reconcile it to its duty not to take such steps as
would speedily terminate the war with the savages.
Such steps had been taken as to produce
much temporary distress among the Pottawatamies
and other tribes, and the destruction of
their villages and crops would employ many of
their warriors in procuring subsistence for their
squaws and children, which consequently gave
a correspondent relief to our frontier settlements;
that a winter campaign well conducted
was indispensable to complete the work which
was begun with so much zeal, but which could
not produce all the benefit that might be expected
from a regular authorized expedition; for
it would be recollected that the mounted men
had gone out suddenly upon the spur of the occasion,
without compensation, with a view to
relieve the frontiers from the disasters of Hull's
humiliating surrender; and in such voluntary
associations many men would consider themselves
under less obligations than if employed
by the Government, although the party with
whom he had the honor to act served beyond
the time for which they enrolled themselves,
and never quitted the service until honorably
discharged. Mr. J. observed, if the savages are
unmindful of the many acts of benevolence, of
justice and friendship exercised towards them
by the United States; if British influence, or
British gold, or any other consideration, could
induce them to continue the savage practice of
imbruing their hands alike in the blood of the
warrior in the field, and the infant in its mother's
arms; if they will be bound by no obligation
however sacred; by no treaty, however solemnly
made; by no dictate of nature, no matter how
self-evident; the United States are absolved
from all acts of further forbearance; and we are
called upon by every feeling of duty and honor
to disarm them of their fury and put them beyond
the power of injury. Mr. J. said he had
not intended to trouble the House with so many
preliminary remarks, but he had seen in his
place the Chairman of the committee to whom
the resolution was to be referred, and he was
anxious that the design and object of the motion
should be known, that the committee
might act with despatch if it met with their
views:
Resolved, That the select committee to whom was
referred so much of the President's Message as relates
to military affairs, be instructed to inquire into the
expediency of authorizing an expedition of mounted
volunteers against the Indian tribes hostile to the
United States.
The resolution was agreed to nem. con., without
debate.
Another member, to wit, from Kentucky,
Samuel McKee, appeared and took his seat.
Several other members, to wit: from New
York, Thomas B. Cooke; from New Jersey,
James Morgan; from Virginia, John Randolph;
and from North Carolina, Lemuel
Sawyer, appeared, and took their seats.
Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts,
William Reed; from Rhode Island,
Elisha R. Potter; from Virginia, Daniel
Sheffey; from North Carolina, James Cochran;
from South Carolina, Richard Wynn,
appeared, and took their seats.
Encouragement to Privateers.
Mr. Bassett, from the committee appointed
on that part of the President's Message which
relates to the Naval Establishment, reported, in
part, a bill in addition to the act concerning
letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods; which
was read twice, and committed to a Committee
of the Whole to-morrow.
The bill is as follows:
A Bill in addition to the act concerning letters of
marque, prizes, and prize goods.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That all prize property, upon sentence of
condemnation, shall, at the request of the owners
of the private armed vessel by which the capture
shall have been made, or of their agents, be, by the
marshal of the district in whose custody the same
may be, delivered over to the said owners or their
agents, to be by them sold or disposed of at their
discretion, and the proceeds thereof distributed by
them agreeably to the provisions of law: Provided,
That all fees, costs, and charges, arising on the process
of condemnation, be first paid, and that the duties
accruing on such prize goods, as also two per cent.
on the estimated value of such prize property, after
deducting all duties, costs, and charges, (which value,
as it respects the cargo, shall be ascertained in the
same manner as is provided by law for ascertaining
the value of goods subject to ad valorem duties; and
as it respects the vessel, to be ascertained by appraisers
to be appointed in the same manner,) shall be
first paid, or secured to be paid, to the collector of
the district into which such prize property may be
brought for condemnation; which two per cent. shall
be in lieu of the two per cent. on the net amount of
the prize money reserved by the seventh section of
the act to which this act is in addition, and shall be
pledged and appropriated to the same fund as is thereby
provided for.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That all bonds
taken for the security of the two per cent. fund before
provided for shall be made payable within sixty days
from the time of taking such bonds.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the owners
of any private armed vessel or vessels, or their agents,
may, at any time before a libel shall be filed against
any captured vessel or her cargo, remove the same
from any port into which it may be first brought, to
any other port in the United States, subject to the
same restrictions, and complying with the same regulations,
with respect to the payment of duties, which
are provided by law in relation to other vessels arriving
in port with cargoes subject to duty: Provided,
That before such removal the said captured property
shall not have been attached at the suit of any adverse
claimant, or a claim against the same have been
interposed in behalf of the United States.
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That wherever
the proceeds of any prize property has been, or shall
be, deposited with the clerk of any district court, pursuant
to the orders of said court, upon condemnation,
the same shall, at the request of the owners of the
private armed vessel by which the capture shall have
been made, or of their agents, be paid over to them,
to be by them distributed agreeably to the provisions
of law.
Another member, to wit, Josiah Quincy,
from Massachusetts, appeared, and took his seat.
Privateer Prize Law.
The House resolved itself into a Committee
of the Whole on the bill in addition to the act
concerning prizes and prize goods.
Mr. Bassett, as chairman of the committee
who reported the bill, explained its provisions,
and enforced the necessity of its adoption. He
took occasion to advert to the numerous captures
made by our private armed vessels, and
their utility as a system of annoyance to the
enemy. In every case in which they had come
in conflict, they had acquitted themselves in a
manner that redounded to their credit.
After some further conversation on the details
of the bill, the following section was, on
motion of Mr. Bacon, substituted for the fourth
section of the bill:
"Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That in cases
of sale of prize property by the marshal of any district,
or wherever the proceeds thereof has been or
shall be deposited with the clerk of any district court,
pursuant to the orders of said court upon condemnation,
the same shall, by the said marshal or clerk respectively,
at the request of the owners of the private
armed vessel by which the capture shall have been
made, or of their agents, be paid over to them, to be
by them distributed agreeably to the provisions of
law: Provided, That all fees, costs, and charges,
arising on condemnation, be first paid, and all duties
accruing on such prize property, as also the two per
cent. fund accruing on such proceeds, be first paid,
or secured to be paid, to the collector of the district
into which such prize may be brought for condemnation,
and that the marshal and clerk shall be allowed
for their services respectively, in selling, receiving,
and paying over as aforesaid, a commission of one per
cent. and no more, on the net proceeds of such prize
property, after deducting the duties, the two per cent.
and charges aforesaid: Provided, also, That such
commission shall not exceed, upon any property included
in one condemnation, the sum of one thousand
dollars."
The bill as thus amended was then ordered to
be engrossed for a third reading.
Retaliation.
The engrossed bill "vesting the power of retaliation
in the President of the United States in
certain cases," was read a third time.
A debate of more than an hour took place on
the question of its passage, which was finally
determined in the negative, by yeas and nays—51
to 61.
Pay of the Army.
The House went into Committee of the Whole
on the bill concerning the pay of the Army of
the United States, which was read.
Mr. Williams, as chairman of the committee
who reported it, rose to explain the provisions
of the bill. He said he hoped the consideration
of the bill would not involve a discussion of the
justice or necessity of the war. War, said he,
is now declared; we have thrown ourselves between
our country and the enemy; and it becomes
us to carry her triumphantly through the
war, or be responsible for the disgrace a contrary
course would incur. The reason of the introduction
of the first provision of the bill, he
said, was the palpable fact, that the present pay
of the Army, taking into consideration the price
of labor throughout the Union, was much below
the average rate. The committee, in the investigations
of this business, had, with much
labor, consulted all sources of information accessible
to them, and in no part of the United
States did it appear to be conceded by their
Representatives, that the fair price of labor was
less than nine dollars per month. Even if the
price was as low as eight, or say seven dollars,
wherefore should the soldier receive less than
any other man? This is a subject on which
every gentleman could decide by recurring to
his own neighborhood, and inquiring, what was
there the price of labor. If he could not procure
the service of an individual there for less than
eight dollars, how can he refuse the soldier that
price which I now solicit for him? The ranks
are not filled; we know it by too melancholy a
proof; and it is our duty to fill them. How
shall we best do it? It will not be contended
that your population is insufficient; no, sir; the
inducement is not adequate. There is no avocation
of life, no employment, however hazardous,
which fails to be pursued from a want of
persons ready to engage in it. No, sir; if you
want men to scale the mountains of ice under
the Northern pole, or endure the fervid rays of a
vertical sun in the hither India, to brave the
stormy ocean, or search for mines in the bowels
of the earth; only find them adequate compensation,
and there are men enough to be found.
The compensation for services performed, ought
always to be in proportion to the risk incurred.
This is a position which cannot be controverted.
There is no reason why the ranks of your Army
are not filled so forcible, as that you do not give
enough to the privates.
Mr. W. then briefly adverted to other provisions
of the bill. To the second section he apprehended
little objection; it had been found
to be necessary, and ample precedent might be
found for it. To the third section there might
and probably would be some objection. It was
founded, he said, on the principle that every
man owed to the country which protected him,
military service; the same principle, already
engrafted in our laws, which obliged the youth
of 18 years old to enter into the militia, warranted
his retention in the service when he had
voluntarily enlisted. The fourth section spoke
for itself and needed no explanation.
The second section having been read—
Mr. Wheaton said he conceived this section
to involve an infraction of the constitution. Any
person who had contracted a debt had certainly
given a pledge, not only of his property, but of
his body to his creditor. It is the creditor's
right to take his body in default of payment,
and the creditor was by this section, in the case
of those enlisting in the army, completely taken
out of his hands. Ample encouragement, Mr.
W. said, might be given to enlistments without
infringing the constitution. He had no objection
to privilege the soldier from arrest after
enlistment, but he could not consent to the passage
of a law, having an ex post facto operation,
which went to exempt him from obligations
previously contracted. He therefore moved to
strike out the words "before or" from the second
section above recited.
Mr. Bacon spoke in support of this provision.
It was necessary to guard against fraud. He
said, in the village in which he lived, such frauds
had been committed, by the creation of fictitious
debts, under which a person enlisting had
procured himself to be arrested. After this
arrest, on giving bail, he was set at large.
Whilst going at liberty, his commander had attempted
to take him; but a writ of habeas corpus
having been taken out, it had been determined
by the courts that a man was the property
of his bail until the suit was determined.
And that determination, Mr. B. said, would
never take place so long as the United States
had an occasion for the man's services; because,
by the same collusion which commenced it, the
suit may be continued from term to term of
court, until the term of enlistment has expired.
He had merely stated facts. He had known an
instance of an officer being obliged to move his
whole corps over the line to avoid these petty
depredations on their ranks; and he would venture
to say that the officers would much rather
face the enemy in the field, than the host of
legal depredators in Massachusetts, on those
enlisted for the public service. The principle
of this provision was not novel, he said, for it
existed already.
The motion to strike out the section was then
negatived by a large majority.
The third section was then read.
Mr. Stow rose and said, that the respect he
felt for the House, seemed to forbid that he
should propose to them any thing not fully matured:
but, that at the same time the objections
to one section of the bill under consideration,
appeared to him so many and so important, that
he could not refrain from urging them, though
as he feared in somewhat of an irregular and
desultory way. In excuse he said, he had supposed
the present bill agreeable to the one reported
in the Senate, and had not observed the
difference till that moment. His objections
were to the 3d section, and which he should
close by moving that it be stricken out. He
arranged his objections principally under three
heads: 1st. Its tendency to violate the public
morals. 2d. Interference with public economy—and
3d, its violation of the spirit of the Constitution
of the United States.
He remarked, that proper instruction and
discipline of youth lay at the bottom of all that
was valuable in this life, and perhaps of the life
to come. That it was of great importance in
every Government, but above all that it was infinitely
so in ours, where the people were real
sovereigns, and where the Government would
be ill or well administered, according as the
youths were bred in temperance, virtue, and
obedience. This section of the bill goes to cut
up those qualities by the roots. It says to the uneasy
boy in his teens, you may enlist and throw
off all parental authority; you may enlist and
defraud the parent or master, who has maintained
you in your helpless state, of his just reward.
The strongest ties of affection and gratitude,
you may, by enlisting, dissolve in a moment.
Nay, more, we say deliberately and solemnly—we
will pay this promoted villain $300 for his
iniquity! For such is the amount of the bounty
and wages for three years. Who, sir, will be
most likely to avail himself of this privilege, or
rather of this course? Not the sober, faithful
minor, who might be trusted in a camp with
some degree of safety, but the fickle, turbulent
restless youth, the one of all others who wants
the salutary restraint of a parent or guardian.
This is the person whom you are about to allow
to plunge himself into all the dissipations,
into all the seductions, and into all the vices of
a camp!
But, sir, said he, it is inhuman, as well as
immoral. Humanity calls upon you to take care
of and educate the miserable offspring of the
poor. Who will take them; who will provide
for their infancy, if at the moment they are able
to make any remuneration for this humane, this
tender care, you offer them $300 to turn ingrate?
But, sir, not only the public morals, but
the public economy require that you should not
enlist minors without the consent of their parents,
guardians, or masters. What does public
economy require, but that every one should
serve the Republic in that capacity in which he
can be most useful? And, sir, let me add that
patriotism requires the same thing. If the
blacksmith or the farmer is most useful in his
calling, there is as much patriotism in attending
to the anvil and the farm, as to the bayonet
and the sword. Men of mature age, by accepting
the terms you offer, or not, determine where
they can be most useful; but does not every
principle of economy forbid that you should go
into the private family, the workshops, and the
manufactory, regardless of the opinion of the
father and superintendent, and seduce the
young man from learning some useful and honorable
employment, and in lieu thereof, at that
tender, at that doubtful period of human life,
you plunge him into all the immoralities of a
camp, and turn him a vagabond on society. No,
sir, true economy requires that children should
be well educated, well governed, and faithfully
bred to some honest calling. The very principle,
notwithstanding all the talk of patriotism,
is recognized in the price you offer for soldiers,
as well by the former law, as by the present
bill. You offered by the former law, five dollars
per month, by the present bill eight dollars.
That is, you say to the world, that by being a
soldier, you render to your country services
worth five or eight dollars. Now, sir, for five
or eight dollars per month is it prudent, is it
economical, to dissolve the all-important relation
of governor and governed in respect to
youth? To break up your infant manufactories,
and to deprive poor children at once of a useful
employment, and a home? But, sir, perhaps
it will be said that necessity, the safety of the
Republic, requires this. When the legions of
Britain were upon our shores, when we were
struggling for our very existence, the necessity
was not then thought sufficiently imperious to
warrant such a principle. Can it then be said,
that with treble the population, and in an offensive
war, necessity requires the dangerous
innovation? Certainly not. Again, the law,
then and now, allows the soldier to be arrested
for a debt amounting to two dollars; and will
you say, that the debt in which there can be no
deception incurred, for the most necessary of
all things, food, clothing, and instruction for infancy,
shall be disregarded? I trust, sir, that
a principle so unreasonable will never prevail.
But, lastly, said Mr. S., I do contend that the
clause is contrary to the spirit, if not the letter,
of the constitution. That constitution provides
that private property shall not be taken without
reasonable compensation. The property
which a parent has in the services of his son, of
a guardian in the services of his ward, and a
master in the services of his servant, though
differing widely in degree, is as real and oftentimes
more important than the farmer has in
his personal estates, or the planter in his slave.
It also impairs the force of contract, which is
strictly interdicted to the States, and a fortiori
not to be done to the General Government.
For these and for many other reasons which
might be added, Mr. S. moved to strike out the
third section of the bill.
Mr. Milnor said that if he understood the
third section of the bill under consideration, it
allows recruiting officers to enlist minors above
the age of eighteen years, without regard to
their situation as apprentices to tradesmen, or
living under the care and guardianship of their
parents; and its object was to hold out to
young minds a temptation to desert the useful
course destined for them by their friends, for
the purpose of becoming soldiers. Now, said Mr.
M., whatever may be the necessity of war, on
some occasions, and however necessary some
might think that in which we are now engaged,
which was a question he should not now meddle
with, he was desirous that its operations
should be so conducted, as to do as little injury
as possible to our fellow-citizens; and, as the
leading principle in the conduct of all politicians
should be a regard to the public good, he hoped
for a general concurrence in this sentiment;
that, for his own part, he wished the war to be
felt as little as possible in the families and occupations
of the people. We are not, said he,
to be organized into a military Government.
However necessary some may deem this war,
all will desire a short one. Thank God, no Napoleon
has yet risen up amongst us to change
our free institutions into a military despotism.
Encourage, if you please, a military spirit, that
we may be ready for the national defence, when
necessary; but let it be done in the spirit of the
constitution, by means of a well-regulated militia;
let your citizens and your farmers surrender
their apprentices and children to be trained
and instructed in military tactics, at stated
times, that, when arrived at the state of manhood,
they may be ready for their country's
service. But what is here proposed? To go
into the workshop of the industrious mechanic,
or into a parent's dwelling, and entice away by
the lure of money and military glory, the apprentice
and the child. No matter what moneys
may have been expended in his education, or how
great has been parental exertion to advance the
future prospects of the child, any recruiting officer,
or even a common soldier, profligate in
his principles, and inured to vicious habits, is by
this bill encouraged to seduce him from his
duty.
Mr. Troup said the objections to this provision
were lame in their nature; he only wished
they were half as sound as they were novel. It
was the result of the experience of men older
than themselves in military concerns, that this
very description of population, between eighteen
and twenty-one, constituted the strength and
vigor of every war. What was the fact as respected
France? So just was this principle in
the contemplation of France, that her whole
army is made up of these young men; and yet
an attempt is made to deter us from using them
by a flimsy pretext, that to employ them would
be violating the obligations of a contract and
the principles of morality. If our feelings and
sympathies be suffered to influence us in favor
of the individual who voluntarily enlists, the reasons
are much stronger in favor of discharging
one-half of those already in your ranks, than
the description just spoken of. There is scarcely
any man over the age of twenty-one years,
between whom and other individuals there is not
some strong obligatory moral tie, which we
ought not to sever if we could conveniently
avoid it. Look at the case of a husband deserting
his wife and children, or of a man, above
twenty-one, deserting his aged parent, dependent
on him for subsistence. Are not these
cases equally strong? The doctrine of the gentlemen,
whether on the score of morality or expediency,
will apply to cases above as well as below
the age of twenty-one.
Mr. Gold premised, that he did not rise to
enter into the general policy of the war; nor
could he deny it to be the duty of those who
have declared the war, to provide an army to
carry it on. But he added, it is better for the
army to be augmented by very liberal bounties
and wages, than that important principles
should be violated and an inroad made upon the
great relations and interests of society. Are
gentlemen aware how extensive is the province
of master and apprentice? How wide-spread
the relation in the community? A sensation
will be produced which gentlemen seem not to
have anticipated. The respective States have,
with studious care, legislated upon and regulated
the various duties and obligations of masters
and apprentices. Under those laws, a clear obligation
is created upon the apprentice to serve
till of age; and in some States, to compensate
for absence or desertion during the stipulated
apprenticeship; for a faithful performance, the
parent or guardian becomes responsible; and
for non-performance, liable for damages to the
master. Can the authors of this bill imagine
that those solemn obligations contained in indentures
of apprenticeship, will dissolve and
vanish under the charm of the bill? Can the
fundamental principles of the constitution, rendering
contracts sacred, be thus uprooted and
destroyed? Can this bill deprive the master of
his action, secured to him by the laws of the
State, against the master or guardian for absence
or desertion of the apprentice? Here is a most
serious bearing upon the laws of the States, regulating
this important relation. But gentlemen
allege necessity; the army must be filled up;
officers are imposed on by fraudulent minors,
who receive the bounty, and then claim a release
upon the plea of non-age. In answer, let
gentlemen beware how they yield to this fancied
plea of necessity. All history attests the
danger of yielding essential principles to State
necessities; to temporary pressure and impulses;
such precedents become infinitely mischievous
in society. No fancied benefit can compensate
for the evil of such examples. How easy
is it to remove much of the complaints by providing
that the minor, who shall impose upon
the recruiting officer, shall refund the bounty
he received before he shall receive his discharge.
Such a provision would be just, and not violate
general principles.
Mr. Little.—In removing one evil, Mr. Chairman,
let us beware that we do not substitute a
greater. The object of the section proposed to
be stricken out of the bill on your table, and now
under consideration, is to fill up the ranks of
your army. From every attention I have been
able to bestow on this subject, which, permit
me to say, I am anxiously desirous, as much so, I
trust, as any gentleman in this committee, to
see realized, will, if returned in its present shape,
in my humble opinion, be productive of much
evil, and perhaps of little good. You receive
into the army, by voluntary enlistment, that
description of our fellow-citizens, at a time of
life to them the most interesting and auspicious
as respects their future pursuits and welfare.
I have always been given to understand
that the camp is but illy calculated in those
stations which they only can fill in the army,
either to improve their understandings or perfect
them in such habits as are calculated to acquire
a respectable subsistence, or fit them for
the domestic duties of their future lives. In the
course of nature, they, it may be truly said,
constitute the future strength and glory of every
country. The laws of this land render every
act of theirs illegitimate. Abstract from the consideration
of a soldier, for which they are only
rendered fit from their corporeal powers, everything
with them is premature; if forced into
existence, like the flower or fruit unseasonably
raised in a hot-bed, wears the external qualities,
but, in fragrance and taste, is unnatural and insipid.
Sir, have we not some reason to doubt the
constitutionality of this section. In its operation,
it evidently will vitiate contracts, which
ought always to be held sacred, solemnly and
voluntarily entered into by the parent or guardian
with the matter of an apprentice, reciprocally
beneficial, founded on the most laudable
and praiseworthy principles, on the faithful performance
of which materially depends the future
welfare of the youth, to which I believe
may reasonably be added the comforts and good
order of society. Do we not know, Mr. Chairman,
that, at that period of their lives and servitude,
in which you make them liable, if this
section is retained, to be drawn from the service
of their masters, that then, and only then, are
they enabled and become qualified to make some
remuneration for the pains and attention paid
to their improvement and instruction by the
worthy and industrious mechanic or manufacturer;
and will you, by this unpropitious act,
endanger the future happiness of the former, and
withhold that just reward due to the industry of
the latter? You annihilate this contract, which
ought to be held, if possible, inviolate by the
Government. Every principle of justice and
sound policy dictates its rigid fulfilment. Are
we not aware, sir, of the immense sums now invested
and actively employed in the different
manufactories distributed over our extensive
country? Do we not know that the manual labor
of them is conducted principally by such
who now are, or will in time, come within the
provision of this section of your bill? Have this
Government, and the people of this country, no
interest in the prosperity of these manufactories?
I have been always taught, and for one
do religiously believe, on their materials virtually
depends the completion of our independence
as a nation. Let me entreat you to reflect before
you hazard this dangerous experiment,
lest, in the adoption of this hitherto novel
principle, and in its operation, you may endanger
the safety, or, at least, the prosperity
of our Republic, by giving its manufactories a
vital stab.
Sundry other amendments were proposed in
the committee, after the bill was reported to
the House, and negatived. The bill was then
ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.
Pay of the Army.
An engrossed bill "concerning the pay of the
non-commissioned officers, musicians, privates,
and others of the Army, and for other purposes,"
was read the third time.
Mr. Quincy.—Mr. Speaker, I am sensible that
I owe an apology for addressing you at so early
a period of the session, and so soon after taking
my seat, if not to the House at least to my particular
constituents. It is well known to them,
at least to very many of them, for I have taken
no pains to conceal the intention, that I came
to this session of Congress with a settled determination
to take no part in the deliberation of
the House. I had adopted this resolution, not
so much from a sense of self-respect, as of public
duty. Seven years' experience in the business of
this House, has convinced me that from this side
of the House all argument is hopeless; that whatever
a majority has determined to do, it will do
in spite of any moral suggestion, or any illustration
made in this quarter. Whether it be
from the nature of man, or whether it be from
the particular provisions of our constitution, I
know not, but the experience of my political
life has perfectly convinced me of this fact, that
the will of the Cabinet is the law of the land.
Under these impressions, I have felt it my duty
not to deceive my constituents; and had, therefore,
resolved by no act or expression of mine,
in any way, to countenance the belief, that any
representation I could make on this floor could
be useful to them, or that I could serve them
any farther than by a silent vote. Even now,
sir, it is not my intention to enter into this discussion.
I shall present you my thoughts rather
by way of protest than of argument. And I
shall not trouble myself afterwards with any
cavils that may be made; neither by whom, nor
in what manner.
I should not have deviated from the resolution
of which I have spoken, were it not for
what appears to me the atrocity of the principle,
and the magnitude of the mischief contained in
the provisions of this bill. When I speak of the
principle as atrocious, I beg distinctly to be understood
as not impeaching the motives of any
gentlemen, or representing them as advocating
an atrocious principle. I speak only of the
manner in which the object presents itself to my
moral view.
It is the principle contained in the third section
of the bill of which I speak. That section
provides, that "every person above the age of
eighteen years, who shall be enlisted by any officer,
shall be held in the service of the United
States during the period of such enlistment;
any thing in any act to the contrary notwithstanding."
The nature of this provision is apparent,
its tendency is not denied. It is to seduce
minors of all descriptions, be they wards,
apprentices, or children, from the service of
their guardians, masters, and parents. On this
principle, I rest my objection to the bill. I
meddle not with the nature of the war. Nor
is it because I am hostile to this war, both in
its principle and its conduct, that I at present
make any objection to the provisions of the bill.
I say nothing against its waste of public money.
If eight dollars a month for the private be not
enough, take sixteen dollars. If that be not
enough take twenty. Economy is not my difficulty.
Nor do I think much of that objection
of which my honorable friend from Pennsylvania
(Mr. Milnor) seemed to think a great deal;
the liberation of debtors from their obligations.
So far as relates to the present argument, without
any objection from me, you may take what
temptations you please, and apply them to the
ordinary haunts for enlistment—clear the jails—exhaust
the brothel—make a desert of the
tippling shop—lay what snares you please for
overgrown vice, for lunacy, which is of full age,
and idiocy out of its time.
But here stop. Touch not private right—regard
the sacred ties of guardian and master—corrupt
not our youth—listen to the necessities
of our mechanics and manufacturers—have
compassion for the tears of parents.
In order to give a clear view of my subject, I
shall consider it under three aspects—its absurdity—its
inequality—its immorality.
In remarking on the absurdity of this principle
it is necessary to recur to that part of the
Message of the President of the United States at
the opening of the present session of Congress,
which introduced the objects proposed in this
bill to the consideration of the House; and to
observe the strange and left-handed conclusions
it contains. The paragraph to which I allude is
the following:
"With a view to that vigorous prosecution of the
war, to which our national faculties are adequate, the
attention of Congress will be particularly drawn to
the insufficiency of existing provisions for filling up
the Military Establishment. Such is the happy condition
of our country, arising from the facility of subsistence
and the high wages for every species of occupation,
that, notwithstanding the augmented inducements
provided at the last session, a partial success
only has attended the recruiting service. The
deficiency has been necessarily supplied during the
campaign, by other than regular troops, with all the
inconveniences and expense incident to them. The
remedy lies in establishing more favorably for the
private soldier, the proportion between his recompense
and the term of enlistment. And it is a subject
which cannot too soon or too seriously be taken
into consideration."
Mr. Speaker—What a picture of felicity has
the President of the United States here drawn in
describing the situation of the yeomanry of this
country! Their condition happy—subsistence
easy—wages high—full employ. To such favored
beings what would be the suggestions of
love, truly parental? Surely that so much happiness
should not be put at hazard. That innocence
should not be tempted to scenes of
guilt. That the prospering ploughshare should
not be exchanged for the sword. Such would
be the lessons of parental love. And such will
always be the lessons which the President of the
United States will teach in such a state of things,
whenever a father of his country is at the head
of the nation. Alas! Mr. Speaker, how different
is this Message! The burden of the
thought is, how to decoy the happy yeomen
from home, from peace, and prosperity, to
scenes of blood—how to bait the man-trap;
what inducements shall be held forth to avarice,
which neither virtue nor habit, nor wise influences,
can resist. But this is not the whole.
Our children are to be seduced from their parents.
Apprentices are invited to abandon their
masters. A legislative sanction is offered to
perfidy and treachery. Bounty and wages to
filial disobedience. Such are the moral means
by which a war, not of defence or of necessity,
but of pride and ambition, should be prosecuted.
Fit means to such an end.
The absurdity of this bill consists in this: in
supposing these provisions to be the remedy for
the evil, of which the President complains.
The difficulty is, that men cannot be enlisted.
The remedy proposed is, more money—and legislative
liberty to corrupt our youth. And how
is this proved to be a remedy? Why it has
been told us, on the other side of the House,
that this is the thing they do in France. That
the age between eighteen and twenty-one is the
best age to make soldiers. That it is the most
favorite age, in Bonaparte's conscription. Well,
sir, what then? Are we in France? Is Napoleon
our king? Or is he the President of the
United States? The style in which this example
has been urged on the House, recalls to my
recollection very strongly a caricature print
which was much circulated in the early period
of our Revolutionary war. The picture represented
America as a hale youth, about eighteen
or twenty-one, with a huge purse in his pocket.
Lord North, with a pistol at his breast, was
saying "deliver your money." George the
Third, pointing at the young man, and, speaking
to Lord North, said, "I give you that man's
money for my use." Behind the whole group was
a Frenchman capering, rubbing his hands for joy,
and exclaiming, "Be Gar! just so in France!"
Now, Mr. Speaker, I have no manner of doubt,
that the day that this act passes, and the whole
class of our Northern youth is made subject to
the bribes of your recruiting officers, that there
will be thousands of Frenchmen in these United
States, rubbing their hands for joy, and exclaiming,
"Be Gar! just so in France." Sir, the
great mistake of this whole project lies in this:
that French maxims are applied to American
States. Now it ought never to be lost sight of by
the legislators of this country, that the people
of it are not and never can be Frenchmen—and,
on the contrary, that they are, and can never
be any thing else than freemen.
The true source of the absurdity of this bill,
is a mistake in the nature of the evil. The
President of the United States tells us that the
Administration have not sufficient men for their
armies. The reason is, he adds, the want of
pecuniary motive. In this lies the error. It is
not pecuniary motive that is wanting to fill your
armies. It is moral motive in which you are
deficient. Sir, whatever difference of opinion
may exist among the happy and wise yeomanry
of New England, in relation to the principle and
necessity of this war, there is very little, or at
least much less diversity of sentiment, concerning
the invasion of Canada, as a means of prosecuting
it. They do not want Canada as an object
of ambition; they do not want it as an
object of plunder. They see no imaginable connection
between the conquest of that province
and the attainment of those commercial rights
which were the pretended objects of the war.
On the contrary, they see, and very plainly too,
that if our Cabinet be gratified in the object of
its ambition, and Canada become a conquered
province, that an apology is immediately given
for extending and maintaining in that country
a large military force; under pretence of preserving
the conquered territories—really, with
a view to overawe adjoining States. With this
view of that project the yeomanry of New England
want that moral motive which will alone,
in that country, fill your armies with men worthy
enlisting. They have no desire to be
the tools of the ambition of any man, or any
set of men. Schemes and conquest have no
charms for them.
Abandon your projects of invasion; throw
your shield over the seaboard and the frontier;
awe into silence the Indians in your territory;
fortify your cities; take the shackles from your
commerce; give us ships and seamen; and show
the people of that country a wise object of warfare;
and there will be no want of men, money,
or spirit.
I proceed to my second objection, which was
to the inequality of the operation of the provisions
of this bill. It is never to be forgotten, in
the conduct of the Government of these United
States, that it is a political association of independent
sovereignties, greatly differing in respect
of wealth, resource, enterprise, extent of territory,
and preparation of arms. It ought, also,
never to be forgotten, that the proportion of
physical force which nature has given does not
lie within precisely the same line of division
with the proportion of political influence which
the constitution has provided. Now, sir, wise
men, conducting a political association thus constructed,
ought always to have mainly in view,
not to disgust any of the great sections of the
country, either in regard to their interests, their
habits, or their prejudices. Particularly ought
they to be cautious not to burden any of the
great sections in a way peculiarly odious to them,
and in which the residue of the States cannot
be partakers, or at least only in a very small degree.
I think this principle of political action
is incontrovertible. Now, sir, of all the distinctions
which exist in these United States, that
which results from the character of the labor in
different parts of the country, is the most obvious
and critical. In the Southern States, all
the laborious industry of the country is conducted
by slaves; in the Northern States it is
conducted by the yeomanry, their apprentices,
or children. The truth is, that the only real
property, in the labor of others, which exists in
the Northern States, is that which is possessed
in that of minors—the very class of which, at
its most valuable period, this law proposes to
divest them. The planter of the South can
look round upon his fifty, his hundred, and his
thousand of human beings, and say, These are
my property. The farmer of the North has
only one or two ewe lambs—his children—of
which he can say, and say with pride, like the
Roman matron, "These are my ornaments."
Yet these, this bill proposes to take from him,
or (what is the same thing) proposes to corrupt
them—to bribe them out of his service; and
that, too, at the very age when the desire of
freedom is the most active, and the splendor of
false glory the most enticing. Yet, your slaves
are safe; there is no project for their manumission
in the bill. The husbandman of the North,
the mechanic, the manufacturer, shall have the
property he holds in the minors subject to him
put to hazard. Your property in the labor of
others is safe. Where is the justice—where the
equality—of such a provision?
It is very well known in our country—indeed
it is obvious, from the very nature of the thing—that
the exact period of life at which the
temptation of this law begins to operate upon
the minor, is the moment when his services begin
to be the most useful to the parent or master.
Until the age of 18, the boy has hardly paid to
the parent or master the cost of his clothing and
education. Between the age of 18 and 20, is
just the period of profit to the father and
master. It is also the period at which, from the
approximation towards manhood, service begins
to grow irksome, and the desire of liberty powerful.
The passions are then, also, in their most
ungoverned sway; and the judgment, not yet
ripe, can easily be infatuated and corrupted by
the vain dreams of military glory. At this
period, your law appears with its instruments of
seduction. It offers freedom to the minor's desire
of liberty—plunder to his avarice—glory to
his weakness. In short, it offers bounty and
wages for disobedience to his natural or social
obligations. This is a true view of this law.
That it will have that full operation which its
advocates hope and expect—that it will fill
your armies with runaways from their masters
and fathers—I do not believe; but, that it will
have a very great operation, I know. The
temptation to some of our youth will be irresistible.
With my consent, they shall never be
exposed to it.
Mr. Speaker, I hope what I am now about to
say will not be construed into a threat. It is
not uttered in that spirit; but only to evince
the strength of my convictions concerning the
effect of the provisions of this law on the
hopes of New England, particularly of Massachusetts.
But pass it, and if the Legislatures
of the injured States do not come down upon
your recruiting officers with the old laws
against kidnapping and man-stealing, they are
false to themselves, their posterity, and their
country.
Mr. Fisk expressed the astonishment he felt
at the observation which had fallen from the
gentleman last up. He certainly agreed with
the gentleman in one thing: that those who
are in pursuit of a favorite object frequently
overleap the bounds of reason and decorum in
support of it. Now, it had been a favorite object
with that gentleman to shield the British
Government from blame; and it was an object
which he certainly pursued with the greatest
ardor and anxiety. In the address of that
gentleman's political friends, in Congress, to
their constituents, subsequent to the declaration
of war, it had been deceptively said, that a disposition
existed in the British Government to
make an arrangement on the subject of impressment.
Now, sir, that the ground is taken from
under them, we hear that the object of the war
is an unrighteous one, and we are guilty of
waging it. Is it indeed guilty to defend our
country? said Mr. F. The gentleman would
overawe the Indians. Sir, the most innocent
party in the war against us is the savage himself.
How comes he in the ranks against us,
with his tomahawk and scalping knife? Why
is he impelled to shed our blood? Why has
the gentleman shielded British instigation of
their outrages?
Again, sir, has the gentleman no feeling for
the sufferings, no ear for the groans of our
suffering seamen? Has he no sympathy for
those relations of life, from which the seamen
is torn away, and for that moral sentiment
which is violated in that outrage—and are we
guilty because we seek to shield our citizens
from it? Are we guilty because we resist the
British scalping knife? Recall the year '98 to
your recollection, sir, and the pompous display
of energy at that day, and the armies raised—to
fight whom?—a few miserable Frenchmen
whom they could catch at sea. War was then
a mere amusement. Why, that we are now at
war with the nation who has been seizing our
property, capturing our citizens, and carrying
them into slavery—why are our means for carrying
on war to be limited?
As to the provision of this bill so much objected
to, was it esteemed such a violation of
all right and principle in the commencement of
the Revolution to take children of sixteen
years of age from their parents? That was a
period when the youth of the country were invited
to the field. I was one who accepted the
invitation, and I have never regretted it. But,
says the gentleman, will you take the child from
the parent? Sir, which excites the most tears—a
child leaving his parent to defend his country,
or a parent torn from his family and his
country to fight for a foreign power? The
truth is, that most of those who object to this
bill would destroy all the means of carrying on
the war, if they could. It was not thought immoral
in the war of the Revolution to take
youths of this age, nor were they the least efficient
part of our army.
Mr. D. R. Williams said, if it was possible
for him to keep down those feelings of indignation
which pressed upon his mind, in what he
had now to offer, he would speak with due
respect to the orders of the House, and not infringe
its privileges. He wished, indeed, he
had not occasion to speak; but, sir, said he, it
is my misfortune to be the Chairman of the
Military Committee, more, Mr. Speaker, by
your partiality than by any merit of mine. I
am compelled to rise. I have been stigmatized
by the gentleman (Mr. Quincy) as the introducer
into this House of an atrocious principle. If
such language comports with our rules of order,
I must submit, seeing it is uttered where he is
protected; but, sir, I must pronounce it a libel
on myself, and throw it back on him who uttered
it, as a foul, atrocious libel on the committee.
Sir, I came here not disposed to use
such language; nothing but extreme injury
should extort it from me. I wish that the gentleman
had kept the resolve he informed us he
had formed; as he could not do so, I would
that he had been good enough to spare me
from the acrimony of his remarks. Atrocity!
The advocate of an atrocious principle! Let
the gentleman recur to those who originated
this principle; let him go back to the day of the
Revolution, and damn the memory of the patriots
of those times, the fruit of whose labors
he so ill deserves to enjoy. The provisions of
those days authorized the enlistment of all over
the age of sixteen years. Nor does the statement
which the gentleman from New York
made alter the case, for if there be an increase
of population since the Revolution, there appears
to be a correspondent deterioration of
patriotism. The gentleman from Massachusetts
admits that a necessity may exist to justify the
course proposed by the bill. Well, sir, was
there ever a crisis calling on a people for vigorous
exertions more awful than that which impends
over us now? Now, when a vile spirit
of party has gone abroad and distracted the
Union? Now, that the State which the gentleman
represents is almost in arms against us?
And, in such a state of things are we to be told
that we are espousing an atrocious principle,
because we are seeking for the means to defend
our country? The will of the President is the
law of the land, says the gentleman. How
can he expect his arguments to be attended to,
when the first word he utters after taking his
seat is to insult and abuse every one opposed
to him in opinion. I beg your pardon, Mr.
Speaker, I ask that of the House, for the language
I am compelled to use; but so long as I
am a man, so help me God, when I am told I
am actuated by an atrocious principle, I will
throw it back in the teeth of the assertor as an
atrocious falsehood. Look back on the principle
adopted by the friends of that gentleman—I
wish I could say who were his friends—I do
not call the honest federalist, who is willing to
support his country's rights, his friend—even in
England, the nation from which he talks of receiving
his religion and morality, and I might
add, his ideas of our rights—even in that country
they do not prevent enlistment of minors—that
is, they are not discharged on the ground
of minority. I have said before, sir, that we
had examples in our own Government, drawn
not to be sure from the purest times, but which
more than covered the whole case. A law was
passed in 1798 which authorized the enlistment
not only, of minors but every description of persons
whom the President of the United States
thought proper to have enlisted—which authorized
him to send his recruiting sergeants into
every family and take those who suited him
best. This was the principle of his friends.
Does the gentleman say that it was atrocious in
1798 to defend ourselves against the French?
But it has become so now, seeing the defence
we seek is against the English. The gentleman
has said we act on an absurd principle; that we
have mistaken the means of carrying on the war
to effect: we want the moral means. By this I
presume he would be understood that the people
are opposed to the war, particularly to our
land operations. There seems then to be no
moral objection to the war on the ocean. And,
sir, if it be not immoral to support the war on
the ocean, on what possible principle can it be
immoral, in the same cause, to support it on the
land? The war on both elements is for the
same object; not as the gentleman says, to rob
and plunder in Canada, but, according to the
motto of the gallant Captain Porter, for "free
trade and sailors' rights."
Mr. Pitkin remarked that the power given
to a recruiting officer to enlist minors was a
new principle. It had not been acted upon
before, or since the Revolution—this is a new
mode of raising an army; were gentlemen prepared
to adopt this new principle? Although
by the resolves of the Congress of 1776, minors
could be enlisted, yet apprentices were exempted—and
if any were enlisted, yet, on
proper application, they were discharged, unless
it could be shown the enlistment was with
the consent of their masters or guardians. By
the law of '98, the President certainly could
direct relative to the age and size of a recruit—yet
to whom did he apply? Not to apprentices—not
to wards—and then if an officer enlisted
an apprentice without the consent of his
master, he could be taken away from him by
the writ of habeas corpus and the officer held
liable for damages. The eleventh section of the
law for raising an additional military force contained
a similar provision, and it was also necessary
the consent of the master or guardian
should be in writing.
Mr. P. did not intend to meddle at all with
the policy of war—he should confine himself to
the consideration of the most important principle
contained in the third section of the bill.
The effect of this bill goes to infringe all the
State laws. They all provide for the relations
which exist between a master and his apprentice—a
guardian and his ward; if the apprentice
runs away he can be procured and brought
back; and some of the States provide, that
when the apprentice comes again into the possession
of his master, that he shall serve not
only the time lost, but an extra time, to remunerate
his master by these services for the losses
he has sustained. If you take away his apprentice
you deprive him of his property—this is a
loss to the master, or he must recover where
the services are due; that is, of the parent or
guardian, who are one of the contracting parties
to the indentures—and where is the remedy?
Will not the officer be also liable to the State
laws? Does not the constitution say, no laws
shall be passed abrogating contracts? This
bill will in its operation sanction the violation
of contracts, or it means nothing—it sanctions
the right to take away the property of guardians,
parents or masters, without providing
any compensation for the same. I repeat, you
are introducing a new principle in the mode of
administering Government. The pressure is
also beyond comparison unequal on the Northern
States. Do gentlemen plead the necessity
of the case? Does a necessity exist superior
to the laws? Are we to understand that
the salus populi shall rule without control? If
not, then what is meant by this grant to take
the property of your constituents, and leave
them no remedy for the injury? The honorable
gentleman from South Carolina has referred
to the practice of other nations. Great
Britain herself never incorporated apprentices
into her armies.
Mr. Williams admitted that apprentices were
exempt—but minors were not.
Mr. Pitkin agreed but even when minors are
enlisted without the consent of their guardians
or masters, they can be released by the writ of
habeas corpus. I believe that, in 1756, Great
Britain passed an act which was designed to
extend to only the colonies; it allowed indented
servants to be enlisted into the army—but
this act made provision for the master, if the
compensation was claimed within so many
months after enlistment, and the necessary facts
were proved before any two justices of the
peace. Whether this act was ever carried into
effect I do not know—but I do know that compensation
was provided for the property taken
from the master in the person of, his servant.
Mr. Troup.—If a stranger in the gallery had
listened to the member from Massachusetts, he
would have supposed that the provision of the
bill against which the gentleman's anathemas
were most vehemently levelled, authorized the
recruiting sergeant to enter the house of the
citizen, drag from it the young man, and transport
him, loaded with chains, (as is said to be
the practice of one nation of Europe,) to the
armies. Who would have supposed that the
provisions merely authorized the recruiting
sergeant to accept the voluntary service of the
young man, between eighteen and twenty-one?
The service due to the country, prior in point
of time, paramount in obligation, must yield,
says the gentleman, to the service due to the
master, the parent, or the guardian. If, sir,
in the days of Rome's greatness, if in the proud
days of Grecian glory, the man could have been
found base and hardy enough to withhold the
young men from the public service, to turn
them from the path of honor, or to restrain
them from the field of fame, he would have
been hurled from the Tarpeian Rock or consigned
to the Cave of Trophonius. The young
man is preferred here, not because he is preferred
in France, but because his physical constitution
and his moral temperament peculiarly
qualify him for the arduous duties of the field and
camp; bodily vigor and activity, ardor, enterprise,
impetuosity; without family, and therefore
without the cares which family involve.
No wife, no helpless children. Without care,
but for his country. Without fear, but for her
dishonor. He is most eminently qualified for
the duties of the camp and the field; all experience
has proved it.
Mr. Macon said it appeared the House was
now in a situation in which it had frequently
been heretofore; that is, they take up a very
small subject and make a very great one of it.
The only question for discussion appeared to
him to be, whether or not they would enlist
into the Army young men between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one. He was very sorry
that, at this early period of the session, a discussion
had been introduced into the House,
which had at all times better be let alone, that
of foreign influence. He did not mean to discuss
it; but, if gentlemen were anxious for it,
he was perfectly willing to set aside a day for
the consideration of the subject, and go about
it methodically. He regretted very much that
the feature to which he had alluded had been
inserted in the bill; because he had been in
hopes that, on the question of raising the pay
of the Army, they would, one and all, have
manifested a disposition to support the rights
of the country. In the hope that they would
yet come to an agreement on the subject; that
they could give some vote of unanimity in relation
to the war, he should move for a recommitment
of the bill, with a view to amend it
by striking out the third section. It appeared
to him that, until a man had acquired political
rights, he ought not to be called on to defend
his country. The gentleman from South Carolina
says the principle of this section already
exists in our militia laws. I admit it; and
hence, I have always, when our militia laws
have been under consideration, moved to strike
out "eighteen" and insert "twenty-one." I
hope, if we do not take recruits under twenty-one,
we will alter the militia laws also, and let
the country rely for its defence on those who
manage its concerns. He hoped the House
would consent to recommit the bill, and, in
some one vote, show something like unanimity.
Mr. Randolph rose to speak at the same
moment with Mr. Macon, but, being first seen
by the Speaker, obtained the floor.
Mr. R. said that he was extremely happy, as
he did not notice his friend from North Carolina,
at the time of his rising—in which case
he should certainly have given way to him according
to custom—that he had caught the
Speaker's eye first. I was about to rise, said
Mr. R., for the purpose of making a similar
motion; and there are considerations on which
it is unnecessary for me to dwell, and towards
which I will not even hint, that render it at
least as agreeable to me that the motion for
recommitment should come from that respectable
and weighty quarter, rather than from myself.
I shall vote for it upon the same grounds
which would have induced me ultimately to
vote against the bill; because it contains provisions,
I might say principles, unsusceptible of
modification, and, in my judgment, hostile to
all those principles which I have hitherto entertained,
and to which it is impossible for me
to give the sanction of my support. I shall
not vote against the bill, for some of the reasons
urged by the gentleman from Massachusetts
on my right, (Mr. Quincy,) with more of eloquence
than temperance, and answered in a
style not dissimilar by my worthy friend on my
left, (Mr. Williams.) They both reminded me
of a stroke of perhaps the only comic poet this
country has produced:
"The more they injured their side,
The more argument they applied."
The gentleman from Massachusetts touched a
chord, which, he ought to have known, was
that which would insure the passage of this
bill; which would excite a temper that would
indispose the House to listen to the still small
voice of conscience and of reason. I, sir, shall
vote for the recommitment of this bill, and for
reasons which I am almost ashamed to urge;
which I hope to be excused for adducing. They
have nothing to do with the question of impressment,
of maritime war, of the invasion of Canada,
of Indian warfare; but, sir, they are principles
which, from length of time, I am sorry to
say, have grown so obsolete, like some of the
older statutes of those countries of more ancient
date than ourselves, that, though I am not
ashamed of them, I am almost ashamed to mention
them—they are those professed by the Republican
party in the year 1798, which I had
the honor of attempting, at least, to support in
those days—the principles, as reduced to record,
of the present Chief Magistrate of our country
in those days. In truth, it has been insinuated,
if not asserted, with much more of candor than
of logical address, that the principles of the bill
are those of the former friends of the gentleman
from Massachusetts on my left, from which, I
suppose, that gentleman has, in some way or
other, deserted. This goes to prove, as far as
the authority of the gentleman from Vermont
and of my worthy friend from South Carolina
has influence, that a long course of opposition
has instilled into the gentleman something of
the principles which did not belong to his
friends while in power; that he is a deserter
from his party, and consequently that I have
remained a faithful sentinel at my post. I did
not expect to hear it said, sir, that this bill was
not to be opposed because a similar bill had
been passed in what used to be called the Reign
of Terror. In other words, I did not expect to
hear it stated that the principles of the Administration
of the predecessor of Jefferson, which,
I suppose, he would now be as ready to recant
as any man in the nation, justified the bill; that
it ought to be passed, because it was fashioned
in conformity to such doctrines. It is now, sir,
I think, some thirteen or fourteen years ago,
since a similar question was agitated on the
floor of this House, and it was my lot to be
compelled to sustain the same side of the question
which I sustain to-day—for I will not use
the qualified term, attempt to sustain, against
one of the proudest names in this country—against
the man who now presides, I will not
say with what splendor of abilities, at the head
of the judicial department of our Government.[30]
The House will readily agree that, plain must
have been that question which could have been
supported with such unequal odds; that strong
must have been that side of the argument against
such an advocate. It was one of those occasions
on which the gentleman who then presided
in the House declared "he never witnessed
a more unpromising debate:" it was so—for it
was one of those which tended to put that gentleman
and his friends into the situation which
so many of them—I will not say all—for there
are some illustrious examples to the contrary—into
the situation which many of them have
since occupied. It was an assertion of the great
fundamental principles of our Government
against arbitrary, high-toned courtly notions.
The party then in power had been nearly as
long in office as the party now in power, and
looked at the question pending before them,
with a very different eye, while they wielded
the sceptre, than that with which they look at
the question now, when the sceptre is applied
to their backs. I am sorry to say that I fear
that the converse of the proposition is, in a great
degree, true, and that those principles which I
then supported, and which were the ground of
the revolution of political sentiment in 1801
which thereafter ensued, have fallen, as it were,
in abeyance; that, in fact, we have forgotten
our oracle.
I have said, on a former occasion, and if I
were Philip, I would employ a man to say it
every day, that the people of this country, if
ever they lose their liberties, will do it by sacrificing
some great principle of free government
to temporary passion. There are certain great
principles, which if they be not held inviolate
at all seasons, our liberty is gone. If we give
them up, it is perfectly immaterial what is the
character of our Sovereign; whether he be King
or President, elective or hereditary—it is perfectly
immaterial what is his character—we
shall be slaves—it is not an elective government
which will preserve us.
But I am afraid I have fallen somewhat into
error, by wandering from the course I proposed.
On the occasion to which I have alluded, I
maintained that the provision of a bill then
pending, similar to that I now object to, was
arbitrary, unconstitutional and unjust, because
it was in the nature of an ex post facto law. It
is of the nature of an ex post facto law—it is
more—it tends to exalt the military authority
over the civil—it is this or it is nothing. If the
section pronounce an ambiguous voice, to be
construed according to expediency, then is there
so much greater reason to recommit the bill, to
reduce it to some shape which shall render it
intelligible to the meanest capacity. It goes to
alter the nature of a remedy—to impair the obligation
of a contract. A man has contracted
a debt, and his creditors arrest him. He enlists.
He enlists through the grates of a prison, or
within the limits of prison bounds. The contract
between this man and the creditor is varied
by the law, because the remedy of the
creditor is changed. Let us not have a descant
on the cruelty of imprisonment for debt, and
the expediency of introducing other provisions
on that subject. That is not the question. It
is on a law for exempting a particular class of
men from those penalties and provisions which
attach to all other classes of society. The military
of all classes in society, that class which
we are about to exempt from the general provisions
attaching to other classes, is that of
which the people of this country have been led
by all our writers, by all our authorities, to entertain
the most watchful and justly founded
jealousy. It is on principles somewhat analogous
to these, or rather the same, much better
enforced, that an opposition was maintained to
a law, not dissimilar in its provisions from this,
in the winter of 1799-1800.
In the fury and tempest of his passion, my
friend from South Carolina seemed to overlook,
what I thought he would be one of the last to
forget, that we live in a limited Government,
possessing restricted powers, which we cannot
exceed. Has the constitution, with the most
jealous scrutiny, defined the privileges of a
member of this House, not permitting us to define
our own, and made our principal privilege
an exemption from arrest; and do we clothe
ourselves with a power of exempting from arrest,
ad libitum, a whole class of society—of
creating a privileged order? We are, indeed, a
privileged order, but we are privileged by the
constitution. I ask the gentleman from South
Carolina whence he derives the power of creating
a privileged order, and, shall this assumption
of power be attempted in favor of the military,
of all other classes? In my opinion, sir,
the section to which I have had reference is
freighted with most fatal consequences. I will
suppose a case. Suppose a man had a writ served
upon him, and he afterwards enlists; that
an escape warrant is taken out against him, and
a contest ensues between the recruiting sergeant
and the civil officer for this man, and that the
civil authority supports its officer by calling out
the force at its disposal. What would be the
upshot? What is it to lead to? I need not
state the consequences. These principles, sir,
were urged thirteen years ago; they are urged
now, in the same place, and on the same occasion.
I cannot consent, in deference to any
gentlemen, however great their zeal, to admit
that I merely urged them at that time, from
party views, to put down one description of
persons in order to get into their warm berths.
I cannot consent to such an admission, and,
therefore, cannot give my support to any bill
which contains such provisions. I have said
this will be an ex post facto law. It is so; it
operates not only after the right has accrued to
the creditor to sue out his writ, but after it is
in a course of execution. Let me put another
case. Suppose that Congress were to pass a
law that every malefactor under the sentence
of death, who enlisted in the Army, should not
have the sentence of the law executed on his
body. Have you not as good a right to do that
as to pass this law? Would you consent to see
a scuffle at the gallows between the civil authority
and the military for the body of that wretch?
I will put another case, sir. A son, who is
the only support of a widowed and aged mother,
in some moment of hilarity, perhaps of
intoxication, led astray by the phantom Glory,
enlists in the army of the United States. I
speak of one who is a minor. Although I know
that freemen of this country cannot be property
in the sense in which a slave is property,
yet, I do allow that the mother has a property
in the time of that child; that he is under an
obligation from which no human law can absolve
him—an obligation imposed upon him by the
maternal throes that issued him into life—by the
nourishment drawn from the parent's breast—by
the cherishing hand which fostered him
through imbecility and infancy. You have not
a right to take him—I hope, then, sir, that no
question will be made of your power.
I put another case, said Mr. R. Although an
apprentice and a minor are not property in the
sense in which a slave is property, there is a
class of men, unluckily, in certain parts of our
country (in Philadelphia, for instance—I mean
that class called "redemptioners,") who were
sold but yesterday in the markets of that city.
Is the gentleman who represents that district
(Mr. Seybert) willing that they shall absolve
themselves from their contract by enlisting in
the Army? If he is, I am. A redemptioner
sold in Philadelphia for a term of years, bought
in the market as fairly as any other commodity—(I
say fairly, because bought with his own
consent, and as he believes, for his own advantage)—such
a person, if tempted to enlist, will,
unquestionably, prefer the pay and emolument
of the soldier in your Army to his present situation.
With regard to apprentices, I very much
fear, sir, that those who enlist will, for the
greater part, be of that description for whom
their masters have advertised six cents reward,
and forewarned all persons from harboring them.
I remember, when a small boy, to have seen a
series of prints by Hogarth, called "The Progress
of Industry and Idleness." The gradations
were not more regular than natural. The
one ends with wealth, honor, and an eligible
matrimonial connection with the daughter of
his master, with whom he had been admitted
into partnership; the other is brought up by
the gibbet. Their names were Thomas Idle
and William Goodchild. I believe, sir, that
more of the Thomas Idles than of any other
will enlist under this law, and I sincerely hope
they will; for I very much fear that even William
Goodchild, after he has gone through the
discipline of a camp for five years, will be utterly
unfit for any other species of employment.
This is not all. There are other considerations,
which I forbear to touch—which, I should have
supposed, would have brought themselves home
to the bosom of every gentleman in this House.
Personal indisposition has prevented my attendance
in this House, and I did not hear of
this bill until last night. It was then mentioned
to me by one who is fast in the old faith, and
has often brought the House to a recollection
of good old principles; and I did hope that they
would this day have received more strenuous aid
from that quarter than they have. I hope the
House will refuse to pass the bill, if it were only
to show that there is some one act of the Administration
of 1799-1800, which the present possessors
of power have not copied from their
statute book. There remains only this, and the
eight per cent. stock loan—and we are saved
from the latter only by the infractions of that
law, which we imperiously refused at the last
session to repeal. It is the infractions of this
law which has poured money into our coffers,
and saved us from the disgrace of an eight per
cent. loan. There is another part of this bill
which strikes me as being inexpedient; but, as
I do not wish to blend considerations of expediency
with those of great and vital principles,
I shall waive any thing on that head.
The question was then taken on the motion
to recommit the bill, and lost. For recommitment
42, against it 62.
The question was then taken that the said
bill do pass; and resolved in the affirmative—yeas
64, nays 37.
Proposed new State.
On motion of Mr. Poindexter, the House
resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole,
on the bill to authorize the people of Mississippi
Territory to form a constitution and State Government,
and for the admission of the same into
the Union.
Mr. Richardson moved to strike out the first
section of the bill.
This motion was supported by Mr. Pitkin,
principally on the ground of the inexpediency
on general principle, of giving to a Territory
embracing a population of only twenty or thirty
thousand souls, a representation in the Senate
equal to that possessed by other States, some
of which contained a million of inhabitants.
Another objection was, that the bill proposed
to incorporate within a State the town and citadel
of Mobile, now in possession of a foreign
power; and thus make it the duty of a State to
expel from its territory a force which the President
had not thought fit to remove.
The motion was opposed by Mr. Poindexter,
who contended that the population of the Territory
was much greater than was represented;
and even if it were not what it is, that a precedent
was to be found in the incorporation of
Ohio and of Louisiana. He represented in glowing
terms, the anxiety of the people of the Territory
to be enabled to bear their share of the
expense as well as the dangers of the present
war in support of our just rights; in which
cause they had already employed twelve hundred
militia, which the gentleman could not say
of the populous State he represented; and if
that were not enough, they were ready to put
a bayonet into the hands of every man in the
Territory capable of bearing arms. As to the
occupancy of Mobile by the Spaniards, it was
not a valid objection; but if it were, he said he
hoped it would soon be invalidated; he trusted
that the spirit of the country would aid the disposition
of the Executive to repel every foreign
enemy from our territories.
The motion to strike out the first section was
negatived, yeas 24.
After some amendment to the bill, the committee
rose and reported it to the House.
Mr. Pitkin renewed the motion to strike out
the first section of the bill; which was negatived
by a large majority.
The bill was then ordered to be engrossed for
a third reading.
Mississippi Territory.
An engrossed bill to enable the people of the
Mississippi Territory to form a constitution and
State Government, and for the admission of
such State into the Union on an equal footing
with the original States, was read the third
time; and, on the question that the same do pass,
it passed in the affirmative—yeas 63, nays 39.
Constitution and Guerriere.
Mr. Bassett communicated to the House the
following documents:
Navy Department, Nov. 21, 1812.
Sir: In order to enable the committee to form a
satisfactory opinion as to the compensation to be provided
for the officers and crew of the frigate Constitution,
for the capture and subsequent destruction of
the British frigate the Guerriere, I have the honor to
state to you that the Constitution rated 44, and
mounted 55 guns; that the Guerriere rated 38 and
mounted 54 guns. The Guerriere, although entirely
dismasted, and in other respects much crippled, could
have been brought into port without incurring any
other risk than that of recapture; but Captain Hull
conceived that if he had manned the Guerriere for
the purpose of sending her into port, he would have
so far reduced the crew of the Constitution that he
might have subjected both vessels to capture. He
presumed that, under all circumstances, it would be
better for him to destroy the Guerriere, and preserve
the force of the Constitution unimpaired, and his
having done so unquestionably proceeded from the
most patriotic considerations.
The Guerriere was a frigate of the first class in
the British navy; and, no doubt, when the engagement
between the Constitution and her commenced,
she was completely fitted in all respects for the most
serious service. The cost of such a ship, independently
of her stores, could not have been less than two
hundred thousand dollars, and her stores were worth,
in all probability, fifty thousand dollars at least;
besides, she had on board a number of prize goods,
the value of which cannot be ascertained; but was
probably equal to fifty thousand dollars more. So
that the whole value of the Guerriere, her stores and
prize goods, at the time the action commenced, may
fairly be estimated at three hundred thousand dollars.
Had Captain Hull have incurred the risk before
mentioned, and succeeded in getting the Guerriere
into port, the officers and crew of the Constitution,
considering the Guerriere as her equal, would have
been entitled to the whole of the Guerriere, her stores
and prize goods. Sooner, however, than run the
risk of losing the Constitution, he determined to destroy
the whole. The question then arises, what, under
these circumstances, ought the officers and crew
to be allowed? For my own part, I have no hesitation
in giving it as my opinion that the sum of one
hundred thousand dollars would not be too liberal a
provision, or too great an encouragement for the great
gallantry, skill, and sacrifice of interest displayed on
this occasion; and I am persuaded that, if such a provision
were made, the difficulties of manning our frigates,
at present experienced, would vanish.
It may further be remarked, that Captain Hull,
while on the cruise, on which he captured and destroyed
the Guerriere, burnt two enemy's vessels,
viz: the brig Lady Warren and the brig Adeora,
and obliged the enemy to burn the brig Dolphin,
with a cargo of hemp and Russia goods, and to abandon
an English barque laden with timber: for no
part of which have the officers or crew of the Constitution
received any compensation.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir,
your obedient servant,
PAUL HAMILTON.
Hon. B. Bassett.
Sir: In compliance with your request, I have the
honor to state to you that my opinion, as to the
value of the Guerriere, at the time the action between
her and the Constitution commenced, is, that, exclusively
of her stores and prize goods, she was probably
worth two hundred thousand dollars; and my
impression is, that her stores and prize goods must
have been worth one hundred thousand dollars.
I am informed that, independently of their stores,
the frigate President cost two hundred and twenty
thousand dollars; that the Chesapeake cost two hundred
and twenty thousand dollars; and that the Congress
cost one hundred and ninety-seven thousand
dollars. These vessels were certainly built on good
terms; and it is from their cost that I form my idea
as to the probable value of the Guerriere; and my
impression as to the value of her stores and prize
goods is derived from personal observation and information
obtained on the occasion from different
persons.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your
obedient servant,
ISAAC HULL.
Hon. Burwell Bassett, Chairman, &c.
Medals and Prize Money.
On motion of Mr. Bassett, the House resolved
itself into a Committee of the Whole, on
the report of the Naval Committee on the proposed
vote of a gold medal to Captain Isaac
Hull, late commander of the frigate Constitution,
and silver medals to the other officers,
and a sum of —— thousand dollars, to be distributed
as prize-money among the officers and
crew, as an expression of the sense entertained
by this House of their bravery and conduct in
attacking and vanquishing the British frigate
Guerriere.
Mr. Bassett spoke in support of the resolution.
He stated the magnitude of the achievement;
the amount of value of the capture; and
assigned many reasons particularly in favor of
the donation to the officers and crew, on whom
collectively he proposed to bestow the sum of
$100,000, and made a motion to that effect. He
said the prize money arising from the capture,
had not the public service required the destruction
of the Guerriere, would have amounted to
much more; and the merits of those concerned
in the capture entitled them to this remuneration.
He dilated on the present low price of
wages on board our public ships, and adverted
to the seaman's hardships and the seaman's
risk, &c.
The question on filling up the blank with
"one hundred thousand dollars," was then
taken, and decided in the affirmative—50
to 37.
The committee rose and reported their agreement
to the resolution.
A new member to wit, from Georgia, William
Barnett, returned to serve as a member
of this House, in the place of Howell Cobb, resigned,
appeared, was qualified, and took his
seat.
Naturalization Laws.
On motion of Mr. Lacock, the House resumed
the consideration of the bill supplementary
to the naturalization laws.
On motion of Mr. Lacock, the bill was amended
by adding thereto the following additional
section:
"And be it further enacted, That every naturalized
citizen of the United States, or the Territories thereof,
shall forfeit such citizenship on his voluntarily departing
from and remaining out of the United States for
and during the term of two years."
On motion of Mr. Fitch, the following other
section was also incorporated in the bill:
"And be it further enacted, That all persons who
shall have been naturalized subsequent to the 18th
day of June last, shall be entitled to all the rights and
privileges of citizens of the United States, from the
date of such naturalization, any thing in the declaration
of war against Great Britain, or any other act, to
the contrary notwithstanding."
Mr. Fisk moved to strike out nine months,
the time allowed to citizens to take the benefit
of our naturalization laws, and insert three.
He said he could not see why so long a time
should be allowed. The longest time extended
to our citizens in Canada is thirty days; and he
did not see why so much more liberality should
be extended to their citizens here. He was opposed
to their remaining here longer than necessary,
the more especially as they employed
themselves in exciting divisions, and fomenting
the party feuds which now agitate the country.
Mr. Lacock thought the time proposed was
too short; that in some districts they could
scarcely hear of the law within that time, and
at any rate might not be able to meet with a
tribunal, at which to comply with the requisites
of the naturalization law, before the expiration
of that period.
Mr. Fisk withdrew his motion for the present.
Shadrack Bond, returned to serve as a delegate,
in this House, for the Illinois Territory,
appeared, was qualified, and took his seat.
Privateer Captures.
Mr. McKim presented a petition of Commodore
Joshua Barney, on behalf of himself and
the owners, officers, and crews, of sundry private
armed vessels of war, "praying to be considered
as claimants to all property proven to
be enemy's property, found on board of vessels
sailing under the American flag, having on
board British manufactured goods, coming from
Great Britain to the United States, and under
the protection of British licenses, which
have been captured by them, or that they may
participate as 'informers' in the seizure and
condemnation of the said property under the
non-importation."—Referred to the Committee
of Ways and Means.
Another member, to wit, from Virginia,
Edwin Gray, appeared, and took his seat.
Another member, viz: from Virginia, William
A. Burwell, appeared, and took his seat.
Imprisonment of American Seamen.
Mr. Bassett offered to the House the following
resolution:
Whereas, It is represented, that Great Britain has
seized sundry persons fighting under the American
flag, laying claims to them alike incompatible with
justice and the rights of the United States as an independent
nation:
Resolved, That the President be requested to lay
before this House the information he has received on
that subject, and the measures taken to redress an
evil which violates the rights and interests, and outrages
the feelings of a free and independent people.
Mr. Bassett stated that several cases had
come to his knowledge in which the British
naval commanders had seized persons taken on
board of American armed vessels, and confined
them, in one instance, in irons, and in another
had transported them to England for trial. It
was not his intention now to go into an examination
of these cases. Such an examination
was not necessary to authorize the
House to call for the information required. He
had given its present form to the motion he had
offered, because its adoption would go to show
that the councils of the nation were not indifferent
to this subject. It would, he trusted,
further enable the Executive to show that it
never slumbered on any occasion in which the
rights of the people were concerned; and he
had no doubt the information to be received
would show it. When it was received, the
House might take what course it pleased; perhaps
no legislative act would grow out of it.
But it was proper, in any event, that the House
should be in possession of information required.
Mr. Milnor said he had no objection to the
call for information, but he excepted to the
form of the resolution, for two reasons. It was
prefaced by a preamble, which was not usual
in such cases, which preamble, moreover, assumed
as fact circumstances of which the
House had no official or authentic information.
His other objection was, that it expressed an
opinion on a point on which he was not ready
to express one. Mr. M. said he knew not the
extent of the evil of which the gentleman complained.
If it was merely that Great Britain
laid claim to her own subjects fighting our battles
against her, he would at least not say that
this was an act on the part of Great Britain
deserving all those severe epithets which the
gentleman had thought proper to attach to it.
The resolution stated facts not before the House,
and expressed an opinion on an act the degree
of enormity of which depended on the circumstances
respecting which it was proposed to ask
for information. Mr. M. wished that the House
should not lightly be compelled into a discussion
of this subject, and especially as the gentleman
had intimated the probability that no
legislative act was to grow out of the information
called for.
Mr. Seybert said, as his colleague's principal
objection to the motion appeared to be a difficulty
as to facts, he hoped to procure his vote
for its adoption by stating at least one which
had come to his knowledge. I, said Mr. S.,
had the honor to have a nephew on board the
ship Wasp. He informed me this morning that
after they had been carried into Bermuda, several
of their crew were taken and confined in
irons; that he saw them in that situation; and
that their crime was, having fought the battles
of our country. What may be my colleague's
feelings on this occasion, I know not—I hope
they are honorable to himself and the House—for
myself I wish the subject investigated. Mr.
S. concluded by expressing his hope that the
resolution would pass.
Mr. Macon said he was anxious to obtain information
on this subject, but doubted the propriety
of the preamble. After the information
was received, it would be time enough to express
an opinion on the subject. He had no doubt
that we must at last come to the determination
to protect every man that is on board of a ship
of the United States. It is what Great Britain
herself does; and in this respect we ought to
follow her example. If these people undertake
to fight our battles, we ought to protect them.
Mr. M. said he was opposed to the preamble,
because he did not wish to give reasons to the
departments of the Government for any call for
information the House thought proper to make;
it was enough that the House should ask for it,
and the President should give or withhold it.
The practice heretofore was against the course
now pursued.
Mr. Bigelow said he had no objection to the
call for information, divested of the preamble
and the opinion expressed in it, except that it
did not go far enough. He proposed to amend
it by adding thereto the following words, "accompanied
with all the evidence in his possession,
which will tend to show whether such
persons are American citizens or British subjects."
Mr. Bassett said he was indifferent as to the
form, provided he obtained the substance; he,
therefore, should submit to such modification as
the gentleman from North Carolina should think
proper to make. But, said Mr. B., as it has
been said that there is no information before
the House, I state that I understand, and it is
my belief, that six men of the crew of the United
States brig Nautilus were detained and
sent to England for trial; and that Commodore
Rodgers had detained as hostages for their safety
twelve British subjects. I state also to the
House that I understand and believe that six
seamen of another armed vessel have been detained,
and that General Pinckney had detained
a like number of British subjects. I state that
I have received information that the boatswain
of the Wasp had been put in irons after she was
taken. These violations of humanity and the
law of nations I believe to require retaliation.
When I voted against a bill on this subject (Mr.
Wright's) it was not because I was opposed to
retaliation. No, sir; retaliation in war is often
mercy—it puts an end to those cruelties which
would otherwise frequently disgrace parties at
war, and is indispensable in the conduct of hostilities.
Mr. B. having withdrawn his motion, it was
substituted by the following, offered by Mr.
Macon:
"Resolved, That the President of the United States
be requested to cause to be laid before this House any
information which may be in his possession touching
the conduct of British officers towards persons taken
in American armed ships."
Mr. Randolph said he trusted that the resolution
now before the House would meet with
no objection; although against the resolution
as first proposed, he must have voted for it, notwithstanding
all the odium which might have
attached to such a vote. He hoped, he said,
that rigorous retaliation would take place if our
countrymen found in arms had been treated as
criminals and not as prisoners of war. He
hoped we should have ample atonement for
every drop of American blood which should be
spilt in such manner. Having taken occasion
to pay a handsome compliment to the gallantry
of our Navy, which was not heard with sufficient
distinctness to be reported, Mr. R. concluded
by hoping there would be no objection
to the resolution.
Mr. Milnor said he thought it due to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Bassett) to state
that, owing to the noise which prevailed in
the House, he had not before heard the statement
which the gentleman had now been kind
enough to make. He had heard of no such case
as that alluded to by his colleague; but he trusted
he had been sufficiently guarded not to commit
himself, even to the most invidious construction,
as opposed to a proper investigation
of this subject. To the present motion he yielded
his perfect acquiescence. Mr. M. said he
trusted that in any thing that related to the
honor of the country in the contest in which we
are now engaged, whatever might have been
his opinion of the propriety of entering into it,
he should not be found more backward than
other gentlemen in sustaining the just rights of
the nation.
Mr. Sheffey said, if American citizens had
been treated in the manner represented, he was
clearly of opinion that severe retaliation ought
to follow. But did gentlemen pretend that a
British subject, running away from a British
vessel, and found on board of one of ours, was
to be considered as entitled to be treated as a
prisoner of war? Could this doctrine be asserted
by any gentleman? He presumed not.
The resolution, as it now stood, would not elicit
the facts material as to this point. He, therefore,
moved to amend it, by inserting, after the
word "persons," the words "other than British
subjects."
Mr. Seybert said he was happy to hear the
declaration last made by his colleague, (Mr.
Milnor.) He hoped the amendment first offered
would be rejected with disdain. [The
Speaker declared that such language was not
proper in debate, the expression being too
strong, and such as sometimes led to a personal
altercation, always to be avoided.] Mr. S.
thanked the Speaker for his caution; he meant
no personality; but he thought it did not become
this House to debate whether the persons
in question were British subjects or not, when
they had been put in irons for fighting the battles
of the country. Let the proof rest on the
aggressor on national law and the violator of
the rules of war. He hoped the House would
without hesitation reject the amendment. I
may go too far, said he, by stating too much;
but I will say thus much without risk of contradiction:
that the boatswain of the Wasp, a
warrant officer of the United States, had been
twelve years within the United States and has
a wife and children here. These, I hope, are
sufficient characteristics to insure him our support:
I will give him mine, and have no doubt
the House will do the same.
Mr. Randolph said that the proposed amendment
brought strongly to view the impropriety
of the House, on the rude suggestions of any
member, committing itself hastily by a definite
determination which to-morrow they might be
disposed to retract. He believed this was one
of those cases in which there was no necessity
for haste. The House would be as competent
to-morrow, to decide on the subject of the resolution
and the proposed amendment, and in a
manner to redound, at least, as much to the
credit of the House and the national good, as
now. With regard to his own opinions, if they
were of any importance with his worthy colleague,
he would at once say they were on this
subject the opinions of that man, from whom he
never did dissent but upon one question, without
being wrong—that man who was emphatically
called for eight years our Commander-in-chief—the
founder of this nation—the author
of the constitution—our first President—the
man who was made for the office, and the office
for him—the man who discharged all its duties
so perfectly, as if it had been only to show those
who come after him their incompetency. Mr.
R. said he would ask his worthy colleague, what
he supposed would have been the fate of a certain
Benedict Arnold, had he been brought
alive to the American camp, after his desertion
from it? On that subject there can be but one
opinion. On another question, if his opinion
was of any value, he would state it. It was not
a loose thought, taken upon the impulse of the
moment; but the result of meditation and reflection.
As long as foreigners, naturalized by
our laws, remain on our soil, he was ready to
throw over them the mantle of the constitution—he
would protect them, as he would protect
the native citizen, at the hazard of the last
shilling of the public revenue, and the last drop
of the blood of our people. But, when they
go abroad on the high seas; when they come
to this country to acquire a neutrality of character,
now indeed no longer to be found here;
when they come here only to neutralize goods
in the Baltic, at Heligoland, in the Black Sea,
the White Sea, and the Red Sea, and the passing
to and fro on the highway of nations; if it
please God, their old master George the Third,
or Napoleon, or Alexander of Russia, should
lay his hand on them, they were welcome, Mr. R.
said, for him. He would not spend one shilling,
one drop of American blood, to redeem such a
man; much less would he have retaliation executed
on subjects of the nation claiming him,
with whom we should happen to come in collision,
which might have to be expiated by the
native blood of these States. I would not, said
Mr. R., have the New England man or old Virginian
executed by any despot, limited or unlimited
in authority, in order to secure to us the
worthless property in the man who is a Christian
in Christendom and a Mussulman in Turkey.
But, Mr. R. asked, did not this question assume a
different shape, when this man was not going
to and fro on the high seas in search of plunder,
which he calls patriotism, but, when he is found
in a public ship of war of the United States?
On that subject—for it was a new question—he
was not prepared to decide. It was not, Mr.
R. said, and the House might rely on it, the
sentiment of the people of these States—it
might be of some comparatively small, and
therefore only insignificant section of the community—that
we should enter into a contestation
with France and England for property in
their subjects.
Mr. R. here drew a comparison between the
practice of harboring slaves in some of our
Northern cities, Philadelphia for instance, and
the countenance given in this country to European
emigrants. As to these foreigners, Mr.
R. said he owed them nothing. He was sorry
they had ever found refuge here—he wished
he had driven them from our shores—or have
permitted, as we have the merchants, to go out
where they pleased, without attempting to protect
them.
Mr. Quincy rose, he said, simply to express
his regret, that a debate in this form and manner
should have arisen. The question which
had been touched, was one which required all
the information and light which could be shed
on it. The principles connected with it were
so numerous and critical, that it required all
the reflection of which gentlemen were capable,
to enable them to discuss and decide it in a
proper manner. He rose also to express his regret
that a motion for amendment should be
made by a gentleman with whom he frequently
coincided in opinion, which went to exclude
information of the manner in which officers
treated persons other than British subjects.
He could not vote against receiving information
of any kind—particularly on a subject so
interesting. Mr. Q. was proceeding in his remarks,
when—
Mr. Sheffey withdrew his motion.
Mr. Bassett explained his ideas of expatriation.
He would not protect the man who had
left the country with an intention not to return,
&c., but he would protect the man who went
out to fight the battles of the country.
Mr. Randolph rose for the purpose of moving
an amendment. He adverted to the language
of the resolution, and drew a distinction between
the character of privateers and of our
public armed vessels. Was it competent, he
asked, to the Government to receive as testimony
the statement of the commander or crew
of an American corsair? It was well known,
too, he remarked, that the high wages which
had been paid to the crews of the privateers,
was one of the reasons why the American
Navy was in some degree unmanned. And,
was it not a different question, whether we
should interpose our authority between the subject
of a foreign nation and his Government,
when that subject is fighting your battles, bleeding
on the deck of your public ship, at twelve
dollars a month, and when he is decoyed into
a corsair by the temptation of eighty, fifty, or
forty dollars a month? There is a difference,
sir, said Mr. R. I trust, said he, if we receive
the information we are about to ask, we shall
get it from a pure and authorized source, such
as no man can question. I mean the commanders
of our public ships of war. Mr. R.
concluded by moving to strike out "American,"
and insert "public," so as to read "public
armed ships."
Mr. Widgery expressed his surprise at the
various expedients resorted to, to embarrass
this question; and hoped this would have the
same fate as the other. He said he could tell
the gentleman that many privateers had been
manned without a cent of wages. But, suppose
they had been manned in other ways, were not
privateers as useful in annoying the enemy as
public ships? No man that knew any thing
about maritime affairs would deny it. Whereever
our privateers had come across an armed
vessel of the enemy, of any thing like equal
force, they had done their duty like American
tars. We are at war, Mr. W. said, and ought
to check the enemy wherever we come in contact
with them. He believed the privateering
carried on had been of great advantage to us
and injury to our enemy. As to the objection
which had been offered to receiving the statement
of their commanders, what were gentlemen
afraid of? No disparagement to the commanders
of the navy, (for he respected them
all,) he knew gentlemen commanding privateers
whose opinions were entitled to as great respect
as that of any other, and whose word could not
be questioned. In relation to the cases referred
to in the resolve, particularly that of the
boatswain, Mr. W. said we were bound by
every principle of the law of nations to support
him to the last cent of our money, more especially
as he had a warrant under the seal of the
United States. The conduct of our enemy was
the less justifiable, as she manned her own ships
with people of all nations.
Mr. Randolph's proposed amendment was
negatived by a large majority; and the resolution
was agreed to without further debate or
opposition.
Macedonian and Frolic.
The following Message was received from the
President of the United States:
To the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States:
I transmit to Congress copies of a letter to the Secretary
of the Navy, from Captain Decatur, of the
frigate "United States," reporting his combat and
capture of the British frigate Macedonian. Too much
praise cannot be bestowed on that officer and his
companions on board, for the consummate skill and
conspicuous valor by which this trophy has been
added to the naval arms of the United States.
I transmit, also, a letter from Captain Jones, who
commanded the sloop-of-war Wasp, reporting his capture
of the British sloop-of-war, the Frolic, after a
close action, in which other brilliant titles will be
seen to the public admiration and praise.
A nation feeling what it owes to itself and to its
citizens could never abandon to arbitrary violence on
the ocean, a class of them which gives such examples
of capacity and courage, in defending their rights on
that element; examples which ought to impress on
the enemy, however brave and powerful, a preference
of justice and peace, to hostility against a country
whose prosperous career may be accelerated, but cannot
be prevented, by the assaults made on it.
JAMES MADISON.
Washington, December 11, 1812.
October 30, 1812.
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that, on the
25th instant, being in the latitude 29° north, longitude
29° 30´ west, we fell in with, and, after an action
of one hour and a half, captured His Britannic
Majesty's ship Macedonian, commanded by Captain
John Carden, and mounting forty-nine carriage guns,
(the odd gun shifting.) She is a frigate of the largest
class, two years old, four months out of the dock, and
reputed one of the best sailers in the British service.
The enemy being to windward, had the advantage of
engaging us at his own distance; which was so great
that, for the first half hour, we did not use our carronades,
and at no moment was he within the complete
effect of our musketry or grape. To this circumstance,
and a heavy swell which was on at the
time, I ascribe the unusual length of the action.
