THE NYÂYA-VAIS'E@SIKA PHILOSOPHY
Criticism of Buddhism and Sâ@mkhya from the
Nyâya standpoint.
The Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of
substance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of
things, on the ground that all collocations are momentary;
each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to
another group and that to another and so on. But if a collocation
representing milk generates the collocation of curd
it is said to be due to a joint action of the elements forming
the cause-collocation and the modus operandi is unintelligible;
the elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separately
generate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for on
such a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrine
of momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of influence
on the part of the cause-elements and their coordination
and manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment.
The supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is the
result of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation is
against our universal uncontradicted experience that specific
elements constituting the cause (e.g. the whiteness of milk) are
the cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e.g. the
whiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness,
blackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lump
state should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities in
the iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience.
Moreover there would be no difference between material (upâdâna,
e.g. clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (nimitta
and sahakâri, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. in
forming the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, and
there was no room for distinguishing the material and the instrumental
causes, as such.
Again at the very moment in which a cause-collocation is
brought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its
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effect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take the
cause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influence
to produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed the
moment after it is born produce any effect? The truth is that
causal elements remain and when they are properly collocated
the effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that we
perceive things as existing from a past time. The past time is
perceived by us as past, the present as present and the future as
future and things are perceived as existing from a past time onwards.
The Sâ@mkhya assumption that effects are but the actualized
states of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holds
within it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect is
already existent even before the causal movement for the production
of the effect, is also baseless. Sâ@mkhya says that the
oil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, and
that it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from the
stone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consists
only in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent in
a potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump of
clay is called the cause and the jug the effect; of what good is it
to say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can never
carry water? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug.
What is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or was
in a potential state before, and that it has now become manifest
or actual? What does potential state mean? The potential state
of the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual state
of the jug must be admitted as non-existent before. If it is
meant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) of
which the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this does
not mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lump
of clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which it
can expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as the
potter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as the
effect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have said
that the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of Sâ@mkhya
that the substance and attribute have the same reality is also
against all experience, for we all perceive that movement and
attribute belong to substance and not to attribute. Again
Sâ@mkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different
276
from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi
non-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fuss
that the qualities of buddhi are reflected on puru@sa and then again on
buddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul
(âtman) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand why
Sâ@mkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that knowledge,
feeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again in
order to explain experience it brought forth a theory of double
reflection. Again Sâ@mkhya prak@rti is non-intelligent, and where
is the guarantee that she (prak@rti) will not bind the wise again
and will emancipate him once for all? Why did the puru@sa become
bound down? Prak@rti is being utilized for enjoyment by
the infinite number of puru@sas, and she is no delicate girl (as
Sâ@mkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the puru@sa
ashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure
(sukha), sorrow (du@hkha) and a blinding feeling through ignorance
(moha) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with what
impudence could Sâ@mkhya think of these as material substances?
Again their cosmology of a mahat, aha@mkâra, the tanmâtras,
is all a series of assumptions never testified by experience nor
by reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders.
The phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful reconstruction
in the light of reason and experience such as cannot be found in other
systems. (See Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 452-466 and 490-496.)
Nyâya and Vais'e@sika sûtras.
It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyâya are
to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars
trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use
in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between
the adherents of different schools of thought trying to
defeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in
the days of the Upani@sads, and the art of disputation was regarded
even then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then by
the name vâkovâkya. Mr Bodas has pointed out that Âpastamba
who according to Bühler lived before the third century B.C. used the
word Nyâya in the sense of Mîmâ@msâ [Footnote ref 1]. The word Nyâya
derived
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[Footnote 1 Âpastamba, trans. by Bühler, Introduction, p. XXVII., and
Bodas's article on the Historical Survey of Indian Logic in the Bombay
Branch of J.R.A.S., vol. XIX.]
277
from the root nî is sometimes explained as that by which sentences
and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning
and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of
words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing
out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered
into combination) were called Nyâya [Footnote ref 1]. Prof. Jacobi on the
strength of Kau@tilya's enumeration of the vidyâ (sciences) as Ânvîk@sikî
(the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge
by further scrutiny), trayî (the three Vedas), vârttâ (the sciences
of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and da@n@danîti (polity), and the
enumeration of the philosophies as Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Lokâyata
and Ânvîk@sikî, supposes that the Nyâya sûtra was not in existence
in Kau@tilya's time 300 B.C.) [Footnote ref 2]. Kau@tilya's reference to
Nyâya as Ânvîk@sikî only suggests that the word Nyâya was not a familiar
name for Ânvîk@sikî in Kau@tilya's time. He seems to misunderstand
Vâtsyâyana in thinking that Vâtsyâyana distinguishes Nyâya
from the Ânvîk@sikî in holding that while the latter only means
the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics.
What appears from Vâtsyâyana's statement in Nyâya sûtra I.i. 1
is this that he points out that the science which was known in his
time as Nyâya was the same as was referred to as Ânvîk@sikî by
Kau@tilya. He distinctly identifies Nyâyavidyâ with Ânvîk@sikî,
but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories
such as sa@ms'aya (doubt) etc., though these were already contained
within the first two terms pramâ@na (means of cognition) and
prameya (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its
special and separate branches (p@rthakprasthâna) were treated,
Nyâyavidyâ would simply become metaphysics (adhyâtmavidyâ)
like the Upani@sads. The old meaning of Nyâya as the means of determining
the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon
by Vâtsyâyana and is sanctioned by Vâcaspati in his
Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ I.i. 1). He compares the meaning of the
word Nyâya (pramâ@nairarthaparîk@sa@nam—to scrutinize an object by
means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word
ânvîk@sikî (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception
and scriptures). Vâtsyâyana of course points out that so far as
this logical side of Nyâya is concerned it has the widest scope for
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Kâlidâsa's Kumârasambhava "Udghâto pra@navayâsâm
nyâyaistribhirudîra@nam," also Mallinâtha's gloss on it.]
[Footnote 2: Prof. Jacobi's "The early history of Indian Philosophy,"
Indian Antiquary, 1918.]
278
itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences
[Footnote ref 1]. He quotes Kau@tilya to show that in this capacity Nyâya
is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its
capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the
way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that
the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this
seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vâtsyâyana himself
designates the logical portion as a p@rthakprasthâna (separate
branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vâtsyâyana or
Kau@tilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made
after Kau@tilya. Vâtsyâyana has no doubt put more stress on the
importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that
seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or
adhyâtmavidyâ was acknowledged by all. But the importance of
the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of
the dharmas'âstras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend
any support to it, and Vâtsyâyana had to seek the support of
Kau@tilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kau@tilya
was not satisfied by counting Ânvîk@sikî as one of the four
vidyâs but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side
with Sâ@mkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably
even in Kau@tilya's time Nyâya was composed of two branches,
one as adhyâtmavidyâ and another as a science of logic or rather
of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external,
and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added
to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might
not attract sufficient attention. Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda
S'âstrî in an article in the Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society
1905 says that as Vâcaspati made two attempts to collect the
Nyâya sûtras, one as Nyâyasûci and the other as Nyâyasûtroddhâra,
it seems that even in Vâcaspati's time he was not certain as to
the authenticity of many of the Nyâya sûtras. He further points
out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sûtras
were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China
and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyâya and Yoga. He also
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[Footnote 1: Yena prayukta@h pravarttate tat prayojanam (that by which
one is led to act is called prayojanam); yamartham abhîpsan jihâsan
vâ karma ârabhate tenânena sarve prâ@nina@h sarvâ@ni karmâ@ni sarvâs'ca
vidyâ@h vyâptâ@h tadâs'rayâs'ca nyâya@h pravarttate (all those which
one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all
beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana,
and all these depend on Nyâya). Vâtsyâyana bhâs'ya, I.i. 1.]
279
thinks that the sûtras underwent two additions, one at the hands
of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who
put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These
suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but
we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such
additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs
of the interpolation of many of the sûtras makes the fixing of
the date of the original part of the Nyâya sûtras still more difficult,
for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and
Prof. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of the Nyâya sûtras on the
basis of references to S'ûnyavâda naturally loses its value, except
on the supposition that all references to S'ûnyavâda must be later
than Nâgârjuna, which is not correct, since the Mahâyâna sûtras
written before Nâgârjuna also held the S'ûnyavâda doctrine.
The late Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na in J.R.A.S. 1918 thinks
that the earlier part of Nyâya was written by Gautama about
550 B.C. whereas the Nyâya sûtras of Ak@sapâda were written
about 150 A.D. and says that the use of the word Nyâya in the
sense of logic in Mahâbhârata I.I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be
regarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any
reasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment
of the subject that the fixing of the date of Ak@sapâda was made
to fit in somehow with his idea that Ak@sapâda wrote his Nyâya
sûtras under the influence of Aristotle—a supposition which does
not require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyâbhû@sa@na
has proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced
a step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part
of the Nyâya. Goldstücker says that both Patañjali (140 B.C.)
and Kâtyâyana (fourth century B.C.) knew the Nyâya sûtras [Footnote ref
1]. We know that Kau@tilya knew the Nyâya in some form as Ânvîk@sikî
in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say
that the Nyâya existed in some form as early as the fourth
century B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think
that at least some of the present sûtras were written some time
in the second century A.D. Bodas points out that Bâdarâya@na's
sûtras make allusions to the Vais'e@sika doctrines and not to Nyâya.
On this ground he thinks that Vais'e@sika sûtras were written before
Bâdarâyana's Brahma-sûtras, whereas the Nyâya sûtras were
written later. Candrakânta Tarkâla@mkâra also contends in his
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[Footnote 1: Goldstücker's Pâ@nini, p. 157.]
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edition of Vais'e@sika that the Vais'e@sika sûtras were earlier than the
Nyâya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the Vais'e@sika
sûtras were written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes
one of the Vais'e@sika sûtras, but the whole foundation of his medical
physics is based on the Vais`e@sika physics [Footnote ref 1]. The
La@nkâvatâra sûtra (which as it was quoted by As'vagho@sa is earlier
than 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are
other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing
that the Vais'e@sika sûtras are probably pre-Buddhistic [Footnote ref 2].
It is certain that even the logical part of the present Nyâya
sûtras was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by
thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I.i. 32 in which
the sûtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (avayava)
Vâtsyâyana says that this sûtra was written to refute the views
of those who held that there should be ten premisses [Footnote ref 3]. The
Vais'e@sika sûtras also give us some of the earliest types of inference,
which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyâya
doctrine of inference [Footnote ref 4].
Does Vais'e@sika represent an Old School of Mîmâ@msâ?
The Vais'e@sika is so much associated with Nyâya by tradition
that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed
to represent an old school of Mîmâ@msâ, older than that represented
in the Mîmâ@msâ sûtras. But a closer inspection of the Vais'e@sika
sûtras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable
way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes
a Vais'e@sika sûtra. An examination of Caraka's Sûtrasthâna (I.35-38)
leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some
compendium of Vais'e@sika such as that of the Bhâ@sâpariccheda
before him. Caraka sûtra or kârikâ (I.i. 36) says that the gu@nas
are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc.,
cognition, and those which begin with the gu@na "para" (universality)
and end with "prayatna" (effort) together with the sense-qualities
(sârthâ). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known
enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found
in the Vais'e@sika sûtra (I.i. 6) which leaves out the six gu@nas,
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Caraka, S'ârîra, 39.]
[Footnote 2: See the next section.]
[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana's Bhâ@sya on the Nyâya sûtras, I.i.32. This is
undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in
Das'avaikâlikaniryukti as noted before.]
[Footnote 4: Nyâya sûtra I.i. 5, and Vais'e@sika sûtras IX. ii. 1-2,
4-5, and III. i. 8-17.]
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heaviness (gurutva), liquidity (dravatva), oiliness(sneha),
elasticity (sa@mskâra), merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma);
in one part of the sûtra the enumeration begins with "para"
(universality) and ends in "prayatna," but buddhi (cognition)
comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in
prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list
and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's
sûtra was written at a time when the six gu@nas left out in the
Vais'e@sika enumeration had come to be counted as gu@nas, and
compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated.
Bhâ@sâpariccheda (a later Vais'e@sika compendium), is a compilation
from some very old kârikâs which are referred to by Vis'vanâtha
as being collected from "atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h"—(from
very ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka's definition of sâmânya
and vis'e@sa shows that they had not then been counted as separate
categories as in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika doctrines; but though
slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition
one finds in the Vais'e@sika sûtra that sâmânya (generality) and
vi'se@sa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka's sûtras were
therefore probably written at a time when the Vais'e@sika doctrines were
undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning
to be written on them.
The Vais'e@sika sûtras seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist
doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is
no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the
argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an
object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I." There
is also no other reference to any other systems except to some
Mîmâ@msâ doctrines and occasionally to Sâ@mkhya. There is no
reason to suppose that the Mîmâ@msâ doctrines referred to allude
to the Mîmâ@msâ sûtras of Jaimini. The manner in which the
nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyâya
phraseology of "pûrvavat" and "s'e@savat" was not known. Vais'e@sika
sûtras in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate
cause [Footnote ref 3]. We know that the S'vetâs'vatara Upani@sad refers to
those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha's article in J.A.S.B.,
1908.]
[Footnote 2: Caraka (I.i. 33) says that sâmânya is that which produces
unity and vis'e@sa is that which separates. V.S. II. ii. 7. Sâmânya and
vis'e@sa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).]
[Footnote 3: Vais'e@sika sûtra (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).]
282
systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient
view [Footnote ref 1]. These considerations as well as the general style of
the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these
sûtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability
are pre-Buddhistic.
The Vais'e@sika sûtra begins with the statement that its object
is to explain virtue, "dharma" This is we know the manifest duty
of Mîmâ@msâ and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini
begins his Mîmâ@msâ sûtras by defining "dharma". This at first
seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vais'e@sika, viz, the description
of the nature of padartha [Footnote ref 2]. He then defines dharma as
that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (nihsreyasa) and
says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate
this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions
(of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives
bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us
through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must
be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts [Footnote ref 3].
The fact that the Vais'e@sika begins with a promise to describe dharma
and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions
and also the ad@r@s@ta (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit
accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many
of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book
by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce
any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows
that Ka@nâda's method of explaining dharma has been by showing
that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and
actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a
good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption
of ad@r@s@ta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The
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[Footnote 1: S'vetâs'vatara I.i.2]
[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the Kalâpa
Vyâkara@na, in which it is said that the description of the six categories
by Ka@nâda in his Vais'e@sika sûtras, after having proposed to describe
the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while
intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himâlaya).
"Dnarma@m vyâkhyâtukâmasya @sa@tpadârthopavar@nana@m Himavadgantukâmasya
sâgaragamanopamam."]
[Footnote 3: The sutra "Tadvacanâd âmnâyasya prâmâ@nyam (I.i.3 and
X.ii.9) has been explained by Upaskâra as meaning "The Veda being the
word of Îs'vara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no
mention of Îs'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later
Nyâya ideas into the Vais'e@sika. Sûtra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of
VI.ii.1.]
283
description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but
is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these
cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on
the supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance
of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards
magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies,
V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion
of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations
have taken place), and the original movement of the
mind are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. In V. ii. 17 the movement
of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the
assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the
movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in
Upaskara) are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) is
said to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to the
annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths
Vais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced)
and the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are founded
on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience
are due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend all
life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or
the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air,
death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena
by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2),
in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy.
Ka@nâda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding
substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of
metaphysics to ad@r@s@ta But what leads to ad@r@s@ta? In answer to
this, Ka@nâda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or
sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (snana),
fasting, holy student life (brahmacarya), remaining at the house
of the teacher (gurukulavasa), retired forest life (vanaprastha),
sacrifice (yajña), gifts (dana), certain kinds of sacrificial
sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the
prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras)
(VI. ii. 2).
He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure
food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary
being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food
leads to prosperity through ad@r@s@ta. He also described how
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feelings of attachment to things are also generated by ad@r@s@ta.
Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Ka@nâda is busy in showing
the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference
to our chapter on Mîmâ@msâ will show that the later Mîmâ@msâ
writers agreed with the Nyâya-Vais`e@sika doctrines in most of their
views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points
in which Mîmâ@msâ differs from Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are (1) self-validity
of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief
in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (according
to Kumârila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego.
Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject
of discussion in the Vais'e@sika. But as no Îs'vara is mentioned,
and as all ad@r@s@ta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we
may assume that Vais'e@sika had no dispute with Mîmâ@msâ. The
fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due
to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the
Vais`e@sika sûtras. It is probable that Ka@nâda believed that the
Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i.
1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with
Mîmâ@msâ suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never
written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in
the days of the Vais'e@sika sûtras, the view was probably what is
represented in the Vais'e@sika sûtras. As there is no reference to
Îs`vara and as ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of actions
in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all
atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais'e@sika was
as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mîmâ@msâ philosophers.
As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one
of the main points of quarrel between the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and
the Mîmâ@msâ, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Ka@nâda gives reasons
in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33
till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the
eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mîmâ@msâ view as we know
from the later Mîmâ@msâ writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question
of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyâya view is
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sûtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my
opinion wrongly interpreted by S'a@nkara Mis'ra in his Upaskâra (II. ii.
36 by adding an "api" to the sûtra and thereby changing the issue, and
II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyabhava" as
sâ@mkhya and bhava instead of sâ@mkhya and abhava, which in my opinion
is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound
as we find in the later Nyâya Vais'e@sika view.]
285
that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the
seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally
this is regarded as the Vais'e@sika view as well. But in Vais'e@sika
III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its
activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this
inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the
activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no
certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is
suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted
on the authority of the scriptures (âgama). To this the final
Vais'e@sika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self
in our feeling as "I" (aham), and we have therefore not to depend
on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus
the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional
proof of what we already find in perception as "I" (aham) (III. ii.
10-18, also IX. i. 11).
These considerations lead me to think that the Vais'e@sika
represented a school of Mîmâ@msâ thought which supplemented
a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.
Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika sûtras.
The Vais'e@sika sûtras begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining
virtue (dharma) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is
that by which prosperity (abhyudaya) and salvation (ni@hs'reyasa)
are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the
Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and
salvation. Then it turns back to the second sûtra and says that
salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special
excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of
substance (dravya), quality (gu@na), class concept (sâmdânya),
particularity (vis'e@sa), and inherence (samavâyay) [Footnote ref 1].
The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and
mind. The gu@nas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure,
separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to
species [Footnote ref 2]. Action (karma) means upward movement
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Upaskâra notes that vis'e@sa here refers to the ultimate
differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this
system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same
element has specific features of difference.]
[Footnote 2: Here the well known qualities of heaviness (gurutva),
liquidity (dravatva), oiliness (sneha), elasticity (sa@mskâra),
merit (dharma), and demerit (adharma) have been altogether omitted.
These are all counted in later Vais'e@sika commentaries and compendiums.
It must be noted that "gu@na" in Vas'e@sika means qualities and not
subtle reals or substances as in Sâ@mkhya Yoga. Gu@na in Vas'e@sika would
be akin to what Yoga would call dharma.]
286
downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal
movement. The three common qualities of dravya, gu@na and karma
are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause,
and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other
dravyas and the gu@nas other gu@nas. But karma is not necessarily
produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or
its effect but the gu@nas are destroyed both by the cause and by
the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses
karma and gu@na and is regarded as the material (samavayi) cause.
Gu@nas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gu@nas, and are
not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is
devoid of gu@na, cannot remain at one time in more than one
object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of
contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi)
of (derivative) dravyas, gu@na, and karma, gu@na is also the non-material
cause (asamavayi) of dravya, gu@na and karma. Karma
is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion
(vega). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be
produced even without karma [Footnote ref 1]. Dravya is the general effect
of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to gu@na in this that it does not produce
karma. The numbers two, three, etc, separateness, contact
and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma
not being connected with more than one thing is not produced
by more than one thing [Footnote ref 2]. A dravya is the result of many
contacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many
colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and
contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In
denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the
cause of dravya and karma [Footnote ref 3].
In the second chapter of the first book Ka@nâda first says that
if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause
even though there may not be the effect. He next says that
genus (samanya) and species (visesa) are relative to the understanding;
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See
Upaskara I.i. 22.]
[Footnote 2: If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the
movement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving.]
[Footnote 3: It must be noted that karma in this sense is quite different
from the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action
which is the cause of rebirth.]
287
being (bhâva) indicates continuity only and is hence
only a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action
maybe both genus and species, but visesa as constituting the ultimate
differences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient).
In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being
(sattâ) in virtue of which things appear as existent, all other
genera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or
species. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it
is different from dravya, gu@na and karma, and yet exists in them,
and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that something
is and must be regarded as a category existing as one
identical entity in all dravya, gu@na, and karma, for in its universal
nature as being it has no special characteristics in the
different objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of
thingness (dravyatva) qualitiness (gu@natva) or actionness (karmatva)
are also categories which are separate from universal being
(bhâva or sattâ) for they also have no separate genus or species
and yet may be distinguished from one another, but bhâva or
being was the same in all.
In the first chapter of the second book Ka@nâda deals with
substances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch, water,
colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (snigdha), fire,
colour and touch, air, touch, but none of these qualities can be
found in ether (âkâs'a). Liquidity is a special quality of water
because butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids
only when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself [Footnote
ref 1]. Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by
touch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred
from the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing inferred
from touch possesses motion and quality, and does not
itself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (dravya)
and is eternal [Footnote ref 2]. The inference of air is of the type of
inference of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics
called sâmânyato d@r@s@ta. The name of air "vâyu" is derived
from the scriptures. The existence of others different from us
has (asmadvis'i@s@tânâ@m) to be admitted for accounting for the
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is
important for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka.]
[Footnote 2: Substance is that which possesses quality and motion. It
should be noted that the word "adravyatvena" in II. i. 13 has been
interpreted by me as "adravyavattvena."]
288
giving of names to things (sa@mjñâkarma). Because we find
that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented
by us) [Footnote ref 1]. On account of the fact that movements rest only in
one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupied
space, would not lead us to infer the existence of âkâs'a
(ether). Âkâs'a has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance
in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a
quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched,
there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this
substance is âkâs'a. It is a substance and eternal like air. As
being is one so âkâs'a is one [Footnote ref 2].
In the second chapter of the second book Ka@nâda tries to
prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire,
and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the
notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is
one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, because
the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space
supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much
nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have
diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the
sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound
is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises
when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features
coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered,
or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some
other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way
but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely
grasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the question
whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons
to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with
a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.
The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the
inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must
be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact
of the senses and their object inheres.
The knowledge of sense-objects (indriyârtha) is the reason by
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I have differed from Upaskâra in interpreting
"sa@mjñâkarma" in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while
Upaskâra makes it a dvandva compound. Upaskâra's interpretation
seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for
the existence of God.]
[Footnote 2: This interpretation is according to S'a@nkara Mis'ra's
Upaskâra.]
289
which we can infer the existence of something different from the
senses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The
types of inferences referred to are (1) inference of non-existence of
some things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existence
of some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of the
existence of some things from the existence of others. In all
these cases inference is possible only when the two are known to
be connected with each other (prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya) [Footnote
ref 1]. When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have
anapades'a (fallacious middle) and sandigdha (doubtful middle);
thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it
has a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of
soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses
and objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of
the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way
in which the existence of one's own soul is inferred [Footnote ref 2], i.e.
by virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In
the second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only
when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects
proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance
and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneity
of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it
may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).
The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling
of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections
pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance
and eternal can be proved after the manner of vâyu. An objector
is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his
soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of sâmânyatod@r@s@ta
inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition
to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but
that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of
soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But
the Vais'e@sika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to
which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of
falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: In connection with this there is a short reference to the
methods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear.
There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference
are only pointed out as the basis.]
[Footnote 2: The forms of inference used show that Ka@nâda was probably not
aware of Gautama's terminology.]
290
then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences
as "I am Yajñadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the
good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference
lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction.
When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajñadatta goes,
there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajñadatta the
body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think
that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else.
As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure,
pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many
by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on
the strength of the scriptures [Footnote ref 1].
In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that
which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered
eternal (nitya). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can
only take place because of the cause. When we speak of anything
as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that
also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal
is ignorance (avidyâ) [Footnote ref 2]. Colour is visible in a thing
which is great (mahat) and compounded. Air (vâyu) is not perceived to
have colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not
the actuality of colour (rûpasamskâra—i.e. in air there is only
colour in its unmanifested form) in it. Colour is thus visible only
when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions [Footnote
ref 3]. In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also
explained. Number, measure, separateness, contact, and disjoining, the
quality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they
abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The
number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the
eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva)
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I have differed here from the meaning given in Upaskâra. I
think the three sûtras "Sukhaduhkhajñananispattyavis'esadekatmyam,"
"vyavasthato nana," and "vastrasâmarthyat ca" originally meant that
the self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also
because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures,
they are regarded as many.]
[Footnote 2: I have differed here also in my meaning from the Upaskâra,
which regards this sûtra "avidya" to mean that we do not know of any
reasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms.]
[Footnote 3: This is what is meant in the later distinctions of
udbhûtarûpavattva and anudbhûtarûpavattva. The word samskâra in
Vais'e@sika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection
(samavaya), production (udbhava) and not being overcome
(anabhibhava). For the last three senses see Upaskâra IV. i. 7.]
291
are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch,
and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain,
etc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile
sense) [Footnote ref 1].
In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the
earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There
cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the
three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one
of them acts as the central radicle (upa@s@tambhaka). Bodies are of
two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwise
produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance
with special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due
to special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to
be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been
given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and
also on account of the authority of the Vedas.
In the first chapter of the fifth book action (karma) is discussed.
Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said
that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the
soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due
to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of
the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is
not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the
hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the
soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of
heaviness (gurutva) the flail will fall when not held by the hand.
Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed
motions (nodanavis'e@sa) which are generated by special kinds of
efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep.
The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown
cause (adr@s@takâranaka). The arrow first acquires motion by
specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia
(vegasamskâra) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls
down through heaviness.
The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explanations
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: This portion has been taken from the Upaskâra of S'ankara
Mis'ra on the Vais'e@sika sûtras of Ka@nâda. It must be noted here
that the notion of number according to Vais'e@sika is due to mental
relativity or oscillation (apeksabuddhijanya). But this mental
relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or
touched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend
on the visual or the tactual sense.]
292
of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical
importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained
as being due to unknown cause (ad@r@s@takâritam) and no explanation
is given as to the nature of this unknown (ad@r@s@ta).
It is however said that with the absence of ad@r@s@ta there is no contact
of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore
mok@sa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the
self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind
is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes
steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, âkâs'a are
regarded as inactive.
The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts
are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account
of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain
Vedic performances, which brings in ad@r@s@ta, purification and impurities
of things, how passions are often generated by ad@r@s@ta,
how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how mok@sa
takes place as a result of the work of the soul.
In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal
things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The
change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning
in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size
is visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many
causes [Footnote ref 1], but the atom is therefore different from those
that have great size. The same thing may be called great and small
relatively at the same time. In accordance with a@nutva (atomic) and
mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The
eternal size of parima@n@dala (round) belongs to the atoms. Âkâs'a
and âtman are called mahân or paramamahân (the supremely
great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure
it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being
of the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat), Atomic size
(parima@n@dala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and
the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether
(âkâs'a) are regarded as eternal.
In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity
and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from
other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality;
the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I have differed from the Upaskâra in the interpretation of
this sûtra.]
293
neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (ekap@rthaktva).
The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc.
Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the
effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither
contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist
independently (yutasiddhyabhâvât). In the eighth book it is said
that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension
of qualities, action, generality, and particularity
perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the
cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the
cause of taste, colour and touch[Footnote ref 1]. In the ninth book
negation is described; non-existence (asat) is defined as that to
which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things
may become non-existent and that which is existent in one
way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind
of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of
existence and non-existence [Footnote ref 2]. All negation can be directly
perceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the
mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also
made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the
yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).
In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the
middle term is described. It is said that anything connected
with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary
or as inseparably connected, will serve as li@nga (reason).
The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or
"these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may
also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism
from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal
cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (avidyâ) is
due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observation
due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite
of this is true knowledge (vidyâ). In the tenth it is said that
pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to
doubt and certainty.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Upaskâra here explains that it is intended that the senses
are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the
sûtras.]
[Footnote 2: In the previous three kinds of non-existence, prâgabhâva
(negation before production), dhvamsâbhâva (negation after destruction),
and anyonyabhava (mutual negation of each other in each other), have
been described. The fourth one is sâmânyâbhâva (general negation).]
294
A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for
because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced.
Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Contact
is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which
inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production
of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of
fire is also a cause.
Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they
have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the
Vedas direct them, they have validity.
Philosophy in the Nyâya sûtras [Footnote ref 1].
The Nyâya sûtras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen
subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramâ@na), object of right
knowledge (prameya), doubt (sa@ms'aya), purpose (prayojana),
illustrative instances (d@r@s@tânta), accepted conclusions (siddhânta),
premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (nir@naya),
debates (vâda), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms
(vita@n@dâ), fallacy (hetvâbhâsa), quibble (chala), refutations
(jâti), points of opponent's defeat (nigrahasthâna), and hold that
by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (nihs'reyasa), is
attained. In the second sûtra it is said that salvation (apavarga)
is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge
(mithyâjñâna), defects (do@sa), endeavours (prav@rtti, birth
(janma), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said
to be of four kinds, perception (pratyak@sa), inference (anumâna),
analogy (upamana), and testimony (s'abda). Perception is defined
as uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names
proceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three
kinds, from cause to effect (pûrvavat), effect to cause (s'e@savat),
and inference from common characteristics (sâmânyato d@r@s@ta).
Upamâna is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known
thing.
S'abda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (âpta)
[Footnote ref 2].
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in Nyâya
sûtras, supplemented here and there with the views of Vâtsyâyana, the
commentator. This follows the order of the sûtras, and tries to present
their ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyâya as
possible. The general treatment of Nyâya-Vais'e@sika expounds the two
systems in the light of later writers and commentators.]
[Footnote 2: It is curious to notice that Vâtsyâyana says that an ârya, a
@r@si or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an âpta (reliable authority).]
295
Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced
and which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledge
are said to be self (âtman), body, senses, sense-objects,
understanding (buddhi), mind (manas}, endeavour (prav@rtti), rebirths,
enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and
salvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (prayatna), pleasure, pain, and
knowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which
upholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain
as arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects [Footnote ref l];
the five senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivi, ap,
tejas, vâyu and âkâs'a; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are
the qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the
objects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot
occur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (manas).
Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and
body. Do@sas (attachment, antipathy, etc) are those which lead
men to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering [Footnote ref
2]. Ultimate cessation from pain is called apavarga [Footnote ref 3].
Doubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting
opinions etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That
for attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work
is called prayojana.
Illustrative example (d@r@s@tânta) is that on which both the
common man and the expert (parîk@saka) hold the same opinion.
Established texts or conclusions (siddhânta) are of four kinds,
viz (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called
the sarvatantrasiddhânta; (2) those which are held by one school
or similar schools but opposed by others called the pratitantrasiddhânta;
(3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturally
follow called adhikara@nasiddhânta; (4) those of the opponent's views
which are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refute
the consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill and
bring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (abhyupagamasiddhânta)
[Footnote ref 4]. The premisses are five:
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Here I have followed Vâtsyâyana's meaning.]
[Footnote 2: Vâtsyâyana comments here that when one finds all things full
of misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated
with pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.]
[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana wants to emphasise that there is no bliss in
salvation, but only cessation from pain.]
[Footnote 4: I have followed Vâtsyâyana's interpretation here.]
296
(1) pratijñâ (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved);
(2) hetu (the reason which establishes the conclusion on the
strength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examples
or negative instances); (3) udâhara@na (positive or negative
illustrative instances); (4) upanaya (corroboration by the instance);
(5) nigamana (to reach the conclusion which has been proved).
Then come the definitions of tarka, nir@naya, vâda, jalpa, vita@n@dâ,
the fallacies (hetvâbhâsa), chala, jâti, and nigrahasthâna, which
have been enumerated in the first sûtra.
The second book deals with the refutations of objections
against the means of right knowledge (pramâna). In refutation
of certain objections against the possibility of the happening
of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there
was always a difference between the two things regarding which
doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiating
characteristics between the two things are not noted.
Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object
to the validity of the pramâ@na in general and particularly of
perceptions on the ground that if they were generated before
the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter,
and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they
could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two
happened together then there would be no notion of succession
in our cognitions. To this the Nyâya reply is that if there were
no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of
knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all
means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any
means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no
means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds
of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous
existence of those different kinds of musical instruments,
so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence
of those objects of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].
The same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as
instruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognition
of other things may themselves be the objects of right
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Yathâpas'câtsiddhena s'abdena pûrvasiddham âtodyamanumîyate
sâdhyam ca âtodyam sâdhanam ca s'abda@h antarhite hyâtodye svanata@h
anumânam bhavatîti, vî@nâ vâdyate ve@nu@h pûryyate iti svanavis'e@se@na
âtodyavis'e@sam pratipadyate tathâ pûrvasiddham upalabdhivi@sayam
pas'câtsiddhena upalabdhihetunâ pratipadyate. Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya, II.
i. 15.]
297
knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which
are instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere
instruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge.
The means of right knowledge (pramâ@na) do not require
other sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of
a lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselves
as well.
Coming to the question of the correctness of the definition
of perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact
of the soul with the mind [Footnote ref 1]. Then it is said that though we
perceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perception
of the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we
can pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not
merely the parts collected together, for were it so one could
say that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms [Footnote ref 2].
Some objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is
wrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this
the Nyáya answer is that there is always such a difference in the
specific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particular
effect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particular
cause [Footnote ref 3]. In refuting those who object to the existence of
time on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present time
did not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible.
The past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not have
perceived things as being done in the past or as going to be
done in the future. The validity of analogy (upamána) as a
means of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved.
The four pramâ@nas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Here the sûtras, II. i. 20-28, are probably later
interpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Nyâya doctrine
of perception, but against the wording of the definition
of perception as given in the,Nyâya sûtra, II. i. 4.]
[Footnote 2: This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who
rejected the existence of wholes (avayavî). On this subject a later
Buddhist monograph by Pandita As'oka (9th century A.D.),
Avayavinirâkara@na in Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts, may be referred
to.]
[Footnote 3: Pûrvodakavis'i@s@tam khalu var@sodakan s'îghrataram srotasâ
bahutaraphenaphalapar@nakâs@thâdivahanañcopalabhamâna@h pûr@natvena,
nadya upari v@r@sto deva ityanuminoti nodakab@rddhimâtre@na. V@atsyâyana
bhâ@sya, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river
is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater
augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current
large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics,
associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of
water, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river].
298
are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthâpatti (implication),
aitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood
in terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is
also understood—if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywhere
we understand that the same contains eight gallons of
corn as well) and abhâva (non-existence) as separate pramâ@nas
for the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthâpatti,
sambhava and abhâva are included within inference.
The validity of these as pramâ@nas is recognized, but they are
said to be included in the four pramâ@nas mentioned before. The
theory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternity
proved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to
refer to class-notions (jâti), individuals (vyakti), and the specific
position of the limbs (âk@rti), by which the class notion is manifested.
Class (jâti} is defined as that which produces the notion
of sameness (samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h).
The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of
the self or âtman. It is said that each of the senses is associated
with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity
in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and
produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from
the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there
would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men: again if there
were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize
things as having seen them before; the two images produced by
the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united
together as one visual perception of the things [Footnote ref 1]; moreover
if there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour
fruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness
belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition,
for the experience of one could not be recognized by another.
If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected
by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose
as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this
entity the knower would require some instrument by which it
would co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is
admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the
sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: According to Vâtsyâyana, in the two eyes we have two different
senses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which
works in both eyes.]
299
senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained.
Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants
show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy
and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in
previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires,
and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments
and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is
argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in
previous existences.
The body is made up of the k@siti element. The visual sense
is material and so also are all other senses [Footnote ref l]. Incidentally
the view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation
is also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three,
fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye,
and touch which are made respectively by the four elements of
earth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements
of which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made
by earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctive
quality of earth, viz. smell.
Against the Sâ@mkhya distinction of buddhi (cognition) and
cit (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between
the buddhi and cit. We do not find in our consciousness two
elements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness,
but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Sâ@mkhya
epistemology that the anta@hkara@na assumes diverse forms in
cognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the supposition
of contacts of manas with the senses, âtman and external
objects. The Buddhist objection against the Sâ@mkhya explanation
that the anta@hkara@nas catch reflection from the external
world just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may
lie near it, that there were really momentary productions of
crystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at
different times is refuted by Nyâya; for it says that it cannot be
said that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to
in those cases where momentariness was actually experienced.
In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no
coming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It is well to remember that Sâ@mkhya did not believe that the
senses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga view
represented in Âtreya-sa@mhitâ (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika
or constituted of the gross elements.]
300
the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The
contact of manas with soul (âtman) takes place within the body
and not in that part of âtman which is outside the body; knowledge
belongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for
even when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitions
destroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous.
Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of
these can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas).
Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again
if it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be
borne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of
another. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given
as follows: (1) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign,
(5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor
and the possessed or master and servant, or things which
are generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of
husband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition,
(11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover
and covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that
which caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such
as that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection,
(19) merit and demerit [Footnote ref 1]. It is said that knowledge does
not belong to body, and then the question of the production of the body
as due to ad@r@s@ta is described. Salvation (apavarga) is effected by
the manas being permanently separated from the soul (âtman)
through the destruction of karma.
In the fourth book in course of the examination of do@sa
(defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of all
other defects such as râga (attachment) and dve@sa (antipathy).
As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by
destruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the
process of origination. Îs'vara is regarded as the cause of the
production of effects of deeds performed by men's efforts, for
man is not always found to attain success according to his efforts.
A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all
things have come into being by no-cause (animitta), for then
no-cause would be the cause, which is impossible.
The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted
on the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed.
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Nyâya sûtra III. ii. 44.]
301
The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (s'ûnyavâdin Bauddhas)
that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to
other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are
merely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are
then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like
the fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen.
Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means
sorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormented
by many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for
pleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamless
sleep, so there is no affliction (kles'a) in the man who attains
apavarga (salvation) [Footnote ref 1]. When once this state is attained all
efforts (prav@rtti) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless
with us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then
there are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism
(aha@mkâra) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects
(do@sa); about the nature of whole and parts and about the
nature of atoms (a@nus) which cannot further be divided. A discussion
is then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijñânavâdins
that nothing can be regarded as having any reality when
separated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as
leading to right knowledge.
The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition
is devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations
(nigrahasthâna) and futilities (jâti).
Caraka, Nyâya sûtras and Vais'e@sika sûtras.
When we compare the Nyâya sûtras with the Vais'e@sika sûtras
we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes
have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The large
amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art
for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was
probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises
which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering
themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their
opponents [Footnote ref 2]. This assumption is justified when
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana notes that this is the salvation of him who has
known Brahman, IV. i. 63.]
[Footnote 2: A reference to the Suvar@naprabhâsa sûtra shows that the
Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving
their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to
the worship of Sarasvatî (goddess of learning), who they supposed would
help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information
and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.]
302
we compare the futilities (jâti) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to
disputations as found in the Nyâya sûtra with those that are
found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There
are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the
Nyâya sûtra and Caraka-sa@mhitâ which have treated of these
matters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g.
d@r@s@tânta, prayojana, pratijñâ and vita@n@dâ) follows very closely
the definitions given of those in the Nyâya sûtras. There are
others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthâna, etc.,
where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are
some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. prati@s@thâpanâ,
jijñâsâ, vyavasâya, vâkyado@sa, vâkyapras'a@msâ, upalambha,
parihâra, abhyanujñâ, etc.) which are not found in the
Nyâya sûtra [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the various types of futilities
(jâti) and points of opponent's refutation (nigrahasthâna) mentioned in
the Nyâya sûtra are not found in Caraka. There are some terms which
are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. aupamya in
Caraka, upamâna in Nyâya sûtra, arthâpatti in Nyâya sûtra and
arthaprâpti in Caraka. Caraka does not seem to know anything
about the Nyâya work on this subject, and it is plain that the
treatment of these terms of disputations in the Caraka is much
simpler and less technical than what we find in the Nyâya sûtras.
If we leave out the varieties of jâti and nigrahasthâna of the
fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the
treatment of Caraka and that of the Nyâya sûtras. It seems therefore
in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the Nyâya
sûtras were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation
to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation
was earlier, whereas the compilation of the Nyâya sûtras represents
a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had
necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied
in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work.
It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have
been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing
through the Nyâya sûtras is that of a polemic against the doctrines
which could be attributed to the Sautrântika Buddhists, the
Vijñânavâda Buddhists, the nihilists, the Sâ@mkhya, the Cârvâka,
and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Like Vais'e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold division
of inference (anumâna) as pûrvavat, s'e@savat and sâmânyatod@r@s@ta.]
303
further allusion elsewhere. The Vais'e@sika sûtras as we have already
seen had argued only against the Mîmâ@msâ, and ultimately agreed
with them on most points. The dispute with Mîmâ@msâ in the
Nyâya sûtras is the same as in the Vais'e@sika over the question
of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the
self-validity of knowledge (svata@h prâmâ@nyavâda)and the akhyâti
doctrine of illusion of the Mîmâ@msists, which form the two chief
points of discussion between later Mîmâ@msâ and later Nyâya,
are never alluded to in the Nyâya sûtras. The advocacy of Yoga
methods (Nyâya sûtras, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be
an alien element; these are not found in Vais'e@sika and are not in
keeping with the general tendency of the Nyâya sûtras, and the
Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahâmahopâdhyâya
Haraprasâda S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.
The Vais'e@sika sûtras, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional
knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the
self (âtman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they
also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived
under special conditions of sa@mskâra (conglomeration etc.).
The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity
(ayaugapadya) of knowledge and efforts is almost
the same with Vais'e@sika as with Nyâya. The Nyâya sûtras
give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring
in the questions of sa@mskâra or udbhûtarûpavattva which Vais'e@sika
does. On the question of inference Nyâya gives three
classifications as pûrvavat, s'e@savat and samânyatod@r@s@ta, but no
definition. The Vais'e@sika sûtras do not know of these classifications,
and give only particular types or instances of inference
(V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made
when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation
of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind
of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and
so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference
without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyâpti
(concomitance of hetu (reason) and sâdhya (probandum)) which became
so important in later Nyâya has never been properly formulated
either in the Nyâya sûtras or in the Vais'e@sika. Vais'e@sika
sutra, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance
between hetu and sadhya (prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya),
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: J.A.S.B. 1905.]
304
but the technical vyâpti is not known, and the connotation of
the term prasiddhipûrvakatva of Vais'e@sika seems to be more
loose than the term vyâpti as we know it in the later Nyâya. The
Vais'e@sika sûtras do not count scriptures (s'abda) as a separate
pramâ@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas.
With Nyâya sûtras s'abda as a pramâ@na applies not only to the
Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and
Vâtsyâyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three
kinds @r@si, ârya and mleccha (foreigners). Upamâna which is
regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyâya is not even
referred to in the Vais'e@sika sûtras. The Nyâya sûtras know of
other pramâ@nas, such as arthâpatti, sambhava and aitihya, but
include them within the pramâ@nas admitted by them, but the
Vais'e@sika sûtras do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The
Vais'e@sika sûtras believe in the perception of negation (abhâva) through
the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i.
1-10). The Nyâya sûtras (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhâva as
non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another
to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks
are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that
absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though
there is thus an agreement between the Nyâya and the Vais'e@sika
sûtras about the acceptance of abhâva as being due to perception,
yet their method of handling the matter is different. The Nyâya
sûtras say nothing about the categories of dravya, gu@na, karma,
vis'e@sa and samavâya which form the main subjects of Vais'e@ska
discussions [Footnote ref 3]. The Nyâya sûtras take much pains to prove
the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have
been important with Vais'e@sika. The slight reference to this
question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient.
The Vais'e@sika sûtras do not mention the name of "Îs'vara," whereas
the Nyâya sûtras try to prove his existence on eschatological
grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self
in the Nyâya sûtras are mainly on the ground of the unity of
sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pramâ@nas is Caraka.
But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from
Nyâya and calls arthâpatti arthaprâpti (Caraka III. viii.).]
[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from Vâtsyâyana's
commentary.]
[Footnote 3: The Nyâya sûtra no doubt incidentally gives a definition of
jâti as "samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h" (II. ii. 71).]
305
Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact
of knowledge. Both the Nyâya and the Vais'e@sika sûtras admit
the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of
atomic structure in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika are absent there. The
Vai'se@sika calls salvation ni@hs'reyasa or mok@sa and the Nyâya
apavarga. Mok@sa with Vais'e@sika is the permanent cessation of
connection with body; the apavarga with Nyâya is cessation of
pain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference between
the Vais'e@sika and Nyâya are said to lie with regard to theory of the
notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc.
Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which
cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment
there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness,
then from a sense of relativeness—apek@sâbuddhi—notion
of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two
things); again, the doctrine of pilupâka (changes of qualities by
heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyâya held)
was held by Vais'e@sika, which the Naiyâyikas did not admit [Footnote ref
2]. But as the Nyâya sûtras are silent on these points, it is not
possible to say that such were really the differences between early
Nyâya and early Vaise@sika. These differences may be said to hold between
the later interpreters of Vais'e@sika and the later interpreters of
Nyâya. The Vais'e@sika as we find it in the commentary of
Pras'astapâda (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyâya from
the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost
the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore
preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found
from the sixth century onwards.
The Vais'e@sika and Nyâya Literature.
It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the Vais'e@sika
sûtras by Ka@nâda, also called Aulûkya the son of Ulûka, though
there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha quotes a passage from
Sa@mk@sepas'a@nkarajaya, XVI. 68-69 in J.A.S.B., 1905, and another
passage from a Nyâya writer Bhâsarvajña, pp. 39-41, in J.A.S.B., 1914,
to show that the old Naiyâyikas considered that there was an element
of happiness (sukha) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the
Vais'e@sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found
in the Nyâya or the Vais'e@sika sûtras, unless the cessation of pain
with Nyâya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss
or happiness.]
[Footnote 2: See Mâdhava's Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha-Aulûkyadars'ana.]
306
appears from the Vâyu purâna that he was born in Prabhâsa near
Dvârakâ, and was the disciple of Somas'armâ. The time of
Pras'astapâda who wrote a bhâ@sya (commentary) of the Vais'e@sika
sûtras cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity
of Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya is this that unlike other bhâ@syas
(which first give brief explanations of the text of the sûtras and
then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining
the first brief comments), it does not follow the sûtras but
is an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnote
ref 1]. There were two other bhâ@syas on the Vais'e@sika sûtras,
namely Râva@na-bhâ@sya and Bharâdvâja-v@rtti, but these are now
probably lost. References to the former are found in
Kira@nâvalîbhâskara of Padmanâbha Mis'ra and also in Ratnaprabhâ
2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this bhâ@sya, namely
Vyomavatî by Vyomas'ekharâcârya, Nyâyakandalî by S'ridhara,
Kira@nâvalî by Udayana (984 A.D.) and Lîlâvatî S'rîvatsâcârya.
In addition to these Jagadîs'a Bha@t@tâcârya of Navadvîpa and S'a@nkara
Mis'ra wrote two other commentaries on the Pras'astapâda-bhâsya,
namely Bhâsyasûkti and Ka@nâda-rahasya. S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425
A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the Vais'e@sika sûtras called the
Upaskâra. Of these Nyâya-kandalî of S'rîdhara on account of its
simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably
the best for a modern student of Vais'e@sika. Its author was a
native of the village of Bhûris@r@s@ti in Bengal (Râ@dha). His father's
name was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchokâ and he
wrote his work in 913 S'aka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes
at the end of his work.
The Nyâya sûtra was written by Ak@sapâda or Gautama, and
the earliest commentary on it written by Vâtsyâyana is known
as the Vâtsyâyana-bhâ@sya. The date of Vâtsyâyana has not
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The bhâ@sya of Pras'astapâda can hardly he called a
bhâ@sya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and
calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories
(Padârthadharmasa@mgraha). He takes the categories of dravya,
gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa and samavâya in order and without
raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on
them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and
dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms
contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of
pilupâka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat
occur in his narration for the first time as the Vais'e@sika sûtras
are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date
definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais'e@sika available to us
after Ka@nâda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th
century A.D.]
307
been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he
lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi
places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a
Vârttika on Vâtsyâyana's bhâ@sya to establish the Nyâya views
and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Di@nnâga
(about 500 A.D.) in his Pramâ@nasamuccaya. Vâcaspatimis'ra
(840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the Nyâyavârttika of
Udyotakara called Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ in order to make
clear the right meanings of Udyotakara's Vârttika which was sinking
in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings
(dustarakunibandhapa@nkamagnânâm). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote
a sub-commentary on the Tâtparya@tîkâ called
Tâtparya@tîkâparis'uddhi. Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) wrote a
sub-commentary on that called the Nyâyanibandhaprakâs'a. Padmanâbha
wrote a sub-commentary on that called Varddhamânendu and S'a@nkara
Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the
Nyâyatâtparyama@n@dana. In the seventeenth century Vis'vanâtha
wrote an independent short commentary known as Vis'vanâthav@rtti,
on the Nyâya sûtra, and Râdhâmohana wrote a separate
commentary on the Nyâya sûtras known as Nyâyasûtravivara@na.