The enthusiasm of every officer, seaman, and
marine, on board this ship, on discovering the enemy,
their steady conduct in battle, and the precision of
their fire, could not be surpassed. Where all have
met my fullest expectations it would be unjust in me
to discriminate. Permit me, however, to recommend
to your particular notice my first lieutenant, William
H. Allen; he has served with me upwards of five
years, and to his unremitted exertions in disciplining
the crew is to be imputed the obvious superiority of
our gunnery exhibited in the result of this contest.
Subjoined is a list of the killed and wounded on
both sides. Our loss, compared with that of the
enemy, will appear small. Among our wounded you
will observe the name of Lieutenant Funk, who died
a few hours after the action; he was an officer of
great gallantry and promise, and the service sustained
a severe loss in his death.
The Macedonian lost her mizzenmast, fore and
main-topmasts, and main-yard, and was much cut up
in her hull.
The damage sustained by this ship was not such
as to render her return into port necessary; and had
I not deemed it important that we should see our prize
in, should have continued our cruise.
With the highest consideration and respect, I am,
sir, your obedient humble servant.
STEPHEN DECATUR.
Hon. Paul Hamilton.
List of killed and wounded on board the United States.
Thomas Brown, New York, seaman; Henry Shepherd,
Philadelphia, seaman; William Murray, Boston,
boy; Michael O'Donnel, New York, private
marine; John Roberts, private marine—killed.
John Mercer Funk, Philadelphia, lieutenant, (since
dead;) John Archibald, New York, carpenter's crew;
Christian Clark, ditto, seaman; George Christopher,
ditto, ordinary seaman; George Mahar, ditto ditto;
William James, ditto ditto; John Lawton, ditto, private
marine—wounded.
On board the Macedonian there were thirty-six
killed, and sixty-eight wounded; among the former,
were the boatswain, one master's mate, and the
schoolmaster; and of the latter were the first and
third lieutenants, one master's mate, and two midshipmen.
Sir: I here avail myself of the first opportunity of
informing you of occurrences of our cruise, which
terminated in the capture of the Wasp, on the 18th
of October, by the Poictiers, of seventy-four guns,
while a wreck from damages received in the engagement
with the British sloop-of-war Frolic, of twenty-two
guns, sixteen of them thirty-two-pound carronades,
four twelve-pounders on the main deck, and
two twelve-pound carronades on the top-gallant forecastle;
making her superior in force to us by four
twelve-pounders. The Frolic had struck to us, and
was taken possession of two hours before our surrendering
to the Poictiers.
We had left the Delaware on the 13th; the 16th
had a heavy gale, in which we lost our jib-boom and
two men; half-past eleven on the night of the 17th,
in latitude 37 degrees north, and longitude 65 degrees
west, we saw several sail, two of them appearing
very large; we stood for them for some time,
then shortened sail, and steered the remainder of the
night the course we had perceived them on. At daylight,
on Sunday the 18th, we saw them ahead; gave
chase, and soon discovered them to be a convoy of
six sail, under the protection of a sloop-of-war; four
of them large ships, mounting from sixteen to eighteen
guns. At thirty-two minutes past eleven A. M.,
we engaged the sloop-of-war, having first received her
fire at the distance of fifty or sixty yards, which space
we gradually lessened until we laid her on board,
after a well-supported fire of forty-three minutes; and
although so near, while loading our last broadside,
that our rammers were shoved against the side of the
enemy, our men exhibited the same alacrity which
they had done during the whole of the action. They
immediately surrendered upon our gaining their forecastle,
so that no loss was sustained on their side after
boarding.
Our maintop-mast was shot away between four
and five minutes from the commencement of the
firing, and falling, together with the maintopsail-yard,
across the larboard fore and fore-topsail braces, rendered
our head-yards unmanageable the remainder
of the action. At eight minutes, the gaff and mizzen
topgallant-mast came down, and at twenty minutes
from the beginning of the action every brace and
most of the rigging was shot away. A few minutes
after separating from the Frolic both her masts fell
upon deck; the main-mast going close by the
deck, and the foremast going twelve or fifteen feet
above it.
The courage and exertions of the officers and crew
fully answered my expectations and wishes. Lieutenant
Biddle's active conduct contributed much to our
success, by the exact attention paid to every department
during the engagement, and the animating
example he afforded the crew by his intrepidity.
Lieutenants Rogers, Booth, and Mr. Rapp, showed,
by incessant fire from their divisions, that they were
not to be surpassed in resolution or skill. Mr. Knight,
and every other officer, acted with a courage and
promptitude highly honorable, and I trust have given
assurance that they may be relied on whenever their
services may be required.
I could not ascertain the exact loss of the enemy,
as many of the dead lay buried under the masts and
spars that had fallen on deck, which two hours' exertion
had not sufficiently removed. Mr. Biddle,
who had charge of the Frolic, states that, from what
he saw, and from information from the officers,
the number killed must have been about thirty, and
that of the wounded about forty or fifty; of the
killed, is her first lieutenant and sailing-master; of
the wounded, Captain Winyates, and the second
lieutenant.
We had five killed and five wounded, as per list:
the wounded are recovering. Lieutenant Claxton,
who was confined by sickness, left his bed a little
previous to the engagement, and though too weak to
be at his division, remained on deck, and showed, by
his composed manner of noting its incidents, that we
had lost by his illness the services of a brave officer.
I am, respectfully, &c.
JACOB JONES.
Hon. Paul Hamilton.
The Message and documents having been
read—
On motion of Mr. Randolph, they were referred
to the Committee on Naval Affairs,
with instructions to report a suitable expression
of the Legislative approbation of the services
detailed.
Mr. R. said he did not wish by this motion to
limit the committee to reporting a resolution;
or to preclude them from expressing approbation
in a more substantial manner.
Navy of the United States.
The House resolved itself into a Committee
of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate, which
had been previously twice read in the House.
Mr. Sawyer made a motion to add the word
"teen" to "four," so as to make it fourteen 74
gun ships.
Mr. S. thought it a proper occasion to try the
question whether we were to have a navy or
not. He took the occasion to congratulate the
House upon the repeated victories of our little
navy over the enemy; and of the grateful prospect
of a speedy termination to the despotism
of the seas. National piracy is about to be exterminated,
and all nations permitted to traverse
their great highway in safety. The thing can
be done; and if we say so, with the will of
God, will be done. The experiment upon
which the proof hangs has been made. British
arms cannot withstand American upon the
sea. The bully has been disgraced by an infant;
and fear shall no longer restrain an abject
world from vindicating its long violated rights.
Give us but a respectable fleet, and it is all we
ask. But what can we do with four seventy-fours?
They are a mere mockery. If we do
mean to make a serious stand upon the ocean,
such a force must be out of all character. If we
mean merely to annoy her trade, (and he trusted
we meant more,) frigates will do; but, to make
any serious impression that way, we must have
a respectable fleet; at least, in his opinion,
fourteen sail-of-the-line. That would give us a
preponderance on our own coast, and enable us
to bring in our prizes with safety. Who can
bear the idea of our being obliged to burn or
sink all the ships we may take away from the
enemy, for fear of their being recaptured? He
thought we should save enough by the protection
they would afford to our prizes to support
the expense of them. We can easily support
such a force. The expense, distributed over
our widely-extended population, would be less
than a dollar a head; and, where is the American
who would grudge such a sum for such an
object? The people, I am confident, will cheerfully
pay it, because we are now at war, and a
navy is found the most efficient weapon in our
hands against the enemy. He therefore trusted
that if it was the disposition of the House to
have a navy, they would establish such a one as
would answer some purpose.
Mr. Seybert said he did not anticipate that
the bill from the Senate would have been called
for to-day by the Chairman of the Naval Committee;
notwithstanding he had bestowed some
attention on the subject, he confessed his remarks
would be made in a manner not entirely
satisfactory to himself; he would, however,
proceed with them.
Mr. Chairman, said he, I wish it was as easy
to build, equip, and man the seventy-fours, as it
will be to add the word "teen" to "four," as is
proposed by the gentleman from North Carolina.
So far from adding to the number of these ships,
contemplated by the bill, he had intended to
move that no seventy-four gun ships should be,
at this time, authorized by the Legislature.
On a former occasion, Mr. S. continued, when
a naval establishment was the subject under
consideration, he stated at length his reasons for
opposing the propositions before the House.
The opinions which he then advanced concerning
an extensively permanent naval establishment
for the United States were still believed
to be well grounded. He did not hesitate to
declare his intention, at this time, and under
the pressure of present circumstances, to yield
much to general feelings, and the sentiments of
the nation; nevertheless, he should guard
against being carried too far by the current of
popular opinion. It is equally my duty, said
he, to keep in view what is conceived to be the
permanent and vital national interest. He declared
a uniform opposition to that establishment,
which could not be brought within the
means and resources of the nation to maintain
it. We have made war, said he, to guarantee
the honor and independence of the nation, as
well as for the support of the just rights of our
citizens; with these objects in view, he had
consented to authorize a regular force of 25,000
men, and advocated one more numerous, though
in principle he was opposed to standing armies.
If, then, a great portion of my fellow-citizens
deem an increase of the Naval Establishment
essential to promote the great work, why should
it be refused on my part? No opposition would
be made by him to the principle or spirit of the
bill before the House, though, he confessed, he
did not approve the provisions as to the kind of
force therein contemplated.
Mr. S. continued.—At this time our principal
object should be, to authorize that species
of force which can be furnished in the shortest
period, and which promises to be the most efficient
in the present contest. If the views of
the Government were not now confined to the
present war, he considered it inexpedient to
build public ships. It was necessary that the
revenue should be cautiously applied. If it be
employed so as to carry on the war with vigor,
he would not shrink from any appropriation
which could tend to produce that effect; by
protracting the contest for the want of means,
expense will be accumulated, and we should
achieve nothing.
Mr. S. would not assent to an increase of the
navy, with a view to reconcile other measures
to the opposition—to him that vote promised
no such result. Our political opponents, continued
he, will tell us, as regards the navy, you
are doing right to add to it; thus far we will go
with you; we always maintained this to be the
proper course; as to your golden dreams in
Canada, we will abandon them to yourselves
exclusively. Such were his present impressions;
it would gratify him to find himself to have
been mistaken. He declared his intention to
oppose the building of 74´s, or double-decked
ships, and to advocate a greater number of the
largest class frigates. If, however, his statements
should not prove satisfactory to the
House, he declared the failure would not induce
him ultimately to vote against that species
of force which a majority might deem expedient.
If, said Mr. S., the great reason for now laying
the keels of the double-decked ships, be
(as was lately acknowledged elsewhere by high
authority) to test the intentions of the legislature
as to a permanent naval establishment, he,
for one, declared, he would not thus be tested,
nor could he be thereby induced to vote in favor
of the proposition; he would always be
governed by circumstances.
The declaration of the committee, that it was
proper to meet "like with like," or, in other
words, because the British have seventy-four
gun ships, the United States should have them
of the same class, would have no effect on him.
We might as well say, because there are ships
in the British service, which carry one hundred
and twenty guns, we should also have such.
This reasoning is fallacious. No one has attempted
to advocate the latter proposition. Admitting
that you had four seventy-four gun ships
on your navy list, he maintained, they would
answer no good purpose. In the course of the
following year, their number will be more than
doubled and trebled on the part of the enemy.
The consequence would be, that your most expensive
ships must either combat under very
unpromising circumstances, or they would be
blockaded in your harbors, and then be worse
than useless; they must be kept at a heavy expense,
and their crews would deprive other
ships of the men necessary for their equipment.
He said, the opinions which he had just advanced
were not the result of idle speculations
at the fireside; they were supported by intelligent
commanders, and rested upon the firm
base of experience; they were confirmed by the
conversations of some whose splendid achievements
adorned the pages of our Revolutionary
history, and by others, who rank as heroes of
the present war. He asked, why need we resort
to other authority, when that of the head
of the Naval Department can be brought to
bear testimony in favor of the propositions laid
down? In the year 1798, the Secretary of the
Navy informed the House that twelve seventy-fours,
as many frigates, and twenty or thirty
smaller vessels, "would probably be found sufficient
to insure our future peace with the nations
of Europe." In 1811, it was declared that,
"twelve sail of seventy-fours and twenty well-constructed
frigates, with our smaller vessels,"
were necessary to annoy the commerce of the
enemy, and guard our coasts. To this he added
that, in the year 1811, during a state of peace
with the United States, the British had seven
ships-of-the-line on the American stations, independent
of fifties, frigates, and smaller vessels;
at the same time, they had thirty-nine
ships-of-the-line on the stocks! Tell me, said
he, what is to keep a great proportion of them
from your coast in 1813?
Mr. McKee said, he had not expected this
subject would have been taken up to-day, or to
say any thing on it when it should be taken up.
But, said he, for what purpose, I feel impelled
to ask, are you going to build these vessels?
Are you to spend four or five millions of dollars,
in addition to your present extraordinary expenditures,
to protect commerce? Will this old
argument, in favor of a navy, now be used,
which we have so often heard heretofore? Sir,
where is your commerce now to protect? Will
you protect that clandestinely destined to Great
Britain? No, surely. Will you protect that destined
to the coast of France? Let us reflect
what commerce you can carry on with France.
None worth protection, or of any moment to
the great body of the American people. Does
France purchase your tobacco or cotton, which
heretofore have found a market there? She
has never been a purchaser of provisions or
breadstuffs. What is the state of trade between
us and France? Your cotton, in France, is
taxed with enormous duties. No man who is
not under the influence of the moon would, at
this time, think of making a shipment there.
Would you ship your commerce there merely
to surrender so much property into the grasp
of the Emperor? It would be the extreme of
folly. Where, then, will you protect your commerce?
To the Baltic, sir? You can carry on
in that quarter no commerce at all interesting
to the great body of the American people. In
what does your export to that region consist?
In articles of colonial produce; not in articles
the produce of your soil. Will you tax the
great agricultural community for the purpose of
protecting this extraneous commerce? I ask if
the people of the West, of the Atlantic, of the
Middle States, or any other portion of the American
people, will be content to be taxed to support
a navy for the protection of a commerce
in foreign produce, by which but few individuals
in the nation can be benefited? There is
no commerce to protect, unless it be that which
exchanges specie for the production of the East
Indies, and benefits no part of the community.
Having no valuable commerce now to protect,
the object of adding vessels to your navy, must
be to fight your battles at sea.
If you would propose a navy as a means of
carrying on war, bend your resources to that
object. We have been told that the trident of
Neptune is passing into our hands. But, sir,
the sovereignty of the ocean is not to be acquired
by four ships-of-the-line and five or six frigates.
You can have no legitimate object in
building such vessels as proposed, unless it be
to carry on the war. If that be your object,
make your means commensurate to the end you
have in view.
Do you yet contend that the object is to protect
commerce? Your commerce is not worth
the cost. And who would pay it? The merchants?
No, sir. They will pay only their
proportion. I recollect, when a boy, to have
seen a little book, in which I admired the pictures
more than the reading, in which were the
representations of a king, a priest, a soldier, and
a farmer; a label issuing from the mouth of
each contained these words: The king says, "I
govern all;" the priest, "I pray for all;" the
soldier, "I fight for all;" and the farmer, "I
pay for all." This, sir, is perfectly true as regards
the American farmers—they pay for all.
And what advantage do they derive from it?
What advantage are my constituents to derive
from the expenditure of this money?
Increase of the Navy.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee
of the Whole on the bill to increase the
Navy of the United States.
Mr. Seybert moved to amend the first section
of the bill by striking out "four seventy-fours
and," so as to erase the provision for
building vessels of that description.
Mr. Gold.—The provision in the bill to introduce
ships-of-the-line into the Navy, I consider,
Mr. Chairman, as fixing the great policy
of a navy under this Government. Frigates
we have had, but in common with petty nations;
for the Barbary Powers have frigates;
the provision now offered rises higher and promises
something worthy of the constitution, something
honorable to the Government. I rejoice,
Mr. Chairman, at the favorable circumstances,
and hail the auspices under which we now meet
this question; we are no longer left to erring
speculations, to uncertain reasoning, but have
under our eyes the sure and infallible test of
experience, of practice in war with a naval
force. Within a few weeks our tars have thrice
grappled with the enemy, and thrice have they
triumphed in combat; the success has swelled
the American bosom with joy from Orleans to
Maine—all without exception of party, vie in
demonstrations of joy and in the bestowment of
honors upon the victors.
While such a scene is presented here, gloom
and dissatisfaction prevail in the metropolis of
Great Britain—those who have been so long
accustomed to conquer, receive the capture of
the Guerriere with as much astonishment as
they would behold a suspension of the laws of
nature. A strange event to Britons!
How often, sir, has it been echoed and re-echoed
within these walls, that it would be
in vain to attempt any thing with a navy
against Great Britain, unless we could bring
ship to ship and man to man—could equal our
enemy on the ocean. How much mistaken
have gentlemen been; how vain is human reason!
The earliest stage of the first war under
the Government has yielded a clear, full, and
incontestable refutation of the argument. While
the American arms have suffered disgrace upon
disgrace on what was deemed the natural and
proper theatre for the display of our power;
while by land all is gloomy and comfortless, and
the heart sickens under the past, our little Navy,
a handful of men, has nobly sustained us upon
the ocean, and banished that despondency which
our disasters by land must have otherwise produced.
If, sir, under such auspices, such overwhelming
evidence of the efficiency of a navy, this
question is to be put by, I shall despair of a
navy; we may rank with Algiers in a force of
frigates, but shall do nothing worthy of a community
of eight millions of souls, placed by
Heaven in a situation most favorable to commerce
and naval power.
The objections, sir, to a navy are not a little
amusing. Do you move the question in peace,
it is objected, that commerce flourishes and you
want not protection; at another time it is said
not to be worth the expense of a navy, and
lastly a navy will draw America into the European
vortex and involve us in a war. Now
that we are in war, a new book of logic is
opened, and it is objected, that you have not
time to build a navy, the war will be over before
ships can be finished. It is thus, sir, that
the arguments against a navy are made to answer
and refute themselves; nay, more, the
argument in war is a satire and reproach to the
objection in peace. "There is not now time to
build a navy," reproaches us for not having
passed the requisite laws at the last session.
I have always considered the great policy of
a navy settled by the constitution; need I
spend time to show, that no great specific power
was delegated to the General Government
unless it was deemed necessary; not necessary
for a dormitory, but to be executed for the general
protection and welfare. This was the polar
star—the test and criterion that governed
in the delegation of powers by the States—powers
not necessary to be exercised for the
general good were retained by the several
States. What greatly strengthens the argument
is, the power to provide a navy is not
only given to the General Government, but
taken away or denied to the several States. In
adopting the constitution, this question was
considered at rest, and a navy was deemed the
necessary consequence of this power; in the
Virginia Convention, where great talent and
ingenuity was displayed in the debate, the point
was so considered, and the objection rested on
that ground; the consequence of adoption was
supposed to be an unequal strengthening of the
commercial parts of the Union. So deeply impressed
was President Washington with the
importance of a navy, and so true to his duty
and just claims of commerce for protection, that
he could not consent to quit his high station in
the public councils without placing on record
his sentiments for the good of his country—this
he did in his speech to the fourth Congress
(second session) in language that well attests
his wisdom and paternal care and solicitude for
his country. He recommended and urged the
policy of a navy in the strongest terms, and I
will not believe that the parting lesson of that
great and good man will be lost to his country—there
is certainly too much respect for his
memory to disregard his solemn advice and
counsel on any subject. In this policy Mr.
Jefferson also concurred at a period most auspicious
to fair inquiry and dispassionate judgment;
it was before the tempest of party arose,
to obscure the great luminary of truth and
blacken the political horizon.
Mr. Widgery.—Mr. Chairman, it will be recollected
that I was last session of Congress
opposed to the building of seventy-fours, until
we had got more frigates. I have been rather
opposed to them in the Committee of Naval
Affairs, not because I was opposed to an augmentation
of the Navy, but because I thought
it more to the advantage of the country to build
frigates and sloops of war at present; and if,
hereafter, when we have sailors plenty to man
the large ships with, it should be thought best
to have larger ships, it may be very well to
build them; but, at present, our resources are
inadequate to build the seventy-fours and the
ten frigates, and say eight or ten sloops of war,
which are absolutely necessary for the protection
of our seacoast, in order to keep off the
British gun-brigs or privateers. The ships-of-the-line
will not answer this purpose, when
they are at sea; they must keep deep water;
they cannot, with safety, follow in under the
land those small vessels which annoy our coasters,
and capture them all along shore. Within
a few days, I have accounts of a small privateer,
of eight guns, having captured twenty or
thirty sail of coasting vessels. Sir, it is a sight
to see a public armed ship of the United States
anywhere on our shore to the eastward of Boston—a
seacoast of 200 miles—when the enemy
can take every thing that passes out to sea, and
a country in which there are the best of ship-harbors,
where they might cruise with safety,
always having a harbor handy to run into. I
cannot feel willing to build seventy-fours, to
the exclusion of the smaller ships, of which we
are so much in want at this time. If you had
the money in your chest, and all ready for the
building four seventy-fours, and all the timber
in the yard—which you have not—still I should
have doubts on my mind as to the propriety of
those heavy ships. Say, if you please, that you
had those ships built, could you send them to
sea? I presume not, if at war with England, because
she would always blockade your harbors
wherever they were; and if you sent them out,
perhaps you would never have to man them
again; not because our ships in single combat
are not a match for hers, but, because they
have more ships than they know what to do
with; they would always outnumber you at
sea, and they would be able to come up with
and capture your four ships. But, for what purpose
are you to send them out? Certainly, not
to take merchantmen. They are not calculated
for that purpose, unless you had more than four
of them. In case you had a number sufficient
to intercept their East India fleet, which, generally,
are under strong convoys of heavy ships,
then it might be an object to send them to sea.
If you are to keep them in port, for the purpose
of harbor defence, you must always keep
them manned; it will be too late to man them
after the enemy comes in sight. And there is,
in my mind, another difficulty: In the manning
these heavy ships, you will have to impress
men to go on board of them, or raise the wages
up to what is given in a merchant ship; because
the sailors will not be willing to go on
board large ships, when they have no chance
for prize money. On the other hand, they will
be very willing to enter on board cruising ships,
such as frigates or sloops of war, in hopes of
taking prizes; and you have not, at present, a
sufficient number of sailors to man what smaller
vessels we want. If you build frigates and
sloops of war, they can be furnished without
your advancing the money; the merchants will
build them, and loan them to the Government.
The frigates and smaller vessels can be put
afloat in six months from the time they are
agreed for; and your ships-of-the-line will not
be finished in less than two years; and if they
do not cost 30 per cent. more than they are
calculated at, I will dare pay all I am worth
towards them for nothing. I am willing to go
for almost any number of frigates, because I
know you can have them built without advancing
a dollar until they are ready for service,
and because I am convinced they are most for
our interest. Popular opinion, I know, has
great weight at times; let us not be carried off
on the wings of enthusiasm; we are at present
at very great expense, and we ought to act prudently
with our finances, or they will soon become
low. At the same time, I cannot agree
with the gentleman from Kentucky, who says
he is opposed to any augmentation of the Navy,
and asks if you are willing to tax the planters
for the building a Navy, and the protection of
the merchant? Sir, will not the same reasoning
apply against the maritime towns being
taxed to support the army of 10,000 men in the
West? Gentlemen say, stay on shore, and you
will be safe. Sir, may we not, in return, say
to the gentlemen who are settling the cheap
lands of the interior, keep among us; go not
into the Indian country; we cannot be taxed to
defend you. This reasoning will apply with as
much force against the interior as theirs does
against the Atlantic towns. Sir, we are all one
people, and, in order to remain so, we must be
willing to defend at all points.
Mr. Bassett spoke several times in the course
of the debate. The following is the substance
of the whole of his remarks: He said, on rising,
that it was with no feigned diffidence that he addressed
the House. I shall, said he, have credit
with every one in the assertion that I am most
anxious that the proposition I have made should
succeed. Must I not, then, deplore the feebleness
of voice, the want of force, of manner, and
promptness of mind and thought, which limit
me? But I shall feel compensated if the House
will, in heart, join me in regretting that a cause
worthy of the first of advocates has fallen into
such puny hands. For the cause, then, will
they hear me, and for their country's good will
they improve each hint I may let fall, by their
better judgment. It is true, sir, we have little
experience—I cannot boast of naval knowledge
in our land—but, yet, we are not quite deficient.
Let it be remembered, that it is on the first
principles that we are to decide; that we are
to mark the outlines only, which depend much
on general reasoning, and, in doing which, we
may resort to the experience of others. I will
follow (though with unequal step) the course
taken by my predecessor last year, and, on the
question to fill this blank, bring the whole subject
before the committee. It will be assumed,
as then proved, that protection is due to every
national right, which cannot be estimated by
pecuniary calculation, but must be tested by
national ability only to defend and protect
them. To the mode of effecting so desirable an
object, I shall confine myself. The report has
assumed it as a principle almost of instinct to
oppose like to like, and so says the history of
man, whom we find ever availing himself of
the improvements of his assailant for self-defence.
Hence has the art of war become to all
nations the most interesting science, and no
citizen is more estimable than he who can direct
the national force with most efficiency.
The importance of a naval force is amply attested
on record. I will first, sir, point you to the
conflicts between the rival Republics of Rome
and Carthage, and ask you to remember the
agency that their vessels had in them. Had the
Romans confined themselves to the land, never
had Carthage been destroyed. The history of
Europe, from Venice to Great Britain, is too
familiar to all who hear me, to require reference
to particulars. It is sufficient for me to call
attention to the effect of naval power, as it
passed from nation to nation. What was the
power of Venice and Genoa when they led the
van of naval power? How quickly did the
sceptre of Portugal rise, as she assumed a station
on the ocean! how sink as she lost her
naval preponderance! How did a navy once
support the United Provinces! and how is it
now the salvation of Great Britain! It is then
a fact, that a naval armament gives effect to
the power of a nation, as do the musket and
bayonet, the cannon and the mortar. And how,
sir, is it attempted to rebut this fact? By showing
a physical disability in the country to avail
itself of this force? No. For then would they
be rebutted by the extent of our coasts, by the
materials for ship-building, (so ample,) and the
known habits and genius of our countrymen, as
each day is evincing. And here, sir, I wish I
could follow up the beautiful figure of my friend,
who, on a former occasion, showed you our
continent, extending to either ocean, with the
finger of Munificence pointing to the goodly
heritage.
We have then these facts: that a navy is a
powerful means of national operation; that our
local situation is fitted for its use; and that we
have the necessary materials. To which it is
objected that your infant Navy must be opposed
to one which has reached the full manhood
of power on the ocean. I admit it. But
shall we therefore abandon the ocean, yield our
birthright, our goodly heritage, without a struggle?
Or, shall we not rather, deducing argument
from example, like the gallant Captain
Hull, avoid their fleets and capture their single
ships.
I am aware that habit impels some to be fearful
on this subject, and the experience of the past
will not convince them. With diffidence, therefore,
do I refer to the efficiency of twelve ships-of-the-line
and twenty frigates, as demonstrated
last session. Let me ask of gentlemen who
thus think, who thus feel, to examine the extent
of their argument. Does it not go, not
only to the abandonment of the ocean, but to
the seacoast also? I shall trust to former statements
for the magnitude of this sacrifice, with
the observation, that abandoning the ocean involves
the loss of one million four hundred
thousand tons of shipping; and that in giving
up the coasts, you lose a valuable portion of
your soil, and some of your fairest cities. I
will not dwell on the magnitude of this sacrifice,
because I cannot believe that Americans
will abandon any right which there is a prospect
to maintain. I cannot, I admit, answer as
conclusively the objection, that much time will
be passed before this force can be procured;
yet, I believe, that a mind which relied on that
objection, might be satisfied that late preparation
is better than none. Nor could a mind, so
circumstanced, fail to see, that, while making
preparation, you come every day nearer your
object; in neglecting it, you are every day further
from it, and you are, in neglecting it,
blending ultimate loss with temporary sacrifice.
Mr. Chairman, is it for an infant nation, or a
popular Government, to be deterred by the
want of preparation? What is it that the youth
has not to prepare, or when was it that a popular
Government taxed itself with previous preparation?
But why this argument of despair?
What were your preparations for the Revolutionary
war, and when made? After an army
was in your country. Yet were they then
made and effectually made. By the bravery of
our fathers our soil was secured; on us it rests
to secure our rights on the water, common to
every independent nation, and as clearly ours
as they are essential to our interests. What is
this argument of infancy? Had not the Navy
of Great Britain a beginning? Yes. There was
a time when Britain had no ship. What then?
She was invaded, and more, she was conquered.
At this day, her wooden walls, as they are proverbially
called, are her defence and protection.
Is it admitted that the British fleet secures her
from attack? If so, would not a fleet secure us
from attack also? But we have it not. Is it
not then our duty, as guardians of the public interest,
to provide this powerful, this necessary
means of defence? But some are alarmed at
the cost. Permit me to recur to the calculation
of the last year. And first, as to the information
derived from British experience, whose
example may be taken as precedent on maritime
subjects; at least they make a powerful
argument, where they are rejected as full proof.
In recurring to British estimates, it certainly
was unexpected to the American eye to see the
same sum charged for a soldier as for a sailor,
viz: —— dollars per month; and as unexpected,
on investigating the British expenditures for a
series of years, to find that the appropriations
for the Navy are found less than those for the
Army, as will be seen by reference to the Annual
Register. In corroboration of this is our
own history, as appears from the calculations
made by my predecessor, of which I will avail
myself.
Is it not then demonstrated by foreign and
domestic experience, that a naval force is the
cheapest the nation can resort to for defence
and protection? Is it not also proved, that a
force believed to be competent, might be obtained
at a sum greatly within the means of the
Government—say twelve millions of dollars—or
a fourth less than the ordinary amount of
revenue for a year in good times? Test this
subject in another way. The cost of your Navy,
twelve millions; give up the ocean, and you
lose, for one item, one million four hundred
thousand tons of shipping, which at fifty dollars
the ton, would be worth five times the sum.
Yet that would unquestionably be the least item
in the account, because that would be but one
loss, while that of your coasting, and other
trade, would swell into a great annual amount,
and be as great a sacrifice of convenience as
profit. Nor is such a conclusion the less to be
deprecated, because it is difficult to foresee all
the evils which must result from the abandonment
of one essential right of an independent
nation. I know it may be said by those who
view this subject differently from me, that they
do not mean to abandon the ocean. It is, then,
for them to show the difference between not
abandoning a right, and not defending it; for
I cannot believe that any gentleman will contend
that the national defence shall be left to
privateers. They have most justly been considered
an aid to the national arm, but Heaven
forbid that they should be relied on as principal.
A private arm, with power to shield the
nation, is what I could not contemplate without
terror. I cannot believe it necessary to pursue
this argument.
To return then: The force adequate to the
defence of our seas would cost twelve millions.
I will not say that this whole expense ought to
be incurred in one year; indeed, it ought to be
remarked, that of the twenty frigates, nearly
eight are ready for service. Let the principle
be yielded, and we can then enter on the calculation
as to the portion which may be procured
each year. The decision, too, would, in
my judgment, be the strongest inducement to
the enemy to make peace when they saw that
you were progressing to a force which they could
not meet. If, indeed, the force which has been
named was not altogether adequate to the object
of defending your own waters, you would
find, having that force, that you could make
any small addition that was requisite without
difficulty. In reference to the opinions of others,
in some measure, did the select committee
determine on the number of ships, and their
force, to be procured this year. Thus if the
first blanks are filled with four seventy-six gun
ships, they cost, per estimate, $333,000, and
will require an appropriation of $1,332,000. If
the other blank be filled with six thirty-eight
gun ships, which, by estimate, cost $220,000,
the requisite appropriation for them will be
$1,320,000. For the sloops of war, the last
blank I have calculated at $61,200, which would
require an appropriation of $367,200; which,
with the necessary appropriation for the four
frigates ordered to be rebuilt last year, viz: the
Philadelphia, New York, General Greene, and
Boston, will amount to $3,500,000. This would
give you four seventy-sixes and eighteen frigates,
mostly of the best size. Compare the efficiency
of that force with the interest of three millions
and a half, the cost, and you cannot but be
gratified with the result. I say, Mr. Chairman,
the interest; because, though it was not in the
province of the select committee to look out
the ways and means, yet was it so interested
as to their object, that they could but ask how
was the money to be had; and they were satisfied
that three millions and a half could, with
facility, be loaned for navy purposes. I state
this with no view to limit the ways and means,
but only that until the subject is given them to
provide for, the House might not be embarrassed
with the difficulty of money.
With the humble hope that the views of the
committee have been shown to be at least most
reasonable, if not most correct, I beg leave to
say a few words as to the different kinds of vessels
proposed. I will not ask that the clerk
should read that excellent letter from Captain
Stewart, because I presume every gentleman
who wishes information has read it more than
once. From that and the other documents, the
committee thought themselves warranted in
recommending four seventy-six gun ships. In
addition to the sufficient reasons offered there,
that a large ship, with fewer men and a less
cost, will be more efficient than small ones, by
the table A it is most conclusively evinced, that
a seventy-six, at one round, throws on the enemy
four pounds fourteen ounces of ball for each
man; whereas, the gunboat throws only ten
ounces. I only give the extremes, that the argument
may be the more readily taken. Here,
too, we have the fact, that six hundred and
fifty men are sufficient for a seventy-six, while
four hundred and twenty are required for a
frigate. The annual expense is, for the large ship,
$202,110; for the frigate, $110,000. While in
action, the larger ship is equal or superior to
three frigates. To support this calculation by
figures, we have the opinions of Captains Hull,
Stewart, and Morris; and Mr. Hamilton says,
that all the officers in service concur in the
opinion; and I am told that such is the real
history of naval conflicts. Mr. Hamilton mentions
one, and Captain Stewart mentions another,
of four French frigates attacking a British
seventy-four, of which one was sunk, two taken,
and the other run off.
It is cause of some exultation to me, that our
naval men, where the opportunity is afforded
them, give the example to prove our theory.
As I am told, orders were sent from Washington
in September to Captain Chauncey, then at
New York, who made his preparation, took his
workmen with him to the Lakes, and some days
since we had the account that he had built and
launched, before November was out, a frigate
of twenty-six guns. The gallant Chauncey enables
me to present an argument that would,
could I do it justice, I am sure, have much
weight. Will any gentleman regret that this
twenty-six gun ship has been built, though the
mastery of the Lakes has been acquired without
it? Neither shall we regret the building of
the seventy-sixes, though peace, which God
send, should come before they are launched.
There is yet one other objection too important
to be passed over, though it was on a former
occasion so ably canvassed. It is the difficulty
of getting seamen. That difficulty exists, I do
admit. Yet is not the difficulty insurmountable.
Here again I avail myself of the illustrations of
my friend from South Carolina.
The gentleman has again referred to the
difficulty of manning your ships, and deems
impressment indispensable. Sir, I admit the
weakness of our nation, and lament it too.
Yet I cannot believe that the hard hand of
tyranny is essential to their well-being; and I
regret that in an assembly of freemen, that this,
the most if not the only detestable example
England has set us as to a navy, should be so
much relied on. Look to the fact, that in five
years forty-two thousand seamen deserted from
the British navy. Look to the fact, that their
prisoners require to be committed to return to
their own country. It is with no little pride
that I call the attention of the gentleman and
the committee to our gallery. Did a British
gallery ever exhibit such a spectacle? No, a
seaman there is a slave, and seldom puts his
foot on shore but under the guard of an officer.
Let us therefore be cautious in admitting that
though Great Britain has been most successful,
that she owes it to the hard, to the iron hand
of impressment. It would not be difficult to
find in her naval institutions other principles
to which the mind would delight to attribute
her superiority, rather than that from which
we cannot but turn in disgust.
Mr. Stow said he should not consider the
motion made by the honorable gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Seybert) as going to defeat
the main object of the bill, which was a liberal
increase of the navy, because he understood his
intention to be to move a larger number of
frigates if the clause for seventy-fours should be
stricken out. The question then he should
consider as simply whether it was best at present
to build any ships-of-the-line, or to confine
our exertions to frigates only? He said his own
opinions had leaned pretty strongly to the latter
side till, as a member of the Navy Committee,
he had been led to a more careful examination
of the subject; and he confessed that that examination
had fully convinced him of the
utility, and he might say necessity, of building
some line-of-battle ships. The propriety of
building them, as well as a proportion of lighter
ships, grew out of the different objects to which
they were to be applied. There could be no
doubt of the superior advantages of frigates and
sloops of war when employed in cruising against
our enemy's commerce, but whenever the object
is to repel a powerful force, ships-of-the-line
ought to be resorted to. They form batteries
infinitely more effective in proportion to
their expense than frigates. To illustrate this—the
cost of a seventy-four is less than one-third
more than that of a forty-four gun frigate,
yet the force is as three to one, or according to
the lowest estimate I have heard, as two to one.
This is easily explained when we consider that
to make a seventy-four is little more than adding
another deck to a large frigate. It would
then appear evident, that unless we resorted to
this kind of force, we should fight our enemy
on the most unequal terms. She could at any
time lay a few heavy ships at the mouths of our
harbors and in our narrow waters, and thus
effectually destroy not only our foreign trade,
but what was of infinitely more importance, she
could destroy the whole of our coasting trade.
Further, said Mr. S., knowing that we have
no powerful ships, she can easily protect by
convoy all her valuable fleets; but if we had
four ships-of-the-line she would be driven to
the enormous expense of convoying every fleet
of merchantmen sailing to any part of America
by five or six seventy-fours, or they would be
exposed to capture by our fleet.
But, said Mr. S., it is objected that they would
be blockaded. This objection was equally against
frigates; but he was perfectly willing to put it
upon that ground, that Great Britain would attempt
to blockade them. What then would be
the case? She must employ six blockading
ships, supported at an enormous expense, at
such a distance; and as had been fully shown
by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr.
Cheves,) last year, six more ships at least must
be occupied in preparing and sailing to replace
the first six—thus employing twelve ships to
four. And after all, the attempt to confine our
ships would frequently be rendered abortive by
storms. Again, it has been objected that we
had no harbors south of Montauk Point, in
which, if pursued, our ships could take shelter.
If by this was meant barely that we had no
harbor properly fortified, he admitted it was
true; and it was also equally true as applied to
our heavy frigates; but if it was meant that
there was no harbor in which ships could enter
that was capable of being properly defended, it
was entirely erroneous. For many such there
were, and where sufficient works could be
erected in a few months.
Mr. S. said a strong reason for building
seventy-fours, and to which he particularly requested
the attention of the committee, grew
out of the state of our preparation. We have
timber for four seventy-fours, seasoned and
ready for use, which could not be applied to
frigates, without great loss. And this explained
the fact, that we could build seventy-fours
sooner than frigates, unless the timber thus provided
should be cut up, which, after years of
deliberate preparation for seventy-fours, would
appear like children's play. He said in a case
of this kind, he thought great respect was due
to experience. That many years ago all the
ships of war belonging to the nations of Europe
were small, but that, without one exception,
they had resorted to a certain proportion of
heavy ships. From this circumstance, as well
as from the uniform opinion of our own officers,
he inferred that these were the most conclusive
reasons in favor of them.
The question was then taken on the motion
to strike out the seventy-fours, and negatived.
The committee rose and had leave to sit again.
Increase of the Navy.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee
of the Whole on the bill to increase the
Navy of the United States.
Mr. Cutts then moved to strike out the
seventy-fours, with a view to increase the number
of frigates to be built to ten, and to add a
number of sloops of war.
Mr. C. spoke at considerable length in support
of his motion, and in favor of frigates and
sloops of war in preference to seventy-four gun
ships.
The question was then taken on striking out
the provision respecting seventy-fours, and was
carried—for the amendment 56, against it 53.
Mr. Cutts moved an amendment authorizing
the building of ten ships of war, of forty-four
guns, and ten sloops of war.—Motion lost by a
great majority.
On motion of Mr. Bassett, the petitions of
J. A. Chevallie, attorney of Amelie Eugene de
Beaumarchais, presented on the 24th of December,
1805, and 2d of April, 1806, together with
all the documents concerning the said claim,
were referred to the Committee of Claims.
Encouragement to Privateering by Public
Armed and Private Armed Vessels.
Mr. Bassett, from the Committee on the
Naval Establishment, presented a bill relating
to captures; which was read twice, and committed
to a Committee of the Whole on Wednesday
next. The bill is as follows:
A Bill relating to captures.
Be it enacted, &c., That where any ship or vessel
in the service of the United States shall have captured,
or may hereafter capture, a ship or vessel belonging
to an enemy, of equal or inferior force, and
it shall become necessary to destroy such prize to
prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy, or
for the security of such ship or vessel so in the service
of the United States, the Secretary of the Navy
is hereby required to issue his commission to one or
more fit person or persons, who, on the best evidence
that can be procured, shall proceed to estimate the
value of such ship or vessel, prize as aforesaid, in the
port into which the capturing vessel shall first enter,
and make return on oath of said estimate or valuation
to the Secretary of the Navy.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary
of the Navy shall thereon proceed to apportion
the sum, which shall be equal to one-half the said
valuation or estimate, as prize money, among the
officers and crew making such capture, and cause the
same to be paid to them accordingly.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That each commissioned
officer shall receive six dollars per day for
each day he shall be employed in making the aforesaid
estimate: Provided, His compensation shall in
no case exceed —— dollars.
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That every captain
or commanding officer of any vessel in the service
of the United States immediately on his coming
into port, after having captured a ship or vessel of
equal or superior force, shall make report thereof to
the Secretary of the Navy, describing particularly
the size and equipment of the ship or vessel so destroyed,
and the nature and extent of the damage
done her in the action, as also the causes and inducements
for destroying his prize, which report, in part,
shall be received as evidence by the commissioners
aforesaid.
Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary
of the Navy shall cause the account of the
money so by him ordered to be paid, to be settled at
the end of one year, and all the unclaimed dividends
he shall cause to be paid over to the Navy Hospital
Fund.
Mr. Bassett, from the same committee, also
presented a bill regulating pensions to persons
on board private armed ships; which was read
twice, and committed to a Committee of the
Whole on Thursday next. The bill is as follows:
A Bill regulating pensions to persons on board private
armed ships.
Be it enacted, &c., That the two and a half per
centum reserved in the hands of the collectors and
consuls by the act of June, eighteen hundred and
twelve, entitled "An act concerning letters of marque,
prizes, and prize goods," shall be paid into the Treasury,
under the like regulations provided for other
public money, and shall constitute a fund for the purposes
of this act, and such other purposes as Congress
may direct, for the aid and comfort of the seamen
of the United States.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary
of the Navy be authorized and required to place
on the pension list, under the like regulations and restrictions
as are used in relation to the Navy of the
United States, any officer or seamen who, on board
of any private armed ship or vessel, bearing a commission
or letter of marque, shall have been, in the
line of duty, wounded or otherwise disabled; if an
officer, allowing him one-half his monthly pay for
the greater disability, and so in proportion; and if a
seaman, or acting as a marine, the sum of six dollars
per month for the greater disability, and so in proportion;
which several pensions shall be paid, by
direction of the Secretary of the Navy, out of the
fund above provided.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the commanding
officer of every vessel having a commission,
or letters of marque and reprisal, shall enter in his
journal the name and rank of any officer, and the
name of any seamen who, during his cruise, shall, in
the line of his duty, have been wounded or disabled,
describing the manner and extent, as far as practicable,
of such wound or disability.
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That every collector
shall transmit quarterly to the Secretary of the
Navy a transcript of such journals as may have been
reported to him, so far as they give a list of the officers
and crew, and the description of wounds and
disabilities, the better to enable the Secretary to decide
on claims for pensions.
Duties on Privateer Prize Goods.
Mr. Cheves, from the Committee of Ways
and Means, to whom was referred the bill from
the Senate directing the Secretary of the Treasury
to remit certain fines, penalties, and forfeitures,
reported the same with amendments, the
principal one of which is to strike out the words
"and the dependencies thereof," so as to exclude
from the operation of the bill, the cases of goods
brought in from Canada, &c.—The bill was referred
to a Committee of the Whole.
Mr. C. also introduced the following report:
The Committee of Ways and Means, to whom
were referred so much of the petition of the owners
and agents of sundry private armed vessels fitted out
of the port of New York, as prays the reduction of
the duties on prize goods, and the petitions of sundry
owners of private armed vessels fitted out of the port
of Boston, and of sundry owners of like vessels fitted
out of the ports of Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia,
also praying a reduction of the duties on prize goods,
report:
That a letter from John Ferguson and John L.
Laurence, agents for the petitioners from New York,
and a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, both
addressed to the chairman of the committee, and
which accompany this report, contain all the facts
and views which will probably be found material in
the examination and consideration of this subject;
and that this committee, having maturely considered
them, are of opinion, that a reduction of the duties
on prize goods, without embracing, at the same time,
all importations made in the prosecution of the ordinary
commerce of the country, cannot, consistently
with sound policy and rational legislation, be made,
and that a general reduction would diminish a revenue,
where it does not distress the consumer, and
would not produce any material increase of gain to
the captors. The committee, therefore, recommend
the following resolve:
Resolved, That it is inexpedient to grant the prayer
of the petitioners.
Documents referred to in the above report.
Washington, Nov. 23, 1812.
Sir: We take the liberty of enclosing to you, for
the inspection of the Committee of Ways and Means,
sundry papers connected with the application by the
owners of privateers in New York, for a reduction of
duties on prize goods. They are as follow:
No. 1, exhibits the proceeds of the schooner Venus
and cargo, captured by the privateer Teazer.
No. 2, is a statement of the cost of the privateers
General Armstrong and Governor Tompkins.
No. 3, contains extracts of letters from several
privateer agents.
The Committee of Ways and Means are (including
the accompanying documents) in possession of three
statements of prize sales, where the property was,
in each case, of a different character from the others.
The cargo of the New Liverpool consisted (contrary
to our impressions when before the committee) altogether
of wine, amounting to 27,959 gallons, whereon
the duty was 46 cents per gallon, which consumed
more than one-half of the proceeds of vessel and
cargo, and, connected with the other charges, left the
owners of the privateer about one-sixth of the captured
property. The Industry was laden with 152
bbls. salmon; and the benevolent intentions of the
privateersmen to restore to an indigent owner the
amount of her loss, terminated, in consequence of
the high duties and charges, in an inability to present
her with more than a paltry sum, scarcely worth her
acceptance. The Venus had a cargo of rum, sugar,
fruit, and preserves, which produced $17,637 68, and
was charged with duties amounting to $8,287 63.
The vessel, being well calculated for a privateer, was
bought in by the captors for that business. But, experience
teaching them that the profits of private
naval warfare are by no means equivalent to the
hazard, they have abandoned that intention, and are
now offering the Venus for sale in the public newspapers,
but cannot find a purchaser.
We would respectfully suggest to the Committee
of Ways and Means that great anxiety exists in New
York, that Congress may give the question of a reduction
of prize duties a speedy decision; which, if
favorable, will revive the spirit and zeal, now expiring,
with which privateering was undertaken at the commencement
of the war; and, if unfavorable, will
prevent those who have purchased vessels for warlike
enterprises, in which they cannot now dispose of any
interest, from incurring losses accumulated under
fruitless expectations.
We have taken the liberty of reminding the committee
that no naval force of any efficiency can be
supported by the Government but at an expense far
greater than the amount of the duties of which we
pray the remission; and that there is probably no
other species of naval armament half so destructive
as privateers to the commerce of an enemy.
The employment of a great number of experienced
masters of vessels and seamen necessarily engaged in
them, whose services could not probably be obtained
in any other way, and whose skill and intrepidity
produce so much honor to the country, forms another
important consideration.
To these may be added, that, in no other way, can
the mercantile interest be so effectually united in the
support and prosecution of the war, as by offering
inducements to the investments of its otherwise unemployed
capital in such enterprises.
We are, sir, with great respect, your obedient
servants,
JOHN FERGUSON,
JOHN L. LAWRENCE.
Hon. L. Cheves, Chairman, &c.
Imprisonment of American Seamen.
The Speaker laid before the House the following
Message from the President of the
United States:
To the House of Representatives of the United States:
I transmit to the House of Representatives a report
of the Secretary of State, complying with their resolution
of the 9th instant.
JAMES MADISON.
December 21, 1812.
Department of State, Dec. 19, 1812.
The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the
resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th
instant, requesting information touching the conduct
of British officers towards persons taken in American
armed ships, has the honor to lay before the President
the accompanying papers marked A, B, C, from
which it appears, that certain persons, some of whom
are said to be native, and others naturalized citizens
of the United States, being parts of the crews of the
United States armed vessels the "Nautilus" and the
"Wasp," and of the private armed vessel the "Sarah
Ann," have been seized, under the pretext of their
being British subjects, by British officers, for the
avowed purpose, as is understood, of having them
brought to trial for their lives, and that others, being
part of the crew of the Nautilus, have been taken into
the British service.
The Secretary of State begs leave also to lay before
the President the papers marked D and E.
From these it will be seen, that whilst the British
naval officers arrest as criminals such persons taken
on board American armed vessels as they may consider
British subjects, they claim a right to retain on
board British ships of war American citizens who
may have married in England, or been impressed
from on board British merchant vessels; and that they
consider an impressed American, when he is discharged
from one of their ships, as a prisoner of war.
All which is respectfully submitted.
JAMES MONROE.
(A.)
Sir John Borlase Warren to Mr. Monroe.
Halifax, September 30, 1812.
Sir: Having received information that a most unauthorized
act has been committed by Commodore
Rodgers, in forcibly seizing twelve British seamen,
prisoners of war, late belonging to the Guerriere, and
taking them out of the English cartel brig Endeavor
on her passage down the harbor of Boston, after they
had been regularly embarked on board of her for an
exchange, agreeable to the arrangements settled between
the two countries, and that the said British
seamen so seized, are now detained on board the
United States frigate President as hostages; I feel
myself called upon to request, sir, your most serious
attention to a measure so fraught with mischief and
inconvenience, destructive of the good faith of a flag
of truce and the sacred protection of a cartel. I
should be extremely sorry that the imprudent act of
any officer should involve consequences so particularly
severe as the present instance must naturally produce,
if repeated; and although it is very much my wish,
during the continuance of the differences existing
between the two countries, to adopt every measure
that might render the effect of war less rigorous, yet,
in another point of view, the conviction of the duty
I owe my country would, in the event of such grievances
as I have already stated being continued, not
admit of any hesitation in retaliatory decisions; but
as I am strongly persuaded of the high liberality of
your sentiments, and that the act complained of has
originated entirely with the officer who committed it,
and that it will be as censurable in your consideration
as it deserves, I rely upon your taking such steps
as will prevent a recurrence of conduct so extremely
reprehensible in every shape.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration,
sir, your most obedient and most faithful humble
servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN,
Admiral of the Blue, Commander-in-Chief, &c.
James Monroe, Esq., Secretary of State.
Mr. Monroe to Sir John Borlase Warren.
Department of State, Oct. 28, 1812.
Sir: I have had the honor to receive your letter
of the 30th September, complaining that Commodore
Rodgers, commanding a squadron of the United
States Navy at the port of Boston, had taken twelve
British seamen, lately belonging to His Britannic
Majesty's ship the Guerriere, from a cartel in the
harbor of Boston, and that he had detained them on
board the President, a frigate of the United States,
as hostages.
I am instructed to inform you, that inquiry shall
be made into the circumstances attending, and the
causes which produced the act, of which you complain;
and that such measures will be taken, on a
knowledge of them, as may comport with the rights
of both nations, and may be proper in the case to
which they relate.
I beg you, sir, to be assured that it is the sincere
desire of the President to see (and to promote, so far
as depends on the United States) that the war which
exists between the two countries be conducted with
the utmost regard to humanity. I have the honor
to be, &c.,
JAMES MONROE.
Sir John B. Warren, Admiral of the Blue,
Commander-in-Chief, &c.
(B.)
Washington, Dec. 17, 1812.
Sir: I have the honor to annex a list of twelve of
the crew of the late United States sloop of war Wasp,
detained by Captain John Beresford, of the British
ship Poictiers, under the pretence of their being
British subjects.
I have the honor to be, respectfully, sir, your obedient
servant,
GEORGE S. WISE, Purser.
Hon. Paul Hamilton, Sec'ry Navy.
[Here follow several other documents, not
deemed of material importance, except the following:]
(C.)
Extract of a letter from Major General Pinckney to
the Secretary of War, dated
Headquarters, Charleston,
November 4, 1812.
"Information having been given upon oath to
Lieutenant Grandison, who at present commands in
the Naval Department here, that six American seamen,
who had been taken prisoners on board of our
privateers, had been sent to Jamaica to be tried as
British subjects for treason, he called upon the marshal
to retain double that number of British seamen
as hostages. The marshal, in consequence of instructions
from the Department of State, asked my
advice on the subject, and I have given my opinion
that they ought to be detained until the pleasure of
the President shall be known. The testimony of
Captain Moon is herewith. I hope, sir, you will
have the goodness to have this business put in the
proper train to have the President's pleasure on this
subject communicated to the marshal."
The Message and documents were, on motion,
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Another member, to wit, from Louisiana,
Thomas Bolling Robertson, appeared, produced
his credentials, was qualified, and took
his seat.
Increase of the Navy.
The bill from the Senate to increase the Navy
of the United States, was read a third time;
and the question, being stated, "Shall the bill
pass?"
Mr. McKee spoke at considerable length
against its passage, and concluded by moving to
postpone it to Monday, with a view to obtaining
further information on the subject of the
materials, &c.
The motion to postpone was supported by
Mr. Alston and Mr. Seybert, and opposed by
Mr. Milnor, Mr. Bassett, and Mr. Widgery.
The votes were for postponement 51, against
it 73.
So the motion was lost.
The question recurring on the passage of the
bill,
Mr. Potter said, as he represented a commercial
State, and his constituents at present were
very anxious for a navy, he felt it his duty to
assign his reasons for the vote he was about to
give. He said, when he saw his political friends,
with only one exception, in favor of the bill
under consideration, and the anxious solicitude
of the gentleman on the other side of the House
for its fate, he felt himself much embarrassed;
but while he was by his feelings at times almost
impelled to vote in its favor, his judgment compelled
him to vote against it.
Mr. P. said his objections to a navy were that
it would cost more than ever it would be worth
to the nation; that we could not build, man,
and support the ships contemplated, in addition
to our present establishment, without resorting
to the same means for their support as other
maritime nations had done; that it must be
supported by impression or oppression; we
must either impress our citizens to man our
Navy, and compel them to serve against their
wills for almost nothing, or oppress the nation
with taxes not to be endured, to enable the
Government to give such wages as would induce
our seamen to enter voluntarily into our
service. He said it had been observed by the
friends of the bill, and particularly by his friend
from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Milnor,) that the
Navy was at this time very popular with all
parties, in this House and the nation; that they
had done honor to themselves and to their
country, while our army had, in almost every
instance, been defeated and disgraced. Mr. P.
said we had been very unfortunate in the selection
of some of our commanding officers, who
had, as it would seem, been appointed more because
they wanted office, than because they were
qualified for it; some of them were too old, and
others too young; but he believed we had as good
officers in our Army as we had in the Navy, and
whenever the time should arrive that would
afford them a fair opportunity, that they would
equally distinguish themselves.
Mr. P. said there was a kind of popular delusion
at this time about a Navy, that he found
difficult to oppose. He said it was at least popular
with all those who expected to make money
out of it, and with many from the most honorable
motives. But he believed, when the people,
who were to pay all, and receive nothing,
come to see that we had spent for them the last
year upwards of twenty millions of dollars,
and that notwithstanding all the moneys we
had received, by double duties, and otherwise,
that we had increased the national debt, in that
year, ten millions six hundred thousand dollars,
and that we want, for the expenses of the present
year, agreeably to the report of the Secretary
of the Treasury, $31,925,000, exclusive
of the expense of the contemplated increase of
our Navy, and for losses and war contingencies—that
when they should put those sums together,
and apportion them to the several
States, agreeable to the constitution, and see
that but few individuals, and not many States,
would have personal property sufficient to pay
their proportions—that this delusion as to those
who have eventually all this money to pay
would at least vanish.
It was likewise said that the spirit of the
nation demanded this increase of our Navy.
He remembered very well that it was so said on
a former occasion, and that the finger of Heaven
pointed to war, but it was very soon found that
the finger of the people pointed to peace. It
was then said, as it is now said, that we were a
divided people, and it was necessary to convince
foreign nations that we would support our
own Government. The then Executive was
addressed from all parts of the United States,
with pledges of life, fortune, and sacred honor,
in support of what he had done, or should do.
This was intended to correct the error abroad
as to our being a divided people, and for no
other purpose. Its object was entirely misunderstood
by the then President. He thought
they were uneasy and wanted something to
steady them. An army was raised, and taxes
laid for their benefit;—a navy was provided
which did honor to themselves and the nation,
that protected our commerce, and caused our
flag to be respected in every sea, in consequence
of which our revenue continued to increase,
notwithstanding all the depredations committed
on our commerce, and the nation
appeared to be prosperous and happy; but
when the people were called upon to test
the sincerity of their pledges and promises, by
the payment of a tax of only two millions of
dollars, they said they had been entirely misunderstood,
that those pledges were intended to
have an influence abroad, and not for the purpose
of trouble at home, and that they would
not pay taxes to support a navy or army; and,
the first opportunity they had, they changed the
Administration. If they would not then pay
two millions of dollars, to support that Administration,
can they be expected to pay nearly
fifty millions for the support of this, for the
same purposes?
Mr. P. said this Administration, during the
last session of Congress, was addressed from all
parts of the Union, and from many of the States
in their legislative capacities, promising to support
them with their lives, fortunes, and sacred
honors, in common form. This perhaps was to
have its influence abroad. The Administration,
believing them sincere, have been induced to
declare war, and are left to carry it on without
money. They find that those pledges and
promises cost but little, and are worth nothing;
and the consequence will be, that when the
people are called upon to pay those enormous
expenses, the present Administration will share
the same fate from them as the former did.
The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Cutts) said the expense of this Navy would
swamp the present, as it had done a former
Administration; that, Mr. P. said, was a business
of their own, it was no concern of his; but
if with their means they could not manage the
affairs of the nation, with their present experience,
having seen the rock on which a former
Administration split, they would richly deserve
it; his only object was to keep his constituents
from being mired down with debt and taxes.
Many gentlemen support this bill upon the
principle that this settles the question; that we
are to become a great naval power, and to have
a permanent Naval Establishment; to this Mr.
P. said he objected for the reasons he had assigned;
he said he had found mankind much
the same: give them power, and they would
not only use, but abuse it—give them money,
and they will spend it, and want to borrow;
and, he said, if an Administration like the present,
without money, without an army, or navy,
would plunge this country so unprepared into a
war, and continue it for the present existing
cause, and extend their views of conquest to the
Floridas, the Canadas, Quebec, Halifax, and
Nova Scotia, whenever they should have money,
an army, and ships; the next thing they would
want colonies, as other nations had done, and
that Bermuda and New Providence would be in
our way; and we must have Jamaica to get
good rum and sugar. And instead of this country
enjoying peace, which is above all things the
most desirable, we should be involved like other
nations in perpetual war.
Mr. Randolph moved to postpone the further
consideration of the bill till to-morrow.—Lost.
So the bill was passed.
Medal to Commodore Preble, &c.
The following Message was received from the
President of the United States:
To the House of Representatives of the United States:
I transmit to the House of Representatives a report
of the Secretary of the Navy, complying with their
resolution of the 16th instant.
JAMES MADISON.
December 23, 1812.
The following is the report referred to in the
above Message:
Navy Department, Dec. 21, 1812.
Sir: On the subject of the resolution of the honorable
the House of Representatives, of the 16th instant,
I have the honor to state, that, in pursuance of the
resolution of Congress of the 3d March, 1805, a gold
medal, emblematical of the attacks on the town, batteries
and naval force, of Tripoli, by the squadron under
Commodore Preble's command, was presented to
Commodore Preble, in the manner stated in the enclosed
letter, dated May 17, 1806: That one month's
pay was allowed, "exclusive of the common allowance,
to all the petty officers, seamen, and marines, of the
squadron, who so gloriously supported the honor of
the American flag, under the orders of their gallant
commander, in the several attacks:" That no sword
has been presented to either of the commissioned
officers or midshipmen, who distinguished themselves
in the several attacks: And that it is not known to
this Department that there ever was made by Congress
a specific appropriation of $20,000 for the purpose
of carrying into effect the resolution referred to.
With respect to that part of the resolution which
requests the President to cause a sword to be presented
to each of the commissioned officers and midshipmen
who distinguished themselves, it is presumed
that the President saw what to his mind appeared
difficulties of great delicacy, from the peculiar language
of the resolution. By the resolution, he was
requested to present swords to such only as had distinguished
themselves; and all having been represented
to him as having acted gloriously, he could not
in justice draw with precision a line of discrimination.
He felt, it is presumed, a repugnance to the making
of a selection, which, by implication, would necessarily
have cast an unmerited reproach upon all not
therein included. A degradation of that kind might
have greatly injured the service, and could not possibly
have been grateful to the honorable feelings of
the favored officers.
I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect,
your obedient servant,
PAUL HAMILTON.
To the President.
Sir: In pursuance of the resolution of Congress of
the 3d March, 1805, requesting the President of the
United States to cause a gold medal to be struck,
emblematical of the attacks on the town, batteries,
and naval force, of Tripoli, by the squadron under
your command, and to present it to you in such manner
as in his opinion would be most honorable to you,
the medal, which will herewith be delivered to you
by Lieutenant Jones, has been struck. You will receive
it, sir, as a testimony of your country's estimation
of the important and honorable services rendered
by you; and you will be pleased to accept an
assurance of the great pleasure I have in the honor
of presenting it to you.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir,
your most obedient servant,
R. SMITH.
To Com. Edward Preble.
From the records of the Navy Department.
PAUL HAMILTON.
After some conversation as to the proper
course for this business to take, it was referred
to a select committee, to consist of seven members,
to consider and report thereon.
Mr. Quincy, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Roane, Mr.
Lacock, Mr. Troup, Mr. Emott, and Mr. Dinsmoor,
were appointed the committee.
Public Lands—Cash System and Reduction of
Price.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of
the Whole on the report of the Committee on
the Public Lands, made on the second instant,
respecting an extension of the time limited by
law for the payment of lands purchased of the
United States.
The report concludes with the following resolutions,
the adoption of which the committee
recommend:
"Resolved, That such part of the laws for the sale
of public lands as allow a credit on part of the purchase
money, be repealed; and that the price at
which lands shall be offered in future shall be one
dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.
"Resolved, That in future sales a portion of the
public lands be offered in tracts of eighty acres.
"Resolved, That two years be given in addition to
the time allowed by law to the purchasers of public
lands, whose time of payment shall have or may
expire on or before the first day of January, 1814, on
condition that all the interest that has accrued or
may accrue on or before the 18th day of March
next, shall be paid at that day, and the interest that
may become due thereafter shall be paid at the day
on which the time, according to existing laws, shall
expire for making payment."
Considerable desultory debate took place on
these propositions; but the committee rose without
coming to any decision thereon, and obtained
leave to sit again.
Additional Military Force.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of
the Whole on the bill "supplementary to the
act for the more perfect organization of the
Army of the United States," and on the bill "in
addition to the act for raising an additional military
force."
The bills having been read through, a motion
was made by Mr. David R. Williams to fill the
blanks in the first bill, for the amount of bounty,
&c., and the question having been stated—
Mr. D. R. Williams said, the embarrassment
which he felt on the present occasion, was not of
an ordinary kind; he was so solemnly impressed
with the importance of the subject before the
committee, he was fearful its success might, in
some degree, depend on his efforts to sustain it;
and, feeling that the interest, perhaps the character
of his country, might be committed by the
decision, he was humbled that its cause could
not by him be more ably supported. He felt,
however, some confidence from the circumstance
that the Military Committee was entitled to the
candor of the House, because it had not presented
mere fragments, to be acted on in detail, but
a system on which to rest the future prosecution
of the war. An explanation of its merits,
from the relation in which he stood to that
committee, was probably expected of him.
Without going back to the unavoidable and
just causes of the war in which we were engaged,
he would presume it was the object of
all to terminate it successfully, and that there
now remained no other mode than to call into
the field a force adequate to the command of
every honorable object. The force was abundant
throughout the community, to secure, if
directed with skill, spirit, and enterprise, our
defence everywhere; and, by offence, to make
the enemy feel it had become his interest to
abstain from plunder and oppression.
The character of our Government had been
so depressed in Europe, not more by foreign
than domestic misrepresentation, as much even
within these walls as without them, it had become
necessary to make war to place our backs
against the wall and prove to European marauders
there is a point beyond which we will not
recede. This good the war has accomplished;
but it has become more than ever necessary to
prove that we will not only declare war, but can
prosecute it with energy and courageous enterprise.
The honor, the character of the nation,
require that the British power on our borders
shall be demolished in the next campaign—her
American provinces once wrested from her,
every attempt to recover them will be chimerical,
except through negotiation. The road to
peace then lies through Canada. When we shall
once be in possession of it, peace, honorable
peace, the sole object of us all, is secured. But
some gentlemen affect a sympathy for the
Canadians—why, say they, will you make war
on them? They have not injured us. Nor,
sir, has the British tar injured us, although
he is the instrument of plunder and impressment.
It is to conquer the sovereignty
of the soil, to raze the British power, to reach,
by such means, her profligate and unjust ministry,
that war is waged at all—the unarmed will
never fall on American bayonets; it is not
against the people of either Canada or Great
Britain, but against the English subject in arms,
that the war is directed. By physical force
then alone can we proceed.
Having shown the necessity of augmenting
the regular forces, it was equally material to
provide for filling the ranks, and for keeping
them at their full complement when filled. With
this view was the 1st section introduced. The
greatest evil, incident to the recruiting service,
results from the number of persons to whom the
public money was necessarily distributed; in
proportion to the number of persons with whom
it is intrusted, will be its misapplication. To
remedy this it is proposed to appoint officers to
each regiment, for that particular purpose, in
no way different from those already appointed,
who shall be employed in recruiting for their
respective regiments; these to be under the
order of a major, who shall receive and be
accountable for the issue of money and clothes
for that service. The ranks filled, the presence
of all the officers on the present establishment
will be indispensable, as in our service the proportion
of privates to the officers is greater than
in any other service whatever. The new organization
which was given to the Army at the
last session increased the number of privates in
each company, without a corresponding increase
of officers. If two lieutenants were necessary
in a company, for the purpose of discipline and
recruiting, when it consisted of only sixty-four
privates, assuredly three are as much so now it
is raised to ninety. The recruits, as fast as they
are enlisted, may be concentrated under the eye
of the major, where they may be exercised and
drilled, so that when he joins the regiment,
they will be qualified to enter the ranks and
face the enemy.
One other objection he could anticipate—perhaps
those who can sneer at the disasters and
misfortunes of the late campaign may object that
there is no encouragement to vote additional
forces, seeing those which have been already
raised have been so illy employed. It becomes
us all to be equally faithful to our country,
whether her arms are victorious or not; it is in
times of discomfiture that the patriot's resolution
and virtues are most needed. It is no matter
by what party names we are distinguished;
this is our country—we are children of the same
family, and ought to be brothers in a common
cause. The misfortune which befalls one portion,
should sink deep in the hearts of the others
also. What misfortune so great as the loss of
character? If we shall forget our impatience
under disgrace, and look back on the events that
have passed, with only as much candor as becomes
us, this objection must vanish. Under the
circumstances in which it found itself, without
experience, either in itself or others to guide it,
Administration ought not to be censured for
the bad military appointments it may have
made, however much it may deserve, if it shall
retain men in employ, when found incapable to
discharge the duties intrusted to him. He was
fearless of contradiction in declaring, all our disasters
sprung from a cause which no man in the
nation could have anticipated. It was next to
impossible any human being could have foreseen,
much less provided against it. It was with
pain and reluctance he felt it his duty to speak
of an officer fallen and disgraced; he wished he
could discover any cause for the surrender of
Detroit, less heinous than treachery or cowardice—between
them he saw nothing to choose.
Justice will hereafter, if party heat denies it
now, pronounce the plan of the campaign, as
intrusted to General Hull, easy to be accomplished
and judicious in its objects. The commandant
was furnished with every means
necessary for success—with money, men, provisions,
and munitions of war, in abundance.
What better mode could have been adopted, to
prevent Indian hostility and intercept British
supplies of the instruments of massacre? That
your army had not been protected beyond the
point with which communications could have
been maintained, is evident from the events
which followed. What was there to mar success?
The commandant at Maiden needed only
an apology to surrender! What if the other
Hull had commanded? Every thing would have
fallen before him—great science was not necessary;
courage and faithfulness would have accomplished
every thing. A train of heavy artillery
was not required to batter a breach for the
assault; it was not necessary to fire a single
gun—not a cartridge need have been expended—the
bayonet alone was adequate to have taken
Maiden at any hour from the moment the American
army crossed into Canada, till its most
shameful retreat. The fort was not enclosed—one
entire side was open to assault. Yes, sir,
had the brave Hull, who bore your "thunder
on the mountain wave," directed the valor of
the army, he would have poured the storm of
victory resistless on the foe. This black deed,
without a battle, was consummated in the
solicitous surrender of the brave corps which
were hastening to his relief; these, too, were
arrested and thrown back on the community,
leaving the whole Western frontier exposed to
savage inroad. Hence all our misfortunes!
After this, will it be contended that the accidental
appointment of an improper agent shall
cause a refusal of the force necessary to drag our
drowned honor up from the ocean of infamy
into which it has been plunged? Impossible!
Economy of life and treasure call for a vigorous
campaign—away with lifeless expedients; miserable
inertness must be banished—zeal and
energy must be infused everywhere. One protracted
campaign will cost twenty-fold more
than the expenditure now asked for. Let this
be the signal for resolution—the first evidence
of energetic policy. Let us suppose ourselves
leading the forlorn hope, and assume the spirit
and vigor characteristic of such an enterprise—the
army will feel it—the people will feel
it—disaster and disgrace will then disappear.
It is to save the public treasure—the people's
blood; it is for the reclamation of character, I
ask for high bounties and premiums; and, so
asking, I hope not to be denied.
The question was then taken on filling the
several blanks in the first bill, and carried.
Mr. H. Clay congratulated the committee and
the nation on the system which had been presented
to their consideration, and the prospect
of prosecuting the next campaign with a vigor
which should insure a successful result. He
rose at this time, however, to propose an amendment
to the bill, the object of which was to repeal
so much of former laws as authorizes a
bounty of land to the recruits. He was satisfied
that, as respected the nation, this was a waste
of its capital, without producing a single provident
result. As to the recruiting service, he
was convinced, from what he had heard, that it
added scarcely any inducement to the recruit—that
it had not added a hundred men to the
army. He confessed he had been much mistaken
as to the effect it had been expected to
produce, &c. Mr. C. added many remarks
going to support his positions, stating, among
other things, that the land would in the end get
into the hands of speculators, and the individuals
for whose benefit it was intended would derive
no advantage from it. Now that it was
proposed to increase the bounty in money, he
thought it would be a proper occasion to repeal
so much of the existing laws as allowed a bounty
in land, on which the recruits set generally as
much value as if it were located in the moon.
Mr. C. concluded by making a motion to that
effect.
Mr. Troup and Mr. Bibb stated objections to
the motion, as going to withdraw what was certainly,
in many parts of the country, an inducement
to enlistments, at a time when every
means ought to be called into action for the
purpose of filling the ranks of the army.
Mr. Clay's motion was then agreed to by the
committee.
The other bill before the committee, going to
authorize the raising an additional force of
twenty thousand men for one year, was then
taken up, and the blanks therein severally filled.
Mr. Pitkin, adverting to the provision of the
bill which gives the appointment of officers below
the rank of colonel to the President alone,
inquired the reasons why, contrary to the general
usage, the Senate were precluded from concurrence
in these appointments?
Mr. Williams stated that the motive of the
committee in proposing this provision was, to
avoid the delay incidental to the minor appointments,
which could be much more easily and
effectually made by the colonels of the regiments,
respectively, who would be personally acquainted
with, and responsible for, the good conduct
of those who were appointed.
Mr. Tallmadge moved to strike out the section
of the bill which directs the manner in
which the company officers shall be appointed.
He said he had hoped that the committee would
have risen and given at least one day for consideration;
that they would have maturely
weighed and deliberately made up their minds
on this question. It is true that, in 1798, there
was a power given to the President of the United
States to appoint all officers for ten thousand
men under the rank of field officers; but
the appointment of all field officers was retained
to the President and Senate. Mr. T. said he
knew how perfectly easy it was to go on step
by step, and yield power till it all passed out of
our hands. The argument now is a plea of
urgency. What was the case in 1798? Not
the same as now. Congress had been making
preparations on the contingency of war. The
language of the law which has been referred to
is to this effect: in case of war being declared
by any foreign power, or the country actually
invaded, then the President shall have the
power of appointing these officers. Such a provision
was very different from that now proposed.
Mr. T. was also opposed to this section
in the bill, because he would not pass a bill
going, as far as in the power of this House, to
take away the power of appointment from the
Senate. It was a disrespect he would not offer
to them, to call upon them to ratify a law depriving
themselves of a power they have uniformly
possessed and exercised.
The question was taken on Mr. Tallmadge's
motion to strike out the section, and lost.
The committee rose and reported the two
bills and the House adjourned.
Additional Military Force.
The question was then taken on engrossment
of the bill for a third reading, and passed in the
affirmative—yeas 70, nays 37, as follows:
Yeas.—Willis Alston, jr., Stevenson Archer, Daniel
Avery, Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, William Barnett,
Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb, William Blackledge,
Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William
Butler, John C. Calhoun, Francis Carr, Langdon
Cheves, Matthew Clay, James Cochran, John Clopton,
William Crawford, Richard Cutts, Roger Davis,
Joseph Desha, Samuel Dinsmoor, Elias Earle, William
Findlay, James Fisk, Meshack Franklin, Charles
Goldsborough, Isaiah L. Green, Felix Grundy, Bolling
Hall, Obed Hall, John A. Harper, Aylett Hawes,
John M. Hyneman, Joseph Kent, William R. King,
Abner Lacock, Peter Little, Aaron Lyle, Nathaniel
Macon, Thomas Moore, William McCoy, Samuel
McKee, Samuel L. Mitchill, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony
New, Thomas Newton, Stephen Ormsby, Israel
Pickens, James Pleasants, jr., Benjamin Pond, William
M. Richardson, Thomas B. Robertson, John
Rhea, John Roane, Jonathan Roberts, Ebenezer Sage,
Thos. Sammons, John Sevier, Adam Seybert, George
Smith, John Taliaferro, Uri Tracy, George M. Troup,
Charles Turner, jr., Robert Whitehill, David R. Williams,
William Widgery, and Richard Wynn.
Nays.—John Baker, Abijah Bigelow, Harmanus
Bleecker, Adam Boyd, James Breckenridge, Elijah
Brigham, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin Chittenden,
John Davenport, jr., William Ely, James Emott,
Thos. R. Gold, Edwin Gray, Jacob Hufty, Richard
Jackson, jr., Lyman Law, Joseph, Lewis, jr., George
C. Maxwell, Archibald McBryde, Jonathan O. Mosely,
Thos. Newbold, Joseph Pearson, Timothy Pitkin,
jr., Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy, John Randolph,
William Reed, Henry M. Ridgely, William
Rodman, Daniel Sheffey, Richard Stanford, Lewis B.
Sturges, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge,
Laban Wheaton, Leonard White, and Thomas Wilson.
So the bill was ordered to be engrossed for a
third reading.
The House then proceeded to the consideration
of the report of the Committee of the
Whole on the other bill reported by the committee,
entitled "A bill in addition to the act to
raise an additional military force, and for other
purposes"—the first section of which is as follows:
Be it enacted, &c., That, in addition to the present
Military Establishment of the United States, there be
raised twenty regiments of infantry, to be enlisted for
the term of one year, unless sooner discharged.
[The remainder of the bill is mere detail; the
bounty on enlistment sixteen dollars.]
Mr. Gold said this was a bill involving questions
of great importance, as well in principle as
in its details. There was one feature especially
of the bill which required mature consideration;
he alluded to the limited period of service of the
proposed additional force. There was no pressing
emergency to hurry the bill; and he, therefore,
moved to postpone the further consideration
of it to Monday, which was negatived.
Death of Mr. Smilie.
So soon as this decision was declared—
Mr. Findlay rose.—It is my melancholy duty,
said he, to announce to this House that my venerable
colleague and old friend and associate,
John Smilie, is no more. He departed this life
at two o'clock this afternoon.
A committee was then appointed to superintend
the funeral of the deceased, consisting of
Messrs. Findlay, Lyle, Brown, Roberts, Davis,
Lacock, and Hyneman.
A resolution was unanimously adopted, requesting
each member of the House, in testimony
of their respect to the memory of John
Smilie, to wear crape on the left arm for one
month.
And, on motion of Mr. Fitch, the House then
adjourned.
On motion of Mr. Findlay,
Resolved, unanimously, That the members of
this House will attend the funeral of the late
John Smilie, this day, at two o'clock.
Resolved, That a message be sent to the Senate
to notify them of the death of John Smilie,
late a member of this House, and that his funeral
will take place at two o'clock, this day.
And then the House adjourned.
Additional Military Force.
The House resumed the consideration of the
report of the Committee of the Whole on the
bill in addition to the act for raising an additional
military force.
The amendments made by the House having
been agreed to, the question was stated, Shall
the bill be engrossed, and read a third time?
Mr. Mosely said that, in stating concisely
some of the reasons which would induce him to
vote against the present bill, he should not attempt
to enter into a consideration of the justice
or expediency of the war, nor the policy of
continuing it. War is declared, and it appears
to be the determination of those who have the
control of our public concerns to prosecute it
with the utmost vigor; yes, sir, with a vigor
that, within twelve months from the enlistment
of the twenty thousand men to be raised by this
bill, we are told must bring it to a successful
termination. Really, Mr. Speaker, when I listened
to the confident assurance of the honorable
Chairman of the Military Committee, that
with these twenty thousand men, in addition to
the troops already raised, and voted to be raised,
we should in a single campaign be able to conquer
Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick,
and that the object of all these conquests was to
procure an honorable peace, I almost felt myself
persuaded as a peace man to join the honorable
gentleman in his project of fighting for
peace one year, with such a certainty of obtaining
it at the expiration of that period; but
unfortunately I could not but recollect the fate
of similar assurances made on former occasions.
When we were about declaring war, I very well
remember that we were told with equal confidence
by gentlemen anxious to engage in it (and
who would listen to no arguments, even for delay,
against the measure) that we had only to
declare war, and Canada would, in the course
of a few months, at most, be ours; that the
militia alone, with the aid of a very few regulars,
would be competent to the conquest of the
whole country, except the fortress of Quebec;
and that that must very soon fall of course. An
honorable gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Fisk)
informed us that the people of those Provinces
would almost conquer themselves; that they
were at least pre-disposed to be conquered—to
use his own expression, that they were "panting"
to participate in our liberty.
Experience has now proved the fallacy of
these predictions. Gentlemen must now be
convinced that Canada is not to be conquered
quite so easily as they had imagined—that it is
not to be subdued with a few thousand militia,
regulars, or volunteers, though aided by proclamations.
I mention proclamations, because they
seem to be considered as an indispensable auxiliary
on all great emergencies. What can be done
by proclamation, I will readily concede we are
competent to do. No nation, I believe, ever
arrived at greater perfection in the art of proclamation-making
than we have done; and if
history is faithful to record them, we shall in
this particular at least bear the palm from all the
world.
Sir, it can afford pleasure to no man, who
feels as he ought for the honor and interest of
his country, to dwell unnecessarily upon the
disasters and disgrace which have everywhere
attended our military operations from the commencement
of the war to the present time. I
mean upon land; for to our little Navy too
much praise cannot be given. Our gallant seamen
have not only afforded to their countrymen
examples of valor worthy of imitation, but they
have also taught us a lesson of wisdom, by which
I am happy to find we have manifested a disposition
to profit. But, sir, while gentlemen must
feel mortified at the miserable termination of all
our boasted military exploits thus far, and might
wish to draw a veil over the disgraceful scenes
which have taken place, it cannot be done; it
would be unwise to attempt it. We ought
rather to look at the causes which have produced
our misfortunes, and pursue a course in
future which may not expose us to similar evils.
Mr. Gold said the annals of this Government,
the last six months, commencing with the declaration
of war, would be found the most interesting,
the most deplorable.
In that period, we have seen a war declared,
precipitately and prematurely; for, notwithstanding
all the arguments urged on that occasion,
with so much zeal and eloquence, time has
dissipated all; the illusion has vanished; your
army, so confidently expected, did not, under
the magic of that declaration, spring into existence;
the condition of your enlistments would
not, I apprehend, at this hour, justify the declaration
of war. We have seen, sir, that war conducted
in a manner well to comport with the
spirit in which it was declared; disaster upon disaster
in rapid succession have followed; the
tone and heart of the country broken; universal
disgust at the past, and deep concern and
anxiety for the future, prevail everywhere.
And what, Mr. Speaker, is now proposed for
the future—what is to retrieve our affairs—on
what are our hopes to rest? An army of twelve-months'
men! A broken reed! An army and
term of service, which well nigh lost the country
in the Revolutionary war; an army which
in every step and stage of that war received the
uniform and reiterated censure and condemnation
of Washington, and every intelligent officer
of that period; an army that stands recorded by
every historian of that war with deep reproach
and reprobation. Such is the foundation of our
future hopes; shutting our eyes upon the lessons
of experience, we live but to repeat former
errors and renew our sufferings. Shall we never
learn, that a soldier is not the creature of an
hour; that he must be seasoned to the hardships
of war; that to remove your recruit from his
fireside, from his plentiful board, and all the
comforts with which he is surrounded, to the
theatre of service, there to sleep on the ground
in tents, with two or three articles of subsistence
only, is to give him up a victim to disease, to
consign him to the grave? This precise result
is presented to the mind by the melancholy review
of the last campaign; disease and death
have walked abroad in our armies on the frontier;
they have been swept to the grave as by
the besom of destruction. It has not stopped
with your army; the frontier inhabitants, infected
by the diseases of the camp, fly from the
deadly theatre as from a destroying angel!