In addition to these works on the Nyâya sûtras many other
independent works of great philosophical value have been written
on the Nyâya system. The most important of these in medieval
times is the Nyâyamañjari of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished
shortly after Vâcaspatimis'ra. Jayanta chooses some of the Nyâya
sûtras for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyâya views quite
independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian
thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vâcaspati's
Tâtparya@tîkâ, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another
important work is Udayana's Kusumâñjali in which he tries to
prove the existence of Îs'vara (God). This work ought to be read
with its commentary Prakâs'a by Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) and its
sub-commentary Makaranda by Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana's
Âtmatattvaviveka is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in
which he tries to establish the Nyâya doctrine of soul. In addition
to these we have a number of useful works on Nyâya in later
times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection
with the present work. Bhâ@sâpariccheda by Vis'vanâtha with
its commentaries Muktâvalî, Dinakarî and Râmarudrî, Tarkasamgraha
with Nyâyanir@naya, Tarkabkâ@sâ of Kes'ava Mis'ra with
308
the commentary Nyâyapradîpa, Saptapadârthî of S'ivâditya,
Târkikarak@sâ of Varadarâja with the commentary Ni@ska@n@taka
of Mallinâtha, Nyâyasâra of Mâdhava Deva of the city of Dhâra and
Nyâyasiddhântamañjarî of Jânakinâtha Bha@t@tâcarya with the
Nyâyamanjarisara by Yâdavâcârya, and Nyâyasiddhântadîpa of
S'a@sadhara with Prabhâ by S'e@sânantâcârya.
The new school of Nyâya philosophy known as Navya-Nyâya
began with Ga@nges'a Upâdhyâya of Mithilâ, about
1200 A.D. Ga@nges'a wrote only on the four pramâ@nas admitted by the
Nyâya, viz. pratyak@sa, anumâna, upamâna, and s'abda, and not on any of
the topics of Nyâya metaphysics. But it so happened that his
discussions on anumâna (inference) attracted unusually great attention
in Navadvîpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and
commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumâna
portion of his work _Tattvacintâma@ni, and many independent
treatises on sabda and anumâna were also written by the scholars
of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home
of Nyâya studies. The commentaries of Raghunâtha S'iroma@ni
(1500 A.D.), Mathurâ Bha@t@tâcârya (1580 A.D.), Gadâdhara Bha@t@tâcârya
(1650 A.D.) and Jagadîsa Bha@t@tâcârya (1590 A.D.), commentaries
on S'iroma@ni's commentary on _Tattvacintâmani, had been
very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyâya became the
most important study in Navadvîpa and there appeared a series
of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject
[Footnote ref l].The contribution was not in the direction of
metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly
in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately
and precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts [Footnote
ref 2]. Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the
nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke
and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature
of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there
should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic
thinking and the development of a system of highly technical
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third
quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyâya was started
in Mithilâ (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century
Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyâya studies. See Mr
Cakravarttî's paper, J. A.S.B. 1915. I am indebted to it for some
of the dates mentioned in this section.]
[Footnote 2: Îs'varânumâna of Raghunatha as well as his
Padârthatattvanirûpa@na are, however, notable exceptions.]
309
expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical
expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted
even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate
and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit
ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the
importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it
can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by
attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.
I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that
so far as the logical portion of the Nyâya system is concerned,
though Ak@sapâda was the first to write a comprehensive account
of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently
worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyâya account
of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic
Das'avaikâlikaniryukti of Bhadrabâhu (357 B.C.), Umâsvâti's
Tattvârthâdhigama sûtra, Nyâyâvatâra of Siddhasena Divâkara
(533 A.D.) Mâ@nikya Nandi's (800 A.D.) Parîk@sâmukha sûtra, and
Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra of Deva Sûri (1159 A.D.) and
Prameyakamalamârta@n@da of Prabhâcandra deserve special notice.
Pramâ@nasamuccaya and Nyâyapraves'a of Di@nnâga (500 A.D.),
Pramâ@nayârttika kârikâ and Nyâyabindu of Dharmakîrtti
(650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most
interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l].
The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and
Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on
Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the
present volume.
It is interesting to notice that between the Vâtsyâyana
bhâ@sya and the Udyotakara's Vârttika no Hindu work on logic
of importance seems to have been written: it appears that the
science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and
the Buddhists; and it was Di@nnâga's criticism of Hindu Nyâya
that roused Udyotakara to write the Vârttika. The Buddhist and
the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics
as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we
come to Ga@nges'a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of
importance on Nyâya in the Buddhist style namely Nyâyasâra
of Bhâsarvajña. Other older Hindu works generally treated of
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Indian Logic Medieval School, by Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na,
for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]
310
inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyâya
interest [Footnote ref 1].
The main doctrine of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2].
The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness
took a common-sense view of things, and held that
things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange
themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues
to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by
the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce
an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or
through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence
is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver
did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same.
Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding
environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general
characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things
are testified by experience to be existing.
As the Nyâya-Vais'e@sikas depended solely on experience and
on valid reasons, they dismissed the Sâ@mkhya cosmology, but
accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (bhûtas), earth
(k@siti), water (ap), fire (tejas), and air (marut). These atoms
are eternal; the fifth substance (âkâs'a) is all pervasive and eternal.
It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading
and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests
sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows
itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves
to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf
man though he has the âkâs'a as his sense of hearing, cannot hear
on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense
organ [Footnote ref 3]. In addition to these they admitted the existence
of time (kâla) as extending from the past through the present to the
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Almost all the books on Nyâya and Vais'e@sika referred to
have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be
acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should
refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyâya in Bengal," by Mr.
Cakravarttî in J.A.S.B. 1915.]
[Footnote 2: I have treated Nyâya and Vais'e@sika as the same system.
Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded
since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some
minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those
of the other. The original character of the two systems has already
been treated.]
[Footnote 3: See Nyâyakandalî, pp. 59-64.]
311
endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could
have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account
for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sâ@mkhya
did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit
of kâla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its
own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms
and their movements. The appearance of kâla as a separate entity
is a creation of our buddhi (buddhinirmâ@na) as it represents the
order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But
kâla in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is regarded as a substance existing by
itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself
as past, present, and future. Sâ@mkhya regarded it as past, present,
and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things
in its different manifesting stages of evolution (adhvan)_. The
astronomers regarded it as being clue to the motion of the planets.
These must all be contrasted with the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika conception
of kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless
substance which appears as many in association with the changes
related to it [Footnote ref l].
The seventh substance is relative space (dik). It is that substance
by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the
right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kâla like dik is
also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight
directions and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighth
substance is the soul (âtman) which is all-pervading. There are
separate âtmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings
of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to âtman. Manas (mind) is
the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory;
all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are
generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the
objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with
the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling,
or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have
a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience
is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not
simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyakandalî, pp. 64-66, and Nyâyamañjarî, pp.
136-139. The Vais'e@sika sûtras regarded time as the cause of things
which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.]
[Footnote 2: See Nyâyakandalî, pp. 66-69, and Nyayamañjarî, p. 140.]
312
of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas
the other things such as quality (gu@na), action (karma), sameness
or generality (sâmânya), speciality or specific individuality
(vis'e@sa) and the relation of inherence (samavâya) cannot show
themselves without the help of substance (dravya). Dravya is thus the
place of rest (âs'rayâ) on which all the others depend (âs'@rta).
Dravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa, and samavâya are the six original
entities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1].
When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and
a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way
of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics
and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any
passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and
attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref
2]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to
reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor
dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands
of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The
entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying
principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there
must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the
percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types
or categories (padârtha), and held that the notion of each type
was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in
number—dravya, gu@na, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red
book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which
rests the concept of "redness" and "oneness," and we thus call the
book a substance (dravya); dravya is thus defined as that which
has the characteristic of a dravya (dravyatva). So also gu@na and
karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the
same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with
Sâ@mkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Abhâva (negation) as dependent on bhâva (position) is
mentioned in the Vais'e@sika sûtras. Later Nyâya writers such as
Udayana include abhâva as a separate category, but S'rîdhara a
contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhâva was not
counted by Pras'astapâda as it was dependent on bhâva—"abhâvasya
prthaganupades'a@h bhâvapâratantryât na tvabhâvât." Nyâyakandalî,
p. 6, and Lak@sa@nâvalî, p. 2.]
[Footnote 2: "Tattvato jñâte@su bâhyâdhyâtmike@su vi@saye@su
do@sadars'anât viraktasya samîhâniv@rttau âtmajñasya tadarthâni
karmânyakurvatah tatparityâgasâdhanâni s'rutism@rtyuditâni
asa@nkalpitaphalâni upâdadânasya âtmajñânamabhyasyata@h
prak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacaye sati
paripakvâtmajñânasyâtyantikas'arîraviyogasya bhâvât." Ibid. p. 7.]
313
whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika would collect "all whiteness" under the name
of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed [Footnote ref l].
They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate
mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions
could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or
not; but whenever they found that there were some experiences
which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate
entities or categories.
The six Padârthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sâmânya,
Vis'e@sa, Samavâya.
Of the six classes of entities or categories (padârtha) we have
already given some account of dravya [Footnote ref 2]. Let us now turn to
the others. Of the qualities (gu@na) the first one called rûpa
(colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone
and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue,
yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (citra). Colours are
found only in k@siti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are
permanent (nitya}, but the colour of k@siti changes when heat
is applied, and this, S'rîdhara holds, is due to the fact that
heat changes the atomic structure of k@siti (earth) and thus the
old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour
is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rûpa is the general
name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus rûpatva
(colourness), and the rûpa gu@na (quality) is that on which
rests this genus; rûpa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended
by the eye.
The second is rasa (taste), that quality of things which can be
apprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent
(ka@tu), astringent (ka@sâya) and bitter (tikta). Only k@siti and ap
have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like
rûpa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must
be distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are
apprehended by the tongue.
The third is gandha (odour), that quality which can be
apprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to k@siti alone. Water
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The reference is to Sautrântika Buddhism, "yo yo
vruddhâdhyâsavân nâsâveka@h." See Pa@n@ditâs'oka's Avayavinirâkarana,
Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts.
[Footnote 2: The word "padârtha" literally means denotations of words.]
314
or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence
of earth materials.
The fourth is spars'a (touch), that quality which can be apprehended
only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold,
hot, neither hot nor cold. Spars'a belongs to k@siti; ap, tejas, and
vâyu. The fifth s'abda (sound) is an attribute of âkâs'a. Had there
been no âkâs'a there would have been no sound.
The sixth is sa@mkhyâ (number), that entity of quality belonging
to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three,
etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative
oscillatory state of the mind (apek@sâbuddhi); thus when there are
two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion—This is one jug and
that is another jug. This is called apek@sâbuddhi; then in the
two jugs there arises the quality of twoness (dvitva) and then an
indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa-dvitva-gu@na) of dvitva in us
and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs.
The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a
similar manner [Footnote ref 1].
The seventh is parimiti (measure), that entity of quality in
things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and
speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is
called parima@n@dala parimâ@na; it is eternal, and it cannot generate
the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely;
when two atoms generate a dyad (dvya@nuka) it is not
the measure of the atom that generates the a@nu (atomic) and
the hrasva (small) measure of the dyad molecule (dvya@nuka),
for then the size (parimâ@na) of it would have been still smaller
than the measure of the atom (parima@n@dala), whereas the
measure of the dya@nuka is of a different kind, namely the
small (hrasva) [Footnote ref 2]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but
then the number (sa@mkhyâ) of the atom should be regarded as
bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (hrasva)
measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dya@nuka)
compose a trya@nuka the number and not the measure "small"
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: This is distinctively a Vais'e@sika view introduced by
Pras'astapâda. Nyâya seems to be silent on this matter. See S'a@nkara
Mis'ra's Upaskâra, VII. ii. 8.]
[Footnote 2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms
as eternal as in "paramâ@nus" and non-eternal as in the dvya@nuka. The
parima@n@dala parimâ@na is thus a variety of a@nuparimâ@na. The
a@nuparimâ@na and the hrasvaparimâ@na represent the two dimensions of
the measure of dvya@nukas as mahat and dîrgha are with reference
to trya@nukas. See Nyâyakandalî, p. 133.]
315
(hrasva) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (mahat)
of the trya@nuka. But when we come to the region of these gross
trya@nukas we find that the "great" measure of the trya@nukas is
the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by
them. For as many trya@nukas constitute a gross body, so much
bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya@nukas
of mahat parimâ@na makes things of still more mahat parimâ@na.
The measure of trya@nukas is not only regarded as mahat
but also as dîrgha (long) and this dîrgha parimâ@na has to be admitted
as coexisting with mahat parimâ@na but not identical, for
things not only appear as great but also as long (dîrgha). Here
we find that the accumulation of trya@nukas means the accumulation
of "great" (mahat) and "long" (dîrgha) parimâ@na, and hence
the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater
and longer than the individual atoms which composed them.
Now the hrasva parimâ@na of the dyads is not regarded as having
a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct
type of measure which is called small (hrasva). As accumulation
of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness,
grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the
hrasva (small) parim_a@na ought to generate still more hrasva
parim_a@na, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of
the dyads was the cause of the measure of the trya@nukas, the
trya@nukas should be even smaller than the dya@nukas. So also if
the atomic and circular (parima@n@dala) size of the atoms is regarded
as generating by their measure the measure of the dya@nukas,
then the measure of the dya@nukas ought to be more atomic
than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should
not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced
by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be
regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign
to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the
cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness
and the parima@n@dala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to
generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect.
But since the dyads and the trya@nuka molecules are seen to
be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are
not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued
that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the
measure of their effects, but it is their number which is the cause
316
of the measure of the latter. This explains a@nuparimâ@na, hrasva
parimâ@na, mahat parimâ@na, and dîrgha parimâ@na. The parimâ@na
of âkâs'a, kâla, dik and âtman which are regarded as all-pervasive,
is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimâ@nas
of the atoms, âkâs'a, kâla, dik, manas, and âtman are regarded
as eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parimâ@nas as belonging to
non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.
The eighth is p@rthaktva (mutual difference or separateness of
things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things
appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is
perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation
such as this jug is not this pot.
The ninth is sa@myoga (connection), that entity of gu@na by
virtue of which things appear to us as connected.
The tenth is vibhâga (separation), that entity of gu@na which
destroys the connection or contact of things.
The eleventh and twelfth gu@nas, paratva and aparatva, give
rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote
and near.
The other gu@nas such as buddhi(knowledge),sukha (happiness),
du@hkha (sorrow), icchâ (will), dve@sa (antipathy or hatred) and
yatna (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.
The characteristic of gurutva (heaviness) is that by virtue of
which things fall to the ground. The gu@na of sneha (oiliness)
belongs to water. The gu@na of sa@mskâra is of three kinds, (i) vega
(velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions,
(2) sthiti-sthâpaka (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing
tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) bhâvanâ
is that quality of âtman by which things are constantly practised or by
which things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref l].
Dharma is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy
happiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 2]. Adharma is
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda says that bhâvanâ is a special characteristic
of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which
things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through
unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India),
repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the
sa@mskâra becomes particularly strong. See Nyâyakandalî, p. 167.
Ka@nâda however is silent on these points. He only says that by a
special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the sa@mskâra,
memory (sm@rti) is produced (ix. 2. 6).]
[Footnote 2: Pras'astapâda speaks of dharma (merit) as being a quality
of the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admit
that dharma is a power of karma (nakarmasâmarthyam). Sacrifice etc.
cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generate
the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action
is destroyed its power (sâmarthya) cannot last. So dharma is to be
admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct
which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions
of time, place, etc. Faith (s'raddhâ), non-injury, doing good to all
beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of
anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods,
fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of
duties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by
Pras'astapâda as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to
these duties and the yamas and niyamas (cf. Patañjali's Yoga) and
attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padârthas attains a dharma
which brings liberation (mok@sa). S'rîdhara refers to the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga
account of the method of attaining salvation (Nyâyakandalî, pp. 272-280).
See also Vallabha's Nyâyalilâvatî, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)]
317
the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a
man to suffer. Ad@r@s@ta or destiny is that unknown quality of
things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and
arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with
their merits or demerits.
Karma means movement; it is the third thing which must
be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or gu@na. There
are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction,
(4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of
karmas rest on substances just, as the gu@nas do, and cause the
things to which they belong to move.
Sâmânya is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect
of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite
of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of
them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows.
In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all
perceived as sat or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness,
which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gu@na,
and karma. This sameness is called sâmânya or jâti, and it is
regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gu@na, or
karma. This highest genus sattâ (being) is called parajâti (highest
universal), the other intermediate jâtis are called aparajâti (lower
universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gu@na, or
still more intermediate jâtis such as gotvâjâti (the genus cow),
nîlatvajâti (the genus blue). The intermediate jâtis or genera
sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as
pas'utva (animal jâti) and gotva (the cow jâti); here however
gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jâti.
The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jâti which
from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.
318
This jâti or sâmânya thus must be regarded as having a separate
independent reality though it is existent in dravya, gu@na and
karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent
reality of sâmânya, but said that the sameness as cow
was really but the negation of all non-cows (apoha). The perception
of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this
is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who
should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent
reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns
on his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika said that negation
of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived
as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained
by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Sâmânya has
thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as
sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that
object [Footnote ref l]. This jâti is eternal or non-destructible, for even
with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jâti, the
latter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2].
Through vis'e@sa things are perceived as diverse. No single
sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees
with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the
existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves.
The, specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated
souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The Buddhist Panditâs'oka says that there is no single thing
running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the
sâmânya could be established, for if it did exist then we could have
known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action
of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If
there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish
jâti in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the
action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should
require one common factor to hold them together, then these should
require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum.
Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent
(yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat). Sâmânya is
such, therefore sâmânya is non existent. No sâmânya can be admitted to
exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past
experiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed and
transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no sâmânya
can be pointed out as being externally perceptible
—Sâmânyadûsanadikprasaritâ—in Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts. The Vedanta
also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know
jâti as a separate substance. So it discards jâti. See Vedântaparibhâsâ,
Sikhamani and Mamprabhâ, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's
_Khan@danakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086.]
[Footnote 2: Similarity (sâdrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category,
for it is defined as identity in difference (tadbhinnatve sati
tadgatabhûyodharmavattvam).]
319
is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the
yogins who can perceive them.
Samavâya, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation
by virtue of which two different things such as substance and
attribute, substance and karma, substance and sâmânya, karana
(cause) and kârya (effect), atoms and vis'e@sa, appear so unified
that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality.
This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why
substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jâti in substance
and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they
are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place
between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected
and may later on be connected (yutasiddha), such as when I put
my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances
and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na by
virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavâya
however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and
gu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as
one inseparable whole (ayutasiddha). This relation is thus a
separate and independent category. This is not regarded as
many like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal because
it has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed
but the samavâya relation which was never brought into being
by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].
These six things are called the six padârthas or independent
realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.
The Theory of Causation.
The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika in most of its speculations took that
view of things which finds expression in our language, and which
we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The Vedânta does not admit the existence of the relation of
samavâya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance
and qualities). Thus S'a@nkara says (Brahma-sûtrabhâ@sya II. ii. 13)
that if a samavâya relation is to be admitted to connect two different
things, then another samavâya would be necessary to connect it with
either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that
another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (anavasthâ).
Nyâya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to
remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of
anavasthâ—prâmâ@nikî (valid infinite, as in case of the question
of the seed and the tree, or of the avidyâ and the passions), and another
aprâmâ@nikî anavasthâ (vicious infinite) as when the admission of
anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]
320
they admitted dravya, gu@na, karma and sâmânya, Vis'e@sa they
had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did
not admit that things were continually changing their qualities,
and that everything could be produced out of everything by a
change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms.
In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the
effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that
the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the
accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the
wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed
the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent
before but was newly produced. This is what is called the
doctrine of asatkâryavâda. This is just the opposite of the
Sâ@mkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed nâbhâvo
vidyate sata@h) and that the non-existent could never be
produced (nâsato vidyate bhâvah). The objection to this view is
that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible
things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika answer is that the view is not that anything
that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced
was non-existent [Footnote ref 1].
It is held by Mîmâ@msâ that an unseen power resides in the
cause which produces the effect. To this Nyâya objects that this
is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for
there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental
operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained
by molecular movement (parispanda). There is nothing
except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence)
between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of
an antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what
succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well
(anyathâsiddhis'ûnyasya niyatâpûrvavarttitâ). Unconditionality
and invariability are indispensable for kâryakâra@na-bhâva or
cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or
adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also
be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only
collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional
upon something else (na svâtantrye@na). The potter's stick is an
unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Nyâyamuñjari, p. 494.]
321
of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment
or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is
not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be
regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable
antecedents or what enters into the production of their
co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they
are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those
of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the
sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably
precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and âkâs'a (ether) as the
substrate and vâyu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into
the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional
antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration
of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the
conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent
of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar),
the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the
potter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be
unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally
all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with
or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded
as causal conditions. Thus Dr. Seal in describing it rightly
remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to
complete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral,
secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the
irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of
energy. This test the Nyâya would accept only in the sense of
an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (parispanda
eva bhautiko vyâpâra@h karotyartha@h atîndriyastu vyâparo
nâsti. Jayanta's Mañjari Âhnika I), but would emphatically
reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious
causal power or efficiency (s'akti) [Footnote ref 1]." With Nyâya all
energy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyâya—its
insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations
of the different causal conditions—that these operations are of
the nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds
to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy,
i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely
repudiates the Sâ@mkhya conception of power or productive
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, 1909, pp. 249-250.]
322
efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (atîndriya) and finds
nothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complements
of operative conditions (kâra@na-sâmagrî), and nothing
in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results
from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions [Footnote ref 1].
Certain general conditions such as relative space (dik), time
(kâla), the will of Îs'vara, destiny (ad@r@s@ta) are regarded
as the common cause of all effects (kâryatva-prayojaka). Those are
called sâdhâra@na-kâra@na (common cause) as distinguished from the
specific causes which determine the specific effects which are called
sâdhâra@na kâra@na. It may not be out of place here to notice that
Nyâya while repudiating transcendental power (s'akti) in the mechanism
of nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of
metaphysical conditions like merit (dharma), which constitutes a
system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical
systems and order of nature.
The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species,
is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained
only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in
presence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from
a certain a priori principle like that of causality or identity of
essence [Footnote ref 2].
The material cause such as the clay is technically called the
samavâyi-kâra@na of the jug. Samavâya means as we have seen
an intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A kâra@na is called
samavâyi when its materials are found inseparably connected
with the materials of the effect. Asamavâyi-kâra@na is that which
produces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of
the samavâyi or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of
the colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the
colour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay
in inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This
colour of the clay is thus called the asamavâyi cause of the jug.
Any quality (gu@na) or movement which existing in the samavâya
cause in the samavâya relation determines the characteristics of
the effect is called the asamavâyi-kâra@na. The instrumental
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, 1909, pp. 249-250.]
[Footnote 2: See for this portion Dr B.N. Seal's Positive Sciences of the
Ancient Hindus, pp. 263-266. Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha on Buddhism.
Nyâyamañjarî Bhâ@sâ-pariccheda, with Muktâvalî and Dinakarî, and
Tarkas@mgraha. The doctrine of Anyathâsiddhi was systematically
developed from the time of Ga@nges'a.]
323
nimitta and accessory (sahakâri) causes are those which help the
material cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheel
and the stick may be regarded as the nimitta and the sahakãri
causes of the effect.
We know that the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika regards the effect as nonexistent,
before the operation of the cause in producing it, but it
holds that the gu@nas in the cause are the causes of the gu@nas in
the effect, e.g. the black colour of the clay is the cause of the
black colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as an
extraneous cause to generate other qualities; thus when a clay
jug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though the
colour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another important
exception is to be found in the case of the production of
the parimâ@nas of dvya@nukas and trasare@nus which are not produced
by the parimâ@nas of an a@nu or a dya@nuka, but by their
number as we have already seen.
Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti).
The doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems
except the Mîmâ@msâ [Footnote ref 1]. According to the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika
view Îs'vara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings
desires to bring about dissolution (sa@mhâreccho bhavati). Simultaneously
with it the ad@r@s@ta force residing in all the souls and
forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act
(s'akti-pratibandha). As a result of this no further bodies, senses,
or other products come into being. Then for the bringing about
of the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of Îs'vara)
the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations
as bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to
the disintegrated atomic state, then all ap, then all tejas and then
all vâyu. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associated
with dharma, adharma and past impressions (sa@mskâra) remain
suspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know that
souls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless,
non-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connected
with bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity of
manas. In the state of pralaya owing to the ad@r@s@ta of souls the
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The doctrine of pralaya and s@r@s@ti is found only in later
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika works, but the sûtras of both the systems seem to be
silent on the matter.]
324
atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the
part of Îs'vara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to
give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings.
At the time of creation, Îs'vara wishes to create and this desire
of Îs'vara works in all the souls as ad@r@s@ta. This one eternal
desire of Îs'vara under certain conditions of time (e.g. of pralaya)
as accessory causes (sahakâri) helps the disintegration of atoms
and at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process
of integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation.
When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called
ad@r@s@ta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this
ad@r@s@ta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play.
At the time of creation action first begins in the vâyu atoms by
the kinetic function of this ad@r@s@ta, by the contact of the souls
with the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact
with one another and the dvya@nukas are formed and then in a
similar way the trya@nukas are formed, and thus vâyu originates.
After vâyu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of water
atoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earth
atoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the
gross form, the god Brahmâ and all the worlds are created by
Îs'vara and Brahmâ is directed by Îs'vara to do the rest of the
work. Brahmâ thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of
the fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. Îs'vara brings
about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good
of all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they
may lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for
the attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover Îs'vara
arranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of
pains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in
our ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes
or punishments according to good or bad deeds [Footnote ref 1]. Many Nyâya
books do not speak of the appointment of a Brahmâ as deputy
for supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma
according to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya and
creation were brought about in accordance with the karma of
men, or that it may be due to a mere play (lîlâ) of Îs'vara.
Îs'vara is one, for if there were many Îs'varas they might quarrel.
The will of Îs'vara not only brings about dissolution and creation,
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyakandalî, pp. 48-54.]
325
but also acts always among us in a general way, for without it
our karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of
pleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the
exterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen.
The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions.
Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications
take place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire
(icchâ) of Îs'vara may thus be compared with the icchâ of Îs'vara
as we find it in the Yoga system.
Proof of the Existence of Îs'vara.
Sâ@mkhya asserts that the teleology of the prak@rti is sufficient
to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The
Mîmâ@msakas, the Cârvâkas, the Buddhists and the Jains all
deny the existence of Îs'vara (God). Nyâya believes that Îs'vara
has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing
atoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If
this be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement
must also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is
Îs'vara. This world is not momentary as the Buddhists suppose,
but is permanent as atoms, is also an effect so far as it is a
collocation of atoms and is made up of parts like all other individual
objects (e.g. jug, etc.), which we call effects. The world
being an effect like any other effect must have a cause like any
other effect. The objection made against this view is that such
effects as we ordinarily perceive may be said to have agents
as their causes but this manifest world with mountains, rivers,
oceans etc. is so utterly different in form from ordinary effects
that we notice every day, that the law that every effect must have
a cause cannot be said to hold good in the present case. The
answer that Nyâya gives is that the concomitance between two
things must be taken in its general aspect neglecting the specific
peculiarities of each case of observed concomitance. Thus I had
seen many cases of the concomitance of smoke with fire, and had
thence formed the notion that "wherever there is smoke there is
fire"; but if I had only observed small puffs of smoke and small
fires, could I say that only small quantities of smoke could lead
us to the inference of fire, and could I hold that therefore large
volumes of smoke from the burning of a forest should not be
sufficient reason for us to infer the existence of fire in the forest?
326
Thus our conclusion should not be that only smaller effects
are preceded by their causes, but that all effects are invariably
and unconditionally preceded by causes. This world therefore
being an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is
Îs'vara. This cause we cannot see, because Îs'vara has no visible
body, not because he does not exist. It is sometimes said that
we see every day that shoots come out of seeds and they are
not produced by any agent. To such an objection the Nyâya
answer is that even they are created by God, for they are also
effects. That we do not see any one to fashion them is not
because there is no maker of them, but because the creator cannot
be seen. If the objector could distinctly prove that there was
no invisible maker shaping these shoots, then only could he point
to it as a case of contradiction. But so long as this is not done
it is still only a doubtful case of enquiry and it is therefore legitimate
for us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shoots
as well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause.
This cause is Îs'vara. He has infinite knowledge and is all merciful.
At the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like our
father who is always engaged in doing us good [Footnote ref 1].
Tht Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Physics.
The four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms.
These have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), viscosity
(or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour,
taste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation of
heat. Âkâs'a (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less being
only as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travel
wave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combination
is only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannot
exist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmospheric
air however consists of atoms in an uncombined state.
Two atoms combine to form a binary molecule (dvya@nuka). Two,
three, four, or five dvya@nukas form themselves into grosser molecules
of trya@nuka, catura@nuka, etc. [Footnote ref 2]. Though this was the
generally current view, there was also another view as has been pointed
out by Dr B.N. Seal in his Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, that
the "atoms have also an inherent tendency to unite," and that
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Jayanta's Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 190-204, and Udayana's
Kusumâñjali with Prakâs'a and Îs'varânumâna of Raghunâtha.]
[Footnote 2: Kadâcit tribhirârabhyate iti trya@nukamityucyate, kadâcit
caturbhirârabhyate kadâcit pañcabhiriti yathe@s@ta@m kalpanâ.
Nyâyakandalî, p. 32.]
327
they do so in twos, threes, or fours, "either by the atoms falling into
groups of threes, fours, etc., directly, or by the successive addition
of one atom to each preceding aggregate [Footnote ref l]." Of course the
atoms are regarded as possessed of an incessant vibratory motion. It
must however be noted in this connection that behind this
physical explanation of the union of atoms there is the ad@r@s@ta, the
will of Îs'vara, which gives the direction of all such unions in harmony
with the principle of a "moral government of the universe,"
so that only such things are produced as can be arranged for the
due disposal of the effects of karma. "An elementary substance
thus produced by primary atomic combination may however suffer
qualitative changes under the influence of heat (pâkajotpatti)"
The impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a dvya@nuka into the
atoms and transforms the characters of the atoms determining
them all in the same way. The heat particles continuing to impinge
reunite the atoms so transformed to form binary or other
molecules in different orders or arrangements, which account for
the specific characters or qualities finally produced. The Vais'e@sika
holds that there is first a disintegration into simple atoms, then
change of atomic qualities, and then the final re-combination,
under the influence of heat. This doctrine is called the doctrine
of pîlupâka (heating of atoms). Nyâya on the other hand thinks
that no disintegration into atoms is necessary for change of qualities,
but it is the molecules which assume new characters under the
influence of heat. Heat thus according to Nyâya directly affects
the characters of the molecules and changes their qualities without
effecting a change in the atoms. Nyâya holds that the
heat-corpuscles penetrate into the porous body of the object and
thereby produce the change of colour. The object as a whole is
not disintegrated into atoms and then reconstituted again, for
such a procedure is never experienced by observation. This is
called the doctrine of pi@tharapâka (heating of molecules). This
is one of the few points of difference between the later Nyâya
and Vais'e@sika systems [Footnote ref 2].
Chemical compounds of atoms may take place between the
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Utpala's commentary on Brhatsamh@itâ I. 7.]
[Footnote 2: See Dr B.N. Seal in P.C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, pp. 190-191,
Nyâyamañjarî, p 438, and Udyotakara's Vârttika. There is very little
indication in the Nyâya and Vais'e@sika sûtras that they had any of
those differences indicated here. Though there are slight indications of
these matters in the Vais'e@sika sûtras (VII. 1), the Nyâya sûtras are
almost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theory
of creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place after
Vâtsyâyana.]
328
atoms of the same bhûta or of many bhûtas. According to the
Nyâya view there are no differences in the atoms of the same
bhûta, and all differences of quality and characteristics of the
compound of the same bhûta are due only to diverse collocations
of those atoms. Thus Udyotakara says (III. i. 4) that there is no
difference between the atom of a barley seed and paddy seed,
since these are all but atoms of earth. Under the continued impact
of heat particles the atoms take new characters. It is heat and
heat alone that can cause the transformations of colours, tastes
etc. in the original bhûta atoms. The change of these physical
characters depends on the colours etc. of the constituent substances
in contact, on the intensity or degree of heat and also on the
species of tejas corpuscles that impinge on the atoms. Heat breaks
bodies in contact into atoms, transforms their qualities, and forms
separate bodies with them.
Pras'astapâda (the commentator of Vais'e@sika) holds that in
the higher compounds of the same bhûta the transformation takes
place (under internal heat) in the constituent atoms of the compound
molecules, atoms specially determined as the compound
and not in the original atoms of the bhûta entering into the composition
of the compound. Thus when milk is turned into curd,
the transformation as curd takes place in the atoms determined
as milk in the milk molecule, and it is not necessary that the
milk molecule should be disintegrated into the atoms of the
original bhûta of which the milk is a modification. The change
as curd thus takes place in the milk atom, and the milk molecule
has not to be disintegrated into k@siti or ap atoms. So again in
the fertilized ovum, the germ and the ovum substances, which in
the Vais'e@sika view are both isomeric modes of earth (with accompaniments
of other bhûtas) are broken up into homogeneous earth
atoms, and it is these that chemically combine under the animal
heat and biomotor force vâyu to form the germ (kalala). But
when the germ plasm develops, deriving its nutrition from the
blood of the mother, the animal heat breaks up the molecules of
the germ plasm into its constituent atoms, i.e. atoms specifically
determined which by their grouping formed the germ plasm.
These germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with the atoms of
the food constituents and thus produce cells and tissues [Footnote ref 1].
This atomic contact is called ârambhaka-sa@myoga.
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Dr B.N. Seal's Positive Sciences, pp. 104-108, and
Nyâyakandalî, pp. 33-34, "S'arîrârambhe paramânava eva kâra@nam na
s'ukra-s'onitasannipâta@h kriyâvibhâgâdinyâyena tayorvinâs'e sati
utpannapâkajai@h paramâ@nubhirârambhât, na ca s'ukras'onitaparamâ@nûnâ@m
kas'cidvis'e@sa@h pârthivatvâvis'e@sât….Pitu@h s'ukra@m mâtuh s'onita@m
tayos sannipâtânantara@m ja@tharânalasambandhât s'ukra-s'onitârambhake@su
paramâ@nu@su pûrvarûpâdivinâs'e samâ@nagu@nântarotpattau
dvya@nukâdikrame@na kalalas'arirotpatti@h tatrântahkara@napraves'o…tatra
mâturâhâraraso mâtrayâ sa@mkrâmate, ad@r@s@tavas'âttatra
punarja@tharânalasambandhât kalalârambhakaparamâ@nu@su
kriyâvibhâgadinyâyena kalalas'arîre na@s@te samutpannapâkajai@h
kalalârambhakaparamâ@nubhirad@r@s@tavas'âd
upajâtakriyairâhâraparamâ@nitbhi@h saha sambhûya
s'arîrântaramârakkyate.".]
329
In the case of poly-bhautik or bi-bhautik compounds there is
another kind of contact called upa@s@tambha. Thus in the case of
such compounds as oils, fats, and fruit juices, the earth atoms
cannot combine with one another unless they are surrounded by
the water atoms which congregate round the former, and by the
infra-atomic forces thus set up the earth atoms take peculiar
qualities under the impact of heat corpuscles. Other compounds
are also possible where the ap, tejas, or the vâyu atoms form the
inner radicle and earth atoms dynamically surround them (e.g.
gold, which is the tejas atom with the earth atoms as the surrounding
upa@s@tambhaka). Solutions (of earth substances in ap)
are regarded as physical mixtures.
Udayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all the
stores of heat required for chemical change. But there are
differences in the modes of the action of heat; and the kind of
contact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemical
action which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from what
transforms flavour or taste.
Heat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitely
small particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions rectilineally
with inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate through
the interatomic space as in the case of the conduction of heat, as
when water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparency
light rays penetrate through the inter-atomic spaces with parispanda
of the nature of deflection or refraction (tiryag-gamana).
In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound
back—which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike the
atoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform
the physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recombine
them, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable
velocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemical
combination [Footnote ref l]. Govardhana a later Nyâya writer says that
pâka means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Dr Seal's Positive Sciences of the Hindus.]
330
changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates
or changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the
same a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When
grass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of
heat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into
such forms as those that belong to milk [Footnote ref 1].
In the Nyâya-Vais`e@sika system all action of matter on matter
is thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (prayatna) is
distinguished from all forms of motion as against the Sâ@mkhya
doctrine which considered everything other than puru@sa (intelligence)
to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore
to be subject to vibratory motion.
The Origin of Knowledge (Pramâ@na).
The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the
most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We
have already seen that Sâ@mkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing
that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the
object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was
then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or puru@sa.
The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to
a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence
of the self.
Nyâya-Vais`e@sika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage
of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably,
and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (sâmagrî)
which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well
as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted
and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus
called pramâ@na or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge
[Footnote ref 2]. None of the separate elements composing
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Govardhana's Nyâyabodhinî on Tarkasa@mgraha, pp. 9, 10.]
[Footnote 2: "Avyabhicârinîmasandigdhârthopalabdhi@m vidadhatî
bodhâbodhasvabhâvâ sâmagrî pramâ@nam." Nyâyamañjarî, p. 12.
Udyotakara however defined "pramâ@na" as upalabdhihetu (cause of
knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have
followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyâpâra or movement of
the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with
them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vâcaspati says: "siddhamindriyâdi,
asiddhañca tatsannikar@sâdi vyâpârayannutpâdayan kara@na eva caritârtha@h
kar@na@m tvindriyâdi tatsannikar@sâdi vâ nânyatra caritarthamiti
sâk@sâdupalabdhâveva phale vyâprîyate." Tâtparya@tîkâ, p. 15. Thus it
is the action of the senses as pramâ@na which is the direct cause of
the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken
place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as
causes in some sense. "Pramât@rprameyayo@h. pramâne
caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetu@h.
Pramât@rprameye tu phaloddes'ena prav@rtte iti taddhetû kathañcit."
Ibid. p. 16.]
331
the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only
their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for
sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal
collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of
course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated
from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the
preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly.
These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate
cognition as qualification (vis'e@sa@na) in determinate perceptions,
the knowledge of li@nga in inference, the seeing of similar things in
upamâna, the hearing of sound in s'abda) but also the assemblage
of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception,
capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for
the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements
all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce
further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations
that is called pramâ@na.
Nyâya argues that in the Sâ@mkhya view knowledge originates
by the transcendent influence of puru@sa on a particular
state of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does
not belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains
within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept
(knowledge). The puru@sa to whom the knowledge belongs, however,
neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as
it always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendental
contact of the puru@sa with buddhi is but a mere semblance
or appearance or illusion, then the Sâ@mkhya has to admit
that there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge
is false. And since all knowledge is false, the Sâ@mkhyists have
precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.
There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine
that simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the
knowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the
rise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither
is the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the
knowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is
evident that this view does not explain why knowledge should
332
express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are
both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes
this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the
object. The doctrine of the Vijñâna vâdins, that it is knowledge
alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also
irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and object
in such a manner that knowledge as object should require
the knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case we
might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also
require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on
ad infinitum. Again if pramâ@na be defined as prâpa@na (capacity
of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being
momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot
be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called
pramâ@na. These views moreover do not explain the origin of
knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like
any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same
way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes
intellectual and physical [Footnote ref 1]. There is no transcendent
element involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production
on the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena
are produced [Footnote ref 2].
The four Pramâ@nas of Nyâya.
We know that the Carvâkas admitted perception (pratyak@sa)
alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the
Vais'e@sika admitted two sources, pratyak@sa and inference (anumâna);
Sâ@mkhya added s'abda (testimony) as the third source;
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 12-26.]
[Footnote 2: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Gañges'a,
a later naiyâyika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of
our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with
the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to
successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure
that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be
successful, I call it valid knowledge. Tattvacintâma@ni, K.
Tarkavâgîs'a's edition, Prâmâ@nyavâda.
"The Vais'e@sika sûtras tacitly admit the Vedas as a pramâ@na. The view
that Vais'e@sika only admitted two pramâ@nas, perception and inference, is
traditionally accepted, "pratyak@sameka@mcârvâkâ@h ka@nâdasugatau puna@h
anumânañca taccâpi, etc." Pras'astapâda divides all cognition (buddhi)
as vidyâ (right knowledge) and avidyâ (ignorance). Under avidyâ he
counts sa@ms'aya (doubt or uncertainty), viparyaya (illusion or
error), anadhyavasâya (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who
had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it
may be) and svapna (dream). Right knowledge (vidyâ) is of four kinds,
perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages
(âr@sa). Interpreting the Vais'e@sika sûtras I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI.
i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy
character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in
themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the
trustworthy character of their author. Arthâpatti (implication) and
anupalabdhi (non-perception) are also classed as inference and upamâna
(analogy) and aitihya (tradition) are regarded as being the same as
faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]
333
Nyâya adds a fourth, upamâna (analogy). The principle on which
the four-fold division of pramâ@nas depends is that the causal
collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature
or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is
different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of
our perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda
(testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge
being different in each case, and the manner or conditions
producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be
admitted that inference and s'abda are different pramâ@nas, though
they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyâya
thus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upamâna
within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production
of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different
pramâ@nas [Footnote ref 1].
Perception (Pratyak@sa).
The naiyâyikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which
they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements.
These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic
of that element of which they were composed. Thus the
ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of
âkâs'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The
eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things.
Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects
by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them.
The cognitive senses (vâk, pâni, pâda, pâyu, and upastha) recognized
in Sâ@mkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such
for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the
general motor functions of the body.
Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the
contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error
not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:
Sâmagrîbhedâi phalabhedâcca pramâ@nabheda@h
Anye eva hi sâmagrîphale pratyak@sali@ngayo@h
Anye eva ca sâmagrîphale s'abdopamânayo@h. Nyâyamañjari, p. 33.]
334
as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just
at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate
[Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow,
the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be
counted as perception but as sound-knowledge (s'abda-pramâ@na).
That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact
of the senses with the object is said to be the product of
the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate
(nirvikalpa) and (savikalpa) determinate. Indeterminate perception
is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of
perception in which it appears without any association with name.
Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage
is just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics
and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete
experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their
characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no
association of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the
names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate
perception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyak@sa. If at the time
of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known
to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should
be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that
product is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which results
from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with
the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is
held by the later naiyâyikas that we are not conscious of it
directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first
stage without which the determinate consciousness could not
arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage
in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the
other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception.
The contact of the sense with the object is regarded
as being of six kinds: (1) contact with the dravya (thing) called
sa@myoga, (2) contact with the gu@nas (qualities) through the thing
(sa@myukta-samavâya) in which they inhere in samavâya (inseparable)
relation, (3) contact with the gu@nas (such as colour etc.) in
the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness
(rûpatva), which inhere in the gu@nas in the samavâya relation.
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Gañges'a, a later naiyâyika of great reputation, describes
perception as immediate awareness (pratyak@sasya sâk@sâtkâritvam
lak@sa@nam).]
335
This species of contact is called sa@myukta-samaveta-samavâya,
for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour
is in samavâya relation, and in the specific colour there is the
colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavâya
relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavâya
by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory
sense is âkâs'a and the sound exists in âkâs'a in the samavâya
relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar
kind of contact called samaveta-samavâya. (5) The generic
character of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceived
by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavâya. (6) There is
another kind of contact by which negation (abhâva) is perceived,
namely sa@myukta vis'e@sa@na (as qualifying contact). This is so
called because the eye perceives only the empty space which is
qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation.
Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in
this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug
is only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along
with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen
that Nyâya admits not only the substances and qualities but all
kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly
apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).
The most important thing about the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika theory
of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the
contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception
of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its
usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception
and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and
the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact
between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge
is indeed arthaprakâs'a, revelation of objects, and it is called
perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its
production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with
which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with
the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not
only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with
the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well.
The senses according to Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are material and we have
seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental
(atîndriya) power (s'akti) than that of actual vibratory
336
movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition [Footnote ref 1].
The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence,
but is one which is similar to the effects produced by
the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When
I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch
not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the
universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also
with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The
result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called âlocanajñâna
(sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the
memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character
(sukhasâdhanatvasm@rti) and as a result of that I perceive the
orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character [Footnote ref
2]. It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable
object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception
through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant
cause (sahakâri). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand
the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon
understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though
this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind,
yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact,
it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and
hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive
intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact
and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is
in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process.
Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable
condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses
be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals
associated with them but also with negation. A perception is
erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does
not possess (atasmi@mstaditi) and right knowledge (pramâ) is that
which presents an object with a character which it really has
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:
_Na khalvatîndriyâ s'aktirasmâbhirupagamyate
yayâ saha na kâryyasya sambandhajñânasambhava@h.
Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 69.]
[Footnote 2:
_Sukhâdi manasâ buddhvâ kapitthâdi ca cak@su@sâ
tasya karanatâ tatra manasaivâvagamyate…
…Sambandhagraha@nakâle yattatkapitthâdivi@sayamak@sajam
jñânam tadupâdeyâdijñânaphalamiti bhâ@syak@rtas'cetasi sthitam
sukhasâdhanatvajñânamupâdeyajñânam.
Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.]
337
(tadvati tatprakârakânubhava) [Footnote ref 1]. In all cases of
perceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object,
but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions
that it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as
a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a
desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate
stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus
far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is
concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the
similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream
that it is misapprehended as a stream [Footnote ref 2]. Jayanta observes
that on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing
of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense
is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the
characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by
illusion [Footnote ref 3]. In the case of mental delusions however there is
no sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant
memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions [Footnote ref 4]. This
doctrine of illusion is known as viparîtakhyâti or anyathâkhyâti. What
existed in the mind appeared as the object before us (h@rdaye
parisphurato'rthasya bahiravabhâsanam) [Footnote ref 5]. Later Vais'e@sika
as interpreted by Pras'astapâda and S'rîdhara is in full agreement
with Nyâya in this doctrine of illusion (bhrama or as Vais'e@sika
calls it viparyaya) that the object of illusion is always the right
thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion
consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics [Footnote ref 6].
I have pointed out above that Nyâya divided perception into
two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate)
according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vâcaspati
says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a
particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or
nirvikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the
universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Udyotakara's Nyâyavârttika, p. 37, and Ga@nges'a's
Tattvacintâma@ni, p. 401, Bibliotheca Indica.]
[Footnote 2: "Indriye@nâlocya marîcîn uccâvacamuccalato nirvikalpena
g@rhîtvâ pas'câttatropaghâtado@sât viparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayo
bhrânto jâyate tasmâdvijñânasya uvabhicâro nârthasya, Vâcaspati's
Tâtparyatîkâ," p. 87.]
[Footnote 3: Nyâyamañjarî, p. 88.]
[Footnote 4: Ibid. pp. 89 and 184.]
[Footnote 5: Ibid. p. 184.]
[Footnote 6: Nyâyakandalî, pp. 177-181, "S'uktisa@myuktenendriye@na
do@sasahakârinâ rajatasa@mskârasacivena sâd@rs'yamanurundhatâ
s'uktikâvi@sayo rajatâdhyavasâya@h k@rta@h."]
338
it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange."
The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with
the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage,
the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not
as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and
attribute (jâtyâdisvarûpâvagâhi na tu jâtyâdînâ@m mitho
vis'e@sa@navis'e@syabhâvâvagâhîti yâvat) [Footnote ref 1]. He thinks
that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated
with name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in
perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do
not know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary
persons, for the association of the names and relations could be
distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage [Footnote ref 2].
S'rîdhara, in explaining the Vais'e@sika view, seems to be largely
in agreement with the above view of Vâcaspati. Thus S'rîdhara says
that in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived
but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory
of other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification
such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the
universals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not
consciously ordered as "different from this" or "similar to this,"
which can only take place at the savikalpa stage [Footnote ref 3].
Vâcaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others,
but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite
subject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyâya
writers however, following Ga@nges'a, hold an altogether different
opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge
means the knowledge of mere predication without any association
with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers.
But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa
stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual
cognition and not a psychological stage. They would
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Tâtparya@tikâ, p. 81, also ibid. p. 91,
"prathamamâlocito'rtha@h sâmânyavis'e@savân."]
[Footnote 2: Ibid. p.84, "tasmâdvyutpannasyâpi nâmadheyasmara@nâya
pûrvame@sitavyo vinaiva nâmadheyamarthapratyaya@h."]
[Footnote 3: _Nyâyakandalî,_p. 189 ff., "ata@h savikalpakamicchatâ
nirvikalpakamapye@sitavyam, tacca na sâmânyamâtram g@rh@nâti bhedasyâpi
pratibhâsanât nâpi svalak@sa@namâtram sâmânyâkârasyâpi sa@mvedanât
vyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandhânâcca, kintu sâmânya@m
vis'e@sañcobhayamapi g@rh@nâti yadi paramida@m sâmânyamayam vis'e@sa@h
ityeva@m vivicya na pratyeti vastvantarânusandhânavirahât,
pi@ndântarânuv@rttigraha@nâddhi sâmânya@m vivicyate,
vyâv@rttigraha@nâdvis'e@soyamiti viveka@h."]
339
not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible
to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a
quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate
(vis'i@s@tavais'i@styajñânam prati hi vis'e@sa@natâvacchedakaprakâra@m
jñâna@m kâra@na@m) [Footnote ref 1]. So, before any determinate knowledge
such as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it must
be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the
indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected
with universality or any other relations (jâtyâdiyojanârahita@m
vais'i@s@tyânavagâhi ni@sprakârakam nirvikalpaka@m) [Footnote ref 2].
But this stage is never psychologically experienced (atîndriya)
and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic
conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate
with a subject. Thus Vis'vanâtha says in his Siddhântamuktâvalî,
"the cognition which does not involve relationing
cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know
the jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower,
the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of
jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the
predicative quality (vis'e@sa@natâvacchedaka) of the predicate 'jug'
which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the
knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative
quality, the content [Footnote ref 3]." But in order that the knowledge
of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at
which the universal or the pure predication should be known
and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though
not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably
necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an
universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be
related to the particular with which it is associated.