Shall we never learn the difference between our
situation, and that of nations who have a competent
military establishment, sufficient at all
times for both offensive and defensive operations?
The slender Military Establishment of the
United States, whilst it consults economy, and
favors the genius of the Government, forbids a
hasty resort to war, especially extra-territorial
and offensive war; time for preparation, after
the measure is resolved on, is indispensable; and
a disregard of our situation in this respect cannot
fail to induce defeat and disaster—to produce
such a campaign as has just now closed.
But, Mr. Speaker, wherefore change the term
of enlistment, from five years, or during the
war, to one year? The sole avowed object of
the war by land was the conquest of the
Canadas. Are you at this hour nearer your object
than on the day you declared war, or has
that object, with a steady and sure pace, constantly
receded from you as you have advanced
in the war? Is Canada so far conquered that
you can now reduce the term of enlistment? It
is impossible to shut our eyes on the past;
while all is disgust and despondency with our
own citizens—sick of the past, and concerned
for the future; while every post brings to the
Cabinet fearful and alarming changes in the
sentiments of the people under this ill-fated
war; your enemy, the Canadians, take courage,
their wavering sentiments have become resolved,
and union in defence of their firesides, the
land that gives them bread, is spreading and
cementing all in the patriotic vow.
There was a time, sir, when you had friends
in the Upper Province; there were many who
wished well to your arms, and would have
greeted your approach, but that ill-fated policy
which precipitated every thing, which in zeal for
the end overlooked the means, has blasted all
our hopes from that quarter. The Canadian,
while he knows your power, distrusts your wisdom
and your capacity to conduct the war; he
dares not commit himself, his all, to such auspices.
Hence, sir, difficulties thicken on every
side, and at least three times the force is now
necessary to effect the conquest, which would
have been required at the commencement of the
war. Have we made an impression on the
Prince Regent and his Ministry? are they now
more disposed to succumb and accept your
terms than before the war? How stand the
people of the British Empire? Instead of their
coercing the Government into our terms, which
we fondly anticipated, the late election to Parliament
shows them disposed to go hand in
hand with the Government in resisting our
claims and inflicting on us all the evils of war.
"Maritime Rights" are echoed and re-echoed
with applause throughout the Empire. Such,
sir, are the bitter fruits of your policy, and to
what farther point the same hand shall conduct
the destinies of the country, remains to be seen.
I seek not to aggravate the misconduct of the
war, nor to commend our enemies, but only
wish, sir, that we may see things as they are,
our actual situation, and thus look danger in
the face. Do you persevere in the conquest of
Canada? Pass not the barrier with an army of
less than forty-five or fifty thousand men: if
you do, in my apprehension, the defeats and
disasters of the past campaign will be visited
upon you; another army will be made to pass
under the yoke, and at the end of the year, you
will find yourself still further removed from
your object. The tug of war is now placed
fairly before us, we cannot advance without
meeting it. Such, Mr. Speaker, are the grounds
on which I object to this twelve-months' army;
it is not adapted to the professed object of the
war, the conquest of Canada. Is there, sir, any
other object in contemplation of the Government;
any other land of leeks and onions,
which Heaven has given us, or to which our
destinies lead? Is the South of easier access
than the North, and is the circle of hostility to
be extended to that quarter? We profess a
pacific policy; moderation and justice are our
boast; let us beware how we commit to the
hazard this high and enviable character; how
we yield, on specious grounds, to the mad and
destructive policy which we reprobate in others;
a policy which has in all periods overwhelmed
nations with calamity, and swelled the tide of
human misery.
I fear there are points in our neutral course,
in our relative conduct towards Great Britain
and France which will not bear examination.
You proclaimed the Berlin and Milan decrees
revoked, and put upon Great Britain the
threatened alternative of non-intercourse. Was
the fact so? You took a promise for the fact;
you proclaimed the fact, while France herself,
the author of the deed and party to be benefited,
denies and disowns it as done at the
time. Here was a fatal error, a departure from
the straight line of justice; and when our error
in this was palpable to all the world, we
gave no explanation, no excuse, but persevered
in a measure which led to war. It is this
course, sir, this departure from even-handed
neutrality between Great Britain and France,
that has lost you the support of your own citizens
to a great and alarming extent, and at this
moment sustains the British Ministry in the
hearts of Englishmen. It is this belief of our
Government's leaning to France, that has carried
that Ministry so triumphantly through the
late elections to Parliament.
If any thing could add to the gloom and
sicken the mind under the prospect before us, it
is the inauspicious conjunction of events. America
and France both making war at the same
time on Great Britain; we making the enemy
of France our enemy, and this at the ill-fated
moment when the all-grasping Emperor of that
country is rolling a baleful cloud, charged with
destruction, north upon the Russian Empire;
upon a power always just to America; upon
our truest and best friend in the European
theatre. Against such a friend, at such a period,
we have beheld the march of the Corsican
through rivers of blood; his footsteps are
traced over the ashes of the proudest cities, and
he sits himself down, at length, at Moscow, like
Marius over the ruins of Carthage.
The question was then taken on Mr. Clay's
motion, and negatived.
Mr. Macon moved to strike out one, and insert
five years as the term of enlistment. He
regretted as much as any one the disasters
which had befallen the country; and there was
but one way to obviate their effects, and that
was by rising superior to them, as a part of the
nation had already done—he meant the Western
country, where a patriotism had been exhibited
equal to that which might have distinguished
Rome in its best days. Their zeal was equal to
their bravery—and the only drawback on their
enterprise was the difficulty of finding something
to eat in the wilderness. We must rise
after reverses. What, sir, said Mr. M., would
have become of Rome, had she desponded when
Hannibal defeated her armies? She rose upon
it and became the mistress of the world. What
would have been the situation of our cause in
the Revolution, if, after the British successes in
Jersey, we had desponded? But the men of
Pennsylvania and New Jersey rose on it, and
victory and triumph followed. Our object now
ought to be to recover the ground we have
lost, and meet the enemy with troops that will
insure success. We are told, sir, this war has
united England to a man. Sir, I never expected
aid from our enemies. Let us follow so good
an example, and unite to a man; let us remember
the old Continental maxim—"United we
stand, divided we fall." If we were as united
in defence of our rights, as England is in her
usurpations, this war would not last a single
campaign—and I hope in this respect we shall,
at least, learn wisdom from an enemy. The
calculations about one or two campaigns, however,
in present circumstances, are visionary.
We have engaged an enemy not in the habit of
yielding very soon. But, if we were to unite,
the question would soon be settled. The cause
and object of this war has been more concisely
stated by one of those actively engaged in it,
than by any other person—I mean Captain Porter's
motto—"Free trade and sailors' rights;"
no man could have given a better definition of
it. It appears to me that one part of this continent
ought to be zealous for the rights of
seamen—another part for a free export trade;
and, if we were, as we ought to be, united, the
war would be carried on with energy and with
success. I agree with the gentleman from New
Jersey, that this thing is not to be done by
paper men. My opinion is, that the best thing
we can do, is to raise men for five years. Let
the Legislature of the country do its duty. If
the thirty-five thousand men, now authorized,
be not enough, let us get as many as will be
adequate to the end we propose. Gentlemen
have thought proper to review former transactions.
I would be willing to pass them over.
I believe almost every measure adopted by the
General Government would have had its destined
effect if adhered to. You have always
got the better of the argument; you have better
proclamations; but what avails all this?
Britain has impressed your seamen, and given
you blows for good words. You have been
heretofore told your paper measures were worth
nothing: now that it is proposed to give blow
for blow, what is said? That you are departing
from the pacific system, which the same persons
before reprobated, and to which they have
become friendly only after every attempt at
pacification has failed. Sir, we are now engaged
in war, and we must succeed or we must
yield the rights of sailors and free trade. Does
any man doubt that the war is justly undertaken?
Is there a man in the nation—I care
not of what political sect, many as there are—who
believes that the war is not undertaken
on just grounds—that we had not borne with
their indignities till we could have borne them
no longer? After plundering your property and
impressing your seamen on the ocean, their
agents have been sent into this nation to sow
divisions among us, who ought to be but one
family. What crime has been left undone?
what injury have we not suffered? Could one
be added to the catalogue? It seems to me
not. No man loves peace more than I do, and
if it had not been for Great Britain sending her
agents to our firesides, I do not know but I
should have voted against the war. It seemed
to me like an attempt on a man's daughter.
Not content with vexing and harassing you
whenever you went from home, they came
here to put strife into your family. You have
been told that the Prince Regent and his Ministers
are firm. Sir, we never calculated on
their receding, but on the energies and force of
the nation to obtain redress, and if we had been
united, we should have equalled our most sanguine
expectations. Let us follow their example,
and determine to maintain our national rights, as
they do to maintain their usurpations on them.
Mr. M. Clay seconded the motion of Mr.
Macon to strike out "one year" and insert
"five," as the term of enlistment. He said an
army ought to be seasoned before it was carried
into the field. We have heard much said, observed
he, about sickness in your army; much
of the sickness, some time ago, at New Orleans,
and much lately of the sickness at Plattsburg.
Have you ever heard of an army on earth that
was carried into the field before it had been
seasoned in the camp? It must, to be good for
any thing, be first disciplined in camp, and become
inured to the mode of living and the fare
of soldiers. It will take some time to season
men to the change in their mode of living
which must take place on going into camp.
It will take a year to prepare them for the
field. Without discipline they will be useless.
Your seamen are brave and successful
because they know what they go to sea for.
Take a landsman on board a ship, and what sort
of a sailor will he make? Such as the French
have on board their vessels. We take no man
into the Navy but who understands his business
and the purpose for which he goes there, and
we see the effects of it. I do not wish it understood,
sir, if I vote against the bill, that I am
opposed to the war. No, sir. It is a righteous
war, into which I go with hand and heart.
We may differ about the mode, but that is all.
I speak from experience more than from any
thing else. Let us raise a sufficient army to
serve during the war, be it long or short. It is
absurd to suppose that we shall not succeed in
our enterprise against the enemy's provinces.
We have the Canadas as much under our command
as she has the ocean; and the way to
conquer her on the ocean is to drive her from
the land. I am not for stopping at Quebec or
anywhere else; but I would take the whole
continent from them, and ask them no favors.
Her fleets cannot then rendezvous at Halifax as
now, and having no place of resort in the
North, cannot infest our coast as they have
lately done. It is as easy to conquer them on
the land as their whole navy could conquer ours
on the ocean. As to coping with them at sea,
we cannot do it. We can annoy them, but not
meet them on the open sea. I would meet
them and hurt them, however, where we can.
We must take the continent from them. I wish
never to see a peace till we do. God has given
us the power and the means; we are to blame
if we do not use them. If we get the continent,
she must allow us the freedom of the sea. I
hope, sir, the amendment of my friend from
North Carolina, going to make this army more
efficient, may be adopted.
Mr. Pleasants said, before the question was
taken, he wished to submit a few of the reasons
why he was opposed to the amendment. The
question before the House, if he correctly understood
it, was not, what were the best materials
of which to make an army; whether men for
the war, for five years, or for twelve months;
but the question was, what is the kind of force,
and for what length of time can you raise an
army to take the field at the earliest period? I
hesitate not a moment, Mr. P. said, to declare,
that if it were within the compass of our ability
to raise an army for five years by voting it, I
would authorize it. Not a moment should I
doubt on the subject. The history of the world
is strongly in favor of such an army. But we
perfectly know, from the progress of the recruiting
service, that we have already authorized as
many men of that description as we shall probably
be able to raise. This force is wanted to
render the next campaign efficient. I consider
the bill merely as a substitute for the volunteer
system heretofore pursued. Of what materials
will this army be composed? Of young men
ready to volunteer their services for one year
in the form of regulars; and in ninety-nine
cases out of a hundred, men will enlist in this
corps who would not enlist for five years, or
for the war. I am sanguine in the opinion,
that this measure, if now adopted, will do away
the defects of the present volunteer system, and
I am fully of opinion, that under it, a force
may be drawn into the field ready to act efficiently
in the next campaign. I am not one of
those, sir, notwithstanding the accounts we
have heard of our disasters, who despair of the
Republic. If we turn to history we shall find
that we have never engaged in any war in
which we have come out better in the first campaign
than we have in this. Look at the war
undertaken under the auspices of Gen. Washington
against the Indians. What was the history
of it? We all recollect the campaign under
Harmar, and its bloody scenes. The campaign
under St. Clair cannot be forgotten. We then
suffered defeat upon defeat, disaster upon disaster,
in the course of the war, which was not
terminated till the treaty of Greenville, in 1795,
though it may be said to have virtually terminated
by the defeat of the Indians by General
Wayne, which occurred previous to the treaty.
If this country be willing to go into the contest
heart and hand, we shall in a very short time
demonstrate to the enemy all we want to convince
her of, that it is in reality her interest to
be at peace with this country. I hope, sir, the
motion to amend the bill will not prevail. I am
perfectly convinced that the bill as it is will
enable us to call a valuable force into service,
and I am sanguine in the hope, that, with its
aid, together with the other force we shall have,
we may clear the continent of the enemy's dominion
in one campaign, though I do not undertake
to predict that we shall.
The question was then taken on Mr. Macon's
proposed amendment, and lost.
The question recurred on the passage of the
bill to a third reading.
Mr. Pearson said, not unfrequently it happens,
Mr. Speaker, both in private and political
life, that men of the clearest perceptions and
most correct motives, experience much difficulty
and embarrassment in determining on the
course best to be pursued, or the application of
means best calculated to produce a given object.
The object most devoutly wished for by myself,
and, no doubt, equally desired by every honest
and honorable man in this community, is, that
my country should once more be restored to
the enjoyment of peace. Under the pressure of
existing circumstances, involved in a war with
a powerful nation—a war now prosecuted for a
doubtful, or, at least, strongly controverted
question of national right—a war, the prosecution
of which, so far as relates to our military
operations, has everywhere, and on all occasions,
been attended with disgrace, defeat, or
disaster; under such circumstances, I confess,
sir, I am not free from embarrassment in determining
on the course demanded by genuine
patriotism, or best calculated to restore the
blessings of peace to the country. I rejoiced
to hear the honorable Chairman of the Military
Committee (Mr. D. R. Williams) declare, the
other day, that his object was also peace. It
must be a source of gratification to the country
to learn that some of the strongest advocates for
the declaration of war begin now to think and
talk of peace.
The honorable gentleman, however, urges
the passage of the bill under consideration,
(which authorizes the enlistment of twenty
thousand additional regular troops for one year;
and provides for the appointment of proportionally
an unusual number of officers, with
all the accompanying paraphernalia of an army,)
as the means best calculated to produce the end
in view. Did I believe, sir, that the passage of
this bill, or (what is more difficult and less
likely to happen) the actual enlistment of the
proposed additional force would secure to us
our object, I would not only consent to give this
force, but ten times the number, if it were by
force alone to be obtained; but when I reflect
on the special and sole cause for which it is
avowed the war is now prosecuted; when I
consider the relative strength, situation, and
disposable force, by sea and land, of the two
nations, and especially when my recollection is
assailed (for we cannot, nor ought we to close
our senses against such damning facts) with the
heretofore scanty enlistments; the confusion
and insubordination which has pervaded many
parts of your army; the extraordinary expense
already incurred, and the uniform disasters
which have marked all your military operations,
I cannot bring my mind to the belief that the
force now proposed can produce any desirable
effect.
Mr. Speaker: As much as I was opposed to
the declaration of war, and as much as subsequent
events have convinced me of the correctness
of the vote I gave on that momentous
question, it is not my purpose on this occasion
to question the policy of that unfortunate act.
My mind is bent on peace; to that object my
efforts are directed. The impression is strongly
fixed on my understanding, that this war can be
terminated with honor and advantage to this
nation, without the further effusion of human
blood. If so, surely no Christian will deny but
justice, humanity, and sound policy demand
that nothing should remain undone, on our
part, to stop this career of carnage and bloodshed.
I have said, sir, that it is my impression
that this war can be terminated with honor and
advantage to this nation, without a further appeal
to arms. In stating this opinion, I do not
mean to be understood as identifying the honor
of the nation with the honor of those by whom
the war was declared; or, in other words, I do
not admit that the national honor rests solely in
the hands of those who may happen to be in
the Administration, or who may happen to constitute
a majority in Congress. No, sir, this is
an elective Government—the power and ultimate
responsibility rest with the people; they
cannot be dishonored unless they pertinaciously
approve of unwise or wicked measures, and
continue to support the authors of such measures.
It is, therefore, not with me a primary
consideration, in the suggestions I am about to
make, how far the honor or reputation, for political
wisdom, of any individuals may be affected
by the adoption of the plan for peace
which has occurred to my mind. I do not
know that any honorable gentleman will be
affected by it, should it be adopted. I hope he
will not; to me it is perfectly indifferent who
are in power, so that the affairs of the nation
are well conducted.
Mr. Speaker: Whatever may have been the
original causes for the declaration of this war,
we are now taught to believe that the question
in contest is reduced to a single point. The
British Orders in Council were repealed on the
21st of June, three days after our declaration of
war; and, of course, without a knowledge of
that event, the blockade of May, 1806, had long
ceased to exist. The sole avowed cause, therefore,
remaining, and for which the war is now
carried on, is the practice of impressment from
on board our merchant vessels. This subject
has for many years engaged the attention of
both nations; it has been a fruitful theme of
execration and declamation for almost every
editor and orator of the age. Great as our
cause of complaint may have been, (and I am
not disposed to palliate it,) it must be admitted
by all who understand the nature and true
bearing of the question, that it had been subjected
to much exaggeration. Permit me, sir,
to remark, that notwithstanding the importance,
the difficulty, and delicacy which have
been justly attributed to this subject, and the
unwillingness at all times manifested on the
part of the British Government to abandon or
derogate from the abstract right of impressing
her own seamen from on board neutral merchant
vessels, it is very far from being certain
that she has not been willing to enter into such
arrangement with this Government, as would
place the question of impressment on a basis
both safe and honorable to this nation. By
a reference to the correspondence of Messrs.
Monroe and Pinkney with the British Commissioners,
which preceded the treaty concluded
by those gentlemen in the year 1806, but which
was unfortunately rejected by the then President,
it is evident that the interest of impressment
was, in the opinion of those gentlemen,
placed on a footing well calculated to secure
our own seamen from the abuse against which
we had complained, and against which it was
our duty to protect them. This opinion was
not only expressed in forcible and decisive language
at the time of entering into the arrangement,
but repeated by Mr. Monroe more than a
year after, in a formal letter to the Secretary
of State. The language of that gentleman, now
your Secretary of State, is peculiarly emphatic,
and must be within the recollection of every
gentleman in this House. Without troubling
the House with the reading of the documents
referred to, it is sufficient for me to state, that
your present Secretary of State did, in a letter
addressed to Mr. Madison, dated February 28,
1808, declare "that he always believed, and
did still believe, that the ground on which the
interest of impressment was placed by the paper
of the British Commissioners of the 8th of
November, 1806, and the explanations which
accompanied it, was both honorable and advantageous
to the United States."
Thus, sir, as we have conclusive evidence of
a disposition on the part of the British Government,
at one period at least, to advance considerable
length towards an adjustment of this
long-contested question; and as we have no
evidence that different principles and claims are
now asserted from those then advanced; I
think it fair to conclude, that it is still in our
power to put an end to this controversy with
safety to our seamen, and advantage to the nation.
Instead, then, of passing this bill, and
spending the blood and treasure of our countrymen
in the prosecution of this war, I conceive
it our duty to make an effort for the sanction
of our just rights, and the restoration of peace,
without a further appeal to force. It is my decided
opinion that such an effort, if fairly and
liberally made by this House, and the Executive
branch of the Government, would not fail
in producing the desired effect.
The peculiar nature of the question, which
now constitutes the sole object for continuing
the war; the intimation given by the Executive
in the correspondence with the British
Government, since the declaration of war, together
with the opinions stated by Mr. Monroe
and Mr. Pinkney, in their letter to the Secretary
of State of January 3, 1807, all tend to
confirm me in the belief, that it is the duty of
Congress to pass a law which would not only
check desertions from the British service, by
excluding persons of that description from employ
in our service, but also deprive the British
Government of the apology alleged for impressing
American seamen, by excluding British subjects
from the commercial and public service of
the United States. Having alluded to the letter
of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney of the 3d
of January, 1807, I will take the liberty of
reading from it a short extract. After stating
the opinion they had formerly expressed, that
although the British Government did not feel
itself at liberty to relinquish formally, by treaty,
its claim to search our merchant vessels for
British seamen, its practice would nevertheless
be essentially, if not completely, abandoned,
they observe: "That opinion has since been
confirmed by frequent conferences on the subject
with the British Commissioners, who have
repeatedly assured us that, in their judgment,
we were made as secure against the exercise
of their pretension by the policy which their
Government had adopted, in regard to that
very delicate and important question, as we
could have been made by treaty. It is proper
to observe, however, that the good effect of
this disposition, and its continuance, may depend,
in a great measure, on the means which
may be taken hereafter by the Congress to
check desertions from the British service. If the
treaty is ratified, and a perfect good understanding
is produced by it between the two
countries, it will be easy for their Governments,
by friendly communications, to state to each
other what they respectively desire, and in that
mode to arrange the business as satisfactorily
as it could be done by treaty."
Thus, sir, had the treaty of 1806 been ratified
and a good understanding been produced between
the two countries, Congress were warned,
even in that event, that it was their duty to
lend their aid in rendering effectual and perpetual
any arrangement which might be made
on this subject of impressment. As to the late
communications from the Executive department,
made to the British Government, since
the declaration of war, it is not my intention at
this time to enter into a particular examination
of their merit or demerit. I will barely remark,
that to me they present a novelty in the history
of war and diplomacy. Propositions, alleged
to be of a pacific nature, made in six days after
the declaration of war! Such a procedure
(much as I desire peace and much as I was opposed
to the war) is to my mind, to say the
least, extremely extraordinary, and its policy
incomprehensible. It is the more so from the
circumstance of a British Minister being on the
spot at the moment of declaring the war and
keeping up a continued correspondence with
the Secretary of State to the last moment of the
existence of peace. Under such circumstances
I should conceive each nation ought to have
known the ultimatum of the other and not
waited for the form of a declaration of war,
to resume the negotiation and give a new
shape to their proposition. I confess that I am
not surprised at the result of this war negotiation—every
thing was demanded to be yielded
by our enemy, for which the war was declared,
even as a preliminary in the first instance to an
armistice, and in the second instance as preliminary
to a negotiation. The equivalent offered
on our part was of a nature which it was
not within the province of the Executive to
confirm, and, of course, depended on what Congress
might or might not do on the subject. In
addition to this, our agent in London, through
whom those propositions were made, did not
possess regular and competent powers, and was
considered by the British Government as incompetent
to act with them on such a subject
on equal terms of obligation and responsibility.
Whatever, therefore, may be my opinion in relation
to those late propositions, and however
illy calculated they may have been to produce
any desirable result, I am far from considering
them unworthy the particular attention of this
House. I allude particularly to the equivalent
proposed as an inducement for the discontinuance
of the practice of impressment. Here, for
the first time in the whole history of the long-protracted
discussion on this subject, it is intimated
that something effectual will be done on
our part to prevent the cause of the abuse of
which we complain—a promise is given, in the
event of obtaining the concessions demanded,
that a law would be passed by Congress to prohibit
the employment of British seamen in the
public or commercial service of the United
States. This, then, is what I ask you now to
do—pass a law effectually to exclude all British
subjects from the public and private maritime
service of the United States; let the law be
well guarded against the possibility of violation
or evasion; and let us be determined rigidly to
enforce it; place this law in the hands of your
Executive; let him immediately appoint one or
more honest, able, independent commissioners;
men who neither have nor expect an office; men
in whom the nation, without regard to party,
would be willing to confide; give them ample
powers to form a treaty or arrange the sole
question which is now the pivot on which this
war depends. Do all this; do it faithfully, and
I venture to predict you will obtain a peace, and
secure your just rights more speedily, more effectually,
and more satisfactorily to the people
of this country, than by all the military operations
in the compass of your power.
Edward Hempstead, returned to serve as
the Delegate in this House from the Territory
of Missouri, appeared, produced his credentials,
was qualified, and took his seat.
Additional Military Force.
The House resumed the consideration of the
bill for raising for one year an additional military
force of twenty thousand men.
The question was stated on the engrossment
of the bill for a third reading.
Mr. Brigham.—Mr. Speaker, the bill under
consideration, if passed into a law, will deeply
affect my constituents and the public in general.
It provides for prosecuting this war on a
more extensive scale—it is a kind of second declaration
of war. The objects of conquest are
multiplied; the field of operation is enlarged;
the Army must be increased with the addition
of 20,000 regular troops; and enlistments encouraged
by additional bounty and wages. Sir,
this is the system of arrangement to prosecute
the scheme of foreign invasion. One error frequently
prepares the way for another; we are
now unhappily involved in the calamities of
war, and the question is, how we shall prosecute
and support it.
Mr. B. said he had been uniformly, and in
principle, opposed to this war, and of course
opposed to all the measures connected with it;
that, in his opinion, this war was both politically
and morally wrong; that it was declared
without suitable preparation, without necessity,
without an army, without adequate resources,
and without unanimity; it has been prosecuted
without success; we have also gained nothing
but loss, defeat, and disgrace; the people are
alarmed at the loss of their peace, distressed
with the fruits of the war, and have serious apprehensions
of what may be the future measures
of Congress on this subject.
Sir, continued Mr. B., this war is of an offensive
character; it is a war of conquest, totally
inconsistent with the spirit and genius of
our constitution, and, if prosecuted in the present
divided state of the country, I fear it may
be fatal to our most valuable institutions. Republics,
sir, ought never to be engaged in a
foreign, offensive war; they are calculated only
for defensive war.
Sir, there is something unaccountable, that
the disposition to prosecute this war should increase,
as the causes of the war decrease, and
the means and ability to carry it on lessen.
The war which we now have on hand is predicated
principally on the Orders in Council.
The impressment of seamen, during the last
session of Congress, was considered of minor
importance and as a proper subject of negotiation
between the two nations, and was so considered
in the days of General Washington, in
those of Mr. Jefferson, and why not now by
Mr. Madison?
Sir, the Orders in Council which interfered
with our neutral rights are revoked. The President,
in his Message at the commencement of
this session, declared the fact, and the war now
rests solely on the subject of impressment. I
do not believe that the prosecuting of this war
will have a tendency to bring about an amicable
and satisfactory adjustment on this subject,
and at the end of the war, if it ever ceases,
this question of impressment must be settled by
treaty.
Sir, at this time, and under these circumstances,
we are called on to augment our standing
army to the number of 55,000 regular troops,
to prosecute the war with vigor, and, as some
say, for glory.
Sir, if this system of warfare is carried into
effect, we shall unavoidably create an annual
expense of forty millions of dollars; and where
is your money to defray this expense? Why,
you must take it from the pockets of our constituents,
and from those who are opposed to
this war; and if you fail of obtaining the necessary
loans, you must stop payment; the nation
will become bankrupt, and future generations
will be loaded with an enormous debt.
Sir, can this be for the honor and interest of
the American people; can it be for the satisfaction
of our constituents; are they in love
with this war? Are they prepared to barter
away their property and their peace for the
hazards and fatigue of a foreign war, which
promises nothing but poverty and distress? It
is impossible. Sir, it is said that we are now
about to make one sublime military effort,
which shall do honor to this nation; that with
these troops we are to take, not only the Canadas,
but Halifax and Nova Scotia, and, for
aught I know, East Florida, follow up the Tippecanoe
expedition, and exterminate the Indians.
Mr. B. said that he never had known
the incipient cause nor by what authority General
Harrison made his incursion into the wilderness,
beyond where the United States had
extinguished the Indian titles, and destroyed
the Prophet's town, but said that he hoped the
time would come when he should know the
merits of that enterprise.
Mr. B. said if the friends of this bill and of
the war could accomplish their darling object,
subdue and take possession of the Canadas, and
all the other British provinces in North America,
in his opinion it would be a great public
misfortune—fatal to the civil liberties of the
country, and change the character of our Government.
Sir, said Mr. B., with these impressions I deprecate
the taking of the Canadas, or the other
British provinces, as I do the loss of liberty and
the ruin of this country. This war cannot be
perpetuated and prosecuted without violating
the laws of humanity and justice, the laws of
religion and morality—and these laws are to be
respected as well by nations as by individuals;
and we have not only reason to believe, but do
believe, that the God of Armies, who superintends
the concerns of men, will give success to
our arms, or blast our enterprise, according to
its moral character. If the Canadas are subdued
and conquered, it must be done by force
of arms; and what have the inhabitants of those
provinces been guilty of, which warrant this
Government in putting them to the sword?
Sir, they are now inoffensive, and quietly
pursuing their own business; they are content
under their own Administration; they are protected
by their own Government, and are not
panting for the liberties of this country, as was
vainly supposed the last season, nor do they ask
us to relieve them from the oppression of their
own Government, which General Hull, in his
tender mercy, promised them in his pompous
proclamation, on the condition that they would
revolt from their rightful Sovereign, and put
themselves under his gracious protection; nor
were they terrified by the threat of extermination,
if found fighting in their own defence by
the side of an Indian; nor were they to be seduced
from their allegiance by promises which
could not be performed. No, sir, nor do they
ask any favor but that you cease from troubling.
Sir, they will not submit, and they have
told you, by their actual resistance, that they
will defend themselves, their councils, their
firesides, their wives, and their children, their
rights and their property; and they are not to
be subdued but at the price of blood. And
where is your authority, where is your right
to go home, invade, and break into a foreign
territory, and there establish a slaughter-house
for the brave sons of America; there spill your
blood, and expend your treasure, destroy cities,
and demolish houses, plunder the inhabitants,
and waste the substance of the industrious and
the innocent? Sir, there is no right but a Napoleon
right, and that right is power, and not
that which reason approves.
Mr. B. said that the war was becoming more
and more unpopular in the Eastern States, especially
in the State which he had the honor to
represent; and they had, in their late elections,
come forth and declared it in a voice and language
which cannot be misunderstood. And
whether there will be a majority in the next
Congress in favor of this war was uncertain—he
hoped not.
Mr. Ridgely said he claimed the patience of
the House while he assigned the reasons that
would influence him to vote against the bill
now under consideration. He considered the
force contemplated to be raised by the bill as
unnecessary. The present Military Establishment
of the United States consisted of various
descriptions of troops; they were the regular
army, the rangers, the volunteers, and the militia.
The regular army was made up of the
Peace Establishment, authorized by the acts of
the 16th of March, 1802, and the 12th of April,
1808, containing about 10,000 men, including
officers, and of the "additional military force,"
which was directed to be raised by the act of
the 11th January, 1812; these different establishments
were incorporated by an act passed
on the 26th of June last; and the present regular
army of the United States, as authorized by
law, consisted of twenty-five regiments of infantry,
three regiments of artillery, two of light
dragoons, one of riflemen, and one of light artillery,
containing in all about thirty-six thousand
men, including company officers and privates;
of these the President might have not
exceeding fifteen thousand enlisted for eighteen
months, and the residue enlisted for five years,
unless sooner discharged. Of the rangers, there
were seven companies by the acts of 27th January,
and 1st July, 1812, and about four or five
hundred men. By the act of the 6th February
last, the President was authorized to accept of
any company or companies of volunteers, either
of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, who might
offer their services to the number of fifty thousand
men; their commissioned officers were to
be appointed in the manner prescribed by law
in the several States and Territories to which
they might respectively belong, and they could
only, according to the fair construction of this
act, be considered as militia, liable to be called
on to do military duty at any time within two
years after they were accepted by the President,
and bound to continue in service one year
after arriving at the place of rendezvous. By
the law of the 6th of July last, the President
was empowered to appoint and commission the
officers of the volunteers who had or should
offer their services, and to form them into battalions,
squadrons, &c., and they were thus converted
from militia into a species of regular
force. By the act of the 10th of April last, the
President was authorized to call on the several
States and Territories for their respective proportions
of a detachment of one hundred thousand
militia; and the call has been made, I
believe, on every State and Territory. The
present military force, then, of the United
States, as authorized by existing laws, consists
of upward of one hundred and eighty-six thousand
men, all of whom, when in service, are
subject to the rules and articles of war. Of
these, the militia can only be used in the prosecution
of this war for defensive purposes; the
regulars and the volunteers may be ordered to
act offensively against the enemy. They may
amount, as we have seen, to eighty-six thousand
men; and if Canada be as weak and badly defended
as gentlemen seem to suppose, and the
Administration should persist in their determination
to conquer it, they should, I think,
be satisfied with such a force to obtain an object
so easily attainable. But, sir, said Mr. R.,
our present Military Establishment is certainly
sufficient for all purposes of defence; and I wish
to see no land forces raised for any other purpose.
I have no hesitation in declaring that I
should lament to see Canada or any of the
British provinces on this continent in our possession,
or forming a part of the American Republic.
They will never be worth, to this nation,
in any point of view, the blood and treasure
that their acquisition will cost us. It has
been said by the honorable chairman of the
Committee on Military Affairs, that there are
now in Canada twelve thousand regular troops,
and that the militia amount to six thousand.
To any thing that gentleman should say, as
matter of fact within his own knowledge, I
should give the most implicit credit. But his
estimate of the militia of Canada must be too
low. His sources of information on this point
must have been incorrect. The population of
Canada (and when I speak of Canada, I mean
both Upper and Lower Canada) has been variously
stated, from three to five hundred thousand
souls; according to no account, I believe,
can it be less than three hundred thousand;
and, I presume, no gentleman on this floor will
say that estimate is too high. Take, then, the
population of Canada to be 300,000 souls; what
number of militia should this population furnish?
We will take the State of New Jersey
as a guide for our calculation; according to the
census of 1810, the population of that State is
245,255, and its militia, by the return for the
same year, 33,740, and the militia bears about
the same proportion to the population in the
States, generally, as it does in this State. If,
then, the militia of Jersey, with its population,
amounts to near thirty-four thousand, we may,
I think, without danger of contradiction, estimate
the militia of Canada (with a larger population)
at between thirty and forty thousand;
to these add the twelve thousand regular troops,
and, in all probability, before we can act offensively
against them in the Spring, the number
of these troops will be greatly increased, and
they may have an efficient force of about fifty
thousand men to oppose an invading army. It
ought to be recollected, also, that a generous
people, contending in their own defence, are
actuated by far different and more worthy motives
than an army of soldiers can be who attempt
their subjugation. The Canadians will
contend for their homes, their wives, their
children; for every thing that can or that
ought to be dear to the human heart. They
will be excited in such a cause to the boldest
deeds. Instead of traitors, we shall find them
true to their country and themselves, and able
and ready to exert all their energies in their
own defence. If we conquer them, it must be
by great exertions, and with immense loss. To
subdue a people acting under the impulse of
such considerations as will operate on them,
will require a force at least double to that
which they can oppose to us. But can any
man imagine that, if we invade the British
colonies, the war will be there? Will the pride
of Britain, powerful as she is at sea, and ready
at any moment to meet every emergency, permit
her tamely to look on and see her provinces
wrested from her, without exerting herself with
all her energies for their security? Will she
make no diversions in their favor? Will she
suffer us to carry the war into her territories,
and not retort upon us? Does an unprotected
seacoast of two thousand miles afford her no
opportunities of attacking us? Do our rich
and flourishing cities, exposed without defence
on the seaboard, to the cannon of her ships of
war, furnish her with no objects worthy her
attention? Will the city of New York, laid in
ashes, atone for the invasion of Canada; or,
will the acquisition of Canada compensate to
us for the loss of New York? Sir, said Mr. R.,
ten Canadas, ten times told, would not be worth
to this nation that single city.
But of what value would these provinces be
to us, if they could be easily acquired? Shall
we, by their conquest, obtain the objects for
which this war is waged? Shall we thereby
secure our commercial rights? Not at all, sir.
On the other hand, if the British Government
would offer them to us, it would be our true
policy to refuse to accept them. It is known
to everybody that the population of several of
the Eastern States is now full, and that great
numbers of their citizens are constantly emigrating.
The direction this emigration takes,
it is also well known, is South and West. This
surplus of population of the Eastern States settles
on the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi,
and carries with it its Eastern habits, and, if
you please, its Eastern prejudices. They become
connected and united with the people of
the South and West. This union and intercourse
will tend to render as the brothers of
one family the citizens of this extended Empire.
The prejudices of the South against the North,
and the North against the South, are weakened
daily and will be destroyed. The course this
emigration takes is just as it should be. The
currents flow from the extremities into the
centre of the country. The operation is most
beneficial to the nation, and tends constantly to
strengthen and cement the union of the States.
But if the British provinces should be conquered
and become incorporated into the Republic,
the direction of the emigration from the Northern
and Eastern States will be at once changed.
It will take a North instead of a South course.
It will go just where it ought not to go. The
strength of the nation, already too much scattered,
will be still more weakened by a further
expansion of its territory and population. The
Northern and Eastern States, at present possessing
more than their proper proportion of
wealth, population, and strength, and having
different habits, pursuits, and interests, from
the Middle and Southern States, will, by the
addition of these provinces, and the settlement
of their surplus of population in them, acquire
a weight and influence that this Union cannot
control. It will exist only at their pleasure,
and, in a few years, the destruction of this Government
and a separation of the States will be
the inevitable consequence.
Mr. Pitkin rose and said:—Before, Mr. Speaker,
we give our sanction to this bill; before we
agree to add so large a force to our present
army, making the whole number fifty-five thousand
men, is it not a duty we owe to ourselves
and to our constituents, seriously to inquire into
the policy, into the necessity of the measure, as
well as into the present state of our relations
with that nation against which we have declared
war? Almost at the very instant when
Congress declared war against Great Britain,
the Orders in Council, and the blockade of May,
1806, the most prominent causes of the war,
were removed. I have always, sir, considered
the Orders in Council as the greatest obstacle
to the restoration of harmony and free intercourse
between the two countries. Had this
obstacle been removed before the declaration
of war, no one can believe that the Executive
would have recommended, or that a majority
in either House of Congress would have adopted
a measure always fraught with evils in all
governments, and which, in a Government like
ours, ought never to be resorted to but in the
last extremity. I cannot believe that the President,
in that case, would have recommended it,
when, on the 26th of July, 1811, through the
Secretary of State, he informed the British
Minister that, on the revocation of the Orders
in Council, the non-importation law would be
removed, and, of consequence, commercial intercourse
would be restored between the two
nations. It would be strange, indeed, if the
President should, in one moment, restore a free
intercourse between the two countries, and, in
the next, recommend to Congress a declaration
of war, solely on account of another topic remaining
in dispute. And, in case such recommendation
had been made, if any confidence is
to be placed in the declared opinions of gentlemen,
many who voted for the war would not,
under such circumstances, have given it their
support. Unfortunately for the country, the
President did not embrace the opportunity,
presented by the repeal of the Orders in Council,
to remove the non-importation law, and
thereby smooth the way for a complete restoration
of harmony between Great Britain and the
United States. Sir, this would have been done,
and the remaining subject of dispute been left
in the same situation as before the declaration
of war, to be adjusted by amicable arrangements.
But, sir, as this was not done, it remains
for us, it remains for the people of the
United States, to determine whether they will
encounter all the evils, all the calamities of
war; whether they will sacrifice the fairest
prospects, and the best interests of this rising
country, on the point now in dispute with
Great Britain.
In the few remarks I shall submit to you, sir,
and to the House, it is not my intention to go
into the consideration of all the original avowed
causes of the war; but to confine myself to the
new aspect of affairs, presented to us since the
declaration of war by the removal of the Orders
in Council and blockades.
On the subject of impressments, for which
alone the war is now to be continued, what, let
me ask, is the principle for which our Government
contends? It is this, sir: that the flag of
the merchant vessel shall cover all who sail
under it; or, in other words, that our flag shall
protect all the foreigners our merchants may
think proper to employ in their service, whether
naturalized or not. Before we raise immense
armies, before we sacrifice any more of the
lives of American citizens, let us inquire—
1st. Whether the principle, if yielded to us
to-morrow, would benefit our native seamen, or
would promote the real permanent interests of
their country.
2d. Whether there is a probability of obtaining
a recognition of this principle by a continuance
of the war.
The foreigners employed in our service are
those who have not been naturalized, and those
who have taken the benefit of our naturalization
laws. The former constitute nearly the
whole: the latter class is very inconsiderable.
The foreigners of the first description, of course,
were in competition with our native seamen,
and either exclude them from employment, or
lessen the rate of their wages. In this way,
then, the employment of foreign seamen is an
injury to our native seamen; and, in a national
point of view, it may well be questioned, whether
their employment subserves the permanent and
solid interest of the country.
Is it not, sir, of the first importance to us, as
a commercial and maritime nation, especially
when it may be engaged in a war with a great
naval power, to be able to have a sufficient
number of native seamen employed in our service?
Seamen, who shall be attached by every
tie to this country, and on whom we can depend
for its defence in time of danger?
This, sir, it is presumed, cannot be denied.
If so, is it not the dictate of wisdom and of
sound policy for us to give encouragement to
our native seamen in preference to those of any
foreign country?
The situation in which we now are proves
the correctness, as well as the importance, of
the position. We are now at war with Great
Britain. And, at the very time when this war
was declared, thousands of British seamen who
had not been naturalized in this country, were,
and they still continue in our employment.
These seamen (I am speaking, sir, of those not
naturalized) are now claimed as British subjects,
and, indeed, by our own laws, are now
considered as alien enemies. Will gentlemen
suffer me to turn their attention to this last
fact?
By a law passed the 6th of July, 1798, it is
enacted, that "whenever there shall be a declared
war between the United States and any
foreign nation or Government, &c., all natives,
citizens, denizens, or subjects, of the hostile nation
or Government, being males of the age of
fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within
the United States, and not actually naturalized,
shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained,
secured, and removed, as alien enemies."
Ought we, sir, to depend upon these men to
man our fleets, or to defend our ports and harbors?
So far as foreigners of this description
are concerned, I do not hesitate to say that it
is not for the interest of this country that our
flag should protect them, and that I will never
consent to continue this war for the maintenance
of this principle on their account. It is
well known, sir, that not only Great Britain,
but that France, and all the nations of Europe,
claim a right to the services of all their subjects
in time of war. In the exercise of this right,
the history of Europe shows that, at the commencement
of almost all wars, proclamations
have been issued by the belligerent powers, recalling
their subjects to aid in the defence of
their respective countries. During the present
war in Europe, this has been done by Great
Britain, by France, and the other belligerent
powers. With respect to this claim of allegiance,
it is not my intention to enter into the
discussion whether, in the abstract, it is well or
ill founded. This would lead me too far, and
would tend to no practical good. I will, however,
observe, that it is a right, a claim, which
has been long exercised in Europe, and has
been sanctioned and acknowledged by the most
able and distinguished European writers on
public law.
With respect to foreigners, who have been
naturalized under our laws, the question is of
a more distinct nature, and presents greater
difficulties. We ought, undoubtedly, to fulfill
all our obligations towards them. What these
obligations are, and how far they extend, are
questions about which a diversity of sentiment
may prevail.—While they remain within our
territories, and within our exclusive jurisdiction,
they are shielded by the general principle, that
all within our dominion and exclusive jurisdiction,
are, of course, protected against all claims
whatever, and never to be molested in any way
without our consent. But, sir, when they go
without our territories, and beyond our exclusive
jurisdiction, and come within the sphere of the
claim of their former Government, the opinion
of the best writers on public law seems to be,
that the obligation of the country, under whose
laws they have been naturalized, does not extend
to guaranty them against such claims,
unless their allegiance was changed with the
consent of their former Government. But, sir,
whatever speculative opinions may be entertained
on this subject, the number of naturalized
seamen is so small, that few, if any, can
be of opinion that we ought to have declared
war, or that we ought to continue it on their
account alone. The whole number of seamen
naturalized from 1796 to 1810, as appears by
the returns made to the Department of State,
is 1,332. This includes those of all nations.
What proportion of these were British, or how
many of them are now in our service, it is impossible
to determine. I presume, however, the
number of naturalized British seamen now in
our employ does not exceed two or three hundred.
Shall we, sir, continue the war for these
men?
I am aware, sir, that with respect to impressment
from our merchant vessels, abuses have
happened, that although the right of taking
American citizens is not claimed, the British
commanders have not been scrupulous whether
they took British subjects or American citizens.
Sir, these abuses I never can, and I never will
justify. I am satisfied, however, that they
have been exaggerated.
But, sir, let me ask, if we have not really
intended to protect foreign seamen under our
flag, if we have not been guilty of gross negligence,
to say the least of it, towards our native
seamen? whether, by our laws, and the practice
under them, we have afforded them all that
protection and security to which they are
entitled?
In 1796, Congress passed an act for the relief
and protection of American seamen. By this
act, the collectors of the several ports were
directed, on application, to enter the names of
seamen, being citizens of the United States, to
grant them certificates, in a form given in the
act. In this certificate, the collector is to describe
the person of the applicant: also, to
declare that, on proof produced to him agreeable
to the act, the seaman is a citizen of the
United States of America.
It is not a little singular that, although the
proof of citizenship to be produced to the collector
must be agreeable to the directions of the
act, the act itself nowhere directs what that
proof must be. Every collector, therefore, has,
under this act, used his own discretion, or has
pursued such directions as he may have received
from the Government as to the kind of proof.
What, sir, has been the practice under this law?
Have those certificates, or protections, as they
are commonly called, been confined to bona fide
American citizens? No, sir; we cannot, we
ought not, to shut our eyes against facts too
notorious to be concealed or denied. Under
this act, made expressly for the protection of
American seamen, every foreign seaman, almost,
at the moment of setting his feet on our shores,
has obtained a certificate from some collector,
that he is a citizen of the United States; and,
with this certificate in his pocket, although
perhaps a deserter from his own Government,
he enters a public or private vessel, as an American
seaman. The mode of obtaining proof
of citizenship is well understood. Among
other modes, some of which are too disgraceful
to be mentioned in this place, those foreign
seamen will go before a magistrate, and, although
hardly able to speak the English language
intelligibly, will swear, for each other,
that they were born within the United States,
and are American citizens. On such proof, a
proof of this sort, the collector issues his certificate.
It will be recollected, sir, that this subject was
brought before this House during the last session,
in a case from Philadelphia, when a certificate
of this kind was obtained by the most
flagrant and avowed act of perjury on the part
of a foreigner who had just arrived in this
country. It was found, on inquiry, that there
was no law, either of Pennsylvania or of the
United States, to punish the man for this act of
false swearing. Not only have these protections
been thus obtained by fraud and perjury,
but they have also, long since, been an object
of barter; they have been bought and sold,
and transferred from one to another, not only
in this country, but in foreign countries.
To show the extent of this traffic in seamen's
protections, permit me to state some facts, of
which I have no doubt, knowing the source
from whence I have derived them. An American
captain having a ship in Bristol, in England,
without a crew, he applied to a man who kept
a boarding-house for sailors, to procure a crew
of American sailors in port; he showed him
a great number of American protections, which
he agreed to sell him for two guineas each,
and with the aid of these to procure him a crew.
By high wages, and by suiting these protections
to the description of British sailors, he procured
this captain his ship's crew; not only so, but
when the ship was about to sail, and it was
doubtful whether those who had engaged for the
voyage would actually go on board, this man
actually procured some of a press gang to take
them as American sailors, who had deserted
from their ships, and put them on board. When
we ourselves place no confidence in these certificates,
when we know that they are thus
obtained by fraud and perjury, can we expect
that foreign nations will give credit to them?
Instead of being a shield and protection to the
real American sailor, they have become a dangerous
weapon of offence.
If, sir, it is not for the permanent interest of
the United States to employ so many transient
foreign seamen, we ought long since, not only to
have refused these false protections, but to have
passed laws for the encouragement of our native
seamen, similar to those which have been adopted
in commercial countries, and are commonly
called navigation acts. This would, in some
measure, have relieved us from the evils which
we now experience, in consequence of the employment
of so many foreign seamen.
Additional Military Force.
The House resumed the order of the day on
the bill for raising an additional military force
of 20,000 men for one year, the question being
on the passage of the bill to a third reading.
Mr. Boyd.—Mr. Speaker: It is with great
diffidence that I address the Chair. When the
bill now before the House was under discussion
on Saturday last; that is, the then proposed
amendment to insert eighteen months,
instead of one year, I was offering my reasons
why I thought that that amendment ought to
prevail; when, unfortunately for me, I was
considered as taking too great a latitude, and
prevented from connecting my remarks. As
there is little difference, in point of principle,
as the bill then was and now is, I embrace this
opportunity to make up that deficiency, and
will now take care to stick as close as possible
to the text.
Sir, I am opposed to passing the bill to a third
reading, because I believe it to be altogether inadequate
to the purpose intended to be accomplished
by it. Sir, when I last addressed the
Chair, I then took a retrospective view of our
past expectations, plans, and propositions, from
which we expected to derive great advantages.
Such were the expectations of that time, that I
did not accord with them. Those expectations
have not been realized; but, instead thereof,
we have met with disappointments and misfortunes.
I thought that viewing the errors of
the past was the most certain way to avoid the
future; and I am not at this time sensible of
that being erroneous.
Mr. Speaker, I am an old man, and not in the
habit of public speaking; and if I have not the
faculty of composing my arguments in so connected
a form as a lawyer's special pleadings, I
hope the House will excuse me, and grant me
their indulgence to do it in such form as my
capacity will admit of.
[The Speaker observed that it was unpleasant
to the Chair that the gentleman should indulge
in such remarks; he had certainly no
wish not to give full latitude to debate. Mr. B.
said he stood corrected, and was allowed to
proceed.]
Then, Mr. Speaker, I object, because, in my
opinion, it is not calculated to produce the desired
effect, or that which is intended by it:
that is, to raise a force competent to the conquest
of the Canadas in the given time. I will
ask how many regiments you have in your present
establishment? Say thirty-five, and you
add twenty, making together fifty-five: what
use is there in multiplying regiments without
men? The Chairman did state that from prudential
motives, he had thought it inexpedient
to give the number now actually in service, or
enlisted by the present establishment. Sir, it
is not my wish to go into a strict inquiry; the
regard I have for the honor of my country
forbids me; but I will suppose seventeen thousand,
and, I believe, that is large; then there is
left officers for eighteen thousand men. Are
these not sufficient for the recruiting service?
to engage every man who is willing to serve his
country? to place a recruiting officer in almost
every town and village in the United States?
They are; and, therefore, you ought not to
create an unnecessary addition. If the present
establishment is not full, what is the reason?
Either that the pay and bounty are not sufficient
inducements, or there is a dislike to the
service; your creating more regiments will not
remove that difficulty. I am against the bill,
because the term of service is too short to
answer any valuable purpose. Suppose them
intended to operate as a force against Canada.
Let us see how that will answer the purpose:
You send out your warrants to commence the
enlistment of the proposed troops at this time;
how long a time, is it contemplated, will be
necessary for their enlistment? My opinion is,
that you will not have them half full in four
months; it is then time to take the field, and
they are then raw troops. The honorable
Chairman (Mr. D. R. Williams) states to you
the number of troops necessary for defensive
operations, according to his calculation, to be
ten thousand; deducting that number from the
present establishment, supposing it to be full.
It is not for me to say how far the present
establishment is short of the whole number, or
will be at that time; but we know that it is far
short; we do not know that it can be filled, and
if it cannot, then those calculations are fictitious.
He also states to you that the regular force in
the Canadas is not to be estimated at less than
twelve thousand, and three thousand in Halifax,
besides their militia. According to this, and
my views, you cannot enter Canada the next
campaign with man for man; and surely that
is not sufficient for conquest in an enemy's
country. But I will suppose that you conquer
a part of the country; that part must be garrisoned
if you will keep it. In a year from the
time of enlistment their term expires, and what
becomes of your conquest, without force to
keep it, supposing it to be made? Say that the
officers will be called into service in four months,
and there is some of the men enlisted six or
eight months hence; the officers must serve
until the expiration of the term of the last man
engaged, or a derangement must take place—always
a disagreeable occurrence in an army.
Sir, if you have not numbers sufficient to
bear down all opposition, invade it not: act on
the defensive until you have engaged your men,
and for a term of time sufficient to answer your
purpose; then may you count upon success and
honor. I do not say that I believe land conquests
will produce an acknowledgment of our
rights on the ocean. I believe it will not; but
unless you act with great regularity, system,
and economy, you cannot avoid it; you must
meet with nothing but disappointments and
disgrace.
Mr. Law said as he was originally opposed
to the war, and the preparatory steps which led
to it, he could not admit the principle, that because
war was declared he was bound to acquiesce,
and lend his aid to promote every plan
for prosecuting the war which might be proposed,
however wild and extravagant the same
might appear. He said he felt it a duty, and he
claimed it as a right, (although he was not ambitious
very often to exercise the right,) to offer
objections to any measures which might be introduced,
if he supposed they were not calculated
to produce the effect intended, although
he might not be in favor of the object itself;
or if he believed the measure proposed would
be productive of real evil. Now, sir, on this
important occasion it would be wise for a moment
to look back, and if we can bear the pain
of retrospection, consider what this nation once
was, what it might be, and what it in fact is.
Time was, and that within the recollection of
us all, when industry, commerce, prosperity,
and peace, gladdened the hearts of this once
happy people, and the use of arms was known
only as a pacific pastime. The nation, like some
individuals, could not bear the intoxicating influence
of prosperity. It might have preserved
its enviable condition, but it labored and groaned
under the weight of national blessings; it
submitted to regard the sinister views and
malign influence of foreign powers; it listened—fatally
listened—to a serpent more fell than
the serpent of old. And now how sad is the
reverse, let a dejected and impoverished nation
answer; in the past, we see departed comforts;
before us, we behold ruin and distress. The
unhappy crisis to which we have arrived has
been progressive. Had the transition been sudden,
the nation would have been driven to desperation.
We have been often admonished by
those who foresaw the present evils; and had we
been wise, might have avoided the calamities
in which the country is now involved, and from
which there is at present no prospect of speedy
relief.
Sir, we will no longer dwell on times past;
we will now briefly notice the causes which
were alleged in the manifestoes which immediately
preceded the declaration of war, and
what was said to be the object, and attempt to
show that the bill now under consideration is
unnecessary for the attainment of the original
object; that it will be injurious to the militia,
and may endanger the liberties of the
country.
As to the causes of the war, without admitting
or denying their justice on national principles
to justify the act at the time it was declared,
he might say that some of the pretended
causes have never been seriously relied on by
our own Government. The principal one has
been wholly removed; and but one of the ingenious
catalogue now remains, and that might
easily be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of
both nations. And, sir, it ought not to be forgotten,
that the act declaring war was carried
with great labor and much reluctance; and
such was the majority in each branch of Congress
that it might well have justified a doubt
as to the expediency when it did pass. Besides,
a large proportion of the United States
were then, and even since have been opposed
to the act. And this opposition was not confined
to those who have been slanderously reported
to be in the interest of Great Britain.
The disgust and abhorrence was felt by some
of the best patriots and purest bosoms in the
country. Experience has also proved that the
public sentiment was against the war; witness
the feeble ranks of your volunteers, the slow
and reluctant march of the militia, and the
tardy progress in the recruiting service. Sir,
the disgrace and disasters which have hitherto
attended the army, have resulted more from a
want of confidence in the justice and propriety
of the war, than from the lack of talents in
those who have conducted the battles, incompetent
as they have been represented to command.
A nation like this cannot be driven to
war. They must feel the justice and necessity
of it, and the justice must be so strong as to
pierce every heart. This would be felt in a
necessary and defensive war; then, indeed, the
nation would smite with one arm. Before such
a people, roused in such a cause, the veteran
legions of Napoleon would be compelled to bite
the dust. Such, alas! is not our case. We
have a war, without the spirit or unanimity
which springs from these causes, and without
the pecuniary means of supporting it. Such a
war must be disastrous! On what, sir, is the
honor of this nation now suspended? On the
Navy! that little navy which was despised,
neglected, and forgotten, until it fought itself
into notice, and rescued the sinking honor of
the country.
What, sir, was the avowed object of this
war? It has ever been said that conquest,
with a view of extending our territory, and enlarging
our dominion, was not the wish of this
Government. The idea of this Republic following
the footsteps of foreign ambitious nations,
was so repugnant to the genius of the
American people, and the constitution under
which we live, that few, if any, of the warmest
advocates of the war dare avow it.
The pretence was to take, or rather to receive
Canada; for it was vainly supposed the
inhabitants of that province would readily join
our standard, on the first invitation. But we
must go through the form of conquest to protect
them from the charge of treason to their
own Government. We were to hold Canada
until peace should return, and then it was to
be delivered up in exchange for maritime rights.
And this it was supposed would be a powerful
weapon in our hands in the negotiation. With
this view the bills augmenting the Army, raising
the volunteers, and transferring the militia,
passed. By the present bill, and the project
connected with it, the original plan is abandoned
with the volunteers and militia, and we are
now presented with a compound system of
conquest, extermination, and defence. It would
seem with the force of fifty-five thousand
regular troops, we are to conquer all the residue
of North America; exterminate every
tawny infidel this side of the Isthmus of Darien,
and defend a seacoast many hundred miles
in extent from the incursions of the enemy!
This is truly a gigantic project. He said he
could not give it his aid; and he thought some
honorable gentlemen who voted for the war
would, when they reflected on the magnitude
of the scheme now presented, seize this occasion
to retire, unwilling to entail on themselves
and posterity the expense and ruin which would
flow from the project, if carried into execution.
Mr. Quincy.—Mr. Speaker, I fear that the
state of my health may prevent my doing justice
to my sentiments concerning this bill. I
will, however, make the attempt though I
should fail in it.
The bill proposes that 20,000 men should be
added to the existing Military Establishment.
This, at present, consists of 35,000 men. So
that the effect of this bill is to place, at the disposal
of the Executive, an army of 55,000. It
is not pretended that this addition is wanted
either for defence or for the relief of the Indian
frontier. On the contrary, it is expressly acknowledged
that the present establishment is
sufficient for both of those objects. But the
purpose for which these 20,000 men are demanded
is, the invasion of Canada. This is
unequivocally avowed by the chairman of the
Committee of Military Affairs, (Mr. D. R. Williams,)
the organ, as is admitted, of the will
and the wishes of the American Cabinet.
The bill, therefore, brings, necessarily, into
deliberation, the conquest of Canada, either as
an object, in itself desirable, or consequentially
advantageous, by its effect, in producing an
early and honorable peace.[31]
Before I enter upon the discussion of those
topics, which naturally arise from this state of
the subject, I will ask your indulgence, for one
moment, while I make a few remarks upon this
intention of the American Cabinet thus unequivocally
avowed. I am induced to this from
the knowledge, which I have, that this design
is not deemed to be serious by some men of
both political parties; as well within this House
as out of it. I know that some of the friends
of the present Administration do consider the
proposition as a mere feint, made for the purpose
of putting a good face upon things, and of
strengthening the hope of a successful negotiation,
by exciting the apprehensions of the British
Cabinet for the fate of their colonies. I
know, also, that some of those who are opposed
in political sentiment to the men who are now
at the head of affairs, laugh at these schemes
of invasion; and deem them hardly worth controversy,
on account of their opinion of the
imbecility of the American Cabinet, and the
embarrassment of its resources.
I am anxious that no doubt should exist upon
this subject either in the House or in the nation.
Whosoever considers the object of this bill to be
any other than that which has been avowed, is
mistaken. Whosoever believes this bill to be a
means of peace, or any thing else than an instrument
of vigorous and long-protracted war,
is grievously deceived. And whoever acts
under such mistake, or such deception, will have
to lament one of the grossest, and perhaps one
of the most critical errors of his political life.
I warn, therefore, my political opponents; those
honest men, of whom I know there are some,
who, paying only a general attention to the
course of public affairs, submit the guidance of
their opinions to the men who stand at the helm,
not to vote for this bill under any belief that its
object is to aid negotiation for peace. Let such
gentlemen recur to their past experience on
similar occasions. They will find that it has been
always the case, whenever any obnoxious measure
is about to be passed, that its passage is assisted
by the aid of some such collateral suggestions.
No sooner do the Cabinet perceive
that any potion, which they intend to administer,
is loathed by a considerable part of the
majority, and that their apprehensions are alive
lest it should have a scouring effect upon their
popularity, than certain under-operators are
set to work, whose business it is to amuse the
minds, and beguile the attention of the patients
while the dose is swallowing. The language
always is: "Trust the Cabinet doctors. The
medicine will not operate as you imagine, but
quite another way." After this manner the
fears of the men are allayed, and the purposes of
the Administration are attained under suggestions
very different from the true motives.
Thus, the embargo, which has since been unequivocally
acknowledged to have been intended
to coerce Great Britain, was adopted, as the
Executive asserted, "to save our essential resources."
So, also, when the present war was
declared against Great Britain, members of the
House were known to state that they voted
for it under the suggestion that it would not be
a war of ten days: that it was known that Mr.
Foster had instructions to make definitive arrangements,
in his pocket; and that the United
States had only to advance to the point of war,
and the whole business would be settled. And
now an army, which, in point of numbers,
Cromwell might envy, greater than that with
which Cæsar passed the Rubicon, is to be helped
through a reluctant Congress, under the suggestion
of its being only a parade force, to make
negotiation successful; that it is the incipient
state of a project for a grand pacification!
I warn also my political friends. These gentlemen
are apt to place great reliance on their
own intelligence and sagacity. Some of these
will tell you that the invasion of Canada is impossible.
They ask where are the men—where
is the money to be obtained? And they talk
very wisely concerning common sense and common
prudence, and will show, with much learning,
how this attempt is an offence against both
the one and the other. But, sir, it has been my
lot to be an observer of the character and conduct
of the men now in power for these eight
years past. And I state, without hesitation, that
no scheme ever was, or ever will be, rejected by
them, merely on account of its running counter
to the ordinary dictates of common sense and
common prudence. On the contrary, on that
very account, I believe it more likely to be both
suggested and adopted by them. And, what
may appear a paradox, for that very reason, the
chance is rather increased that it will be successful.
I could illustrate this position twenty ways.
I shall content myself with remarking only upon
two instances, and those recent; the present
war, and the late invasion of Canada. When
war against Great Britain was proposed at the
last session, there were thousands in these
United States, and I confess to you I was myself
among the number, who believed not one word
of the matter. I put my trust in the old fashioned
notions of common sense, and common
prudence. That a people, which had been more
than twenty years at peace, should enter upon
hostilities against a people which had been
twenty years at war; that a nation, whose
army and navy were little more than nominal,
should engage in a war with a nation possessing
one of the best appointed armies and the most
powerful marine on the globe; that a country,
to which neutrality had been a perpetual harvest,
should throw that great blessing away for
a controversy in which nothing was to be gained,
and every thing valuable put in jeopardy;
from these, and innumerable like considerations,
the idea seemed so absurd that I never once entertained
it as possible. And now, after war
has been declared, the whole affair seems so extraordinary
and so utterly irreconcilable to any
previous suggestions of wisdom and duty, that I
know not what to make of it or how to believe
it. Even at this moment my mind is very much
in the state of certain Pennsylvania Germans,
of whom I have heard it asserted that they are
taught to believe, by their political leaders, and
do at this moment consider the allegation,
that war is at present existing between the
United States and Great Britain, to be a
"federal falsehood."
It was just so with respect to the invasion of
Canada. I heard of it last June. I laughed at
the idea, as did multitudes of others, as an attempt
too absurd for serious examination. I
was in this case again beset by common sense
and common prudence. That the United States
should precipitate itself upon the unoffending
people of that neighboring colony, unmindful of
all previously subsisting amities, because the
parent State, three thousand miles distant, had
violated some of our commercial rights; that
we should march inland, to defend our ships,
and seamen; that with raw troops, hastily collected,
miserably appointed, and destitute of
discipline, we should invade a country defended
by veteran forces, at least equal, in point of
numbers, to the invading army; that bounty
should be offered and proclamations issued, inviting
the subjects of a foreign power to treason
and rebellion, under the influences of a quarter
of the country upon which a retort of the same
nature was so obvious, so easy, and, in its consequences,
so awful; in every aspect, the design
seemed so fraught with danger and disgrace,
that it appeared absolutely impossible that it
should be seriously entertained. Those, however,
who reasoned after this manner were, as
the event proved, mistaken. The war was declared.
Canada was invaded. We were in haste
to plunge into these great difficulties, and we
have now reason, as well as leisure enough, for
regret and repentance.
The great mistake of all those, who reasoned
concerning the war and the invasion of Canada,
and concluded that it was impossible that either
should be seriously intended, resulted from this,
that they never took into consideration the connection
of both those events with the great election
for the Chief Magistracy which was then
pending. It never was sufficiently considered
by them, that plunging into war with Great
Britain was among the conditions on which the
support for the Presidency was made dependent.
They did not understand, that an invasion
of Canada was to be in truth only a mode of
carrying on an electioneering campaign. But
since events have explained political purposes,
there is no difficulty in seeing the connections between
projects and interests. It is now apparent
to the most mole-sighted how a nation
may be disgraced, and yet a Cabinet attain its
desired honors. All is clear. A country may
be ruined, in making an Administration happy.
I said, Mr. Speaker, that such strange schemes,
apparently irreconcilable to common sense and
common prudence, were, on that very account,
more likely to be successful. Sir, there is an audacity,
which sometimes stands men instead
both of genius and strength. And most assuredly,
he is most likely to perform that which
no man ever did before, and will never be likely
to do again, who has the boldness to undertake
that which no man ever thought of attempting
in time past, and no man will ever think
of attempting in time future. I would not,
however, be understood as intimating that this
Cabinet project of invasion is impracticable,
either as it respects the collection of means and
instruments, or in the ultimate result. On the
contrary, sir, I deem both very feasible. Men
may be obtained. For if forty dollars bounty
cannot obtain them, a hundred dollars bounty
may, and the intention is explicitly avowed not
to suffer the attainment of the desired army to
be prevented by any vulgar notions of economy.
Money may be obtained. What by means of
the increased popularity derived from the augmentation
of the navy, what by opening subscription
offices in the interior of the country,
what by large premiums, the cupidity of the
moneyed interest may be tempted beyond the
point of patriotic resistance, and all the attained
means being diverted to the use of the army,
pecuniary resources may be obtained, ample at
least for the first year. And, sir, let an army
of thirty thousand men be collected, let them
be put under the command of a popular leader,
let them be officered to suit his purposes, let
them be flushed with victories, and see the
fascinating career of military glory opening upon
them, and they will not thereafter ever be deficient
in resources. If they cannot obtain
their pay by your votes, they will collect it by
their own bayonets; and they will not rigidly
observe any air-lines or water-lines in enforcing
their necessary levies; nor be stayed by
abstract speculation concerning right, or learned
constitutional difficulties.
I will now proceed to discuss those topics
which naturally arise out of the bill under consideration,
and examine the proposed invasion
of Canada, at three different points of view.
1. As a means of carrying on the subsisting
war.
2. As a means of obtaining an early and honorable
peace.
3. As a means of advancing the personal and
local projects of ambition of the members of
the American Cabinet.
Concerning the invasion of Canada, as a
means of carrying on the subsisting war, it is
my duty to speak plainly and decidedly, not
only because I herein express my own opinions
upon the subject, but, as I conscientiously
believe, the sentiments also of a very great
majority of that whole section of country in
which I have the happiness to reside. I say
then, sir, that I consider the invasion of Canada
as a means of carrying on this war, as cruel,
wanton, senseless, and wicked.
You will easily understand, Mr. Speaker, by
this very statement of opinion, that I am not
one of that class of politicians which has for so
many years predominated in the world, on
both sides of the Atlantic. You will readily
believe, that I am not one of those who worship
in that temple, where Condorcet is the High
Priest and Machiavel the God. With such politicians
the end always sanctifies the means; the
least possible good to themselves perfectly justifies,
according to their creed, the inflicting the
greatest possible evil upon others. In the judgment
of such men, if a corrupt ministry at three
thousand miles distance shall have done them
an injury, it is an ample cause to visit with desolation
a peaceable and unoffending race of men,
their neighbors, who happen to be associated
with that ministry by ties of mere political dependence.
What though these colonies be so
remote from the sphere of the questions in controversy,
that their ruin or prosperity could
have no possible influence upon the result?
What though their cities offer no plunder?
What though their conquest can yield no glory?
In their ruin there is revenge. And revenge to
such politicians is the sweetest of all morsels.
With such men, neither I nor the people of that
section of country in which I reside hold any
communion. There is between us and them no
one principle of sympathy either in motive or
action.
That wise, moral, reflecting people, which
constitute the great mass of the population of
Massachusetts—indeed, of all New England—look
for the sources of their political duties nowhere
else than in those fountains from which
spring their moral duties. According to their
estimate of human life and its obligations, both
political and moral duties emanate from the
nature of things, and from the essential and
eternal relations which subsist among them.
True it is, that a state of war gives the right to
seize and appropriate the property and territories
of an enemy. True it is, that the colonies of
a foreign power are viewed, according to the
law of nations, in the light of its property.
But in estimating the propriety of carrying desolation
into the peaceful abodes of their neighbors,
the people of New England will not limit
their contemplation to the mere circumstance
of abstract right, nor ask what lawyers and
jurisprudists have written or said, as if this
was conclusive upon the subject. That people
are much addicted to think for themselves, and
in canvassing the propriety of such an invasion,
they will consider the actual condition of those
colonies, their natural relations to us, and the
effect which their conquest and ruin will have,
not only upon the people of those colonies, but
upon themselves, and their own liberties and
constitution. And above all, what I know will
seem strange to some of those who hear me,
they will not forget to apply to a case occurring
between nations, as far as is practicable, that
heaven-descended rule which the great author
and founder of their religion has given them
for the regulation of their conduct towards
each other. They will consider it the duty of
these United States to act towards those colonies
as they would wish those colonies to act,
in exchange of circumstances, towards these
United States.
The actual condition of those colonies, and
the relation in which they stood to the United
States antecedent to the declaration of war,
were of this nature. Those colonies had no
connection with the questions in dispute between
us and their parent State. They had
done us no injury. They meditated none to us.
Between the inhabitants of those colonies and
the citizens of the United States, the most friendly
and mutually useful intercourse subsisted.
The borderers on this, and those on the other
side of the St. Lawrence, and of the boundary
line, scarcely realized that they were subjects
of different governments. They interchanged
expressions and acts of civility. Intermarriages
took place among them. The Canadian sometimes
settled in the United States; sometimes
our citizens emigrated to Canada. After the
declaration of war, had they any disposition to
assail us? We have the reverse expressly in
evidence. They desired nothing so much as to
keep perfect the then subsisting relations of
amity. Would the conquest of those colonies
shake the policy of the British cabinet? No
man has shown it. Unqualified assertions, it is
true, have been made, but totally unsupported
by any evidence, or even the pretence of argument.
On the contrary, nothing was more obvious
than that an invasion of Canada must
strengthen the Ministry of Great Britain, by
the excitement and sympathy which would be
occasioned in the people of that country in consequence
of the sufferings of the innocent inhabitants
of those colonies, on account of a dispute
in which they had no concern, and of
which they had scarcely a knowledge. All this
was anticipated—all this was frequently urged
to this House, at the last and preceding sessions,
as the necessary effect of such a measure. The
event has justified those predictions. The late
elections in Great Britain have terminated
in the complete triumph of the friends of the
British Ministry. In effecting this change, the
conduct of the United States in relation to
Canada has had, undeniably, a mighty influence,
by the disgust and indignation felt by the British
people at a step so apparently wanton and cruel.
As there was no direct advantage to be hoped
from the conquest of Canada, so also, there was
none incidental. Plunder there was none—at
least, none which would pay the cost of the
conquest. Glory there was none. Could seven
millions of people obtain glory by precipitating
themselves upon half a million, and trampling
them into the dust? A giant obtain glory by
crushing a pigmy! That giant must have a
pigmy's spirit who could reap, or hope, glory
from such an achievement.
Surely a people, with whom we were connected
by so many natural and adventitious ties,
had some claims upon our humanity. Surely
if our duty required that they and theirs should
be sacrificed to our interests or our passions,
some regret mingled in the execution of our
purpose. We postponed the decree of ruin
until the last moment. We hesitated—we delayed
until longer delay was dangerous. Alas!
sir, there was nothing of this kind or character
in the conduct of the Cabinet. The war had
not yet been declared, when General Hull had
his instructions to put in train the work of destruction.
There was an eagerness for the
blood of the Canadians—a headlong precipitation
for their ruin, which indicated any thing
else rather than feelings of humanity, or visitings
of nature, on account of their condition.
Our armies were on their march for their frontier,
while yet peace existed between this
country and the parent State; and the invasion
was obstinately pursued, after a knowledge that
the chief ground of controversy was settled by
the abandonment of the British Orders in
Council; and after nothing remained but a
stale ground of dispute, which, however important
in itself, was of a nature for which no
man has ever yet pretended that for it alone
war would have been declared. Did ever one
Government exhibit towards any people a more
bloody and relentless spirit of rancor? Tell
me not of petty advantages—of remote, and
possibly useful contingencies which might arise
from the devastation of those colonies. Show
any advantage which justifies that dreadful vial
of wrath which, if the intention of the American
Cabinet had been fulfilled, would, at this
day, have been poured out upon the heads of the
Canadians. It is not owing to the tender mercies
of the American Administration, if the bones of
the Canadians are not at this hour mingled with
the ashes of their habitations. It is easy enough
to make an excuse for any purpose. When a
victim is destined to be immolated, every hedge
presents sticks for the sacrifice. The lamb who
stands at the mouth of the stream, will always
trouble the water, if you take the account of
the wolf who stands at the source of it. But
show a good to us bearing any proportion
to the multiplied evils proposed to be visited
upon them. There is none. Never was there
an invasion of any country worse than this, in
point of moral principle, since the invasion of
the West Indies by the Buccaneers, or that of
the United States by Captain Kidd. Indeed,
both Kidd and the Buccaneers had more apology
for their deed than the American Cabinet.
They had at least the hope of plunder; but in
this case there is not even the poor refuge of
cupidity. We have heard great lamentations
about the disgrace of our arms on the frontier.
Why, sir, the disgrace of our arms on the frontier
is terrestrial glory, in comparison with the
disgrace of the attempt. The whole atmosphere
rings with the utterance, from the other side of
the House of this word "glory"—"glory" in
connection with this invasion. What glory?
Is it the glory of the tiger, which lifts his jaws,
all foul and bloody, from the bowels of his victim,
and roars for his companions of the wood
to come and witness his prowess and his
spoils? Such is the glory of Genghis Khan,
and of Bonaparte. Be such glory far, very far,
from my country. Never, never may it be accursed
with such fame.
"Fame is no plant that grows on mortal soil,
Nor in the glistering foil
Set off to the world, nor in broad rumor lies,
But lives and spreads aloft, by those pure eyes,
And perfect witness of all-judging Jove,
As he pronounces lastly on each deed."
May such fame as this be my country's meed!
But the wise and thoughtful people of our
Northern section will confine their reflections
to the duties which result from the actual condition
of those colonies, and their general relations
to the United States; they will weigh
the duties the people of the United States owe
to themselves, and contemplate the effect which
the subjugation of those Canadians will have
upon our own liberties and constitution. Sir,
it requires but little experience in the nature of
the human character, and but a very limited
acquaintance with the history of man, to be
satisfied that with the conquest of the Canadas,
the liberties and constitution of this country
perish.
Of all nations in the world, this nation is the
last which ought to admit, among its purposes,
the design of foreign conquests. States such as
are these, connected by ties so peculiar; into
whose combination there enters necessarily numerous
jealousies and fears; whose interests are
not always reconcilable; and the passions,
education, and character of whose people, on
many accounts, are repugnant to each other;
with a constitution made merely for defence;
it is impossible that an association of independent
Sovereignties, standing in such relations
to each other, should not have the principles of
its union, and the hopes of its constitution,
materially affected by the collection of a large
military force, and its employment in the subjugation
of neighboring territories. It is easy
to see that an army collected in such a state of
society as that which exists in this country,
where wages are high and subsistence easily to
be obtained, must be composed, so far as respects
the soldiery, for the most part of the
refuse of the country; and as respects the
officers, with some honorable exceptions indeed,
must consist, in a considerable degree, of men
desperate sometimes in fortune, at others in reputation;
"choice spirits;" men "tired of
the dull pursuits of civil life," who have not virtue
or talents to rise in a calm and settled state
of things, and who, all other means of advancement
or support wanting or failing, take to the
sword. A body of thirty or fifty thousand
such men, combined, armed, and under a popular
leader, is a very formidable force. They
want only discipline and service to make them
veterans. Opportunity to acquire these, Canada
will afford. The army which advances to
the walls of Quebec, in the present condition of
Canadian preparation, must be veteran. And a
veteran army, under a popular leader, flushed
with victory, each individual realizing, that
while the body remains combined, he may be
something, and possibly very great; that if dissolved,
he sinks into insignificance; will not be
disbanded by vote. They will consult with one
another, and with their beloved chieftain, upon
this subject; and not trouble themselves about
the advice of the old people who are knitting
and weaving in the chimney corners at Washington.
Let the American people receive this
as an undoubted truth, which experience will
verify. Whoever plants the American standard
on the walls of Quebec, conquers it for himself,
and not for the people of the United States.
Whoever lives to see that event—may my head
be low in the dust before it happen!—will witness
a dynasty established in that country by
the sword. He will see a King or an Emperor,
dukedoms, and earldoms, and baronies, distributed
to the officers, and knights' fees bestowed
on the soldiery. Such an army will not trouble
itself about geographical lines, in portioning out
the divisions of its new empire; and will run
the parallels of its power by other steel than
that of the compass. When that event happens,
the people of New England, if they mean to be
free, must have a force equal to defend themselves
against such an army. And a military
force equal to this object will itself be able to
enslave the country.
Mr. Speaker—When I contemplate the character
and consequences of this invasion of
Canada; when I reflect upon its criminality and
its danger to the peace and liberty of this once
happy country; I thank the great Author and
Source of all virtue, that through His grace that
section of country in which I have the happiness
to reside, is, in so great a degree, free from
the iniquity of this transgression. I speak it
with pride, the people of that section have done
what they could to vindicate themselves and
their children from the burden of this sin. That
whole section has risen, almost as one man, for
the purpose of driving from power, by one
great constitutional effort, the guilty authors of
this war. If they have failed, it has not been
through the want of will or of exertion, but in
consequence of the weakness of their political
power. When in the usual course of Divine
Providence, who punishes nations as well as
individuals, His destroying angel shall on this
account pass over this country—and sooner or
later, pass it will—I may be permitted to hope
that over New England his hand will be stayed.
Our souls are not steeped in the blood which
has been shed in this war. The spirits of the
unhappy men who have been sent to an untimely
audit, have borne to the bar of divine justice
no accusations against us.
This opinion, concerning the principles of this
invasion of Canada, is not peculiar to me. Multitudes
who approve the war, detest it. I believe
this sentiment is entertained, without distinction
of parties, by almost all the moral sense,
and nine-tenths of the intelligence, of the whole
northern section of the United States. I know
that men from that quarter of the country will
tell you differently. Stories of a very different
kind are brought by all those who come trooping
to Washington for place, appointments, and
emoluments; men who will say any thing to
please the ear, or do any thing to please the
eye of Majesty, for the sake of those fat contracts
and gifts which it scatters; men whose
fathers, brothers, and cousins, are provided for
by the Departments; whose full-grown children
are at, suck at the money-distilling breasts of
the Treasury; the little men who sigh after
great offices; those who have judgeships in
hand or judgeships in promise; toads that live
upon the vapor of the palace, that swallow great
men's spittle at the levees; that stare and wonder
at all the fine sights which they see there;
and most of all wonder at themselves—how
they got there to see them. These men will
tell you, that New England applauds this invasion.
But, Mr. Speaker, look at the elections. What
is the language they speak? The present tenant
of the Chief Magistracy rejected, by that whole
section of country, with the exception of a single
State unanimously. And for whom? In
favor of a man, out of the circle of his own
State without much influence, and personally
almost unknown. In favor of a man against
whom the prevailing influence in New England
had previously strong political prejudices; and
with whom, at the time of giving him their
support, they had no political understanding; in
favor of a man whose merits, whatever in other
respects they might be, were brought into notice,
in the first instance, chiefly so far as that
election was concerned, by their opinion of the
utter want of merit of the man whose re-election
they opposed.
Among the causes of that universal disgust
which pervaded all New England, at the Administration
and its supporters, was the general
dislike and contempt of this invasion of Canada.
I have taken some pains to learn the sentiments
which prevail on this subject in New England,
and particularly among its yeomanry, the pride
and the hope of that country. I have conversed
with men, resting on their spades and leaning
on the handles of their ploughs, while they
relaxed for a moment from the labor by which
they support their families, and which gives
such a hardihood and character to their virtues.
They asked—"What do we want of Canada?
We have land enough. Do we want plunder?
There is not enough of that to pay the cost of
getting it. Are our Ocean rights there? Or is
it there our seamen are held in captivity? Are
new States desired? We have plenty of those
already. Are they to be held as conquered territories?
This will require an army there.
Then, to be safe, we must have an army here.