But both the old and the new schools of Nyâya and Vais'e@sika
admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which
the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary
particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universals
and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the
perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced
by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception
consists in the attribution of jâti (universal), gu@na (quality),
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Tattvacintâma@ni p. 812.]
[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 809.]
[Footnote 3: Siddhântamuktâvalî on Bhâ@sâpariccheda kârikâ, 58.]
340
kriyâ (action), nâma (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref
1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are
not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication
of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the
false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the
quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a
thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The
same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different
from that which moves. But name is completely different
from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified,
and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it
was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are
altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now
as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference
of the Nyâya ontological position with that of the Buddhists,
for we know that Nyâya and Vais'e@sika believe jâti, gu@na
and kriyâ to be different from substance and therefore the predicating
of them of substance as different categories related to it
at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as
erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vâcaspati replies that the
memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make
the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot
in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated
until the second stage through the joint action of memory
is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in
order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in
mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated
with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there
cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the
Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should
identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which
was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual
perception. To this Vâcaspati says that through the help of
memory or past impressions (sa@mskâra) this can be considered
as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be
the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 93-100, "Pañca caite kalpanâ bhavanti
jâtikalpanâ, gu@nakalpanâ, kriyâkalpanâ, nâmakalpanâ dravyakalpanâ ceti,
tâs'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanât kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanât
kalpanâ ucyante." See Dharmakîrtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4.
See also pp. 409-410 of this book.]
341
present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an
effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an
object of past experience refers to a past time and place and
is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with
an object which is experienced at the present moment. It
has to be admitted that Vâcaspati's answer is not very satisfactory
for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception
which was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see
that early Nyâya-Vais'e@sika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception
as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and
differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with
the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual
development of perception as the progressive effects of causal
operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the
self and the object under the influence of various intellectual
(e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes,
it does not, like Vedânta, require that right perception should only
give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation
as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon
the variety of causal collocations.
Mind according to Nyâya is regarded as a separate sense
and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy
and will. The later Nyâya writers speak of three other kinds
of contact of a transcendental nature called sâmânyalak@sa@na,
jñânalak@sa@na and yogaja (miraculous). The contact sâmânyalak@sa@na
is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a
particular we are transcendentally (alaukika) in contact with all
the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding
universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and
through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated
with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all
smoke in general. Jñânalak@sa@na contact is that by virtue of which
we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving
by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of
sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only,
but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact
of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental
contact (alaukika sannikar@sa) by virtue of which this is rendered
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Tâtparya@tîkâ, pp. 88-95.]
342
possible is called jñânalak@sa@na. But the knowledge acquired by
these two contacts is not counted as perception [Footnote ref l].
Pleasures and pains (sukha and du@hkha) are held by Nyâya
to be different from knowledge (jñâna). For knowledge interprets,
conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to
appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel
that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot
be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then
that experience which generates sukha in one should have generated
the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should
have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not
happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might
not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's
sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain,
it is evident that there must be some differences between the
pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different,
and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case
was associated with sukha and in another case with du@hkha,
This shows that sukha and du@hkha are not themselves knowledge.
Such is the course of things that sukha and du@hkha are generated
by the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through
or in association with other objects either in direct perception or
in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in
the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be
remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes
in their production.
The yogins are believed to have the pratyak@sa of the most
distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power
by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive
the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their
mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions
of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may
have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Siddhântamuktâvalî on Kârikâ 63 and 64. We must remember
that Ga@nges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in the
Nyâya sûtra which we have discussed above, and held that perception
should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character
of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception
as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle
(Tattvacintâma@ni, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him
as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the
definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by
Udyotakara as mentioned above.]
343
and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhânajñâna,
which is also to be regarded as a pratyak@sa directly
by the mind. This is of course different from the other form
of perception called mânasa-pratyak@sa, by which memories of
past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept
visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive
that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the
eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual
percept with it. According to Vedânta this acquired perception
is only a case of inference. The prâtibha-pratyak@sa however is
that which is with reference to the happening of a future event.
When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective
cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to
the self by the mind as "I know this pot." This is effected by
the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition
which had already been generated in the soul. This second
reperception is called anuvyavasâya, and all practical work can
proceed as a result of this anuvyavasâya [Footnote ref. l].
Inference.
Inference (anumâna) is the second means of proof (prâmâ@na)
and the most valuable contribution that Nyâya has made has
been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a
thing on the strength of the mark or liñga which is associated
with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember
that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire
in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically
called liñga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been
made (the hill in this example) is called pak@sa, and the term
"fire" is called sâdhya. To make a correct inference it is
necessary that the hetu or liñga must be present in the pak@sa,
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: This later Nyâya doctrine that the cognition of self in
association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be
contrasted with the triputîpratyak@sa doctrine of Prabhâkara, which
holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously
in knowledge. Vyavasâya (determinate cognition), according to Ga@nges'a,
gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am
aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding
the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasâya (cognition), "_idamaha@m
jânâmîti vyavasâye na bhâsate taddhakendriyasannikar@sâbhâvât
kintvida@mvi@sayakajñânatvavis'i@s@tasya jñânasya vais'i@styamâtmani
bhâsate; na ca svaprakâs'e vyavasâya tâd@rs'a@m svasya vais'i@s@tya@m
bhâsitumarhati, pûrva@m vis'e@sa@nasya tasyâjñânât, tasmâdidamaha@m
jânâmiti na vyavasâya@h kintu anuvyavasâyah." Tattvacintâma@ni, p. 795.]
344
and in all other known objects similar to the pak@sa in having the
sâdhya in it (sapak@sa-sattâ), i.e., which are known to possess the
sâdhya (possessing fire in the present example). The liñga must
not be present in any such object as does not possess the
sâdhya (vipak@sa-vyâv@rtti absent from vipak@sa or that which does
not possess the sâdhya). The inferred assertion should not be
such that it is invalidated by direct perception {pratyak@sa) or
the testimony of the s'âstra (abâdhita-vi@sayatva). The liñga
should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way
could also be possible (asat-pratipak@sa). The violation of any
one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu
as determining the inference, and thus would only make the
hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvâbhâsa or
seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made.
Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible
is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the
pak@sa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvâbhâsa is technically
called asiddha-hetu. Again, hetvâbhâsa of the second type,
technically called viruddha-hetu, may be exemplified in the case
that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being
created" is present in the opposite of sâdhya {vipak@sa), namely
non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality
which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type,
technically called anaikântika-hetu, is found in the case that
sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "being
an object of knowledge" (prameyatva) is here the hetu, but it is
present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sâdhya), as well
as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the
sâdhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the
sâdhya is not absolute (anaikântika). A fallacy of the fourth
type, technically called kâlâtyayâpadi@s@ta, may be found in the
example—fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc.
Here pratyak@sa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is
fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called prakara@nasama, is to be
found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same
time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-eternal,
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Nyâya did not believe in the
doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mîmâ@msâ did. Eternality
of sound meant with Mîmâ@msâ the theory that sounds existed as eternal
indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under
certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of
movement of the vocal muscles.]
345
since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like
âkâs'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.
The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against
inference by the Cârvâkas, that inferential arguments are
valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity
of nature in two relations, viz. tâdâtmya (essential
identity) and tadutpatti (succession in a relation of cause and
effect). Tâdâtmya is a relation of genus and species and not
of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer
that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related
to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of
the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a
pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity
(tâdâtmya). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of
succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.
Nyâya holds that inference is made because of the invariable
association (niyama) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance of
which with the sâdhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions
noted above) with the sâdhya, and not because of such specific
relations as tâdâtmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the
inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the
essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument
that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well;
for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both
ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a
pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with
those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential
identity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark)
with the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama.
The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect)
is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the
case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of
other types of inference, where the association as cause and
effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is
inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the
li@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted
above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].
We perceived in many cases that a li@nga (e.g. smoke) was
associated with a li@ngin (fire), and had thence formed the notion
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamañjari on anumâna.]
346
that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we
perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered
the concomitance (vyâpti) of smoke and fire which we had
observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill,
which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we
concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the
li@nga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its
concomitance with fire (_t@rtîya-li@nga-parâmars'a) is thus the cause
(anumitikara@na or anumâna) of the inference (anumiti). The
concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called vyâpti. When
this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with
those having fire, it is called bahirvyâpti; and when it refers to the
conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any
relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was
observed, it is called antarvyâpti. The Buddhists since they did
not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyâpti
view of concomitance to bahirvyâpti as a means of inference [Footnote ref
1].
Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference
will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign
(hetu) with the signate (sâdhya), how are we to assure ourselves in
each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (vyâptigraha)
had been correct, and the observation of concomitance
had been valid. The Mîmâ@msâ school held, as we shall see in
the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case
in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases
I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there
was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire.
But Nyâya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where
there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in
all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any
smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should
be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire
should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically
called anvayavyâpti and the latter vyatirekavyâpti. But even this
is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a
hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have
been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but
it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance,
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Antarvyâptisamarthana, by Ratnâkaras'ânti in the Six
Buddhist Nyâya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica, 1910.]
347
or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It
may be that one might never have observed smoke without an
antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even
that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in
a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass
produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained
the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately
followed by the disappearance of smoke (yasmin sati bhavanam
yato vinâ na bhavanam iti bhuyodars'ana@m, Nyâyamañjarî,
p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of
concomitance (vyâpti} between the ass and the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. But
of course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the
above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu,
and there might be some other condition (upâdhi) associated
with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire
in green wood (ârdrendhana) produced smoke, but one might
doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced
smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it.
But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged
in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would
have to be dispensed with (vyâghâta). Thus such doubts as
lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or
unsettle the notion of vyâpti or concomitance at which we
had arrived by careful observation and consideration [Footnote ref 2]. The
Buddhists and the naiyâyikas generally agreed as to the method
of forming the notion of concomitance or vyâpti (vyâptigraha),
but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance
always depended on a relation of cause and effect
or of identity of essence, whereas Nyâya held that neither the
relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of
genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was
quite a number of other types of inference which could not be
brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the
tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening
other things would happen could certainly exist, even
without the supposition of an identity of essence.
But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often
have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Tâtparya@tîkâ on anumâna and vyâptigraha.]
[Footnote 2: Tâtparya@tîkâ on vyâptigraha, and Tattvacintâma@ni of
Ga@nges'a on vyâptigraha.]
348
infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyâya holds however
that though different causes are often found to produce
the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one
effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its
other attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found
that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other
effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy
downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water
of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of
the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits
that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the
rise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street
of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances,
the special manner in which the water flows by small
rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was
due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we
see that Nyâya relied on empirical induction based on uniform
and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists
assumed a priori principles of causality or identity of essence.
It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyâya
works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves
assured that there was no such upâdhi (condition) associated with
the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but
that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sâdhya in
a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce
smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to
produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition
(upâdhi) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on
account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and
so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in
the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so
in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the
validity of vyâpti, it is necessary that we must be assured that
there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned
the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide
experience (bhûyodars'ana).
Pras'astapâda in defining inference as the "knowledge of that
(e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of
the reason" described a valid reason (li@nga) as that which is connected
with the object of inference (anumeya) and which exists
wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases
349
where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyâya
qualifications of _pak@sasattva, sapak@sasattva and vipak@sâsattva of
a valid reason (hetu). Pras'astapâda further quotes a verse to say
that this is the same as what Kâs'yapa (believed to be the family
name of Ka@nâda) said. Ka@nâda says that we can infer a cause
from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one
thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition
or in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We
can infer by a reason because it is duly associated
(prasiddhipûrvakatva) with the object of inference. What this
association was according to Ka@nâda can also be understood for
he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association,
the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred
or it has no concomitance with it (aprasiddha) or it has a doubtful
existence sandigdha). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has
horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns.
Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for
there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though
a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The
first fallacy is a combination of pak@sâsattva and sapak@sâsattva,
for not only the present pak@sa (the ass) had no horns, but no
horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipak@sasattva,
for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus,
it seems that when Pras'astapâda says that he is giving us the view
of Ka@nâda he is faithful to it. Pras'astapâda says that wherever
there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke.
When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the
smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that
there is fire. But with regard to Ka@nâda's enumeration of types of
inference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect
from the cause," etc., Pras'astapâda holds that these are not the
only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing
the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection
such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides
inference into two classes, d@r@s@ta (from the experienced characteristics
of one member of a class to another member of the same
class), and sâmânyato d@r@s@ta. D@r@s@ta (perceived resemblance) is
that where the previously known case and the inferred case is
exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point
out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of
flesh on its neck (sâsnâ), I can whenever I see the same hanging
350
mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But
when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended
to a different class of objects, it is called sâmânyato d@r@s@ta.
Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded
with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests,
namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with
the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of
heaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (svanis'citârtha)
is expressed in five premisses for convincing others
who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then
the inference is called parârthânumâna. We know that the distinction
of svârthânumâna (inference for oneself) and parârthânumâna
(inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists.
Pras'astapâda does not make a sharp distinction of two classes
of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be
conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is
called parârthânumâna. But this need not be considered as an
entirely new innovation of Pras'astapâda, for in IX. 2, Ka@nâda
himself definitely alludes to this distinction (asyeda@m
kâryyakâra@nasambandhas'câvayavâdbhavati). The five premisses which are
called in Nyâya pratijñâ, hetu d@r@s@tânta, upanaya, and nigamana
are called in Vais'e@sika pratijñâ, apades'a, nidars'ana, anusandhâna,
and pratyâmnâya. Ka@nâda however does not mention the name
of any of these premisses excepting the second "apades'a." Pratijñâ is
of course the same as we have in Nyâya, and the term nidars'ana is
very similar to Nyâya d@r@s@tânta, but the last two are entirely
different. Nidars'ana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence
(e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of
an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has
no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being [Footnote ref l]).
He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example
___________________________________________________________________
{Footnote 1: Dr Vidyâbhû@sa@na says that "An example before the time of
Dignâga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the
understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has
smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asa@nga made the example more serviceable
to reasoning, but Dignâga converted it into a universal proposition, that
is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection
between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery; because
it has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (Indian Logic,
pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vâtsyâyana had an imperfect example
as "like a kitchen" (s'abda@h utpatvidharmakatvâdanuya@h sthâlyâdivat,
I.i. 36), but Pras'astapâda has it in the proper form. Whether
Pras'astapâda borrowed it from Dig@nnâga or Dig@nnâga from Pras'astapâda
cannot be easily settled.]
351
(nidars'anâbhâsa). Pras'astapâda's contribution thus seems to consist
of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of
the nidars'ana, but the names of the last two premisses are so
different from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable
to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional
Vais'e@sika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely
indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being
pursued in Vais'e@sika circles independently of Nyâya. There is
no reason however to suppose that Pras'astapâda borrowed anything
from Di@nnâga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes,
for, as I have shown above, most of Pras'astapâda's apparent innovations
are all definitely alluded to by Ka@nâda himself, and
Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the
question of the fallacies of nidars'ana, unless it is definitely proved
that Di@nnâga preceded Pras'astapâda, there is no reason whatever
to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former [Footnote ref 1].
The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most
important part of inference. Vâtsyâyana says that an inference
can be made by the sight of the li@nga (reason or middle) through
the memory of the connection between the middle and the major
previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it
is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the
connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded
as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to
inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is
li@ngaparâmars'a, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the
minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major,
for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection,
but the present perception of the middle associated with
the memory of the connection (sm@rtyanug@rhîto li@ngaparâmars'o).
But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance.
Udyotakara's criticisms of Di@nnâga as shown by Vâcaspati have
no reference to this point The doctrine of tâdâtmya and tadutpatti
was therefore in all probability a new contribution to
Buddhist logic by Dharmakîrtti. Dharmakîrtti's contention was
that the root principle of the connection between the middle and
the major was that the former was either identical in essence
with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a
mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya with Nyâyakandalî, pp. 200-255.]
352
the desired connection [Footnote ref 1]. Vâcaspati in his refutation of
this view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a
separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedence
such that there being fire there is smoke and there being
no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with
perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the
smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless
it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated,
it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately
preceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of
argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is
known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke
can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time
and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many
cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause
and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this
morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of
identity of essence (tâdâtmya as in the case of the pine and the
tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be
inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any
inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described
in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are
naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when
such is the case, though we may not know any further about the
nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former
and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under
certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there
may always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate
the validity of inference. To this Vâcaspati's answer is that if
even after observing a large number of cases and careful search
such conditions (upâdhi) cannot be discovered, we have to take
it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural
connection between the middle and the major. The later
Buddhists introduced the method of Pañcakâra@nî in order to
determine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions
determining the causal relation are (1) neither the cause nor the
effect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate
succession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Kâryyakâra@nubhâvâdvâ svabhâvâdva niyâmakât avinâbhâvaniyamo'
dars'anânna na dars'anât. Tâtparya@tîkâ, p. 105.]
353
immediate succession the effect disappears. But this method
cannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of cause
and effect relation; and if by the assumption of a cause-effect
relation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is better
to accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effect
relation [Footnote ref 1].
In early Nyâya books three kinds of inference are described,
namely pûrvavat, s'e@savat, and sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta. Pûrvavat is the
inference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from
heavy dark clouds; s'e@savat is the inference of causes from effects,
e.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river; sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta
refers to the inference in all cases other than those of
cause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the
tamarind from its form and colour. Nyâyamañjarî mentions
another form of anumâna, namely paris'e@samâna (reductio ad
absurdum), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. consciousness)
of any other thing (e.g. âtman), because it was already
definitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any
other part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to
anything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of
these variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely
that of the inference of the probandum (sâdhya) by virtue of the
unconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called
the vyâpti-niyama. In the new school of Nyâya (Navya-Nyâya)
a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an
important place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalânvayi, and
kevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the
vyâpti has been observed by a combination of a large number of
instances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence,
as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever
there is smoke there is fire (anvaya), and where there is no fire,
there is no smoke (vyatireka)). An inference could be for one's
own self (svârthânumâna) or for the sake of convincing others
(parârthânumâna). In the latter case, when it was necessary that
an inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner,
live propositions (avayavas) were regarded as necessary, namely
pratijña (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), udâhara@na
(where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen),
upanaya (this hill has smoke), niga@mana (therefore it has got
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâya@na's bhâsya, Udyotakara's Vârttika and
Tâtparyya@tîkâ, I.i. 5.]
354
fire). Kevalânvayi is that type of inference, the vyâpti of which
could not be based on any negative instance, as in the case
"this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge
(ida@m, vâcyam prameyatvât)." Now no such case is known which
is not an object of knowledge; we cannot therefore know of any
case where there was no object of knowledge (prameyatva) and
no name (vâcyatva); the vyâpti here has therefore to be based
necessarily on cases of agreement—wherever there is prameyatva
or an object of knowledge, there is vâcyatva or name.
The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances
in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the
inference that earth differs from other elements in possessing
the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from
other elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident
that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the
concomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There
is only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our
inference—earth differs from other elements, since it has the
special qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in
those cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such
special traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone.
Upamâna and S'abda.
The third pramâ@na, which is admitted by Nyâya and not by
Vais'e@sika, is upamâna, and consists in associating a thing unknown
before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some
other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never
seen a wild ox (gavaya) goes to the forest, asks a forester—"what
is gavaya?" and the forester replies—"oh, you do not
know it, it is just like a cow"; after hearing this from the
forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to
be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya.
This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its
similarity to a known thing is called upamâna. If some forester
had pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him
that it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have
known the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would
have been due to testimony (_s'abda-prama@na). The knowledge is
said to be generated by the upamâna process when the association
of the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer
355
on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknown
animal to a known one. The naiyâyikas are thorough
realists, and as such they do not regard the observation of
similarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind.
Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the
association of the name in accordance with the perception of
similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is
called upamâna [Footnote ref 1].
S'abda-pramâ@na or testimony is the right knowledge which
we derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful
persons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the
Vedas were uttered by Îs'vara himself. The Vedas give us
right knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the
utterances of the infallible Îs'vara. The Vais'e@sikas did not admit
s'abda as a separate pramâ@na, but they sought to establish the
validity of testimony (s'abda) on the strength of inference (anumiti)
on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible
person. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly
corroborated by the Vais'e@sika sûtras, which tacitly admit the
validity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this
was how Vais'e@sika was interpreted in later times.
Negation in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika.
The problem of negation or non-existence (abhâva) is of great interest
in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only
from the point of view of perceptibility. Kumârila [Footnote ref 2]
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamañjarî on upamâna. The oldest Nyâya view was that
the instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the association
of the name "wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself
"upamâna." When Pras'astapâda held that upamâna should be treated as a
case of testimony (âptavacana), he had probably this interpretation
in view. But Udyotakara and Vâcaspati hold that it was not by the
instruction alone of the forester that the association of the name
"wild ox" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and
the memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is the
perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories
that lead us to this association called upamâna. What Vâtsyâya@na
meant is not very clear, but Di@nnâga supposes that according to
him the result of upamâna was the knowledge of similarity or the
knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vâcaspati of course holds that
he has correctly interpreted Vâtsyâya@na's intention. It is however
definite that upamâna means the associating of a name to a new object
(samâkhyâsambandhapratipattirupamânârtha@h, Vâtsyâya@na). Jayanta
points out that it is the preception of similarity which directly
leads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of
the forester cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently
it cannot be classed under testimony (s'abda). See Pras'astapâda
and Nyâyakandalî, pp. 220-22, Vâtsyâya@na, Udyotakara, Vâcaspati and
Jayanta on Upamâna.]
[Footnote 2: See Kumârila's treatment of abhâva in the S'lokavârttika,
pp. 473-492.]
356
and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the
next chapter, hold that negation (abhâva) appears as an intuition
(mânam) with reference to the object negated where there are no
means of ordinary cognition (pramâ@na) leading to prove the existence
(satparicchedakam) of that thing. They held that the notion
"it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is no
contact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when
we turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the non-existence
of a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and
the non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see
neither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged
that if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say
the same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even
then since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-contact,
which is absent in the other case, we could never say
that both are grasped by perception. We see the ground and
remember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises
the notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual
perception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were
no tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence
at the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he
is asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where
he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware
of the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even
without perceiving the place and without any operation of the
memory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of
there being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence,
for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind,
and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could
be regarded as a reason (li@nga), for the non-perception of the jug
is related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no
concomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and
its non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of
non-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same difficulty
about the notion of non-existence (abhâva) which was sought
to be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be
admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process
of knowledge. Nyâya however says that the perception of
non-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception
of one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g.
357
there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the
ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug
arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and
there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground
should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of
the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due
to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug
is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle
that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact
with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or
non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even
without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance,
and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact.
It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required
in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation
or non-existence of other places which are far away from him.
To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary
that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a
thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only
be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as
well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehension
of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to
be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-existence
but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived
before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence
(e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (abhâva) can thus, according
to Nyâya, generate its cognition just as any positive
existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere
vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not,"
as position (bhâva) is what generates the cognition "it is."
The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold
that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with
specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now);
but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think
that negation could thus be associated with them in any
relation. There is also no relation between the negation and its
pratiyogi (thing negated—e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for
when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there
is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the
relation of opposition (virodha), for we could have admitted it, if
358
the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug,
for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without
effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negation
is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the
nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it
will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it
will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or
that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception,
e.g. (1) svabhâvânupalabdhi (natural non-perception—there
is no jug because none is perceived); (2) kâra@nânupalabdhi
(non-perception of cause—there is no smoke here, since there is
no fire); (3) vyâpakânupalabdhi (non-perception of the species—there
is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) kâryânupalabdhi
(non-perception of effects—there are not the causes of smoke here,
since there is no smoke); (5) svabhâvaviruddhopalabdhi (perception
of contradictory natures—there is no cold touch here because
of fire); (6) viruddhakâryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory
effects—there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7)
virudhavyâptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance—past is not of necessity
destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) kâryyaviruddhopalabdhi
(opposition of effects—there is not here the causes
which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi
(opposite concomitants—there is no touch of snow here,
because of fire); (10) kâra@naviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes—there
is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire);
(11) kâra@naviruddhakâryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes—this
place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it
is full of smoke [Footnote ref 1]).
There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation,
but that does not prove that there is any reason for the
cognition of negation (heturnâbhâvasamvida@h). All that we can
say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use
(yogyatâ) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyatâ
is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage
as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort.
Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of
negation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions
which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive
perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyabindu, p. 11, and Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 53-7.]
359
leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug
(anupalambha@h abhâva@m vyavahârayati) [Footnote ref 1].
The Nyâya reply against this is that the perception of positive
existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we
have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said
that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception
of the ground without the jug. But is this being without
the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then
it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even
when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over
the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a
distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground
with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground,
without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter
much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negation
is apprehended by perception as much as any positive
existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different;
just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects
there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of
negation with space and time with which it appears associated is
the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality
(vis'e@sya vis'e@sa@na). The relation between the negation and its
pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is
the other is not. The Vais'e@sika sûtra (IX. i. 6) seems to take abhâva
in a similar way as Kumârila the Mima@msist does, though the
commentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2]. In Vais'e@sika
the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) prâgabhâva (the
negation preceding the production of an object—e.g. of the jug
before it is made by the potter); (2) dhva@msâbhâva (the negation
following the destruction of an object—as of the jug after it is
destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) anyonyâbhâva (mutual
negation—e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, pp. 34 ff., and also Nyâyamañjarî,
pp. 48-63.]
[Footnote 2 Pras'astapâda says that as the production of an effect is the
sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign
of its non-existence, S'rîdbara in commenting upon it says that the
non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (li@nga) of its
non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for
he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses
(bhâvavad abhâvo'pîndriyagraha@nayogyah) and that there is an actual
sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the
preception of non-existence (abhâvendriyasannikar@so'pi
abhâvagraha@nasâmagrî), Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 225-30.]
360
in the horse that of the cow); (4) atyantâbhâva (a negation which
always exists—e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in
other places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1].
The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices
for the seeker of Salvation.
It is probable that the Nyâya philosophy arose in an atmosphere
of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence
of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do
not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are
tarka, nir@naya, vâda, jalpa, vita@n@dâ, hetvâbhâsa, chala,
jâti and nigrahasthâna.
Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern
its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of
some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not
inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right
conclusion. When there is doubt (sa@ms'aya) about the specific
nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nir@naya means the
conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two
opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the
doctrines that there is or is not an âtman, in which each of them
tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is
called a vâda. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants
give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents.
A jalpa is called a vita@n@dâ when it is only a destructive
criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without
seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvâbhâsas
are those which appear as hetus but are really not so. Nyâya
sûtras enumerate five fallacies (hetvâbhâsas) of the middle (hetu):
savyabhicâra (erratic), viruddha (contradictory), prakara@nasama
(tautology), sâddhyasama (unproved reason) and kâlâtîta (inopportune).
Savyabhicâra is that where the same reason may prove
opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible
like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because
it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha
is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a
jug is eternal, because it is produced); prakara@nasama is that
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The doctrine of negation, its function and value with
reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects,
and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.]
361
where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form
(e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of
eternality); sâdhyasama is that where the reason itself requires
to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion,
but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not);
kâlâtîta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not
tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that
sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the
drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and
the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour
is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was
already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the
case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the
stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal.
The later Nyâya works divide savyabhicâra into three classes,
(1) sâdhâra@na or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is
an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire
is also an object of knowledge), (2) asâdhâra@na or too restricted
(e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this
cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the
sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasa@mhârin or unsubsuming
(e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of
knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be
found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion
may also be drawn). The fallacy satpratipak@sa is that in
which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite
conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is
non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy asiddha (unreal)
is of three kinds (i) âs'rayâsiddha (the lotus of the sky is fragrant
because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in
the sky), (2) svarûpâsiddha (sound is a quality because it is
visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) vyâpyatvâsiddha is that
where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence
is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because
there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red
hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated
with smoke. The fallacy bâdhita is that which pretends to prove
a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot
because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the
fallacies counted by Vais'e@sika. Contrary to Nyâya practice
362
Pras'astapâda counts the fallacies of the example. Di@nnâga also
counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is
incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms;
but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakîrtti counted also the
fallacies of the pak@sa (minor); but Nyâya rightly considers that
the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard
inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the
intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the
purpose of defeating him. Jâti consists in the drawing of contradictory
conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with
the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthâna
means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving
self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is
conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious
opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating
tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical
work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to
emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his Nyâyamañjarî that these
had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant
disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils.
If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the
pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow,
and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding
onward for the attainment of mok@sa should acquire these devices
for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge
of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyâya sûtra as
being necessary for the attainment of salvation [Footnote ref l].
The doctrine of Soul.
Dhûrtta Cârvâkas denied the existence of soul and regarded
consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were
other Cârvâkas called Sus'ik@sita Cârvâkas who admitted the
existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death.
The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self.
The naiyâyikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics
mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience.
They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing,
etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 586-659, and Târkikarak@sâ of
Varadarâja and Niska@n@taka of Mallinâtha, pp. 185 ff.]
363
some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self
is not proved according to Nyâya merely by the notion of our
self-consciousness, as in the case of Mîmâ@msâ, for Nyâya holds
that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may
be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or
I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot
be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we
cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the
inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to
which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced
as a result of collocations. Never has the production of
âtman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any
destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not
located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at
the same time in all places (vibhu), and does not travel with
the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though
âtman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are
seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation
of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested
or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness
as a result of suitable collocations [Footnote ref l].
Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different
facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than
the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and
pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures
and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be
due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed
in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world
must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as
the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.
Îs'vara and Salvation.
Nyâya seeks to establish the existence of Îs'vara on the basis of
inference. We know that the Jains, the Sâ@mkhya and the Buddhists did
not believe in the existence of Îs'vara and offered many antitheistic
arguments. Nyâya wanted to refute these and prove the existence
of Is'vara by an inference of the sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta type.
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:Jñânasamavâyanibandhanamevâtmanas'cetayit@rtvam, &c. See
Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 432 ff.]
364
The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the
world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never
produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to
this view the Nyâya holds that the world as a whole is also an
effect like any other effect. Many geological changes and landslips
occur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in
nature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but a
result of production. But even if this is not admitted by the
atheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of
the universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a
difference between the order and arrangement of human productions
(e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe;
and therefore from the order and arrangement(sannives'a-vis'i@s@tatâ)
of the universe it could not be argued that the universe was
produced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order and
arrangement that is found in human productions that a creator
or producer could be inferred. To this, Nyâya answers that the
concomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement"
in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not with
specific cases of "order and arrangement," for each specific case
may have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar
other specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same
kind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard
the specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and consider
the concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general.
So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order and
arrangement" in general with "the existence of a creator," and
thus though the order and arrangement of the world may be
different from the order and arrangement of things produced by
man, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would
not be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many
effects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground
without any creator being found to produce them, does not hold,
for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created
by a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has
a creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in
its construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order
and arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an
effect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator.
Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes,
365
so Îs'vara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus
omniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not
require memory; all things are perceived by him directly without
any intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He is
always happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the
karma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or
protects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the
results of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless
can by its will produce changes in our body and through it in
the external world, so Îs'vara also can by his will create the
universe though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any
association of body with Îs'vara is indispensable for our conception
of him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body,
so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of
our body take place, so also by his will changes and movements
are produced in the atoms [Footnote ref l].
The naiyâyikas in common with most other systems of Indian
philosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that
the small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of
sorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (sarva@m
du@hkha@m vivekina@h); the wise therefore is never attached to the
so-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows.
The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (mithyâjñâna)
which consists in thinking as my own self that which
is not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge;
when once the true knowledge of the six padârthas and
as Nyâya says, of the proofs (pramâ@na), the objects of knowledge
(prameya), and of the other logical categories of inference is
attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can
be removed by constant thinking of its opposite (pratipak@sabhâvanâ),
namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any
pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but
pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it
will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction
of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and
ignorance about them (collectively called do@sa, cf. the kles'a of
Patañjali) are also destroyed.
With the destruction of attachment actions (prav@rtti) for the
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote:1: See Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 190-204, Îs'varânumâna of Raghunâtha
S'iro@ma@ni and Udayana's Kusumâñjalî.]
366
fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with
it sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment,
actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the
production of body and its experiences. With the cessation of
sorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of all
its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains
in its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Nyâya-Vais'e@sika
is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a
state of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in
its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness
in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute
happiness (ânanda), though really speaking the state of mukti
can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in
its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain,
knowledge, willing, etc. [Footnote ref 1].
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 499-533.]
MÎMÂ@MSÂ PHILOSOPHY [Footnote ref 1]
A Comparative Review.
The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika philosophy looked at experience from
a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any
such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our
common sense experience should be considered as coming out of
an original universal (e.g. prak@rti of the Sâm@khya). Space, time,
the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are
substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material
things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many
entities which have distinct and separate existence but which
manifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also
karma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and even
the class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering in
substances. Knowledge (jñâna) which illuminates all things is
regarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are
other qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely
as the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is
also viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other
physical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical
circumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the
combination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and
the objects of sense, knowledge (jñâna) is produced. Soul with
Nyâya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc.
inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action,
class notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate entity, as
without it the different entities being without any principle of
relation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction.
Sâ@mkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of an
infinite number of reals of three different types, which by their
combination were conceived to be able to produce all substances,
qualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to exist
between substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: On the meanirg of the word Mîmâ@msâ see Chapter IV.]
368
that these were but so many aspects of a combination of the three
types of reals in different proportions. The reals contained within
them the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge,
willing, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantly
and new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collocations
did not bring about any new thing but brought about a
phenomenon which was already there in its causes in another
form. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with them
merely a form of subtle illuminating matter stuff. Sâ@mkhya holds
however that there is a transcendent entity as pure consciousness
and that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contact
this pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought-matter
into conscious thought or experience of a person.
But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and
separate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly
be demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this has
been pointed out by the Nyâya school in a very strong and
emphatic manner. Even Sâ@mkhya did not try to prove that the
existence of its transcendent puru@sa could be demonstrated in
experience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the
existence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of
a permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing states
of knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle
towards virtue and emancipation. Sâ@mkhya had first supposed
knowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and
then had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as
puru@sa (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here
in some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by
the inadequate analysis of consciousness (buddhi) as being
non-intelligent and incessantly changing.
Nyâya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self
on the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality,
and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis
is again based upon another uncritical assumption that substances
and attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature
of the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was
a quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance
in which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon
the self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their
conclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-conscious
369
thought. Of course it is true that Sâ@mkhya had approached
nearer to this view than Nyâya, but it had separated
the content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it
threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite
unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem
to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification
of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this
could not be done except by what may be regarded as a makeshift—a
transcendent illusion running on from beginningless
time. These difficulties occurred because Sâ@mkhya soared to a
region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common
sense experience. The Nyâya position is of course much worse
as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve anything,
but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could
not be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on
a one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common
sense experience that substances are different from qualities and
actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the
whole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is,
to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary
that the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought
to the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and
an account of experience should be given according to its verdict.
No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores
the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is
a relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction
is ushered in by the Mîmâ@msâ system. The Mîmâ@msâ sûtras
were written by Jaimini and the commentary (bhâ@sya) on it was
written by S'abara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made
by Kumârila, who preceded the great S'a@nkarâcârya, and a disciple
of Kumârila, Prabhâkara.
The Mîmâ@msâ Literature.
It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew
in India in the Brâhma@nas. This system once set up gradually
began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details
of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some
generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of
India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old
rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition
370
had it, and this it seems gave rise to the sm@rti literature. Discussions
and doubts became more common about the many
intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries
into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and
priests. These represent the beginnings of Mîmâ@msâ (lit. attempts
at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were
different schools of this thought. That Jaimini's Mîmâ@msâ sûtras
(which are with us the foundations of Mîmâ@msâ) are only a comprehensive
and systematic compilation of one school is evident from
the references he gives to the views in different matters of other
preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not
available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has
written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it
may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so
masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other
attempts that were made before him. Jaimini's Mîmâ@msâ sûtras
were probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the ground work
of the Mîmâ@msâ system. Commentaries were written on it by
various persons such as Bhart@rmitra (alluded to in Nyâyaratnâkara
verse 10 of S'lokavârttika), Bhavadâsa {Pratijñasûtra 63}, Hari and
Upavar@sa (mentioned in S'âstradîpikâ). It is probable that at least
some of these preceded S'abara, the writer of the famous commentary
known as the S'abara-bhâ@sya. It is difficult to say anything
about the time in which he flourished. Dr Ga@ngânâtha
Jhâ would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current
verse which speaks of King Vikramâditya as being the son
of S'abarasvâmin by a K@sattriya wife. This bhâ@sya of S'abara
is the basis of the later Mîmâ@msâ works. It was commented
upon by an unknown person alluded to as Vârttikakâra by
Prabhâkara and merely referred to as "yathâhu@h" (as they say)
by Kumârila. Dr Ga@nganâtha Jhâ says that Prabhâkara's commentary
B@rhatî on the S'abara-bhâ@sya was based upon the work
of this Vârttikakâra. This B@rhatî of Prabhâkara had another
commentary on it—@Rjuvimâlâ by S'alikanâtha Mis'ra, who also
wrote a compendium on the Prabhâkara interpretation of Mîmâ@msâ
called Prakara@napañcikâ. Tradition says that Prabhâkara
(often referred to as Nibandhakâra), whose views are
often alluded to as "gurumata," was a pupil of Kumârila. Kumârila
Bha@t@ta, who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporary
of S'a@nkara (788 A.D.), wrote his celebrated independent
371
exposition of S'abara's bhâ@sya in three parts known as S'lokavârttika
(dealing only with the philosophical portion of S'abara's
work as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as
Tarkapâda), Tantravârttika (dealing with the remaining three
chapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and
@Tup@tîkâ (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books)
[Footnote ref 1]. Kumârila is referred to by his later followers
as Bha@t@ta, Bha@t@tapâda, and Vârttikakâra. The next great Mîmâ@msâ
scholar and follower of Kumârila was Ma@n@dana Mis'ra, the author of
Vidhiviveka, Mîmâ@msânukrama@nî and the commentator of Tantravârttika,
who became later on converted by S'a@nkara to Vedantism. Pârthasârathi
Mis'ra (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his S'âstradîpikâ,
Tantraratna, and Nyâyaratnamâlâ following the footprints
of Kumârila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumârila,
the names of Sucarita Mis'ra the author of Kâs'ikâ and Somes'vara
the author of Nyâyasudhâ deserve special notice. Râmak@r@s@na
Bha@t@ta wrote an excellent commentary on the Tarkapâda of
S'âstradîpikâ called the Yuktisnehapûra@nî-siddhânta-candrikâ and
Somanâtha wrote his Mayûkhamâlikâ on the remaining chapters
of S'âstradîpikâ. Other important current Mîmâ@msâ works which
deserve notice are such as Nyâyamâlâvistara of Mâdhava, Subodhinî,
Mîmâ@msâbâlaprakâs'a of S'a@nkara Bha@t@ta, Nyâyaka@nikâ of
Vâcaspati Mis'ra, Mîmâ@msâparibhâ@sa by K@r@s@nayajvan,
Mîmâ@msânyâyaprakâs'a by Anantadeva, Gâgâ Bha@t@ta's
Bha@t@tacintâma@ni, etc. Most of the books mentioned here have been
consulted in the writing of this chapter. The importance of the
Mîmâ@msâ literature for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are all
Vedic duties to be performed according to its maxims, but even the
sm@rti literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and rituals
of Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explained
by them. The legal side of the sm@rtis consisting of inheritance,
proprietory rights, adoption, etc. which guide Hindu civil life even
under the British administration is explained according to the
Mîmâ@msâ maxims. Its relations to the Vedânta philosophy will
be briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations with
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika have also been pointed out in various places of this
chapter. The views of the two schools of Mîmâ@msâ as propounded
by Prabhâkara and Kumârila on all the important topics have
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Mahâmahopadhyâya Haraprasâda S'âstrî says, in his
introduction to Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts, that "Kumârila preceded
Sa@nkara by two generations."]
372
also been pointed out. Prabhâkara's views however could not
win many followers in later times, but while living it is said that
he was regarded by Kumârila as a very strong rival [Footnote ref 1]. Hardly
any new contribution has been made to the Mîmâ@msâ philosophy
after Kumârila and Prabhâkara. The Mîmâ@msâ sûtras deal mostly
with the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in
connection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be
gleaned out of them. S'abara's contributions are also slight and
vague. Vârttikakâra's views also can only be gathered from the
references to them by Kumârila and Prabhâkara. What we know
of Mîmâ@msâ philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone.
It did not develop any further after them. Works written on the
subject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do
not know of any work on Mîmâ@msâ written in English except
the excellent one by Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ on the Prabhâkara
Mîmâ@msâ to which I have frequently referred.
The Parata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Nyâya and the
Svata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Mîmâ@msâ.
The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge
(svata@h-prâmâ@nya) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure
of the Mîmâ@msâ philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude
of truth. The Mîmâ@msâ philosophy asserts that all knowledge
excepting the action of remembering (sm@rti) or memory is
valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither
depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other
knowledge for its validity. But Nyâya holds that this self-validity
of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation.
It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge
is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this
knowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive
anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this
visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is
true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumârila, not being able to convert
Prabhâkara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended
that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhâkara whether his burial
rites should be performed according to Kumârila's views or Prabhâkara's.
Prabhâkara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by
him only to rouse up Kumârila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumârila's views
were the right ones. Kumârila then rose up and said that Prabhâkara
was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was
alive. But this has of course no historic value.]
373
it has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and
how can it certify the objective truth of its representation? In
other words, how can my perception "a blue thing" guarantee
that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively
as well? After my perception of anything as blue we do not
have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue
is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot
be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certain
that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but
there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object
from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively
valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify
its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge,
and following our perception of even a mirage we should
never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions,
and this proves that when we practically follow the
directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity,
which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perception
with what we find later on in practical experience. Again,
every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations,
and as such depends upon them for its production, and
hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else.
It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for
validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and
attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People
only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically
in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of
a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with
our perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposes
of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of
knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the
object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (arthakriyâjñâna
or phalajñâna) just as perception or knowledge represented
them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of
knowledge (svata@h-prâmâ@nya), but validity is ascertained by
sa@mvâda or agreement with the objective facts of experience [Footnote
ref l].
It is easy to see that this Nyâya objection is based on the
supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective
collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 160-173.]
374
only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this
theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be
experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations;
we have a perception and immediately we become aware of certain
objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the
objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that
the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis
which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme
prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a
phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we
say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external
collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted
by experience; knowledge only photographs the
objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that
knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is
only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation
to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is
not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and
interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in
things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What
we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the
agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objective
facts never come to us directly, they are always taken
on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty
than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed
different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but
these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this
is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact
before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes
different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for
experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and
not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by
us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts
are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is
what is said to be the self-validity (svata@h-prâmâ@ya) of knowledge
in its production (utpatti). As soon as knowledge is produced,
objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link
between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on
which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing
or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent
375
of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well
(svakâryakara@ne svata@h prâmâ@nya@m jñânasya). Whenever there
is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is
certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work
(prav@rtti} according to its direction. There is no indecision in
our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness
of knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with
it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases
of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which
carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not
valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear
to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we
reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed
itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which
goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man
works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction
that his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper
of mind. This is what Mîmâ@msa means when it says that the
validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though
its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other
data (jñânasya prâ@mâ@nyam svata@h aprâmâ@nya@m parata@h). Knowledge
attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory
experience (bâdhakajñâna) comes in or when our organs etc. are
known to be faulty and defective (_kara@nado@sajñâna). It is from
these that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when
we take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them
not, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of
knowledge certified at the moment of its production need not
be doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find
any defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All
knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently
by itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory
is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon
a previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and
cannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself.
The place of sense organs in perception.
We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it
could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so,
the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in
376
face of the Nyâya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the
ground of diverse sense-contact the Mîmâ@msâ probably could not
afford to remain silent on such an important point. It therefore
accepted the Nyâya view of sense-contact as a condition of knowledge
with slight modifications, and yet held their doctrine of
svata@h-prâmâ@nya. It does not appear to have been conscious of
a conflict between these two different principles of the production
of knowledge. Evidently the point of view from which it looked
at it was that the fact that there were the senses and contacts
of them with the objects, or such special capacities in them by
virtue of which the things could be perceived, was with us a
matter of inference. Their actions in producing the knowledge
are never experienced at the time of the rise of knowledge, but
when the knowledge arises we argue that such and such senses
must have acted. The only case where knowledge is found to
be dependent on anything else seems to be the case where one
knowledge is found to depend on a previous experience or knowledge
as in the case of memory. In other cases the dependence
of the rise of knowledge on anything else cannot be felt, for the
physical collocations conditioning knowledge are not felt to be
operating before the rise of knowledge, and these are only inferred
later on in accordance with the nature and characteristic
of knowledge. We always have our first start in knowledge
which is directly experienced from which we may proceed later
on to the operation and nature of objective facts in relation to it.
Thus it is that though contact of the senses with the objects
may later on be imagined to be the conditioning factor, yet the
rise of knowledge as well as our notion of its validity strikes us
as original, underived, immediate, and first-hand.
Prabhâkara gives us a sketch as to how the existence of
the senses may be inferred. Thus our cognitions of objects are
phenomena which are not all the same, and do not happen always
in the same manner, for these vary differently at different moments;
the cognitions of course take place in the soul which may thus
be regarded as the material cause (samavâyikâra@na); but there
must be some such movements or other specific associations
(asamavâyikâra@na) which render the production of this or
that specific cognition possible. The immaterial causes subsist
either in the cause of the material cause (e.g. in the case of the
colouring of a white piece of cloth, the colour of the yarns which
377
is the cause of the colour in the cloth subsists in the yarns which
form the material cause of the cloth) or in the material cause itself
(e.g. in the case of a new form of smell being produced in a
substance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterial
cause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is put
in the fire and in which the smell is produced). The soul is
eternal and has no other cause, and it has to be assumed that
the immaterial cause required for the rise of a cognition must
inhere in the soul, and hence must be a quality. Then again
accepting the Nyâya conclusions we know that the rise of qualities
in an eternal thing can only take place by contact with some
other substances. Now cognition being a quality which the soul
acquires would naturally require the contact of such substances.
Since there is nothing to show that such substances inhere in
other substances they are also to be taken as eternal. There are
three eternal substances, time, space, and atoms. But time and
space being all-pervasive the soul is always in contact with them.
Contact with these therefore cannot explain the occasional rise
of different cognitions. This contact must then be of some kind
of atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul.
This atom may be called manas (mind). This manas alone by
itself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
effort, etc. The manas however by itself is found to be devoid
of any such qualities as colour, smell, etc., and as such cannot
lead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities; hence
it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterized
by these qualities; for the cognition of colour, the mind will
need the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristic
quality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorous
characteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we know
that the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature must
be one composed of tejas or light, as colour is a feature of light,
and this proves the existence of the organ, the eye—for the cognition
of colour; in a similar manner the existence of the earthly
organ (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), the
âkâs'ic organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ of
touch) may be demonstrated. But without manas none of these
organs is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts have
to be admitted, (1) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of the
sense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the manas
378
with the sense organs, and (4) of the manas with the soul. The
objects of perception are of three kinds,(1) substances, (2) qualities,
(3) jâti or class. The material substances are tangible objects of
earth, fire, water, air in large dimensions (for in their fine atomic
states they cannot be perceived). The qualities are colour, taste,
smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction,
priority, posteriority, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and
effort [Footnote ref l].
It may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion that
Kumârila Bha@t@ta was rather undecided as to the nature of the
senses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says that
the senses may be conceived either as certain functions or
activities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing things
without coming into actual contact with them, or that they might
be entities which actually come in contact with their objects [Footnote ref
2], and he prefers this last view as being more satisfactory.
Indeterminate and determinate perception.
There are two kinds of perception in two stages, the first
stage is called nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and the second savikalpa
(determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its perception
at the first moment of the association of the senses and
their objects. Thus Kumârila says that the cognition that appears
first is a mere âlocana or simple perception, called non-determinate
pertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resembling
the cognitions that the new-born infant has of things around
himself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia is
presented to consciousness; all that is present there is the
individual wherein these two subsist. This view of indeterminate
perception may seem in some sense to resemble the Buddhist
view which defines it as being merely the specific individuality
(svalak@sa@na} and regards it as being the only valid element in
perception, whereas all the rest are conceived as being imaginary
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Prakara@napañcikâ, pp. 53 etc., and Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ's
Prabhâkaramimâ@msâ, pp. 35 etc.]
[Footnote 2: S'lokavârttika, see Pratyak@sasûtra, 40 etc., and
Nyâyaratnâkara on it. It may be noted in this connection that
Sâ@mkhya-Yoga did not think like Nyâya that the senses actually went
out to meet the objects (prâpyakâritva) but held that there was
a special kind of functioning (v@rtti) by virtue of which the
senses could grasp even such distant objects as the sun and the stars.
It is the functioning of the sense that reached the objects. The nature
of the v@rtti is not further clearly explained and Pârthasârathi objects
to it as being almost a different category (tattvântara).]
379
impositions. But both Kumârila and Prabhâkara think that both
the genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate
stage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because
we do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in
contrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus or
differentia; a thing can be cognized as an "individual" only in
comparison with other things from which it differs in certain well-defined
characters; and it can be apprehended as belonging to a
class only when it is found to possess certain characteristic features
in common with some other things; so we see that as other things
are not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept
at the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an
individual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the
characteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are perceived
at the indeterminate stage [Footnote ref 1]. So long as other things are
not remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and
hence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first
stage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past impressions
brings the present perception in relation to past ones
and realizes its character as involving universal and particular. It
is thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate
and the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case
memory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory
in the determinate perception refers to those other objects of
memory and not to the percept. It is also held that though the
determinate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet
since the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not
enter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as
a valid cognition. Kumârila also agrees with Prabhâkara in
holding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception
valid [Footnote ref 2].