And with a standing army, what security for
our liberties?"
These are no fictitious reasonings. They are
the suggestions I doubt not of thousands and
tens of thousands of our hardy New England
yeomanry; men who, when their country calls,
at any wise and real exigency, will start from
their native soils and throw their shields over
their liberties, like the soldiers of Cadmus,
"armed in complete steel;" yet men, who have
heard the winding of your horn to the Canada
campaign, with the same apathy and indifference
with which they would hear in the streets
the trilling of a jews-harp, or the twirring of a
banjo.
The plain truth is, that the people of New
England have no desire for Canada. Their
moral sentiment does not justify, and they will
not countenance its invasion. I have thus stated
the grounds on which they deem, and I have
felt myself bound to maintain, that this contemplated
invasion of that territory is, as it respects
the Canadians, wanton and cruel; because
it inflicts the greatest imaginable evils on them,
without any imaginable benefit to us; that, as
it respects the United States, such an invasion
is senseless, because, ultimately, ruinous to our
own political safety; and wicked, because it is
an abuse of the blessings of Divine Providence,
and a manifest perversion of His multiplied
bounties, to the purpose of desolating an innocent
and unoffending people.
I shall now proceed to the next view I proposed
to take on this project of invading Canada,
and consider it in the light of a means to
obtain an early and honorable peace. It is said,
and this is the whole argument in favor of this
invasion, in this aspect, that the only way to
negotiate successfully with Great Britain, is to
appeal to her fears and raise her terrors for the
fate of her colonies. I shall here say nothing
concerning the difficulties of executing this
scheme; nor about the possibility of a deficiency
both in men and money. I will not dwell on
the disgust of all New England, nor on the influence
of this disgust with respect to your
efforts. I will admit, for the present, that an
army may be raised, and that during the first
years it may be supported by loans, and that
afterwards it will support itself by bayonets. I
will admit farther, for the sake of argument,
that success is possible and that Great Britain
realizes the practicability of it. Now, all this
being admitted, I maintain that the surest of
all possible ways to defeat any hope from negotiation,
is the threat of such an invasion, and
an active preparation to execute it. Those must
be very young politicians, their pin-feathers
not yet grown, and however they may flutter
on this floor, they are not yet fledged for any
high or distant flight, who think that threats
and appealing to fear are the ways of producing
a disposition to negotiate in Great Britain,
or in any other nation which understands what
it owes to its own safety and honor. No nation
can yield to threat, what it might yield
to a sense of interest; because, in that case, it
has no credit for what it grants, and what is
more, loses something in point of reputation,
from the imbecility which concessions made
under such circumstances indicate. Of all nations
in the world, Great Britain is the last to
yield to considerations of fear and terror. The
whole history of the British nation is one tissue
of facts, tending to show the spirit with which
she meets all attempts to bully and brow-beat
her into measures inconsistent with her interests
or her policy. No nation ever before made such
sacrifices of the present to the future. No nation
ever built her greatness more systematically,
on the principles of a haughty self-respect,
which yields nothing to suggestions of danger,
and which never permits either her ability or
inclination to maintain her rights to be suspected.
In all negotiations, therefore, with that
power, it may be taken as a certain truth, that
your chance of failure is just in proportion to
the publicity and obtrusiveness of threats and
appeals to fear.
The American Cabinet understands all this
very well, although this House may not. Their
policy is founded upon it. The project of this
bill is to put at a still further distance the chance
of amicable arrangement, in consequence of the
dispositions which the threat of invasion of
their colonies, and attempt to execute it, will
excite in the British nation and Ministry. I
have some claim to speak concerning the policy
of the men who constitute the American Cabinet.
For eight years I have studied their history,
characters, and interests. I know no
reason why I should judge them severely, except
such as arise from those inevitable conclusions,
which avowed principles and distinct
conduct have impressed upon the mind. I say,
then, sir, without hesitation, that in my judgment,
the embarrassments of our relations with
Great Britain, and keeping alive between this
country and that a root of bitterness, has been,
is, and will continue to be, a main principle of
the policy of this American Cabinet. They
want not a solid settlement of our differences.
If the nation will support them in it, they will
persevere in the present war. If it will not,
some general arrangements will be the resort,
which will leave open opportunities for discord;
which on proper occasions will be improved by
them. I shall give my reasons for this opinion.
I wish no sentiments of mine to have influence
any farther than the reasons upon which they
are founded justify. They are public reasons,
arising from undeniable facts; the nation will
judge for itself.
The men who now, and who, for these twelve
years past, have, to the misfortune of this country,
guided its councils and directed its destinies,
came into power on a tide, which was
raised and supported by elements constituted of
British prejudices and British antipathies. The
parties which grew up in this nation took their
origin and form at the time of the adoption of
the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, in 1794. The
opposition of that day, of which the men now in
power were the leaders, availed themselves,
very dexterously, of the relics of that hatred
towards the British name which remained after
the Revolutionary war. By perpetually blowing
up the embers of the ancient passions, they
excited a flame in the nation; and by systematically
directing it against the honorable men
who at that time conducted its affairs, the
strength and influence of those men were impaired.
The embarrassments with France,
which succeeded, in 1798 and 1799, were turned
to the same account. Unfortunately, those
who then conducted the public affairs attended
less to the appearance of things, than to their
measures; and considered more what was due
to their country than was prudent, in the state
of the prejudices and jealousies of the people,
thus artfully excited against them. They went
on, in the course they deemed right, regardless
of personal consequences, and blind to the evidences
of discontent which surrounded them.
The consequences are well known. The supreme
power in these United States passed into
the hands which now possess it; in which it has
been continued down to the present time. The
transfer of power was effected, undeniably,
principally on the very ground of those prejudices
and antipathies which existed in the nation
against Great Britain; and which had been
artfully fomented by the men now in power,
and their adherents, and directed against their
predecessors. These prejudices and passions constitute
the main pillar of the power of these
men. In my opinion, they never will permit it
to be wholly taken away from them. They
never will permit the people of this country to
look at them and their political opponents, free
of that jaundice with which they have carefully
imbued the vision of their own partisans. They
never will consent to be weighed in a balance
of mere merits; but will always take care to
keep in reserve some portion of these British
antipathies, to throw as a make-weight into the
opposite scale, whenever they find their own
sinking. To continue, multiply, strengthen,
and extend these props of their power, has been,
still is, the object of the daily study and the
nightly vigils of our American Cabinet. For
this the British Treaty was permitted to expire
by its own limitation; notwithstanding the state
of things which the Treaty of Amiens had produced
in Europe was so little like permanent
peace, that the occurrence of the fact, on which
the force of that limitation depended, might
easily have been questioned, with but little
violence to the terms, and in perfect conformity
with its spirit. For this a renewal of the Treaty
of 1794 was refused by our Cabinet, although
proffered by the British Government. For this
the treaty negotiated by Messrs. Monroe and
Pinkney in 1807 was rejected. For this, in
1811, fifty thousand dollars were paid out of
the public Treasury to John Henry, for the obvious
purpose of enabling the American Cabinet
to calumniate their political opponents, on this
very point of British influence, upon the eve of
elections, occurring in Massachusetts, on the
event of which the perpetuation of their own
power was materially dependent.
Mr. Speaker, such men as these never will
permit a state of things to pass away, so essential
to their influence. Be it peace or war arrangement
or hostility, the association of these
British antipathies in the minds of the mass of
the community, with the characters of their
political opponents, constitutes the great magazine
of their power. This composes their whole
political larder. It is, like Lord Peter's brown
loaf, their "beef, mutton, veal, venison, partridge,
plum-pudding, and custard."
From the time of the expiration of the British
Treaty of 1794, and the refusal to renew
it, the American Cabinet have been careful to
precede negotiation with some circumstances
or other, calculated to make it fail, or at least
to make a successful result less certain. Thus
in 1806, when, from the plunder of commerce,
by British cruisers, a negotiation, notwithstanding
the obvious reluctance of the Cabinet, was
forced upon them, by the clamors of the merchants,
the non-importation law of April, in
that year, was obtruded between the two countries.
In the course of the debate upon that
law, it was opposed upon this very ground,
that it was an obstacle to a successful negotiation.
It was advocated, like the bill now under
discussion, as an aid to successful negotiation.
It was also said by the opponents of the
law of 1806, that Great Britain would not negotiate
under its operation, and that arrangement,
attempted under proper auspices, could
not be difficult, from the known interests and
inclinations of that nation. What was the consequence?
Precisely that which was anticipated.
The then President of the United States
was necessitated to come to this House, and
recommend a suspension of the operation of that
law, upon the openly-avowed ground of its being
expedient to give that evidence of a conciliatory
disposition; really, because, if permitted
to continue in operation, negotiation was
found to be impracticable. After the suspension
of that law, a treaty was formed. The
merits of that treaty, it is not within the scope
of my present argument to discuss. It is sufficient
to say, it was deemed good enough to receive
the sanction of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney.
It arrived in America and was rejected
by the authority of a single individual; apparently
because of the insufficiency of the arrangement
about impressment. Really because
a settlement with Great Britain, at that time,
did not "enter into the scope of the policy" of
the American Cabinet. The negotiation was
indeed renewed, but it was followed up with
the enforcement of the non-importation law,
and the enactment of the embargo. Both which
steps were stated at the time, as they proved
afterwards, to be of a nature to make hopeless
successful negotiation.
In this State the Executive power of this nation
formally passed into new hands, but substantially
remained under the old principles of
action, and subject to the former influences. It
was desirable that a fund of popularity should
be acquired for the new Administration. Accordingly,
an arrangement was made with Mr.
Erskine, and no questions asked, concerning the
adequacy of his powers. But, lest this circumstance
should not defeat the proposed arrangement,
a clause was inserted in the correspondence
containing an insult to the British Government,
offered in the face of the world, such as no
man ever gave to a private individual whom he
did not mean to offend. The President of the
United States said, in so many words, to the
person at the head of that Government, that he
did not understand what belonged to his own
honor, as well as it was understood by the
President himself. The effect of such language
was natural, it was necessary; it could not
but render the British Government averse to
sanction Mr. Erskine's arrangement. The effect
was anticipated by Mr. Robert Smith, then
acting as Secretary of State. He objected to
its being inserted, but it was done in the President's
own handwriting. As Mr. Erskine's
authority was denied by the British Government,
it is well known that in fact, on the point
of this indignity, the fate of that arrangement
turned. Can any one doubt that our Cabinet
meant that it should have this effect? I send
you word, Mr. Speaker, that I have agreed with
your messenger, and wish you to ratify it. I
think you, however, no gentleman, notwithstanding;
and that you do not understand, as
well as I, what is "due to your own honor."
What think you, sir? Would you ratify such
an arrangement if you could help it? Does a
proffer of settlement, connected with such language,
look like a disposition or an intention to
conciliate? I appeal to the common sense of
mankind on the point.
The whole stage of the relations, induced between
this country and Great Britain, in consequence
of our embargo and restrictive systems,
was, in fact, a standing appeal to the fears of
the British Cabinet. For, notwithstanding those
systems were equal in their terms, so far as they
affected Foreign Powers, yet their operation
was notoriously almost wholly upon Great Britain.
To yield to that pressure, or to any thing
which should foster, in this country, the idea
that it was an effectual weapon of hostility, was
nothing more than conceding that she was dependent
upon us. A concession, which, when
once made by her, was certain to encourage a
resort to it by us on every occasion of difficulty
between the two nations. Reasoning, therefore,
upon the known nature of things, and the plain
interests of Great Britain, it was foretold that,
during its continuance she would concede nothing.
And the event has justified these predictions.
But the circumstance the most striking,
and that furnishing the most conclusive evidence
of the indisposition of the American Cabinet to
peace, and their determination to carry on the
war, is that connected with the pretended repeal
of the French decrees, in November, 1810,
and the consequent revival, in 1811, of our restrictive
system against Great Britain.
If ever a body of men were pledged to any
thing, the American Cabinet, its friends and
supporters, were pledged for the truth of this
fact; that the French decrees of Berlin and Milan
were definitively repealed as it respects the
United States, on the first of November, 1810.
If ever any body of men staked their whole
stock of reputation upon any point, our Cabinet
did it on this. They and their partisans asserted
and raved. They denounced every man as
a British partisan who denied it. They declared
the restrictive system was revived by the
mere effect of the proclamation. But lest the
courts of law should not be as subservient to
their policy as might be wished, they passed the
law of the 2d of March, 1811, upon the basis of
this repeal, and of its being definitive. The
British Government refused, however, to recognize
the validity of this repeal, and denied
that the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed
on the first of November, 1810, as our Cabinet
asserted. Thus, then, stood the argument between
the British Ministry and our Cabinet.
The British Ministry admitted that if the Berlin
and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of
November, 1810, they were bound to revoke
their Orders in Council. But they denied that
repeal to exist. Our Cabinet, on the other hand,
admitted that if the Berlin and Milan decrees
were not repealed on the 1st of November, 1810,
the restrictive system ought not to have been
revived against Great Britain. But they asserted
that repeal to exist. This was, virtually,
the state of the question between the two countries
on this point. And it is agreed, on all
hands, that this refusal of the British Government
to repeal their Orders in Council, after
the existence of the repeal of the Berlin and
Milan decrees, as asserted by the American
Cabinet, was the cause of the declaration of
war between the two countries. So that in
truth, the question of the right of war depended
upon the existence of that fact; for if that
fact did not exist, even the American Cabinet
did not pretend that, in the position in which
things then stood, they had a right to declare
war, on account of the continuance of the British
Orders in Council.
Now, what is the truth in relation to this all-important
fact, the definitive repeal of the Berlin
and Milan decrees on the 1st of November,
1810; the pivot upon which turned the revival
of the restrictive system and our declaration of
war? Why, sir, the event has proved that in
relation to that fact the American Cabinet was,
to say the least, in an error. Bonaparte himself,
in a decree, dated the 28th of April, 1811,
but not promulgated till a year afterwards, distinctly
declares that the Berlin and Milan decrees
were not definitively repealed, as relates
to the United States, on the 1st of November,
1810. He also declares that they are then, on
that twenty-eighth of April, for the first time,
repealed. And he founds the issuing of this
decree on the act of the American Congress of
the 2d of March, 1811. That very act, which
was passed upon the ground of the definitive
repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, on the
1st of November, 1810; and which, it is agreed
on all sides, the American Government were
bound in honor not to pass, except in case of
such antecedent repeal.
Were ever a body of men so abandoned in
the hour of need, as the American Cabinet, in
this instance by Bonaparte? Was ever any
body of men so cruelly wounded in the house of
their friend? This, this was "the unkindest cut
of all." But how was it received by the American
Cabinet? Surely they were indignant at
this treatment. Surely the air rings with reproaches
upon a man who has thus made them
stake their reputation upon a falsehood; and
then gives little less than the lie direct, to their
assertions. No, sir, nothing of all this is heard
from our Cabinet. There is a philosophic tameness
that would be remarkable, if it were not,
in all cases affecting Bonaparte, characteristic.
All the Executive of the United States has found
it in his heart to say, in relation to this last decree
of Bonaparte, which contradicts his previous
allegations and asseverations, is, that "This
proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner
of it, liable to many objections!"
I have referred to this subject as being connected,
with future conduct, strikingly illustrative
of the disposition of the American Cabinet
to carry on the war, and of their intention, if
possible, not to make peace. Surely, if any
nation had a claim for liberal treatment from
another, it was the British nation from the American,
after the discovery of the error of the American
Government, in relation to the repeal of the
Berlin and Milan decrees, in November, 1810.
In consequence of that error, the American
Cabinet had ruined numbers of our own citizens,
who had been caught by the revival of
the non-intercourse law; they had revived that
law against Great Britain, under circumstances
which now appeared to have been fallacious;
and they had declared war against her, on the
supposition, that she had refused to repeal her
Orders in Council, after the French decrees
were in fact revoked: whereas, it now appears
that they were in fact not revoked. Surely
the knowledge of this error was followed by
an instant and anxious desire to redress the resulting
injury. As the British Orders in Council
were in fact revoked, on the knowledge of
the existence of the French decree of repeal,
surely the American Cabinet at once extended
the hand of friendship; met the British Government
half way; stopped all farther irritation;
and strove to place every thing on a basis best
suited to promote an amicable adjustment. No,
sir, nothing of all this occurred. On the contrary,
the question of impressments is made the
basis of continuing the war. On this subject,
a studied fairness of proposition is preserved,
accompanied with systematic perseverance in
measures of hostility. An armistice was proposed
by them. It was refused by us. It was
acceded to by the American General on the
frontiers. It was rejected by the Cabinet. No
consideration of the false allegation on which
the war in fact was founded; no consideration
of the critical and extremely consequential
nature to both nations of the subject of impressment;
no considerations of humanity, interposed
their influence. They renewed hostilities.
They rushed upon Canada. Nothing would
satisfy them but blood. The language of their
conduct is that of the giant, in the legends of
infancy:
"Fee, faw, fow, fum,
I smell the blood of an Englishman;
Dead or alive, I will have some!"
Can such men pretend that peace is their object?
Whatever may result, the perfect conviction
of my mind is, that they have no such
intention, and that if it comes it is contrary
both to their hope and expectation.
I would not judge these men severely. But
it is my duty to endeavor to judge them truly;
and to express fearlessly the result of that judgment,
whatever it may be. My opinion results
from the application of the well-known principle
of judging concerning men's purposes and
motives: to consider rather what men do,
than what they say; and to examine their
deeds in connection with predominating passions
and interests; and on this basis decide.
In making an estimate of the intentions of
these or any other politicians, I make little or
no account of pacific pretensions. There is a
general reluctance at war, and desire of peace,
which pervades the great mass of every people;
and artful rulers could never keep any nation
at war any length of time, beyond their true
interests, without some sacrifice to that general
love of peace which exists in civilized men.
Bonaparte himself will tell you that he is the
most pacific creature in the world. He has already
declared, by his proclamation to Frenchmen,
that he has gone to Moscow for no other
end than to cultivate peace, and counteract the
Emperor of Russia's desire of war. In this
country, where the popular sentiment has so
strong an impulse on its affairs, the same obtrusive
pretension must inevitably be preserved.
No man or set of men ever can or will get this
country at war, or continue it long in war, without
keeping on hand a stout, round stock of
gulling matter. Fair propositions will always
be made to go hand in hand with offensive
acts. And when something is offered so reasonable
that no man can doubt but it will be accepted,
at the same moment something will be
done of a nature to embarrass the project, and if
not to defeat at least to render its acceptance
dubious. How this has been in past time, I have
shown. I will now illustrate what is doing and
intended at present.
As from the uniform tenor of the conduct of
the American Cabinet, in relation to the British
Government, I have no belief that their intention
has been to make a solid arrangement with
that nation; so, from the evidence of their disposition
and intention, existing abroad and on
the table, I have no belief that such is at present
their purpose. I cannot possibly think
otherwise, than that such is not their intention.
Let us take the case into common life. I have
demands, Mr. Speaker, against you, very just
in their nature, but different. Some of recent,
others of very old date. The former depending
upon principles very clearly in my favor. The
latter critical, difficult, and dubious, both in
principle and settlement. In this state of
things, and during your absence, I watch my
opportunity, declare enmity; throw myself
upon your children and servants and property,
which happen to be in my neighborhood, and
do them all the injury I can. While I am doing
this, I receive a messenger from you, stating
that the grounds of the recent injury are settled;
that you comply fully with my terms.
Your servants and children, whom I am plundering
and killing, invite me to stay my hand until
you return, or until some accommodation can
take place between us. But, deaf to any such
suggestions, I prosecute my intention of injury
to the utmost. When there is reason to expect
your return, I multiply my means of injury
and offence. And no sooner do I hear of your
arrival, than I thrust my fist into your face, and
say to you—"Well, sir, here are fair propositions
of settlement; come to my terms, which
are very just; settle the old demand in my way,
and we will be as good friends as ever." Mr.
Speaker, what would be your conduct on
such an occasion? Would you be apt to look
as much at the nature of the propositions, as at
the temper of the assailant? If you did not
at once return blow for blow, and injury for injury,
would you not at least take a little time
to consider? Would you not tell such an assailant,
that you were not to be bullied nor
beaten into any concession? If you settled at
all, might you not consider it your duty in
some way to make him feel the consequences
of his strange intemperance of passion? For
myself, I have no question how a man of spirit
ought to act under such circumstances. I have
as little, how a great nation, like Great Britain,
will act. Now, I have no doubt, sir, that the
American Cabinet view this subject in the same
light. They understand well, that by the declaration
of war, the invasion of Canada, the
refusal of an armistice, and perseverance in hostilities,
after the principal ground of war had
been removed, they have wrought the minds
of the British Cabinet and people to a very
high state of irritation. Now is the very moment
to get up some grand scheme of pacification;
such as may persuade the American
people of the inveterate love of our Cabinet for
peace, and make them acquiescent in their perseverance
in hostilities. Accordingly, before
the end of the session, a great tub will be thrown
out to the whale. Probably, a little while before
the Spring elections, terms of very fair
import will be proffered to Great Britain. Such
as, perhaps, six months ago our Cabinet would
not have granted, had she solicited them on her
knees. Such as probably, in the opinion of the
people of this country, Great Britain ought to
accept; such perhaps as in any other state of
things, she would have accepted. But such as,
I fear, under the irritation produced by the
strange course pursued by the American Cabinet,
that nation will not accept. Sir, I do not
believe that our Cabinet expect that they will
be accepted. They think the present state of
induced passion is sufficient to prevent arrangement.
But to make assurance doubly sure, to
take a bond of fate, that arrangement shall not
happen, they prepare this bill. A bill, which
proposes an augmentation of the army for the
express purpose of conquering the Canadas.
A bill which, connected with the recent disposition
evinced by our Cabinet, in relation to those
provinces, and with the avowed intent of making
their subjugation the means of peace,
through the fear to be inspired into Great Britain,
is as offensive to the pride of that nation
as can well be imagined; and is, in my
apprehension, as sure a guarantee of continued
war as could be given. On these grounds, my
mind cannot force itself to any other conclusion
than this, that the avowed object of this bill is
the true one; that the Canadas are to be invaded
the next season; that the war is to be
protracted: and that this is the real policy of
the American Cabinet.
I will now reply to those invitations to
"union," which have been so obtrusively urged
upon us. If by this call to union is meant a
union in a project for the invasion of Canada,
or for the invasion of East Florida, or for the
conquest of any foreign country whatever,
either as a means of carrying on this war or
for any other purpose, I answer, distinctly, I
will unite with no man nor any body of men
for any such purposes. I think such projects
criminal in the highest degree, and ruinous to
the prosperity of these States. But, if by this
invitation is meant union in preparation for defence,
strictly so called; union in fortifying
our seaboard; union in putting our cities into a
state of safety; union in raising such a military
force as shall be sufficient with the local militia
in the hands of the constitutional leaders, the
Executives of the States, to give a rational degree
of security against any invasion; sufficient
to defend our frontiers, sufficient to awe into
silence the Indian tribes within our Territories;
union in creating such a maritime force as shall
command the seas on the American coasts, and
keep open the intercourse, at least between the
States: if this is meant, I have no hesitation;
union on such principles you shall have from
me cordially and faithfully. And this, too, sir,
without any reference to the state of my opinion,
in relation to the justice or necessity of
this war. Because I will understand such to
be the condition of man, in a social compact,
that he must partake of the fate of the society
to which he belongs, and must submit to the
privations and sacrifices its defence requires,
notwithstanding these may be the result of
the vices or crimes of its immediate rulers.
But there is a great difference between supporting
such rulers in plans of necessary self-defence,
on which the safety of our altars and
firesides especially depend, and supporting them
in projects of foreign invasion, and encouraging
them in schemes of conquest and ambition,
which are not only unjust in themselves, but
dreadful in their consequences; inasmuch as,
let the particular project result as it may, the
general effect must be, according to human view,
destructive to our own domestic liberties and
constitution. I speak as an individual. Sir,
for my single self, did I support such projects
as are avowed to be the objects of this bill, I
should deem myself a traitor to my country.
Were I even to aid them by loan, or in any
other way, I should consider myself a partaker
in the guilt of the purpose. But when these
projects of an invasion shall be abandoned;
when men yield up schemes which not only
openly contemplate the raising of a great military
force, but also the concentrating them
at one point, and placing them in one
hand; schemes obviously ruinous to the
fates of a free Republic—as they comprehend
the means by which such have ever heretofore
been destroyed; when, I say, such schemes
shall be abandoned, and the wishes of the
Cabinet limited to mere defence and frontier
and maritime protection, there will be no need of
calls to union. For such objects there is not, there
cannot be, but one heart and soul in this people.
Mr. Archer said, so great was the respect
which he felt for the House, so deep was the
consciousness which he entertained of his inability
to do justice to a cause, especially one of
so much magnitude and importance, of which
he might be the advocate, that he would be
doing injustice to his feelings were he not to
express the weight of the embarrassments which
oppressed him. But the wide range which the
present discussion had taken, involving considerations
of great national interest, and calling
forth the cruel asperities of political intolerance,
seemed to leave him no alternative in
the discharge of his duty, but to repel the unfounded
insinuations which had flown in so
copious a stream from the other side of the
House. Were gentlemen to confine themselves
to a temperate investigation of the propriety of
adopting measures either recommended by the
Executive, or proposed by the majority, who is
there that would not listen with pleasure and
satisfaction? But when the liberty of debate
was prostituted in disseminating the most unfounded
charges, in the indiscriminate abuse of
the constituted authorities of the nation, he
confessed he could not "always be a hearer,
and never reply." The few observations he
had to make would be without either system or
arrangement, having bestowed no previous consideration
on the subject, and should be confined
not so much to the bill for raising an additional
army, as the remarks and arguments of those
gentlemen who had preceded him on the other
side of the House.
And here, he said, he hoped to be permitted
first to notice the charge which had been confidently
made by a gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gold) against the majority of the House.
He had asserted (and he seemed to dwell upon
the assertion with peculiar satisfaction) that
war had been declared by Congress prematurely
and without due preparation; that to embark
in a war with a powerful nation, without
a large standing army, was impolitic in the extreme.
This principle, said Mr. A., in the general
might be true, but it had certainly no application
to this country. Our Government
was founded on the broad basis of popular
opinion, liable to fluctuation upon the first
appearance of any system which might be calculated
to destroy the liberties of the people.
A laudable jealousy of their rulers throbbed in
the heart of every man in the country, who
would seize the first opportunity to change an
Administration that would raise a standing
army in time of peace, whatever might be the
professed objects of such an Administration.
From this jealousy the natural result would be,
that the men who raised the army would never
declare the war which it was intended to wage.
He would refer to the Administration of Mr.
Adams. An army had been then raised, or
attempted to be raised, to defend the country
against an anticipated French invasion. The
professed object was disbelieved, and the people,
apprehending an invasion of their rights,
removed from power the men who had voted
for the army. All our institutions were repugnant
to a standing army in time of peace. Anticipated
invasion would seldom justify it, because
it might be made a pretext for the purpose
at all times, and with the most dangerous
views. What had been said by the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Quincy) seemed to
confirm this position, for he had expressed his
fears of the army, even in a state of declared
war, when that army was to be employed out
of the limits of the country; and if jealousy
existed at such time, the conclusion would
naturally follow that it would exist to a greater
degree in a time of peace. The argument then
of the gentleman, if it proved any thing, proved
too much, because its effect would always be to
frustrate the views of the Government, and
prevent it from going to war to avenge even
the grossest insult, or to assert even its most
indisputable rights. But an appeal had been
made with much confidence to the history of
all Europe, to bear him out in the charge he
had made, and it had been said that no instance
of a nation's engaging in a war without having
a well-regulated and disciplined army could be
adduced. This, said Mr. A., will be admitted,
but he presumed it was incumbent upon the
gentleman to show that some analogy existed
between the Governments of Europe and that
of the United States, before his argument could
have any application to the subject. There the
people had no voice in the selection of their
rulers. There the arbitrary will of the monarch
was the law of the land, and his decrees, however
oppressive or obnoxious, were enforced by
the hand of power, without a murmur or complaint.
There each Government is surrounded
by kingdoms powerful and strong, the ambition
of whose rulers prompts them to seize upon
every occasion to enlarge the boundaries of
their dominions. For one of these powers,
even in the most peaceful condition of the
world, to be destitute of a powerful and permanent
military force, would evince an inattention
to its own security and independence,
which would demonstrate the incapacity of its
monarch to govern his subjects, or to preserve
the integrity of his possessions. But the dissimilarity
of the Government and situation of
the United States would show the inapplicability
of the gentleman's maxim to this country.
Here we have no powerful neighbor whose incursions
we dread. Here we are happily removed,
by a wide-extended ocean, from those
nations who, upon a declaration of war by us,
could overrun the country with a military force,
or endanger its civil institutions. Here we have
a people proudly jealous of their liberties, who
will put down constitutionally every attempt in
a state of peace to raise a Military Establishment.
To have delayed, then, the declaration
of war against England, until the ranks of the
army authorized to be raised had been completely
filled, would have been a most certain
course to have defeated the object which Congress
had in view. The jealousies and fears
which would have been the necessary consequence
of such delay, would have brought into
power men of far different views; men who, if
the natural conclusion to be drawn from the
arguments of some of them could be admitted,
would sooner submit to all the indignities we
had received from Great Britain, than resist
her. The war was therefore not declared prematurely,
but was delayed to as late a period
as the nature of our institutions would permit.
And, if what he had said would not be sufficient
to satisfy the gentleman from New York of his
error, the army that was so shamefully surrendered
at Detroit, if it had been commanded by
a man of spirit and fidelity, would long before
this, by the possession which it would have
given us of an important province of the enemy,
have convinced him that war was not declared
without preparation. But, for having said so
much upon this point, some apology seemed to
be necessary upon his part, and he could only
say that he had been induced to do so, because,
having been one of the majority who voted for
war against England, the charge seemed to be
an imputation against his character, which the
duty every man owed to himself bound him to
repel.
It had been said by a gentleman from Connecticut
(Mr. Pitkin) that the nature of the war
had been changed; the principal cause had been
removed by the British Order in Council of June
23d, 1812, by which her previous orders were
repealed; that it was a well-ascertained fact
that war would not have taken place if this intelligence
had reached the United States before
its declaration; and that the Executive ought
to have acceded to the terms proposed through
Admiral Warren, and have terminated the contest.
These were grounds which demanded
some consideration, and he trusted that he
would be able to show, from authentic documents,
that his premises were erroneous, and
that of course his conclusions did not follow.
But he would now admit, for the sake of argument,
(what he should hereafter prove incorrect,)
that the Orders in Council were the principal
cause of the war; he could not, for himself,
see how, even then, the war ought in justice
to have terminated. Did it follow that minor
considerations should be placed out of view or
yielded up entirely? Would it have been proper
for the Government to have entered into no
stipulations for the security of American seamen?
Would it have been proper in them to
have claimed on behalf of our citizens no indemnity
for the vast amount of spoliations
which have been made on the property of
American merchants? Unquestionably not.
Until these considerations, admitting them to
be of minor importance, should have been satisfactorily
adjusted, to have made a peace, in his
opinion, would have been the height of impolicy.
Sir, said he, it is not sufficient that the
injury should cease, but that ample compensation
should be made for the commission of the
wrong. This was the case every day between
individuals in civil society, and why ought not
the rule to apply with equal force to States, in
their relation to each other? Justice was its
foundation, and that would operate upon the
one as well as the other. These considerations
alone, perhaps, ought to be deemed sufficient to
show that the course the gentlemen would have
taken would have been unwise. But, supposing
them to have no weight, he thought it
might be satisfactorily shown that, to have acceded
to the terms proposed by the British
Government, would have been an actual abandonment
of the principal cause which had induced
hostilities. To have negotiated without
entering into an arrangement in relation to the
important interest of impressment, would unquestionably
have been a relinquishment of the
right which we claimed, to be exempted from
its exercise. But it was said that was a secondary
consideration. From whence was this conclusion
drawn? Were we more regardful of
the property than the personal liberty of the
citizen? Was it taken from an impression
which had gone abroad in the country? or
from the unofficial conversation of the members
of the House? These opinions (if the expression
were allowed) he would call extra judicial,
and entitled to no consideration. But to show
that impressment was the principal cause, he
would resort to the best evidence of which the
case was susceptible. He would appeal to the
archives and records of the country, which, in
his opinion, would be conclusive, to show what
the opinions of Congress were upon that subject.
And, in the first place, would call the
attention of the House to the report of the
committee to whom our foreign affairs were
intrusted, which was made on the 29th of November,
1811. After commenting on the operation
of the Orders in Council, they say:
"That they are not of that sect whose worship is
at the shrine of a calculating avarice, and while they
are laying before the House the just complaints of
our merchants against the plunder of their ships and
cargoes, they cannot refrain from presenting to the
justice and humanity of their country the unhappy
case of our impressed seamen. Although the groans
of these victims of barbarity for the loss of (what
would be dearer to Americans than life) their liberty;
although the cries of their wives and children in
the privation of protectors and parents have of late
been drowned in the louder clamors at the loss of
property; yet is the practice of forcing our mariners
into the British navy, in violation of the rights of our
flag, carried on with unabated rigor and severity. If
it be our duty to encourage the fair and legitimate
commerce of the country by protecting the property
of the merchant, then, indeed, by as much as life and
liberty are more estimable than ships and goods, so
much more impressive is the duty to shield the persons
of our seamen, whose hard and honest services
are employed equally with those of the merchants,
in advancing, under the mantle of its laws, the interests
of their country."
Again, the same committee, in the report
which they made to the House, detailing the
causes which should induce the House to declare
war, say, (after speaking of the evils flowing
from the Orders in Council:)
"That they will proceed to the consideration of
another wrong, which has been still more severely
felt. This is the impressment of our seamen, a practice
which has been unceasingly maintained by Great
Britain in the wars to which she has been a party
since our Revolution. That they cannot convey, in
adequate terms, the deep sense which they entertain
of the injustice and oppression of this proceeding.
Under the pretext of impressing British seamen,
Americans were seized in British ports, on the high
seas, and in every other quarter to which the British
power extends, were taken on board British men of
war, and compelled to serve there as British subjects.
In this mode our citizens were wantonly snatched
from their own country and their families; deprived
of their liberty, and doomed to an ignominious and
slavish bondage; compelled to fight the battles of a
foreign country, and often to perish in them. Our
flag has given them no protection; it has been unceasingly
violated, and our vessels exposed to danger
by the loss of the men taken from them. That while
this practice is continued, it is impossible for the
United States to consider themselves an independent
nation, for every case produces a new proof of their
degradation."
These reports, by the adoption of the measures
they recommended, were sanctioned by
the Congress of the United States, and may be
considered as furnishing strong, if not full and
complete evidence, that the Legislative department
of the Government considered the impressment
of our seamen as the principal cause
which impelled them to have recourse to the
last resort of injured nations. The opinion of
the Executive had been manifested in clear and
explicit terms upon the subject, in the Message
of the Chief Magistrate of the 1st of June, 1812.
Thus we have these concurrent proofs against
the assertions of the gentleman from Connecticut,
(Mr. Pitkin.) If, then, as it appears clearly
to have been, from the documents before
alluded to, that impressment was the principal
cause of the war, that it was an injury which
no independent nation could submit to without
surrendering a portion of its sovereignty,
would it not be admitted, even on the ground
which had been taken, that, to have terminated
the war by acceding to the propositions alluded
to, would have been degrading to the nation,
and have manifested the incompetency of the
Executive to have conducted with firmness the
helm of State which had been submitted to his
guidance and direction? And no doubt could
be entertained had such an event taken place,
but we should have heard denunciations against
the Administration proceeding from the very
quarter whence they now flow. Then they
would have been made with infinitely more
justice, because they would have been supported
by reason and by truth. We should
have then found the opposition appealing to
the sympathies of the people, and proclaiming
that their most inestimable rights had been surrendered
by Government in the pacification;
that although they were originally opposed to
a war, when it had once been declared they
would have prosecuted it until the claim had
been abandoned by the British Government.
For, it cannot be concealed that unless, in the
present contest, Great Britain can be compelled
to relinquish her claim to the right of impressment,
unless it be made the sine qua non by the
American Government, to any arrangement of
the existing differences between the two nations,
our claim to exemption from the practice
must be forever given up, and Great Britain
will feel herself at liberty to continue to exercise
it with ten-fold rigor and severity.
Mr. A. declared that, notwithstanding the
clamor of French influence and French alliance,
he felt no apprehensions upon that subject, as
he was well convinced it was not the intention
or wish of our Government to engulf us in
the unfathomable vortex of European warfare.
One word to the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gold) and he had done. It had been considered
by him as a most unfortunate circumstance
that we should be engaged in a war with
Great Britain when Russia was struggling for
her independence. The most amicable relations
existed, it was true, between Russia and the
United States; but would the gentleman have
us on that account to submit to every species of
indignity from the ally of that power? He beheld
with as much detestation and abhorrence
the conduct of the French Emperor as any man
could possibly do. His ambitious progress was
everywhere marked with blood. The vengeance
of Heaven, he trusted, would arrest him
in his career to universal conquest and dominion.
The present condition of Russia, although
her people groaned under a despotism of the
most unrelenting nature, must excite the sympathy
of every man in this country, because she
was contending for her independence, and he
would wish her complete success in the war in
which she was now engaged, but that her
triumph would protract the restoration of peace
to his own country.
Mr. Grundy.—Mr. Speaker, had this debate
been confined to the bill before you, I should
certainly not have troubled the House with any
remarks of mine; but as the gentlemen opposed
to the war in which we are engaged have selected
this as a fit occasion to bring before this
House and the nation a full view of all the relations
which exist between this and other countries,
an apology at least is furnished for a
member of that committee, to whose examination
these subjects have been confided, to give
his ideas upon the various points suggested.
This I shall endeavor to do with temper and
moderation.
I will now proceed to state, as accurately
and as concisely as I am able, the manner in
which the points in difference between the two
nations ought to be considered.
Upon some of the subjects in controversy, for
instance, that of impressment, negotiation had
been tried unsuccessfully for twenty years, as I
will show before I sit down, from the public records
of the country; on others it had been
tried for a shorter period. At the last session
of Congress, when every hope of obtaining justice
in any other way was lost, the United
States declared war, not to procure a repeal of the
Orders in Council only, but to obtain redress for
the unjust spoliations which had been committed
on the property of American citizens, and
to cause Great Britain to cease the practice of
impressment. Other causes of irritation existed,
but these were the prominent causes of the war.
It may be taken as granted, in this discussion,
that those orders are revoked, notwithstanding
the objectionable manner of the revocation.
You are now asked to lay down the sword before
you have obtained any of the objects of
the war, except the abolition of these obnoxious
orders. I request gentlemen to reflect, whether
this is not, in point of fact, an abandonment of
the other points in dispute? Do you not, by
ceasing to prosecute the war which is already
commenced, declare, in the strongest possible
terms, that you will not make war for the injuries
which remain unredressed? Can any man
persuade himself that you will obtain that by
negotiation for which you have determined
you will not fight! and that, too, from a nation
at all times disposed to depress this growing
country? That politician must have a very imperfect
knowledge of the considerations which
influence all Cabinets, who does not know that
the strongest inducement which can be brought
to operate in favor of an injured nation, is the
apprehension of retaliation, or fear of war, entertained
by the other party. I cannot, perhaps,
establish this more clearly in any other way
than by recurring to the history of a transaction
which took place between the United States
and Great Britain. Immediately after the attack
on the Chesapeake, this Government demanded
reparation. The terms proposed were
reasonable, and such as a nation, inclined to act
justly, would promptly have acceded to. For
five years, or more, did the British Government
refuse, or rather fail, to make that arrangement,
which, at the last session, produced a satisfactory
adjustment on that subject. Why, sir, was
justice so long delayed, and why was it at last
obtained? The British Minister discovered a
determination in Congress to submit no longer.
He saw that, unless something was done, friendly
relations between the two countries must immediately
cease. He saw that public sentiment
called so loudly for an opportunity of obtaining
that justice by force which had been refused to
fair argument, that he granted us that reasonable
satisfaction which had been so long withheld.
Sir, had he not seen the approaching
storm, no atonement for that wanton outrage
on our national sovereignty had yet been made.
If you now say that you will not prosecute the
war, the enemy must view it as a decision pronounced
by this Government, that war shall
not be waged by the American nation for the
impressment of her citizens, or for depredations
committed on commerce. It might as well be
said, in plain, intelligible language, that the
ocean is to be abandoned by the people of the
United States, except so far as depends on the
will of Great Britain. If both the property and
liberty of American citizens on the ocean are
subject to her disposal, you cease to possess the
rights of a sovereign and independent nation.
For my own part, if we have the right to claim
security for the liberty and property of our citizens
against that nation, of which no man dare
express a doubt, I am for asserting it until the
object is attained, or the ability of this nation
fails; of the latter I have no fear.
It is pretended that this Government is not desirous
of peace, and that this is a war of conquest
and ambition. I beg gentlemen to refrain from
making statements which they themselves do
not believe. After the declaration of war, what
has been the conduct of the Executive?
Through Mr. Russell, our Chargé des Affaires
at London, they have offered to conclude an
armistice on terms which would remove every
pretext for complaint on the part of Great
Britain. He proposed that this country should
exclude from her service British seamen. It is
true that Lord Castlereagh urged Mr. Russell's
want of powers, and stated that the American
Congress alone could make the necessary provisions
on that subject. If, however, sincerity
had existed with the British Ministry, a temporary
arrangement could have been made, by
which hostilities would have been suspended
until the legitimate authorities of this country
could have expressed an opinion. If Mr. R. had
not adequate powers to conclude an armistice,
the proposition made by Mr. Monroe to Admiral
Warren was not liable to the same objection.
In substance, both propositions were the same;
to the latter, no offer of compliance has been
tendered. If I have any objections to the late
overtures made by the Executive, it is that too
great an anxiety for peace is manifested; but
when the nature of our institutions is consulted,
a strong propensity for domestic quiet is discovered;
and, therefore, the Administration should
be indulged in any measure calculated to restore
harmony between the two countries, provided
the honor and interests of the nation are not
compromitted.
I ask gentlemen in opposition to lay aside
party feelings, and reflect whether, if we now
recede, points are not conceded to the enemy,
which they would not yield if in power. They
affect to be the followers of Washington. I
will show them what his opinions were on the
subject of impressment. From them the pretended
Washingtonians of the present day will
discover their degeneracy. Yes, sir, the Father
of his Country too well understood the value of
liberty ever to consent that the most obscure
individual of his country should be deprived of
it by a foreign despot. So early as the year
1792, the British nation commenced the practice
of impressment, as now exercised by it. On
the 11th day of June, in that year, the then
Secretary of State addressed a letter to Mr.
Pinkney, the American Minister at London, in
which the practice of impressment is strongly
reprobated; and let it be remembered, that
although this letter was written by the Secretary,
it contained the sentiments of the President
of the United States. In order that the
House may more fully comprehend what were
the sentiments of that man, whose memory we
all venerate, I will read so much of the letter
referred to, as relates to this subject:
"The peculiar custom in England of impressing
seamen on every appearance of war will occasionally
expose our seamen to peculiar oppressions and vexations.
It will be expedient that you take proper opportunities
in the mean time of conferring with the
Minister on this subject, in order to form some
arrangement for the protection of our seamen on those
occasions. We entirely reject the mode which was
the subject of a conversation between Mr. Morris and
him; which was, that our seamen should always
carry about them certificates of their citizenship.
This is a condition never yet submitted to by any
nation—one with which seamen would never have
the precaution to comply. The casualties of their
calling would expose them to the constant destruction
or loss of this paper evidence; and thus the British
Government would be armed with legal authority to
impress the whole of our seamen. The simplest rule
will be, that the vessel being American, shall be evidence
that the seamen on board her are such."
If, at so early a period, the right of search for
men was objected to by this Government, how
much more forcible is the objection now? We
were then a young nation; we have since increased
in resources by which our rights can be
maintained; whilst the violation of those rights
have been augmented in a greater degree. On
the 6th of November, 1792, the Secretary of
State wrote to the American Minister at London
a letter, in which, when speaking on the
subject of impressment, the following language
is used: "It is unnecessary to develop to you
the inconveniences of this conduct, and the impossibility
of letting it go on. I hope you will
be able to make the British Ministry sensible of
the necessity of punishing the past and preventing
the future." I know, Mr. Speaker, that
there is danger of fatiguing the House by recurring
to documents of this sort, but my apology
is a good one: those to which I refer have
never been printed for the information of the
members of this House, nor have the public had
an opportunity of inspecting them. I hope,
therefore, to be indulged in pursuing the sentiments
of former Administrations further on a
subject of so much interest. On the 20th of
February, 1800, Mr. Pickering, Secretary of
State, addressed the President of the United
States on the subject of a proposed treaty between
the two countries, upon which occasion
he makes the following remark: "That he
transmits Mr. Liston's note of the 4th of February,
together with his project of a treaty for
the reciprocal delivery of deserters; which appears
to the Secretary utterly inadmissible, unless
it would put an end to impressment; which
Mr. Liston seemed to imagine, while the seventh
paragraph of his project expressly recognizes
the right of impressing British subjects, and
consequently American citizens as at present."
Mr. Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury, when
giving his opinion to the President, says—"That
the project of a treaty proposed by His Britannic
Majesty for the reciprocal delivery of deserters
from the land and naval service, does not sufficiently
provide against the impressment of
American seamen, and is therefore deemed inadmissible."
Mr. Stoddert, who acted as Secretary of the
Navy, at that period, when advising the President
on the same subject, says—"That the Secretary
is clearly of opinion that it is better to
have no article, and meet all consequences, than
not to enumerate merchant vessels, on the high
seas, among the things not to be forcibly entered
in search of deserters."
The letter of the present Chief Justice of the
United States to Mr. King, Minister at London,
dated on the 20th of September, 1800, places
this subject in a strong light; he says—
"The impressment of our seamen is an injury of
very serious magnitude, which deeply affects the feelings
and the honor of the nation. This valuable class
of men is composed of natives and foreigners, who engage
voluntarily in our service. No right has been
asserted to impress the natives of America. Yet they
are impressed; they are dragged on board British
ships of war, with the evidence of citizenship in their
hand, and forced by violence then to serve until conclusive
testimonials of their birth can be obtained.
These must most generally be sought for on this
side the Atlantic. In the mean time acknowledged
violence is practised on a free citizen of the United
States by compelling him to engage and to continue
in foreign service. Although the Lords of the
Admiralty uniformly direct their discharge on the
production of this testimony, yet many must perish
unrelieved, and all are detained a considerable time
in lawless and injurious confinement. It is the duty
as well as the right of a friendly nation to require
that measures be taken by the British Government
to prevent the continued repetition of such violence
by its agents. This can only be done by punishing
and frowning on those who perpetrate it. The mere
release of the injured, after a long course of service
and of suffering, is no compensation for the past and
no security for the future. It is impossible not to
believe that the decisive interference of the Government
in this respect would prevent a practice, the
continuance of which must inevitably produce discord
between two nations which ought to be friends to
each other."
In another part of the same letter, Mr. Marshall
observes, "the United States require positively
that their seamen who are not British
subjects, whether born in America or elsewhere,
shall be exempt from impressment."
From these documents we clearly collect
what was the view which the first and second
Presidents of the United States had on this subject,
and that of the principal officers of the
Government. It appears that this exemption
from impressment is no new claim set up by
men now in power. It is as old as the Government
itself, and there never has been, nor can
there be, an Administration in this country
who dare surrender this point to any foreign
power. Once relinquished, we had as well
abandon the ocean altogether. If the liberty
of American citizens is to be subject to the will,
not of the English Government, but what is infinitely
worse, of every petty officer that navigates
a British ship, it is in vain that we boast
of freedom; we do not possess it; and only let
the British Government understand you distinctly
on this point, and you need talk no more
of American commerce.
It has been said, by a gentleman from North
Carolina, (Mr. Pearson,) that, if we exclude
British seamen from our service by law, one of
two things must happen—either a peace would
be the result, or the people of this country all
unite in a vigorous prosecution of the war. If
I have mistaken the meaning of the gentleman,
I wish him to correct me at this time, and answer
the question directly, if, in that event, he
will support the war? [Mr. Pearson explained.]
Mr. Grundy proceeded: Sir, from the
explanation given, it will, I fear, be as difficult
to come to an understanding with that gentleman,
as it is to accommodate the points in dispute
with the British Ministry; for, although
the gentleman says he will not surrender an
essential right of the country, a question might
be made by him as to what were essential
rights. I will, nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, make
one more effort to elicit the opinion of the gentleman
on this subject. I ask him whether he
considers the impressment of American seamen
"a violation of an essential right of this country?"
[Mr. Pearson said he so considered it.]
Then, said Mr. Grundy, from the gentleman's
own declaration he is bound to support us in
the war, if the principle of impressment is not
relinquished by Great Britain. I have no hesitation
in saying that, in a time of peace, I am
willing British seamen, not naturalized in this
country, should be excluded from our service.
I believe that such a regulation would inflict
no injury or inconvenience on the country.
Whenever, therefore, a proposition to this effect
is made, so as to take effect at the conclusion
of the war, I shall vote for it. I consider
it a direct encouragement to our own seamen,
calculated to foster and cherish the enterprise
and industry of that important class of our
citizens.
Mr. Bleecker.—Mr. Chairman: I have a very
few, very desultory, and I fear very unimportant
observations to make on the subject now
before the committee. They will be few, not
because the subject does not abound with various
fruitful and interesting topics, but because
an indisposition of some days has unfitted me
for any considerable effort of memory.
I was opposed to the war when it was declared,
because I was confidently persuaded
that the evils of which we complained were of
a nature not to be remedied by war. I thought,
too, sir, that by entering into war, we were
plunging ourselves into evils a million fold
greater than those from which we sought to be
relieved. I was opposed to the war, because I
thought that, notwithstanding all the decrees
and orders of the belligerents affecting our neutral
rights, we might enjoy a commerce more
extensive and profitable than we could have in
a time of European peace. The war in Europe
was, in fact, a blessing to this country. I was
opposed to the war, because I knew that the
whole of one of the great political parties in the
Northern and Eastern, the most commercial
section of the country, which was most interested
in the avowed objects of the war, openly
condemned it; and I believed that a great portion
of the other party was secretly opposed to
it. This objection was to my mind perfectly
conclusive. If there had been no other reason
against the war, this was enough. What, sir,
go to war when that part of the country which
has most of its wealth, strength, and resources,
is decidedly opposed to it! go to war for commercial
and maritime rights, when the people
of that part of the country which is principally
interested in its commerce and navigation,
openly execrate war!
It seemed to me that it became legislators
who were disposed to exercise a paternal regard
over the interests of the nation, to give up their
own opinions, their prejudices and partialities,
rather than go to war with a people thus divided.
And permit me to say, sir, without any
disparagement to the members of this House,
that thousands and tens of thousands of the inhabitants
of that part of the country of which I
have been speaking, are as competent to understand
the true interest and honor of the nation,
as gentlemen who happen to be members of
Congress.
I was opposed to the war, because I thought
it might expose our happy form of Government—our
excellent political institutions—to a dangerous
trial. I was afraid, sir, that the war
might produce a pressure upon the Government
which it would not be able to sustain. I was
opposed to the war, and this was the bitter
draught, because it brought us into concert and
co-operation with the great destroyer, the grand
enemy of freedom and humanity throughout the
world. I was opposed to the war, because I
believed the state of things in Europe, out of
which our difficulties arose—a state of things
which the United States had no power to control—was
in its nature transient. Rather than
plunge ourselves into the vortex of European
politics; rather than encounter the evils and
dangers of war, I thought it would be wise and
prudent to wait until "the troubled waters
should subside, and the ancient landmarks of
the world reappear above the flood;" with a
living statesman, I thought I saw in the very
cloud which blackened all our horizon, the
bow which was set for a token, that the tempest
would not be forever.
But, sir, war was declared, and the doctrine
has since been promulgated, that it is now the
duty of every man to support it; that all inquiry
must be hushed, and all examination of its expediency
and propriety cease. So far as this
doctrine inculcates obedience to the laws, it has
my cordial approbation; but inasmuch as it denies
the right of the citizen to examine into the
causes of the war, to express and publish his
opinions respecting its policy, it is an insult to
the understanding of an intelligent people, and
inconsistent with the character and spirit of the
constitution. War is declared by law. How
shall the law be repealed? How can we get
rid of the war, if we may not say that it is inexpedient,
impolitic, and ruinous? How abominable
the doctrine is, that the declaration of war
shuts the door against all inquiry, is manifest
from the consideration, that it would enable a
wicked Administration to perpetuate its power
by declaring war. Again, sir, I would ask the
advocates of the doctrine I am reprobating,
when will it be proper to show the folly and
ruinous consequences of the war? Suppose the
war to have continued five or ten years, and the
country to be impoverished, its commerce annihilated,
its resources exhausted, its best blood
expended in wild and fruitless projects of conquest,
the people oppressed by debts and taxes,
will it then be deemed improper to expose
the absurdity and mischief of continuing the
war? Surely, sir, it will be patriotic and laudable
to alarm the people, to entreat them to put
an end to that which is the cause of their calamities.
And if such conduct will then be
proper, it must be laudable and patriotic now
to show them their evils and dangers, and to
point them to the means of escape.
But, sir, what has been the state of the country
since the declaration of war? I speak
again in reference to public opinion. The people
of the North and East have poured out
their feelings and opinions, their complaints and
groans, in addresses, petitions, resolutions, and
remonstrances against the war. Look, sir, at
the Presidential election, and you see all the
Northern and Eastern States; with the exception
of Vermont, arrayed against the Administration.
You see the people disregarding the
old line of party division and distinction. Yes,
sir, in spite of such division and distinction,
"burying their mutual animosities," their ancient
prejudices, "in their common detestation"
of the policy of the Government, rising up in
their might and strength to manifest their hostility
to the course of measures it has pursued.
This, Mr. Chairman, is a state of things which
ought to arrest the attention, and engage the
reflection of the National Legislature, for without
that section of country our strength is
weakness. I know how ungracious and invidious
topics of this kind are to some gentlemen.
But, sir, we cannot help it that the
country is made up of sections. We are legislating
for such a country, and it is our business
and duty to regard the circumstances, the
interests, and feelings of the people of different
parts of the Union. We declared war for commerce;
the people most interested in commerce
were opposed to it. We continue the war for
sailors' rights, and three-fourths of our native
American seamen belong to New York and
the Eastern States, the people of which are
sighing for peace. It ought to be remembered,
too, sir, that the war itself must have the
effect of driving a vast portion of our sailors
out of the country into foreign service.
But, Mr. Chairman, whatever may have been
the reasons for declaring war, the question is
not now what it was when war was declared.
Our relations with the belligerents have materially
and essentially changed. So much have
they changed, that I declare, without fear of
contradiction, that had they been on the 17th
of June last what they now are, we should not
have gone to war. I hope no gentleman of this
committee will deny this. But if any gentleman
should deny it, the nation will not believe
him. Sir, we have received new, important,
and interesting evidence of the true state of our
foreign relations since the declaration of war.
Facts which were then unknown, and which
have shed a flood of light upon the situation and
policy of the United States, have since been
published to the world. The repeal of the Orders
in Council itself, by removing the principal
cause of the war, has produced a most material
change; for had they been repealed before
the war was declared, there would have
been no war; and let it be remembered, that
they were repealed before the war was known
in England. But this is not all to which I refer.
I mean to speak of the evidence we have received
respecting our relations with France;
and I hope gentlemen will not be startled or
offended by what I am about to say. I declare
confidently and boldly that Napoleon has inveigled
us into the war. He has cajoled and
deceived us. But for his arts, intrigues, and
duplicity, the United States would not now
have been at war with Great Britain. Yes, sir,
he has led us on step by step, until he brought
us to the edge of the precipice, and plunged us
into the abyss. We have been humbled and
mortified. He has triumphed over our character,
our honor, our rights, our independence. I
do not say these things hastily, carelessly, or
lightly. And I will add, that after the discovery
of the deceit and duplicity which the Emperor
of France has practised upon us, it became the
duty of this Government to go back to the
ground it occupied before the President's proclamation
of November, 1810, or to declare immediate
war against France. A proper regard
to the honor, the character, and independence
of the country, demanded this of its Government.
Sir, the proof of what I have said is plain;
and it is time that it be stated here, and spread
before the nation. I beg the attention of the
committee to the facts on which it rests. I
need not go back farther than to the law of
May, 1810, which provided that the non-intercourse
act should cease, as to that belligerent
which should first repeal its decrees violating
our neutral rights, and that it should operate on
the other, which should fail so to do, within
three months after the President's proclamation
of the fact of such repeal. This law, and the
conduct of the President under it, are the immediate
cause of the war, and the present unhappy
state of the country. On the 5th of August,
1810, the Duke de Cadore wrote his
famous letter to General Armstrong, the American
Minister in Paris, stating that the Berlin
and Milan decrees would, upon certain conditions,
cease on the first of November then next.
On the authority of this letter, the President of
the United States issued his proclamation, declaring
the fact, that the French decrees were
repealed. But the British Government, not
considering the letter of the Duke de Cadore
sufficient evidence of their repeal, did not revoke
their Orders in Council, and, in consequence,
our non-intercourse act went into operation
against Great Britain the February following.
Notwithstanding the proclamation of
the President, great doubts existed in this country,
whether the French decrees were in fact
repealed. To remove these doubts, to confirm
the proclamation, to prevent inquiry and investigation
in the judicial tribunals of the country,
the act of March, 1811, was passed. Yet, sir,
it has ever since been denied that the decrees
of Berlin and Milan were repealed. The public
prints have teemed, and the tables of this
House have been loaded with the proofs of their
existence and execution. You remember, sir,
an impressive argument, in many respects original,
an unanswered and unanswerable argument
of the honorable gentleman from Virginia
(Mr. Randolph) on this subject in this House,
towards the close of the last session. But, sir,
notwithstanding all this, this Government persisted
in declaring that the French decrees were
repealed. I do not mean to discuss that stale
matter. The statement I make is necessary to
my present purpose. The question of their repeal
was the subject of a very voluminous and
long-continued correspondence between Mr.
Foster, the British Minister, and our Secretary
of State. The discussion, I believe, was protracted
to the last moment of peace. War was
declared on the 18th of June. Some weeks afterwards,
appeared in this country a decree of
Napoleon, issued in May last, and bearing date
the 28th of April, 1811. This is an extraordinary
paper, and deserves some attention. I
will read it:
"April 28, 1813.
"Napoleon, Emperor of the French, &c.
"On the report of our Minister of Foreign Relations:
"Seeing, by a law passed 2d March, 1811, the
Congress has ordered the execution of the provisions
of the act of non-intercourse, which prohibits the vessels
and merchandise of Great Britain, her colonies
and dependencies, from entering the ports of the
United States.
"Considering that the said law is an act of resistance
to the arbitrary pretensions consecrated by;
the British Orders in Council, and a formal refusal to
adhere to a system invading the independence of
neutral powers and of their flag; we have ordered,
and do decree, as follows:
"The decrees of Berlin and Milan are definitively,
and to date, from 1st November last, considered as
not existing in regard to American vessels."
Now, sir, did this decree exist at the time of
its date? No, sir, the date is false. If the
decree existed in April, 1811, why was it not
communicated to this nation, the only one interested
in the subject? Why was it not communicated
to Mr. Russell, who so strongly urged
upon the French Government the necessity of
furnishing some evidence of the repeal of the
decrees. For the purpose of communicating
some satisfactory information on that subject to
this country, he detained the John Adams in
France, in July, 1811. You will remember
Napoleon's decree is dated in April. Permit
me here to read a passage of Mr. Russell's letter
to Mr. Monroe, dated the 15th of July, 1811.
"On the 14th of June, Mr. Hamilton, of the John
Adams, reached Paris, and informed me that this
vessel had arrived at Cherbourg. Unwilling to close
my despatches by her, without being able to communicate
something of a more definite and satisfactory
character than any thing which had hitherto transpired,
I immediately called at the Office of Foreign
Relations, but, the Minister being at St. Cloud, I was
obliged to postpone the interview which I sought until
the Tuesday following. At this interview, I stated
to him the arrival of the frigate, and my solicitude
to transmit by her to the United States some act of
this Government, justifying the expectation with
which the important law which she had brought
hither had, undoubtedly, been passed."
After Mr. Russell had left Paris, he wrote
from England to Mr. Barlow, who succeeded
him, "for additional proofs of the removal of
the decrees." Mr. Barlow seems to be very
anxious "to get the treaty through, carrying an
unequivocal stipulation, that shall lay that question
to rest."
But it was all in vain; no authentic evidence
of the repeal was furnished. This decree did
not exist; and why was it not issued? Why
was the evidence of the repeal of the decrees
withheld? The answer is obvious. The United
States were not yet committed to go to war with
Great Britain. Napoleon knew very well that
when proper evidence of the repeal of his decrees
was furnished, the English Orders in
Council would be repealed, and the United
States would not go to war with Great Britain.
For, sir, he knew very well, and we know very
well, that for the subject of impressments alone,
this country would not go to war. It cannot
be denied, that for this cause we should not
have declared war. This Government has
never been disposed to go to war on that
ground alone. The present President of the
United States made an arrangement with Mr.
Erskine, which gladdened the heart of every
man in the nation, without any provision on
that subject, without any mention of it; and
there was not a murmur in the country, on account
of its omission. Mr. Pinkney, too, as stated
by the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Troup,)
yesterday, again and again, offered to accommodate
with England, on the rescinding of the
Orders in council, without any reference to impressments.
Sir, this decree itself is an insult to this Government.
It is issued expressly, because we
had taken our stand against England; it is declared
to be issued in consequence of our act of
March, 1811, when, in fact, the President's
proclamation and the act of March were founded
on the repeal of the decrees. To show the
correctness of my remarks on this part of the
subject; to show that Napoleon has triumphed
over our honor and character, I beg leave to
call the attention of the committee to Mr.
Russell's letter to Mr. Monroe, dated the 9th of
June, 1811. His language does credit to his
understanding and feelings:
"To have waited for the receipt of the proclamation,
in order to make use of it for the liberation of
the New Orleans Packet, appeared to me a preposterous
and unworthy course of proceeding, and to be
nothing better than absurdly and basely employing
the declaration of the President, that the Berlin and
Milan decrees had been revoked, as the means of obtaining
their revocation. I believed it became me to
take higher ground, and without confining myself to
the mode best calculated to recover the property, to
pursue that which the dignity of the American Government
required.
"A crisis, in my opinion, presented itself, which,
was to decide whether the French edicts were retracted
as a preliminary to the execution of our law; or
whether, by the non-performance of one party, and
the prompt performance of the other, the order in
which these measures ought to stand was to be reversed,
and the American Government shuffled into
the lead, where national honor and the law required
it to follow."
It would have been base to have employed
the President's proclamation, that the Berlin
and Milan decrees had been revoked as the
means of obtaining their revocation. But
what, sir, is the price we have at length paid
for the repeal? The President's proclamation
was not enough; the act of March added to it
was not enough; we could not procure the revocation
till we went to war. For, sir, the
Emperor would not issue this decree till he
knew that we were pledged and committed to
go to war with Great Britain. How he knew
this, sir, it is not for me to say. We all know,
however, that he had all the acts of this Government
to satisfy him of the course we were
pursuing—the step we were about to take. He
had the President's Message, the report of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, the war
speeches of the members of this House, the laws
for raising armies, and the embargo. In the
month of May, then, when the policy of this
country in relation to Great Britain was settled,
he issued his decree, just in such time, too,
sir, that it could not reach this country till we
had plunged into the war. And well, in such a
state, might he repeal his decrees, which, by
the war itself, would be superseded—would become
a nullity.
Thus, sir, believing the French decrees to be
repealed, we departed from our neutral stand by
enforcing the non-intercourse law against Great
Britain. We have in vain waited for such evidence
of their repeal as would have induced
Great Britain to rescind her Orders in Council—the
great cause of the war. Their revocation
depended upon the repeal of the French decrees;
and had they been revoked, there would
have been no war between the United States
and Great Britain. The decree, declaring the
edicts of France to be revoked, is at length issued,
when the Emperor knows it is too late to
prevent the war. The decree is communicated
to the English Government, the Orders in
Council are revoked on the ground of the repeal
of the French decrees, but the United
States have declared war. How, sir, can I make
this matter plainer? Our whole course against
Great Britain has proceeded from the belief of
the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees; but
that evidence of their repeal, which would have
stopped our course, by means of which the Orders
in Council would have been revoked, and
the war would have been avoided, is withheld
till the Emperor knows that war is inevitable.
Thus, sir, have we been duped, deceived, and
inveigled.
I repeat it, sir, had we, on the 17th June, understood
our foreign relations as we now understand
them, we should not have declared war.
And would it not have been just and magnanimous
in this Government, when all doubt was
removed on the subject of the French decrees,
to have acknowledged its error? Did not the
honor, the character, the independence of the
country require of us to go back to our original
neutral ground? I rose principally for the purpose
of presenting this view of the arts and
deceit of the French Emperor to the committee.
I regret that I have not done it more fully and
clearly; and I hope that some gentleman more
competent to a proper examination of the subject
will yet take it up before we get through
this discussion.
Mr. Tallmadge said he felt a peculiar embarrassment
in rising to offer to the consideration
of the committee some of his own reflections on
the important subject now under debate, from
a twofold consideration. In the first place, the
magnitude of the question might claim the aid
of more exalted talents than he pretended to
possess, and, therefore, to do it justice, he
feared, would not be in his power. For, said
Mr. T., in the extensive range of debate which
has been permitted by the Chair, the whole
field of our foreign relations has been open to
examination, and the policy of our own Government
in relation to Great Britain has been
deemed fairly within the range of discussion.
In the second place, the gentlemen who had
preceded have occupied the ground so ably, and
discussed the subject so extensively, that it was
somewhat difficult to present arguments entirely
novel to arrest the attention of the committee.
Having a belief, however, that there were some
important considerations, in relation to the bill
now under debate, which had not yet been
brought into view, he begged the attention of
the committee while he endeavored to lay before
them the views which he had taken of the
subject, and which constrained him most decidedly
to oppose the passage of the bill.
Before I enter upon the merits of the subject,
said Mr. T., I take occasion to express my
hearty assent to declarations made by honorable
gentlemen that this is no time to indulge the
bickerings of party; and that it is greatly to be
desired that all distinctions of this sort were
entirely laid aside and forgotten. Sir, I should
consider it the most auspicious event of my life
if I could see every gentleman on this floor determined
to take and maintain the true old
American ground occupied by the patriots of
'76. Although it may be painful to the feelings
of an honorable mind to be assailed with
odious appellations, and charged with duplicity
and falsehood, yet the mind which has virtue
for its basis, a conscious integrity for its support,
and firmness sufficient to enable the man
to do his duty, may hope to pass unhurt by
such malicious darts.
Standing, as I do, in the highly-responsible
situation of one of the legislators of this extensive
country, I hope to have stability and integrity
sufficient to enable me to discharge my
duty to my constituents. If, after having passed
through the Revolutionary war, and having
never changed my political creed to the present
day, an odious epithet could induce me to
alter my course, I should be unworthy the confidence
of my country. But whence, Mr.
Chairman, proceeds this system of slander and
abuse? From the foul presses of our country.
To whom are some of the fairest characters
which have ever adorned this or any other
country indebted for the odious epithets of
monarchists, foreign agents, tories, and the
like? To your imported patriots, who, weary
of the dull pursuits of industry on their native
soil, or escaping from the justice of the laws of
their own country, have fled to this happy land
to instruct its inhabitants in the true principles
of liberty and equality.
To this set of newly-fledged politicians, and
men of a similar stamp, is this once happy
country indebted for one-half the miseries and
much of the disgrace which it suffers.
I have been led into this digression in consequence
of remarks which have fallen from the
other side of the House, but will now return to
my subject.
A gentleman from New York, (Mr. Stow,)
who addressed you early in this debate, told us
that he reprobated the war, and had no confidence
in the Administration to conduct it to a
successful issue, but should vote for the bill to
enable them to carry it on. This is strange political
logic to my understanding. While I subscribe
fully to his premises, the reasonings of my
mind bring me to a very different result. Because
I deprecate this war as pregnant with
great evils, if not ruin to my country, I will,
therefore, take all constitutional measures to
bring it to a speedy and honorable close; and
because I have no confidence in the Executive
department of our Government, nor in the
subordinate agents who have been appointed to
vote for this bill, which, if adopted, will
enlist still greater evils on this devoted
country.
In presenting the subject to this honorable
committee, in its most appropriate form, it may
be proper to examine into the prominent causes
of our dispute, which has terminated in open
war with Great Britain. These I take to be
three, viz:
1. The Orders in Council.
2. Impressment of our seamen.
3. The attack upon the Chesapeake.
That we may narrow the point in controversy
as much as possible, I remark that ample and
satisfactory atonement having been made for
the violation of our rights by the attack on the
Chesapeake, one cause of disquietude and a
prominent one too, has been finally removed. It
has indeed been frequently remarked on this
floor, that the satisfaction offered for the unauthorized
attack on the frigate Chesapeake was
long delayed, and very reluctantly offered.
However painful it may be to censure the conduct
of our own Government, yet a sense of
justice obliges me to say, that to every overture
made by Great Britain to accommodate this unpleasant
affair, our Administration attached
some exceptionable condition which closed the
door to an amicable adjustment. The committee
cannot have forgotten the early disavowal
of this wanton aggression on the honor of our
flag by the British Government, and the tender
of satisfaction which was made, but failed because
our Minister was instructed to couple with
this complaint the subject of impressment; nor
can they have forgotten how indignant the
Ministry and nation were when the President
assumed the right of judging what would best
comport with the honor of their King. Few,
I believe, who read the offensive remark, expect
a different result from that which ensued.
And while I am upon this subject I take occasion
to remark, that in all our attempts to
negotiate with the British Government there
seems to have been some untoward circumstance,
some unfortunate condition, either
accidentally or intentionally, attached to the
question at issue, which has defeated the negotiation.
It would be within the scope of my present
plan to take a particular review of the British
Orders in Council, as well as the subject of impressments.
But inasmuch as the documents
relating to these two subjects have been laid
on every gentleman's table; and more especially
when I reflect that both topics have been
very ably discussed by some gentlemen who
have preceded me, and especially by the gentleman
who has just sat down, (Mr. Bleecker,)
I shall content myself with taking but a brief
review of these prominent, and I may add, the
only remaining causes for the present war. As
to the Orders in Council, it ought not to be forgotten,
that during several lengthy discussions
to obtain their repeal, as well by our Ministers
in London, as at this place, they have been considered
as the prominent point in dispute. So,
again, as to the origin of our restrictive system;
it cannot be forgotten that the friends and abettors
of those measures uniformly professed that
they were adopted as retaliatory for the Orders
in Council. From the first partial non-importation
act, which passed on the eighteenth of
April, 1806, down to the law of the second of
March, 1811, the object has been, on the very
face of the law, to procure a repeal of the Orders
in Council, and of the Berlin and Milan
decrees. If any doubt should remain on the
mind of any member of this committee as to
this fact, I beg him to turn his eye to the
restrictive code, and I presume he will find the
evidence to be abundant and complete. In this
system of anti-commercial regulations, I find
the origin and progress of our present political
calamities. And here, Mr. Chairman, I shall
readily admit, that we had grievances and complaints,
great and heavy, against both of the
belligerents; nor have I the least inclination to
palliate or excuse them. My object is to show,
what I have uniformly expressed on this floor,
that our system of non-importation, non-intercourse,
and embargo, have been directed against
the Orders in Council, as to Great Britain, and
nothing else; and finally, have brought this
country into a ruinous war. Is there a man
within these walls, who does not now believe
(as was fully predicted when the law passed) that
the conditions held out to the two great belligerents,
to induce them to repeal their obnoxious
edicts, violating the neutral commerce of
the United States, placed the execution of our
law in the hands of a foreign Government? Is
there a man of ordinary capacity in the United
States, having the means of information, who
now believes that the Berlin and Milan decrees
were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810,
according to the proclamation of the President
of the United States, solemnly announcing that
fact; and that they thenceforward ceased to
violate our neutral commerce? Does not candor
constrain all to confess that, long after the pretended
repeal of the aforesaid decrees, our commerce
was harassed in every sea where French
cruisers could reach it? Need I point you to
the piratical seizures and burning of American
property in the Baltic, the Mediterranean and
the Atlantic seas, by the privateers and fleets of
the French Empire; subsequent to this pretended
repeal, and sanctioned expressly by its
authority? If all other evidence should be
deemed insufficient, I inquire whether the
French Emperor himself has not sufficiently
humbled this country (if indeed our cup of humiliation
had not been full before) by his own
formal antedated repeal of his Berlin and
Milan decrees, long subsequent to the time
imposed on the President by the Duke of
Cadore?
It cannot have escaped the attention of the
committee, or of the nation, that Napoleon's
decree, respecting the Berlin and Milan decrees,
bears date the 28th of April, 1811, and is explicitly
bottomed on the law of Congress passed
March 2, 1811; the sole object of which law
was to confirm the proclamation of the President
which had then been issued more than four
months, and the legality of which had become
very questionable. This decree may be found
among the documents accompanying the President's
Message of November 4th, 1812, and on
the forty-sixth page of those printed papers.
If further evidence should be needed to prove
the abominable fraud of this transaction, it may
be found in the correspondence of our Minister
at Paris, in the summer of 1811, wherein he
remarks, that he had repeatedly demanded
evidence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan
decrees, but none could be obtained. And yet,
forsooth, we are now furnished with a decree
dated in April preceding, but not issued until
we are so entangled in French toils, that war
with Great Britain was inevitable. If this fact
alone had been understood, I put it to the candor
of this honorable committee to say, whether
they would have consented to the declaration
of war against Great Britain at the time and
for the reasons which were given? I say, without
fear of contradiction, that they would not.
If my premises are true, and the inference undisputed,
since the Government has been grossly
deceived and drawn into this war, for reasons and
causes which did not then exist, most assuredly
it becomes our duty as well as interest to relieve
the country from its pressure as soon as
possible.
In addition to all this, it is a singular fact in
the history and progress of this war, that in
five days after its declaration, (viz. on the 23d of
June, 1812,) and as soon as the aforesaid decree
of the French Emperor was made known to
the British Ministry by Mr. Russell, an Order
in Council was issued, repealing the former obnoxious
orders, which had been ostensively the
most prominent cause of the war; and yet the
President has never issued his proclamation announcing
that fact, as by the terms of the law
of March 2d, 1811, he was expressly bound to
do. On this failure of the President to do what
the law enjoined on him to perform, as well as
having issued his proclamation of November,
1810, without possessing the facts required by
the law to support him, I make no comment.
The account is still unsettled between him and
this injured country.
The Orders in Council having thus been revoked,
the continuance of the war seems to rest
upon the impressment of our seamen alone.
Give me leave then to inquire into the grounds
of this practice, as claimed by Great Britain.
Is it not bottomed on the ancient doctrine of
perpetual allegiance—or in other words, that the native-born
subject can never so expatriate, as that
the mother country may not claim his service
in time of war? Is this a novel doctrine, either
as to time, or the nation who now attempts to
enforce it? I venture to say that Great Britain
has practised upon this principle ever since she
has been a nation; and it is farther manifest
that France, and all the maritime powers of
Europe, have maintained the same doctrine.
Nay, sir, we maintain the same doctrine in our
own country; in proof of which, witness the
President's proclamation at the commencement
of this war; and notice also the recent case of
Clark the spy, who was condemned to suffer
death by a court martial, and was pardoned by
the President on the ground of his owing allegiance
to the United States, although residing
in an enemy's territory, and having been naturalized
or sworn allegiance to the King of
Great Britain. Hence it would seem, that the
principle set up was not novel nor singular.
But what is the principle in contest between
the two Governments? Great Britain claims
the right to visit neutral merchant ships on the
high seas; and if she finds any of her natural born
subjects, to take them into her service.
The Government of the United States denies to
her this right, and asserts, that a foreigner
naturalized in this country, is absolved from
all allegiance to the parent State. The practice
of Great Britain under her principle, has undoubtedly
subjected some of our native citizens
to capture and involuntary service, from causes
which I need not here repeat. In all such cases,
I take it to be admitted on all hands, that she
sets up no claim, and therefore every abuse of
this sort is capable of remedy. But on this
head I have no hesitation in expressing my unqualified
belief, founded on documents which
have been laid on our tables, that the list of
such impressed seamen is greatly exaggerated.
Out of the number six thousand two hundred
and fifty-seven of American citizens said to
have been impressed, and forming a standing
head piece to the list of our grievances, I very
much question if five hundred native Americans
can be found among them all. The documents
lately furnished by the Secretary of State, if
carefully examined, will serve very much to
substantiate this fact. Many names are there
returned who have only forwarded their claims
to our Consul at London, and who, very probably,
never set foot on American ground.
Others again are continued on the list who
have been discharged years ago, and others who
have voluntarily engaged in her service.
The question then at issue, I take to be this—Shall
the war with Great Britain be continued
to oblige her to relinquish the practice
of taking from our merchantmen her native
British sailors? If we could obtain the principle
by continuing the war, I think it can be
demonstrated, that it would be injurious to the
American seamen to have it so established, inasmuch
as it would, by increasing the number
of our seamen, necessarily diminish their wages.
But, circumstanced as Great Britain is, contending
for her existence against the most formidable
power on earth, and resting her last hopes
upon her navy, I presume she will never relinquish
the principle.
The inquiry has been made, with some solicitude,
what will you do with naturalized foreigners?
I answer, treat them hospitably, and
extend the arm of protection and all the blessings
of government to them while they continue
within your territorial jurisdiction; but if
they leave your territory, and choose to go
upon the great highway of nations, the risk and
the choice are their own, as will be the peril.
Put the case fairly to the yeomanry of our
country, and let them understand the subject,
that this war is to be carried on for the purpose
of protecting foreigners while sailing on the
high seas, and I very much incline to the
opinion, that they would, dismiss the authors
of this war from further service, or oblige them
soon to bring it to a close. Sir, I will not consent
to waste one drop of pure American blood,
nor to expend a single dollar, to protect, on the
high seas, all the vagabonds of Europe. Valuable
as may have been the acquisition in obtaining
many great and good men as emigrants
from Europe, still I must maintain the opinion,
that all the blessings of liberty and domestic
government, which are secured to them in common
with our native citizens, ought to be an
ample compensation. I know it is no easy
matter to draw the precise line where protection
shall cease; but in a question of such moment
as peace or war, the prosperity and happiness,
perhaps the misery and ruin of our country,
I cannot hesitate as to the course proper
to be pursued.
With respect to protections, they have become
so much a matter of bargain and sale,
that having been counterfeited and sold in almost
every port in Great Britain, as well as in
America, they have long since ceased to answer
any valuable purpose. It has been a fact long
since well established, that a foreigner, who
could scarcely speak our language, could procure
a protection in Great Britain purporting to
be evidence of his American citizenship. This
then may account for the light and contemptuous
treatment given to this species of evidence
by the officers of the British navy.
Mounted Rangers.
Mr. Jennings said that it must be recollected
by the House, that the act which was passed at
the last session of Congress, for the raising certain
companies of rangers for the protection of
the frontiers, had expired. Those rangers were
raised under the apprehension of attacks from
the savages; and these apprehensions have unfortunately
been realized far beyond the general
anticipation. When those companies were
raised, Mr. Speaker, we expected long since to
have taken possession of the British Province
of Upper Canada, thereby to have intercepted
the connection and communication between the
British and the northwestern Indians. It will
therefore readily be perceived, that in consequence
of our disappointed expectations in that
quarter, the northwestern frontier will be more
exposed to the savage knife and tomahawk, at
the opening of the approaching spring, than
they have been heretofore. This description of
force, if again organized, and stationed at
suitable points without the frontier settlements,
will render it more efficient, and in a better
situation to range the woods and prevent the
unapprised attack of the savage upon the helpless
women and children. If we had to expect
invasion from a civilized foe, our situation
would not excite so much terror, but the savage
character draws no distinction between the
helpless infant and the prisoner of war. Under
such circumstances, no calculation of expenditure
ought to have any weight against a measure
calculated to afford a necessary and proper
protection to such an important and extensive
frontier of the United States. The secrecy and
facility with which the savages can assail that
frontier, renders it improper that we should
depend entirely for protection upon the volunteers
and militia of an adjoining State. They
carry with them their prejudices, and too often
forget the sacred rights of private property.
This fact has unfortunately been verified by a
petition which I presented yesterday from the
territory which I represent. But I cannot believe
that such is the character of the citizens
of Kentucky, although I do believe that the
cause of that plundering, so far as it did take
place in the western part of the territory of
Indiana, by a portion of the Kentucky volunteers,
may be found in the unhallowed exertions
of local political purposes, to impress on
the minds of at least some of those volunteers,
that they were to defend British agents, British
partisans, and persons having connection with
the savages.
I shall now (said Mr. J.) present to the
House the following resolutions which I have
prepared, as well for the purpose of offering a
bounty in lands to those who would volunteer
their services as rangers for the protection of
the northwestern frontier, as for the purpose
of inquiring into the expediency of paying the
militia and volunteers who have already rendered
important services in shielding the helpless
from savage cruelty:—
"Resolved, That the Committee on Military Affairs
be, and they are hereby, directed to inquire into the
expediency of authorizing the President of the United
States to raise at least twelve companies of rangers,
by the acceptance of volunteers or enlistment for one
year, to be mounted or otherwise, as the service may
require.
"Resolved, That the said committee inquire into
the expediency of allowing a bounty in land to
those who shall tender their services as rangers, and
be accepted by the President of the United States.