Some Ontological Problems connected with the
Doctrine of Perception.
The perception of the class (jâti) of a percept in relation to
other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference
between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems
of jâti and avayavâvayavî (part and whole notion) were
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Compare this with the Vais'e@sika view as interpreted by
S'rîdhara.]
[Footnote 2: See Prakara@napañcikâ and S'âstradîpikâ.]
380
the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering
into discussion about jâti, Prabhâkara first introduced the
problem of avayava (part) and avayavî (whole). He argues as
an exponent of svata@h-prâmâ@nyavâda that the proof of the true
existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness,
and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness
must be admitted to have its existence established. Following
this canon Prabhâkara says that gross objects as a whole exist,
since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material
cause and their connection (sa@myoga) is the immaterial cause
(asamavâyikâra@na), and it is the latter which renders the whole
altogether different from the parts of which it is composed; and
it is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the
whole is perceived. Kumârila holds that it is due to the point of
view from which we look at a thing that we call it a separate
whole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are identical,
but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing
appears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it
from the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing
appears to be a whole of which there are parts (see S'lokavârttika,
Vanavâda) [Footnote ref 1].
Jâti, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, is
different from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in its
entirety in each individual constituting that jâti (vyâs'ajyav@rtti),
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: According to Sâ@mkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity
of the universal and the particular (sâmânyavis'esasamudâyo dravyam,
Vyâsabhâsya, III. 44), for there is no other separate entity which is
different from them both in which they would inhere as Nyaya holds.
Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts
exist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which
they exist close together (mrantarâ hi tadavayavâh), and it is this
latter combination (ayutasiddhâvayava) which is called a dravya, but
here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is the
parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space
between them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as
Panditâs'oka has shown did not believe in any whole (avayavi), it
is the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole
occupying space (paramânava eva hi pararûpades'aparihârenotpannâh
parasparasahitâ avabhâsamânâ desavitânavanto bhavanti). The whole
is thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see Avayavinirâkarana, Six
Buddhist Nyâya Tracts). Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless
(niravayava} and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an
object we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as different from the
parts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid
reason against it:
"adustakaranodbhûtamanâvirbhûtabâdhakam
asandigdañca vijñânam katham mithyeti kathyate."
Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 550 ff.]
381
but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the
argument that jâti should be denied, because it involves the conception
of a whole (class) consisting of many parts (individuals). The
class character or jâti exists because it is distinctly perceived by
us in the individuals included in any particular class. It is eternal
in the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, even
when one of the individuals ceases to exist. When a new individual
of that class (e g. cow class) comes into being, a new
relation of inherence is generated by which the individual is
brought into relation with the class-character existing in other
individuals, for inherence (samavâya) according to Prabhâkara
is not an eternal entity but an entity which is both produced
and not produced according as the thing in which it exists is
non-eternal or eternal, and it is not regarded as one as Nyâya
holds, but as many, according as there is the infinite number of
things in which it exists. When any individual is destroyed, the
class-character does not go elsewhere, nor subsist in that individual,
nor is itself destroyed, but it is only the inherence of
class-character with that individual that ceases to exist. With
the destruction of an individual or its production it is a new
relation of inherence that is destroyed or produced. But the
class-character or jâti has no separate existence apart from the
individuals as Nyâya supposes. Apprehension of jâti is essentially
the apprehension of the class-character of a thing in relation to
other similar things of that class by the perception of the common
characteristics. But Prabhâkara would not admit the existence of
a highest genus sattâ (being) as acknowledged by Nyâya. He
argues that the existence of class-character is apprehended because
we find that the individuals of a class possess some common
characteristic possessed by all the heterogeneous and disparate
things of the world as can give rise to the conception of a separate
jâti as sattâ, as demanded by the naiyâyikas. That all things are
said to be sat (existing) is more or less a word or a name without
the corresponding apprehension of a common quality. Our experience
always gives us concrete existing individuals, but we
can never experience such a highest genus as pure existence or
being, as it has no concrete form which may be perceived. When
we speak of a thing as sat, we do not mean that it is possessed
of any such class-characters as sattâ (being); what we mean
is simply that the individual has its specific existence or svarûpasattâ.
382
Thus the Nyâya view of perception as taking only the
thing in its pure being apart from qualities, etc, (sanmâtra-vi@sayam
pratyak@sa@m) is made untenable by Prabhâkara, as according to
him the thing is perceived direct with all its qualities. According
to Kumârila however jâti is not something different from the
individuals comprehended by it and it is directly perceived.
Kumârila's view of jâti is thus similar to that held by Sâ@mkhya,
namely that when we look at an individual from one point of
view (jâti as identical with the individual), it is the individual that
lays its stress upon our consciousness and the notion of jâti becomes
latent, but when we look at it from another point of view
(the individual as identical with jâti) it is the jâti which presents
itself to consciousness, and the aspect as individual becomes latent.
The apprehension as jâti or as individual is thus only a matter
of different points of view or angles of vision from which we look
at a thing. Quite in harmony with the conception of jâti, Kumârila
holds that the relation of inherence is not anything which is distinct
from the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist,
but only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves
(S'lokavârttika, Pratyak@sasûtra, 149, 150, abhedât samavâyo'stu
svarûpam dharmadharmi@no@h), Kumârila agrees with Prabhâkara
that jâti is perceived by the senses (tatraikabuddhinirgrâhyâ
jâtirindriyagocarâ).
It is not out of place to mention that on the evidence of
Prabhâkara we find that the category of vis'e@sa admitted by the
Ka@nâda school is not accepted as a separate category by the
Mîmâ@msâ on the ground that the differentiation of eternal
things from one another, for which the category of vis'e@sa is
admitted, may very well be effected on the basis of the ordinary
qualities of these things. The quality of p@rthaktva or specific
differences in atoms, as inferred by the difference of things they
constitute, can very well serve the purposes of vis'e@sa.
The nature of knowledge.
All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the
knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether
perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal
the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self
is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded
as perception from the point of view of self. The division
383
of the pramâ@nas as pratyak@sa (perception), anumâna (inference),
etc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with
reference to the varying modes in which they are brought within
the purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illumining
or revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could have
knowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by the
remembrance of dreams. It is knowledge (sa@mvid) that reveals
by its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects.
It is generally argued against the self-illuminative character of
knowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects they
are said to reveal; and if they have the same form we may rather
say that they have the same identical reality too. The Mîmâ@msâ
answer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and the
cognized were not different from one another, they could not
have been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it is
by cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. The
cognition (sa@mvedana) of a person simply means that such a
special kind of quality (dharma) has been manifested in the
self by virtue of which his active operation with reference to
a certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cognition
is that with reference to which the active operation of the
self has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely formless,
for they have the cognitional character by which things are
illumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character than
this, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only are
believed to have forms and only such forms as knowledge reveal
to us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference to
objects that were perceived previously, and of which the impressions
were left in the mind and were aroused by the unseen agency
(ad@r@s@ta). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of remembrance
of that which was previously experienced. Only such of the impressions
of cognized objects are roused in dreams as can beget just that
amount of pleasurable or painful experience, in accordance with the
operation of ad@r@s@ta, as the person deserves to have in accordance
with his previous merit or demerit.
The Prabhâkara Mîmâ@msâ, in refuting the arguments of those
who hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognized
by some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since we
do not experience any such double cognition and also because it
would lead us to a regressus ad infinitum, for if a second cognition
384
is necessary to interpret the first, then that would require a third
and so on. If a cognition could be the object of another cognition,
then it could not be self-valid. The cognition is not of course unknown
to us, but that is of course because it is self-cognized, and
reveals itself to us the moment it reveals its objects. From the
illumination of objects also we can infer the presence of this
self-cognizing knowledge. But it is only its presence that is inferred
and not the cognition itself, for inference can only indicate the
presence of an object and not in the form in which it can be
apprehended by perception (pratyak@sa). Prabhâkara draws a
subtle distinction between perceptuality (sa@mvedyatva) and being
object of knowledge (prameyatva). A thing can only be apprehended
(sa@mvedyate) by perception, whereas inference can only
indicate the presence of an object without apprehending the
object itself. Our cognition cannot be apprehended by any other
cognition. Inference can only indicate the presence or existence
of knowledge but cannot apprehend the cognition itself [Footnote ref 1].
Kumârila also agrees with Prabhâkara in holding that perception
is never the object of another perception and that it ends
in the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception. But he
says that every perception involves a relationship between the
perceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves as
the agent whose activity in grasping the object is known as cognition.
This is indeed different from the Prabhâkara view, that
in one manifestation of knowledge the knower, the known, and
the knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine of
tripu@tîpratyak@sa) [Footnote ref 2].
The Psychology of Illusion.
The question however arises that if all apprehensions are
valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot
be regarded as valid? The problem of illusory perception and
its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian
philosophy. Omitting the theory of illusion of the Jains called
satkhyâti which we have described before, and of the Vedântists,
which we shall describe in the next chapter, there are three
different theories of illusion, viz. (1) âtmakhyâti, (2) viparîtakhyâtî
or anyathâkhyâti, and (3) akhyâti of the Mîmâ@msâ school. The
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Prabhâkaramîmâ@msâ, by Dr Ga@nganâtha Jhâ.]
[Footnote 2: loc. cit. pp. 26-28.]
385
viparîtâkhyâti or anyathâkhyâti theory of illusion is accepted by
the Nyâya, Vais'e@sika and the Yoga, the âkhyâti theory by
Mîmâ@msâ and Sâ@mkhya and the âtmakhyâti by the Buddhists.
The commonest example of illusion in Indian philosophy is
the illusory appearance of a piece of broken conch-shell as a piece
of silver. That such an illusion occurs is a fact which is experienced
by all and agreed to by all. The differences of view are with regard
to its cause or its psychology. The idealistic Buddhists who deny
the existence of the external world and think that there are only
the forms of knowledge, generated by the accumulated karma of
past lives, hold that just as in the case of a correct perception, so
also in the case of illusory perception it is the flow of knowledge
which must be held responsible. The flow of knowledge on account
of the peculiarities of its own collocating conditions generates
sometimes what we call right perception and sometimes wrong
perception or illusion. On this view nothing depends upon the so-called
external data. For they do not exist, and even if they did
exist, why should the same data sometimes bring about the right
perception and sometimes the illusion? The flow of knowledge
creates both the percept and the perceiver and unites them. This
is true both in the case of correct perception and illusory perception.
Nyâya objects to the above view, and says that, if
knowledge irrespective of any external condition imposes upon
itself the knower and the illusory percept, then the perception
ought to be of the form "I am silver" and not "this is silver."
Moreover this theory stands refuted, as it is based upon a false
hypothesis that it is the inner knowledge which appears as coming
from outside and that the external as such does not exist.
The viparîtakhyâti or the anyathâkhyâti theory supposes that
the illusion takes place because on account of malobservation we
do not note the peculiar traits of the conch-shell as distinguished
from the silver, and at the same time by the glow etc. of the
conch-shell unconsciously the silver which I had seen elsewhere
is remembered and the object before me is taken as silver. In
illusion the object before us with which our eye is associated is
not conch-shell, for the traits peculiar to it not being grasped, it
is merely an object. The silver is not utterly non-existent, for it
exists elsewhere and it is the memory of it as experienced before
that creates confusion and leads us to think of the conch-shell as
silver. This school agrees with the akhyâti school that the fact
386
that I remember silver is not taken note of at the time of
illusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enough
to account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definite
positive aspect associated with it, viz. the false identification of
silver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-shell before us.
The âkhyâti theory of Mîmâ@msâ holds that since the special
peculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed, it is erroneous
to say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-shell as
the silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-shell is not cognized
at all. What happens here is simply this, that only the
features common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the perceiver
fails to apprehend the difference between these two things,
and this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certain
weakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by the
common features of the conch-shell and silver is not apprehended,
and the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some past
time that has appeared before him is not perceived; and it is as
a result of this non-apprehension of the difference between the
silver remembered and the present conch-shell that the illusion
takes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of a
dual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such is
different from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly a
matter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as the
difference between the remembrance of silver and the sight of
the present object is not apprehended, the illusory perception
appears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a real
valid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity on
the part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiver
would be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the case
of a real perception. Kumârila agrees with this view as expounded
by Prabhâkara, and further says that the illusory judgment is as
valid to the cognizor at the time that he has the cognition as any
real judgment could be. If subsequent experience rejects it, that
does not matter, for it is admitted in Mîmâ@msâ that when later
experience finds out the defects of any perception it can invalidate
the original perception which was self-valid at the time of its
production [Footnote Ref. 1]. It is easy to see that the Mîmâ@msâ had to
adopt this view of illusion to maintain the doctrine that all cognition
at the moment of its production is valid. The âkhyâti theory
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Prakara@napañcikâ, S'âstradîpikâ, and S'lokavârttika,
sûtra 2.]
387
tries to establish the view that the illusion is not due to any
positive wrong knowledge, but to a mere negative factor of non-apprehension
due to certain weakness of mind. So it is that
though illusion is the result, yet the cognition so far as it is cognition,
is made up of two elements, the present perception and
memory, both of which are true so far as they are individually
present to us, and the cognition itself has all the characteristics of
any other valid knowledge, for the mark of the validity of a cognition
is its power to prompt us to action. In doubtful cognitions also,
as in the case "Is this a post or a man?" what is actually perceived
is some tall object and thus far it is valid too. But when this
perception gives rise to two different kinds of remembrance (of
the pillar and the man), doubt comes in. So the element of apprehension
involved in doubtful cognitions should be regarded
as self-valid as any other cognition.
Inference.
S'abara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation
has been known to exist between two things, we can have the
idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind
of knowledge is called inference. Kumârila on the basis of this
tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice
that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire)
subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent
relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend
upon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also necessary
that the two things (smoke and fire) coexisting in a third
thing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence of
one thing should also be cases involving the existence of the
other, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e.g. fire),
though including all the cases of the existence of the other
(smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter
(smoke) may not exist. When once a permanent relation, whether
it be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity of
the constellation of K@rttikâ with Rohi@nî, where, by the rise of the
former the early rise of the latter may be inferred), or a case of
identity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or
a case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and
a third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of
cases, is perceived, they fuse together in the mind as forming
388
one whole, and as a result of that when the existence of the
one (e.g. smoke) in a thing (hill) is noticed, we can infer the
existence of the thing (hill) with its counterpart (fire). In all
such cases the thing (e.g. fire) which has a sphere extending
beyond that in which the other (e.g. smoke) can exist is called
gamya or vyâpaka and the other (e.g. smoke) vyâpya or gamaka
and it is only by the presence of gamaka in a thing (e.g. hill,
the pak@sa) that the other counterpart the gamya (fire) may be
inferred. The general proposition, universal coexistence of the
gamaka with the gamya (e.g. wherever there is smoke there is
fire) cannot be the cause of inference, for it is itself a case
of inference. Inference involves the memory of a permanent
relation subsisting between two things (e.g. smoke and fire) in a
third thing (e g. kitchen); but the third thing is remembered only
in a general way that the coexisting things must have a place
where they are found associated. It is by virtue of such a memory
that the direct perception of a basis (e.g. hill) with the gamaka
thing (e.g. smoke) in it would naturally bring to my mind that
the same basis (hill) must contain the gamya (i.e. fire) also.
Every case of inference thus proceeds directly from a perception
and not from any universal general proposition. Kumârila holds
that the inference gives us the minor as associated with the major
and not of the major alone, i.e. of the fiery mountain and not of
fire. Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it was
known in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the possessor
of fire, yet the case of the mountain was not anticipated
and the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly new
knowledge (des'akâlâdhikyâdyuktamag@rhîtagrâhitvam anumânasya,
Nyâyaratnâkara, p. 363) [Footnote ref 1]. It should also be noted that in
forming the notion of the permanent relation between two things,
a third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered
and for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough
that in the large number of cases where the concomitance was
noted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomitance
failed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances
in which the absence of the gamya or vyâpaka was marked by an
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumârila
was indebted to Di@nnâga for this; for Di@nnâga's main contention is that
"it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is
the fiery hill that is inferred" for otherwise inference would give us
no new knowledge see Vidyâbhû@sa@na's Indian Logic, p. 87 and
Tâtparya@tikâ, p. 120.]
389
absence of the gamaka or vyâpya, should also be noted, for a
knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for
the forming of the notion of the permanent relation [Footnote ref 1]. The
experience of a large number of particular cases in which any two
things were found to coexist together in another thing in some
relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure
creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the
gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist
in exactly the same relation [Footnote ref 2]. In those cases where the
circle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the
existence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other.
It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases
of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of
coexistence as well.
The question arises that if no inference is possible without
a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity
of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded
as self-valid. To this Kumârila's answer is that memory
is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramâna, as it does
not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the
acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence
of two things in another was known in a number of cases,
yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya
in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the
gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not
perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the
gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.
As regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicit
statement of the process of inference for convincing others
(pârârthânumâna) both Kumârila and Prabhâkara hold that three
premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three
premisses pratijñâ, hetu and d@rstânta may quite serve the purpose
of an anumâna.
There are two kinds of anumâna according to Kumârila
viz. pratyak@satod@rstasambandha and sâmânyatod@r@s@tasambandha.
The former is that kind of inference where the permanent
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Kumârila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance
(vyâpti) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the
positive ones.]
[Footnote 2: "tasmâdanavagate'pi sarvatrânvaye sarvatas'ca vyatireke
bahus'ah sâhityâvagamamâtrâdeva
vyabhicârâdars'anasanâthâdanumânotpattira@ngîkartavya@h."
Nyâyaratnâkara, p. 288.]
390
relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and
fire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where
the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete
things but between two general notions, as in the case of movement
and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is
change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the
change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held
that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals
[Footnote ref 1].
Prabhâkara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the
permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact
that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke)
is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both
subsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation between
two things is the main point, whereas in all other associations
of time and place the things in which these two subsist
together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things
(e.g. fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact that
though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the
concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute [Footnote
ref 2]. When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that
the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the
presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any
smoke is seen. Prabhâkara counts separately the fallacies of the
minor (pak@sâbhâsa), of the enunciation (pratijñâbhâsa) and of
the example (d@r@s@tântâbhâsa) along with the fallacies of the middle
and this seems to indicate that the Mîmâ@msâ logic was not altogether
free from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke
includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there
would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential
cognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhâkara,
for he does not admit that a pramâ@na should necessarily bring
us any new knowledge, for pramâ@na is simply defined as "apprehension."
So though the inferential cognition always pertains to
things already known it is yet regarded by him as a pramâ@na,
since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See S'lokavârttika, Nyâyaratnâkara, S'âstradîpikâ,
Yuktisnehapûra@nî, Siddhântacandrikâ on anumâna.]
[Footnote 2: On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is
no condition (upâdhi) which may vitiate the inference, Prabhâkara has
nothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in
a large number of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must say
that it does not exist (prayatnenânvi@syamâ@ne aupâdhikatvânavagamât,
see Prakara@napañcikâ, p. 71).]
391
Upamâna, Arthâpatti.
Analogy (upamâna) is accepted by Mîmâ@msâ in a sense which
is different from that in which Nyâya took it. The man who
has seen a cow (go) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox
(gavaya), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with
the go, and then cognizes the similarity of the go (which is not
within the limits of his perception then) with the gavaya. The
cognition of this similarity of the gavaya in the go, as it follows
directly from the perception of the similarity of the go in the
gavaya, is called upamâna (analogy). It is regarded as a separate
pramâ@na, because by it we can apprehend the similarity
existing in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is
not mere remembrance, for at the time the go was seen the
gavaya was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen,
and what was not seen could not be remembered. The difference
of Prabhâkara and Kumârila on this point is that while the
latter regards similarity as only a quality consisting in the fact
of more than one object having the same set of qualities, the
former regards it as a distinct category.
Arthâpatti (implication) is a new pramâ@na which is admitted
by the Mîmâ@msâ. Thus when we know that a person Devadatta
is alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot reconcile
these two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being
in the house without presuming his existence somewhere outside
the house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Devadatta
outside the house is called arthâpatti (presumption or
implication).
The exact psychological analysis of the mind in this arthâpatti
cognition is a matter on which Prabhâkara and Kumârila
disagree. Prabhâkara holds that when a man knows that Devadatta
habitually resides in his house but yet does not find him
there, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquired
previously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, and
the cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at his
house. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the cause
of implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Devadatta,
and thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remain
somewhere outside. That can only be found by implication,
without the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed.
The mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for
392
making the presumption that he is outside the house, for he
might also be dead. But I know that Devadatta was living and
also that he was not at home; this perception of his absence from
home creates a doubt as regards my first knowledge that he is
living, and it is for the removal of this doubt that there creeps in
the presumption that he must be living somewhere else. The
perception of the absence of Devadatta through the intermediate
link of a doubt passes into the notion of a presumption that he
must then remain somewhere else. In inference there is no element
of doubt, for it is only when the smoke is perceived to exist
beyond the least element of doubt that the inference of the fire
is possible, but in presumption the perceived non-existence in the
house leads to the presumption of an external existence only
when it has thrown the fact of the man's being alive into doubt
and uncertainty [Footnote ref 1].
Kumârila however objects to this explanation of Prabhâkara,
and says that if the fact that Devadatta is living is made doubtful
by the absence of Devadatta at his house, then the doubt
may as well be removed by the supposition that Devadatta is
dead, for it does not follow that the doubt with regard to the life
of Devadatta should necessarily be resolved by the supposition
of his being outside the house. Doubt can only be removed
when the cause or the root of doubt is removed, and it does not
follow that because Devadatta is not in the house therefore he is
living. If it was already known that Devadatta was living and his
absence from the house creates the doubt, how then can the very
fact which created the doubt remove the doubt? The cause of
doubt cannot be the cause of its removal too. The real procedure
of the presumption is quite the other way. The doubt about
the life of Devadatta being removed by previous knowledge or
by some other means, we may presume that he must be outside
the house when he is found absent from the house. So there cannot
be any doubt about the life of Devadatta. It is the certainty
of his life associated with the perception of his absence from the
house that leads us to the presumption of his external existence.
There is an opposition between the life of Devadatta and his
absence from the house, and the mind cannot come to rest without
the presumption of his external existence. The mind oscillates
between two contradictory poles both of which it accepts but
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Prakara@napañcikâ, pp. 113-115.]
393
cannot reconcile, and as a result of that finds an outlet and a
reconciliation in the presumption that the existence of Devadatta
must be found outside the house.
Well then, if that be so, inference may as well be interpreted
as presumption. For if we say that we know that wherever there
is smoke there is fire, and then perceive that there is smoke
in the hill, but no fire, then the existence of the smoke becomes
irreconcilable, or the universal proposition of the concomitance
of smoke with fire becomes false, and hence the presumption
that there is fire in the hill. This would have been all right if
the universal concomitance of smoke with fire could be known
otherwise than by inference. But this is not so, for the concomitance
was seen only in individual cases, and from that came the
inference that wherever there is smoke there is fire. It cannot
be said that the concomitance perceived in individual cases suffered
any contradiction without the presumption of the universal
proposition (wherever there is smoke there is fire); thus arthâpatti
is of no avail here and inference has to be accepted. Now
when it is proved that there are cases where the purpose of inference
cannot be served by arthâpatti, the validity of inference
as a means of proof becomes established. That being done we
admit that the knowledge of the fire in the hill may come to us
either by inference or by arthâpatti.
So inference also cannot serve the purpose of arthâpatti, for
in inference also it is the hetu (reason) which is known first, and
later on from that the sâdhya (what is to be proved); both of
them however cannot be apprehended at the same moment, and
it is exactly this that distinguishes arthâpatti from anumâna.
For arthâpatti takes place where, without the presumption of
Devadatta's external existence, the absence from the house of
Devadatta who is living cannot be comprehended. If Devadatta is
living he must exist inside or outside the house. The mind cannot
swallow a contradiction, and hence without presuming the external
existence of Devadatta even the perceived non-existence cannot
be comprehended. It is thus that the contradiction is resolved by
presuming his existence outside the house. Arthâpatti is thus
the result of arthânupapatti or the contradiction of the present
perception with a previously acquired certain knowledge.
It is by this arthâpattipramâ@na that we have to admit that
there is a special potency in seeds by which they produce the
394
shoots, and that a special potency is believed to exist in sacrifices
by which these can lead the sacrificer to Heaven or some such
beneficent state of existence.
S'abda pramâ@na.
S'abda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by
most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the
Jaina, Buddhist, Cârvâka and Vais`e@sika. A discussion on this
topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore
omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the
Nyâya, and the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority
of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and
they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied
it. Some sought to establish this authority on the supposition
that they were the word of God, while others, particularly the
Mîmâ@msists strove to prove that they were not written by anyone,
and had no beginning in time nor end and were eternal.