"Resolved, That the said committee inquire likewise
into the expediency of making provision for
compensating the militia or volunteers, who may
have been called out, or whose services may have
been accepted by the Executives of either of the
territories of the United States."
The resolutions were ordered to lie on the
table.
Additional Military Force.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee
of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate
authorizing the raising of twenty thousand men,
for one year, if in the opinion of the President
of the United States the public service shall require
it.
Mr. Wheaton said: Mr. Speaker, every intelligent
man, whose age has given him an opportunity
of combining experience with observation,
must know that there are times
when, on certain questions relating to the great
interests of the nation, the sober remonstrances
of truth and reason are of little or no avail
against the misguided impetuosity of public
prejudice. To such a crisis, if we have not already
arrived, it is greatly to be feared that we
are fast approaching. To float along the current
of popular opinion requires very little exertion;
but the man that is placed in a situation where
the public safety demands that he should stem
the torrent and buffet the storm, cannot but reflect,
with peculiar sensibility, on the very unequal
task he has to perform. The bill, now
under consideration, has opened a field of discussion
on the general policy of the war, in
which its advocates and opponents seem to
have given full range to their imaginations; and
the arguments, on both sides, have apparently
been attended with various success. There
can, however, be little doubt on which side the
victory will finally be declared. It is well
known that the majority are determined, and
the bill will pass. I had therefore resolved to
take no part in the dispute, but to content myself
with giving a simple vote. But, reflecting
that I am called upon to act on a subject by me
deemed important, not only for myself, but for
the good of the people whom I have the honor
to represent, who will be equally interested in
the result, I have felt myself impelled, both by
duty and inclination, to state some of the
reasons on which that vote will be grounded.
The bill proposes giving authority to the
President of the United States to raise twenty
thousand regular troops, in addition to the
thirty-five thousand already authorized by law.
This may be right or wrong, proper or improper,
according to times and circumstances,
and the objects which the measure is contemplated
to effect. Were the country invaded by
a foreign foe, and a foe so powerful as to make
this additional number of troops necessary for
its defence, I should say it were right and
proper to raise them, whatever expense it might
be to the nation. But if, as the advocates of
the bill profess, these men are to be enlisted,
and, together with those heretofore authorized,
are to form a powerful army for the purpose of
foreign conquest, I have no hesitation in giving
it, as my opinion, that it is improper and wrong,
or, at least, as the President has told us respecting
the French decree repealing those of Berlin
and Milan, that "the proceeding is rendered, by
the time and manner of it, liable to many objections."
Objections, it is apprehended, may
arise from want of powers given to Congress by
the constitution, either expressed or implied,
to do this thing, with its professed object in
view—that is, foreign conquest. And if these
are unavailing, common reason and common
sense furnish objections, sufficiently strong, to
the expediency of our undertaking such enterprises.
Objections, for want of sufficient powers
given by the constitution, may be considered
as novel; but, if sound, they should nevertheless
prevail. The war itself is novel, this
being the first of the kind that ever we have
undertaken since that instrument was formed,
or since we became an independent nation. If
the constitution gives Congress any power to
carry on foreign wars, those powers must be
collected from expressions it contains, or from
some clear and necessary implication from
something that is therein expressed. It will be
very readily admitted, that our national Government
is a Government of a very simple construction,
and that it possesses very limited
powers; being established by compact, not by
conquest, it has not all the powers incident to
the sovereignties of other countries; not produced
by conquest, it was not made for conquest.
"The enumeration of certain rights in
the constitution shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people;
and the powers not delegated to the United
States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively,
or to the people." The framers of
this constitution took particular care, not only
to define the powers they intended to give, but
the objects to which that power should be applied,
and therefore, but for those defined objects,
Congress have no powers at all. The
objects are first pointed out clearly and plainly,
and then the powers necessary to their attainment.
The people of this country, after having
effected the Revolution and established their
independence, considering their great transmarine
distance from the nations of the Old
World, and all their jarring and rival interests,
flattered themselves with the expectation of
long peace. Unapprehensive of being attacked
at home, they had no idea of making war for
the purpose of conquest abroad. "Peace and
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances
with none," was their motto, and the same sentiment
has been sanctioned by a man, whom
the advocates of this war have never ceased to
admire. An aversion to standing armies was
among the causes that induced the Declaration
of Independence; without standing armies, it
was then believed, and we now know full well,
foreign wars cannot be carried on. Foreign
wars did not, therefore, come within the scope
of that policy that dictated the constitution. I
am not insensible, that, by the constitution, a
power is given to Congress to declare war, (not
to make it,) but their power is not to be exercised
but in the spirit of that instrument, and
for the attainment of some or all of the objects
for which it was framed. And what are those
objects? Why, and for what was the constitution
made? Its authors have told us. It was
for "the forming of a more perfect union,
establishing justice, insuring domestic tranquillity,
providing for the common defence,
promoting the general welfare, and securing the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,"
and all these benefits for the people
that then did, or who thereafter should, belong
to, or reside in the territory then embraced by
the United States, and none other. The constitution
was not made for any other, nor can
it give jurisdiction over any other. If all or
any of these objects are endangered, and it can
be made to appear that raising the additional
army proposed by this bill be necessary to the
preservation and security of them, and can
afford a rational prospect of producing such an
effect, then my objections to the measure, so
far as they arise from the apprehension of the
want of constitutional authority, will be obviated.
But here, permit me to ask, whether
adding twenty thousand new troops to our
present regular army, will be likely to have the
effect of forming a more perfect union among
the people of these States, or whether the little
progress already made in the war has not produced
fearful apprehensions of a sad reverse?
If justice be not already established in our
country, can there be any probability that a
more formidable army will effect an object so
desirable? No; for it is a well-known maxim,
as true now as in those ancient times when it
was written, that "Inter arma leges silent." So
romantic an idea, as being able to establish
justice through the world, could not have entered
the heads of those that framed the constitution.
Much has been said respecting the
laws of nations; but they are now nowhere to
be found, but in those books that treat on that
subject; they were formed by the nations of the
civilized world, and evidenced by the treaties,
compacts, and agreements, entered into by
them; but the Governments of Europe, in
their struggle for power and dominion, seem to
have disregarded or broken them down; and
they being the majority in number, and superior
in strength, it is not at present in our power to
build up and enforce them. The unavoidable
state of the world must be submitted to, until
human nature shall, by its Great Author, be
corrected. Nor can we, from what we have
experienced, promise ourselves, from foreign
war, an increase of tranquillity at home. But
we are authorized, and are bound to provide for
our common defence, and to raise armies, as
well of regulars as militia, for that purpose,
whenever the unfortunate situation of our
country may render such a measure necessary;
and our raising of a regular army could never
have been contemplated by the framers of the
constitution for any other purpose, and therefore
give no authority so to do, and, as if conscious
that this were the case, the committee
that penned the act passed by Congress in June
last, declaring war, made use of a form altogether
unusual in other countries on similar
occasions. The act declares that "war exists
between the United Kingdoms of Great Britain
and Ireland, and the United States;" going upon
the idea, that hostilities had then been actually
commenced against us by that Government,
and our country invaded by a British armed
force. Such a doctrine would have been very
proper, and it might have been proper to raise
armies in pursuance of it, had it been true.
But such was not the fact. No hostile invasion
of the country, by the British Government,
had then been made, attempted or threatened.
But some may say, and do say, that, if it were
not a point then, it is now, and that, therefore,
if we had no right to raise regular armies then,
it being a time of peace, we may feel ourselves
fully authorized now, since war has been declared,
to raise new ones, or make additions to
the old. This, indeed, would be contrary to a
principle universally received and adopted, that
no one should be permitted to take the advantage
of his own wrong.
I know it is a doctrine, that the ruling party
in this country, both in and out of this House,
are every day zealously endeavoring to inculcate,
that even admitting the war to have been
wrong, at its commencement, it has now become
the constitutional duty of its original opponents
to afford every aid and encouragement
to its prosecution. But this is a doctrine that I
think no one can yield his assent to, till he is
made to believe that two lines, constantly
diverging, may finally meet in the same point.
If our country has been in any degree invaded,
and such invasion be in consequence of our
having first invaded the territories of the invaders,
it is proper for us, by withdrawing the
cause, to put an end to the effect. The last, and
not the least object of the powers given by the
constitution, is "to secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Many
arguments cannot be necessary to show the tendency
of foreign wars to destroy liberty. I
believe history does not furnish an instance of
any people long free, after engaging in the mad
projects of foreign conquest. While Rome was
content with her ancient boundaries, her inhabitants
were blessed with freedom; but,
afterwards, jealousies, tumults, insurrections,
and seditions, and those two great plagues and
scourges of mankind—anarchy and tyranny—following
in the train, destroyed every vestige
of liberty among that people. Is there any
liberty left among the people of France, or of
those countries that France has conquered?
Fortunate for them, if they are less enlightened
than we are; for, in such case, though slaves,
they may not be quite so miserable ones.
"The very age and body of our constitution,
its form and pressure," indicative of the genius
and temper of the people that adopted it, are all
opposed to the prosecution of wars for conquest.
Such enterprises must not be undertaken,
or the constitution must be destroyed.
Gentlemen seem already inclined to attribute
the disgrace and defeats that have hitherto
marked our progress in this war, rather to the
form and constitution of our Government, than
to the weakness and folly of its Administration.
The French Emperor has been extolled, and his
mode of conducting wars has been more than
intimated as being worth our imitation. If, in
making foreign conquests, we would have his
success, we must make use of his means, and
then we may bid adieu to our former happy institutions,
our laws, and our liberty. On this
ground, therefore, I am opposed to the progress
of this war. But if I had not a scruple
left, as to the authority given to Congress by
the constitution to make this war for conquest,
(and perhaps I ought not to have,) my sense of
its inexpediency, while I shall have any regard
for the welfare and prosperity of my country,
will forever forbid my giving it the smallest aid.
Mr. H. Clay (Speaker) said he was gratified
yesterday by the recommitment of this bill to a
Committee of the whole House, from two considerations:
one, since it afforded to him a
slight relaxation from a most fatiguing situation;
and the other, because it furnished him with
an opportunity of presenting to the committee
his sentiments upon the important topics which
had been mingled in the debate. He regretted,
however, the necessity under which the Chairman
had been placed of putting the question,[32]
precluded him from an opportunity he had
wished to have enjoyed of rendering more acceptable
to the committee any thing he might
have to offer on the interesting points it was his
duty to touch. Unprepared, however, as he
was to speak on this day, of which he was more
sensible from the ill state of his health, he would
solicit the attention of the committee for a few
moments.
I was a little astonished, I confess, said Mr. C.,
when I found this bill permitted to pass silently
through the Committee of the Whole, and that,
not until the moment when the question was
about to be put for its third reading, was it
selected as that subject on which gentlemen in
the opposition chose to lay before the House
their views of the interesting attitude in which
the nation stands. It did appear to me that
the loan bill, which will soon come before us,
would have afforded a much more proper occasion,
it being more essential, as providing the
ways and means for the prosecution of the war.
But the gentlemen had the right of selection,
and having exercised it, no matter how improperly,
I am gratified, whatever I may think of
the character of some part of the debate, at
the latitude in which for once they have indulged.
I claim only, in return, of gentlemen
on the other side of the House, and of the committee,
a like indulgence in expressing, with
the same unrestrained freedom, my sentiments.
Perhaps in the course of the remarks which I
may feel myself called upon to make, said he,
gentlemen may apprehend that they assume too
harsh an aspect; I have only now to say that
I shall speak of parties, measures, and things,
as they strike my moral sense, protesting against
the imputation of any intention on my part to
wound the feelings of any gentleman.
Considering the situation in which this country
is now placed, in a state of actual war with
one of the most powerful nations on the earth,
it may not be useless to take a view of the
past, of various parties which have at different
times appeared in this country, and to attend
to the manner by which we have been driven
from a peaceful posture. Such an inquiry may
assist in guiding us to that result—an honorable
peace—which must be the sincere desire of
every friend to America. The course of that
opposition, by which the administration of the
Government had been unremittingly impeded
for the last twelve years, was singular, and, I
believe, unexampled in the history of any country.
It has been alike the duty and the interest
of the Administration to preserve peace. Their
duty, because it is necessary to the growth of an
infant people, their genius and their habits. Their
interest, because a change of the condition of the
nation brings along with it a danger of the loss
of the affections of the people. The Administration
has not been forgetful of these solemn
obligations. No art has been left unessayed;
no experiment, promising a favorable result, left
untried to maintain the peaceful relations of the
country. When, some six or seven years ago,
the affairs of the nation assumed a threatening
aspect, a partial non-importation was adopted.
As they grew more alarming, an embargo was
imposed. It would have attained its purpose,
but it was sacrificed upon the altar of conciliation.
Vain and fruitless attempt to propitiate!
Then came a law of non-intercourse, and a general
non-importation followed in the train. In
the mean time, any indications of a return to the
public law and the path of justice, on the part
of either belligerent, are seized with avidity by
the Administration—the arrangement with Mr.
Erskine is concluded. It is first applauded, and
then censured by the opposition. No matter
with what sincerity the Administration cultivates
peace, the opposition will insist that it
alone is culpable for any breach between the
two countries. Because the President thought
proper, in accepting the proffered reparation
for the attack on a national vessel, to intimate
that it would have better comported with the
justice of the King (and who does not think
so?) to punish the offending officer, the opposition,
entering into the royal feelings, sees in
that imaginary insult abundant cause for rejecting
Mr. Erskine's arrangement. On another
occasion, you cannot have forgotten the hypercritical
ingenuity which they displayed to divest
Mr. Jackson's correspondence of a premeditated
insult to this country. If gentlemen would
only reserve for their own Government half the
sensibility which is indulged for that of Great
Britain, they would find much less to condemn.
Restriction after restriction has been tried;
negotiation has been resorted to, until longer
to have negotiated would have been disgraceful.
Whilst these peaceful experiments are undergoing
a trial, what is the conduct of the opposition?
They are the champions of war; the
proud, the spirited, the sole repository of the
nation's honor; the exclusive men of vigor and
energy. The Administration, on the contrary,
is weak, feeble, and pusillanimous—"incapable
of being kicked into a war." The maxim, "not
a cent for tribute, millions for defence," is loudly
proclaimed. Is the Administration for negotiation?
The opposition is tired, sick, disgusted
with negotiation. They want to draw the
sword and avenge the nation's wrongs. When,
at length, foreign nations, perhaps, emboldened
by the very opposition here made, refused to
listen to the amicable appeals made, and repeated
and reiterated by the Administration, to
their justice and to their interests; when, in
fact, war with one of them became identified
with our independence and our sovereignty,
and it was no longer possible to abstain from it,
behold the opposition become the friends of peace
and of commerce. They tell you of the calamities
of war; its tragical events; the squandering
away of your resources; the waste of
the public treasure, and the spilling of innocent
blood. They tell you that honor is an illusion!
Now we see them exhibiting the terrific forms
of the roaring king of the forest. Now the
meekness and humility of the lamb! They are
for war, and no restrictions, when the Administration
is for peace; they are for peace and
restrictions, when the Administration is for
war. You find them, sir, tacking with every gale,
displaying the colors of every party, and of all
nations, steady only in one unalterable purpose:
to steer, if possible, into the haven of power.
During all this time the parasites of opposition
do not fail by cunning sarcasm or sly inuendo
to throw out the idea of French influence,
which is known to be false; which ought to
be met in one manner only, and that is, by the
lie direct. The Administration of this country
devoted to foreign influence! The Administration
of this country subservient to France!
Great God! how is it so influenced? By what
ligament, on what basis, on what possible foundation,
does it rest? Is it on similarity of
language? No! we speak different tongues;
we speak the English language. On the resemblance
of our laws! No! the sources of our
jurisprudence spring from another and a different
country. On commercial intercourse? No!
we have comparatively none with France. Is
it from the correspondence in the genius of the
two governments? No! here alone is the
liberty of man secure from the inexorable despotism
which everywhere else tramples it under
foot. Where, then, is the ground of such an
influence? But, sir, I am insulting you by
arguing on such a subject. Yet, preposterous
and ridiculous as the insinuation is, it is propagated
with so much industry, that there are persons
found foolish and credulous enough to believe it.
You will, no doubt, think it incredible (but I
have nevertheless been told the fact) that an
honorable member of this House, now in my
eye, recently lost his election by the circulation
of a story in his district, that he was the first
cousin of the Emperor Napoleon. The proof
of the charge was rested on a statement of facts
which was undoubtedly true. The gentleman
in question it was alleged had married a connection
of the lady of the President of the
United States, who was the intimate friend of
Thomas Jefferson, late President of the United
States, who some years ago was in the habit of
wearing red French breeches. Now, taking
these premises as established, you, Mr. Chairman,
are too good a logician not to see that the
conclusion necessarily followed!
Throughout the period he had been speaking
of, the opposition had been distinguished,
amidst all its veerings and changes, by another
inflexible feature—the application of every vile
epithet, which our rich language affords, to
Bonaparte. He has been compared to every
hideous monster and beast, from that of the
Revelations to the most insignificant quadruped.
He has been called the scourge of mankind,
the destroyer of Europe, the great robber, the
infidel, and—Heaven knows by what other
names. Really, gentlemen remind me of an
obscure lady in a city, not very far off, who
also took it into her head, in conversation with
an accomplished French gentleman, to talk of the
affairs of Europe. She, too, spoke of the destruction
of the balance of power, stormed and
raged about the insatiable ambition of the Emperor;
called him the curse of mankind—the
destroyer of Europe. The Frenchman listened
to her with perfect patience, and when she had
ceased, said to her, with ineffable politeness:
"Madam, it would give my master, the Emperor,
infinite pain, if he knew how hardly you
thought of him."
Sir, gentlemen appear to me to forget that
they stand on American soil; that they are not
in the British House of Commons, but in the
Chamber of the House of Representatives of the
United States; that we have nothing to do with
the affairs of Europe—the partition of territory
and sovereignty there—except in so far as these
things affect the interests of our own country.
Gentlemen transform themselves into the
Burkes, Chathams, and Pitts, of another country,
and forgetting, from honest zeal, the interests
of America, engage, with European sensibility,
in the discussion of European interests. If
gentlemen ask me, if I do not view with regret
and sorrow the concentration of such vast
power in the hands of Bonaparte, I reply
that I do. I regret to see the Emperor of
China holding such immense sway over the
fortunes of millions of our species. I regret to
see Great Britain possessing so uncontrolled a
command over all the waters of our globe.
And if I had the ability to distribute among
the nations of Europe their several portions of
power and of sovereignty, I would say that
Holland should be resuscitated, and given the
weight she enjoyed in the days of her De Witts.
I would confine France within her natural boundaries—the
Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine—and
make her a secondary naval power only.
I would abridge the British maritime power,
raise Prussia and Austria to first-rate powers,
and preserve the integrity of the Empire of
Russia. But these are speculations. I look at
the political transactions of Europe, with the
single exception of their possible bearing upon
us, as I do at the history of other countries or
other times. I do not survey them with half
the interest that I do the movements in South
America. Our political relation is much less
important than it is supposed to be. I have
no fears of French or English subjugation. If
we are united, we are too powerful for the
mightiest nation in Europe, or all Europe combined.
If we are separated, and torn asunder,
we shall become an easy prey to the weakest of
them. In the latter dreadful contingency, our
country will not be worth preserving.
In one respect there is a remarkable difference
between Administration and the Opposition—it
is in a sacred regard for personal liberty.
When out of power, my political friends condemned
the surrender of Jonathan Robbins;
they opposed the violation of the freedom of
the press, in the sedition law; they opposed
the more insidious attack upon the freedom
of the person, under the imposing garb of
an alien law. The party now in opposition,
then in power, advocated the sacrifice of the
unhappy Robbins, and passed those two laws.
True to our principles, we are now struggling
for the liberty of our seamen against foreign
oppression. True to theirs, they oppose the
war for this object. They have indeed lately
affected tender solicitude for the liberties of the
people, and talk of the danger of standing armies,
and the burden of taxes. But it is evident to
you, Mr. Chairman, that they speak in a foreign
idiom. Their brogue betrays that it is not
their vernacular tongue. What! the opposition,
who in 1798 and 1799, could raise an useless
army to fight an enemy three thousand miles
distant from us, alarmed at the existence of one
raised for a known specified object—the attack
of the adjoining provinces of the enemy? The
gentleman from Massachusetts, who assisted by
his vote to raise the army of twenty-five thousand,
alarmed at the danger of our liberties
from this very army!
I mean to speak of another subject, which I
never think of but with the most awful considerations.
The gentleman from Massachusetts,
in imitation of his predecessors of 1799, has entertained
us with Cabinet plots, Presidential
plots, which are conjured up in the gentleman's
own perturbed imagination. I wish, sir, that
another plot of a much more serious kind—a
plot that aims at the dismemberment of our
Union—had only the same imaginary existence.
But no man, who had paid any attention to
the tone of certain prints, and to transactions
in a particular quarter of the Union for several
years past, can doubt the existence of such a
plot. It was far, very far from my intention to
charge the opposition with such a design. No,
he believed them generally incapable of it. He
could not say as much for some who were unworthily
associated with them in that quarter of
the Union to which he referred. The gentleman
cannot have forgotten his own sentiment,
uttered even on the floor of this House, "peaceably
if we can, forcibly if we must;" in and
about the same time Henry's mission to Boston
was undertaken. The flagitiousness of that
embassy had been attempted to be concealed by
directing the public attention to the price which
the gentleman says was given for the disclosure.
As if any price could change the atrociousness
of the attempt on the part of Great Britain, or
could extenuate in the slightest degree the
offence of those citizens who entertained and
deliberated upon the infamous proposition!
There was a most remarkable coincidence between
some of the things which that man states,
and certain events in the quarter alluded to.
In the contingency of war with Great Britain,
it will be recollected that the neutrality and
eventual separation of that section of the Union
was to be brought about. How, sir, has it happened,
since the declaration of war, that British
officers in Canada have asserted to American
officers that this very neutrality would take
place? That they have so asserted can be established
beyond controversy. The project is
not brought forward openly, with a direct
avowal of the intention. No, the stock of good
sense and patriotism in that portion of the country
is too great to be undisguisedly encountered.
It is assailed from the masked batteries of friendship
to peace and commerce on the one side,
and by the groundless imputation of opposite
propensities on the other. The affections of
the people are to be gradually undermined.
The project is suggested or withdrawn; the
diabolical parties, in this criminal tragedy,
make their appearance or exit, as the audience
to whom they address themselves are silent,
applaud or hiss. I was astonished, sir, to have
lately read a letter, or pretended letter, published
in a prominent print in that quarter, written
not in the fervor of party zeal, but coolly and
deliberately, in which the writer affects to
reason about a separation, and attempts to demonstrate
its advantages to different sections of
the Union, deploring the existence now of what
he terms prejudices against it, but hoping for
the arrival of the period when they shall be
eradicated.
The war was declared because Great Britain
arrogated to herself the pretension of regulating
foreign trade, under the delusive name of retaliatory
Orders in Council—a pretension by
which she undertook to proclaim to American
enterprise, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no
farther." Orders which she refused to revoke
after the alleged cause of their enactment had
ceased; because she persisted in the act of impressing
American seamen; because she had
instigated the Indians to commit hostilities
against us; and because she refused indemnity
for her past injuries upon our commerce. I
throw out of the question other wrongs. The
war in fact was announced, on our part, to
meet the war which she was waging on her
part. So undeniable were the causes of the
war; so powerfully did they address themselves
to the feelings of the whole American people,
that when the bill was pending before this
House, gentlemen in the opposition, although
provoked to debate, would not, or could not,
utter one syllable against it. It is true they
wrapped themselves up in sullen silence, pretending
that they did not choose to debate such
a question in secret session. Whilst speaking
of the proceedings on that occasion, I beg to be
permitted to advert to another fact that transpired—an
important fact material for the nation
to know, and which I have often regretted
had not been spread upon our journals. My
honorable colleague (Mr. McKee) moved, in
Committee of the Whole, to comprehend France
in the war; and when the question was taken
upon the proposition, there appeared but ten
votes in support of it, of whom seven belonged
to this side of the House, and three only to the
other.
It is said that we were inveigled into the war
by the perfidy of France; and that had she furnished
the document in time, which was first
published in England, in May last, it would
have been prevented. I will concede to gentlemen
every thing they ask about the injustice of
France towards this country. I wish to God
that our ability was equal to our disposition to
make her feel the sense of that injustice. The
manner of the publication of the paper in question,
was undoubtedly extremely exceptionable.
But I maintain that, had it made its appearance
earlier, it would not have had the effect supposed;
and the proof lies in the unequivocal
declarations of the British Government. I will
trouble you, sir, with going no further back
than to the letters of the British Minister, addressed
to the Secretary of State, just before
the expiration of his diplomatic functions. It
will be recollected by the committee that he
exhibited to this Government a despatch from
Lord Castlereagh, in which the principle was
distinctly avowed, that to produce the effect of
the repeal of the Orders in Council, the French
decrees must be absolutely and entirely revoked
as to all the world, and not as to America alone.
A copy of that despatch was demanded of him,
and he very awkwardly evaded it. But, on the
10th of June, after the bill declaring war had
actually passed this House, and was pending
before the Senate, (and which, I have no doubt,
was known to him,) in a letter to Mr. Monroe,
he says: "I have no hesitation, sir, in stating
that Great Britain, as the case has hitherto
stood, never did, nor ever could engage, without
the greatest injustice to herself and her
allies, as well as to other neutral nations, to repeal
her orders as affecting America alone, leaving
them in force against other States, upon
condition that France would except singly and
specially America from the operation of her decrees."
On the 14th of the same month, the
bill still pending before the Senate, he repeats:
"I will now say, that I feel entirely authorized
to assure you, that if you can at any time produce
a full and unconditional repeal of the
French decrees, as you have a right to demand
it in your character of a neutral nation, and
that it be disengaged from any question concerning
our maritime rights, we shall be ready
to meet you with a revocation of the Orders in
Council. Previously to your producing such
an instrument, which I am sorry to see you regard
as unnecessary, you cannot expect of us to
give up our Orders in Council." Thus, sir, you
see that the British Government would not be
content with a repeal of the French decrees as
to us only. But the French paper in question
was such a repeal. It could not, therefore, satisfy
the British Government. It could not,
therefore, have induced that Government, had
it been earlier promulgated, to repeal the Orders
in Council. It could not, therefore, have
averted the war. The withholding of it did not
occasion the war, and the promulgation of it
would not have prevented the war. But gentlemen
have contended that, in point of fact, it
did produce a repeal of the Orders in Council.
This I deny. After it made its appearance in
England, it was declared by one of the British
Ministry, in Parliament, not to be satisfactory.
And all the world knows, that the repeal of
the Orders in Council resulted from the inquiry,
reluctantly acceded to by the Ministry, into the
effect upon their manufacturing establishments,
of our non-importation law, or to the warlike
attitude assumed by this Government, or to
both. But it is said that the Orders in Council
are done away, no matter from what cause;
and that having been the sole motive for declaring
the war, the relations of peace ought to
be restored. This brings me into an examination
of the grounds for continuing the war.
I am far from acknowledging that had the
Orders in Council been repealed, as they have
been, before the war was declared, the declaration
would have been prevented. In a body
so numerous as this, from which the declaration
emanated, it is impossible to say with any degree
of certainty what would have been the
effect of such a repeal. Each member must answer
for himself. I have no hesitation then,
in saying, that I have always considered the
impressment of American seamen as much the
most serious aggression. But, sir, how have
those orders at last been repealed? Great Britain,
it is true, has intimated a willingness to
suspend their practical operation, but she still
arrogates to herself the right to revive them
upon certain contingencies, of which she constitutes
herself the sole judge. She waives the
temporary use of the rod, but she suspends it
in terrorem over our heads. Supposing it was
conceded to gentlemen that such a repeal of the
Orders in Council, as took place on the 23d of
June last, exceptionable as it is, being known
before the war, would have prevented the war,
does it follow that it ought to induce us to lay
down our arms without the redress of any other
injury? Does it follow, in all cases, that that
which would have prevented the war in the
first instance should terminate the war? By
no means. It requires a great struggle for a
nation prone to peace as this is, to burst through
its habits and encounter the difficulties of war.
Such a nation ought but seldom to go to war.
When it does, it should be for clear and essential
rights alone, and it should firmly resolve to
extort, at all hazards, their recognition. The
war of the Revolution is an example of a war
began for one object and prosecuted for another.
It was waged in its commencement against the
right asserted by the parent country to tax the
colonies. Then no one thought of absolute independence.
The idea of independence was
repelled. But the British Government would
have relinquished the principle of taxation.
The founders of our liberties saw, however, that
there was no security short of independence,
and they achieved our independence. When
nations are engaged in war, those rights in controversy,
which are acknowledged by the Treaty
of Peace, are abandoned. And who is prepared
to say that American seamen shall be surrendered
the victims to the British principle of impressment?
And, sir, what is this principle? She
contends that she has a right to the services of
her own subjects: that, in the exercise of this
right, she may lawfully impress them, even
although she finds them in our vessels, upon the
high seas, without her jurisdiction. Now, I
deny that she has any right, without her jurisdiction,
to come on board our vessels on the
high seas, for any other purpose but in pursuit
of enemies, or their goods, or goods contraband
of war. But she further contends that her subjects
cannot renounce their allegiance to her
and contract a new obligation to other Sovereigns.
I do not mean to go into the general
question of the right of expatriation. If, as is
contended, all nations deny it, all nations at the
same time admit and practice the right of naturalization.
Great Britain, in the very case of foreign
seamen, imposes perhaps fewer restraints
upon naturalization than any other nation. Then,
if subjects cannot break their original allegiance,
they may, according to universal usage, contract
a new allegiance. What is the effect of this
double obligation? Undoubtedly, that the Sovereign
having possession of the subject would
have a right to the services of the subject. If
he return within the jurisdiction of his primitive
Sovereign, he may resume his right to his
services, of which the subject by his own act
could not divest himself. But his primitive
Sovereign can have no right to go in quest of
him, out of his own jurisdiction into the jurisdiction
of another Sovereign, or upon the high
seas, where there exists either no jurisdiction,
or it belongs to the nation owning the ship
navigating them. But, sir, this discussion is
altogether useless. It is not to the British principle,
objectionable as it is, that we are alone to
look; it is to her practice—no matter what
guise she puts on. It is in vain to assert the
inviolability of the obligation of allegiance. It
is in vain to set up the plea of necessity, and to
allege that she cannot exist without the impressment
of her seamen. The truth is, she
comes, by her press gangs, on board of our vessels,
seizes our native seamen, as well as naturalized,
and drags them into her service. It is
the case, then, of the assertion of an erroneous
principle, and a practice not conformable to the
principle—a principle which, if it were theoretically
right, must be forever practically wrong.
We are told by gentlemen in the opposition that
Government has not done all that was incumbent
on it to do to avoid just cause of complaint
on the part of Great Britain; that, in particular,
the certificates of protection, authorized by the
act of 1796, are fraudulently used. Sir, Government
has done too much in granting those paper
protections. I can never think of them
without being shocked. They resemble the
passes which the master grants to his negro
slave: "Let the bearer, Mungo, pass and repass
without molestation." What do they imply?
That Great Britain has a right to take all
who are not provided with them. From their
very nature they must be liable to abuse on both
sides. If Great Britain desires a mark by which
she can know her own subjects, let her give
them an ear mark. The colors that float from
the mast head should be the credentials of our
seamen. There is no safety to us, and the gentlemen
have shown it, but in the rule that all
who sail under the flag (not being enemies) are
protected by the flag. It is impossible that this
country should ever abandon the gallant tars
who have won for us such splendid trophies.
Let me suppose that the Genius of Columbia
should visit one of them in his oppressor's prison
and attempt to reconcile him to his wretched
condition. She would say to him, in the. language
of the gentlemen on the other side,
"Great Britain intends you no harm; she did
not mean to impress you, but one of her own
subjects; having taken you by mistake, I will
remonstrate, and try to prevail upon her by
peaceable means to release you, but I cannot,
my son, fight for you." If he did not consider
this mockery, he would address her judgment,
and say, "You owe me, my country, protection;
I owe you in return obedience. I am no
British subject, I am a native of old Massachusetts,
where live my aged father, my wife and
my children. I have faithfully discharged my
duty. Will you refuse to do yours?" Appealing
to her passions, he would continue, "I lost
this eye in fighting under Truxton with the Insurgent;
I got this scar before Tripoli; I broke
this leg on board the Constitution when the
Guerriere struck." If she remained still unmoved,
he would break out, in the accents of
mingled distress and despair,
"Hard, hard, is my fate! once I freedom enjoyed,
Was as happy as happy could be!
Oh! how hard is my fate, how galling these chains!"
I will not imagine the dreadful catastrophe
to which he would be driven by an abandonment
of him to his oppressor. It will not be, it
cannot be, that his country will refuse him protection!
It is said that Great Britain has been always
willing to make a satisfactory arrangement of
the subject of impressment; and that Mr. King
had nearly concluded one prior to his departure
from that country. Let us hear what that Minister
says upon his return to America. In his
letter dated at New York, in July, 1803, after
giving an account of his attempt to form an arrangement
for the protection of our seamen,
and his interviews to this end with Lords
Hawkesbury and St. Vincent; and stating that,
when he had supposed the terms of a convention
were agreed upon, a new pretension was set
up (the mare clausum,) he concludes: "I regret
not to have been able to put this business on a
satisfactory footing, knowing as I do its very
great importance to both parties; but I flatter
myself that I have not misjudged the interests
of our own country, in refusing to sanction a
principle that might be productive of more extensive
evils than those it was our aim to prevent."
The sequel of his negotiation, on this
affair, is more fully given in the recent conversation
between Mr. Russell and Lord Castlereagh,
communicated to Congress during its
present session. Lord Castlereagh says to Mr.
Russell:
"Indeed there has evidently been much misapprehension
on this subject, and an erroneous belief
entertained that an arrangement in regard to it has
been nearer an accomplishment than the facts will
warrant. Even our friends in Congress—I mean
those who were opposed to going to war with us—have
been so confident in this mistake, that they
have ascribed the failure of such an arrangement
solely to the misconduct of the American Government.
This error probably originated with Mr. King;
for, being much esteemed here, and always well received
by the persons in power, he seems to have
misconstrued their readiness to listen to his representations,
and their warm professions of a disposition
to remove the complaints of America in relation to
impressment, into a supposed conviction on their part
of the propriety of adopting the plan which he had
proposed. But Lord St. Vincent, whom he might
have thought he had brought over to his opinions,
appears never for a moment to have ceased to regard
all arrangement on the subject to be attended with
formidable, if not insurmountable obstacles. This is
obvious from a letter which his Lordship addressed
to Sir William Scott at the time."
Here Lord Castlereagh read a letter, contained
in the records before him, in which Lord St.
Vincent states to Sir William Scott the zeal with
which Mr. King had assailed him on the subject
of impressment, confesses his own perplexity,
and total incompetency to discover any
practical project for the safe discontinuance of
that practice, and asks for counsel and advice.
"Thus you see," proceeded Lord Castlereagh,
"that the confidence of Mr. King on this subject
was entirely unfounded."
Thus, continued Mr. Clay, it is apparent,
that, at no time, has the enemy been willing to
place this subject on a satisfactory footing. I
will speak hereafter of the overtures made by
the Administration since the war.
The disasters of the war admonish us, we are
told, of the necessity of terminating the contest.
If our achievements upon the land have been
less splendid than those of our intrepid seamen,
it is not because the American soldier is less
brave. On the one element, organization, discipline,
and a thorough knowledge of their duties,
exist on the part of the officers and their
men. On the other, almost every thing is yet to
be acquired. We have, however, the consolation
that our country abounds with the richest
materials, and that, in no instance, when engaged
in action, have our arms been tarnished.
At Brownstown, and at Queenstown, the valor
of veterans was displayed, and acts of the noblest
heroism were performed. It is true, that the
disgrace of Detroit remains to be wiped off.
That is a subject on which I cannot trust my
feelings, it is not fitting I should speak. But
this much I will say, it was an event which no
human foresight could have anticipated, and for
which the Administration cannot be justly censured.
It was the parent of all the misfortunes
we have experienced on land. But for it the
Indian war would have been in a great measure
prevented or terminated, the ascendency on
Lake Erie acquired, and the war pushed perhaps
to Montreal. With the exception of that
event, the war, even upon the land, had been
attended by a series of the most brilliant exploits,
which, whatever interest they may inspire
on this side of the mountains, have given
the greatest pleasure on the other. The expedition
under the command of Governor Edwards
and Colonel Russell, to Lake Peoria, on the Illinois,
was completely successful. So was that
of Captain Craig, who, it is said, ascended that
river still higher. General Hopkins destroyed
the Prophet's town. We have just received intelligence
of the gallant enterprise of Colonel
Campbell. In short, sir, the Indian towns have
been swept from the mouth to the source of the
Wabash, and a hostile country has been penetrated
far beyond the most daring incursions of
any campaign during the former Indian war.
Never was more cool, deliberate bravery displayed
than that by Newnan's party from Georgia.
And the capture of the Detroit, and the
destruction of the Caledonia, (whether placed to
our maritime or land account,) for judgment,
skill, and courage, on the part of Lieutenant
Elliott, has never been surpassed.
What cause, Mr. Chairman, which existed for
declaring the war has been removed? We
sought indemnity for the past and security for
the future. The Orders in Council are suspended,
not revoked; no compensation for spoliations;
Indian hostilities, which were before
secretly instigated, now openly encouraged;
and the practice of impressment unremittingly
persevered in and insisted upon. Yet Administration
has given the strongest demonstrations
of its love of peace. On the 29th June, less than
ten days after the declaration of war, the Secretary
of State writes to Mr. Russell, authorizing
him to agree to an armistice, upon two conditions
only; and what are they? That the
Orders in Council should be repealed, and the
practice of impressing American seamen cease,
those already impressed being released. The
proposition was for nothing more than a real
truce; that the war should in fact cease on
both sides. Again, on the 27th July, one month
later, anticipating a possible objection to these
terms, reasonable as they are, Mr. Monroe empowers
Mr. Russell to stipulate in general terms
for an armistice, having only an informal understanding
on these points. In return, the
enemy is offered a prohibition of the employment
of his seamen in our service, thus removing
entirely all pretext for the practice of impressment.
The very proposition which the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Pitkin) contends
ought to be made, has been made. How
are these pacific advances met by the other
party? Rejected as absolutely inadmissible;
cavils are indulged about the inadequacy of Mr.
Russell's powers, and the want of an act of Congress
is intimated. And yet the constant usage
of nations I believe is, where the legislation of
one party is necessary to carry into effect a given
stipulation, to leave it to the contracting party
to provide the requisite laws. If he fails to do
so, it is a breach of good faith, and a subject of
subsequent remonstrance by the injured party.
When Mr. Russell renews the overture, in what
was intended as a more agreeable form to the
British Government, Lord Castlereagh is not
content with a simple rejection, but clothes it
in the language of insult. Afterwards, in conversation
with Mr. Russell, the moderation of
our Government is misinterpreted and made the
occasion of a sneer, that we are tired of the war.
The proposition of Admiral Warren is submitted
in a spirit not more pacific. He is instructed,
he tells us, to propose that the Government of
the United States shall instantly recall their letters
of marque and reprisal against British ships,
together with all orders and instructions for any
acts of hostility whatever against the territories
of His Majesty or the persons or property of his
subjects. That small affair being settled, he is
further authorized to arrange as to the revocation
of the laws which interdict the commerce
and ships of war of His Majesty from the harbors
and waters of the United States. This
messenger of peace comes with one qualified
concession in his pocket, not made to the justice
of our demands, and is fully empowered to
receive our homage, the contrite retraction of
all our measures adopted against his master!
And in default, he does not fail to assure us, the
Orders in Council are to be forthwith revived.
Administration, still anxious to terminate the
war, suppresses the indignation which such a
proposal ought to have created, and in its answer
concludes by informing Admiral Warren, "that
if there be no objection to an accommodation of
the difference relating to impressment, in the
mode proposed, other than the suspension of the
British claim to impressment during the armistice,
there can be none to proceeding, without
the armistice, to an immediate discussion and
arrangement of an article on that subject."
Thus it has left the door of negotiation unclosed,
and it remains to be seen if the enemy
will accept the invitation tendered to him. The
honorable gentleman from North Carolina (Mr.
Pearson) supposes, that if Congress would pass
a law, prohibiting the employment of British
seamen in our service, upon condition of a like
prohibition on their part, and repeal the act of
non-importation, peace would immediately follow.
Sir, I have no doubt if such a law were
passed, with all the requisite solemnities, and
the repeal to take place, Lord Castlereagh would
laugh at our simplicity. No, sir, Administration
has erred in the steps which it has taken to
restore peace, but its error has been not in doing
too little, but in betraying too great a solicitude
for that event. An honorable peace is attainable
only by an efficient war. My plan would
be to call out the ample resources of the country,
give them a judicious direction, prosecute
the war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever
we can reach the enemy, at sea or on land, and
negotiate the terms of a peace at Quebec or Halifax.
We are told that England is a proud and
lofty nation that, disdaining to wait for danger,
meets it half way. Haughty as she is, we once
triumphed over her, and if we do not listen to the
counsels of timidity and despair we shall again
prevail. In such a cause, with the aid of Providence,
we must come out crowned with success;
but if we fail, let us fail like men—lash
ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together
in one common struggle, fighting for "seamen's
rights and free trade."
Mr. McKee moved an amendment to the bill,
going to place the appointment of the other
field officers of each regiment, as well as the
Colonels, in the President and Senate. The
motion was agreed to.
Additional Military Force.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee
of the Whole, on the bill for raising an
additional military force of twenty thousand
men for one year.
Mr. Sheffey said he felt grateful for the opportunity
which had been afforded him, to deliver
his sentiments on the subject before the
committee. It was now about a year ago, when
he had stated his reasons at length on the question
of the war then meditated against Great
Britain. Since that time, he had been generally
a silent, though not an inattentive spectator.
Conscious that there had fallen to his share a
full portion of the frailty common to man, he
felt disposed to distrust his own opinion. He
had even hoped he might be mistaken, he had
hoped that experience would prove the fallacy
of his apprehensions; that the predictions of
gentlemen, who differed from him in sentiment,
would be realized; that the rights of the country
would be secured by arms, to which the
majority had resorted; and that the evils anticipated
would vanish before us. On a review,
however, of the reasons which had then influenced
him, aided by the experience of the last
year, he found his opinions, not only unshaken,
but strongly confirmed.
The bill before us, said Mr. S., contemplates
an addition of twenty thousand men to the army
heretofore authorized to be raised. By the
measures preparatory to the war, upwards of
thirty-six thousand men were directed to be enlisted;
with the addition now contemplated,
our regular army will amount to more than
fifty-six thousand men. The question which at
once presents itself to every mind disposed to inquire,
is, what is the object of this vast military
force? We are here not left to conjecture; this
inquiry has been anticipated, and we have been
directly told by the chairman of the Military
Committee, (Mr. Williams,) that it is intended
for offensive purposes; that the conquest of
Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, is
to be achieved. If I have any right to deliberate
on this subject, and to express the opinion
which my view of the real interests of the country
dictates, I at once say, that I cannot give
my assent to raise such a force for such a purpose.
Was an augmentation of the army required
to defend us against any enemy, either
on the maritime or inland frontier, no member
of this House would more readily accord the
means of defence and protection than myself.
In such event, I shall not inquire how we got
into the situation, or by whose temerity the
enemy has been brought on our borders. I
shall consider defence as a matter of imperious
necessity, forbidding all calculation as to means
and consequences. But, as it is admitted by
all, that the force already authorized is more
than sufficient for every defensive purpose; as
it is expressly avowed that it is required for
offensive operations in the territories of the enemy,
the question assumes a different shape; it
is stripped of the overruling influence which attends
necessity; it becomes a mere question of
expediency, controlled by the various considerations
which reason and policy may dictate.
So far as my conduct is concerned, before I can
consent to the prosecution of the war, in the
manner contemplated, I must be convinced that
the objects in controversy are not only just,
but of sufficient importance in their practical
effect on the community to justify such an experiment,
and not attainable in any other way;
that there is a reasonable probability that such
a war will secure to us those objects; and that
we are not endangering the greater good, to
obtain an exemption from the lesser evil; hazarding
certain great rights, to secure others of
far inferior importance.
I regret that I cannot, consistently with my
sense of duty, yield the unlimited confidence in
their measures, which the majority demand.
My reason must be convinced, before my confidence
can be bestowed. There are, indeed,
cases where superior virtue and wisdom, tested
by long and successful experience, have a strong
claim to our confidence. But this, in my opinion,
is not the case here. A retrospect of the
transactions of the last eight years, will show
how much gentlemen have been mistaken and
disappointed in their views of our foreign policy;
particularly that part which is connected
with the difficulties in which we now find ourselves,
and which may be said to be the groundwork
of them. In making this declaration, and
in leading your attention to the facts, it is not
my object to give offence to any one. I believe
gentlemen are actuated by the purest motives,
and sincerely disposed to render essential service
to the country. I speak of facts only, intending
to show a mistaken, not a corrupt or
vicious course.
Our difficulties with Great Britain commenced
soon after the treaty of 1794 (generally called
"Jay's Treaty") expired by its own limitation,
in consequence of the peace of Amiens. About
that time the British Government offered to
our Minister, then resident in London, a renewal
of the treaty. That instrument had been
negotiated under the auspices, and received the
sanction of Washington, the father and benefactor
of his country. It is true, that its stipulations
did not embrace every subject which we
could have wished; and those that were embraced,
were not so advantageously settled as
might have been done, had we had it in our
power to have dictated the terms. But it is
equally true, that experience refuted all the
speculations, and dissipated all the apprehensions,
with which the country was filled at the
time of its ratification. During its operation
we enjoyed a degree of prosperity unexampled
in this or any other country. Our leading interests
flourished in a manner unknown before,
and unexperienced since; our agriculture was
encouraged by high prices and ready markets
for its products; the freedom of navigation,
and the enterprise of our people, carried our
commerce to every part of the globe. I ask
this House and this nation, whether their hopes
or wishes extend beyond what we then enjoyed?
If they do, they hope for that which is opposed
by all human probability, and they wish for
that which has scarcely ever fallen to the lot of
man. We were, indeed, not exempt from every
evil, or gratified by every possible good. What
nation or individual ever reached that state?
But the great essentials of national prosperity
were in our possession. Our Government, however,
was not satisfied. The overture of the
British Government was rejected, under the impression,
no doubt, that better terms could be
obtained; that the situation of Great Britain
would compel her to yield to our demands,
however extensive.
Soon after the rejection of this overture, Great
Britain assumed the right to interdict the trade
in the products of her enemies' colonies, when
taken directly from those colonies to the mother
country, conformably, as she asserted, to the
principles adopted in the war of 1756. In consequence
of which, our Government, with a view
to coerce her into a relinquishment of her pretensions,
passed the partial non-importation act
of 1806. It had not the intended and promised
effect. They again resorted to negotiation, and
repealed the restriction. About this time, a
change happened in the British Cabinet, highly
auspicious to our interests. "Our friends," yes,
our old friends, who had espoused our cause
in time of peril and danger, who had defended
our rights during all the vicissitudes of the Revolution,
and who had manifested their friendship
for us on every occasion since, got into
power. With these men, a negotiation was
opened by our Government through the instrumentality
of our Ministers, Messrs. Monroe and
Pinkney, which resulted in a treaty, as our own
Ministers declared, "both honorable and advantageous
to the United States," and the best that
could be obtained. It was not only "advantageous"
as it respected our commerce, but the
informal understanding which accompanied it,
would have secured us against the abuses of impressments;
so our own Ministers believed. But
it was rejected without being even submitted to
the Senate. The reasons have never been disclosed
to the nation. I presume, however, that
it was confidently expected that such was the
situation of Great Britain, that any terms that
we should dictate would be granted.
The terms which our Government demanded
not being accorded on the part of Great Britain,
a new policy was resorted to by our Government,
which was held up to the nation as a
sovereign remedy for all our difficulties, which
were daily increasing. An embargo, not limited
in its duration, was laid on our shipping.
The prominent virtues of this remedy were supposed
to be—that it would coerce the belligerents,
but particularly Great Britain, into an
abandonment of their injurious measures; and
above all, that it would save us from being involved
in war. The experience of one year,
however, manifested how little its supporters
understood of the means and resources of other
nations, and of the character of our own. The
privations to which a great portion of our people
were subjected in consequence of this measure
coerced our Government into a repeal, long
before any sensible impression could be made on
Great Britain. The embargo was abandoned,
because the people would bear it no longer, and
the non-intercourse system was adopted in its
stead. This also had its day—but this, like the
embargo, experience condemned as injurious
and ruinous policy; and the public voice called
for its repeal. It was succeeded by the act of
the first of May, 1810, the source of our present
difficulties.
When this act passed this House, we were
told that its provisions held out the strongest
inducement to each of the great belligerents,
to precede its rival in the abrogation of the
injurious edicts affecting the commerce of this
country, and that whoever might lead the other
would unquestionably follow. It required very
little sagacity to penetrate this subject. It was
easily foreseen that this measure would be employed
to detach us from our neutral situation,
which it was so much our interest, and had
been so much our desire, to maintain. This
apprehension experience has realized. We now
feel the consequences in their fullest extent.
After we had become the dupes of French
perfidy, by putting in force the non-importation
system against Great Britain, under the belief,
that on the first day of November, 1810, the decrees
of Berlin and Milan were repealed, the
falsehood of which has since been placed beyond
all rational doubt, it happened as had been
anticipated, that finding the inefficiency of the
restrictive system against Great Britain, the
nation was called on, about the commencement
of last session, to assume a threatening attitude
towards that power. We were then told by
the supporters of our foreign policy, that war
would not be necessary. That justice was withheld
from us by the Government of that nation
under the impression that force would not be
used to maintain our rights, which impression
it was only necessary to remove by manifesting
a determined spirit in making warlike preparations.
This prevailed with many, and the army
was voted. But it did not intimidate our enemy.
We were then told, that it was necessary
to declare war, as affording conclusive evidence
of our sincerity: but that it would not be necessary
to continue it beyond a few weeks,
when our objects would be attained by a just
and honorable peace. We were also told, at
the same time, that in six weeks after the
declaration of war, we should be in possession
of a great portion of the enemy's colonies. All
these promises have been disappointed. We
have effected nothing by commercial restrictions,
nothing by arms, and nothing by negotiation;
and, if there is not a change in our
policy, the war promises to be perpetual.
Having detained you thus long with these
preliminary topics, permit me to draw your attention
to those that grow directly out of the
bill before the committee. I have said, that
the causes ought not only to be just, but important
in their effect on the community, to justify
a resort to arms. I will say more. A nation
situated as this is, who has so much to lose, and
so little to gain, ought not to relinquish its
peaceful state but in the last extremity. Are
the causes which existed at the time when this
war was declared, of that character which, according
to this idea, justified its commencement;
and are those now remaining sufficient to sanction
its continuance?
I exclude all consideration of the abstract
justice of our complaints against Great Britain.
Upon that subject I never had but one opinion.
I always did believe that her conduct towards
this country was not only unjust as it affected
us, but impolitic as it affected herself.
Before the war commenced last Summer, the
Orders in Council formed the principal ground
of complaint against Great Britain. I venture
to assert, without the dread of contradiction,
that if the repeal which has since taken place
had happened and been known here before we
resorted to the sword, we should have remained
at peace. I make this declaration on (what I
deem) the most unquestionable authority. The
proof is on record. In 1808, Mr. Jefferson,
then President of the United States, through
our Minister in London, proposed to the British
Government to relinquish the embargo as to
her, on condition the Orders in Council were
revoked. In 1809, Mr. Madison entered into
the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, which made
the same condition the sole foundation for restoring
amicable intercourse between the two
nations. In 1810 and 1811, the discussions between
our Government and that of Great Britain
were confined almost exclusively to that
subject. And in 1812, preceding the declaration
of war, the Secretary of State informed
the British Envoy, that if the Orders in Council
were revoked, the non-importation act would
cease immediately. During the whole of this
period, our complaints were directed to the
Orders in Council, and our measures, (I speak
of our restrictive system,) so far as they affected
Great Britain, were adopted with a single eye
to their repeal. Until the war was declared, I
did not suppose that it would be waged for any
other object.
The Orders in Council, though a violation of
our maritime rights in point of principle, were
practically of very little injury to our commerce
at the commencement of the war in
which we are now engaged. The reasons are
obvious. Our commerce to France, Holland,
Italy, &c., never was of great importance.
And the effect of the French "municipal regulations"
had caused it to dwindle into insignificance.
The exclusions, restrictions, impositions,
and confiscations, so permanent in the
commercial code (and practice) of Napoleon,
had inspired our merchants with a due portion
of caution, how they ventured their property
into the power of a Government actuated by no
liberal principle, and bound by no faith. From
this state of things, it was not difficult to conjecture
that the period was not distant when
Great Britain must become convinced of the inefficiency
of the Orders in Council, so far as
respected their retaliatory object on her enemy.
How could France be distressed by the British
interdiction of her foreign commerce, when
France herself was hostile to that commerce—when
she adopted every measure to narrow, to
shackle, and ultimately to exclude it? We
had even strong evidence that British statesmen
began to waver on the subject. The vote in the
House of Commons, during the last Winter,
showed a minority unusually strong, and indicated
most clearly that before long the Orders
in Council were doomed to perish. But, with
this information before our eyes, we hurried on
to war without waiting for the event, or even
without waiting for preparation.
The Orders in Council have since been repealed.
The manner has indeed been objected
to by the honorable Speaker, (Mr. Clay,) because
the right to secure them in certain events
is reserved. But surely this cannot be and has
not been considered by our Government a serious
objection; for without such reservation the
power to revive them existed to every possible
extent. The only question is, do they cease to
violate our neutral commerce? This is not
doubted. The remaining obstacle, therefore,
to a good understanding between the two nations,
and the sole ostensible cause for persevering
in the war, is the subject of impressments.
This is, indeed, a difficult and unquestionably
an interesting subject. Not that I place entire
confidence in the sympathetic descriptions of
the magnitude of the evil, which we have so
often heard and daily heard in this House. I
am inclined to believe fancy has colored the
picture too highly. There is one reason, above
all others, which leads me to that conclusion.
It is this: In that section of the United States
of which two-thirds of our seamen are natives,
there is a strong, overwhelming current of opinion
against this war. Can it be possible that
the country where dwells the kindred of those
who are said to be incarcerated in great numbers
in the "floating dungeons" of Great Britain
is not only indifferent about the fate of its
children, but opposes, as ruinous, the war
waged for their protection? It is certainly a
curious spectacle to see the defenders of seamen's
rights come from those portions of the
Union that have little commerce, and few, if
any, seamen. I do not mean to insinuate that
those gentlemen do wrong in espousing the
cause of the oppressed, to whatever quarter
they may belong; but I state the fact to show
that their sympathies may possibly have magnified
the evil—and to infer from it, that the
opposition of those most immediately interested
is to be ascribed, not to their insensibility, but
to their apprehensions that this war, instead of
securing seamen's rights, will banish their seamen
into foreign service.
The controversy between this country and
Great Britain seems to have been brought to a
single point. She claims the service of her
seafaring subjects in time of danger. Our Government
admits this right. To give effect to
the right thus claimed and admitted, she insists
that her officers may go on board our merchant
ships on the high seas, or in her ports—search
for and take her subjects. This our Government
deny, and claim the immunity of the flag
so far as persons are concerned; because, under
the pretext of taking British subjects, American
citizens are frequently taken. It does, indeed,
not distinctly appear in the late communication
from our Executive to the British
Government, that they mean by the terms
American citizens, whether it includes naturalized
persons as well as natives. With respect
to those of the first description, I confess I feel
no great interest for their immunity abroad or
on the high seas; I am one of those who think
that we act sufficiently liberal when we offer
them any asylum from the oppression or poverty
of their own country, receive them into
our bosom, and extend to them all the advantages
belonging to us; and so long as they remain
within our territorial limits, they shall,
with my consent, have the full benefit of the
protection which our laws afford to all. But I
cannot consent that the native blood of this
country shall be profusely wasted to protect
aliens born, wherever they may ramble. We
all profess a deep solicitude for the interest of
seamen. To describe their distresses and to
eulogize their valor and patriotism, is one of
the topics of the day. And yet we are contending
for principles which, if successful, will
bring a host of foreigners in competition with
them to elbow them out of employment. But
it is said that Great Britain does the same—that
by the act passed during the reign of
George II., foreign seamen are naturalized who
have been in the King's service for two years,
and that she has no right to object if we imitate
her conduct. It is true she has adopted
such a regulation. But I have never heard of
any instance where she has contended that such
a person is absolved from his natural allegiance,
if he comes within the power of his original
sovereign. I have understood that act to
mean that such persons should become entitled
to certain rights—not absolved from any duties
towards others, should they leave the country.
That they should have the right to hold lands—be
admitted under the regulations of the navigation
act as British seamen on board merchant
ships, and participate in the pension and hospital
provisions. Should I be mistaken, however,
I am not inclined to relinquish my opinion,
merely because the practice of Great Britain
is opposed to it.
Sir, I do not find fault with the Administration
for insisting on the immunity of our flag,
as it respects the seamen. I approve of the
principle. It is of that character which at a
proper time and with proper means is (in effect
and to all general purposes) attainable, if we do
not by ill-timed and imprudent efforts frustrate
it. It is supposed that the present is the auspicious
moment to insist on our rights. That
pressed as Great Britain is by the most powerful
enemy the world ever saw, who threatens
her very existence; the impression which we
can make upon her by our arms, will be greater
than at any other time. This very circumstance
renders the attainment of our object more difficult,
and makes our case hopeless. Her danger
forbids a compliance with our demands. In
her present struggle, her naval power constitutes
her security. Without that she would
long since have become a French province.
This every man in England knows and feels. It
is well known that four-fifths of her seamen on
board her navy render not voluntary but compulsory
service. Should this principle be established,
which in all cases would afford a
secure asylum in our merchant ships, it is
dreaded by British statesmen and the British
people, that their seamen, allured by higher
wages and easier employment, would abandon
their service, and thus render their country accessible
to their enemy. Hence you see every
Ministry, of whatever political party or distinction,
tremblingly alive to this subject. They
dare not touch it in the present state of that
country. No man could maintain his power a
moment after having hazarded the public safety
by making an experiment, the effect of which
could not be foreseen, and may be productive
of such disastrous consequences. This spirit is
manifest in all the communications from the British
Cabinet to our Government. We have seen
the sentiments of Lord Grenville, Lord Auckland,
Lord Holland, and Mr. Fox, men whose prepossessions
were in our favor, and who on almost
every other subject supported our pretensions.
On this subject they resisted our demands, because
they dared not grant them. While I conceive
the claims of our Government as not going
too far, I doubt their prudence as to the
time and manner of giving them effect. I fear
that instead of realizing our wishes the measures
pursued are calculated to deprive us of
every hope hereafter. In the present unexampled
state of the world, according to my limited
conception of our true interest, we ought to
have seriously avoided all hostile collision with
foreign powers. We ought to have cherished
the resources within our grasp. Nothing is
more obvious than the remark made by the
honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr.
Bleecker,) that, with all the injuries which we
received from the belligerents, our commerce
was more extensive and more profitable in the
aggregate than if Europe had been at peace.
We might have obtained (and we ought not to
have rejected) such temporary arrangements
with England, (with whom our commerce was
chiefly carried on,) which, though they did not
embrace all our interests, would have secured
those of first importance and kept us at peace.
The benefits of such a policy are to my mind
self-evident. Should Europe be restored to
tranquillity and assume something like its former
appearance, (and I do not believe the present
state of things durable,) we should have
been able to have effected every valuable object,
because such a change will probably bring with
it a respect for the rights of nations, which
have now no existence but in name. And
should an imposing attitude have been wanting
to give effect to our claims, we should have exhibited
an unbroken spirit and unexhausted resources.
An honorable member from Tennessee, (Mr.
Grundy,) the other day, read some extracts
from the instructions transmitted to our Minister
in London, in 1792. His object was to
show the deep interest which the great man
who then presided over this nation felt on the
subject of impressments. I sincerely wish that
while gentlemen resort to his opinions to support
theirs, they would consent to imitate his
conduct. Nothing can be more strikingly different
than his policy and that which is now
pursued.
In 1793 the subject of impressments did not
form the only complaint against Great Britain.
The Treaty of Peace remained unexecuted on
her part. To that was added the great injury
which our commerce sustained by the extensive
captures made by her cruisers during that year.
The interest which was felt for the success of
the French Revolution, against which Great
Britain had arrayed herself, tended to excite the
nation, even beyond the measure of its wrongs,
and ripen it for war. But the wisdom of Washington
saved us from being drawn into the
vortex, which has since devoured all who approached
it. His genius considered the true
interests of his country to consist in the preservation
of its peace; and he had firmness
enough to preserve it, though opposed by the
strong feelings of the people. Notwithstanding
the accumulated wrongs which we had received,
he sent a messenger of peace, and ultimately
gave his assent to a treaty in which
there was not one stipulation even to restrain
the abuses of impressments, which the year
before he had declared could not be longer tolerated.
Why was this done by him, who, to say
the least, had as much affection for his country's
rights, as the politicians of the present day—whom
fear never influenced—and who could
safely calculate on the support of the people,
should he resort to arms? The answer is
obvious. Peace upon almost any terms was
better than a hopeless, endless contest. What
a contrast does his example present to the
conduct of those who now direct the destinies
of this nation, and who, while they reject
his policy, resort to his opinions to support their
own?
Upon the subject of foreign war, and the objects
connected with it, the opinions of gentlemen
of the majority have certainly undergone
a strange revolution since they came into power.
Little more than twelve years ago, they deprecated
foreign war as inconsistent with the spirit
of our institutions, and the genius of our Government.
Nothing short of self-defence, when
attacked in our own country, was considered
as a justification for abandoning our peaceful
pursuits, and mingling in hostility with European
powers. Every other object was deemed
subordinate to the preservation of peace, because
with it was connected every benefit which
it had pleased Providence to bestow upon us,
and which our detached situation rendered secure.
We now hear those very gentlemen talk
of Rome and Greece in their proudest days,
when they inspired terror into the inhabitants
of distant climes and carried their arms to every
quarter of the globe; and their example is held
up for our imitation. The almost boundless
extent of our territory is become too limited,
and we hear of conquests in the North and
South, as essential to our security and happiness.
In taking a retrospect, and contrasting
former opinions with present conduct, a person
would almost be inclined to distrust his observation,
was there not left on record monuments
with sentiments of former times entertained
by gentlemen in the days of humility,
when they were struggling against power.
Permit me to call your attention to a resolution
of the Virginia Assembly, adopted in 1798,
said to be draughted by Mr. Madison, now
President of the United States, upon this subject.
It was then considered the standard of
Republican opinion, by all who professed to be
of that party. It in substance declares, that
though the General Assembly view with indignation
the violations of our commerce, the impressment
of our seamen, and other wrongs
committed by foreign nations, yet detached as
the United States are from European concerns,
they should deprecate a war waged for any
other object except self-defence, in cases of actual
invasion. This resolution had an eye to
our relations with France, from whom we had
then received every injury and indignity she
could inflict, and with whom we were in a state
of partial hostility; but it explicitly declares,
that we ought to engage in offensive war, for
no object whatever. Let the sentiment be
compared with the conduct of the same men
now they are in power.
Sir, I am one of those who doubt our capacity
to obtain the conquest of the British provinces.
I believe that the opinion, that we are
a very powerful nation abroad, is a fanciful
delusion. To be powerful abroad, requires a
Government of sufficient energy, not only to
bring into action all the physical and pecuniary
resources of the country, but to command them
promptly. The very nature of our Government,
where every thing depends immediately
upon the people, forbids the idea that you can
effect one or the other. The inconveniences
and privations to which they must be subjected,
are sufficient causes with the great body of
the community, who do not perceive very distinctly
how they are to be benefited by an offensive
war, to turn their faces against it.
Their Representatives, knowing their feelings,
dare not press them with a heavy hand, which
at once destroys every thing like energy. Besides,
the want of promptitude, the characteristic
defect of such a Government, whose powers
are divided into many hands, prevents the resources
even within their reach to be obtained
and applied in time to insure success. The
consequence of all this is—imbecility in obtaining,
and want of celerity in applying the
necessary means. This may be considered as
a very great evil, particularly to those who have
presented to us the example of Rome in her
proudest days, when she was mistress of the
world, for our imitation. Sir, I rejoice that
such is the state of my country. It is the legitimate
offspring of our free institutions. The
people are strong and the Government is weak;
whenever this state of things shall be reversed,
then shall we be able to inspire terror into other
nations. But until that period shall arrive, we
shall exhibit weakness and slowness of action,
as to all offensive and external purposes.
To retain the British provinces as an indemnity
for our losses, is an event which I cannot
wish, because I can see no possible benefit resulting
from it. Have we not already territory
enough? Is it desirable to incorporate with us
a people composed of heterogeneous materials,
who are not only unaccustomed to our institutions,
but many of whom entertain an unconquerable
hatred for them? I believe it would
have been better had we never acquired any
foreign territory at all. If we had been contented
with the limits embraced by the old thirteen
United States, the prospects of remaining
a united people, and preserving our free institutions,
would, in my conception, be much more
flattering. I am, therefore, opposed to new acquisitions.
But it is repeatedly urged that the
possession of Canada is necessary to secure us
from the hostilities of the savage tribes on our
northwestern borders; was this the fact, I
might yield my assent to prosecute the war to
attain that object. But experience has shown
that we can have peace with them, though
Canada is in the possession of a foreign power.
For seventeen years after the Treaty of Greenville
we were entirely exempt from Indian hostilities;
and not until we waged war ourselves,
did they become troublesome upon our frontiers.
My apprehensions are not solely confined to
the danger resulting from military power; there
are other consequences equally to be dreaded,
which I fear may overwhelm us, should we
continue in this course. There is one peculiarly
delicate, but equally important—so delicate,
that gentlemen have supposed it ought not even
to be mentioned. Sir, shall I not be permitted
to point to the yawning gulf beneath? Shall
I not attempt to arrest your progress in the path
where lies a serpent that will sting you to death?
I deprecate disunion as an event pregnant with
every evil. The moment it happens, civil liberty
is banished from this country. I feel deeply
interested that it should not happen. Permit
me, however, to observe, that a union is connected
by a consciousness which is felt that the
various interests of the different sections are
consulted and protected, and not by force. If
you wish to perpetuate the Union, you must
preserve that opinion. The moment that it
shall no longer exist, the ties that bind us together
become feeble indeed. The present
war, though ostensibly waged for principles in
which the Northern and Eastern people have a
deep interest, is considered by them—and they
certainly understand their interest best—as calculated
to prostrate it. They feel the evils of
your measures daily, and they see no prospect
that they ever will be benefited by them. The
physical power of the country is in their hands,
and it requires nothing but public sentiment,
which quickly follows public interest, and you
ripen them for a state of things most of all to
be deprecated. I hope we shall avert the evil
by banishing the cause of discontent.
Besides the immediate physical evils which
present themselves as probably resulting from
our measures, there are other moral evils which
I must dread. Our Government was made to
secure the happiness of the people, and every
thing which even remotely is calculated to impair
their moral sense, will have an effect upon
their situation. When the people shall become
attached to principles inconsistent with morality,
or with their tranquil, civil pursuits,
their prosperity and their freedom are at hazard.
The spirit of conquest and of military
glory, however fascinating, is baneful to the
prosperity and liberty of every country. This
spirit has shown itself in our country, of late,
in an unusual degree. We have become tired
of the peaceful character of our pursuits;
and we want nothing but success on this first
attempt to encourage us to become a great military
nation, attempting conquest in every quarter.
Whenever that happens, we shall share
the destiny of other nations. When the same
spirit and the same councils prevail, the misery
of the mass of the people is the support of the
national glory.
One of the evils which I dread, as attending
the war, and in my opinion not the least, Mr.
Chairman, is, that we have united our exertions
with the efforts of the great destroyer of mankind,
who, having prostrated the independence
of almost every nation on the continent of Europe,
has drawn us into our present situation,
to assist him in humbling his remaining enemy,
whose destruction is, above all others, nearest
his heart. I do not believe that gentlemen are
so far lost to all sense of their country's interest,
as designedly to unite the destiny of this nation
with him, who lives only to destroy. I believe
them, when they declare that such is not their
intention. But we are united in fact. His ostensible
object is the liberty of the seas: so is
ours. His successes are our successes, and his
defeats are our defeats. Being thus associated in
fact—having one common object—if the war
continues any time, we shall be associated in
name also. When pressed beyond our present
expectation by our enemy, we shall not make
any difficulty in submitting to arrangements
which may appear to us advantageous, but
which are calculated to fasten us to the car of
the conqueror. We may want men to enable
us to obtain the object of our offensive operations
in the North; France can furnish them.
We may want ships to defend our coast; we
can obtain them from the same quarter. But,
for these things, we must stipulate an equivalent;
and what can that be, but to unite in
striking England from the list of independent
nations?
Mr. Robertson.—Mr. Chairman, I am well
aware that the House will listen (if it listens at
all) with much reluctance to a further discussion
of the subject under consideration. Nevertheless,
it is my intention explicitly, but concisely
to state some of the reasons, which influence
me to support the measure proposed; some
of the views connected with them, which command
my approbation, and induce my aid. Sir,
I propose to make a few remarks on the bill itself,
and subsequently, without following gentlemen
in the wide and expansive range of argumentative,
declamatory, and defamatory eloquence,
in which they have thought fit to indulge,
to reply to some of the observations which
struck me with most force, and which my
memory still retains.
The honorable Chairman of the Committee on
Military Affairs is entitled to the thanks of this
House, and of the nation, for the able and lucid
exposition he has given, of the plan intended to
be pursued by the Government in the prosecution
of the war in which we are engaged, and of
the objects for the attainment of which an increase
of the Military Establishment is deemed
necessary. What is that plan, and what are the
objects in contemplation? The power of the
nation is to be called out; a portion for a defence
of our seacoast and extensive frontier; the
residue to be sent forth to battle against our implacable
foe, to drive him from the American
continent, and thus to insure our future peace,
if not our Union and independence. These objects
are avowed, and efforts and energy are
necessary to their success.
The propriety of defending our country can
be denied by none. This proposition is clear.
Even the gentlemen on the other side of the
House (as it is fashionable to speak) do not oppose
it. For myself I do not hesitate to say, it
presses itself on my feelings with irresistible
force. When I take into consideration the exposed
situation of the people whom it is my
pride and honor to represent, when I view them
surrounded by numerous and warlike tribes of
Indians, skirted by strongholds in the possession
of a nation devoted to our foe, containing
in the bosom of their country a class of beings
always on the watch to overwhelm them in
ruin, I lose sight of other considerations, and
am compelled to urge, as I do most earnestly,
that no obstacles may be thrown in the way of
our complete protection. I have lived for some
years in the country to which I have called
your attention. I have not been altogether an
inattentive observer, nor indifferent to its interests.
The neglected state of the militia under
the territorial government, its present unorganized
and unarmed state, have not escaped
my notice. But we must "blame the culture,
not the soil." The inhabitants are brave, expert
in the management of the horse and in the
use of arms. The materials are good. It is unnecessary
to dwell on these, or to mention other
circumstances of an internal nature. Suffice it
to be observed, our situation is insecure. I have
stated, sir, that we are surrounded by numerous
and warlike tribes of Indians. I will not recount
their numbers, nor blazon their powers
of doing mischief. Those facts are too notorious
to require repetition. I have stated that
strongholds in our immediate neighborhood are
in the possession of a people devoted to our
enemy. The Spaniards on our eastern frontier
are under their perfect control. They considered
the English as fighting for the independence
of Spain, their native country, their religion,
and their King. In their towns an extensive
British trade is carried on, and from their
ports, where they refit, issue forth the armed
vessels of that nation to the annoyance of the
commerce of our country. The Indians too are
excited against us. On my journey from New
Orleans to this place, passing through the Creek
confederacy, I received certain information that
the Spanish commandant at St. Marks had assured
them that their friends the British were
expected soon in considerable force at that
place and at Pensacola, and that they should be
furnished with arms and other munitions of
war to be used against the Americans. Sir,
humanity to that people, as well as the irresistible
claims we have to protection, require that
a force should be stationed on the Mobile and
Mississippi sufficient to prevent the effect of
British and Spanish machination, or to throw
back on themselves the evils of hostility.
I now proceed to examine some of the objections
which have been made, not to the bill,
but to the further prosecution of the war. The
war is denounced as unconstitutional, cruel,
the effect of French influence, and as intended
to place James II. on the throne of America.
In making the first objection, gentlemen could
not have been serious; they could not have expected
that it would have been deemed worthy
of an answer. The power to make war belongs
to all nations; is of the essence of Government;
but the Constitution of the United States gives
it expressly, in so many words: "The Congress
shall have power to declare war, to raise and
support armies." Whether the war be defensive
or offensive, depends on circumstance and
accident, but cannot affect the right. If war be
defensive and offensive, still the whole is equal
to its parts. But to what does this doctrine
lead? Do gentlemen believe it to be true?
Then it becomes their duty to move for the appointment
of a committee to inquire into the
circumstances of the capture of the Macedonian,
and if it be discovered that she was taken at
more than a marine league from the shore, to
cashier the American officer, declare the attack
and capture unconstitutional, and restore the
vessel to her former master. Then an enterprise,
giving rise to a new era in maritime history,
and entwining round the brows of the
United States a wreath of imperishable laurel,
turns out to be a violation of that instrument
on the sacredness of which depends the Union
and happiness of America. The war is not unconstitutional,
nor can it, by any possibility, be
so considered.
But it is said that, as the Orders in Council
are repealed, the question of impressment is the
only one in controversy between the United
States and Great Britain; and, on the subject, the
honorable gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr.
Pearson,) has, without difficulty, settled principles
about which jurists have differed in opinion.
He contends that individuals cannot divest
themselves of their allegiance; that the
right of expatriation does not exist; that the
practice of naturalization is wrong. These
opinions are as erroneous as they are repugnant
to every principle of human liberty, and owe
their origin to feudal times and feudal States;
times and States, the prolific sources of the
vilest principles in politics and morals.
I believe that every civilized nation under
the sun is in the practice of naturalizing foreigners.
The omnipotent Parliament of Great
Britain exercises this right. The rights of all
independent nations are equal. Whatever
course Great Britain pursues in relation to the
subjects or citizens of other countries, these
countries are authorized to pursue in relation to
the subjects of Great Britain. Whatever her
admirers may say to the contrary, if she does
not acknowledge, she is compelled to act in
conformity to this principle. Where is there in
her history an example of her punishing as a
traitor, a Briton naturalized by a foreign Government,
although found in arms against her?
If a subject could not divest himself of his natural
allegiance; if once a subject always a subject,
were true, how is it that Napper Tandy
was suffered to escape punishment? Why was
he not hanged as a traitor? He was born in
Ireland, became a French citizen, served in war
against his native country, was taken, tried, and
found guilty of high treason; but when a terrible
retaliation was threatened by France, in the
event of his execution, that nation, which never
yields to threats, restored him to his then
adopted country.
But gentlemen are opposed to the further
prosecution of the war. Do they contend that
the causes which rendered it necessary have
been removed? Have we obtained the objects
for which it was commenced? Is the new and
before unheard-of system of blockade abandoned?
A system which, under the pretence of
being a military measure, was converted into a
commercial scheme beneficial to the belligerents,
and destructive alone to the rights of the
neutrals. Have our citizens been restored to
their country? Is any disposition evidenced to
omit tearing them from their homes and families
in future? What will be the consequence
of laying down our arms, of shrinking from our
present attitude? We are at the feet of Great
Britain: and after having for years attempted
in vain to obtain justice, we are to recommence
fruitless negotiation. Admit that we are unable
to enforce our demands, to support our independence,
that we cannot carry on war, that
the friends of the British Government in this
country (to use their own expression) will not
permit us; in such a situation, with such admission,
to expect justice would be folly in the extreme.
England would return to her habitual
spoliations, would re-establish that state precisely
the most beneficial to herself, the most
injurious to us: infinitely better to her than
peace on fair terms, for then the opportunity
would be lost of feeding and enriching her navy
at our expense; better than war, as the numerous
prizes brought into her ports of late very
clearly prove. Formerly the losses were exclusively
ours. Yes, sir, willingly would she return
to, and forever continue, her former career of
depredation; and the next ten years would add
another thousand to the thousand American
vessels already carried into her ports.
Too long did we suffer disgrace and degradation.
Peace, with all its blessings, may be enjoyed
at too dear a price. But yet, while it
was possible to preserve it, we shut our eyes
against the most flagrant injuries; we affected
not to hear the loudest insults. Peace was congenial
to our habits, favorable to the principles
of our Government. It was not to be apprehended
it would be, nor cannot be now believed
that it was wantonly abandoned. Whilst tranquillity
prevailed it was wise to dwell on its advantages.
Now, that in spite of all our efforts
we are at war, it is well to inquire whether circumstances
may not grow out of it favorable to
our future happiness and prosperity.
The British possessions in America present
themselves to our view and invite a conquest.
I am struck with the contrariety of opinion
which prevails among gentlemen. Some of
them speak of the country as barren, the climate
as inclement, the inhabitants thereby scattered
over the face of the territory. If this be
true, it will not be considered as worth defending,
and as by its loss Britain loses nothing, the
sympathy which she seems to have excited, and
the doleful jeremiads to which her anticipated
disasters have given rise, are as unnecessary as
they are misplaced. But others say, no doubt
from its importance to its European sovereign
it will be defended to the last extremity; that
the United States cannot take it; that the army
we propose to send into the field will prove insufficient.
When gentlemen differ so widely,
no satisfactory conclusion can be drawn from
their opinions. Sir, Canada will be defended,
and it is from a belief of that fact, and from a
knowledge of the force which Great Britain
may bring into the field, that the troops now
demanded become necessary. We have heard
an estimate of that force too often to be again
repeated. It has lost nothing of its magnitude
and importance. Its valor has received the
highest praise, and we are triumphantly asked
if we expect to intimidate Great Britain.
Sir, none but cowards calculate on the cowardice
of their foe. We do not expect to intimidate
her. We expect to meet her armies in
the field and to vanquish them. The power of
Britain must be extinguished in America. She
must no longer be permitted to corrupt the
principles and to disturb the peace and tranquillity
of our citizens. Our frontier inhabitants
must not be kept in dread and danger from her
Indian allies. And never shall we be secure
among ourselves, and exempt from the mischievous
intrigues of Europeans, until European
power is expelled across the Atlantic. The
gentleman from Massachusetts says, that Canada
entered into the scheme of the war. It
certainly does now enter into the scheme of the
war. Sir, no citizen of the United States would
have given his consent to an unprovoked attack
on that country merely for the purpose of getting
possession of it. But I do, for one, rejoice
that, under present circumstances, we thus have
an opportunity afforded us, not only to make
our enemy feel our power, but to drive him
from this continent, and to remove one of the
most frequent causes of war among nations—neighborhood
and contiguity. The evils of
peace, on the terms of gentlemen in opposition,
cannot be borne. Let us then, with firmness,
persevere in the contest in which we are engaged,
until it can be terminated on principles
compatible with the rights and honor of the
nation.
The committee now rose, reported progress,
and obtained leave to sit again.
Additional Military Force.
The House again resolved itself into Committee
of the Whole, on the bill to raise an additional
army of twenty thousand men, for one
year.
Mr. Emott addressed the Chair as follows:
Mr. Chairman: I mean no common-place remark,
when I declare to you, that I address you
on the subjects which have been brought into
this debate, and as I think properly so brought,
with great reluctance. My general deportment
since I have been honored with a seat on this
floor, is sufficient evidence to you and the committee
that I feel an unwillingness to mingle in
the war of words which is carried on here.
There are causes which add to this repugnance
on the present occasion. The debate has been
continued for such a length of time, and in part
has been conducted with so much asperity, that
the minds of all have become fatigued, and the
passions of many inflamed. I know, and I duly
appreciate the difficulties which, under such
circumstances, surround and face the speaker.
But, sir, there are considerations of public duty,
and individual propriety, which urge, nay, demand
of me, to ask your patience, and the indulgence
of the House, while I present to you
and to them my view of the great subjects involved
in this discussion.
Mr. Chairman, I am aware that, in the discussion
I am about commencing, I shall render
myself obnoxious to the wit of gentlemen who
think that, to bring into view other topics than
those which arise out of the details of the bill
now on your table, is to go beyond the range of
legitimate debate. The bill contemplates the
raising an additional military force of twenty
thousand men; thus increasing the Military Establishment,
or the standing army of the country,
to upwards of fifty-five thousand men.
Now, sir, with the details of this bill I have
nothing to do. Nay, I will confess to you that
I like the bill as it stands, providing for enlistments
for one year only, better than I should
were it amended, as has been proposed, by
prolonging the terms, precisely for the reason
that the force will be less efficient and dangerous,
and more under legislative control. I meddle
not with the fitness of the instrument.
That is the business of other men; but, being
opposed to the continuance of the war offensively,
as I was to its commencement, I cannot
consent to grant any further force to carry it
on. The only check, or control, which the
Legislature can constitutionally have over a
war after it is begun, is in withholding the
means; and, in voting the means, either in men
or money, every member of the Legislature
ought to be satisfied of the necessity of prosecuting
the war.
According to my best judgment, sir, this war
was improperly commenced, and it is unnecessarily
continued; and I shall now proceed to
explain the grounds of that judgment by an examination
of the causes of the war, as they existed
at its commencement, and as they now remain.
As this is the first time the subject has
been brought into debate, and, indeed, the
earliest opportunity which has been allowed, of
an open discussion, I am sure I shall be pardoned
for going into detail, if I even should be tedious,
as I know I shall be uninteresting. It is a
right which I think I may claim, to state distinctly
my reasons and motives for the votes
which I have given, and may give, in relation
to the war, after what has been said in this
House, and out of it, about the opposition to the
views of the Administration.
In making this examination, I shall pass in
review, in as brief a manner as possible, the
three great subjects of complaint against Great
Britain; her orders of blockade, her Orders in
Council, and her practice of impressment. But
for one or all of these, the war certainly would
not have been declared; and I may assume that,
for but one or all of these, the war ought not
to be continued. I cannot, indeed, but recollect,
that the gentleman from Louisiana has
mentioned the conquest of Canada, and of the
Floridas, as causes for the continuance of the
war. As respects the Canadas, I have heretofore
understood that their reduction might
be a consequence of the war, but never until
now did I know that it was to be shifted into
a cause for carrying it on. And, in regard to
the Floridas, I will not consent that their conquest
should, in the existing relations of this
country, be either a cause or consequence of
war. I will confess to you, that an invasion
of the colonies of Spain at this time, under the
stale excuses of convenience or necessity, strikes
me with abhorrence. It is not only against
the genius of our Government, and, as I hope,
the character of our people, but, if persisted
in, will be a foul blot in our national history.
[Here the speaker entered into an elaborate documentary
investigation to show that the Decree of
Blockade, and the Orders in Council, were not adequate
causes for war at the time it was declared—and
that both these causes had since ceased to exist, the
Orders in Council having been revoked, and the
fictitious, or paper blockades, discontinued.]
Impressment of Seamen.—The injury done to
our seamen under the British practice of impressment,
was also made a cause of the war,
and to the eye, at least, it is the only one which
now remains.
Mr. Chairman, the discussion of this subject
is attended with adventitious difficulties, growing
out of the times and the state of the country.
The public mind, in some sections of the
Union, is in such a feverish state on this account,
from tales oft told of bondage worse
than negro slavery, and of condemnation without
trial, that the person who is willing to
"hear the other party," is at once branded
with foreign partialities, and threatened with
the trial by mob. Besides, sir, it is intimated
that a negotiation is to be had, or may possibly
be attempted, which may be affected by
an open discussion of the topic. In point of
duty, I feel myself called upon to take some
notice of the subject, but my view of it will
be less perfect than in a different situation I
should think desirable.
The President, in the war Message, thus introduces
the subject: "British cruisers have
been in the continued practice of violating the
American flag on the great highway of nations,
and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing
under it; not in the exercise of a belligerent
right, founded on the law of nations against an
enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over
British subjects." As this does not present the
case in its true light, I shall, for the purpose of
fairly bringing to view the conflicting claims of
the two nations, give you an extract from the
letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Monroe, of the 5th
of January, 1804, containing instructions for a
treaty with Great Britain: "With this exception,
(persons in the military service of an enemy)
we consider a neutral flag on the high seas,
as a safeguard to those sailing under it. Great
Britain, on the contrary, asserts a right to search
for and seize her own subjects; and under that
cover, as cannot but happen, are often seized
and taken off, citizens of the United States, and
citizens or subjects of other neutral countries,
navigating the high seas, under the protection
of the American flag."
The claim, then, on the part of the British is,
that in time of war they have a right to enter
neutral merchant vessels on the high seas, to
search for and seize their subjects, being seamen.
On our part it is, that on the high seas
the flag shall cover and protect all sailing under
it, whether British subjects or American citizens.
These are distinctly the claims of right
on the part of the two nations, and I shall so
consider them, without regard to practice apart
from right.
One or two remarks, sir, before I enter upon
the subject. The first is, that I do not mean to
moot the point, relative to the rights of our
naturalized citizens, or the extent of our duties
towards them. But this I will say, that I am
willing to give them all the protection which
the situation of the country and its true interests
will justify. I know that the unruly passions
and the meddling dispositions of some
foreigners, have raised prejudices in the minds
of many persons against all foreigners. But I
know, also, and I speak without reference to
political opinions or prejudices, that among our
naturalized citizens are to be found men, and
many men, too, of great worth and respectability,
and who are extensively useful to the country.
These men have my good will, and it is
certainly my wish, that they should be fostered
and protected, as far as it can be done, without
putting at hazard the great interests and the
permanent welfare of the country. But, sir,
to this class of our citizens, the claim that they
are to be protected on the high seas by our
flag, is really of little importance. Our claim
never was, and I am sure never will be, that
they are to be protected, if they put themselves
within the power of their former Sovereign,
by going to his ports, or placing themselves on
his territories. And yet such is the state of
the commerce of the world, that it can scarcely
happen in a mercantile voyage, in this or the
other hemisphere, that the vessel will not at
some time be in a British port, and the crew
on British ground; our right of flag will not
then save our adopted citizens from impressment.
For the slight benefit, therefore, to our
naturalized citizens, which can arise under our
claim, if established, I am sure the well-meaning
and reasonable part of them will not ask
the country to continue the war on their account.
Another remark which I wish to make is, that
I am most decidedly the friend, nay, sir, if you
please, the partisan, of the seamen of the country.
I have no doubt that this nation is destined
to be a great maritime power; and that, in
times not very far distant, we are to owe our
prosperity, as a commercial people, and possibly,
under Providence, our security, to our
seamen. I am therefore a friend to "seamen's
rights," properly understood and fairly enforced;
but this shall not blind me to the rights of
others. Besides, in a war to be carried on for
seamen alone, and that, too, on the abstract
question of the right of flag, I can see great
danger to the seamen in their just claims to
protection; and, I must beg their friends, in
and out of this House, to reflect before they
act. As surely as the war is continued on this
ground alone, so surely will seamen become
unpopular, and their rights be neglected. When
the evils of the war press upon the country,
and press they will; when the many lives sacrificed,
and the countless millions expended, shall
be brought to view, is it not to be apprehended
that seamen and their claim will be remembered,
only as the cause of the scenes of expense
and blood through which we are to pass? It
is not dealing fairly with our seamen, to make
them the scape-goats of this war.
The British then claim the right, in time of
war, to take their seamen out of neutral merchant
vessels on the high seas.
Is this claim a novel one? That the claim
is novel, is certainly intimated by the Committee
of Foreign Relations, when they say that
the impressment of which we complain, is "a
practice which has been unceasingly maintained
by Great Britain in the wars to which she
has been a party since our Revolution." Indeed,
it has been most roundly asserted, and by
many it is believed, that the British claim was
made for the first time after our war; that it
originated in views hostile to our commerce
and maritime rights; and that in practice it is
only brought to bear upon us. In truth, however,
whatever may be the justice of the claim,
it is not a recent one. It has, in a greater or
less degree, been practised on in all the wars in
which England has been engaged for the two
last centuries.
The instructions to armed ships are not frequently
made public; but it so happens, that
we have in print an instruction on this very
point, given in 1646, by the Earl of Northumberland,
Lord High Admiral of England, to Sir
John Pennington, which goes beyond the present
claim: "As you meet with any men of
war, merchants, or other ships, belonging to any
foreign Prince or State in any road where you,
or any of His Majesty's fleet, may happen to
come, you are to send to see whether there be
any of His Majesty's subjects on board; and if
any seamen, gunners, pilots, or marines, (whether
English, Scotch, or Irish,) be found on board,
you are to cause such of his Majesty's subjects
to be taken forth, and so disposed of as they
shall be forthcoming, to answer their contempt
of His Majesty's proclamation in that kind."
These instructions were modified in the reign of
Charles the Second, so as to exclude public
armed vessels, and with this modification they
have come down to the present times. If it
were at all necessary to the purposes of my argument,
I might show that this right has been
exercised both towards France and Holland,
long before we had existence as a nation.
Their vessels have been searched, and British
seamen taken from them. But enough has
been said to prove that the claim, if unjust, is
not novel.
Is the claim peculiar to the British? I am
justified in saying that this claim, in time of war,
to search for and seize seamen in neutral merchant
vessels, on the high seas, has been made
and exercised by every maritime nation in
Europe. To be more particular—I assert, and
stand ready to prove, that it has been made and
enforced by France as well as England, and is
now. It would be a waste of time to go very
much at large into the French usages on this
subject. I propose to do little more than to
refer to one or two French ordinances, and
then show from our State papers their practical
application to us.
By the French laws, and they are ancient
laws, the seamen of the country are all classed,
and enrolled, and licensed. In 1784, an edict
was made which is still in force, declaring, that
any classed seaman, who shall, in time of peace,
be found serving in foreign ships, shall be sentenced
to fifteen days' confinement, and reduced
to the lowest wages, and serve two years extraordinary
at the lowest rate; but those who, in
time of war, shall be arrested in foreign ships,
or passing into foreign countries, shall be sentenced
to three years' service in the galleys.
Under the authority of this, and similar ordinances,
the French have taken their seamen out
of our vessels, and in some instances our seamen
with them.
Mr. Chairman, the first proof relative to the
committee, is the impressment document of
January last, known to the American people as
the 6,057 document. The Secretary of State,
Mr. Monroe, at the close of the introductory report,
says, "it is equally impossible, from the
want of precise returns, to make an accurate
report of the names or number of citizens of the
United States, who have been compelled to enter
into the French service, or are held in captivity
under the authority of that Government, whether
taken from vessels captured on the high
seas, or seized in rivers, ports, or harbors; the
names of a few only, greatly below the number
believed to be so detained, being within the
knowledge of this Department. A detail therefore
is not attempted, with respect to this part
of the call of the House of Representatives."
Yes, sir, it is known to the Administration, that
some of our citizens have been compelled to enter
into the service of the French Emperor, while
others are held in captivity by him. Ask, however,
for their names, and you have for answer,
that all the persons detained are not known
to the Government, and therefore it cannot be
material that you should have the names of
any. Say to gentlemen, here is a case of American
rights violated, and you will be told, that
the injury, in practice, is not of sufficient importance
to justify strong measures against the
French Government. Be it so. But attempt
to prove to the same gentlemen, that the practical
operation of British blockades and Orders
in Council, is not such as to require war, you
will then hear, that it is necessary to fight
about the principle.
I have one other paper to lay before the committee,
on this subject. For some years back,
the information about French impressments has
been general and vague, or altogether withheld.
Formerly this was otherwise. In a report respecting
the impressment of seamen in 1797,
made by the Secretary of State to this House,
on the 27th of February, 1798, we have the
names of upwards of twenty American citizens,
taken out of American vessels, on the high seas,
by French privateers. We have more, sir.
This same report states, that two French seamen
named Lewis had been impressed from on board
the American ship Bryseis by a French Commodore's
ship; that Francis Gibbons, a native of
France, but married and resident at New London
in Connecticut, was impressed from the American
ship Edward, at Rochefort, by authority of
the French Republic, and put on board a
French ship of war: and that Henry Doughty,
an American, was impressed at sea from the
American brig Elsa by the French frigates
Lapancy and Thetis. I could instance other
cases, but these are sufficient to show, that
neither the claim nor the exercise of it is peculiar
to the British.
If this right, or claim of right, however, is
made a mere pretext by any nation to seize and
detain our seamen, I am willing to allow that
it would be a cause of war. But even in this
case, war ought not to be waged until we have
done our duty to our seamen and the offending
nation, by making suitable regulations to prevent
the employment of the seamen of such
nation. Have we done this, as respects Great
Britain? Perhaps some such regulation is to
be found in the law which defines what vessel
is an American vessel, and which, as such, is
entitled to hoist our flag. Look at it, sir. According
to the act of December, 1792, an American
ship is one wholly owned by an American
citizen, and commanded by a person also a
citizen. The crew may be all foreigners—all
Englishmen, if you please—all English deserters.
In this, therefore, we find no security to the
British Government.
But, we have also the law of May, 1796,
which provides, that the collectors may register
seamen calling themselves American, and grant
certificates of citizenship. Out of this law, it
is presumed, has grown the practice of granting
protections, as they are called—papers procured
from notaries and magistrates, ofttimes on the
most barefaced perjuries, and always considered
as a species of negotiable property for value
received. Sir, these protections, in their abuse,
are a scandal to the nation. It has made false
swearing an employment, and the granting of
false papers a business. The price of such a
paper is as well known in the great seaport
towns as is that of your stocks. All ages and
complexions and tongues may have this badge of
citizenship, by paying the charges in such cases
provided. If this, however, was not so; if
protections were only granted to real Americans;
it is difficult to see how this is to prevent
the employment of British sailors. It is
not necessary that the persons navigating an
American vessel should have them.
This act of ours was presented to the British
Government by Mr. King, in January, 1797,
and Lord Grenville, on the 27th of March following,
in a manner highly conciliatory, and
certainly with much force, stated specific objections
to the law. The Executive, when in July
last he answered the call of the Senate for
papers relative to impressments, omitted this
letter of Lord Grenville, but he gives a letter
from the then Secretary of State, to our Minister
at the British Court, of the third of October,
1797, in which the force of the objections
seems to be admitted: "Lord Grenville's observations
on the act of Congress for the relief
and protection of American seamen, present
difficulties which demand consideration at the
ensuing session." Nothing was, however, done
at that or any future session. In truth, we
have done nothing to prevent the employment
of British seamen in our public or private ships;
and they are to be found in both. And yet,
with this fact staring us in the face, we are
called upon to say that the war is altogether
just on our part!
It will probably be urged that the British
practice under this claim, in its application to
us, was sufficient to prove that the reclamation
of their seamen was not so much the object of
the British Government, as the seizure of our
seafaring citizens: that it had become so outrageous
as not only to justify, but to require
war. Without, sir, meaning to excuse or to
palliate the taking even the cabin boy, if done
knowingly and wittingly; and being willing to
admit, that about the period of the attack on
the Chesapeake, we had much and serious cause
to complain on the subject, I must be permitted
to say that I have not evidence to satisfy me,
that when we declared war, the practice of the
British was such as to prove that the claim on
their part was a mere pretext to take our
sailors. In truth, I believe, if the Administration
have not deceived themselves on this subject,
that they have attempted a gross deception
on the public.
The instructions given at this day, by the
British Admiralty to a naval commander, on
this subject, directs him, "when he meets with
any foreign ship or vessel, to send a lieutenant
to inquire whether there may be on board of
her any seamen who are the subjects of His
Majesty; and if there be, to demand them, provided
it does not distress the ship; he is to demand
their wages up to the day; but he is to
do this without detaining the vessel longer than
shall be necessary, or offering any violence to,
or in any way ill-treating the master or his
crew." Mr. Monroe may perhaps recognize in
this, the instructions shown to him after his
arrangement, and of which he declared himself
satisfied; but whether he does or not, it
must be conceded that it provides for a moderate
exercise of the right. The person who is
to make the search is an officer of some standing;
he is only to take seamen who are British
subjects, excluding thereby, not merely our
citizens, but all foreigners; and he is not to
take even British seamen, if, by it, he destroys
the crew, or endangers the vessel. Allowing
the right to exist, it is difficult more fairly to
regulate its exercise.
But it may be urged that the practice of the
British commanders does not correspond with
these instructions; that they search and seize
at large, according to their will and pleasure.
I know, sir, that the habits and education of a
military man, not unfrequently make him act as
if power and right meant the same thing: and
I, therefore, have no doubt that there have been
abuses. But I do most conscientiously believe
that these abuses have been greatly magnified,
and are, even by the well meaning, vastly overrated.
I am aware that I shall be referred to
the impressment document of last session.
This document, sir, is so illy understood, and
has been the source of so much misrepresentation,
that I must be allowed slightly to review
it.
The Secretary, in the report says, that the
list transmitted had been received from our
agent at London, and "contains the names of
American seamen and citizens who have been
impressed and held in bondage in His Britannic
Majesty's ships of war, for the several quarters
of 1809 and 1810." The list is headed, "A return
or list of American seamen and citizens
who have been impressed and held on board of
His Britannic Majesty's ships of war, from 1st
of April to the 30th of June, inclusively," and
so of the other quarters. Now the plain meaning
of this is, if any meaning it has, that the
persons whose names were thus sent to us were
impressed and made to serve on board British
armed ships, at some period in the years 1809
and 1810. Indeed, this has been so stated in
this House, and in the Administration prints.
And yet the most superficial examination will
show that this is not true. Let me read to you
one or two names: "4868. David Wiley." In
the column of the "result of applications and
remarks," we have this explanation of his case:
"Impressed on shore at New Brunswick, and
taken on board the Plumper, was detained
two days, when the commander put him on
board a vessel bound to Aberdeen, from thence
worked his passage to London, and appeared at
this office 29th August, 1805; is evidently an
American. Discharged." Here, then, we have
a man who was not on board a British ship in
1809, and whose "bondage" did not probably
continue more than two days.
Again, "4936. Richard Butler, representing
himself of Petersburg, Pennsylvania. Impressed
1797 at the Cape of Good Hope, from the
Mercury of Baltimore, and detained on board
the Garland." Remark: "Remained on board
the Garland two months, then draughted to the
Tremendous, in which he served two and a half
years, was then discharged; has never received
his wages or prize-money; says he was well
used on board both ships. Was discharged as
an American citizen at the Cape of Good Hope;
his pay and prize-money lists were given to the
consul at the Cape. Discharged." This man,
therefore, according to the statement of our
Consul, so far from having been impressed and
held on board a British ship in 1809, had been
impressed in 1797, and discharged in 1799. I
might, sir, give you many other cases equally
strong, but these are sufficient to prove that,
by design or mistake, the document is wrongly
headed; that the persons named in the list
were not all on board British ships in 1809 and
1810; and, therefore, that, in its general results,
it does not show the state of the British practice
in those years.
In truth, the list is nothing more than the
return of the names of persons who, within the
year, had applied to Mr. Lyman, our Consul
and agent for seamen, for protections against
future, or for his aid in getting released from
present impressment. It was his duty, as I do
not doubt it was made his interest, to receive
all applications, and when necessary, to lay
them before the proper British authority. Jew
and Greek, Turk and Christian, the growth of
our own soil, and the produce of other countries,
all threw themselves upon Mr. Lyman,
and he, laboring in his vocation, granted patents
of citizenship, or made his claim on the British
Admiralty. Sir, there is not a man who, in
practice or by inquiry, has made himself acquainted
with the manner in which this business
is transacted, but knows that many foreigners
who never saw this country, or sailed under
its flag, have attempted, by application to our
agents abroad, to shield themselves against
British impressment. The Secretary of State,
Mr. Monroe, needs no information on this subject,
having himself resided in London as our
Minister. It was the duty of our agent to send
home some account of his proceedings, and I
have no objection to his making such a list as
we have before us. But I do object to its being
palmed on the American nation as a true history
of British impressments affecting our people
and nation. I pray you look at this list. In
the year commencing in April, 1809, and ending
in March, 1810, we have about nine hundred
and forty names; and of these, about
seven hundred are given with blanks in the
columns for the "towns and States of which
they represent themselves to be citizens"—"when
impressed"—"where impressed"—"ships
from whence taken"—"nations"—"masters."
The time and the result of the application
are only given. And from these entries
in Mr. Lyman's book you are called upon
to admit that the applicant was an American,
and that he was impressed in the year 1809 by
the British, on the high seas, out of an American
vessel. Really, this is asking too much.
Mr. Chairman, I have examined the list from
April, 1809, to April, 1810, with great attention,
for the purpose of ascertaining the number
of impressments which took place in that year,
and I will now make to you one or two statements,
which may cast some light on the subject
of the British practice. The number
which, by the list, appears to have been impressed
in that year, is one hundred. It will
be understood that in this number I do not include
those whose names are carried out in
blank, as has been stated. It is uncertain
whether such persons ever were impressed;
and, at all events, it is fair to presume, that
their service on board British ships had commenced
before 1809, or otherwise there could
be no difficulty in giving dates. Of the one
hundred, seventy-six were discharged, and six
had deserted, leaving less than twenty to be
accounted for.
Another result: Of the persons thus taken,
fifty-seven were impressed on shore, and forty-three
at sea. Again: Thirty of these seamen,
when impressed, made part of the crews of
British vessels, and thirty-four American vessels;
and of the thirty-four, twelve were taken
on land; leaving about twenty-two persons
taken from American vessels on the high seas.
It is possible, sir, that in these statements I may
not be perfectly accurate; I am certain, however,
that I am substantially so.
I do not mean to represent that this is a full
account of all the impressments which took
place in 1809; on the contrary, I admit that it
is not. Many impressments were certainly
made of persons undeniably British subjects,
who would scarcely think of applying to Mr.
Lyman, and will not, therefore, be found in his
book. Many persons, also, having a right to
his interference, were not then known to him.
My object in making these explanations, was to
show that the 6,057 document does not furnish
such strong evidence of British aggression as
has been supposed.
The number of our seamen impressed by the
British has been so variously represented, that
I have, from motives of curiosity as well as
duty, been desirous to arrive at something like
a reasonable certainty on the subject. We hear
of ten, twenty, nay, forty thousand of our citizens,
confined in the floating dungeons of Great
Britain, fighting her battles against their will.
The evidence of this, however, is only to be
found in the imagination of gentlemen. It is
the old story over again, of the "six men in
buckram." In part representing the greatest
commercial State in the Union, it may be expected
that I have some personal knowledge on
this subject, but indeed I have none such to
give. Is there not in this some proof that the
evil has been magnified? I have sought for information
in quarters where only it is to be
found, among the shipping merchants and ship
owners of the country. I will now furnish you
with the opinion of an intelligent gentleman
from Marblehead, whose means of information
are ample, and whose veracity will not be
doubted. I mean my friend from Massachusetts,
who sits before me. (Mr. Reed.) He has
favored me with this statement.
"In answer to your inquiry relative to the seamen
of Marblehead, I have to remark that the average
shipping of that port, for the last twenty years, may
be estimated at about 19,006 tons, of which it is fair
to calculate ten thousand tons were employed in
foreign commerce, and the residue in the fisheries
and in the coasting trade. Allowing six men to
every hundred tons, which is the usual estimate, it
gives an average of eleven hundred and seventy-six
seamen in all, and six hundred in our foreign trade,
each year; the number of seamen, therefore, employed
from Marblehead for the last twenty years,
must have been considerable, say five thousand. I
have resided at that place nearly twenty years, and,
during the greater part of the time, have been
actively engaged in commerce. According to my
own recollection, aided by that of others who have
the best means of information, I do not believe that
twenty of the seamen of Marblehead, native or naturalized,
have been impressed by the British within
the twenty years, and it is not known that one has
been demanded without being released."
As there is no reason to suppose that Marblehead
has been more fortunate with respect to
impressments than other places, we have here
something whereby to form an estimate of the
number of our seamen taken by the British.
My own conviction is, that the American seamen,
impressed and held by the British, at the
commencement of this war, did not much exceed
five hundred in all, and certainly did not
amount to one thousand. Permit me, sir, to
mention one circumstance which speaks loudly
on this subject. If the practice of impressment
had been as outrageous as has been represented,
it must have fallen with great force on the Eastern
States, as it is there the mass of our seamen
are found. We are then to expect much feeling
and passion on this account. The war must be
popular when the cause of it is brought home
to every man's door. No such thing, sir. The
war is confessedly odious there. It is in States
where seamen never grew that the war has its
strongest advocates. It is there that you principally
find the dark pictures of sailors' sufferings,
and hear the loud and long appeals to the
sympathies and passions of the people about
seamen's rights and seamen's injuries.
I have now, sir, finished the remarks which I
intended to make on the British claim and
practice of impressment. We have for years
past had so much idle declamation on the subject,
that a dispassionate investigation of it
appeared to me to be called for. In the course
of these remarks, I have attempted to show
that the claim was neither novel nor peculiar,
and it is not wholly unsupported by reason;
that our true interest calls more for a fair regulation
of the practice than an abandonment of
the rights; and that the conduct of the British,
of late, has been such as to warrant an opinion,
that an arrangement may be made, having for
its object a proper regulation of the practice,
leaving the rights of both nations, whatever
they may be, untouched. Sir, with this view
of the subject, it is not possible for me to consent
to the adoption of measures, having for their
object the further prosecution of the war offensively
on our part; and I cannot, therefore, vote
for the bill on your table. The war has not
yet assumed a character. We have, indeed,
added much, and are about to add more, to the
public debt. Already a portion of our citizens
are burdened with oppressive exactions in the
form of duties, and heavy taxes are staring all
in the face. But yet our homes and altars remain
safe and unpolluted. Let us seize this moment
to give the nation peace, and the people
happiness. This is the appointed time, and if
we do not improve it, I fear my country is to
suffer in its prosperity and its institutions. For
Heaven's sake let us pause!
Mr. Macon said after failing in his attempt to
amend the bill, he had considered it of very
little importance; indeed, in its present form,
he was not anxious whether it passed or not;
and he had intended not to have troubled the
committee on the subject, but the strange course
which the debate had taken had called him up
almost against his own consent. He could truly
say that he would not have offered a word to
the committee, had not those who oppose the
bill have brought into the discussion French influence,
operating by a sort of magic on every
act of the Executive. The conduct of the Executive
had undergone the strictest scrutiny by
these gentlemen, and their own arguments
would, in his opinion, convince every impartial
man, that it had been perfectly fair and upright
to all foreign nations; the least attention to the
documents, which have from time to time been
published, would also convince every man of
it, and satisfy all that the great object of the
Government had been peace, and that peace
was maintained until it could no longer be done
without surrendering almost every national
right worth preserving. Mr. M. said he would
endeavor in his observations to follow the example
which had been set the last two days:
not to utter a word to wound the feelings of
any one; nor would he refer to the documents,
because every member possessed them, and they
had been published for the information of the
people; and he was sure that the committee
must be tired with hearing a sentence here, and
a paragraph there, read from them. The true
way to understand them was to read the
whole. But he had never been in the practice
of making many quotations from books or documents,
and he thought it unnecessary to make
any now. He was clearly of opinion that the
gentlemen who were opposed to the Administration
had the right to say whatever they
thought of it, and to select the subject on which
they would speak; and as they had made the
selection, he hoped they would have an opportunity
now to deliver their sentiments. He,
however, regretted that they had selected this
bill; because, of all the bills which may be
brought before the House the present session,
not one, he thought, would require despatch
more than this. The loss of a day now may be
the loss of the next campaign. He had expected
that this general debate, which seems to include
every thing but the bill, would have
been delayed until the loan should be under
discussion.
The points made in the debate seem to be:
impressment; the right to expatriate; the right
to naturalize; and French influence; neither of
which have any connection with the bill, which
is to raise troops for one year. Sir, said Mr. M.,
I will not retort a charge of British influence,
and so balance one assertion against the other,
because I do not believe that there is much of
either in the nation; but if I was to say there
was none, I should not say what I believe. People
may honestly differ in opinion as to the
effect which the success of England or France
over the other might have on the interests of
the United States, without being under the influence
of either; and this, no doubt, is the
case with thousands.
I will, before I proceed further, notice some of
the observations made by the gentleman from
New York, (Mr. Emott.) If I have not understood
him or any other gentleman correctly, I
hope that I shall be corrected; because it is my
sincere desire to state their statements fairly;
and it is not always possible to take down their
own words. He said, if there was any English influence,
it was the influence of Locke and Sidney.
As well might he have spoken of the influence
of any other patriots who lived before
us. Their influence will be respected wherever
their works shall be read; but that sort of influence
is not the influence of which we have
heard so much, and which I intend hereafter to
notice. He also mentioned the influence which
drove the first settlers to Plymouth. Yes, sir,
that influence was truly British, and that sort
of influence Great Britain has been exercising
ever since the first settlers, by their own industry
and exertions, got into a situation to be
useful to her; and that influence, or rather
that persecution, compelled the first settlers of
Carolina to leave the other provinces, and to
settle a second time in the woods, and, as soon
as they were able, to pay taxes. That same influence
followed them, and made their condition
much worse. It pursued the people in
every part of the continent, until they declared
themselves independent; and, from that day to
this, she has not treated the United States as
she has treated other independent nations.
Mr. Chairman, I was astonished when the
gentleman told us he was not a friend to standing
armies; and, almost in the same breath,
said that, at the last session, he voted for raising
the twenty-five thousand men, and that he
did not mean to go to war when he gave the
vote. For what purpose, then, could they be
wanted? Experience had already shown that
the old establishment was quite sufficient in
time of peace. Indeed, a very considerable
part of that was raised soon after the affair of
the Chesapeake, and under an expectation that
war would follow, and not for a regular peace
establishment.
The same gentleman told us, that impressment
by the British Government was no new
thing. This is certainly true as far as regards
her own subjects, and from her own vessels;
but the systematic impressment of foreigners
from foreign ships, is a new thing; and that,
too, when the men and the ships both belong
to the same nation. That Government never
attempted to impress Spaniards, Dutch, French,
Swedes, or Danes, from vessels belonging to the
same nation with the person; and it is this new
doctrine, which operates solely on us, of which
we complain. The question between us and
England has nothing to do with the doctrine
that free ships shall make free goods, or free
men, if gentlemen please. And why draw that
into the debate on the impressment of American
citizens from American vessels? No law
or precedent can be produced for this abominable
and wicked practice. It was never attempted
to be justified, notwithstanding impressment
is no new thing with her. Every
Sovereign, said the gentleman, has a right to
the service of all his subjects in time of war.
But this right is like some others which Sovereigns
claim; it is without a remedy. Of what
avail is the proclamation of the Prince Regent
in this country, ordering the British subjects
home? None. Many of them are still here,
and, probably, will remain until the termination
of the war, and the British Government will
never dream of punishing one of them for disobedience.
But, admit this right in Sovereigns
to its fullest extent, and it does not give one
Sovereign the right to impress the citizens or
subjects of another; nor does it justify such an
act; of course it does not touch the act of
which we complain; that is, the impressing of
American seamen from American vessels.
It is curious that, throughout this whole debate,
there seems to have been drawn a distinction
between the rights of a man who cultivates
the soil, and of him who follows the sea, and
that this distinction should have been drawn by
those who claim to be the champions of commerce
and of a navy, and who have told us
that agriculture and commerce were inseparable.
Ought it not, then, to follow, that the
rights of those employed on land or water
should also be inseparable? This strange doctrine,
as was observed by the gentleman from
Louisiana, (Mr. Robertson,) may dust the eye,
but cannot stagger the understanding of any
one.
The same gentleman said, that we had taken
no measures to exclude British seamen from
American vessels. For what purpose were
protections given to American seamen? Surely
to protect them against impressment, and to
show that we had no desire to protect others;
and what more ought to have been done, he
did not tell us. I ask, did any nation ever do
more? Besides, has not the United States,
over and over again, offered to make an arrangement
with England on the subject of
sailors, which should be satisfactory to both,
by securing to each the use of their own sailors?
and has she not always refused to make
any arrangement about them? And it may
be fairly asked here, what measures Great
Britain has taken to prevent her officers from
impressing our seamen? None that I have
heard of, and she is the aggressor. We have
not injured her, while she has been impressing
our sailors whenever she wanted and could find
them. If the United States wanted sailors
ever so much, they could not impress one of
hers, and she knows this; and she would not
suffer one of them to be impressed by any
foreign power; and we must determine to defend
the rights of ours, or it will be idle to talk
about navigation, commerce, and a navy. Indeed,
if commerce and agriculture be inseparable,
you must defend the rights of the persons
concerned in both, or both must be injured.
There are no neutrals able to carry our products
to market, and if you will not protect
your seamen, they will not carry them.
It is worthy of remark, that, for twenty
years past, the Government of the United
States has been trying to settle the question of
sailors with Great Britain, and that every attempt
has failed, and that it is just now discovered
that we have always begun wrong.
My colleague (Mr. Pearson) and the gentleman
from Connecticut, (Mr. Pitkin,) it appears,
could settle this great question without much
difficulty. If they can, I wish most sincerely
they would. I am, however, apprehensive that
they are a little mistaken, because General
Washington, when President, having Major
Pinckney, now Major General Pinckney, for
Minister at London, tried without effect. Mr.
Adams renewed it with Mr. King for Minister;
Mr. Jefferson with Colonel Monroe and Mr.
Pinkney, now the Attorney General; and Mr.
Madison, with the last named Pinkney. All
these Presidents and Ministers, with the aid of
every Cabinet, have failed. Every description
of political opinion, with the greatest talents,
have been employed and done nothing. At the
end of twenty years we have gained nothing,
and lost our labor; the question is as unsettled
as ever; and we have been worsted in this way,
that, while we were negotiating, they were impressing
seamen.
We have been told by my colleague, that it
is not the right, but the abuse of impressment
of which we complain. It is true, sir, that we
do not complain of Great Britain impressing
her own subjects; she may do as she pleases
with them; that is no concern of ours; all we
ask of her is to keep her hands off our people;
and we deny her right to impress American
citizens; and if the abuse be the impressing
them, of that we do complain, and not without
just cause, because she has impressed many of
them, and compelled them to fight her battles;
and I have understood, after we had declared
that war existed between her and us, that she
detained those she had before impressed as prisoners
of war, and this may be a part of her
public law. Indeed, we have heard much about
universal law and public law, neither of which,
from the statements made, seem to have much
regard to right or justice, which ought to be the
foundation of all law. One universal law seems
to be, that Sovereigns can command their subjects
to return home in case of war; another,
that no person can expatriate himself; and Great
Britain is no doubt willing to acknowledge
another, by which she might impress sailors
from all the world. As to the first, we need
not trouble ourselves about it; and the second,
the United States have not acknowledged; and
we are now contending against impressment;
and permit me here to observe, that the republicans
have always considered the impressment
of citizens a more serious injury than the
spoliation of property.
I must return to Porcupine's paper,[33] which,
as well as I now recollect, never contained a
sentence in favor of the Revolution, or much in
praise of the constitution, if it was praised at
all; no outrage was committed which it did not
approbate; a few of the outrages of that time
shall be stated: The Rogue's March was played
under the window of the man who drew the
Declaration of Independence, The man who
first took up arms after the fall of Charleston,
and whose body had been almost riddled in defence
of his country, was a member of Congress,
and was insulted at the circus. Another
member, of no common cast of mind, was insulted
at the theatre; a man who will do his
duty in whatever situation he may be placed.
Another, returning home with his family, was
insulted and almost mobbed; he is now one of
the Cabinet, mentioned by the gentleman from
Massachusetts, (Mr. Quincy.) If I was not almost
exhausted I would give some of the details
of these then fashionable transactions. I will
only add, it was nothing in those days for a few
men to whip a printer whose publications they
did not like. All these outrages and violations
of law, it is believed, were not only approved
by the editor of the before-named paper, but
other Federal papers also. This same editor
claimed to have more subscribers for his paper
than any other editor in the Union. And after
he returned to Europe, he wrote and published
about some of his former supporters. Had this
have been a French editor, and acted toward
the Federal party as he did toward the Republican,
and the subscribers to his paper Republicans,
could not those who look at every thing
now done to find French influence, have had
as good a field to hunt in as any they have yet
found? At the very time these events took
place, the majority talked as much about French
influence as the minority now does; they had
clues, sub-plots, ocean massacres, and a hundred
other equally ridiculous and unfounded tales,
which circulated for a day. I have mentioned
these things not with an intent to wound the
feelings of any man living, but with a view of
trying to persuade those who talk so much
about French influence, to look at both sides of
the question about foreign influence; and if
they will, I hope we shall never hear of it again
in this House.
Mr. Genet, when he was Minister of France,
began to intrigue, for which he was dismissed.
Mr. Liston, when he was Minister of England,
began the same work, for which he was not dismissed.
If the Republicans had then been in
power, and Liston a French Minister, could not
a strict examination of the documents have
placed it as easily as many other acts have been
to French influence?
While all these things were doing, and many
others quite as strange, the gentlemen call themselves
the followers of General Washington.
If they be truly his followers, they ought to
adhere to his principles, and attend to his last
advice. Every act of his went to perpetuate
the Union and to attach the States to each
other. I fear the sentiments contained in his
farewell address to the nation are getting out
of fashion with those who claim to be his exclusive
followers; or why do we hear within
these walls, the foundation of which he laid
for union, union, union; disunion spoken of,
"peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must;"
and why listen to idle and unfounded tales
about foreign influence, which can never injure
us as long as we stick to the old maxim—united
we stand, divided we fall? Straws show which
way the wind blows! What has become of
the newspaper called the Washington Federalist?
The name was, I have understood,
changed to the Independent American; out of
that, I believe, was raised the Federal Republican—all
good names; but why lose the name
of Washington to a paper supported by his exclusive
followers? And this is the first time to
my recollection that they have adopted Republican
in their calendar.
I have heard that Federalism is not now the
same that it was when Mr. Adams was President:
we shall know more about this if ever
they get into power again; be this as it may,
every man has a right to change his opinion;
it is a right which no Government can take
from him, and when convinced that he is
wrong, it is his duty to change. But I had
thought, when Mr. Adams was President, we
were told that he followed the plan of General
Washington, and that he was then a favorite
with the party who elected him, but a great
change has taken place in regard to him. I always
thought him an honest man, and I think
so still. After Mr. Adams got out of fashion,
Colonel Burr became so great a favorite with
the Federal gentlemen who were then in Congress,
that they voted thirty-five times for him
to be President, when they must have known
that not one elector who voted for him intended
him for President. Afterward, Mr. Madison
was a favorite; but, after the refusal of the
British Government to ratify the arrangement
made with Mr. Erskine, they examined the
matter, and discovered he had not done right,
and he got out of fashion. Then the late
worthy and venerable Vice President and
Colonel Monroe became favorites; Colonel
Monroe got out of fashion about the time he
was appointed Secretary of State; and, lastly,
Mr. De Witt Clinton became a favorite. I
hope he will not be injured by it, but he seems
to be losing ground, as we have been told it
was not his merit that induced the Federalists to
support him for President, but the demerit of
Mr. Madison. This does not appear to be a
good reason, because they might have selected a
man from their own party, who they thought
had merit. But all these things may be the
doings of those who, a former member of this
House called ultra-Federalists; and it will be
recollected that all these men became favorites,
on the old doctrine of, "divide and conquer;"
and it ought not to be forgotten that, when
Messrs. Ellsworth and Davie returned from
France, their political friends were a little shy
of them; indeed, I should not be surprised if
Messrs. Jay, King, Walcott, and Dexter, should
not much longer be favorites. If we may judge
from the public prints, Commodore Rodgers is no
longer one, though he, like the others, is understood
to be a Federalist; but these men will never
say, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must."
I would really thank any gentleman to tell me
what is now meant by the party name, Federalist.
It is a fact on record, that General Washington
did not approve of self-created societies,
and I have understood that some of the people
who claim to be his exclusive followers, have
their self-created Washington Benevolent Societies,
wherever they can establish them, and
that they are political societies, and they were
intended to oppose some other society; perhaps
the Tammany. This could not justify the proceeding.
As to myself, I do not care if there
was one in every three miles square in the nation,
so that I am left free not to be a member.
We naturalize, without hearing a complaint
from any quarter, emigrants from Great Britain,
of every trade and profession, merchants, lawyers,
doctors, and even divines; to which may
be added tradesmen and mechanics; they all go
where they please, live among us, and take part
in the politics of the day. If foreign influence
could be introduced into the country by naturalizing,
we should have more of British than of
French; but naturalizing seems well enough for
every body but a sailor, but do not permit him
to become a citizen; he will be in the way of
native sailors, who want encouragement; besides,
we know that Great Britain will impress
him, and we know as well, when her officers
want men, they care not whether they are
American or English. The native American
has never complained that the naturalizing of
foreigners of his trade or profession, injured
him; nor has a complaint been heard from a
native seaman against naturalizing foreign sailors;
and we have had experience enough to
know that our merchants could complain, and
complain almost against their own complaint.
Let their property be captured, or expected to
be captured, under a new order in France or
England, and more complaints will be made
about it, than the impressing of a dozen citizens.
The situation of the merchant, when plundered,
is bad enough, but his property is not taken
away without a trial of some sort before a
judge learned in the law, whose duty it ought
to be to decide according to law; he also employs
lawyers to have justice done him. Not
so with the sailor; when impressed, there is no
learned judge to decide his case, or lawyer to
have justice done; force is law to him, and his
oppressor judge; he is put on board ships, and
compelled to fight battles, in which neither he
nor his country have any concern: deprived of
the right to complain or petition; he is poor,
friendless—Great God! can it be possible, that
we shall yield the point of impressment, for the
sake of carrying on a little trifling trade by
hook or by crook!
All agree that we ought to fight for the rights
of native seamen, and all agree that some of
them have been impressed; why not all, then,
join, heart in hand, to maintain their rights?
Is it because the British officers impress from
our vessels others besides natives? This cannot
lessen their just claim to the protection of their
country. We have, however, been told that
only ninety-three persons were impressed in
one year from American vessels; if only three
of them had been the sons of the gentleman
(Mr. Emott) who gave the information, I ask,
would he have been contented with the long
investigation of documents, to ascertain if any
of the diplomatic meanders turned towards
French influence? No, sir, he would not; he
would have demanded of the National Government
to have his children restored to
his arms; he could demand this in a way to be
heard. Far different is the case with these unfortunate
parents who have had their sons impressed;
they are too poor and friendless to be
heard; the rights of the nation may be abandoned
by little and little, until none be left;
exactly as you may take a cent at a time from
one thousand dollars, until none be left. All
must determine to protect American seamen on
board American vessels, or not hereafter pretend
to claim any jurisdiction over the vessels
when they are out of the limits of the United
States. If a single citizen should be impressed
on American land, the whole nation would be
in a flame; the right to protection is the same,
whether on American land or an American
vessel.
It has been said that we do not act justly;
that we encourage British seamen to run away,
because we do not apprehend them and send
them back, when they have run away from
their vessels; they run away before our people
see them, of course there is no encouragement
to the running away. As to the sending them
back, we are not bound to do it; and if it depended
on me one should never be sent back,
until the British ceased impressing and plundering
our citizens, and I would agree that
every man who engaged in the war on our side
should have the right to be naturalized, though
he fled from British naval tyranny.
It is remarkable that, while we hear not a
word said to justify England for impressing and
plundering the people of the United States, that
so much should have been said to prove that
we ought not to have gone to war with her,
and that we were wrong in doing so. This is
the best way that could have been devised to
keep her aggressions out of view; not to say a
word about them, and talk a great deal about
the hardships of war, and the taxes which must
be imposed to carry it on, winding up all their
lamentations for the state of the country, with,
if it was not for the war, a little trade could be
carried on. Impressment, then, is a mere trifle,
compared with this trade, and it may be that
Great Britain understands it so, and is willing
to gratify us with this trade for kin-sake, as
long as we are contented to be impressed for
kin-sake. The citizens who are impressed
would tell her, if telling would release them,
that nations are no kin.
This surely has been the most unfortunate
Government from its establishment to the present
time that ever existed; almost every thing
that has been done is wrong: it was wrong to
fix the seat of Government here; it was wrong
to place this House and the houses for the
offices so far from each other; it was wrong to
give paper protections to American seamen; it
was wrong to have a little mercy in the revenue
laws; it was wrong to repeal the internal taxes;
I believe that was called oppression—though I
am no prophet, I venture to predict, that to lay
them to carry the war on will be wrong also;
to take Canada would be wrong;—indeed, it
would be difficult to find any thing which has
been done right, according to the modern Federal
creed. How are we to get things right? Give
up the chair you are in to one, the White House
to another, and they will soon give you a sedition
law which will put all right. The great
discovery which these gentlemen have made,
that so much has been wrong under every Administration,
would surprise the people, were
they not this moment astonished at the discovery
of perpetual motion by Redheffer—two
such great discoveries must add vastly to
the character of the nation.
The attempt to take Canada is so wicked that
some of the gentlemen are quite alarmed at it.
We hear of the unoffending Canadians, but not
of the unoffending sailor; at one time they are
the most unoffending and loyal people in the
world, at another they are French, and not fit
to be united in our Government. We have
heard much of the same sort formerly said
about the people of Louisiana, and they have
become a State, without any trouble to themselves
or the Union. What has become of that
high Federal spirit which disdained to buy
Louisiana? Where is it when Canada is mentioned?
The Federalism which desired to conquer
Louisiana and keep it by force of arms, is
changed when Canada is the question. The
outrageous conduct of Great Britain is as much
worse than that of Spain, as her impressment
and plundering were worse than the refusal of
the right of deposit. For one, I am willing
to have Canada and Florida, and have them
you must before many years. The situation of
Mobile is such as to compel you before very
long to take possession of it. Canada and
Florida would rid us of bad neighbors, and
make us more happy.
The committee then rose and reported the
bill.
The several amendments made in Committee
of the Whole were agreed to by the House.
Mr. Fitch again moved to strike out the 4th
section, giving the President exclusively the
appointment of all officers under the rank of
field officers.
The question was decided in the negative by
yeas and nays. For the motion 34, against it 74.
And the bill was then (half past six o'clock)
ordered to be engrossed for a third reading,
without a division.
And on motion, the House adjourned until
to-morrow.
Additional Military Force.
The bill, in addition to the act passed at the
last session "to raise an additional military
force"—the object of which is to raise twenty
regiments of men for one year, if deemed necessary
by the President to the public service—was
read a third time, and the question stated,
"Shall the bill pass?"
Mr. Kent.—Mr. Speaker, it is with great reluctance
I rise to trouble the House with any
remarks of mine, at a time when their patience
must be so completely exhausted, by the unusual
length of the debate which has already taken
place upon the subject before you. The bill on
your table proposes to raise an additional military
force of twenty thousand men, and it has
been objected to on account of its expense, and
the consequent danger growing out of it to the
liberties of our country. We are, sir, in a state
of war; and what is evidently the course which
we should pursue whilst in that situation? We
should advocate and support such measures as
are calculated to bring that war, justly made on
our part, to a speedy, honorable, and successful
conclusion. Viewing the bill on your table as
a measure of that description, I shall give it my
support, regardless of that additional expense
which gentlemen so emphatically dwell upon.
Nay, sir, it is better to expend the thirty millions
of dollars (even if that sum was necessary)
so repeatedly spoken of on the other side of the
House as the cost of the war for two years, to
accomplish our object, than to expend the same
sum in five years, even if we could effect our
object with equal certainty.
However commendable economy may be in
every other situation in life, in war it is inadmissible;
it loses its character; it becomes
parsimony: you might as well attempt to unite
profusion and avarice as war and economy. All
that the utmost prudence can require of you
when in a state of war, is to make your means
ample; lay your plans well; and to the judgment
and the skill in these particulars only can
you look for economy or for savings; for the
want of an inconsiderable supply of men or
money, a campaign might prove disastrous, to
recover which would require an immense sacrifice
of blood and treasure.
The Army has been represented as dangerous
to the liberties of the country. At one moment
we are told that, when it shall be completed, it
will be unequal to the conquest of a petty province
adjoining us, and not exceeding in population
the State of Maryland; the next moment
we are told that it will endanger the liberties
of seven millions of freemen. Arguments thus
paradoxical need no refutation. Sir, I do not
pretend to have any military experience, and I
am willing to concede the point to those possessing
it, that men enlisted for three or five
years are preferable to those enlisted for one
year as proposed by the bill; yet I feel confident
that every object will be accomplished by
this bill that is intended. It is not proposed to
rely solely on an army of this description to
carry on the war; you have nearly a sufficient
military force authorized for five years, and you
want the men to be raised by this bill only as
auxiliaries, till the ranks of that army can be
filled. With these observations on the bill before
you, I shall proceed to make a few remarks
upon what has fallen from gentlemen on
the other side of the House; in doing which I
shall endeavor to confine myself to what has
not been noticed by others, or, if attended to,
not sufficiently so.
If I understood an honorable gentleman from
Connecticut correctly, who addressed you the
other day, (Mr. Pitkin,) he said we were contending
for the employment of foreigners. We
contend, sir, for nothing which, as an independent
nation, we are not entitled to, and which
the laws of nations do not guarantee to us.
What have been the propositions heretofore
made by our Government to Great Britain upon
this subject? I find, by a recurrence to the
correspondence of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney
with that Government, in 1806, that we made
the following propositions, the most material of
which were omitted yesterday (not intentionally
I hope) by the gentleman from New York,
(Mr. Emott.) Here Mr. K. read the following
proposals from the public documents of 1807
and 1808. We offered—
1. To afford no refuge or protection to British
seamen.
2. To deliver them up if they took refuge
among us.
3. To make laws for restoring them.
4. To aid in searching for, seizing, and restoring
them.
5. To keep them in our prisons when requested.
6. To prohibit our citizens from carrying them
off.
7. To prohibit their employment.
8. To make penal laws for punishing their
employers.
9. To make it our duty to restore them.
10. To extend the foregoing provisions, not
only to deserters, but to all seafaring people.
These propositions went completely to secure
to Great Britain the services of all her seafaring
subjects, except such as were naturalized
under our laws, which amounted to but few,
indeed; thirteen hundred British seamen only
having been naturalized since the commencement
of our Government, and, in all probability,
an equal number of our seamen have been
naturalized by Great Britain during the same
period. Yet, to my astonishment, have I heard
it stated, during this debate, that our Government
had made no serious propositions to secure
to Great Britain the services of her seamen.
But equitable as these propositions were, they
were rejected. Notwithstanding, sir, our Government,
anxious in their pursuit after peace,
have gone still further; they have, through our
late Chargé d'Affaires in London, (Mr. Russell,)
proposed to Great Britain to exclude from our
naval service, as well public as private, all her
seamen, including those which may hereafter
be naturalized; and notwithstanding the liberality
and justice of this proposal, it, like all others,
has been made without producing the desired
effect. And what more, sir, could have been
asked of us, required, or granted, than is contained
in these offers? Nothing more, unless,
indeed, they had asked for our independence,
and, yielding to the requisition, we had granted
it. When an American vessel is at sea, it is
amenable to no laws but those of its own country
and the laws of nations; and where, in
either of these, will the advocates for impressment
find their justification? Sir, had not the
practice of impressment been treated as a casual,
a trivial circumstance, during this debate, I
should not have presumed to trouble the House
with my desultory remarks; and my principal
object in addressing the House, was to ask their
attention to a document which appears to have
been overlooked, and which, if necessary, will
place the abomination of that practice in colors
too strong to be mistaken.
Here Mr. K. read the following extract of a
letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Monroe,
dated January 4th, 1804—
"The whole number of applications made by impressed
seamen to our Consul in London, between the
month of June, 1797, and September, 1804, were two
thousand and fifty-nine. Of this number, one hundred
and two seamen only were detained as British
subjects, which is less than one-twentieth of the
whole number impressed. Eleven hundred and forty-two
were discharged, or ordered to be so, and eight
hundred and five were detained for further proof,
with the strongest presumption that the greater part,
if not the whole, were Americans, or other aliens,
whose proof of citizenship had been lost or destroyed."
It is, then, evident, from this document, that,
for every British seamen obtained by this violent
proceeding, a number of Americans, or other
aliens, with whom Great Britain has no right
to meddle, not less than twenty for one have
been the victims to it. Sir, have we become so
lost to the real independence and sovereignty of
the country, that we are prepared to yield to
this degrading, debasing, and humiliating badge
of vassalage?
The Romans, of old, had a practice of making
the governors of those countries they conquered
pass annually beneath their yoke, as a mark of
submission; but we, doomed to humiliation far
greater, are made to pass daily, nay, hourly,
beneath one much more galling. Some gentlemen
object to the propositions made by Mr.
Russell, and assert that he was not authorized.
They should recollect that Mr. Russell's letter,
containing this final offer to the British Government,
was communicated to this House by
the President, and, had it not met with his concurrence,
it is presumable he would, in his communication,
have expressed his disapprobation
towards it. Nay, a similar offer has been made
by the Secretary of State to Admiral Warren.
I know not whether the feelings of shame or
indignation predominate in my breast, when I
see gentlemen constantly laboring to place their
own Government in the wrong; and, in contradiction
to the official records of this House, insist
that we are contending for the employment
of foreigners.
The language of our Government upon that
subject, is this, sir: that, if the oppressed and
unfortunate inhabitants of Europe, escaping
from their tyranny and panting after their long-lost
liberty, seek a refuge in our happy country,
upon their compliance with our naturalization
laws, we are willing to extend to them those
blessings we enjoy; but should they become
dissatisfied with the advantages which the interior
of the country affords them, and they think
proper to depart from our shores, we say to
them, we will not risk our peace for their protection
beyond our territorial limits. So far
from our contest with Great Britain being for
the employment of her subjects, it is a contest
for shielding a large and valuable portion of our
fellow-citizens from British thraldom, under
the lash of which they have too long labored;
and who will dare discriminate in that protection
which is equally due to all, that is due to
the meanest individual in the community, and
withhold it from a class of men who have done
honor to the American character, and covered
themselves with glory?
Mr. Randolph rose, apparently laboring under
the effects of a serious indisposition, and addressed
the Chair.
I rise (said he) with a heart saddened by the
disgrace of our common country, and sickened
by the way in which the business of the State
has been managed.
Of the temper and virulence which have manifested
themselves in this debate, I shall not
have any occasion to divest myself in the course
of the very few remarks which I fear I shall be
enabled to make, because towards them I have
no purpose. Indeed, when I look around me,
I am exceedingly sad; and I know not now if
it will be in my power to go on.
I had intended, if time and health permitted,
to address to this Assembly some few observations,
confined principally to the change which
has taken place in the relations of our country
since the declaration of war, not only respecting
that belligerent with whom we are engaged in
hostilities, but her adversary also. But the
course that this debate has taken imposes upon
me a painful duty, which I trust God will give
me strength to discharge: the duty of reviewing
past transactions in the Government, which,
from my heart, I would, instead of bringing
them up on the present occasion, gladly discharge
from my memory. But self-defence is
the first law of nature. The merest reptile, the
worm itself, will turn when trod upon. Nor is
the force of the blow lessened by its being dealt,
as in the present case, by the hand—I will
not say under the garb and circumstances—of
Friendship.
It was my lot, sir, and I may assuredly say
my misfortune, to take some little share in those
transactions which brought about a civil revolution
in the Government of this country. I
hope that I am understood. I feel I shall be
understood, when I speak of this, by all wise
and good men; and it is with them only that I
wish to hold intercourse—to commune. It is
of their good opinion alone that I am ambitious,
if indeed ambition dwell any where in my
heart.
Let me endeavor to recall to recollection the
state of things about the period when I had the
unhappiness to dedicate myself to political life.
Through the opposition, bold but just, which
was made by myself, and those associated with
me, to the measures of that Administration, an
entire change was effected in the control of the
Government. One Administration was ejected
from power, and another took its place. Is it
necessary for me to descant upon the topics of
difference which then separated the two great
parties in the Government? Is it necessary for
me at this time of day to make a declaration of
the principles of the Republican party? Is it
possible that such a declaration could be deemed
orthodox when proceeding from lips so unholy
as those of an excommunicant from that
church? It is not necessary. Those principles
are on record; they are engraved upon it indelibly
by the press, and will live as long as the
art of printing is suffered to exist. It is not for
any man at this day to undertake to change
them. It is not for any man who then professed
them, by any guise or circumlocution, to
conceal apostacy from them, for they are there—there
in the book. What are they? They
have been delivered to you by my honorable
colleague—what are they? Love of peace, hatred
of offensive war; jealousy of the State
Governments towards the General Government,
and of the influence of the Executive Government
over the co-ordinate branches of that
Government; a dread of standing armies; a
loathing of public debt, taxes, and excises; tenderness
for the liberty of the citizen; jealousy,
Argus-eyed jealousy, of the patronage of the
President. From these principles what desertions
have we not witnessed? Will you have a
list of them? I shall not undertake it.
Principle does not consist in names. Federalism
is a real thing—not a spectre, a shadow,
a phantom. It is a living addition to the power
of the General Government, in preference to
the power of the States; partiality for the Executive
power, in distinction to that of the co-ordinate
Departments of the Government; the
support of great military and naval force, and
of an "energetic" administration of the Government.
That is what is called Federalism.
Yes, an energetic Administration, not in its real,
but technical sense; for it has a sense as technical
as any in our laws. That is Federalism.
And, when I am opposing the course which
looks toward the rearing up of great Military
and Naval Establishments, of an extent not
only incommensurate with the necessity but the
ability of my country, I care not with whom I
vote; I will be true to my principles. Let any
man lay his finger upon a vote in which, since
I have had the honor (if, indeed, it be an honor)
of a seat in this House, I have departed from
those principles, and I will consent that, quoad
hoc, I am a Federalist. But it will be in vain
to search for such a vote.
So strenuous, sir, had been the contest—so
hot the spirit of rivalship between the two contending
parties—that, after the Revolution of
1801, a curious spectacle was presented to this
nation and to the world—a spectacle which, I
am bold to say, never did before make its appearance
in any Government, and never will appear
again. It was this: that, as if the character
that each party had borne when in collision
with one another was indelible, the two parties,
after power was transferred from one to the
other, did actually maintain the same character
which they had derived from impressions received
during their late conflict: and the admiring
world saw with astonishment the case of
an opposition minority attempting to force upon
a reluctant Administration patronage and power,
which that Administration put by, and
sternly refused to accept. Yes, sir; for a time
so completely had the Republicans been imbued
with the principles which they professed whilst
in a minority, that, after becoming the majority,
the Federalists pressed on their old adversaries
power and patronage, to which they absolutely
opposed themselves, repelling, for a season, every
project of the kind. Is it necessary for me to
allude to the reduction of the Army—to say by
whom it was made? Sir, the proposition for it
was originally made by the personage now addressing
you; it came from what was then considered
the Governmental side of the House.
And by whom was it opposed? By gentlemen
who had so long fought under the banners of a
Government of "energy," that they were not
content to submit to the diminution of its patronage
or its power, even in the hands of their
political opponents. I speak of facts. Such a
case will never occur again. Nay, indeed, in a
little time, the sweets of power had their effect
on one side of the House, as the frowns of adversity
had upon the other; and after awhile,
the court and country parties as easily changed
sides as right and left do when a man turns
upon his heel.
Yes, sir, the tone of this House was soon
changed. We succeeded, however, in the reduction
of the Army; but I will trust to the
recollection of gentlemen, upon all sides of the
House, by what instrumentality this change
was effected. The Commander of that Army
was retained in his position. I have not leisure,
health, or strength, to go into the details; gentlemen
will remember them. Meanwhile, peace
with this country was negotiated in France by
the commissioners sent by Mr. Adams, and was
followed up very soon afterwards by the short
respite that the truce of Amiens gave to European
combatants, wearied rather than satiated
with slaughter. These events placed this country
in the happiest condition. Of the proceeds
of the direct and internal taxes voted by the
predecessors of the administration of Mr. Jefferson,
one moiety at least came into the Treasury
after their dismissal from office. But these
proceeds were not necessary to give an overflow
of money into the Treasury, which we never
ceased to have until we departed from those
principles of government and that policy which
brought us into power. We sailed on for some
time in the full tide of successful experiment,
unobstructed by squalls or adverse gales, if we
except only the Yazoo breeze. That question
was, if I forget not, the first cause of a breach
between those persons who had a direct lead in
the Government of the country. There were
men who did not hesitate, in opposition to all
the heads of your Departments, to throw themselves
into the breach at that time attempted in
the constitution of the country, to defend it,
and to defend it with success. It appears, from
some documents that have lately been laid upon
our table, that errors of that day have been
perceived, and that tender consciences which at
that time revolted, are now entirely reconciled
to the compromise which was then stamped
with the reprobation of almost every honest
man from Georgia to Virginia. There were
considerations of personal feeling which gave to
other parts of the Union, and to certain individuals
therein, a bias on that subject; and I
should be extremely sorry to be considered as
passing any thing like general censure upon the
advocates of that measure in or out of this
House. I refer only, of course, to those who
were not parties concerned in the fraud.
At that time, sir, all was prosperity and joy.
At that time were accumulated in the Treasury
those surpluses which, in one year, nearly
equalled the sum for which, in the present
year, the revenue is deficient, notwithstanding
the loan of last year, and to make up which deficiency
the head of the Treasury has been able
to devise no other means than a resort to new
loans. Yes, sir, there were then those surpluses
in the Treasury, the ghosts of which lingered
along its vaults for a time after their corporeal
bodies departed, and were then heard of no more.
But to proceed. The expenditures of the
Government, during the first four years of the
Jefferson Administration, exclusive of payments
on account of the public debt, averaged only
eight millions of dollars a year. In the four last
years of the Jefferson Administration, those expenditures
were very greatly increased, amounting
in the year 1808, (the last of the four,)
without any increase of Army and Navy expenditures,
to upwards of sixteen millions of
dollars—rivalling the expenditures of any one
year of Mr. Adams's war, and amounting to
one-half as much as was expended by the Father
of his Country in his eight years of the Presidency,
during which he was called upon to establish
public credit, to maintain a bloody Indian
war, and to lay the foundation of that character
of integrity which the Government has so
long sustained abroad, notwithstanding the misconduct
of its rulers. Yes, sir, it is a curious
but notorious fact, that in 1808 and 1809—and
I speak of 1809, for, although the present incumbent
came into office on the 3d of March of
that year, expenses were incurred and voted in
his predecessor's time—the expenditures of the
Government outraged all belief when compared
with the objects on which they were lavished.
And here, Mr. Chairman, let me put to you,
and to the gentleman on my right, if it be within
the compass of any man's powers to detract
more from the merit of an administration of
the Government of the United States in managing
at least one branch of the revenue than has
been done by that honorable gentleman? What
has he said? I will not repeat his words; to
do so would be odious, invidious; but I well
know if what he did say had come from the
other side of the House, it would have been set
down to the rancor of party spirit; to personal
spleen; or to want of respect for the White
house, or the Red house, or some other house.
What has become of that vast amount of money?
No man knows; and to the best of my knowledge
and belief, so help me God, no man will
ever know.
I find, as I anticipated, a difficulty in dragging
along my miserable body, and my feeble
mind, in this discussion; a difficulty not less,
perhaps, than that of dragging along with me
the attention of members of this House. I ask
its patience, its pardon, and its pity.
But to continue. In this prosperous state of
our country, the war in Europe was renewed,
or about to be renewed. The Government of
the United States would naturally, from the
situation of affairs in that quarter of the world,
experience a temporary diminution in its revenue,
which it need not feel or regard, because
it had been enabled to make that noble provision
for a sinking fund, for lessening the national
debt, for paying off the mortgages on the
estate of every man in the country and of those
who are unborn. It had made that noble provision,
which was attempted to be diverted to
the necessities created by the policy of the last
four years of Jefferson's Administration, and
the actual diversion of which, I believe, was
the first act of this Administration. It had
made that appropriation of eight millions of
dollars for a sinking fund, not to be touched
for any other purpose, and which, at the time
of the appropriation, no man dared to believe
would be gambled away.
The war in Europe brought to this country,
among other birds of passage, a ravenous flock
of neutralized carriers, which interposed the
flag of neutrality, not only between the property,
but even between the persons of the two
belligerent powers; and it was their clamor
principally, aided by the representations of
those of our merchants who saw and wished to
participate in the gains of such a commerce,
that the first step was taken in that policy of
restriction, which it was then foreseen would
lead to the disastrous condition in which we
now find ourselves. Yes, it was then foreseen
and foretold. What was then prophesied is
now history. It is so. "You," said the prophet,
"are prospering beyond all human example.
You, favorites of Almighty God, while all the
rest of the world are scourged, and ravaged,
and desolated by war, are about to enter into a
policy called preventive of war; a policy which
comes into this House in the garb of peace, but
which must end in war." And in war it has
ended. Yes, sir, we have been tortured, fretted,
goaded, until at last, like some poor man driven
from his family by discord at home, who says
to himself, "any thing, even exile, is better
than this," we have said that we will take war;
we will take any thing for a change. And
when war came, what said the people? They
said, "any thing for a change!"
At that time circumstances occurred, and I
hope the House will pardon me for alluding to
them. It is absolutely necessary that I should
do so. They have been spoken of by others
before me; they were at the time, and have
been since, detailed in the most solemn manner
on the floor of this body. A denial of them
has been challenged and never received. At
that time, I repeat, circumstances occurred
which made it my duty to oppose the projects
of the Executive Government of this country
in its relations with foreign powers.
At that time nothing that the Spanish Government
could do, not even the invasion of our
own territory, not even the capture and carrying
off, not from our decks, but our soil, a
portion of our citizens, could rouse this House
to a spirit which would, in my judgment, have
comported not only with its honor, but was
absolutely indispensable to its dignity. We
were wanting in the assertion of the rights of
our own country over its soil and jurisdiction,
by which assertion, then, we might have averted
the calamities which have since befallen us;
but a project for that purpose, recommended by
the committee to whom that subject was referred,
did not meet the approbation of the
House. And from that day and date, the black
cloud has thickened over us; has become more
and more dense. From that day and date,
have we departed from those counsels—in my
humble judgment, at least—from those principles,
adherence to which had induced the people
of the United States to clothe us with their
power and confidence.
What have we done since? From that day,
with a short interruption, the policy of this
Government has actually subserved, as far as it
could, the purposes of France. I speak of
facts; of facts susceptible of proof, which may
be felt, seen, touched, heard, and understood
by all except those too indolent to examine
them, or too ignorant for the light of truth to
have any effect upon their understandings. I
say, sir, that the policy of this Government has,
from that time, subserved the purposes of
France. And how do I prove it? Why, sir,
by way of meeting the French decrees, which
prohibit to us all intercourse with Great Britain,
we cut off the intercourse between us and
the whole world. We virtually held out to
our great commercial cities—to Boston, New
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston—the
same language as Bonaparte had held to
his own cities: "I know that you are suffering,
and unhappy; that the grass is growing in your
streets; that the ships at your wharves are rotting,
until they are fit only for fuel; that your
trade is dwindling only to nothing; but what
is all that to my continental system? What
are a few seaport towns—enterprising, wealthy,
and prosperous, as indeed they are—what are
they, compared to my continental system?"
And, sir, what was our "restrictive" system?
Similar in point of effect—certainly cotemporaneous
in point of time—to Bonaparte's "continental
system." Sir, it is a matter susceptible
of demonstration, if I possessed the physical
power to go through with it, that the system
recommended by the then President of the
United States, of laying an embargo on all ships
and vessels in our ports, for the purpose of
"keeping in safety these essential resources,"
took place in consequence of a communication
from our Minister in Paris to this Government,
transmitting certain correspondence of his with
the French Government. And although in the
message to both Houses of Congress, recommending
the measure, the President does use
the term "belligerent powers," I do attest the
fact, and I call upon other gentlemen, who
know it, to attest it also, that, while the message
purposely referred to both "belligerents,"
not one scrip of manuscript relating to the
other "belligerent" accompanied that message;
nor was there any thing contained in that message
relating to that "belligerent," but a scrap
from an English paper, about the size of a
square of its columns, containing some speculations
of a London editor; and I say that there
did not exist in this House, nor in this nation—if
there did, let the evidence be produced—any
knowledge of the existence of the orders in
council, which have been put forward as justifying
the embargo. If their existence had been
known at the time, would the President in his
message recommending an embargo have failed
to notice the fact? Would he not have used it
as one of the strongest inducements to the adoption
of this system? Would those "orders"
not have been published in the National Intelligencer,
which is considered—and certainly not
without cause, in view of certain things which
we have lately seen in it—to be the Court
paper? Produce the National Intelligencer of
that date; there is not one syllable to be found
in it concerning the Orders in Council. No,
sir, in his message on the occasion referred to,
the President did not produce any acts of the
"belligerents" referred to, but only the correspondence
between General Armstrong, our
Minister at Paris, and that Government, on the
subject of the construction of one of its first
decrees. It was in consequence of the more
recent decrees of France, and not of the British
Orders in Council, that the embargo was recommended
and laid. And yet, in the discussion
which came off on that measure, it was represented
as a weapon against England, which
would be more efficient than any war, and
must bring her to our feet: it would give effect
to the object which Bonaparte had in view, of
destroying her by consumption, by cutting her
off from the commerce of the world. Although
I state these facts, I know that it may be
proven—and I am sorry that it can—by reference
to the journals of this House, and by a
report, too, of an honorable and respectable
committee of this House, that the embargo was
designed to obviate the effects of the Orders in
Council.
But, sir, it is indisputably true, that there
was no mention in the embargo message of those
Orders in Council—no allusion to them in debate
upon it—no knowledge of them at the time
that the embargo law was passed, that can be
proven by any document whatsoever entitled
to the least respect; and I will even go so far as
to allow as evidence the authority of any newspaper.
The members of that committee had
heard so much of the Orders in Council, and
the effect that it was pretended that the embargo
would have upon them, that in their report,
speaking of them, they absolutely transposed
cause and effect. It is unfortunate that it
should be so; but it is nevertheless true.
Events subsequent to the period to which I
have now brought myself have been detailed in
this debate in a manner so clear, so lucid, so
convincing, by two honorable gentlemen from
New York, that there is no need of my repeating
the narrative: but I must be permitted to
say that the statement made yesterday by a
gentleman from New York, (Mr. Emott,) will
be refuted when Euclid shall come to be considered
a shallow sophist, and not before. My
honorable friend from the same State, who
spoke a few days ago, called upon gentlemen to
handle that part of the subject—the revocation
of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and the inveiglement
thereby of this country into a war
with England—in a manner more able than, he
was pleased to say, he himself had done it.
The attempt to do this would, indeed, be to
gild refined gold, to paint the lily, to add to the
perfume of the violet—in all cases a most ridiculous
and wasteful excess. And yet, sir, the
situation in which I unhappily stand, and in
which it was my lot to stand at the conclusion
of the last session of Congress, compels me to
say a word on this subject. You will remember,
sir, that it was my misfortune, during the
first session of this Congress, to oppose the attempt
to impress upon this House and the nation
certain most preposterous, absurd, and
false propositions; for the temerity of which
effort I came under the censure—implied, at
least, if not to say direct—of this honorable
body. The contrary propositions, which I undertook
to maintain, were, first, that the Berlin
and Milan decrees were not repealed on the
first of November, 1810, and that the only evidence
of any such repeal, up to that date, was
the President's Proclamation of the second of
that month; and secondly, that the British Orders
in Council did, in point of fact, establish no
serious insurmountable obstacle to negotiation
between that Government and the United
States. Why, sir, I shall not here go into any
argument on this point; if I had the ability, I
have not the will; and, if I had the will, I have
not the ability. Nor can it be necessary, when
the Emperor of France himself comes into
court, and cannot reject his own authority, as
borne in his own laws. Yes, sir, he did come
forth, and, in his antedated decree of the 28th
of April, 1811—though it unquestionably ought
to bear date full twelve months later—does, in
the most offensive of all possible ways, establish
the fact, not only that the Berlin and Milan
decrees were not repealed (as all the world
knew except the President of the United States)
on the first of November, 1810, but that they
were in his mind when he issued his decree,
dated 28th April, 1811. They were repealed,
finally, in consequence—of what? Of your
doing that which for years he had been attempting,
by menace and blandishment, to induce
you to do—that is to say, embark in war
with England, taking sides with France, "causing,"
as the phrase was, "our flag to be respected:"
And this, too, after your having
posted up in the ledger of this House that war
with one of the "belligerents" was equivalent
to submission to the other!
My other proposition was, that the Orders in
Council constituted no insurmountable obstacle
to negotiation between this country and Great
Britain. And what was the fact in regard to
them? Why, that almost at the time that this
position was taken on this floor—a few weeks
only thereafter—the Orders in Council were repealed.
I put it to you, sir, and to the great mass of
the people of this country—to the honest, laborious,
unsuspecting, kind-hearted, confiding,
generous, and just people—had the fact been
known that the French decrees were not repealed,
and that the Orders in Council were repealed,
whether any man, in any station, would
have had the confidence to propose a declaration
of war against England, taking part against
her, and siding with France in the conflict in
which those nations are engaged?
And, whilst I am upon this subject, permit
me to say, suppose the proposition which was
repeatedly made—in more than one instance
by the person who is now addressing you, and
supported with the greatest ability by gentlemen
on the other side of the House—to postpone
our declaration of war against Great Britain
until the autumn, when we might be in
some state of preparation and readiness for it—had
succeeded, what would have been the
consequence? At this time we should have
been at peace; we should have been lying secure
in that snug safe haven of neutrality, in
which the good sense of the greatest and best
men of this country have always attempted to
moor the public ship. Now, where are we?
And shall this war be called a popular war; a
war of the people; a war called for by the public
voice, into which this country has been
plunged, not more by the agency of the friends
of Government than of its enemies, in the
hope of the latter that this Administration
would sink and founder in it, and they rise to
power thereupon? Is it possible that that can
be deemed a war of the people, a popular war,
which has enabled a gentleman known to be
of the most respectable connections, and possessed,
I believe, of considerable talent—but
who, put in competition with the veteran politician
now at the helm of Government, is but
a boy in politics—a person whose pretensions
are so extremely inferior, to rival the present
Chief Magistrate in the confidence of the people,
and for a time, as you know, make him
tremble for his re-election? It is, however,
some consolation to reflect that, in all free Governments,
the public voice will sooner or later
be heard upon all their measures, and in condemnation
of those which the opinion of that
public detests and execrates. This is a great
law of politics; it is to the political what gravitation
is to the physical world; it cannot be
counteracted. Statesmen know it, feel it; they
do not reason to it, but from it; they never lose
sight of it, but are guided by it in all their
measures. And those of us who live to see the
next Congress, will live to see the effects of that
law in this House.
Sir, we have passed so many laws, we have
had so many objects for enticing the belligerents
on the one hand and coercing them on the
other, and enticing and coercing them together,
that I feel some little difficulty, in the present
state of my brain, in referring to them by title
or date; but it is the law passed on this subject,
in consequence of which the celebrated letter
of the 1st of August of the Duc de Cadore was
written, to which I desire most particularly to
refer. If, after the proclamation of the President
of the United States of the 1st of November
thereafter, issued in consequence of that
letter, revoking so much of our non-intercourse
law as related to France, an unbroken warfare
being kept up by France on our commerce—a
fact as notorious as the existence of any fact in
nature—was it not good cause for reinstating
the law in relation to France, and putting her
on her ancient ground? Then I would be glad
to know, for one, whether our continuing at
war with England was any better cause for
keeping up the interdiction in relation to her,
after she had revoked her Orders in Council?
In other words, it being admitted by gentlemen
on one side, as it has been contended by gentlemen
on the other, that the revocation of the
Orders in Council by Great Britain was such a
one as did satisfy the terms of the non-intercourse
act, what was the reason that the proclamation
required by our law in such case did
not issue? Why, sir, the state of war between
the United States and Great Britain being offensive
on our part—being of our own making—was
held to be a cause why we cannot execute
our law as relates to her. Now, whilst
the continued war upon us by France, by seizures
of our merchant vessels and their cargoes,
is not considered an obstacle to its execution
in regard to her, is it not as clear as the noon-day
sun, that if the making of war by France
on the United States did not constitute any
good cause for withholding the revocation as
to her, when she professed to have repealed her
Berlin and Milan decrees, there was no reason
why it should not have been extended to Great
Britain also, when she actually repealed her
Orders in Council?
I am extremely at a loss to say whether my
judgment, my memory, my imagination, or my
command of words, fit me for the expression
of the few scattered ideas I have on this subject;
I fear that they may fail me. But I believe
it will be conceded, on all hands, that if,
after the revocation of the British Orders in
Council, the President of the United States had,
as he honorably might have done, made that
repeal the basis of negotiation with Great Britain,
there is not a man in this country—certainly
there is none among his admirers and
adherents—who would not have hailed him as
the restorer of the peace and prosperity of the
country, which had been so idly (I had almost
said so wickedly) disturbed. But, regardless
of every consequence, we went into war with
England as an inconsiderate couple go into
matrimony, without considering whether they
have the means of sustaining their own existence,
much less that of any unfortunate progeny
that should happen to be born of them.
The sacrifice was made. The blood of Christians
enjoying the privileges of jury trial, of
the writ of habeas corpus, of the freedom of
conscience, of the blessings of civil liberty,
citizens of the last Republic that ambition has
left upon the face of a desolate earth—the
blood of such a people was poured out as an
atonement to the Moloch of France. The Juggernaut
of India is said to smile when it sees
the blood flow from the human sacrifice which
its worship exacts; the Emperor of France
might now smile upon us. But no, sir, our
miserable offering is spurned. The French
monarch turns his nose and his eyes another
way. He snuffs on the plains of Moscow a
thousand hecatombs, waiting to be sacrificed
on the shrine of his ambition; and the city of
the Czars, the largest in the world, is to be at
once the altar and the fire of sacrifice to his
miserable ambition. And what injury has the
Emperor of Russia done to him? For what
was he contending? For national existence;
for a bare existence; for himself and the people
who are subject to his sway. And what,
sir, are you doing? Virtually fighting the battles
of his foes; surrendering yourself to the
views of his adversary, without a plea—without
any thing to justify your becoming the victims
of his blasting ambition.
Yes, sir, after having for years attempted to
drive us by menace into war with England,
when he has seen us fairly embarked in it, and
the champions of human rights bleeding in his
cause, the Ruler of France has turned with
contempt from your reclamations; he has left
your Minister, who was charged with those reclamations,
to follow him in his Russian campaign,
to whip up his jaded Pegasus, and, travelling
at his heels, to overtake him if he can.[34]
For these injuries and insults what atonement
has been made? What satisfaction has been
received for your plundered property? And
what is the relation in which you stand to
France? At this moment, when it is well
known that it would not require one additional
man in the army or navy to make good, in the
eye of nations, your character as an independent
and high-spirited people, you are prostrate
at the feet of your's and the world's undoer.
Is there any thing yet wanting to fill up the
full measure of injustice you have sustained?
Gentlemen on all sides are obliged to admit that
the provocation which we have received from
France is ample; that the cup of it is overflowing.
And yet, what is our situation in relation
to that destroyer of mankind—him who, devising
death to all that live, sits like a cormorant
on the tree of life; who cannot be glutted,
nor tired, with human carnage; the impersonation
of death; himself an incarnate death?
All this, I say, does prove—and if it does not
I call on gentlemen to disprove the fact—that
there is a difference in the standard by which
we measure French aggressions and the aggressions
of any other people under the sun.
When Spain was the ally of France she was—what?
She was secure from our indignation.
There was not a murderer, a barbarian, in all
our Western wilderness that was not safe under
the Spanish cloak. For why? Because the
King of Spain, such as he was—for he wore
only the semblance of a crown—was in alliance
with France; and he must not be touched.
But what has Revolutionary Spain done?
What offence has she committed against France?
That she is not only helpless, destitute of resources,
unable to return a blow, but, above all,
is coveted by France, are considerations which
cannot justify, on the part of France, conduct
towards her more infamous than that of the
English at Copenhagen—conduct cowardly as
it is unprincipled. But, sir, I forewarn gentlemen
of the Southern country—I do beseech
them, with a sincerity which no man can have
a right to question—to beware how they transfer
the theatre of war from the rocks and snows
of Canada to the sandhills, the rice-fields, the
tobacco plantations of the Southern States.
For them to think of voluntarily consenting to
make that region the theatre of the war, would
compel me to believe that they are on the verge
of that madness which precedes the destruction
of all doomed by Heaven to perish.
Sir, I have just touched, with trembling and
faltering hand, some of the preliminary observations
which I had intended, at some time or
other, to make, into which I have now been
prematurely forced to enter, not more unexpectedly
than unavoidably, by the strange turn
which this debate has taken.
There are two other points—for, in respect
to the Orders of Council, I shall not say a word
about them—upon which I am very anxious to
offer myself to your attention: the one the celebrated
point of impressment, which, though
it has been very ably handled, is not yet exhausted:
the other the Indian war on our Western
border. And I also wish to say something
on the subject of negotiation. In the midst of
a war with one of the greatest powers of Europe,
why should the gleam of the tomahawk
and the scalping-knife, the cries of massacred
women and children reaching our ears—why
should these fright us from our propriety?
Why, we are told the Indians of the West have
been stirred up to war with us by British
agents. But what is the fact? That we have
no Indian war, but a war of our own seeking,
as I have already, in the course of this session,
read to you certain proofs; and I will now give
you another. It is this: It is agreed on all
hands—no man has attempted to dispute it—that,
in the affair of the battle of Tippecanoe,
the commander and the officers distinguished
themselves by the greatest gallantry. How
has it happened, then, that while we have been
freely voting medals to those gallant officers of
our navy who have distinguished themselves
on the ocean—and I hope we shall vote them
something more substantial—not a whisper has
been heard in relation to those who have been
engaged in this expedition against the Indians?
The subject has not been even inquired into.
Do we know, at this moment, as a Legislature,
the causes of that disastrous business—I call it
so from its consequences—or by whose authority
this war was made? Or, is it come to this:
that Governors of our Territories are to consider
themselves as so many Hastings and Wellesleys
of our country, and that, while they do
not involve us in war with Christians like
themselves, they may go to any extent in exterminating
the Red Barbarians here as in the
East Indies Governors and Proconsuls of the
British Government do there in regard to uncivilized
powers of that quarter of the globe?
Is it discovered that our Territorial Governors
may at pleasure invade the territory of other
nations—for, inconsiderable and contemptible
though they be, the Indian tribes are nations—in
like manner that the British authorities make
war upon those nations of the East? Yes, sir,
not only is this a war of our own seeking—not
only we had it in our power to keep the peace—but
in the country which was the scene of
the battle, and in the adjacent country, it was
the most popular war ever waged. The frontier
people of this country have been in the habit
of driving the heathen before them; and to
them the chase of the deer, the elk, and the antelope,
is not so grateful as that of the red men
they hunt. I believe that it is the cause of serious
regret to many of the people of the West
that there is now no longer any motive to drive
them from their lands. As to the Red Men,
the Big-Knives have, without any foreign
prompting or instigation, driven them off from
a country more extensive than that over which
the Emperor of France wields his sceptre. So
I put aside this item of Indian war altogether
as a matter of account in the list of our grievances
against the British Government. There
is not a shadow of foundation for believing that
these Indians were or could have been instigated
to take up the hatchet against us until hostile
arms had been taken up against them.
When driven to the wall they must fight or die—the
last alternative left to them—for which
nobody can blame them.
It was, sir, a saying of one of the best men
who ever wrote, in correspondence with a
friend, that he had no time to write a shorter
letter; and I can truly say that I have not time
to deliver a shorter speech. I know that this
question will be taken to-day, for I have been
so admonished; and my own very severe and
sudden indisposition, which I am almost ashamed
to name, will compel me to detain your attention
much longer than under other circumstances
would have been the case.
A word, now, on the subject of impressment.
Our foreign trade had grown beyond the
capacity of either our tonnage or seamen to
manage. Our mercantile marine was an infant
Hercules; but it was overloaded beyond
its strength: the crop was too abundant to be
gathered by our hands alone. The consequence
was, and a natural one too, that not only the
capitalists flocked into our country from abroad
to share in our growing commerce, but the
policy also of our Government was adapted to
it, and a law was passed to enable us to avail
ourselves of the services of British seamen and
seamen of other countries. And, in doing this,
we availed ourselves of the pretext—which, as
long as the countries to which they belonged
winked at it, was fair for us to use—of taking
these British seamen for Americans. It was in
1796 that commenced the act, to which reference
has been made, and that system of "protections,"
as they were called, the very mention
of which, at this day, causes a burst of honest
indignation in the breast of citizens whose situation
enables them to ascertain their true
character. If these "protections," so termed,
have not been forged all over Europe, it is only
for the reason that the notes of a certain bank
of which I have heard have not been forged,
viz: that, the bank being broke, its notes were
so worthless that people would not even steal
them. The "protections" are attainable by
everybody; by men of all ages, countries, and
descriptions. They are a mere farce. The issuing
of them has gone far to disgrace the
character of the country, and has brought into
question and jeopardy the rights of real American
citizens. This question of impressment,
delicate as it has been said to be—difficult as in
one view it certainly is—is, of all others, in my
judgment, the most compact. With the gentleman
from New York, I will say that the tide
of emigration has brought to the shores of our
country many most valuable characters; some
of them persons with whom I have the honor
of being in habits, not only of intimacy, but
friendship. I believe there does not exist one
man of this description, who comes bona fide
to this country to settle himself and children
here, that would require you to go to war on
his account. And, sir, I believe that the belligerent
position itself in which you now find
yourself will relieve you in a great degree of
this evil, for many seamen who have so long,
by virtue of these "protections," passed themselves
off for American, will find it to be very
convenient to be Portuguese or Swedish seamen,
or seamen of some other State than the United
States—some State that is not at war with England.
Sir, there is a wide difference between
the character of American seamen and seamen
of every other country on earth. The American
seaman has a home on the land, a domicil,
a wife and children, to whom he is attached,
to whom he is in the habit of returning after
his voyages; with whom he spends, sometimes,
a long vacation from the toils of maritime life.
It is not so with the seamen of other countries.
For the protection of men of the first description,
I am disposed, if necessary, to use the force
of the country, but for no other. I know, indeed,
that some gentlemen who have spoken
much on the subject of the principle of impressment,
will tell you that the right to take
from a neutral vessel one seaman, if carried to
its extent, involves a right to take any, or all
seamen. Why, sir, in like manner, it might be
argued that the taking illegally of one vessel at
sea involves the right to take every vessel.
And yet, sir, who ever heard of two nations
going to war about a single case of capture,
though admitted not to be justified by the laws?
Such a case never did and never will occur.
Of one thing we are certain: it rests upon no
doubtful ground: that Great Britain, rather
than surrender the right of impressing her own
seamen, will nail her colors to the mast, and go
down with them. And she is right, because,
when she does surrender it, she is Samson
shorn of his strength: the sinews of her power
are cut. I say this openly in the House of Representatives;
and I am not communicating to
the enemy a secret of any value, because she has
herself told us that she can never surrender it.
She has told us so, not when she stood in the
relation of an enemy toward us, but in the friendly
intercourse of the British Ministry with our
late Commissioners at London. Turn to the
book: I wish the honorable gentleman, if he
has it, would for a moment let me have the use
of it. You are told in that book that every effort
was made by the American Commissioners
to effect a relaxation of this right; that the
British Ministry evinced the sincerest desire to
give satisfaction to them on this point: but
what? The Admiralty was consulted; they
waked up out of their slumbers the Civilians at
Doctors' Commons to deliberate upon it; and
they came to the conclusion that the Government
of Great Britain could not give up that
right. Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, the Commissioners
of the United States to negotiate a
treaty with the Government of Great Britain, in
their correspondence with their own Government,
give this fact to excuse themselves for
failing to accomplish their object, and to prove
that every thing had been done that could be on
their part, and every thing conceded on the other
side that the most friendly disposition could
warrant—and here I do not speak of masked
friendship, but of real friendship. Although
every thing possible had been done, this right of
impressment of her own seamen was a sine qua
non on the part of Great Britain—one which
would not, could not, must not, be surrendered.
And, sir, if this question of the right of impressment
was one on which we were to go to war
with Great Britain, we ought to have gone to
war then; because we were then told by the
highest authority in that Government that this
was a point which never would be given up.
I find, sir, that I cannot trust my broken voice
to read the book, now that it is in my hand, but
must rely upon my recollection for facts.
Now, this question lies as I have said, in a
very small compass. The right of Great Britain
to take her own seamen from your merchant
vessels, (if it be a right,) is one which she has
exercised ever since you were a People, wherever
occasions for its exercise have occurred.
Will you not only go to war, but wage a bellum
ad internecinum for it? Will you wage an endless
war of extermination for this right, which,
you have known for two and twenty years of
your national existence, she will not relinquish?
A gentleman from Tennessee, of whose capacity
few men have more respectful opinion than myself,
has quoted the diplomatic correspondence
as far back as 1792, to show what General
Washington's opinions were on this question
of impressment, and this opinion of the Father
of his Country is now held up to the people of
the United States for the purpose of enlisting
their prejudices in the conviction that, by involving
the country in warfare, we are at this
moment treading in the footsteps of that great
man, and acting upon his principles. Nothing
can be more untrue. To say that the Treaty of
Louisiana was negotiated two years after the
letter of instruction quoted from the Washington
Administration, and that that treaty contained
no provisions on this point, is a reply in
full on this course of argument. But what does
the correspondence referred to prove? What
every treaty, what every negotiation, has proven:
that England would not give up this point,
although she made offers for guarding against
abuse—offers more favorable to us than ours to
her. And yet the Administration of this Government
have had the hardihood or the folly to
plunge the nation into a war for it—for a point
on which General Washington, Mr. Adams, and
Mr. Jefferson, men differing from each other as
may be in every aspect, had been content to negotiate,
rather than go to war for its assertion.
What was the offer made to our Government
by the British Ministry? If I do not forget,
their offer was that they would not impress
American seamen. Their offer to us was not
accepted, but it was beyond question, in my
opinion, more beneficial than the proposition
which we on that occasion made to them.
But it may be said that the right of search
cannot be endured; that the protection of our
flag must be held inviolate; that if a search of
our ships be permitted for British seamen, they
may actually take American seamen. Sir, there
is no doubt of the fact that by mistake, sometimes
perhaps by wilful misconduct, on the part
of officers engaged in the search, such a thing
may happen. But, should we not think it exceedingly
strange that the misconduct of an
officer of the American Government, in one case
in twenty if you will, should be a cause of war
for any nation against us? It is one of those
cases which does occur, and will forever occur,
to a neutral power, whenever a general war is
lighted up. It is one of the prices which this
country has to pay for its rapid accession of
wealth, such as is unheard of in the annals of
any other nation but our own. And this, sir, is
the state of things in which we have undertaken,
in children's language, to quarrel with our
bread and butter; and to identify ourselves with
one of the belligerents in a war in which we
have no proper concern. I will not touch at
all the abstract question of the right of impressment:
it has been so much more ably handled
by others that I shall not say a word about it.
I address myself to the common sense of the
planter, the farmer, the agriculturist of our
country—are you willing upon such grounds as
these to continue this war? I have no doubt
what will be their answer.
On these subjects I have delivered my sentiments
more than once before in this House. I
think of them with horror as the accursed cause
of this war. Not that the men who are in power
are worse men than other people, but that they
have brought upon this land of peace and freedom
issues the end of which it would be impossible
for any human being to divine.
One thing is certain, that the right of search
does practically exist, and has been acknowledged
by all nations. The President of the
United States and his Secretary of State, as great
masters of the Law of Nations, will be among
the first to acknowledge it; they have acknowledged
it, and by our treaties with foreign powers,
this country has heretofore acknowledged
it, so far as concerns the right to search for contraband
goods and enemy's property. Suppose
that there are notorious abuses under this right:
should we be justified in declaring that no search
whatever of our merchant vessels shall be allowed?
There is no doubt that, under the color
of the right of search—for I am advocating its
lawful purposes only—abuses have been committed
on neutrals; and as long as men exist it
will be so. The liability to abuse of this right
is the price which neutrals pay for the advantages
which they derive from their neutrality;
and I should like to know whether it would be
for me to join in the contest in which these belligerents
are engaged for the recovery of my
neutral rights. Where are those rights when
great maritime powers become belligerent?
There are neutral rights undoubtedly, but there
are also neutral duties. And shall a neutral nation,
a nation which has in that character prospered
and flourished more than any people on
the face of the globe, sacrifice those rights and
those advantages, and resort to war against
one of those belligerents—and for what? For
a point of honor! Yet, whilst in this Quixotic
spirit we have gone to war with England; although
we have been robbed, reviled, contemned
throughout by the Emperor of France, we can
see no cause of war with him!
What shall we say of the French doctrine in
relation to this subject of impressment? If that
has been dwelt upon in this debate by any honorable
gentleman of this House it has escaped
my notice. What is the French doctrine on this
subject—established at the time when the United
States stood in relations of peace and amity to
that power, when every heart beat high with
sympathy for the success of French freedom;
when some of those who have since transferred
their admiration, I will not say their love, to
the present head of the French Government, to
the enemy of French freedom, and all freedom,
to all commerce, and right, and religion—at the
time when some of those who have since so lamentably
changed on this subject felt an interest
for freedom and France scarcely inferior to that
which they felt for freedom and America? What
were then the doctrines of the French Government?
That all who spoke the English language
should be treated as Englishmen, unless they
could give proof to the contrary; the onus probandi
lying on those who spoke the language of
Locke, and Newton, and Milton, and Shakspeare.
Yes, sir, whilst the English Government establishes
no such doctrine, the French Government
acts upon the principle that speaking the English
language is prima facie evidence of your
being a British subject, and would justify their
treating you as an enemy, the burden of the
proof to the contrary being thrown upon yourself.
And, sir, is it nothing to the bill which we
are now debating, for raising an additional army
of twenty thousand men—or is it a departure
from order to hint on this floor at a circumstance
which all men are employed and occupied in discussing
at their firesides?—that this army, to
constitute an aggregate of fifty-five thousand
regular troops, is about to be put under the control
of the man who was the author of the
Anonymous Letters at Newburg at the close of
the Revolutionary war, inciting a handful of
men, the remnant of the old American army—perhaps
not numbering six thousand altogether—to
give a master to the nation? Is that a consideration
to have no weight upon such a question
as this? With me, sir, it is conclusive. I will
tell gentlemen on both sides of the House that a
Government or a man may despise a calumny—that
the arrows of slander will fall blunt and
harmless upon them—provided that the Government
and the man be true to itself and himself.
Yes, sir, ask yourself this question in regard to any
man, to whom you are about to confide important
trusts: Does he pay his just debts? Is he a man
of truth? Does he discharge as he ought the duties
of a friend, a brother in society? After having
done that, be his politics what they may,
and his peculiarity of opinion in politics what it
may, he is a good man; he acquires the esteem
of all who know him; he is impenetrable to
mere vulgar calumny. This Government ought
to employ men of real worth and capacity: it is
not always that those showing qualities attracting
attention in private life, or as companions,
are of real capacity. Do those who administer
the Government make it a rule to employ in the
public service none but men of real capacity, or
worth, of integrity, and of high character? Do
they give their contracts and offices without
fear, favor, or affection, to men of responsibility
and character—to such men as you would in
private life give your own contracts to? Or do
they bestow them, as is done in some Governments
differently constituted from ours, where
church preferment and military preferment are
sometimes made a dirty job of Parliamentary
interest? Do they employ men of clean hands,
with fair characters; or is every caitiff, without
examination, welcome to their arms, provided
he can bring with him the proof of his treachery
to his former employers? It depends on these
facts whether confidence is due to any Administration
of the Government.
Sir, I have much yet to say which appeared
to me, when I rose, not to be unworthy your
attention; but I confess to you, with feelings
something like contrition, that my opinion on
this subject has undergone a change.
There is one point, however, on which I do
not know how to speak in this place with the
reverence which is due to it. I cannot pass it
over, and yet I know not how to touch it. Yes,
sir, there is one reflection pressing itself as a
crown of thorns upon my own head, which I
am bound to present to the consideration of this
Assembly and this people. Is it fitting that the
only two nations among whom the worship of
the true God has been maintained with any
thing like truth and freedom from corruption;
that the only two nations among whom this
worship has been preserved unstained, shall be
the two now arrayed against each other in hostile
arms in a conflict in which, let who will
conquer in the fight, his success in one point, if
that be an object, will have been attained: so
much of human life, liberty, and happiness, will
have perished in the affray—in the service of
this scourge with which it has pleased God, in
his wisdom and justice, not in his mercy, to inflict
mankind? Is it fitting that those hands
which unite in giving to idolaters and to the
heathen the Word of God, the Book of Life—that
those hands, and those alone, should be
thus drenched in each other's blood? Will you
unite as a Christian with your Protestant brother
across the Atlantic for these noble purposes,
and then plunge the dagger into his breast with
whom you are associated in a cause so holy—one
so infinitely transcending the low, the little,
the dirty business we are called upon here to
transact? I hope that the sacrifice may be
stopped. We have nothing to expect from the
mission of our Minister to the Ruler of France,
whether at Moscow, or wherever else he may
be. The Deity or Devil whom we worship is
not to be mollified by our suppliant appeals.
Let us turn from him—come out of his house—and
join in the worship of the true and living
God, instead of spilling the blood of his people
on the abominable altar of the French Moloch.
Sir, I have done. I could have wished to
continue my remarks further, but I cannot.
When Mr. Randolph concluded, the House
adjourned.
Additional Military Force.
The House then resumed the consideration of
the bill to raise twenty additional regiments of
infantry for one year.—The question being on
the passage of the bill.
Mr. Stow, said: Mr. Speaker, I am aware of
the delicacy and novelty of my situation, as well
from the indulgence of the House, as from the
neutral course which I mean to pursue. He
must have been indeed an inattentive observer
of mankind who proposes to himself such a
course without being exposed to difficulties and
dangers from every side. Our country has experienced
them too long from the great belligerents
of Europe, and an individual will
quickly find them here. For even this House
is not exempt from its great party belligerents
who issue their conflicting decrees and Orders
in Council; and, in imitation of the hostile
Europeans, it is sometimes a sufficient cause of
condemnation to have been spoken with by the
adverse side. Yet, notwithstanding all these
dangers, I mean to launch my neutral bark on
this tempestuous ocean, conscious of the rectitude
of my intentions, and humbly hoping
for the approbation of my country and my
God.
The proper extent of the discussion growing
out of this bill seemed to be confined to these
inquiries: Can the force contemplated be obtained?
If obtained, will it accomplish the end
proposed? And lastly, will the force be an
economical one? If the discussion had been
confined to these limits I would have listened,
and not have spoken; but, sir, it has taken a
wider range, and assumed a more important
aspect. It has embraced the present, and past,
and the future. The causes of the war, and the
mode of conducting it, have been investigated,
and even confident predictions have been made
as to its end. The history and the state of our
negotiations have been carefully examined—and
the Presidential order of succession has been
scrutinized by the light of experience as well as
that of prophecy. We have sometimes been
forced into the scenes of private life; and, at
other times, we have been chained to the car of
Napoleon. In short, sir, the discussion has
ranged as wide as existence, and, not content
with that, the speakers "have exhausted worlds,
and then imagined new." I do not pretend to
censure this—it may be well for the people to
have their political concerns thus splendidly
dressed and passed in review before them. But
still I will attempt to call the attention of the
House from the regions of fiction, of fancy, and
of poetry, to the humble, but I trust no less
profitable, sphere of reality and prose. Passing
by many of those things which have amused by
their ingenuity, or surprised by their novelty,
but which do not deserve a serious answer, I
will endeavor to state distinctly the grounds
taken by the opponents of this bill, or rather
the opponents of furnishing the means of prosecuting
the war: Firstly. It is alleged "that
the war was originally unjust." Secondly.
"That if the war was originally just, it has
become unjust to continue it in consequence of
the revocation of the British Orders in Council."
Thirdly. "That it is inexpedient to prosecute
the war, because we have no means of
coercing our enemy or enforcing our claims."
Fourthly. "That we are unable to support the
war." And fifthly. "That, in consideration of
all these circumstances, the House ought to withhold
the means of further prosecuting the war."
First, then, it was alleged that the war was
originally unjust. Here let me call on the House
to distinguish between unjust and inexpedient.
Nothing can be more important than to have
clear and distinct ideas about those words which
lie at the bottom of a science, or inquiry. This
is happily illustrated in mathematics—there
every word, by the help of diagrams, is carefully
defined; and the consequence is, that there are
no disputes among mathematicians, while their
labors have done honor to mankind. A thing
may be just and yet inexpedient: the justice of
an act relates to the conduct of another, the
expediency of our own situation. It may be
just for me to sue the man who withholds from
me the smallest sum; and yet so inexpedient
as to be even ridiculous. Thus a war may be
perfectly just, and at the same time highly inexpedient.
This, if I mistake not, was the
ground generally taken the last year by the opponents
of the war, particularly by the gentleman
from Virginia before me, (Mr. Sheffey,)
which pointed out the distinction which I
have endeavored to do, though with more ability
and success. I hope the House will bear
this distinction in mind; because it is of the
greatest importance in the investigation which
I intend to make. Before I enter further on
the argument, I ask the House to indulge me
for a moment while I explain my views relative
to the commencement of the war. I never saw
any want of provocation on the part of Great
Britain. I never for an instant doubted the
justice of the war, while I urged its inexpediency
with all my might. I considered man
placed here by a beneficent Providence, on a
fertile soil, and in a happy climate, enlightened
by science, and protected by the wisest of laws.
By our Revolution cut adrift, as I may say, from
the old world, before the storm which was
about to desolate Europe arose, I fondly hoped
that this new world would furnish one fair experiment
of what science, liberty and peace,
might achieve, free from those corruptions which
have eternally attended on war. I hoped to see
the country improved, and bound together by
roads and canals, to see it adorned by literary
institutions, and by every establishment which
reflects honor upon man. Nor do I yet believe
that this was an Utopian vision, or an idle
dream. I still believe it might all have been
realized by a different course—but the nation
has determined on war, and, though it was
not my choice, I still maintain that it is not
unjust.
I shall now examine the second proposition,
"that if the war was originally just, its further
prosecution is unjust." On what ground does
this rest? It is this, that the Orders in Council
were the cause of the war; those orders having
ceased, the prosecution of the war becomes unjust.
Here again justice and expediency are
confounded. It was never maintained, that the
Orders in Council rendered war more just than
many other outrages, though they went farther
to prove its expediency, and even necessity.
It therefore follows, that their repeal does not
affect the justice of the war; unless accompanied
with compensation for the spoliations
committed under them, and atonement made
for other wrongs. Neither of these, is it pretended,
has been done; except so far as relates
to the affair of the Chesapeake, and which I
purposely left out of the catalogue of grievances.
An injury which was a just cause of war, remains
a just cause for its continuance, till
atonement is offered, or till it is settled by negotiation.
But, sir, an ample justification of war
remains in the impressment of our seamen. The
claim on our part is not, as has been alleged, a
claim to protect British seamen—it is a claim
to protect American citizens. Nay, more, as
respects the justice of the continuance of the
war, it is a claim only, that they will cease from
the practice during the truce, that it may be
seen whether it is possible to arrange it by negotiation.
Is it unjust to continue the war, till
this demand is complied with? or does any
American wish to see his country prostrated
still lower?
Having thus far explained my ideas relative
to the justice of the commencement and continuance
of the war, I will now proceed to answer
the third objection, namely: That it is
inexpedient to carry it on, because we have no
means of coercing our enemy—of compelling
him—to what? barely to a just and honorable
peace; for that is all we demand. And have
we no means of doing this? Better, then,
to surrender the charter of our independence,
confess we are incapable of self-protection, and
beg his most gracious Majesty to again take us
under his paternal care. Such a doctrine, sir, is
as unfounded, as it is degrading to the American
character. We have ample means of compelling
Great Britain to do us justice; they are to
be found in the value of our commerce; in the
enterprise of our privateers; in the gallantry of
our ships of war, and the conquest of her provinces.
Our custom (considering her in the
light of a mechanic or merchant who supplies)
is of vital importance to Great Britain. It is
not to be measured by its amount, in pounds,
shillings, and pence, but by the strength and
support she derives from the intercourse. For,
while I admit that Great Britain does not send
half her exports to the United States, I do
maintain, that the custom of this country is of
more importance to her, than that of the whole
world besides. It is with a nation as with an
individual, if he exchange luxuries for luxuries,
or superfluities, such as ribands for ribands,
which he consumes, he adds nothing to his
wealth; but if he exchange his luxuries, or his
ribands, for bread, or for such materials as give
scope to his industry, he is then benefited, and
enriched by the interchange. Such is the situation
of Great Britain with regard to America.
She, and her dependencies, receive more
of provision, and raw materials, from America,
than from all other parts of the world together.
Our trade exactly gives effect to her industry,
her machinery, and her capital. And it is this
which has, in a great degree, enabled her to
make such gigantic efforts in the awful contest
in which she is engaged. Our privateers; will
they have no effect on Great Britain? Will
she learn nothing from the loss of three or four
hundred ships? And will she be insensible to
the efforts of our little Navy? Can they touch
no nerve in which Britons feel? Far different
are my conclusions, from what I have seen in
British papers—they show that she is tremblingly
alive to that subject.
Sir, I will now consider her provinces, about
which so much has been said. I, too, will speak
of that wonderful country, called Canada, which
unites in itself all contrarieties! Which is so
cold and sterile, as to be not worth possessing;
and so fertile, that if, by any calamity it should
become ours, it would seduce away our population;
which is so unhappy under the British Government
as not to lure our inhabitants; yet so
happy, that it is criminal to disturb their felicity;—whose
inhabitants, if united with ours,
would destroy us, because they have none of
the habits of freemen; and who, well knowing
the privileges of their free Government, will
defend them to the last. A country which is
of no importance to Great Britain, and whose
loss would not make her feel; a country which
is so valuable to Great Britain that she will
never give it up. A country so weak that it is
inglorious to attack it; and a country so strong
that we can never take it. But, sir, leaving
these, and a thousand other contradictions, the
work of fancy or of spleen, I will present to the
House what I believe to be a true view of the
subject, drawn from a near residence and much
careful examination. Canada is of great importance
both to Great Britain and the United
States. It is important to Great Britain in the
amount and kind of its exports. In the last
year preceding war, its exports amounted to
between seven and nine millions of dollars, an
amount almost as great as the exports of the
United States preceding the Revolutionary war.
And had the most discerning statesman made
out an order, he could not have selected articles
better adapted to the essential wants of Great
Britain. It has been said that Canada is of less
value than one of the sugar islands of the West
Indies. Sir, in the present state of the world,
Canada is of more importance to Great Britain,
in my opinion, than the whole West India
Islands taken together. In danger, as she is, of
being shut out from the Baltic, and fighting for
her existence, she wants not the luxuries, the
sugars, and the sweetmeats of the West Indies—she
wants the provisions, the timber, the
masts, and the spars of the North.
Canada is also of the greatest importance to
the United States, in a commercial and political
point of view. I have in a great measure
explained its commercial importance, by stating
its exports; a large portion of which were the
products of the United States. Let an attentive
observer cast his eye for one moment on
the map of North America; let him bear in
mind, that from the forty-fifth degree of latitude
the waters of Canada bound for a vast extent
one of the most fertile, and which will
become, one of the most populous parts of the
United States; and he will readily perceive
that the river St. Lawrence must soon be the
outlet for one-third of all the products of
American labor. The same circumstances will
enable it to lay an impost on one-third of our
imported articles. Nor will the evil to our revenue
end here. Great Britain will be enabled
to smuggle her goods through this channel into
all parts of the Union. It will be in vain that
you attempt to counteract her by laws; from
the great length and contiguity of her possessions,
she will forever evade them, unless by
your laws you can change the nature of man.
But its greatest importance is in a political point
of view: for, although not as happy in its government
as the United States, it is sufficiently
so to draw off multitudes of our new settlers,
when the intermediate lands of the State of
New York, which separate it from New England,
shall be fully occupied. From this circumstance
it will divide the American family,
and, by the commercial relations which I have
pointed out, it will exert a dangerous influence
over a part of our country; for the transition
from commercial dependence, to political allegiance,
is too obvious to be insisted on. Having
endeavored to show the importance of
Canada to both of the contending nations, I
I will only add that it is within our power.
The fourth objection is, that we cannot support
the war—that we have not the ability to
carry it on. Before I proceed to answer this
objection, permit me, sir, to notice a single inconsistency
of the gentlemen by whom it has
been urged. It is this: in one part of their argument,
they represent the people as too happy to
enlist, and in another part as too poor to pay!
Both of these propositions, I presume, cannot
be true. Not to dwell longer, however, upon
this contradiction, I do maintain, sir, that the
nation is fully able to prosecute the war. On
what does the ability of a nation depend? A
person who will give himself the trouble of examining
things rather than words, will find that
it is proportioned to the number of laborers and
the productiveness of their labor. Wherever,
from soil, climate, or improvement, the labor of
a country will produce more than a supply of
the necessaries of life, it is evident that the surplus
time may be devoted to idleness, to the
production and consumption of luxuries, or to
the carrying on of war. To illustrate this
farther—suppose the labor of a person for five
days will support him six, then it is clear, that
the labor of five men will support the sixth
man in idleness or in war. Now, sir, there is
nowhere that the labor of seven millions of
people will produce so much as in this country;
consequently, nowhere have seven millions of
people so great an ability to carry on a war.
The quantity of circulating medium, whether
made of paper or of silver dollars, has very
little to do with the subject. If it is made of
paper, and to a great extent, it only shows that
the people are in their habits commercial; and
that the faith of contracts is well supported.
The real ability of a nation lies in what I have
stated; and he must be a weak politician who
cannot call it forth.
Mr. Speaker, I will now consider the last,
and by far the most important objection of all;
and one, without which, I certainly would not
have spoken. It is, that in consideration of all
the circumstances in which we are placed, it is
the duty of this House to withhold the means
of further prosecuting the war. It will not be
denied, I trust, that this is a fair statement of
the scope and object of most of the reasonings
which have been employed; and that without
this construction, they would be irreconcilable
with common sense. This doctrine, in my
opinion, goes not only to the overthrow of our
constitution, but to the destruction of liberty
itself. The principle of our Government is, not
only that the majority shall rule, but that they
shall rule in the manner prescribed by the constitution.
So that if it could be proved that a
majority of the people were in favor of certain
measures, it would not be sufficient till they
had pronounced that decision through the constitutional
organs. In short, it must have been
a principal object with the framers of our constitution
to suspend, at least for a limited time,
the effects of popular opinion. The constitution
has committed the legislative power to
three co-equal branches; and to the same hands
has it entrusted the power of declaring war;
while it has expressly confided the treaty-making
power (and which alone can make peace)
to two only of those branches. The claim now
set up, goes to invest that branch which has no
authority in the matter, not only with the
treaty-making power, but also with a complete
control over the other two branches. Thus one
branch of the Government forcing the nation
to desist from doing what three, including itself,
had thought best to perform. Let us test the
correctness of this principle by applying it to
another co-equal branch of the Government.
Let us suppose the President has made a treaty
of peace, which is disapproved of by the Senate—and
suppose upon this he should say, the war
ought not to be further prosecuted, and refuse
to employ the public force, would you not impeach
him? Most unquestionably you would.
I expressly admit that cases may be imagined,
where such a course would be proper—where
it would be not only the duty of this House to
withhold supplies, but where it would be the
duty of an individual to resist the laws; but
such are extreme cases, not provided for by any
organization of Government. What, sir, has
been the practice of the British House of Commons?
Have they ever refused supplies because
a war was unpopular, since their revolution?
Did not the same Parliament, which resolved
that they would consider any man as an enemy
to his country, who would advise his Majesty
to the further prosecution of offensive war in
America, still vote the means for carrying on
the war? A similar case occurred when Mr.
Fox came last into power—he disapproved of
the commencement and conduct of the war,
and yet he called for and received the necessary
supplies.
Mr. Calhoun observed, that he could offer
nothing more acceptable, he presumed, to the
House, than a promise not to discuss the Orders
in Council, French decrees, blockades, or embargoes.
He was induced to avoid these topics
for several reasons. In the first place, they
were too stale to furnish any interest to this
House or country. Gentlemen who had attempted
it, with whatever abilities, had failed
to command attention; and it would argue very
little sagacity on his part not to be admonished
by their want of success. Indeed, whatever
interest had been at one time attached to these
subjects, they had now lost. They have passed
away; and will not soon, he hoped, return into
the circle of politics. Yes, sir, as reviled as has
been our country's efforts to curb belligerent
injustice, as weak and contemptible as she has
been represented to be in the grade of nations,
she has triumphed in breaking down the most
dangerous monopoly ever attempted by one nation
against the commerce of another. He
would not stop to inquire whether it was the
non-importation act, or the menace of war, or,
what was the most probable, the last operating
on the pressure produced by the former. The
fact is certain, that the Orders in Council of
1807 and 1809, which our opponents have often
said that England would not yield, as they
made a part of her commercial system, are now
no more. The same firmness, if persevered in,
which has carried us thus far with success, will,
as our cause is just and moderate, end in final
victory. A further reason which he had, not
to follow our opponents into the region of documents
and records, was, that he was afraid of a
decoy; as he was induced to believe from appearances
that their object was to draw our attention
from the merits of the question. Gentlemen
had literally buried their arguments
under a huge pile of quotations; and had wandered
so far into this realm of paper, that
neither the vision of this House has been, nor
that of the country will be, able to follow them.
There the best and worst reasons share an equal
fate. The truth of the one and error of the
other, are covered with like obscurity.
Mr. C. said he would not multiply proof on
a course of conduct the bad effect of which
was too sensibly felt to be easily forgot, and
the continuation of which was but too apparent
in the present discussion. For what was the
object of the opposition in this debate? To
defeat the passage of this bill? It has been
scarcely mentioned; and contains nothing to
raise that storm which has been excited against
it. The bill proposes to raise twenty thousand
men only, and that for one year; and surely
there is nothing in that calculated to lay such
strong hold of the jealousy or fear of the community.
What then is the object of the opposition?
Gentlemen certainly do not act without
an intention; and wide as has been the
range of debate, it cannot be so lawless as to
be without an object. It was not, he repeated,
to defeat the passage of this bill; no, but what
was much more to be dreaded, to thwart that,
which the bill proposes to contribute to, the
final success of the war; and for this purpose
he must do the opposition the credit to say, they
have resorted to means the best calculated to
produce the effect. In a free Government, in
the government of laws, two things are necessary
for the effectual prosecution of any great
measure; the law by which the executive officer
is charged with the execution and vested
with suitable powers; and the co-operating
zeal and union of the people, who are always
indispensable agents. Opposition to be successful
must direct its efforts against the passage of
the law; or, what was more common and generally
more effectual, to destroy the union and
the zeal of the people. Either, if successful, is
effectual. The former would in most cases be
seen and reprobated; the latter, much the most
dangerous, has, to the great misfortunes of Republics,
presented at all times a ready means of
defeating the most salutary measures. To this
point the whole arguments of opposition have
converged. This gives a meaning to every
reason and assertion, which have been advanced,
however wild and inconsistent. No topic has
been left untouched, no passion unessayed. The
war has been represented as unjust in its origin,
disastrous in its progress, and desperate in its
farther prosecution. As if to prevent the possibility
of doubt, a determination has been
boldly asserted not to support it. Such is the
opposition to the war, which was admitted on
all sides to be just; and which in a manner received
the votes even of those who now appear
to be willing to ruin the country in order
to defeat its success.
But, say our opponents, as they were opposed
to the war, they are not bound to support it;
and so far has this opposition been carried, that
we have been accused almost of violating the
right of conscience, in denying the right set up
by gentlemen. The right to oppose the efforts
of our country, while in war, ought to be established
beyond the possibility of doubt, before it
can be justly adopted as the basis of conduct.
How conscience can be claimed in this case
cannot be very easily imagined. We oppose
not by laws or penalties; we only assert that
the opposition experienced cannot be dictated
by love of country, and is inconsistent with the
duty which every citizen is under to promote
the prosperity of the Republic. Its necessary
tendency is to prostrate the country at the feet
of the enemy, and to elevate a party on the
ruins of the public. Till our opponents can
prove that they have a right which is paramount
to the public interest, we must persist in denying
the right to thwart the success of the war.
War has been declared by a law of the land;
and what would be thought of similar attempts
to defeat any other law, however inconsiderable
its object? Who would dare to avow an intention
to defeat its operation? Can that, then,
be true in relation to war which would be reprobated
in every other case? Can that be true
which, when the whole physical force of the
country is needed, withdraws half of that force?
Can that be true which gives the greatest violence
to party animosity? What would have been
thought of such conduct in the war of the Revolution?
Many good citizens friendly to the liberty
of our country were opposed to the declaration at
the time; could they have been justified in such
opposition as we now experience? To terminate
the war through discord and weakness is
a hazardous experiment. But, in the most unjust
and inexpedient war, it can scarcely be
possible, that disunion and defeats can have a
salutary operation. In the numerous examples
which history furnishes, let an instance be
pointed out, in any war, where the public interest
has been promoted by divisions, or injured
by concord. Hundreds of instances may be
cited of the reverse. Why, then, will gentlemen
persist in that course where danger is almost
unavoidable, and shun that where safety
is almost certain?
But, sir, we are told that peace is in our power
without a farther promotion of the war. Appeal
not, say our opponents, to the fear, but to
the generosity of our enemy. England yields
nothing to her fears; stop, therefore, your preparation,
and throw yourself on her mercy, and
peace will be the result. We might, indeed,
have pardon, but not peace on such terms.
Those who think the war a sacrilege or a crime,
might consistently adopt such a course; but we,
who know it to be for the maintenance of the
just rights of the community, never can. We
are farther told that impressment of seamen was
not considered a sufficient cause of war; and are
asked why should it be continued on that account?
Mr. C. observed that he individually
did not feel the force of the argument; for it
had been his opinion, that the nation was bound
to resist so deep an injury even at the hazard of
war; but, admitting its full force, the difference
is striking between the commencement and the
continuance of hostilities. War ought to be
continued until its rational object, a permanent
and secure peace, could be obtained. Even the
friends of England ought not to desire the termination
of the war, without a satisfactory adjustment
of the subject of impressment. It
would leave the root that must necessarily shoot
up in future animosity and hostilities. America
can never quietly submit to the deepest of
injury. Necessity might compel her to yield
for a moment; but it would be to watch the
growth of national strength, and to seize the
first favorable opportunity to seek redress. The
worst enemy to the peace of the two countries
could not desire a more effectual means to propagate
eternal enmity.
But it is said that we ought to offer to England
suitable regulations on this subject to secure
to her the use of her own seamen; and
because we have not, we are aggressors. He
denied that we were bound to tender any regulations,
or that we had not. England was the
party injuring. She ought to confine her seamen
to her own service; or, if that was impracticable,
propose such arrangements that she
might exercise her right without injury to us.
This is the rule that governs all analogous cases
in private life. But we have made our offer;
it is, that the ship should protect the sailor. It
is the most simple and only safe rule; but, to
secure so desirable a point, the most liberal and
effectual provisions ought and have been proposed
to be made on our part to guard the British
Government against the evil they apprehended,
the loss of her seamen. The whole
doctrine of protection heretofore relied on, and
still recommended by the gentleman from Connecticut,
(Mr. P.,) is false and derogatory to our
honor; and under no possible modification can
effect the desirable objects of affording safety to
our sailors, and securing the future harmony of
the two countries. Nor can it be doubted, if
governed by justice, she will yield to the offer
of our Government, particularly if what the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Bleecker) says
be true, that there are ten thousand of her seamen
in our service. She would be greatly the
gainer by the arrangement. Experience, it is to
be feared, however, will teach that gentleman
that the evil lies much deeper. The use of her
seamen is a mere pretence. The blow is aimed
at our commercial greatness. It is this which
has animated and directed all of her injurious
councils towards this country. England is at
the same time a trading and fighting nation;
two occupations naturally at variance, and most
difficult to be united. War limits the number
and extent of the markets of a belligerent, makes
a variety of regulations necessary; and produces
heavy taxes, which are inimical to the prosperity
of manufactories and consequently commerce.
These causes combined give to trade new channels,
which direct it naturally to neutral nations.
To counteract this tendency, England, under
various but flimsy pretences, has endeavored to
support her commercial superiority by monopoly.
It has been our fortune to resist with no
inconsiderable success this spirit of monopoly.
Her principal object in contending for the right
of impressment is to have, in a great measure,
the monopoly of the sailors of the world. A
fixed resistance will compel her to yield this
point as she has already done her Orders in
Council. Success will amply reward our exertions.
Our future commerce will feel its invigorating
effects. But, say gentlemen, England
will never yield this point, and every effort on
our part to secure it is hopeless. To confirm
this prediction and secure our reverence, the
prophecies of the last session are relied on.
Mr. C. felt no disposition to disparage our opponents'
talents in that line; but he very much
doubted whether the whole chapter of woes had
been fulfilled. He would, for instance, ask
whether so much as related to sacked towns,
bombarded cities, ruined commerce, and revolting
blacks, had been realized?
Such, then, is the cause of the war and its
continuation; and such the nature of the opposition
experienced, and its justification. It remains
to be seen whether the intended effect
will be produced. Whether animosity and discord
will be fomented, and the zeal and union
of the people to maintain the rights and indispensable
duties of the community will abate;
or, describing it under another aspect, whether
it is the destiny of our country to sink under
that of our enemy or not. Mr. C. said he was
not without his fears and his hopes.
On the one hand our opponents had manifestly
the advantage. The love of present ease and
enjoyment, the love of gain, and party zeal,
were on their side. These constitute part of
the weakness of our nature. We naturally lead
that way without the arts of persuasion. Far
more difficult is the task of the majority. It is
theirs to support the distant but lasting interest
of our country; it is theirs to elevate the minds
of the people, and to call up all of those qualities
by which present sacrifices are made to secure
a future good. On the other hand, our
cause is not without its hope. The interest of
the people and that of the leaders of a party
are, as observed by a gentleman from New York,
(Mr. Stow,) often at variance. The people are
always ready, unless led astray by ignorance or
delusion, to participate in the success of the
country, or to sympathize in its adversity.
Very different are the feelings of the leaders;
on every great measure they stand pledged
against its success, and almost invariably consider
that their political consequence depends
on its defeat. The heat of debate, the spirit of
settled opposition, and the confident prediction
of disaster, are among the causes of this opposition
between the interest of a party and their
country; and in no instance under our own
Government have they existed in a greater degree
than in relation to the present war. The
evil is deeply rooted in the constitution of all
free Governments, and is the principal cause of
their weakness and destruction. It has but one
remedy, the virtue and intelligence of the people—it
behooves them, as they value the blessings
of their freedom, not to permit themselves
to be drawn into the vortex of party rage. For
if by such opposition the firmest Government
should prove incompetent to maintain the rights
of the nation against foreign aggression, they
will find realized the truth of the assertion that
government is protection, and that it cannot exist
where it fails of this great and primary object.
The authors of the weakness are commonly
the first to take the advantage of it, and to
turn it to the destruction of liberty.
Mr. Desha.—Mr. Speaker, it is not my intention
to detain you long; my principal object
in rising is to conjure gentlemen to bring this
debate to a close. Sir, what can gentlemen
flatter themselves by suffering this discussion to
be protracted to so unwarrantable a length? It
cannot be supposed that the substantial part of
this House (I mean those who think much and
speak little) will, by theoretical or sophisticated
remarks, be driven from their course. Then,
sir, those long-winded speeches must be either
intended for the gallery, or for gentlemen's constituents.
It would certainly be unjustifiable
to sport away the public money; to exhaust
the public patience in making long speeches,
merely for the purpose of amusing the ear of
the gallery. And, sir, your constituents would
much rather you would act with decision, with
promptitude, in adopting measures calculated
for a vigorous prosecution of the war, that it
might be brought to a speedy and honorable
termination, than to take up weeks in detailing
the causes of the war. The people are fully
apprised of the causes of the war, from the
documents that have been promulgated; they
are satisfied that it is a just and necessary war:
that it has been forced upon us by the injustice
and oppression of our enemy, occasioned in a
great measure by the violent opposition of a
party to the Administration. Sir, act so as to
give a vigorous prosecution to the war, and act
promptly, and the people will support you with
manly firmness, independent of the consideration
of expense.
Mr. Speaker, this bill contemplates raising
twenty thousand men for one year. Although
I shall vote for the bill under consideration, I
do not altogether approve of it. Sir, the time
of service is too short to answer a valuable
purpose. I am not so sanguine as to suppose
that we will overrun the British provinces in
one season. I should like it much better if the
time of service, as has been proposed, was extended
to eighteen months, and the bounty
raised in proportion. You would then have
the advantage of two campaigns; in the last
of which, you might calculate on a certainty
of being able to do something of a decisive
character, as you would have the advantage of
disciplined troops; and really, sir, if this bill is
to answer any valuable purpose, it ought to have
been passed some time since. Gentlemen certainly
must see that the object of the opposition is
procrastination; they have predicted that the
bill under consideration, if adopted, will not
only run the country to extraordinary expenses,
swell the national debt to an enormous size,
but that it will ultimately bring disgrace on the
Government. And, sir, they are determined
that their predictions shall be realized, by putting
off the passage of the bill until late in the
season thereby preventing you from obtaining
the men in time to do any thing of a decisive
character next summer. This, in my mind, is
unquestionably their object; and I believe the
ambition of some of them is such, that, rather
than be found false prophets, they would endanger
the only republic in the world. Sir, I do
not wish to be understood to include the whole
Federal party; far from it. I believe there are
some, and I hope a considerable portion, who
are American in principle, and would, perhaps,
go as far as any American in defending their
country's rights. Sir, it is not my intention to
arraign motives; but, speaking of party, what
has been the conduct of the Federalists for
twelve years past, ever since the termination
of the Reign of Terror? A uniform opposition
to every thing of a prominent character proposed
by the different republican Administrations.
Now, sir, if Mr. Jefferson and Mr.
Madison had been the weakest of men, as well
as the wickedest, (which no man in his senses,
who had any respect for his character, or standing
in society, would assert,) they must have
accidentally happened on something right in the
course of twelve years.
Mr. Speaker, it is mortifying to see gentlemen
who call themselves Americans, rise up in
the face of the nation to palliate and vindicate
the conduct of an enemy, and at the same time
reprobate, in the strongest language of ridicule,
every step proposed by the Administration calculated
to counteract the iniquitous and destructive
policy of our enemy. Can such
conduct be called American? Sir, when it
ought to be the duty and pride of every man
having any pretensions to American principles,
to rally under the governmental standard, in
order to assist in expelling our tyrannical oppressors
from the continent, by which extricating
the Government from its present difficulties,
you see the Federal party making every
exertion in their power to make the war a
dishonorable one.
I know, Mr. Speaker, that it is in the nature
of tyrannical or despotical Governments to take
arbitrary strides; yet, sir, I do believe that the
impositions and oppressions heaped upon the
American Government; the evils under which
we at this time labor, are measurably, if not
entirely, attributable to the party hostility arrayed
against the Administration. Sir, they
have, by their uniform opposition, led the
British to believe that they had a powerful party
in this country; that parties were nearly
equally balanced; that it would be impossible
for a Republican Administration to adhere to
any decided stand taken against England, and
that finally the English party would prevail.
Thus, sir, have Government been beset by party.
They have been baffled in every peaceable step
calculated to vindicate our rights, or redress
our grievances, until, by the injustice of our
foreign enemy, bottomed on the aid they calculated
on receiving from our domestic foes, the
Government have been forced into war. And
now you are told to put a stop to the war, and
try once more if Briton will not do us justice.
Degrading thought! Sir, we have already
humbled ourselves in making proposals, and all
efforts on the part of the Administration failed.
The world has seen and understood that the
failure was attributable to her own wickedness,
and not to our pertinacity. Sir, the American
Administration has exhibited an example of
moderation unparalleled in the annals of the
world; our forbearance has astonished the universe,
and we have the consolation to see that
neither the guilt of aggression, nor the folly of
ambition, can be fairly attributed to it. Negotiation,
as well as patience, has been exhausted.
Instead of appealing again to the justice of a
Government that makes principle bend to
power, we have been necessarily compelled
(though reluctantly) to appeal to arms, and I
trust in God that they will never be laid down
short of justice.
Mr. Cheves rose.—It was for some time
during this debate, said he, my intention to
have mingled my unimportant opinions and
sentiments with those of other gentlemen in
this discussion; but I gave way from time to
time before the eagerness of others who were
desirous of presenting themselves to your attention,
and I had entirely abandoned the idea of
taking any part in the argument; but the sudden
and unexpected indisposition at this moment
of my worthy friend and honorable colleague,
(Mr. Williams,) the chairman of the
committee with whom this bill originated, who
was expected to close the debate, has left a
vacuum in the argument which I propose to
fill. Could he have addressed you, as he was
prepared and anxious, in the faithful discharge
of his duty to do, it would have rendered the
feeble attempt which I shall make as unnecessary
as it would have been impertinent and obtrusive.
I propose, then, to speak, as my
honorable friend would probably have done,
generally, but briefly, on the several heads of
discussion which have been introduced into the
debate, which has not been on the bill before
you, but on the general merits of the war; the
origin, progress, and continuance of it. I mean
not to censure the wide range which this discussion
has taken. It is fair and right in gentlemen
of the opposition to select some occasion
during each session on which to discuss the
great questions of state which the public events
of the passing times present; and the one furnished
by the bill before you was perhaps as
proper as any other.
Almost all the gentlemen who have addressed
you, have very gravely told you, by way of exordium,
of their unquestionable right to do so,
and of the firmness with which they mean to
assert and exercise it, as if there had been, at
any time, really an opposition to this freedom of
discussion. These introductions must be a little
amusing to the members of this House and to
the attendants in your galleries, who have been
in the habit of listening to the gentlemen. But
if there ever could have been a doubt on this
subject, and surely there never was any, the
debate, which I hope is about to be closed, affords
an ample refutation of it. There are
parts of this debate which will descend to distant
posterity as a monument of the freedom
of discussion in this Hall. I trust, sir, we shall
furnish few such testimonials—I hope never to
see another exhibition on this floor. They must
be looked upon with apprehension by all those
who consider the restraints of personal politeness
and the urbanity of social esteem as affording
a better security to those who love
peace and good manners, for the preservation
of these valuable objects, than can be lent by
the strongest arm or the severest sanctions
which positive institutions have established;
restraints under which even "vice itself loses
half its evil, by losing all its grossness." I shall
imitate the example of gentlemen who followed
in the debate—I shall pour oil upon the waves,
and endeavor to still the raging of the storm.
Gentlemen, fruitful in epithets, yet rather
fruitful in their abundance than in their variety,
have called this an unjust, wanton, wicked, and
unnecessary war. I, on the contrary, assert it
to be a just and necessary war. One characteristic
difficulty here presents itself, which has
occurred in all the discussion in and out of this
House on this subject. What is a just and necessary
war? By the advocates of war it is
asserted that the injuries and insults of the enemy
demanded war, and rendered this war just
and necessary. The opponents of war admit
the magnitude of the insults and injuries, but
deny the inference. They assert that the war
is unnecessary and not justifiable, because the
pecuniary expenditure and loss will exceed
in value the commercial objects for which we
are contending. The advocates of war deny
both the premises and the conclusion. The objects
of the war are not merely commercial, but,
if they were, the inference is denied. They admit
that the pecuniary expenditure and loss
will exceed the pecuniary value of the commercial
objects for which they contend, but
they deny that a war for commercial objects is
therefore unnecessary or indefensible. To an
intelligible argument it seems, therefore, under
these circumstances, necessary that we should
begin by some definition of a just and necessary
war; and yet it seems to be a melancholy
labor in a great and free State, where public
sentiment should be unequivocal on such subjects,
to proceed by rules of logic to establish
great first principles of public sentiment; but
I fear that, as all good things are purchased by
concomitant sacrifices, we have not obtained
the innumerable blessings and advantages of
the freedom of speech and of the press for
nothing. I fear they have sometimes substituted
an erring reason for a better guide—the
great uncontaminated current of public feeling—the
moral sense of the nation, of which the
honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Quincy) so often tells so much.
But we must inquire, what is a just and necessary
war? A war is just and necessary
when waged to protect and defend the violated
pecuniary interests of the country; or to defend
and secure the sovereign rights and independence
of a country; or, lastly and principally,
to support and maintain the national
honor. The last, indeed, embraces all the others;
and, if I have distinguished, it is rather in conformity
with custom, or for the purpose of elucidation
than from any practical separation
which I admit between the last and the former.
But I am likely to incur the derision of the honorable
gentlemen in the opposition by speaking
of national honor. They seem not to have admitted
the term into their vocabulary; they
treat it as a new language; they remind me of
the character of Goldfinch in one of Holcroft's
plays, who, when he hears the Romans mentioned,
exclaims, "Romans! Romans! who are
they?" So the gentlemen, "national honor!
what's that? what's that?" Yet, sir, strange
as it may seem to the honorable gentlemen over
the way, the maintenance of the principle of
national honor, by which I mean that principle
which animates and sustains an elevated fitness
of character and conduct, is the only justifiable
cause of war; and, if necessary, the principle
ought to be maintained by all the sacrifices of
war in its worst shape. No war is justifiable
or necessary which is waged merely for pecuniary
objects, if we can suppose such a war, for
all wars involve expense and loss greater than
the amount of any pecuniary objects for which
they can be waged. On the ground of interest
merely they would not, therefore, be justifiable;
and there is to be superadded, what cannot be
valued in money, the value of human life. But
the value of every thing is founded on the security
with which it is enjoyed. One unpunished
violation of right provokes another and another,
until all security is destroyed; and,
therefore, it is necessary to resist given infractions
of pecuniary right by sacrifices beyond
the value of the right itself, because resistance
is necessary to the security of all other pecuniary
rights—nay, to the security of all other
rights. Security of rights is a political thing;
it is the protection of Government; it derives
its value, and a great portion of its power, too,
from a faithful and unrelaxed application of it
to all the rights and interests of a nation; and
is diminished in its value, and in its power also,
by any failure to afford the protection which is
due by Government to the subjects and the
interests under its control. To abandon any
interest is to abandon all, and to protect one is
to protect all; war, therefore, waged to protect
one political right is waged to protect all
political rights; no war is, in consequence, made
for any given right merely as such, but for all
the rights and interests which are bound together
in a nation under the social and civil
compacts. To compare the expenditure and
losses of war with the value of commercial objects,
which may be the immediate cause of
war, is to talk idly, and to forget the true end
of all war and the first great purpose of Government—security.
A great man (Sir James
Mackintosh) has said, "the paramount interest
of every State, that which comprehends all
others, is security." Will you, then, it may be
inquired, go to war to avenge the infraction of
the smallest right under the protection of Government,
and for this object jeopardize every
other, and spill the blood of your fellow-citizens?
Certainly not. There is a fitness which
cannot be defined in anticipation, but which
is easily discoverable when the occasion occurs,
which determines when a war is necessary. It
may depend upon the nature of the injury; on
the character which the nation has acquired;
on its ability to avenge the injury; on the
character of the nation which has inflicted
the injury, and a thousand other circumstances.
The question ought always to be, What
becomes the nation? What is due to the
national honor? What is necessary to sustain
an elevated fitness of character and conduct
in the nation? If the injury sustained
be one which cannot or will not probably be
repeated, it is less necessary to avenge it. If
the nation be poor and feeble, it may be obliged
to submit to the violation of a great right. If
it be great and powerful, it must sometimes resent
a smaller injury; it may sometimes disdain
to notice a considerable aggression upon its
rights; in short, in no instance is the expense
of the war a rule which will prove it just and
necessary, or otherwise; in every instance is
national honor, that is, a fitness of character
and conduct, the rule by which its necessity
and justifiable character are determinable. Generally
when a nation is able to resist with effect
the infraction of important pecuniary rights, it
seems indubitable that an elevated fitness of
character and conduct requires resistance. But
this obligation is increased, and is less doubtful
when any of the sovereign rights of a nation
are infringed, as in gross and reiterated insults
to the national flag, habitual violations of the
personal liberty of its subjects, invasion of its
territories, and the like; these are assaults upon
its independence, and there is no room left for
an inquiry into the fitness of resistance; it may
indeed be supposed to change from a question
of expediency to an act of necessity; it is a
struggle for self-preservation; the nation acts
upon a principle which is inherent in the meanest
insect, and of which inanimate matter is
not divested; the worm, when trodden on,
writhes in resistance as well as anguish, and the
reaction of inanimate matter seems to be the
repulsive act of self-preservation.
What, then, did an elevated fitness of character
and conduct require of the American Government,
in relation to Great Britain, at the
moment war was declared? What does it still
require? I repeat, the war is a just and necessary
war. This will be proved by adverting to
the causes of the war. What, then, were the
causes of the war? They were principally new
and before unheard-of blockades—the Orders
in Council, which have been generally so called,
by way of pre-eminence; the spoliations of our
commerce under various unfounded and insulting
pretexts, and the impressment of our seamen.
I am not permitted by the circumstances
under which I address you to go at length
into any of these subjects. But I may ask,
what on the ocean did we enjoy but by the sufferance
of Great Britain? What insults, what
injuries had we not suffered? When did they
begin; when, though they may have been varied
in character, were they relaxed in degree,
and when were they probably to cease?
Great Britain has been properly selected as
the first object of our hostility. When a proposition
was made to include France as well as
Great Britain in the declaration of war, gentlemen
on neither side of the House did support it.
The opposition prints throughout the Union
laughed it to scorn. Few men thought of resisting
both at once. The voice of both parties
appeared to be against it. The Government,
obliged to resist, was obliged to select its
enemy. Should France have been selected?
With the blood of our citizens insultingly slaughtered
without the slightest provocation, on the
shores of our own territory, unatoned for till
the moment of the declaration of war, with the
habitual impressment of our seamen in every
sea, with the continual and reiterated violation
of your right to seek where you choose a market
for your native produce, all before your
eyes, and with no hope of a discontinuance of
these injuries, we are told that we ought to
have diverted our enmity from Great Britain,
and directed it against France. Where, sir,
could we attack France? Where are her colonies
into which we could carry our arms?
Where could we subjugate her provinces?
Where are her ships?—where her commerce?
Where could we have carried on against her
any of the operations of war? Would the
chivalry of gentlemen on the other side of the
House have suggested an invasion of France?
An honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr.
Gold) said it would not have required another
man nor another ship, to have resisted France.
But, why, I pray you? Because such a resistance
would have been confined to the idle and
nugatory act of declaring it. Effectual resistance
would have been impracticable. Gentlemen
would resist France, would declare war
against France, merely to show their indignation
at her perfidy and injustice; and here I
confess my feelings go with the gentlemen—I
would do so too, had we no other enemy to
contend with. But if we had abandoned or deferred
our resistance to the injuries of England
and as a pretext for it assailed France, would
not the act have been idle and weak? Would
it not have been wicked, to borrow one of the
epithets which gentlemen have applied to the
war with England, so to have sported with the
public feelings and the national resentment as
to have declared war against France, the minor
aggressor, whom we could not touch, and to have
suppressed our resentment against Great Britain,
whose injuries were unlimited and unceasing,
and whom alone we could reach? But
why, sir, are the injuries these nations have
done contrasted, and those of the one made an
apology for those of the other? Why are we
partisans of either? Have we no country of
our own? Is there a land upon the globe so
fair, so happy, and so free? And, beholding
and enjoying these blessings,
"Breathes there a man with soul so dead
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native land!"
Sir, I feel neither as a Frenchman nor Briton,
but as an American. As a citizen of the United
States, I bear no affection to any other
country. If I have any feeling of partiality for
either of the great belligerents, it is for the
country, and the people of Great Britain. From
them I draw my blood in a very short descent.
But that nation is the injurer of my country,
and I can see her in no other light than that of
an enemy, nor can I find any apology for her
in the injuries France has done us. Sir, the
Government did right in discriminating between
Britain and France, and selecting the former. It
was the only mode of real practical resistance.
The world would have laughed at us had we
declared war against France, who was no longer
able to injure us, whom we could not assail
with effect, and have left the unceasing injuries
of Great Britain to go on unresisted and unresented.
The world would have considered it
as a mere cover for our pusillanimity. I say,
then, that the Government was not tricked into
a war with Great Britain. It was commenced
in the prosecution of the best and most deliberate
policy. It was the only honorable and
practicable course. If there has been an error,
and I think there has, it was in not having long
since resisted England. War against England
should have followed the first embargo; that
was a wise measure, but it could not endure
forever; it carried the policy of commercial restriction
upon the enemy as far as such a policy
should ever be carried, which from its nature
can only be temporary. It at the same time
prepared the nation for war; it brought home
your wealth and seamen; it brought home your
vessels, and placed you in the attitude in which
the nation ought to have been previous to war,
and its termination ought to have been followed
by immediate and vigorous war. The pulse
of the nation was high, and the confidence of
the people in their rulers and resources great.
Distrust has grown out of the hesitation and
timidity then manifested. If the embargo had
been followed up by war, some of the greatest
injuries we have since suffered would not have
occurred. France would not have ventured to
have seized and sequestered our vessels and
property as she subsequently did. She was
tempted to do it because she saw we would
suffer and submit to any injury.
Gentlemen say, that popular opinion was
against the war. I deny it, sir. It was called
for by popular opinion; and this will not be
disproved, however soon popular opinion shall
incline to peace, and gentlemen on the other
side of the House regain the reins of power,
as they are not unlikely to do, however just
and necessary the war. Any man who thought
with half the ability with which the gentlemen
do, must have believed that in voting for war,
he was probably surrendering himself politically
a victim on the altar of his country; yet it is
frequently declared, that the majority have declared
this war to preserve their seats. They
declared it against popular opinion, too, to preserve
their seats, which they hold by the tenure
of popular opinion! Are gentlemen serious?
Look at the history of nations, and see if
the war-makers have been generally the peacemakers.
But war was prematurely declared, it is said,
because we had not a regular disciplined army
at the time. Preparation for operations on
land must have been relative to the defence of
our own territory, or the invasion of the enemy's
territory. The militia are the proper and
the adequate defenders of the soil on which
they live; for this purpose we did not want any
other army. They might have been made
more extensively useful. I join not with their
revilers—I wish that their usefulness had not
been circumscribed by a doctrine subversive of
the true principles of the constitution which
was maintained on this floor. I rejoice that I
combated that doctrine; yet I do not mean to
consider them as a fit army of invasion. I acknowledge
that we were not prepared with a
regularly-disciplined army, qualified for the invasion
and conquest of the enemy's country.
But should we have been prepared by winter,
the time to which gentlemen wished to have
deferred the declaration of war? It is a truth
that a Government like ours never will, and
never can, be prepared for war in peace. The
great and effective preparation for war must
grow out of the progress and events of the war.
Notwithstanding our disasters on land, I believe
our preparation is greater, and our situation
better, than it would have been had the war
been deferred. We were to expect, in the commencement
of the war, to suffer such misfortunes.
Except in the affair of Detroit, nothing
has happened which should cause us to blush:
that disgrace, like the disgrace of the Chesapeake,
will be the harbinger of glory—I take it
as an omen of victory. I pledge myself, if the
war continue it will be so in the event. As the
war stands at this moment, we have suffered
little, and we have humbled the pride of the
enemy where it was most insulting. We have
insured the confidence of the nation, from the
seashore to the mountains beyond them, as far
as our population reaches, in our naval ability.
I ask the gentlemen on the other side of the
House, whether we have not gained something
in this respect by the war? In one word, who
would now commence the war and take the
chance of better success in preference to the
actual fortune of the war since it has been declared.
It was not prematurely declared. I
now contend the war ought to be continued.
Some gentlemen have thought fit to say in debate,
that the only alleged cause of war was
formed by the Orders in Council. But from
their own act, their celebrated protest, I will
prove the contrary. Impressment is there enumerated
as among the causes of war, as it was
in all the public acts of the time relative to the
causes of war. Without more words, I am authorized
in asserting that impressment was one
of the principal causes of the war; and although
had the Orders in Council been revoked, and
their revocation known to us before war was
declared, we would no doubt have temporized
longer; yet this cause itself must in the end
have produced war.
It appears that very soon after the General
Government went into operation, this practice
was the subject of remonstrance; this was under
the Administration of General Washington.
It has been the subject of negotiation and remonstrance
under every succeeding Administration.
But it is alleged, because it was not
settled in the Treaty of 1794, that it was not
considered by General Washington as justifiable
cause of war, and it is inferred that it ought
not now to be considered as sufficient cause for
the continuance of the war. What, sir, shall
constitute cause of war? The spoliation of
your property? Not so, say gentlemen, because
the expenditure for redress will be greater than
the injury sustained. The violation of the personal
liberty of your citizens and the degradation
of the ensign of your sovereignty? No,
say gentlemen, General Washington did not
consider these as sufficient cause of war. Will,
then, any injury, or any combination of injuries,
authorize or require national resentment?
The reasoning of the gentlemen would lead us
to a negative conclusion. But in their estimate
of the actual causes of the present war, they
appear to consider the business of impressment
as trivial, and the Orders in Council as every
thing. What, sir, will you go to war for property,
the value of which is only relative, and
which, compared with personal liberty, is worthless,
and refuse to go to war for the personal
liberty of the citizen? for that which is alike
"Given to the fool, the vain, the evil—
To Ward, to Waters, Chartres, and the Devil!"
You will wage war, and not to rescue your fellow-citizens
from imprisonment and stripes?
But however this subject was to be viewed before
we were actually involved in war, it must
now be put on a footing of certainty; if our
claim be not secured it will be surrendered;
to make peace without obtaining any security
against the abuse of which we complain, would
be to acquiesce in it, and to acquiesce in it
would be to surrender the rights of the country.
This was the reasoning of Mr. King, who in one
of his communications to Government on this
subject says, he has abandoned negotiation, because
to acquiesce in the views of the British
Government would be to surrender our rights.
And shall I be obliged, sir, to come here with
volumes of documents to prove the rights of the
citizen; to demonstrate that the naval officers
of Britain have not a right to incarcerate him;
to drag him to the gangway and flog him?
Shall I be obliged by a laborious process of reasoning
to prove the obligation of Government
to rescue him from such suffering? No, gentlemen
generally have abandoned this ground,
and say, that the impressment of our citizens
is, under proper circumstances, justifiable cause
of war; and the gentleman from North Carolina,
(Mr. Pearson,) who opened the debate on
this subject says, that if a fit proposition, accompanied
by means calculated to give it a fair
chance of success, were tendered and did not
procure a cessation of the practice of impressment,
he would support the war. What is the
proposition which he submits? That we shall
prohibit from serving in our ships the seamen
of Great Britain and other foreign seamen, and
confine our crews to our own citizens. This
being done he will support the war. I challenge
gentlemen on the other side of the House
to say distinctly to the people, for whom an
honorable gentleman (Mr. Quincy) has said this
debate was intended, that this war should not
be continued for the protection of our seamen;
they will not, they dare not. But if they are
against the continuance of the war, it is on that
ground and no other. The honorable gentleman
from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) says, Great
Britain has a right to insist on the services of
her own subjects, and that England would not
be England if she could not command them. I
say that America will cease to be America if
she suffers her to command them at the price
of the liberty of her citizens and the honor of
her flag. The same gentleman says, England
will nail the flag to the mast and go to the bottom
with it, rather than surrender the right of
taking her seamen from on board our merchant
vessels. I hope, sir, we shall imitate the noble
example she sets us, and make every sacrifice
rather than give up our citizens to bondage and
stripes.
But, say gentlemen, the public law of all nations
on earth, ancient and modern, has denied
the right of expatriation. Admit that they are
correct, and for the purpose of the argument,
I do admit that such is the general law. But
what is this law as modified by the practice of
nations? Every nation which has thus forbidden
expatriation has at the same time granted
naturalization, and the general practice of nations
is undoubtedly the law of nations. Does
not England naturalize foreigners? Does she
not naturalize your citizens? If she does not
do it as generally as you do, it is because it is
not her policy to do so; it is enough that she
naturalizes your seamen; it is enough that all
nations have, at the same moment, forbidden
expatriation and granted naturalization. The
law must be the result of neither exclusively,
but of both these practices. Mr. Burke, (the
great Edmund,) who was certainly no innovator,
denominates Charles XII. the murderer of Patkul.
Patkul was born a Swedish subject and had
repeatedly taken up arms against his Sovereign;
he was adopted by Russia and had been her
Minister at the Court of Poland. Charles XII.,
the Sovereign to whom his natural allegiance
was due, obtained possession of his person and
put him to death—this act Mr. Burke denominates
murder!
Governments which have naturalized foreigners
have protected their naturalized subjects,
and the Government to whom the native allegiance
of such subjects was due, though they
have denied the right of expatriation, have not
impugned the protecting interposition of the
adopted sovereign. If they have, it has been
considered as an act of unprincipled violence,
and in the instance of Patkul has merited and
received the denomination of murder. On this
subject I will quote a single sentence from one
of Mr. King's letters; he says, "it behooves
the British Government to adhere to the principle
of natural allegiance wholly, or renounce
it wholly." Contending themselves for the right
of naturalization, can the British Government
deny it to others? On the part of this Government
sufficient evidence of its pacific and accommodating
disposition appears in its offer to
surrender every thing it can, consistently with
national faith. On the part of Britain a protraction
of the war, by refusing to meet us on the
terms proposed, can proceed from no other motive
than a determination to continue that abuse
of power which she has inflicted and we have
suffered so long. The ground taken by this
country is what we must insist upon keeping,
and I doubt not we will succeed if we contend
for it as we ought. The informality of the negotiation
between our Chargé d'Affaires and
the British Government has been mentioned as
a cause of its failure. If there had been an amicable
disposition on the part of the British Government,
the authority would have been considered
ample. If there be not an amicable disposition
we will negotiate in vain. We must fight,
or we shall never succeed in obtaining a recognition
of our rights. I will advert to one argument
of the gentleman from New York, (Mr.
Emott,) who has examined this subject with
ability. It is that one which appeared to me
to make the greatest impression on the House.
He said he had examined the voluminous document
on the subject of impressment, which was
printed during the last session by order of the
House, and that it did not appear from that
document that more than ninety-three American
seamen had been impressed in the year
1809; from which I believe every one who
heard him inferred that it was proved affirmatively
by that document, that no more than
ninety-three American seamen, who were named
therein, were impressed in that year. Now,
what is the fact? The document does not state
in one case, perhaps of eight or ten, when the
impressment took place, and there are one thousand
five hundred and fifty-eight persons named
in that document. Of course the gentleman
could not be authorized to say that but ninety-three,
or any other precise number, were impressed
in 1809. All those, the date of whose
detention is not stated, may have been impressed
in 1809. It is probable much the greatest
portion was. A more particular examination of
this point of inquiry will prove the magnitude
of the evil. From the 1st of April, 1809, to
the 30th of September, 1810, a period of
eighteen months only, a single agent of this
Government, in London, received one thousand
five hundred and fifty-eight applications from
impressed seamen. How many were unable to
apply? Men imprisoned on board ships of
war, scattered over the ocean and on distant
stations, how could they apply to Mr. Lyman
in London and give in their names? The number
impressed must have been great, indeed,
when a single agent in the short space of
eighteen months, registered the names of one
thousand five hundred and fifty-eight applicants.
Of this number a part was discharged,
acknowledged to be Americans beyond the possibility
of denial; a small number is detained
as being born in England, and the remainder
are detained under various pretexts—such as
supposed to be born in England, being on distant
stations, having consular certificates proving
them Danes, Swedes, &c.; as if they had
any better right to take from on board an
American vessel a Swede or a Dane than an
American citizen. Even their own doctrine
goes to assert a right to seize none but their
own subjects. I ask, now, whether the impression
made by the gentleman from New
York was a just one? Whether it does not
appear probable that at least one thousand of
those contained in this list were impressed
without even a plausible pretext? But if in
a single statement I make out a result so variant
from the statement of the gentleman, I beg
you and the public to test the other statements
of the gentleman in the same way. Not, sir,
that the gentleman made the statement with
any unfair intention, for no man is more honorable
or correct—he has my highest esteem—but,
it will show how liable we are to err—nay,
how prone we are to err when our feelings and
habit of thinking run with our argument. So
much for impressment. It is an abuse such as
cannot be tolerated by an independent nation.
It is one which ought to be resisted by war.
The question was then taken on the passage
of the bill, and decided in the affirmative—For
the bill 77, against it 42, as follows:
Yeas.—Willis Alston, jun., William Anderson,
Stevenson Archer, Daniel Avery, Ezekiel Bacon, David
Bard, Josiah Bartlett, Burwell Bassett, William
W. Bibb, William Blackledge, Robert Brown, William
A. Burwell, William Butler, John C. Calhoun,
Francis Carr, Langdon Cheves, James Cochran, John
Clopton, Lewis Condict, William Crawford, Richard
Cutts, Roger Davis, John Dawson, Joseph Desha,
Samuel Dinsmoor, Elias Earle, William Findlay,
James Fisk, Meshack Franklin, Thomas Gholson,
Isaiah L. Green, Felix Grundy, Bolling Hall, Obed
Hall, John A. Harper, Aylett Hawes, John M. Hyneman,
Richard M. Johnson, Joseph Kent, William R.
King, Abner Lacock, Peter Little, Aaron Lyle,
Thomas Moore, William McCoy, Samuel McKee,
Alexander McKim, Arunah Metcalf, Samuel L. Mitchill,
Jeremiah Morrow, Hugh Nelson, Anthony
New, Thomas Newton, Stephen Ormsby, Israel
Pickens, James Pleasants, jun., Benjamin Pond,
William M. Richardson, Samuel Ringgold, Thomas
B. Robertson, John Rhea, John Roane, Jonathan
Roberts, Ebenezer Sage, Lemuel Sawyer, Ebenezer
Seaver, John Sevier, Adam Seybert, Samuel Shaw,
George Smith, John Smith, William Strong, John
Taliaferro, George M. Troup, Charles Turner, jr.,
William Widgery, and Richard Wynn.
Nays.—John Baker, Abijah Bigelow, Hermanus
Bleecker, James Breckenridge, Elijah Brigham,
Epaphroditus Champion, Martin Chittenden, Matthew
Clay, Thomas B. Cooke, John Davenport, jr.,
William Ely, James Emott, Asa Fitch, Thomas R.
Gold, Charles Goldsborough, Edwin Gray, Jacob
Hufty, Richard Jackson, jun., Philip B. Key, Lyman
Law, Joseph Lewis, jr., William Lowndes, Archibald
McBryde, James Milnor, Jonathan O. Mosely, Joseph
Pearson, Timothy Pitkin, jun., Elisha R. Potter,
Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, William Reed,
Henry M. Ridgely, William Rodman, Daniel Sheffey,
Richard Stanford, Lewis B. Sturges, Samuel Taggart,
Benjamin Tallmadge, Uri Tracy, Laban Wheaton,
Leonard White, and Thomas Wilson.
Ordered, That the title be, "An act in addition
to the act, entitled 'An act to raise an additional
military force, and for other purposes.'"
Land claims in Missouri Territory—Confirmation
of private claims—Pre-emptions.
Mr. Hempstead observed, that he had certain
resolutions to submit, on which, as they were
somewhat in detail, he would ask the liberty to
make a few remarks. Under the second section
of the first act for adjusting land claims in the
Territory of Louisiana, (now Missouri,) each actual
settler was entitled to six hundred and
forty acres of land, together with such other
and further quantity as heretofore had been allowed
for the wife and family of such actual
settler, agreeably to the laws, usages, and customs
of the Spanish Government. A majority
of the Board of Land Commissioners in that
Territory were, under that section, so liberal in
their grants, that it excited the alarm of Government.
This alarm, sir, was soon transferred
to the people, and has continued ever since;
because a majority of the Board passed from
one extreme to the other, and granted, in many
instances, only one hundred, one hundred and
fifty or two hundred arpens, where they had
before granted seven or eight hundred arpens.
The grants for the smaller quantities are contained
in the lists of grants, and being final
against the United States, would never come
before Congress, unless upon petitions from individual
claimants. Other boards of Commissioners,
acting under the same law, have granted
to the actual settler in every instance, when
the law had been complied with, six hundred
and forty acres; and it would seem to me, sir,
that the people of the Missouri Territory are entitled
to the same justice.
The second resolution is to provide as well
for rejected claims, in which no testimony has
been adduced, as when testimony has been received;
and to prevent individual claimants
from loading our table with petitions. The
mode pointed out will present all claims to
Congress at one time. With these observations
I shall submit the resolutions for the sanction
of the House:
Resolved, That the Committee on the Public Lands
be instructed to inquire into the expediency of authorizing,
in favor of the claimants, the re-examination
of the grants of land made by the board of
Commissioners for ascertaining and adjusting the
titles and claims to land in the district of Louisiana,
under the second section of the act, entitled "An
act for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and
claims to land within the Territory of Orleans and
the district of Louisiana," passed the 2d of March,
1805; and also the grants made by the Recorder of
Land Titles for the Territory of Missouri, under that
part of the third section of the act, entitled "An act
further providing for settling the claims to land in
the Territory of Missouri," passed the 13th of June,
1812, which provides for settlement of donation
rights in all cases where the quantity of land granted
is less than six hundred and forty acres; and that
said committee have leave to report by bill, or otherwise.
Resolved, That the Committee on the Public Lands
be instructed to inquire into the expediency of authorizing
the Recorder of Land Titles for the Territory
of Missouri to receive testimony in all the claims
to land in which none has been adduced, and
which are rejected in the report made by the late
board of Commissioners for ascertaining and adjusting
the titles and claims to land in the then district
of Louisiana, now Territory of Missouri; and, afterwards,
to arrange into classes, according to their
respective merits, as well the claims embraced by
this resolution, as the other rejected claims mentioned
in said report, and made abstracts containing the
substance of the evidence in support of such claims,
and such other information and remarks as may be
necessary to a proper decision thereon, and report on
said claims to the General Commissioner of the
Land Office; and that said committee have leave to
report by bill, or otherwise.
Resolved, That said committee be instructed to inquire
into the expediency of granting the right of
pre-emption to actual settlers on the public lands in
the said Territory of Missouri; and that said committee
have leave to report by bill, or otherwise.
The resolutions were then agreed to.
Two other members, to wit: from Massachusetts,
Peleg Taliman; and from Pennsylvania,
William Piper, appeared, and took their
seats.
Encouragement to Privateer Captures.
The House resolved itself into a Committee
of the Whole on the bill "relating to captures."
[The bill provides that compensation shall be
allowed to the officers and crews of our public
vessels, for vessels of the enemy necessarily
destroyed at sea after their capture.]
Mr. Bassett stated to the House the considerations
by which the Naval Committee had
been induced to report this bill. It grew more
immediately out of the case of the Guerriere
destroyed by the Constitution—a case precisely
in point. Such a principle as that which the
bill proposed, he believed, had been engrafted
in the British service. It was at least required
by equity and sound policy, where the public
service required the destruction of a vessel for
fear of recapture by the enemy in its disabled
state, that some compensation should be made
to the captors in lieu of that which would have
accrued from the sale of the vessel had it been
brought into port.
Mr. H. Clay (Speaker) spoke in opposition
both to the principles and details of the bill.
He was disposed to believe the principle unprecedented
in any other country; but even if
it were not, he thought it ought not to exist in
this country. It would have the effect to make
it the interest of the captor, unless the vessel
should be immediately on the coast, or in the
very mouth of our rivers, to destroy the
captured vessel. On consulting the underwriters,
gentlemen would find the premium required
on bringing in a vessel of any description
from any considerable distance, would be
equal to one-half her value; and, as proof of it,
Mr. C. instanced the high insurance even from
Charleston and New Orleans, along our own
coast, to a northern port. The strongest possible
temptation would, therefore, be offered by
giving half the value of the destroyed vessel
to the captors in case of her destruction. Mr.
C. moved to strike out the first section of the
bill.
Mr. Bassett replied to Mr. Clay, and defended
the bill, on the ground of expediency
and of precedent. In the British nation, he
said, rewards were always liberally bestowed
on skill and valor, and they must always be
by every country that wishes to encourage
these qualities in its citizens. The principle
did exist in the British service, not by statutory,
but by admiralty regulations; and in
all such cases rewards had been liberally dispensed.
Mr. Bacon opposed the bill as inexpedient
and unprecedented. To show that it went beyond
the British legal provisions in that respect,
he quoted a statute of that nation which
allows to the captors of vessels so destroyed,
as the bill contemplates, a bounty of five
pounds for every man found alive on board
said captured vessels, the aggregate to be
equally distributed among the crew of the captors.
Further, he believed, that Government
had not gone.
Mr. Cheves on this remarked, that every encouragement
was afforded to British naval officers,
by their Government, as well by promotions
to higher office and to nobility, &c., which
were not known in this country, as by pecuniary
rewards and pensions, not in all cases
by statutory, but by Executive sanctions. He
was disposed to be liberal to our officers, to
foster our rising navy. But, though friendly
to the principle, he objected to the particular
details of the bill, which he thought susceptible
of modifications which would be better
made in select committee than in the House.
He, therefore, moved that the committee rise.
Mr. Quincy objected to the principle of the
bill, which he thought fundamentally questionable.
He was for providing specially by statute
for each case after its occurrence, where the
circumstances of the case required an exercise
of liberality by Congress, and to legislate generally
for future occurrences.
The committee then rose, reported progress,
and were refused leave to sit again; and,
On motion of Mr. Cheves, the bill was recommitted
to the Naval Committee.
Privateer Pensions.
The House then resolved itself into a Committee
of the Whole, on the bill regulating
pensions to persons on board private armed
ships.
[This bill directs that the two per cent. reserved
in the hands of consuls and collectors, in
pursuance of an act of June last, respecting private
armed vessels, &c., be paid into the Treasury,
to constitute a fund for pensions to persons
disabled on board private armed vessels, of
the mode and degree of which disability the log
book of each vessel is to be evidence.]
Mr. Burwell moved to strike out the vital
section of the bill, with a view to try the principle.
In support of the motion, he remarked
that he conceived it improper to adopt a principle
so extremely liable to abuse as this, especially
when pensions had been refused to at
least equally meritorious sufferers during the
Revolution. The evidence which the log book
of a vessel would afford, would be so very liable
to error, and so indefinite, as not to be entitled
to that conclusive weight given to it by the bill.
The proper course, he conceived, would be, to
leave the subject open to the annual disposition
of Congress; which was now the case with certain
other pensions.
Mr. Bassett stated, in reply, that, at the last
session, two per cent. having been reserved
from the wages of the seamen on board private
armed vessels, for the avowed and declared purpose
of constituting a fund for pensions to the
wounded, this bill now merely indicated the mode
of carrying this provision into effect. The money
had been reserved by the collectors and consuls,
and as it was never the intention of Congress to
make them a present of it, it remained for Congress
to direct the mode of its distribution. If
the principle was incorrect, it ought to have
been objected to when the pledge was given by
the House last session on the subject.
The question on striking out the section was
negatived by a very small majority; and the
committee rose and reported the bill.
Mr. Stow made a motion going to confine the
pensions allowed by the bill to such as should
be disabled in actual service, and spoke in support
of his motion.
Mr. McKim opposed the motion. The services
rendered by the privateers were valuable
to the country and ought to be encouraged.
The duties on prize goods, he said, brought into
the port of Baltimore alone, had amounted to
three hundred and fifty-four thousand dollars.
This showed the importance of this system in a
pecuniary point of view.
Mr. Stow questioned the benefit rendered to
the public interest by privateering, and said he
was in favor of letting this fund accumulate, and
first see whether there was sufficient to pension
those having received known wounds in action,
before they agreed to extend it to all casualties
on board private armed vessels.
Mr. Little asserted the utility of privateers
and their efficiency as a means of annoying the
enemy, He bore testimony to the bravery they
had displayed in all conflicts with the enemy,
and to the injuries they had inflicted on his
commerce. The enterprising individuals concerned
in it ought to be encouraged; for, by the
impediments to the prosecution of their enterprise,
many had been already discouraged and
had dismantled their vessels. If properly encouraged,
they would scour every sea, however
distant, and ransack every port and harbor in
search of the enemy. He was in favor of exhibiting
the most liberal disposition towards
them.
Considerable further debate took place on
the amendment, which was at last agreed to by
a very small majority.
Mr. Rhea subsequently moved to recommit
the bill to the same committee which reported
it, for the purpose of amendment; and the bill
was recommitted.
Astronomical Observatory.
Mr. Mitchill, from the committee to whom
was referred the memorial of William Lambert,
and the report made thereon by the Secretary of
State at the last session, presented a bill authorizing
the establishment of an Astronomical Observatory;
which was read twice, and committed
to a Committee of the Whole on Friday next.
The report is as follows:
On the 27th December, 1809, Mr. Lambert addressed
the House of Representatives upon the expediency
of establishing a first meridian for the United
States at their permanent seat of Government. This
was ordered for consideration to a select number of
gentlemen, who, on the 28th March, eighteen hundred
and ten, laid upon the table an able and learned
opinion, accompanied with scientific calculations illustrative
of the object. They concluded their investigation
by recommending that provision should be
made, by law, for determining, with the greatest accuracy,
the distance between the City of Washington
and Greenwich in England, and that the proper
instruments should be procured.
Afterwards, on the 23d January, 1811, the memorial
was referred to a select committee; and, on the
23d of the ensuing February, that committee was
discharged, and the memorial referred to the Secretary
of State for his consideration.
Conformably to the desire of the House, that officer
wrote to the Speaker a letter which, after having
been read, on the third day of July, 1812, was ordered
to lie on the table. That letter was, on the
8th December last, ordered to the present committee,
who have diligently weighed the matters which it
contains.
It is their opinion that astronomical observations
are highly useful to a navigating and commercial
people, already eminent for their progress in science
and the arts, and who are laboring for the completion
of their national dignity and splendor.
The most ready method of obtaining the information
to be derived from noting the phenomena of the
heavens, is by the establishment of an observatory.
This may be erected at the city of Washington. By
such an institution, means may be adopted not only
to fix the first meridian, but to ascertain a great
number of other astronomical facts and occurrences
through the vigilance of a complete astronomer.
The House met with closed doors; and, after
being opened, another member, to wit, from
New York, Peter B. Porter, appeared, and
took his seat.
Encouragement to Privateers.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee
of the Whole on the report of the Committee
of Ways and Means on the petitions of
Joshua Barney and Stephen Kingston.
The resolution, reported by the Committee of
Ways and Means, "that it is inexpedient to legislate
upon the subject of the petitions," was
disagreed to; and the following was reported to
the House as a substitute thereto:
"Resolved, That any right or claim of the United
States to British property which may have been captured
by American privateers, arising from forfeiture
under any provision of the non-importation acts, ought
to be relinquished for the benefit of the captors."
The question on the original resolution was also
disagreed to by a vote of the House. For disagreeing
61, against it 47.
And the resolution proposed in Committee of
the Whole as a substitute, was, as stated above,
agreed to; and was referred to the Committee
of Ways and Means to bring in a bill in pursuance
thereof.
Impressed Seamen.
The following Message was received from the
President of the United States:
To the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States:
I transmit, for the information of Congress, copies
of a correspondence between John Mitchell, Agent
for American Prisoners of War at Halifax, and the
British Admiral commanding at that station.
I transmit for the like purposes copies of a letter from
Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy.
January 22, 1813.
JAMES MADISON.
Extract of a letter from John Mitchell, Esq., Agent for
American Prisoners of War at Halifax, to the Secretary
of State, dated
"December 5, 1812.
"I cover you a copy of a correspondence, which
took place in consequence of different applications I
received, either by letter or personally, from persons
detained on board His Britannic Majesty's ships of
war in this place.
"I formerly mentioned to you that the Admiral had
assured me that he would discharge all the citizens of
the United States who were in the fleet, and actually
did discharge several. This induced me to think I
should be correct, and in the perfect line of my duty,
in sending him a list of the applicants to me, and requesting
an inquiry to be made, and discharges granted
to all who were citizens of the United States; I, therefore,
covered him a list of the names now enclosed to
you, which produced his letter to me of the same date,
(December 1, 1812.)
"I read it with surprise, because some of the men
had informed me their captains had refused to report
them to the Admiral. Now, if no one here was, or is,
allowed to do it, their situation is hopeless.
"It is not my place, sir, to reason with you on this
business. Proof of Nativity, in his first letter, is a
strong expression; and how few are in possession of
it, and how many who cannot obtain it.
"The second paragraph, in the second letter, prevents
my interfering; and I have since been obliged
to send a man away, requesting him to apply to his
commanding officer."
Copy of a letter from John Mitchell, Esq., Agent for
American Prisoners of War at Halifax, to Sir John
Borlase Warren, dated
December 1, 1812.
Sir: Since the sailing of the last cartels, in which
you were pleased to send home several Americans,
who had been in His Britannic Majesty's service, others
who are now on board of the Centurion and Statira
have requested of me to procure their discharge,
and to be sent home.
Will you, sir, have the goodness to direct an inquiry,
and order the release of such as are citizens of
the United States?
Besides the enclosed list, I am told there are others
whose names I have not.
I have the honor to be, &c.,
JOHN MITCHELL, Agent.
Copy of a letter from Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren,
to John Mitchell, Esq., Agent for American
Prisoners of War at Halifax, dated
December 1, 1812.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt
of your letter of this date, respecting some men,
therein mentioned, on board His Majesty's ships under
my command, said to be citizens of the United
States, and in reply, beg to acquaint you, that whenever
I have received representations from the captains
of His Majesty's ships of any part of their
crews being citizens of America, with sufficient proof
of their nativity, I have directed their discharge
from the service.
I must observe to you that I cannot permit the interference
of any applications from men belonging to
His Majesty's ships, but through their commanding
officers: and in your department, of prisoners of war
only, I shall at all times be most happy to receive
your communications.
I have the honor to be, &c.,
JOHN B. WARREN.
Copy of a letter from John Mitchell, Esq., Agent for
American Prisoners of War at Halifax, to Admiral
Sir John Borlase Warren, dated
December 3, 1812.
Sir: I had yesterday the honor to receive your
letter, dated the 1st instant, in which you observe
that you cannot permit the interference of any application
from men on board of His Britannic Majesty's
ships of war, but through their commanding officers.
Desirous of conforming as far as possible to established
regulations, permit me the honor to inquire of
your Excellency, if by your letter I am to understand
that I am not to receive the applications of seamen
declaring themselves citizens of the United
States, who are on board of His Majesty's ships of
war, and communicate the same to you? If this is
the meaning, I shall most certainly conform, though
I must lament the regulation.
I have the honor to be, &c.,
J. MITCHELL, Agent, &c.
Copy of a letter from Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren,
to John Mitchell, Esq., Agent for American
Prisoners of War at Halifax, dated
December 4, 1812.
Sir: In reply to your letter, dated yesterday, I
have to acquaint you that whenever any address is
made relative to men on board His Majesty's ships, it
must be by the commanders of such vessels direct.
I cannot permit any application by other persons in
time of war, but in the above mode.
It will always afford me pleasure to attend to your
wishes in any respect relative to the situation or exchange
of prisoners, or to afford any aid or relief in
my power. I have the honor to be, &c.,
JOHN B. WARREN.
From Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the
Navy.
U. S. Frigate President,
Boston, Jan. 14, 1813.
Sir: Herewith you will receive two muster books,
of His Britannic Majesty's vessels Moselle and Sappho,
found on board the British packet Swallow.
As the British have always denied that they detained
on board their ships of war American citizens,
knowing them to be such, I send you the enclosed, as
a public document of their own, to prove how illy
such an assertion accords with their practice.
It will appear by these two muster books that so
late as August last, about an eighth part of the Moselle
and Sappho's crews were Americans; consequently,
if there is only a quarter part of that proportion
on board their other vessels, that they have
an infinitely greater number of Americans in their
service than any American has yet had an idea of.
Any further comment of mine on this subject, I
consider unnecessary; as the enclosed documents
speak but too plainly for themselves. I have the
honor to be, &c.,
JOHN RODGERS.
Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.
The Message and documents were read, and
referred to the Committee of Foreign Relations.
Treasury Notes.
On motion of Mr. Cheves, the House resolved
itself into a Committee of the Whole on
the bill reported by the Committee of Ways
and Means authorizing the issuing of Treasury
notes for the service of the year 1812.
[The bill authorizes the President of the United
States to cause to be issued Treasury notes to the
amount of five millions of dollars, and also, if he
shall deem it expedient, to issue a further amount,
not exceeding five millions of dollars, provided the
amount issued under the latter provision shall be
deemed and held to be in part of the loan of sixteen
millions of dollars authorized by the bill passed this
day. The notes to bear interest at the rate of five
and two-fifths per cent. per annum, to be redeemed
one year after the day on which they are respectively
issued.]
The bill having been read through by sections,
and no objection having been made thereto,
the committee rose and reported it.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a
third reading without division; and then the
House adjourned.
A new member, to wit, from New York,
Thomas P. Grosvenor, elected to supply the
vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Robert
Le Roy Livingston, appeared, produced his
credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.
Grant to Daniel Boone.
Mr. Hempstead, from the committee to
whom were referred the petition of Daniel
Boone, and the resolutions of the Legislature of
Kentucky in his behalf, made a report; which
was read twice, and committed to a Committee
of the Whole on Monday next.
Territory of Missouri.
Mr. McKee, from the select committee which
was directed to inquire into the propriety of
amending the act for the government of the
Missouri Territory, reported against any amendment.
The report is as follows:
That they have had the subject to them referred
under their consideration, and have examined the
act above recited. The principal difficulty suggested
to the committee, occurring in the execution of the
law, appears to relate to the election of a delegate to
represent the interest of the Territory in the Congress
of the United States. By the first clause of the 6th
section of the act it is provided "that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of members elected
every second year, by the people of the said Territory,
to serve for two years." By the 13th section of
the said act it is also provided "that the citizens of
the said Territory entitled to vote for Representatives
to the General Assembly thereof, shall, at the time
of electing their Representatives to the said General
Assembly, also elect one delegate from the said Territory
to the Congress of the United States." It also
appears that an election was held in pursuance of the
act on the second Monday of November last, when a
delegate was elected. It appears that doubts have
been entertained whether the delegate thus elected
can legally hold his seat after the 3d day of March
next, and an alteration of the law has been suggested
as necessary to obviate the difficulty. It seems to the
committee that the first clause of the 6th section, and
the 13th section of the act, taken together, leaves no
room for doubt, but evidently fixes the period for
which the delegate may hold his seat at two years
from the second Monday of November last; and it
follows, as a necessary consequence, that the delegate
elected in pursuance of the law, and for the term of
two years, cannot be deprived of his right to a seat
by any subsequent law.
It also appears to the committee that the Territorial
Legislature are furnished, by the 7th section of
the act, with competent power to change the time of
holding elections so as to obviate any difficulty that
may occur in the subsequent elections of a delegate.
The committee, therefore, recommend the following
resolution:
Resolved, That the act entitled "An act providing
for the government of the Territory of Missouri," requires
no amendment.
By Benjamin Howard, Governor of the Territory of
Louisiana, Commander-in-Chief of the Militia
thereof, and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, in
and over the same:
A PROCLAMATION.
In discharge of those duties enjoined on the Governor
of this Territory by an act of the Congress of
the United States of America, approved the 4th of
June, 1812, entitled "An act providing for the government
of the Territory of Missouri," I have made
the following arrangements, preparatory to the new
organization of Government to be instituted by the
said act, and which will commence its operation on
the first Monday in December next; that is to say;
I have divided the future Territory of Missouri into
five counties, excluding from the civil jurisdiction of
each of said counties any tract or tracts of country
which may fall within their respective general limits,
as hereinafter set forth, the Indian title to which may
not have been extinguished.
That portion of territory situated north of the Missouri
River, and usually known by the name of the
Forks, as lying between that river and the river Mississippi,
shall compose one county, and be called the
county of St. Charles.
That portion of territory bounded by the Missouri
river on the north; by the Mississippi on the east;
on the south by the Platin creek, from its mouth to
its source; thence by a west line to the Missouri
river, or to the western boundary of the Osage purchase;
and on the west, by the said western boundary
of the Osage purchase, shall compose one other
county, and be called the county of St. Louis.
That portion of territory bounded by the county of
St. Louis on the north; on the east by the Mississippi;
on the south by Apple creek, from its mouth to
its source; thence by a due west line to the western
boundary of the Osage purchase; and on the west,
by the said western boundary of the Osage purchase,
shall compose one other county, and be called the
county of St. Genevieve.
That portion of territory bounded on the north by
the south limit of the county of St. Genevieve; east
by the Mississippi; west by the western boundary of
the Osage purchase; and south by that line which
formerly separated the commanders of Cape Girardeau
and New Madrid, and known more recently as the
boundary between these two districts, shall compose
one other county, and be called the county of Cape
Girardeau.
That portion of territory bounded north by the
south limit of the county of Cape Girardeau; east by
the Mississippi; south by the 33d degree of north
latitude, (the southern boundary of this Territory as
settled by act of Congress;) west by the western
boundary of the Osage purchase; and from the
southern extremity thereof to the 33d degree of north
latitude aforesaid, shall compose one other county,
and be called the county of New Madrid.
And I do hereby make known and declare that
elections of Representatives, to serve in the General
Assembly of the future Territory of Missouri, shall be
holden throughout the Territory, on the second Monday
of November next, at the respective seats of justice
of the present districts, which are hereby declared
to be the seats of justice for the several future
counties respectively except that the town of New
Madrid shall be the seat of justice of the future
county of New Madrid, which said future county
will comprehend the present districts of New Madrid
and Arkansas; to wit: at the town of St. Charles for
the future county of St. Charles, at which time and
place there will be chosen for the said county two
Representatives. At the town of St. Louis for the
future county of St. Louis, at which time and place
there will be chosen four Representatives. At the
town of St. Genevieve for the future county of St.
Genevieve, at which time and place there will be
chosen for the said county three Representatives. At
the town of Cape Girardeau for the future county of
Cape Girardeau, at which time and place there will
be chosen for the said county two Representatives.
And at the town of New Madrid for the future
county of New Madrid, at which time and place there
will be chosen for the said county two Representatives.
And I do, moreover, make known and declare that
on the said second Monday of November next, an
election will also be holden, at the several seats of
justice aforesaid, for a Territorial delegate to the
Congress of the United States. And I do enjoin and
require that these elections be holden by the sheriffs
of the present districts, or in their absence, or inability
to act, by the coroners respectively; that the
said sheriffs or coroners shall take the polls of those
qualified to vote; that the clerks of the courts of the
present districts, or their deputies, shall respectively
write down the names of the voters in a fair and legible
manner, and that the presiding judges of the
courts of the present districts respectively, or in case
of absence, or inability to act, the next in commission
shall attend, and be judges of the qualification
of the voters; that the said elections shall be
opened at the respective seats of justice aforesaid,
at or before 9 o'clock in the morning of the said
second Monday of November, and close at sunset of
that day.
And the sheriffs or coroners respectively, after
having caused the proces-verbal of said polls to be
signed by the clerks or their deputies, who may have
respectively committed the same to writing, and
countersigned by the judges respectively who may
have attended the elections, will themselves certify
the same, explicitly stating, at large, the names of
the persons elected as Representatives, and the
name of the person having the greatest number of
votes as a delegate to Congress, and make immediate
return thereof to the Governor of the Territory.
And I do, lastly, enjoin and require, that the Representatives
of the several future counties, so as aforesaid
to be elected, do convene in the town of St.
Louis on the first Monday in December next, as provided
by the act of Congress aforesaid.
In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of
the Territory of Louisiana to be hereunto affixed.
Given under my hand, at the town of St. Louis, the
first day of October, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and twelve, and of the independence
of the United States of America the thirty-seventh.
BENJAMIN A. HOWARD.
For the information of the people who are called
on to decide the right of suffrage by the Governor's
proclamation, we have inserted below that part of
the law which defines the qualification as well of the
Representative as of the voter.
"No person shall be eligible or qualified to be a
Representative, who shall not have attained to the
age of twenty-one years, and who shall not have resided
in the Territory one year next preceding the
day of election, and who shall not be a freeholder
within the county in which he may be elected; and
no person holding an office under the United States,
or an office of profit under the Territory, shall be a
Representative. In case of vacancy, by death, resignation,
or removal or otherwise of a Representative,
the Governor shall issue a writ to the county wherever
a vacancy may be as aforesaid, to elect another
person to serve the residue of the term. That all
free white male citizens of the United States above
the age of twenty-one years, who have resided in
said Territory twelve months next preceding an election,
and who shall have paid a territorial or county
tax, assessed at least six months previous thereto,
shall be entitled to vote for Representatives to the
General Assembly of said Territory."
The report was ordered to lie on the table.
Arming and Classing the Militia.
The House resumed the consideration of the
bill supplementary to the act for arming the
militia, and for classing the same.
Mr. Fitch moved to strike out all that part
of the bill which provides for the classing the
militia of the United States.
Mr. Ely said that he was totally opposed to
the classification of the militia; that it had
been pressed upon us from year to year, by
gentlemen from the Southern section of the
Union, he knew not why; that he thought the
effects of the measure in rendering the militia
efficient, for constitutional purposes, were very
trifling and unimportant. From some cause or
other, the militia in the Southern States are
very little improved, and gentlemen seemed to
imagine that classification was to supply the
place of arms, of organization, of discipline, of
every thing. This would not prove to be the
case. He said that the laws heretofore made
had proved in the Northern States, particularly
in Massachusetts, abundantly sufficient to answer
all the purposes of forming an efficient
militia; but they have been followed up by
State regulations which had been enjoined by
penalties sufficiently severe. These, he had understood,
had been in a great measure neglected
in the South, and this was the reason that
the militia were so imperfect; and if the States
would not enforce those laws, he had no idea
they would enforce this. The sums expended
on the militia in Massachusetts, both from the
public treasury and by private individuals,
is very great—that State has furnished more
than sixty artillery companies, with their pieces,
ammunition carriages, and every thing appurtenant
to them, complete; the artillery and
cavalry are completely uniformed and equipped,
and are required so to be by law; for the greater
part, the infantry are in uniform complete, are
well armed, and are equal in all respects to any
militia in the world. That this classification
would add to their burdens, and they had already
burdens enough; that it would be an insidious
thing, and so considered by the militia,
and go to destroy the harmony of the militia
corps. That if gentlemen in the South thought
it would be useful, let their State governments,
who were the best judges, adopt as much of it
as they pleased. No one would object to that,
if they did not interfere with existing regulations.
All will acknowledge that the State
Governments have it in their power, and it has
been, in some form or other, exercised by some
of the States, and particularly by Pennsylvania—this
measure will interfere with their favorite
mode. He said he was disposed to have the
militia in the South improved, but he prayed
gentlemen not to adopt a measure calculated to
injure one part of the militia, more than it
would benefit the other; he hoped the provisions
for classing the militia would be stricken
out of the bill.
Mr. Williams and Mr. Stow opposed the
motion.
The question was decided by yeas and nays:
For striking out 58, against it 65.
The bill was then ordered to be engrossed for
a third reading.
A new member, to wit, from North Carolina,
William Kennedy, elected to supply the
vacancy occasioned by the death of Gen. Thomas
Blount, appeared, was qualified, and took his
seat.
Constitution and Guerriere.
The engrossed bill providing compensation to
Captain Hull, and the officers and crew of the
frigate Constitution, for the capture and destruction
of the British frigate Guerriere, was
read a third time.
[The bill authorizes a grant of $50,000.]
Mr. McKee opposed the passage of the bill,
on the ground that the President has no authority
to expend the public money in gratuitous
grants to individuals.
Mr. Sawyer stated, that he wished to make
some remarks in reply to Mr. McKee, but, from
the lateness of the hour, and an indisposition
with which he was oppressed, it was not now
in his power. He therefore moved an adjournment,
which was carried—ayes 54.
Mr. Seaver presented a petition of Benjamin
Waterhouse, medical doctor, of Boston, stating
that he is willing, and wishes to undertake the
inoculation of the army of the United States
with the "kine-pock inoculation," and praying
the aid and patronage of Congress in that undertaking.—Referred
to the Committee on Military
Affairs.
Constitution and Guerriere.
The House resumed the order of the day on
the bill making compensation to the officers and
crew of the Constitution for the destruction of
the frigate Guerriere. The bill being on its
third reading—
Mr. Sawyer spoke in support of the bill, and
in reply to Mr. McKee.
Mr. Dawson.—Mr. Speaker: The bill which
is now on your table, and which I hope will
soon receive your signature, was drawn from a
resolution, or rather the part of a resolution
which I had the honor to offer you at the very
commencement of the session.
When I offered you that resolution, I did
hope, and I did believe, that it would have received
the immediate attention and unanimous
approbation of this House; that regardless of
those punctilios which too often shackle the
best intentions, and do injury to the best causes,
and in compliance with the sentiments and
feelings of the nation, we should have immediately
expressed our own, thereby giving force
to that expression, and have rendered that tribute
which is justly due to undaunted valor, and
to modest merit; that we should have declared
our admiration, and the high sense we entertain
of the gallant conduct of the defenders of
their country's flag, and the defenders of her
rights, and while we gave to some testimonials
of our approbation, we should have yielded to
all that which is justly due.
In this expectation I have been wofully disappointed;
doubts, difficulties, and delays have
taken place; commitment has succeeded commitment,
and so many amendments, or rather
alterations, have been made to the original resolution,
that I can scarcely call it my own; it
has received the fostering care of so many stepfathers
that I am almost constrained to disown
it as illegitimate; but as it is natural to protect
that which we call "our own," although
all the features do not please us, so I shall vote
for that bill although all its provisions do not
please me.
Some gentlemen, with a liberality which I
neither envy, nor shall I imitate, are willing to
load those brave tars with all the praise, with
all the applause, which the pride of language
can bestow, or which a resolution written on
paper gilded with gold can confer; and, becoming
their own judges, they think that ample
compensation for all the hardships they have
suffered, for all the dangers they have encountered,
for all the wounds they have received.
With all the respect which I feel for these honorable
gentlemen, and the high value which I
set on their good opinion, I do not think it ample
compensation to the brave and indigent
tars who have boldly fought your battles, and
generously sacrificed their interest for your
good; they merit some more substantial stuff
than air; they have acquired for you, sir, they
have given to your enemy, something more
substantial.
Others there are, who are well pleased to bestow
on the brave officers who have distinguished
themselves, some testimonials of our
approbation—some insignia of their merit.
With these gentlemen I most perfectly agree,
and most cordially voted in favor of the bill for
that purpose. But, while I remember the gallant
captain who proudly steps the quarterdeck,
I will not forget the sailor boy, "who
whistles o'er the lee," or the aged mariner who
fathoms the deep, and on whom, when the battle
rages, danger has no more effect than the
foaming surge which surrounds him has on the
hard rock, when it dashes and breaks against
its side; they all, sir, are entitled to your applause
and gratitude; they all demand your
justice; and to render that justice is the object
of the bill now on your table, as I will presently
show, and which had it passed at an earlier period
of the session, as I did expect it would,
your "Constellation" would not have lain for
weeks within your view for the want of men,
and is still, I believe, in your waters, but would
long since have been at sea, and would have
added new trophies to those already won.
The Secretary of the Navy, I mean the late
Secretary, in whose veracity and integrity I
have the highest confidence, who carries to his
retirement the best wishes of my heart, and
under whose auspices this gallant exploit was
achieved, and Commodore Hull, whose disinterestedness
seems only equalled by his valor, have
informed us that "the Guerriere" when she
went into action was worth two hundred
thousand dollars, and that she had articles on
board to the value of one hundred thousand
dollars. She was one of the finest frigates in
the British navy, well manned, and commanded
by one of their most experienced and gallant
captains! This ship, our frigate, "the Constitution,"
of equal force, attacked, vanquished,
and captured, after a short, though one of the
most brilliant actions recorded in the naval history
of any country; thereby giving certain
presages of future glory, and a character to our
rising navy, coeval almost with its existence,
and setting an example which other officers
and crews, equally emulous of fame, have since
imitated, and have obtained the same laurels,
which will never fade.
Agreeably to the act for the better government
of the Navy of the United States, the
ship, with all articles on board her, became their
prize; they might have used it to their best
advantage; they might have brought her into
port, and divided the whole among themselves;
but apprehensive that from the crippled state
of the prize she might again fall into the hands
of your enemy; nay, sir, that your own frigate
might be endangered in protecting and convoying
her, they with that liberality, with that
magnanimity which marks the character of the
sailor, determined to destroy her, thereby sacrificing
their interest for your good.
And here, Mr. Speaker, let me ask what other
class of men in our society can you find who
would have acted thus nobly? I fear, sir, we
shall search for them in vain. I am sure, sir,
that we shall not find them among those who
daily violate your laws, relieve your enemy of
his surplus manufactures, or supply him with
your provisions, and then come here and receive
indemnification, remission for the crimes
which they have committed.
And, sir, what is the mighty boon which
these brave and indigent tars ask from you? or
rather was it that I, in the name of justice, demanded
for them?—it is one-sixth part in value
of that property—of their property, which
they have sacrificed for your good, rather than
it should fall into the hands of your enemy.
And will you refuse it? No, you will not, you
cannot, you dare not. You will not, because
every consideration of policy, and the best interest
of our country, forbid it; you cannot,
because every feeling which ennobles the human
heart, and I think I know yours, forbids
it; you dare not, because justice forbids it; and
you dare not do an act so flagitious.
Mr. Speaker, during the very lengthy discussions
which have taken place in this session, I
have remained silent in my seat; this has not
arisen from a supineness of disposition, or from
an inattention to the public business, or the
public welfare, but in the hope, that when gentlemen
had exhausted all their eloquence, they
would have permitted us to progress, and to
place our country in the situation demanded by
the crisis; and I should have indulged that disposition
which I have to be silent, had not an
attempt been made to deprive the brave and
needy tars of that which is justly due to them;
but under these circumstances I could not restrain
my feelings, and have to regret that I
cannot give to them that utterance which the
occasion calls for.
[The argument against this bill was, that it
would be setting a precedent which would be
considered authoritative in future cases; that
it was giving a donation for an act of duty only,
though gallantly performed. It was rewarding
a service, which, had it been rendered on land,
would have received no remuneration, as experience
had proved in the case of the Tippecanoe
expedition; and that it was contrary to justice
to confer pecuniary rewards on one class of our
citizens in exclusion of others. In favor of the
bill it was stated that the captured vessel, if she
had been brought into port, would have produced
six times the amount now proposed to
be allowed to her; and that the captors ought
not to incur a total loss from the destruction of
the vessel, which the fear of her falling into
the hands of the enemy had rendered necessary
to the public service. It was urged, that if any
city in the United States had to legislate on this
subject, five times as much would have been
awarded as is now proposed. All the gentlemen
who spoke, offered the tribute of their respect
to the gallantry and conduct of the officers
and seamen of our public vessels.]
The question on the passage of the bill was
decided in the negative—yeas 55, nays 59.
Virginia Military Bounty Lands.
The House then proceeded to consider the report
of the Committee of the Whole on the report
of the select committee touching the claims
of the officers and soldiers of the Virginia line
of the Revolutionary army to military bounty
lands.
The question was then taken to concur with
the Committee of the whole House in their disagreement
to the resolution recommended by
the select committee, which is as follows:
Resolved, That provision should be made for securing
to the officers and soldiers of the Revolutionary
army of Virginia, on State establishment, in the
land or sea service of the said State, the bounty lands
which were promised to them, either by a law or
resolution of the said Commonwealth, out of the
lands not otherwise appropriated, and lying on the
northwest side of the river Ohio, within the Virginia
cession, to be of good quality, according to the true
intent and meaning of the promises made on the part
of Virginia, and that, if a sufficiency of good land
within the meaning of the aforesaid engagement
cannot there be found, that their bounties shall be
satisfied out of any other public land of the United
States, not heretofore otherwise appropriated:
And was determined in the affirmative—yeas
66, nays 41.
Encouragement to Public and to Private Armed
Privateers.
On motion of Mr. McKim,
Resolved, That the Committee on Naval Affairs
be instructed to inquire into the expediency
of relinquishing, in favor of the officers
and crews of the public armed ships of the
United States, a greater portion of the value of
prizes than they are now by law entitled to;
and, also, to inquire into the expediency of providing
further encouragement to equipping and
employing private armed vessels of war against
the ships and commerce of the enemy; and
that the committee have leave to report by bill,
or otherwise.
A message was received from the Senate informing
the House that, owing to the indisposition
of Mr. Gaillard, the Senate have appointed
Mr. Franklin the teller, on their part, at
the counting of the votes of the Electors for
President and Vice President of the United
States.
Counting of Electoral Votes.
The hour of 12 having arrived, the Senate
entered the Hall of Representatives, preceded
by their President, Secretary, Sergeant-at-Arms,
and Doorkeeper, and proceeded to seats prepared
for them—the members of the House
having risen to receive them, and remaining
standing until all had entered. The President
of the Senate took a seat which had been prepared
for him at the Speaker's right hand, and
the Secretary of the Senate was placed beside
the Clerk of the House. The Tellers—Mr.
Franklin of the Senate, and Messrs. Macon
and Tallmadge of the House—were seated at
a table in front of the Speaker's chair.
The President of the Senate then proceeded
to open and hand to the Tellers the sealed returns
from each State, which were severally
read aloud by one of the Tellers, and noted
down and announced by the Secretaries of each
House.
The votes having all been opened and read,
the following result was announced from the
Chair, by the President of the Senate, viz:
| States. |
President. |
Vice President. |
| James Madison. |
De Witt Clinton. |
Elbridge Gerry. |
Jared Ingersoll. |
| New Hampshire |
— |
8 |
1 |
7 |
| Massachusetts |
— |
22 |
2 |
20 |
| Rhode Island |
— |
4 |
— |
4 |
| Connecticut |
— |
9 |
— |
9 |
| Vermont |
8 |
— |
8 |
— |
| New York |
— |
29 |
— |
29 |
| New Jersey |
— |
8 |
— |
8 |
| Pennsylvania |
25 |
— |
25 |
— |
| Delaware |
— |
4 |
— |
4 |
| Maryland |
6 |
5 |
6 |
5 |
| Virginia |
25 |
— |
25 |
— |
| North Carolina |
15 |
— |
15 |
— |
| South Carolina |
11 |
— |
11 |
— |
| Georgia |
8 |
— |
8 |
— |
| Kentucky |
12 |
— |
12 |
— |
| Tennessee |
8 |
— |
8 |
— |
| Ohio |
7 |
— |
7 |
— |
| Louisiana |
3 |
— |
3 |
— |
| Totals |
128 |
89 |
131 |
86 |
RECAPITULATION OF ELECTORAL VOTES.
| For President of the United States. |
| James Madison, of Virginia, |
128 |
| De Witt Clinton, of New York, |
89 |
|
217 |
| For Vice President of the United States. |
| Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, 131 |
| Jared Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, |
86 |
|
217 |
The President of the Senate, in pursuance of
the joint resolutions of the two Houses, then
announced the state of the votes to both Houses
of Congress, and declared "That James Madison,
of the State of Virginia, was duly elected
President of the United States, for four years,
to commence on the fourth day of March next;
and that Elbridge Gerry was duly elected
Vice President of the United States, for the
like term of four years, to commence on the
said fourth day of March next."
The two Houses then separated, and the Senate
returned to their Chamber.
A message from the Senate informed the
House that the Senate have appointed a committee,
on their part, to join such committee as
this House may appoint on their part, to wait
upon the President of the United States, and
to inform him of his re-election, for four years,
to commence on the fourth day of March next.
Regulation of Seamen.
The House resumed the consideration of the
bill excluding foreign seamen from the service
of the United States.
Mr. Pitkin's motion to strike out the first
section of the bill, for the purpose of inserting
a proposed amendment, being still under consideration,
considerable discussion took place
on it, but it was eventually withdrawn to give
way to the following motion.
Mr. Ridgely moved to strike out of the first
section all the words in brackets, as follows:
Sec. 1. Be it enacted, &c., That from and after the
termination, by a treaty of peace, of the war in
which the United States are now engaged with Great
Britain, it shall not be lawful to employ as seamen,
or otherwise, on board of any public vessel of the
United States, or of any vessel owned by citizens of
the United States, or sailing under their flag, any
person or persons, except natural born citizens of the
United States, or citizens of the United States at the
time of such treaty being made and concluded, [or
persons who, being resident within the United States
at the time of such treaty, and having previously declared,
agreeably to existing laws, their intention to
become citizens of the United States, shall be admitted
as such within five years thereafter in the manner
prescribed by law.]
After some conversation, the motion was negatived
by yeas and nays—for it 40, against it 80.
Encouragement for Privateering—Bounty for
Prisoners.
Mr. Bassett, from the Committee on the
Naval Establishment, made a report relative to
the expediency of affording greater encouragement
to privateering. The report is as follows:—
That, in relation to the first inquiry, they find
that, by the British statutes of the 13th and 27th of
George the Second, the whole prize of each and
every public armed vessel is given to the officers and
crews making the capture; and they find this principle
published by British proclamation, in relation
to the present war with the United States. The
laws of the United States, vol. 3, page 360, direct
that, if a capture be made by an American public
armed vessel, of equal or superior force, the capturing
vessel shall have the whole; in all other cases of
capture, one-half is distributed to the officers, and the
other half is paid to the Commissioners of the Navy
Pension Fund, pledged, first, for the payment of pensions,
and the surplus to be disbursed for the comfort
and benefit of seamen. This fund for Navy pensions
amounts to something more than two hundred
thousand dollars, yielding an annual interest of fifteen
thousand dollars; and the amount of pensions is from
seven to eight thousand dollars; leaving a yearly
balance of seventeen thousand dollars in favor of the
fund, and this without the addition of the prizes
made this war, which are known to exceed one hundred
thousand dollars, and will probably amount to
two hundred thousand dollars, so as to double the
fund; while only four persons have been added to
the list by the war, to receive twenty-one dollars.
From the above it appears, that, from the old pension
list, the amount of pensions is little more than
three per centum on the amount of prizes. Were
five per cent. from the future prizes, to be added to
this fund, on past experience it would promise an
adequate sum for the payment of pensions. Your
committee, however, concluded that it would not do
to rely conclusively on past experience, and, on the
ground of certainty, deemed it best for the fund to
remain as established for another year, when more
experience would give more confidence to the decision.
As this report is intended to bring the subject under
the view of the House, with the hope that it will not
be lost sight of at the next session, it will be proper
here to add, that, with some of the committee, the
idea was entertained that ten per cent. should be
withheld from distribution, viz.: five per cent. for the
pension, and five for the navy hospital fund; in
which not only the imbecility of decrepitude, but the
imbecility of infancy should always find an asylum.
On the other branch of the inquiry, your committee
give their fullest attestation to the utility and importance
of privateers. If, at other times and in other
countries, the effect of individual exertion has been
distrusted, the unexampled gallantry of our citizens,
in that way, since the declaration of war, assures us
that, with Americans, even the individual arm can
make an efficient impression on the foe. The mode,
however, of giving encouragement, they found not
free from difficulty. As least liable to objection, they
recommend that a bounty be paid for every prisoner
brought in; and, that this proposition may be regularly
before the House, they report a bill.
Mr. Bassett, from the Naval Committee, then
reported a bill allowing a bounty to privateers.
[Allowing a bounty of —— dollars for each
person they bring in.] Twice read and committed.
Additional General Officers.
On motion of Mr. Williams, the House resolved
itself into a Committee of the Whole on
the bill authorizing the appointment of additional
general officers in the Army of the United
States.
[The bill provides for the appointment of ——
additional Major Generals, and —— Brigadier
Generals.]
The following letters from the Secretary of
War were read:
Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, December 23, 1812.
Sir: Before I reply to your question, "how many
major generals and brigadiers are necessary for an
army of thirty-five thousand men?" it may not be
amiss to state what is believed to have been the proportion
of officers of these grades in the Revolutionary
army, and what is understood to be the proportion,
at this time, in European armies.
In the first army of the Revolution, raised in 1775,
we had a commander-in-chief, four major generals,
and eight brigadiers. In 1776, five brigadiers were
promoted to the rank of major generals, and twenty-three
brigadiers appointed. In 1777, six brigadiers
were promoted to the rank of major generals, and
three major generals and eighteen brigadiers appointed.
The loss of papers in the War Office, by fire, in
1800, renders it impossible to say, with precision,
at what particular periods many of these general officers
left the service; but it is within my recollection
that, on the 28th of June, 1778, fourteen major generals,
and sixteen brigadiers, were actually in service
of the United States. Yet, by referring to the official
letters of General Washington, in 1778 and 1779,
it will be seen that a further increase of general officers
was often and warmly recommended.
The main army, under the immediate command of
General Washington, it is believed, never amounted
to thirty-five thousand men, and it is by no means
certain that this number was ever in service at one
and the same time, in the whole of what was
designated "the continental army." Yet, at no period,
between the first of May, 1777, and the close of the
war, had we less than thirty general officers in service.
It was deemed necessary, in the Revolution, and it
is understood to be the general practice in Europe, at
this time, to have at least one brigadier general for
every two thousand men, and one major general for
every four thousand.
In this country we have never had a grade between
the commander-in-chief and that of major general;
hence it was found necessary, in the "continental
army," to give to the senior major general the command
of the right wing, and to the next in rank,
that of the left, which, from the limited number of
general officers, often left a division to a brigadier, a
brigade to a colonel, and a regiment to a subordinate
field officer; but, in Europe, this difficulty is obviated
by the appointment of general officers of higher
grades.
From the best information I have been able to obtain
on this subject, I have no hesitation in saying
that eight major generals, and sixteen brigadiers, to
command the divisions and brigades of an army of
thirty-five thousand men, is the lowest estimate
which the uniform practice of France, Russia, and
England, will warrant, and that this is much below
the proportion of officers of these grades actually employed
in the army of the Revolution.
As you have not required my opinion whether it
be necessary to have a higher grade than that of
major general, I have not deemed it proper to touch
this subject, and have confined myself to the number
of major generals and brigadiers deemed necessary
to command the divisions and brigades of an army of
thirty-five thousand men. It may not, however, be
improper to remark that, if it is intended to have no
higher grade than that of major general, their number
should be increased to eleven; so as to give one
for the chief command, one for each wing, and one
for each division of four thousand men.
I am, sir, very respectfully, yours, &c.
T. H. CUSHING, Adj't Gen.
The Hon. Secretary of War.
Sir: In reply to the letter you did me the honor
to write to me, on the 5th instant, by direction of
the Committee on Military Affairs, I respectfully submit
the following opinions:
1st. That an increased number of general officers
is essential to the public service. The number of
regiments provided for by law, is, two of light dragoons,
three of heavy artillery, one of light artillery,
one of riflemen, and forty-five of infantry, making,
together, fifty-two regiments.
The simplest organization is ever the best. Hence
it is, that, as a regiment consists of two battalions, so
a brigade should consist of two regiments, and a division
of two brigades.
This sphere of command will be found in practice,
sufficiently large. The management of two thousand
men in the field, will be ample duty for a brigadier,
and the direction of double that number will give
full occupation to a major general. To enlarge the
sphere of command in either grade would not be a
mean of best promoting the public good.
Taking these ideas as the basis of the rule, and
taking for granted, also, that our ranks are filled,
the present establishment would require twenty-five
brigadiers and twelve major generals. But the latter
admission requires qualification, and, under existing
circumstances, it may be sufficient that the higher
staff should consist of eight major generals, and sixteen
brigadiers.
The general argument, on this head, might be fortified
by our own practice during the war of the Revolution,
and by that of European nations at all times.
Believing, however, that this view of the subject has
been already taken by the adjutant general, in a late
communication to you, I forbear to do more than
suggest it.
2. The recruiting service would be much promoted,
were the bounty in land commutable into
money, at the option of the soldier, and at the end
of his service. This modification would be addressed
to both descriptions of men—those who would prefer
money, and such as would prefer land.
I need hardly remark that bounties, at the close
of service, have many advantages over those given
before service begins. The former tie men down to
their duty; the latter furnish, if not the motive, at
least the means of debauch and desertion.
Another, and a public reason, for the preference,
may be found in the greater convenience with which
money may be paid at the end, than at the commencement
of a war.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, &c.
JOHN ARMSTRONG.
Hon. D. R. Williams,
Chairman Com. on Military Affairs.
The bill authorizing the appointment of additional
general officers in the Army of the United
States, was then read a third time, and
passed by yeas and nays: for the bill 95, against
it 30.
Suspension of Non-Importation.
Mr. Cheves, from the Committee of Ways
and Means, made the following report:—
The Committee of Ways and Means report: That
they have deemed it to be their duty, that the public
service may not suffer and that the public credit may
be duly supported, to look beyond the ways and
means of the present year, and to take into consideration
the revenue which may be wanted for the
year 1814. That an estimate of the probable amount
of the revenue which will accrue under existing laws,
and be receivable within that year, has been submitted
to Congress in the Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Treasury made during the present session.
That, comparing the amount thereof with the sums
which will probably be required by a prudent regard
to the public credit, it appears to the committee indispensably
necessary to make a further provision;
that this may be done by a partial suspension of the
non-importation acts, which will not greatly lessen
their injurious effects upon the enemy, by an additional
duty on foreign tonnage, and by the imposition
of internal taxes and duties: That, in their
opinion, all these means will be necessary to supply
the revenue which will be wanted: That it is impracticable,
during the present session, consistently
with a due attention to the other business of the nation,
to enact the laws necessary to embrace the last-mentioned
object; but that this may be done without
difficulty and without a delay which will be injurious
either to the public credit or the public service, by
an earlier meeting of Congress than the constitutional
period, which it will be the duty of Congress, or the
Executive branch of the Government, to fix at such
time as shall be deemed most proper and expedient:
That it is, however, necessary that the suspension of
the non-importation acts which is contemplated
should be enacted at the present session of Congress:
and for this purpose and the imposition of additional
duties on foreign tonnage, they beg leave to report a
bill. They also report herewith a correspondence
between the Secretary of the Treasury and this committee
on the subject of this report.
Letter from the Chairman of the Committee of Ways
and Means to the Secretary of the Treasury:
Committee-Room, Feb. 3, 1813.
Sir: I am directed by the Committee of Ways
and Means to request from you the favor of a reply
to the following questions:
1. What, in your opinion, would be the probable
amount of revenue applicable to the service of the
year 1814, which would result from a modification or
partial repeal of the non-importation acts, such as is
suggested in your letter, of the 10th of June, 1812,
addressed to the Committee of Ways and Means?
2. Is the modification suggested by that letter the
best in your opinion that can be devised to obtain a
given revenue, with the least possible diminution of
the effects of the non-importation acts? If not, be
pleased to suggest such alterations and improvements
as occur to your mind.
3. Are there, in your opinion, any further legal
provisions necessary, or will any be expedient, more
effectually to enforce the non-importation acts, or to
insure the more effectual collection of the revenue?
4. Would it, in your opinion, be advisable to increase
the duty on foreign tonnage? If it would, to
what amount? and what would be the probable
addition to the revenue applicable to the year 1814
by such increase? I am, &c.,
LANGDON CHEVES.
Hon. Albert Gallatin, &c.
Answer of the Secretary.
Treasury Department, Feb. 9, 1813.
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following answer
to the questions proposed in your letter of the
3d instant:
1. It is believed from the reasons stated in my letter
of the 10th June last to the Committee of Ways
and Means, that the amount of revenue applicable to
the service of the year 1814, which would result from
a modification of the non-importation acts suggested
in the said letter, may be estimated at about five
million of dollars, provided that modification takes
place during the present session of Congress.
2. No better modification, for the purposes therein
intended, has suggested itself than that proposed in
the letter aforesaid. But it would seem requisite, for
the same object, that no drawback should be allowed
on the re-exportation of the merchandise which may
be thus imported.
3. The most important legal provision which appears
necessary to enforce the non-importation acts,
is a positive prohibition of a restoration by order of
court of merchandise, the importation of which is
prohibited by law. It is also believed that it will be
necessary to order all the cargoes of salt, particularly
from Lisbon, to be discharged under the inspection
of proper officers; and it appears reasonable
that the expense should be defrayed by the importers.
4. It appears, in every point of view, highly desirable,
that the duty on foreign tonnage should be
increased. A duty of ten dollars per ton does not
seem greater than what is required for the protection
of American vessels. But I cannot form any correct
estimate of the probable addition resulting to
the revenue from such increase. Much would depend
on the suppression of the trade carried on by American
vessels with enemies' licenses.
With respect to the necessity of providing an additional
revenue for the year 1814, I beg leave to
refer to the statements made and opinions expressed,
when I had the honor several weeks ago to wait on
the Committee of Ways and Means. And I beg
leave to add that this necessity has been considerably
increased by the subsequent expenditures authorized
by law; amongst which must be particularly mentioned
the act for the increase of the navy, and that for
raising twenty thousand men for one year. Indeed,
considering the general rate of expenditure resulting
from the war measures which have been adopted, I
am of opinion it will be necessary to recur both to a
modification or repeal of the non-importation acts
and to the proposed internal taxes, in order to provide
a revenue commensurate with those expenses.
When an additional revenue of five millions was believed
sufficient, that opinion was predicated on the
supposition made by the committee, that annual loans
of only ten or twelve millions of dollars would be
wanted. With a revenue of twelve millions of dollars
for this year, it is ascertained that a loan of at
least sixteen millions is necessary.
I have the honor to be, &c.,
ALBERT GALLATIN.
Hon. Langdon Cheves, Chairman, &c.
The report and documents were read.
Mr. Cheves then introduced the bill above
mentioned, which was read the first time, and
ordered to be read a second time by a vote of
44 to 36.
Mr. Milnor presented a memorial of the
Pennsylvania Society for promoting the Abolition
of Slavery, complaining that American
vessels, navigated by American citizens, are engaged
in the African slave trade, under the
flags of foreign nations, and praying that Congress
will take this subject into consideration,
and pass such laws as will remedy the evil of
which they complain.—Referred to a select
committee; and Mr. Milnor, Mr. Robertson,
Mr. Grosvenor, Mr. Wheaton, and Mr. Earle,
were appointed the committee.
Naturalization Laws.
On motion of Mr. Lacock, the House resolved
itself into a Committee of the Whole,
on the bill to amend the naturalization laws
of the United States; which, having been
amended in committee, was reported to the
House.
Mr. Lacock moved to amend the bill by extending
the naturalization of aliens to all those
"who have heretofore or may within nine
months hereafter, declare their intention agreeably
to law to become citizens of the United
States," and declaring that they may be admitted
as such.
This motion was negatived.—For the amendment
45, against it 48.
On the question of concurrence with the
committee in striking out the second section of
the bill, which deprives of his right to the
privileges of citizenship any citizen who shall
depart from and remain without the limits of
the United States for a term of two years—the
yeas and nays were, for striking out the section
71, against it 43.
The bill having been thus amended, was ordered
to be engrossed for a third reading.
The engrossed bill supplementary to the
several acts on the subject of a uniform rule
of naturalization, was read a third time.
Mr. Bacon opposed its passage on the ground
of the impolicy of encouraging the emigration
of alien enemies during the existence of war;
and concluded a short speech against the bill by
moving its commitment to a Committee of the
Whole.
Mr. Grundy supported the motion on the
ground of defects in the detail of the bill,
which he wished to amend.
The motion for recommitment was carried
by a large majority, and the bill made the order
of the day for Monday.
War Taxes.
Mr. Little introduced the following resolution,
with some remarks in favor of the policy
of the non-importation act, to which he avowed
himself to be very friendly, and to the suspension
of which he was opposed:
"Resolved, That the Committee of Ways and
Means be, and hereby are, instructed to report to this
House a bill or bills laying taxes for the support of
the War."
The question of considering of this resolution
was decided in the affirmative, by yeas and
nays—for consideration 66, against it 38.
The resolution being thus presented to the
House for its adoption—
A desultory debate of two hours took place
on it, in the course of which a motion was
made by Mr. Grundy to lay the resolution on
the table, and negatived—60 to 45.
The following was the course of the debate,
which was of too irregular a nature to be reported
entire:
Mr. Grundy opposed the motion, because it
had already been declared impracticable, by the
Committee of Ways and Means, to act properly
on the subject at the present session.
Mr. Little supported it, on the ground of
his opposition to a suspension of the non-importation
act, a measure which he reprobated
as injurious to the manufactures of our country,
and weakening our measures against Great
Britain, of which he considered the non-importation
act to be as powerful as any.
Mr. Stow advocated the motion, because he
wished the House to redeem the pledge given
at the last session, that taxes would be laid at
this, and to observe something like consistency
in their proceedings.
Mr. Weight was also warmly in favor of the
measure, and rather imputed blame to the Committee
of Ways and Means for not having before
acted on this subject, without waiting for
instructions from the House.
Mr. Bibb replied to the remarks which had
been made in favor of the resolution. At the
last session it was presumed that it would be
necessary to lay taxes at this session; but the
revenue accruing in the intermediate time had
swelled so far beyond its anticipated amount as
to render it unnecessary to levy taxes for the
service of the ensuing year.
Mr. Wright again spoke in favor of the motion.
Mr. Richardson was decidedly in favor of a
repeal or modification of the non-importation
act, though he believed both that measure and
the imposition of taxes would be necessary to
supply the revenue.
Mr. McKim was in favor of the motion, because
he was opposed to the suspension or
weakening of the non-importation act.
Mr. Cheves spoke at length in defence of the
Committee of Ways and Means, and in demonstration
of the impracticability of acting on the
subject properly at the present session. Sitting
day and night, and passing by all other business,
a proper system of taxation could not be
digested and put into the form of law before
the end of the session. Two only out of fourteen
of the bills it would be necessary to pass
to carry the system proposed at the last session
into effect, would require the whole of the
present session to perfect them. The passage
of a system of taxation, besides, would not obviate
the necessity of the passage of the law
suspending partially the non-importation act.
It would require both. The taxes, he agreed,
must be laid, but could not at the present session.
Mr. Wright replied.
Mr. Stow again spoke. He would, if all the
tax bills could not be passed, at least pass one,
and break the charm which seemed to withhold
the House from touching the subject.
Mr. Archer moved to strike out the whole
of the resolution, for the purpose of inserting
an instruction to the Committee of Ways and
Means to report a bill or bills, pursuant to the
report of the Committee of Ways and Means on
this subject, which passed the House on the 4th
day of March, 1812.
This modification of the motion was accepted
by Mr. Little.
Mr. Cheves then withdrew his objection to
the motion, as it contained a definite instruction,
and he felt a delicacy as a member of the
Committee of Ways and Means in opposing it,
though he was convinced it would be impracticable
to pass the bills at the present session.
Mr. Roberts opposed the motion, and expressed
his regret that the discussion, which
was fixed for to-morrow, should be forestalled
by this resolution.
Mr. Johnson warmly opposed the motion, as
going to cast censure on a committee which had
labored day and night in its vocation, and requiring
them to originate measures which they
had already declared it impracticable to act on
at the present session, &c.
Mr. Widgery also spoke against the motion,
decidedly.
The question on the adoption of the resolution
as modified by Mr. Archer, was decided
in the negative—yeas 47, nays 69.
Encouragement to Privateering.
On motion of Mr. Little, the House resolved
itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the
bill remitting the claim of the United States to
certain goods, wares, &c., captured by the private
armed vessels of the United States.
Mr. McKim, under the belief that the bill as
it now stands does not place privateers on a
better footing than before, and does not answer
the object intended by the resolution which produced
it, proposed the following substitute by
way of amendment:
"That all right and claim of the United States to
British property, which may have been captured by
American privateers, arising from forfeiture under
any provision of the act entitled 'An act to prohibit
commercial intercourse between the United States and
Great Britain and France and their dependencies,
and for other purposes,' and an act entitled 'An act
concerning the commercial intercourse between Great
Britain and France and their dependencies, and for
other purposes,' and an act supplementary to the last
mentioned act, be, and the same is hereby relinquished
for the benefit of the owners, officers, and crews of
the privateers respectively that may have captured
the same."
This amendment produced some discussion, in
which Messrs. McKim and Wright advocated
the motion, and Messrs. Roberts and Fisk opposed
it; when the question was taken and lost,
without a division.
Mr. Roberts moved to amend the bill, so as
to include captures made of goods which were
shipped anterior to as well as since the declaration
of war was known in England. This
amendment was adopted, 46 to 32.
The committee then rose, reported the bill to
the House, as amended; the amendments were
concurred in, and the bill ordered to be engrossed
and read a third time to-morrow, 47 to 39.
Another member, to wit, from New Hampshire,
George Sullivan, appeared, and took
his seat.
Encouragement of Private Armed Privateering.
The engrossed bill to release the claims of the
United States on certain goods, wares, and merchandise,
captured by private armed vessels,
was read a third time, and debated.
The bill was passed by the vote, by yeas and
nays—for the bill 52, against it 38:
The following Message was received from the
President of the United States:
To the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States:
I lay before Congress a letter, with accompanying
documents, from Captain Bainbridge, now commanding
the United States frigate "the Constitution," reporting
his capture and destruction of the British
frigate "the Java." The circumstances and the
issue of this combat afford another example of the
professional skill and heroic spirit which prevail in
our naval service. The signal display of both by
Captain Bainbridge, his officers, and crew, command
the highest praise.
This being a second instance in which the condition
of the captured ship, by rendering it impossible
to get her into port, has barred a contemplated reward
of successful valor, I recommend to the consideration
of Congress the equity and propriety of a general
provision, allowing, in such cases, both past and
future, a fair proportion of the value which would
accrue to the captors on the safe arrival and sale of
the prize.
Feb. 22, 1813.
JAMES MADISON.
St. Salvador, January 3d, 1813.
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that, on the
29th ultimo, at 2 P. M., in south latitude 13° 6´, and
west longitude 38°, about ten leagues distant from
the coast of Brazil, I fell in with, and captured, His
Britannic Majesty's frigate Java, of 49 guns, and upwards
of four hundred men, commanded by Captain
Lambert, a very distinguished officer. The action
lasted one hour and fifty-five minutes, in which time
the enemy was completely dismasted, not having a
spar of any kind standing. The loss on board the
Constitution was nine killed and twenty-five wounded,
as per enclosed list. The enemy had sixty killed
and one hundred and one wounded, certainly; (among
the latter, Captain Lambert, mortally;) but by the
enclosed letter, written on board this ship, by one of
the officers of the Java, and accidentally found, it is
evident that the enemy's wounded must have been
much greater than as above stated, and who must
have died of their wounds previously to their being
removed. The letter states sixty killed and one
hundred and seventy wounded.
For further details of the action, I beg leave to
refer you to the enclosed extracts from my journal.
The Java had, in addition to her own crew, upwards
of one hundred supernumerary officers and seamen,
to join the British ships of war in the East Indies;
also, Lieutenant General Hislop, appointed to the
command of Bombay, Major Walker, and Captain
Wood, of his staff, and Captain Marshall, master and
commander in the British navy, going to the East
Indies to take command of a sloop of war there.
Should I attempt to do justice, by representation,
to the great and good conduct of all my officers and
crew, during the action, I should fail in the attempt;
therefore, suffice it to say, that the whole of their
conduct was such as to merit my highest encomiums.
I beg leave to recommend the officers particularly to
the notice of Government, and also the unfortunate
seamen who were wounded, and the families of those
brave men who fell in the action.
The great distance from our own coast, and the
perfect wreck we made of the enemy's frigate, forbade
every idea of attempting to take her to the United
States. I had, therefore, no alternative but burning
her, which I did on the 31st ultimo, after receiving
all the prisoners and their baggage, which was very
tedious work, only having one boat left out of eight,
and not one boat left on board the Java.
On blowing up the frigate Java, I proceeded to
this place, where I have landed all the prisoners, on
their parole, to return to England, and there remain
until regularly exchanged, and not to serve in their
professional capacities, in any place, or in any manner
whatever, against the United States of America, until
said exchange is effected. I have the honor to be, &c.
WILLIAM BAINBRIDGE.
Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary Navy.
The Frigate Constitution.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of
the Whole on the bill, reported by the Naval
Committee this morning, to compensate the
officers and crew of the United States frigate
Constitution for the destruction of the British
frigates Guerriere and Java. [This bill provides
that —— dollars shall be paid out of the
Treasury to Captain Hull and the officers and
crews of the Constitution frigate, and a like
sum to Captain Bainbridge and his crew, for
their two gallant achievements; and appropriates
a sum of —— dollars therefor.]
Mr. Bassett moved to fill the first blank with
fifty thousand dollars.
After some conversation between Messrs.
Bassett, Ely, Stow, and Milnor, on the propriety
of making a general instead of a special
provision on this head, as recommended by the
President, the question on filling the first
blank with fifty thousand dollars was carried in
the affirmative, ayes 60.
The second blank was then filled with one
hundred thousand dollars.
The committee rose and reported the bill;
and the amendments were concurred in.
The bill was then ordered to be engrossed,
and read a third time.
The Frigate Constitution.
The bill making compensation to the officers
and crew of the frigate Constitution for the destruction
of the British frigates Guerriere and
Java, was read a third time and passed, by yeas
and nays. For the bill 61, against the bill 39.
Order in Council.
The following Message was received from the
President of the United States:
To the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States:
I lay before Congress copies of a proclamation of
the British Lieutenant Governor of the island of
Bermuda, which has appeared under circumstances
leaving no doubt of its authenticity. It recites a
British Order in Council of the 26th of October last,
providing for the supply of the British West Indies
and other colonial possessions, by a trade under
special licenses; and is accompanied by a circular
instruction to the Colonial Governors, which confines
licensed importations from ports of the United States,
to the ports of the Eastern States exclusively.
The Government of Great Britain had already
introduced into commerce during war, a system,
which, at once violating the rights of other nations,
and resting on a mass of forgery and perjury unknown
to other times, was making an unfortunate
progress in undermining those principles of morality
and religion which are the best foundation of national
happiness.
The policy now proclaimed to the world, introduces
into her modes of warfare a system equally distinguished
by the deformity of its features, and the depravity
of its character; having for its object to
dissolve the ties of allegiance and the sentiments of
loyalty in the adversary nation, and to seduce and
separate its component parts, the one from the other.
The general tendency of these demoralizing and
disorganizing contrivances will be reprobated by the
civilized and Christian world; and the insulting attempt
on the virtue, the honor, the patriotism, and
the fidelity of our brethren of the Eastern States,
will not fail to call forth all their indignation and resentment,
and to attach more and more all the States
to that happy Union and Constitution, against which
such insidious and malignant artifices are directed.
The better to guard, nevertheless, against the effect
of individual cupidity and treachery, and to turn the
corrupt projects of the enemy against himself, I recommend
to the consideration of Congress the expediency
of an effectual prohibition of any trade whatever,
by citizens or inhabitants of the United States,
under special licenses, whether relating to persons or
ports; and, in aid thereof, a prohibition of all exportation
from the United States in foreign bottoms—few
of which are actually employed—whilst multiplying
counterfeits of their flags and papers are
covering and encouraging the navigation of the
enemy.
JAMES MADISON.
February 24, 1813.
The Message and accompanying documents
were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Extra Session.
The House went into Committee of the Whole
on the bill to alter the time of the next meeting
of Congress—a motion being under consideration
to fix on the fourth Monday in October.
Mr. Grundy spoke in reply to some observations
of Mr. Johnson (on yesterday) in favor of
that day. Mr. G. was decidedly in favor of
meeting in May; he believed it necessary to the
support of public credit that the House should
meet in May. Had not the Committee of Ways
and Means first taught him that an early session
was necessary with that view, if revenue should
not, as it would not, be provided at this session,
he should not have been found advocating an
extra session. The House had been told by their
financial committee, that it was indispensably
necessary forthwith to provide a revenue; and
that a paper system, without a foundation of
permanent revenue, would involve the nation
in disgrace or irretrievable ruin. Mr. G. quoted
various reports of the Committee of Ways and
Means to show that they had made such statements.
With these facts staring him in the face,
how could he do otherwise than urge an early
session? If it was indispensably necessary a
day or two ago to provide a revenue, what had
since occurred obviating that necessity? Nothing.
War had been declared, and it was the
duty of those who declared it to provide the
ways and means of carrying it on. Mr. G. protested
against the idea which had been advanced
of giving enormous interest for loans, and
against accumulating a large debt, almost without
the knowledge of the people on whom it
would be saddled, and expressed his determination,
as far as lay in his power, to go on and
provide the ways and means.
Power of Retaliation.
The bill giving to the President of the United
States the power of retaliation in certain cases
therein mentioned, was read a third time.
A motion was made by Mr. Quincy to adjourn—lost,
56 to 16.
The bill was then passed by the following
vote:
Yeas.—Willis Alston, jr., William Anderson, Stevenson
Archer, David Bard, William Barnett, Burwell
Bassett, William W. Bibb, William Blackledge,
William Butler, John C. Calhoun, Francis Carr,
Langdon Cheves, James Cochran, John Clopton,
Richard Cutts, John Dawson, Joseph Desha, Samuel
Dinsmoor, Elias Earle, Meshack Franklin, Thomas
Gholson, Peterson Goodwyn, Isaiah L. Green, Felix
Grundy, Bolling Hall, Obed Hall, John A. Harper,
John M. Hyneman, Richard M. Johnson, William
Kennedy, William R. King, Peter Little, William
Lowndes, Thomas Moor, William McCoy, Samuel L.
Mitchill, James Morgan, Jeremiah Morrow, Hugh
Nelson, Thomas Newton, Stephen Ormsby, Israel
Pickens, William Piper, James Pleasants, jr., John
Rhea, John Roane, Jonathan Roberts, Thomas B.
Robertson, Adam Seybert, Samuel Shaw, George
Smith, John Taliaferro, Charles Turner, jr., Robert
Whitehill, David R. Williams, and Robert Wright.
Nays.—Abijah Bigelow, Elijah Brigham, Epaphroditus
Champion, Martin Chittenden, James Emott,
Asa Fitch, Thomas P. Grosvenor, Lyman Law, Jos.
Lewis, jr., Jonathan O. Mosely, Elisha R. Potter,
Josiah Quincy, William Reed, William Rodman,
Daniel Sheffey, Richard Stanford, and Leonard
White.[35]
Foreign Licenses.
An engrossed bill to prohibit the use of licenses
or passes, issued under the authority of
any foreign Government, was read the third
time.
And on the question, "Shall this bill pass?"
it passed in the affirmative—yeas 59, nays 32.
Relations with France.
Mr. Goldsborough, after observing on the
propriety of the House having all the information
on foreign affairs which was accessible;
and remarking, also, that they were much in
the dark in respect to our relations with
France, moved the following resolution:
Resolved, That the President of the United States
be requested to cause to be laid before this House the
French decree, purporting to be a repeal of the
Berlin decrees, referred to in his Message of the 4th
of November last; together with such information
as he may possess concerning the time and manner of
promulgating the same; and, also, any correspondence
or information touching the relations of the
United States with France, in the office of the Department
of State, not heretofore communicated,
which, in the opinion of the President, it is not
incompatible with the public interest to communicate.
And on the question to agree to the same, it
passed in the affirmative—yeas 102, nays 4.
Mr. Goldsborough and Mr. Kennedy were
appointed a committee to present the said resolution
to the President.
On motion, the House adjourned.
Non-Exportations in Foreign Bottoms.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee
of the Whole, on the bill prohibiting the
exportation of certain articles therein specified,
in foreign vessels.
Mr. Clay spoke at considerable length in favor
of this bill, as forming a complete system,
connected with one which passed the House the
other day, prohibiting the use of foreign licenses
on board vessels of the United States, suited to
the present relations of the United States, and
to the proper action on the enemy.
Mr. Robertson spoke as follows: Mr. Chairman,
I do not often trespass on the patience of
the House, but I request their attention whilst
I state a few of the reasons which compel me
to oppose the bill now under consideration.
I am the more disposed to do this, because
my opposition arises from considerations in a
great measure peculiar to myself, and because I
differ with gentlemen in the correctness of
whose opinions I usually concur. Without,
then, considering the principles it involves, I
reject this bill, because it is not in fact what it
professes to be; it is not a restrictive measure;
its provisions may operate prejudicially on ourselves,
but cannot affect the enemy. In one of
two general systems, I might go along with
gentlemen. Let us have non-importation, non-intercourse,
and embargo—thus the restrictive
system may have its full bearing; let us refuse
to purchase manufactures of the British; let us
refuse to furnish them with provisions, then we
may be consoled for the privations which we
ourselves must experience, by reflecting on the
great evils which we inflict on the enemy.
I can but smile at the patriotism of honorable
gentlemen, who affect to starve the English by
refusing to buy their manufactures, whilst they
inundate the army, the navy, the colonies of
that nation, with a profusion of all the necessaries
and luxuries of life—they will starve a
few miserable manufacturers, whilst they industriously
feed their armed men. With the
most glaring and barefaced inconsistency, they
object to admitting into our markets any the
minutest article of British manufacture, that the
inhabitants may perish for the want of means
to purchase bread; whilst bread is exported
with a hope that it should, indeed a perfect certainty
that it will be consumed by this same
people. I cannot concur in these half-way
measures. I voted for a repeal of the non-importation
act. I hoped that commerce, sufficiently
hazardous and fettered by the present
state of the world, would cease to be shackled
by ourselves. I hoped, that now the sword was
drawn, we should carry on war in the usual
and accustomed manner—that the Government
would be aided by the receipt of revenue arising
from duties and imposts—that the people
would be thus partially relieved from taxes—that
the nation would be strengthened and inspired
by an accession of wealth, now more
than ever necessary.
But whatever, sir, might be my opinion of
this bill, viewed as a restrictive measure; for
other considerations it meets with my decided
disapprobation. We prohibit neutrals from
clearing out from our ports with the productions
of our country, whilst our own vessels are
left free to do so. We deny to them that commerce,
which as a neutral we formerly enjoyed.
Heretofore we complained of the injustice
of belligerents, and now that we are engaged
in war, and that too for neutral rights and free
trade, we are about to practise similar abuses.
Aware that some apology would be deemed
necessary, we call it a municipal regulation;
it may be so—and perhaps we are borne out by
strict law; but we attempt a justification on
the ground of cutting off our enemy from supplies,
of which he stands in need, and which,
notwithstanding his perilous situation, he dares
to hope to receive through a train of insolent
artifices, derogatory to the integrity of the
Union, and disgraceful to those with whom
they shall prevail.
Now, sir, if the measure proposed could in
any way counteract his views—if it went the
full length of preventing him from procuring
the various articles which his necessities require,
I confess it would be inflicting a punishment,
which not only the laws of war would
authorize, but which the unprecedented baseness
of his late attempt most loudly calls for;
but no such effect will be produced. For what
is there to prevent our vessels from transporting
the products of the United States to Amelia,
Pensacola, St. Bartholomews, there to be deposited,
and thence carried in neutral or British
bottoms to Jamaica, the Bahamas, or wheresoever
else they may be wanted? And again, if,
notwithstanding the hostile attitude in which
we stand in relation to each other England is
compelled to encourage a trade by license, will
not her necessities equally induce her to connive
at exportation? Can it be doubted, that
her armed vessels would not be instructed to
allow our provisions to pass unmolested, when,
by pursuing a contrary conduct, she would be
starving her own colonies? And is it not clear
that a traffic, which the war prevents from
being direct, would continue to be carried on,
as it is at present, through intermediate ports?
Mr. Chairman, the present scheme seems to
me to be merely calculated to produce vexation
and embarrassment at home; to operate with
peculiar hardship on neutral rights, without inflicting
on the enemy any injury commensurate
with these evils. Sir, if gentlemen wish to reap
the full effect of a restrictive system, that system
must be rigid and complete. Let our ports
be sealed; let there be neither egress nor ingress;
let us neither buy nor sell, and let us
prepare to bear the positive burdens of active
war. No section of our widely-extended Union
could then complain of peculiar oppression.
The plan would present itself to us, recommended,
at least, by the generality of its operation;
by the impartiality of its character. But, if
this cannot be done, if the shipping interests of
some of the States, and the manufacturing establishments
of others, must be encouraged, and
if others still must sell their wheat and flour,
let us pursue the opposite course; let us sweep
restrictive measures by the board; thus should
we enjoy all the advantages which would result
to the Government from imposts, all the benefits
that would accrue to individuals from exports.
In either of these modes of proceeding
I might concur; but I cannot consent to the
plan now submitted, nor acquiesce in the wisdom
or policy of our existing regulations. They
are not promotive of the general welfare, but,
on the contrary, are ruinous to the interests of
that portion of the Union whose interest it is
peculiarly my duty to protect. Yet, I cannot
help observing that, however under their oppressive
operation commerce languishes, and
Southern agriculture is completely annihilated,
they are tolerated by the Eastern States, because
they promote their domestic manufactures,
and impoverish and embarrass the Government;
and they are advocated and supported
by the Middle States, because they consider, or
affect to consider them, as very patriotic; because
they inflict privations, which, by-the-by,
they do not feel; and, finally, because, nevertheless,
they are enabled to sell off, at excellent
prices, the productions of their farms. Thus,
sir, a feast is spread before us; but it is served
up, however splendidly and abundantly, in
shallow dishes; and, while the foxes of the
Eastern and Middle States lap up the soup with
great dexterity, the storks of the Mississippi,
Mobile, and Altamaha, look on, perhaps with
admiration, but certainly with no satisfaction
whatever. While, sir, the spleen of hostility
towards the Government is gratified, while the
manufacturing establishments of the East are
promoted, while the middle section of the Union
disposes of, at high prices, the abundant harvest
of their fields, what becomes of the commerce
of our country? What fate befalls the agriculture
of the South? Our cotton rots on the
stalk. From this proscription of foreign manufactures,
the grower of the raw material is irretrievably
ruined. Possibly he may sell an
inconsiderable portion of his crop, for contemptible
prices, to domestic manufacturers,
while he is compelled to buy, at enormous rates,
the articles which his wants require. If he
wishes to sell, he finds no competition among
purchasers. Does he find it necessary to purchase,
he suffers equally from the want of competition
among those who sell.
A debate of considerable length took place, in
which Mr. Calhoun supported the bill, though
opposed to the amendment made on motion of
Mr. Quincy in Committee of the Whole.
Mr. Grosvenor spoke as follows:
Mr. Speaker: When I had the honor to address
you, on a measure which has finally passed
this House, I stated, at some length, my reasons
for believing that the Government had no
serious intention to pass the bill now before
you. But, sir, from a furious zeal, this day manifested
in a certain quarter, to drive the measure
through this House, I fear I was mistaken.
I therefore deem it an indispensable duty, in the
name of the commercial and agricultural districts
which I represent, to enter my solemn protest
against this new project of the Government.
I shall not enter into any argument, to show
the impolicy, the injustice, and the danger of
such a measure, considered as a measure of non-exportation.
The task has been most ably and
successfully performed by an honorable gentleman
from South Carolina, (Mr. Lowndes;) he
has shown, that connected with the maritime
power of the enemy, and with other bills already
passed this House, this measure has all
the blasting qualities, without even the few
equivocal benefits of a broad restrictive system;
and he has demonstrated the irreparable mischiefs
which must result from such weak and
mongrel measures. His reasoning has not been
met—it cannot be refuted—I will not weaken
its effect on the House, by attempting to enforce
it.
My principal object in rising, was to examine
the grounds upon which the honorable gentleman
from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) who
last addressed you, has rested his justification
of the measure. He has assured us, that it is
not at all intended as a part of any new system;
that its object is in no respect a prohibition
of free and fair exportation. Sir, whatever
gentlemen may intend, it is too palpable
for denial, that this measure is, in truth, a restrictive
and an anti-commercial measure, and
in conjunction with the license bill already passed,
must operate (as far as such weak and unnatural
measures can operate) as a broad and
iron system of non-exportation.
But, sir, what are the intention and the objects
of the bill according to the view of that
honorable gentleman: "To avenge insult"—"to
retaliate on the enemy his attempts to destroy
us"—"to carry to his own lips his own
poisoned chalice." And where are these insults,
these injuries, these vital attempts of the
enemy to be found? Henry's celebrated mission,
after rioting for a time on the spoils of the
Treasury, has found the tomb of the Capulets.
And although its ghost seems to haunt the honorable
gentleman from South Carolina, yet sure I
am, that a thing of air would not have inspired
him with all those bitter feelings which he has
poured forth upon the enemy.
No, sir, it is the last Message of the President
which contains all this dreadful matter. In
that Message came before us an Order in Council
by the Prince Regent, and a letter from a
British Secretary, to a West India Governor.
Sir, by that order, certain West India ports
are opened to the importation of articles which
they wish to purchase, and to the exportation
of produce which they wish to sell. This is no
new practice; in every European war, the belligerent
mother country has never failed to
open some of her colonies to neutral commerce.
By this order nothing more is done, and so far
from any insult or injury to us in the body of
the order, our nation is not even named.
The honorable gentleman from South Carolina
(Mr. Lowndes) has pertinently asked, to
what extent you would carry your new principles
of honor and retaliation. The enemy
spares the commerce of the East, and destroys
that of the South; you must equalize them by
destroying the former. You cannot stop here.
If the enemy blockades the South, you must
embargo New England. If he burns Charleston
and Norfolk, you must burn New York and
Boston. In fine, any thing spared in one section
of the Union by the enemy, which he
has the power to destroy, and not spared in
another, must be destroyed by our Government,
by way of equalizing the burdens of the
war.
The gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,)
to whom I have so often alluded, was
disposed highly to compliment the people of
the Northern States. He declared his full confidence
in their fidelity, patriotism, and honor,
and he believes that they will not only spurn with
contempt the attempt to seduce them, but will
hail the present measure as just, honorable, and
wise. Sir, the patriotism of that people is undoubtedly
as warm and as disinterested as that
of any people on this globe; and if, indeed, this
were an attack on their honor, they would need
no such law as this to teach them their duty,
or to compel them to perform it. But, sir, I
do not believe that their patriotism will feel
insulted. They will hardly be satisfied by flattery
and compliment for this attack upon their
commerce. I would not be surprised if they
should answer the honorable gentleman somewhat
in this manner: "Hands off, Mr. Calhoun,
if it please you; we do not dislike your
compliments; indeed, we are pleased with the
notes of this new tune from the South. We
will do any thing in reason to oblige you; but
really, sir, to be complimented out of our commerce;
to be flattered into poverty; to be
cowed into service, is a little more than the rules
of civility demand."
It has been avowed on this floor, [by Mr.
Speaker Clay,] that this bill is only one part of
a contemplated system of rigid non-exportation.
Have gentlemen reflected on the disastrous consequences
of such a system at the present time?
The district which I have the honor to represent,
is a portion of an extensive tract of mercantile
and agricultural country, extending up
the Hudson River far into the interior of New
York. The merchants and farmers of that
country did believe, that when you appealed to
arms, your restrictive system was at rest forever.
They had a right so to believe, from the
declarations of gentlemen on this floor, and
from the unequivocal conduct of Government.
Under this belief, during the present winter
the merchants have constantly purchased produce
at high and advanced prices. In the numerous
villages scattered on either side of the
Hudson River, and over immense tracts far to
the west of it, the stores are groaning with the
productions of their soil. Sir, when the Spring
opens, they will find all their prospects blasted,
and bankruptcy staring in their faces. Through
the whole frozen interior of the North and
East, the condition of the merchants and farmers
is similar, and similar disastrous consequences
will be realized.
We are involved in war with a nation powerful
in her resources, clothed in complete
armor, and to whom, from long habit, a state of
warfare has become almost a national condition.
We need all our resources and all our energies
to save this war from a disgraceful conclusion.
What then but madness can dictate a policy
tending to dry up our resources and paralyze our
energies. Wounded by the spear of war, what
but downright political quackery could prescribe
those "restrictive" nostrums, to restore the nation
to health and vigor? Are the old chimerical
notions of starving the enemy, yet floating
in the brains of gentlemen? In despite of experience,
do they yet believe that our blessed country
alone can produce food for the world? Are
the countries of the Baltic and Caspian Seas no
longer cultivated? Has the Nile ceased to
fructify the fields of Egypt? Have Sicily and
the Barbary coasts returned to a barren state
of nature? Has France herself agreed to bury
her surplus breadstuffs in the earth? Or has
England lost that ascendency on the ocean, and
forgot all those commercial arts, by which she
was wont to procure supplies from all those
countries? Seven years of restrictions have in
vain been tried. Your enemy has laughed you
to scorn, and your own people have cursed the
policy that crushed their prosperity. There is
no doubt that, as at the time you laid the embargo,
the closing of your ports now, might
produce a temporary inconvenience to the
enemy; but the measure would finally and permanently
recoil on our merchants, and even
farmers. These men have, therefore, a deep
and vital interest in this question. Twice already
they have been sacrificed to test the efficacy
of our "restrictive energies."
Do you intend again to stretch them on the
rack, again to cover the country with sackcloth
and ashes? Is another brood of "restrictive"
harpies, more unseemly and more hungry than
their predecessors, to be let loose among them?
And is this bill a pioneer to the new swarms of
"continental" locusts?
Mr. Speaker, I shudder when I behold that
anti-commercial demon, which for seven years
has been glutted with the mangled limbs of
commerce, still hovering about this bill. The
deluded people did believe that, when "you
let slip the dogs of war," the monster had
fallen, never again to trample down their
rights, or devour the remnant of their prosperity.
They were mistaken. He has risen invigorated
from the blow; like the horse leech,
he continues to cry, "give, give!" He never
will be satisfied while the farmers of the North
and the East are prosperous and powerful, or
while the ships of an independent merchant
float safely and successfully on the ocean. Sir,
I do trust in Heaven, that the people of this
Union will not sleep forever—I do trust, that
the time is not far distant when the rulers of
this nation shall be compelled again to travel
in the paths of peace, commerce, and honor. I
do trust that this new system, fraught as it is
with new destruction, will meet an effectual
overthrow. On this floor, I have no hope of
such an event. The current of influence is
here too strong to be resisted. But if the God
of nations "doth seek our rulers, and hath
given our Senators wisdom," it must find its
grave in the other branches of the Government.
Mr. Quincy opposed the bill, and after some
remarks from Mr. Blackledge in reply to him,
the question on concurring with the Committee
of the Whole in their amendment was taken,
to wit: to strike out from the fifth line of the
first section, the words, "and every," and to
insert "wheat, flour, rice, cotton, tobacco, indigo,
tar, pitch, or turpentine, or any other
article, the growth, produce, or manufacture of
the United States:." And passed in the affirmative—yeas
69, nays 29.
Constitution and Java.
The House took up for consideration the resolution
from the Senate requesting the President
of the United States to present to Captain
William Bainbridge a gold medal, with suitable
inscriptions, and to the officers of the
frigate Constitution silver medals, in testimony
of the high sense entertained by Congress of
their gallantry and skill in achieving the capture
and destruction of the British frigate Java;
which was read three times, and passed.
Bounty to Privateers.
The House went into a Committee of the
Whole on the bill allowing a bounty to privateers;
but the committee being unable to progress
for want of a quorum, it rose and reported
the fact to the House; and the bill and
report were ordered to lie on the table, and the
House adjourned.
Navy Yards.
On motion of Mr. Reed,
Resolved, That the Secretary of the Navy be,
and he is hereby, directed to report to this
House, at the next session of Congress, a statement
of the number of Navy Yards belonging
to, and occupied for the use of the United
States; the accommodations provided in each,
with the number of officers and men attached
to each, with their rank and pay; also, the
quantity and species of timber provided in
each. Also, a statement of the expenditures
made in each yard during the years 1811 and
1812; the number of vessels required during
that time, with the species, quantity, and cost
of repairs on each vessel, and the manner in
which such repairs have been made, whether
by contract or otherwise, and the terms. Also,
the amount of timber provided under the law
making an annual appropriation of two hundred
thousand dollars, with a statement of the
contracts made under said act, and the terms
thereof: Also, the number of officers in the
naval service of the United States, their rank,
pay, and employ.
Encouragement to Privateers.
The bill allowing a bounty to privateers was
passed through a Committee of the Whole, and
ordered to lie on the table, under the impression
that it could not be acted on at the present
session.
Thanks to the Speaker.
On motion of Mr. Sawyer,
Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of
this House be presented to Henry Clay, in testimony
of their approbation of his conduct in the
discharge of the arduous duties assigned him
while in the Chair.
Whereupon, the Hon. Speaker rose and
made the following observations:
"I thank you, gentlemen, for the testimony you
have just so kindly delivered in approbation of my
conduct in the Chair. Amidst the momentous subjects
of deliberation which undoubtedly distinguish
the 12th Congress as the most memorable in the annals
of America, it has been a source of animating
consolation to me, that I have never failed to experience
the liberal support of gentlemen in all quarters
of the House. If in the moment of ardent debate,
when all have been struggling to maintain the
best interests of our beloved country as they have
appeared to us respectively, causes of irritation have
occurred, let us consign them to oblivion, and let
us in the painful separation which is about to ensue,
perhaps forever, cherish and cultivate a recollection
only of the many agreeable hours we have
spent together. Allow me, gentlemen, to express
the fervent wish that one and all of you may enjoy
all possible individual happiness, and that in the
return to your several homes you may have pleasant
journeys."
Closing Business.
On motion of Mr. Dawson, a committee was
appointed, jointly with a committee to be appointed
by the Senate, to wait upon the President
of the United States, and inform him that
the two Houses are now ready to adjourn, and
desire to know whether he has any further
communication to make to them during the
present session.
Messrs. Dawson and Grosvenor were appointed
the committee on the part of the
House.
The Senate agree to the resolution for the
appointment of a joint committee to wait on
the President of the United States, and notify
him of the proposed recess of Congress,
and have appointed a committee on their
part.
For some time a quorum was not present.
Bills from the Senate were waiting. A
call of the House was had, and it appeared
that sixty-four members only were present.
After receiving from the President all the
bills which had passed, and being informed
by the committee that he had no further communications
to make, the House adjourned
sine die.