Their authority was not derived from the authority of any
trustworthy person or God. Their words are valid in themselves.
Evidently a discussion on these matters has but little value with
us, though it was a very favourite theme of debate in the old
days of India. It was in fact the most important subject for
Mîmâ@msâ, for the Mîmâ@msâ sûtras were written for the purpose
of laying down canons for a right interpretation of the Vedas.
The slight extent to which it has dealt with its own epistemological
doctrines has been due solely to their laying the foundation
of its structure of interpretative maxims, and not to
writing philosophy for its own sake. It does not dwell so much
upon salvation as other systems do, but seeks to serve as a
rational compendium of maxims with the help of which the
Vedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly performed.
But a brief examination of the doctrine of word (s'abda)
as a means of proof cannot be dispensed with in connection with
Mîmâ@msâ as it is its very soul.
S'abda (word) as a pramâ@na means the knowledge that we
get about things (not within the purview of our perception) from
relevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words of
which they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds,
viz. those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas.
The first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not
395
uttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid in
itself. The meanings of words are of course known to us
before, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof;
but the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of the
relations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged
means of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept s`abda
as a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that the
validity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of its
being uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would not
explain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for when
even the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known,
we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of any
sentence.
Prabhâkara thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters,
or are understandable as combinations of letters. The constituent
letters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and are
thus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception which
serve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. The
reason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to be
found in a separate potency existing in the letters by which the
denotation of the word may be comprehended. The perception
of each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, but
leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions
of the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings
about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing
about the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearing
a word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admitted
that the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the
purpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separate
potencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is
the direct cause of verbal cognition. Both Prabhâkara and
Kumârila agree on this point.
Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words
have natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of
their own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their
comprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will
not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the
word in question is expressive of such and such a meaning,
but the word was all along competent to denote that meaning
and it is the hearer's knowledge of that fact that helps him to
396
understand the meaning of a word. Mîmâmsâ does not think
that the association of a particular meaning with a word is due
to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings
to the words [Footnote ref 1]. Words are thus acknowledged to be denotative
of themselves. It is only about proper names that convention
is admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to see
the bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic
commandments, by the performance of which such results would
arise as could not have been predicted by any other person.
Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though
they are ever present some manifestive agency is required by
which they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency consists
of the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the
word. Nyâya thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the cause
that produces the word while Mîmâm@sâ thinks that it only manifests
to the hearer the ever-existing word.
The process by which according to Prabhâkara the meanings
of words are acquired maybe exemplified thus: a senior commands
a junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the
child on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the
senior's commands comes to understand the meaning of "cow"
and "horse." Thus according to him the meanings of words can
only be known from words occurring in injunctive sentences; he
deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things
only as related to the other factors of the injunction (anvitâbhidhâna
vâda), and no word can be comprehended as having any
denotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine
holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally
related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence,
thus the word gâm accusative case of go (cow) means that it is
intended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine
genus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of
action, viz. bringing in the sentence gâm ânaya—bring the cow.
Kumârila however thinks that words independently express
separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentence
expressing one connected idea (abhihitânvayavâda). Thus
in gâm ânaya, according to Kumârila, gâm means the bovine
class in the accusative character and ânaya independently means
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: According to Nyâya God created all words and associated them
with their meanings.]
397
bring; these two are then combined into the meaning "bring the
cow." But on the former theory the word gâm means that it is
connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence
only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above
sentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannot
have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of Kumârila
which is also the Nyâya theory is called abhihitânvayavâda [Footnote ref
1].
Lastly according to Prabhâkara it is only the Veda that can
be called s'abda-pramâ@na, and only those sentences of it which
contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way
with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is
only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the
speaker. But Kumârila considers the words of all trustworthy
persons as s'abda-pramâ@na.
The Pramâ@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi).
In addition to the above pramâ@nas Kumârila admits a fifth
kind of pramâ@na, viz. anupalabdhi for the perception of the
non-existence of a thing. Kumârila argues that the non-existence of
a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived
by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could
come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some
people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumâna.
They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object
there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision
of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy
to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want
of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions
are to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How
can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped?
It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of pramâ@na
namely anupalabdhi.
All things exist in places either in a positive (sadrûpa) or in
a negative relation (asadrûpa), and it is only in the former case
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Prabhâkaramîmâ@msâ by Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ and S.N.
Dasgupta's Study of Patanjali, appendix. It may be noted in this
connection that Mîmâ@msâ did not favour the Spho@ta doctrine of sound
which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of
letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was
manifested (spho@ta) but not created by the passing sounds of the
syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this
word manifestation. See Vâcaspati's Tattvabindu, S'lokavârttika
and Prakara@napañcikâ. For the doctrine of anvitâbhidhâna see
Sâhkanâtha's Vâkyârthamât@rkâv@rttî.]
398
that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the
latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be
had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we
designate as a separate pramâ@na as anupalabdhi. Prabhâkara
holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the
perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need
of admitting a separate pramâ@na as anupalabdhi. For what is
meant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perception
of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty
space before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought
not to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the
place is not absolutely empty. If empty space is defined as that
which is not associated with the jug, then the category of negation
is practically admitted as a separate entity. If the perception of
empty space is defined as the perception of space at the moment
which we associated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then
also want of knowledge as a separate entity has to be accepted,
which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or
negation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain
the notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best
be an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to knowledge,
or in other words to substitute for the place of the external
absence of a thing an associated want of knowledge about the
thing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends
in failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted
either in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negation
or abhâva as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted.
It is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen without
any knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the next
moment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug.
But this also means that the moment of the perception of the
ground is associated with the want of knowledge of the jug or
its negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admission
of negation as a separate category, for what other meaning can
there be in the perception of "only the ground" if it is not meant
that it (the perception of the ground) is associated with or qualified
by the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception of
the ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence of
the jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived.
The qualifying phrase that "only the ground is perceived" becomes
399
meaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are not
specified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of the
ground. And this would require that we had already the notion
of negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a special
manner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should also
be noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates the
notion of negation immediately and not through other negations,
and this is true not only of things of the present moment but also
of the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when we
remember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus a
separate pramâ@na by which the absence or want of a sensible
object—the negation of a thing—can be comprehended.
Self, Salvation, God.
Mîmâ@msâ has to accept the existence of soul, for without it
who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would
be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing
sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is
thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the
sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many,
one in each body. Prabhâkara thinks that it is manifested to us in
all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence
of self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so,
why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our
cognitions—even in those where there is no perception of the body?
Kumârila however differs from Prabhâkara about this analysis of
the consciousness of self in our cognitions, and says that even
though we may not have any notion of the parts of our body or
their specific combination, yet the notion of ourselves as embodied
beings always appears in all our cognitions. Moreover in our
cognitions of external objects we are not always conscious of the
self as the knower; so it is not correct to say that self is different
from the body on the ground that the consciousness of self is
present in all our cognitions, and that the body is not cognized in
many of our cognitions. But the true reason for admitting that
the self is different from the body is this, that movement or
willing, knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., cannot be attributed to
the body, for though the body exists at death these cannot then be
found. So it has to be admitted that they must belong to some
other entity owing to the association with which the body appears
400
to be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge,
feeling, etc. though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet perceived
by others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc.,
are perceived by other men. It is a general law of causation
that the qualities of the constituent elements (in the cause) impart
themselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the body
is made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc., and
this also corroborates the inference of a separate entity as the
vehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that
if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a
mover? But Mîmâ@msâ does not admit that movement means
atomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which
moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul.
It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter
moves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an
agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of
the body. The self must also be understood as being different
from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses
he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all
through.
The question now arises, how is self cognized? Prabhâkara
holds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from the
cognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizor
entering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both the
self and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in
what we have already described as tripu@ti-pratyâk@sa (perception
as three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illumined but
knowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and
the object in one operation. But just as in the case of a man
who walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is
regarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the
case of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet
it appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is not
soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum,
and appears in it as the cognitive element "I" which is inseparable
from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is
cognized the self also is not cognized.
Kumârila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from
the body is perceived by a mental perception (mânasa-pratyak@sa
as the substratum of the notion of "I," or in other words the self
perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its
401
own nature shines forth in consciousness as the "I." The objection
that the self cannot itself be both subject and object to its
own operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhâkara's
theory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yet
considers it as the subject of the operation. The analogy of
linguistic usage that though the walking affects the walker yet
he is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge,
for the usage of language is not philosophical analysis. Though
at the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet it
does not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, but
reveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception which
is distinct from the knowledge of objects. The self is no doubt
known as the substratum of "I," but the knowledge of this self
does not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects,
nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of
objects, but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition
which we represent as the "I." The self does not reveal itself as
the knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of the
mind. This is indeed different from Prabhâkara's analysis, who
regarded the cognition of self as inseparable from the object-cognition,
both being the result of the illumination of knowledge.
Kumârila agrees with Prabhâkara however in holding that soul
is not self-illuminating (svayamprakâs'a), for then even in deep
sleep the soul should have manifested itself; but there is no such
manifestation then, and the state of deep sleep appears as an
unconscious state. There is also no bliss in deep sleep, for had
it been so people would not have regretted that they had missed
sensual enjoyments by untimely sleep. The expression that
"I slept in bliss" signifies only that no misery was felt. Moreover
the opposite representation of the deep sleep state is also found
when a man on rising from sleep says "I slept so long without
knowing anything not even my own self." The self is not
atomic, since we can simultaneously feel a sensation in the head
as well as in the leg. The Jaina theory that it is of the size of
the body which contracts and expands according to the body it
occupies is unacceptable. It is better therefore that the soul should
be regarded as all-pervading as described in the Vedas. This
self must also be different in different persons for otherwise their
individual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain cannot
be explained [Footnote ref 1].
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See S'lokavârttika, âtmavâda S'âstra-dîpikâ, âtmavâda and
mok@savâda.]
402
Kumârila considered the self to be merely the potency of
knowledge (jñânas'akti) [Footnote ref 1]. Cognitions of things were
generated by the activity of the manas and the other senses. This self
itself can only be cognized by mental perception, Or at the
time of salvation there being none of the senses nor the manas
the self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge
without any actual expression or manifestation. So the state of
salvation is the state in which the self remains devoid of any
of its characteristic qualities such as pleasure, pain, knowledge,
willing, etc., for the self itself is not knowledge nor is it bliss
or ânanda as Vedânta supposes; but these are generated in it by
its energy and the operation of the senses. The self being divested
of all its senses at that time, remains as a mere potency of the
energy of knowledge, a mere existence. This view of salvation
is accepted in the main by Prabhâkara also.
Salvation is brought about when a man enjoys and suffers
the fruits of his good and bad actions and thereby exhausts them
and stops the further generation of new effects by refraining from
the performance of kâmya-karmas (sacrifices etc. performed for
the attainment of certain beneficent results) and guarantees
himself against the evil effects of sin by assiduously performing
the nitya-karmas (such as the sandhyâ prayers etc., by the performance
of which there is no benefit but the non-performance
of which produces sins). This state is characterized by the
dissolution of the body and the non-production of any further
body or rebirth.
Mîmâ@msâ does not admit the existence of any God as the
creator and destroyer of the universe. Though the universe is
made up of parts, yet there is no reason to suppose that the
universe had ever any beginning in time, or that any God created
it. Every day animals and men are coming into being by the
action of the parents without the operation of any God. Neither
is it necessary as Nyâya supposes that dharma and adharma
should have a supervisor, for these belong to the performer and
_____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It may be mentioned in this connection that unlike Nyâya
Mîmâ@msâ did not consider all activity as being only of the nature of
molecular vibration (parispanda). It admitted the existence of energy
(s'akti) as a separate category which manifested itself in actual
movements. The self being considered as a s'akti can move the body and
yet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means the
relationing of the energy with a thing. Nyâya strongly opposes this
doctrine of a non-sensible (atîndriya) energy and seeks to explain all
action by actual molecular motion.]
403
no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot
be any contact (sa@myoga) or inherence (samavâya) of dharma
and adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannot
have any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like
the carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the
world either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the
beginning there were no beings towards whom should he be
actuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself
require a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator,
no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been
running the same, without any new creation or dissolution, s@r@s@ti
or pralaya.
Mîmâ@msâ as philosophy and Mîmâ@msâ as ritualism.
From what we have said before it will be easy to see that
Mîmâ@msâ agrees in the main with Vais'e@sika about the existence
of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities,
rûpa, rasa, etc. Kumârila's differences on the points of jâti,
samavâya, etc. and Prabhâkara's peculiarities have also been
mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that
Kumârila was influenced by Sâ@mkhya thought rather than by
Nyâya. Sâ@mkhya and Vais'e@sika are the only Hindu systems which
have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics;
other systems have generally followed them or have differed from
them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhâkara and
Kumârila have thus but little importance, as they agree in
general with the Vais'e@sika view. In fact they were justified in not
laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance
of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyâya-Vais'e@sika about
the world was most suitable.
The main difference of Mîmâ@msâ with Nyâya consists of the
theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the
Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from
God, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any
other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity
of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the
advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated
to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and
there being nothing to contradict them later on there would be
nothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions
404
invalid. The other pramâ@nas such as perception, inference, etc.
were described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to us
how dharma could be acquired, for dharma was not an existing
thing which could be perceived by the other pramâ@nas, but
a thing which could only be produced by acting according to
the injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of dharma
and adharma therefore the s'abdapramâ@na of the Veda was our
only source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have a
knowledge of the different means of cognition, as without them
it would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatable
Vedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolution
which is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not be
acknowledged by the Mîmâ@msâ as it would have endangered the
eternality of the Vedas. Even God had to be dispensed with on
that account.
The Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and Brâhma@nas
(also called the vidhis or injunctive sentences). There are
three classes of injunctions (1) apûrva-vidhi, (2) niyama-vidhi, and
(3) parisa@nkhyâ-vidhi. Apûrva-vidhi is an order which enjoins
something not otherwise known, e.g. the grains should be washed
(we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for the
sacrifice except by the above injunction). Niyama-vidhi is that
where when a thing could have been done in a number of ways,
an order is made by the Veda which restricts us to following
some definite alternative (e.g. though the chaff from the corn
could be separated even by the nails, the order that "corn should
be threshed" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as the
only course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the niyama-vidhi
that which is ordered is already known as possible but only as
an alternative, and the vidhi insists upon one of these methods as
the only one. In apûrva-vidhi the thing to be done would have
remained undone and unknown had it not been for the vidhi.
In parisa@nkhyâ-vidhi all that is enjoined is already known but
not necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra "I take
up the rein" (imâm ag@rbhnâ@m ras'anâ@m) which could be used in
a number of cases should not however be used at the time of
holding the reins of an ass.
There are three main principles of interpreting the Vedic
sentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectively
they yield a meaning but not individually, then they should be
405
taken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentences
can however yield meanings separately by themselves they
should not be connected together. (3) In the case of certain
sentences which are incomplete suitable words from the context
of immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied.
The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma.
The mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deities
or powers are to be taken as being for the specification of the
deity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be remembered
that as dharma can only be acquired by following
the injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted as
giving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedas
which cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as forming
part of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive.
Thus it is that those sentences in the Vedas which
describe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction
(called the arthavâdas) should be interpreted as forming part
of a vidhi-vâkya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Even
those expressions which give reasons for the performance of
certain actions are to be treated as mere arthavâdas and interpreted
as praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only as
mandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired.
When a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions of
the Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existence
is proved by the authority of the scriptures is generated
either in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positive
force called apûrva produces in time the beneficent results of the
sacrifice (e.g. leads the performer to Heaven). This apûrva is like
a potency or faculty in the agent which abides in him until the
desired results follow [Footnote ref 1].
It is needless to dilate upon these, for the voluminous works
of S'abara and Kumârila make an elaborate research into the
nature of sacrifices, rituals, and other relevant matters in great
detail, which anyhow can have but little interest for a student
of philosophy.
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ's Prabhâkaramîmâ@msâ and Mâdhava's
Nyâyamâlâvistara.]
406
THE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VEDÂNTA
Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential
than the Dialectic of controversy.
Pramâ@na in Sanskrit signifies the means and the movement
by which knowledge is acquired, pramâtâ means the subject or
the knower who cognizes, pramâ the result of pramâ@na—right
knowledge, prameya the object of knowledge, and prâmâ@nya the
validity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge is
sometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge to
its object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion of
validity in the mind of the subject—the knower (that his perceptions
are true), which moves him to work in accordance with
his perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for the
attainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things.
The question wherein consists the prâmâ@nya of knowledge has
not only an epistemological and psychological bearing but a
metaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of knowledge
based on an analysis of psychological experience, and on
the other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with the
theory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justify
a theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and interpretation
of experience which the others sometimes ignored or
sometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of different
schools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat one
another in actual debates, and the result of these debates was frequently
very important in determining the prestige of any school
of thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Nyâya
or Mîmâ@msâ thinker in a great public debate attended by many
learned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame at
once spread all over the country and he could probably secure a
large number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputation
were often undertaken by great masters all over the country
for the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schools
and of securing adherents to their own. These debates were therefore
not generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical
407
mood with the object of arriving at the truth but in order to
inflict a defeat on opponents and to establish the ascendency of
some particular school of thought. It was often a sense of personal
victory and of the victory of the school of thought to which the
debater adhered that led him to pursue the debate. Advanced
Sanskrit philosophical works give us a picture of the attitude
of mind of these debaters and we find that most of these
debates attempt to criticize the different schools of thinkers by
exposing their inconsistencies and self-contradictions by close
dialectical reasoning, anticipating the answers of the opponent,
asking him to define his statements, and ultimately proving that
his theory was inconsistent, led to contradictions, and was opposed
to the testimony of experience. In reading an advanced work on
Indian philosophy in the original, a student has to pass through an
interminable series of dialectic arguments, and negative criticisms
(to thwart opponents) sometimes called vita@n@dâ, before he can
come to the root of the quarrel, the real philosophical divergence.
All the resources of the arts of controversy find full play
for silencing the opponent before the final philosophical answer
is given. But to a modern student of philosophy, who belongs to
no party and is consequently indifferent to the respective victory
of either side, the most important thing is the comprehension of
the different aspects from which the problem of the theory of
knowledge and its associated metaphysical theory was looked at
by the philosophers, and also a clear understanding of the deficiency
of each view, the value of the mutual criticisms, the speculations
on the experience of each school, their analysis, and their
net contribution to philosophy. With Vedânta we come to an
end of the present volume, and it may not be out of place here
to make a brief survey of the main conflicting theories from the
point of view of the theory of knowledge, in order to indicate the
position of the Vedânta of the S'a@nkara school in the field of
Indian philosophy so far as we have traversed it. I shall therefore
now try to lay before my readers the solution of the theory
of knowledge (pramâ@navâda) reached by some of the main
schools of thought. Their relations to the solution offered by
the S'a@nkara Vedânta will also be dealt with, as we shall attempt
to sketch the views of the Vedanta later on in this chapter.
408
The philosophical situation. A Review.
Before dealing with the Vedânta system it seems advisable
to review the general attitude of the schools already discussed to
the main philosophical and epistemological questions which determine
the position of the Vedânta as taught by S'a@nkara and
his school.
The Sautrântika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man is
concerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (puru@sâdrtka).
This however cannot be done without right knowledge (samyagjñâna)
which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said
to be right when we can get things just as we perceived them.
So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned,
it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore
this does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about
knowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or
contradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how
far our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our
actions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get
in our practical experience (arthaprâdpakatva). The perception is
right (abhrânta non-illusory) when following its representation we
can get in the external world such things as were represented by
it (sa@mvâdakatva). That perception alone can be right which is
generated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination.
When I say "this is the cow I had seen," what I see is the
object with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that
this is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is
not perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by
the visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which
I see now never existed before so as to be invested with this
or that permanent name. This association of name and permanence
to objects perceived is called kaipanâ or abhilâpa.
Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhilâpa
association (kalpanâpo@dha), for though this is taken as a part of
our perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and
hence its association with the object is an evident error. The
object as unassociated with name—the nirvikalpa—is thus what
is perceived. As a result of the pratyak@sa the manovijñâna or
thought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also
determined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an
409
object of knowledge (grâhya), and by the fact of the rise
of such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing
realizable or attainable in the external world. The special
features of the object undefinable in themselves as being
what they are in themselves (svalak@sa@na) are what is
actually perceived (pratyak@savi@saya) [Footnote ref 1].
The pramâ@naphala (result of perception) is the
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word
"svalak@sa@na" of Dharmakîrtti between ray esteemed friend Professor
Stcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmakîrtti held
that the content of the presentative element at the moment of perception
was almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, "According to your
interpretation svalak@sa@na mean,—the object (or idea with Vijñânavâdin)
from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated,
this I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past and
future has been taken away, what remains? The present and the present
is a k@sa@na i.e. nothing…. The reverse of k@sa@na is a k@sa@nasamtâna
or simply sa@mtâna and in every sa@mtâna there is a synthesis ekîbhâva
of moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi = nis'caya =
kalpana = adhyavasâya)…There is in the perception of a jug something
(a k@sa@na of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the idea of
a jug (which is always a sa@mtâna, always vikalpita), and if you take
the idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains:
k@sanasya jñânena prâpayitumas'akyatvât. This is absolutely the Kantian
teaching about Synthesis of Apprehension. Accordingly pratyak@sa is a
transcendental source of knowledge, because practically speaking it
gives no knowledge at all. This pramâ@na is asatkalpa. Kant says
that without the elements of intuition (= sense-knowledge = pratyak@sa =
kalpanâpo@dha) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements of
intellect (kalpanâ = buddhi = synthesis = ekîbhâva) they would be blind.
Empirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory of
Dharmakîrtti. He is a Vijñânavâdî as I understand, because he maintains
the cognizability of ideas (vijñâna) alone, but the reality is an
incognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is bâhya, it is
artha, it is arthakriyâk@sa@na = svalak@sa@na; that is the reason for
which he sometimes is called Sautrântika and this school is sometimes
called Sautranta-vijñânavâda, as opposed to the Vijñânavâda of As'vagho@sa
and Âryâsanga, which had no elaborate theory of cognition. If the jug as
it exists in our representation were the svalak@sa@na and paramârthasat,
what would remain of Vijñânavâda? But there is the perception of the jug
as opposed to the pure idea of a jug (s'uddhâ kalpanâ), an element of
reality, the sensational k@sa@na, which is communicated to us by sense
knowledge. Kant's 'thing in itself' is also a k@sa@na and also an element
of sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmakîrtti
has also s'uddhâ kalpanâ and s'uddham pratyak@sam. …And very
interesting is the opposition between pratyak@sa and anumâna, the first
moves from k@sa@na to sa@mtâna and the second from sa@mtâna to k@sa@na,
that is the reason that although bhrânta the anumâna is nevertheless
pramâ@na because through it we indirectly also reach k@sa@na, the
arthakriyâk@sa@na. It is bhrânta directly and pramâ@na indirectly;
pratyak@sa is pramâ@na directly and bhrânta (asatkalpa) indirectly… ."
So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers are
concerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushes
the interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive "this is
blue," the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative
element of sense-knowledge (svalak@sa@na) and the affirmation
(nis'caya). So far we are in complete agreement. But Professor
Stcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a k@sa@na (moment)
and is nothing. I also hold that it is a k@sa@na, but it is nothing
only in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving
affirmation such as "this is blue." The affirmative process
occurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative
element of the first moment (pratyak@sabalotpanna N.T., p. 20) but
this presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative
process of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannot
express its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other
ideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form
a part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be its
own specific nature (svalak@sa@na). But what is this specific nature?
Dharmakîrtti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he means
those specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when
the object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (yasyârthasya
sannidhânâsannidhânâbkyâm jñânapratibhâsabhedastat svalak@sa@nam N.,
p. 1 and N.T., p. 16). Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specific
characteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the
object itself; it is the appearance of the "blue" in its specific
character in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative
or ideational process, the result is the concept or idea "this is blue"
(nîlasarûpa@m pratyak@samanubhûyamâna@m nîlabodharûpamavasthâpyate …
nîlasârûpyamasya pramâ@nam nîlavikalpanarûpa@m tvasya pramâ@naphalam,
N.T.p. 22). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue
(nîlanirbhâsa@m hi vijñânam, N.T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance
(yatkiñcit arthasya sâk@sâtkârijñânam tatpratyak@samucyate, N.T. 7) and
this is real (paramârthasat) and valid. This blue sensation is
different from the idea "this is blue" (nîlabodha, N.T. 22) which is
the result of the former (pramâ@naphala) through the association of
the affirmative process (adhyavasâya) and is regarded as invalid for
it contains elements other than what were presented to the sense and is
a vikalpapratyaya. In my opinion svalak@sa@na therefore means pure
sensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object
and with Dharmakîrtti this is the only thing which is valid in perception
and vikalpapratyaya or pramânaphala is the idea or concept which follows
it. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the
construction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage
of the first moment of sensation-presentation (k@sa@nasya
prâpayitumas'akyatvât, N.T. 16). N.T. = Nyâyabindu@tîkâ,
N = _Nyâyabindu (Peterson's edition).]
410
ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing
the means which being followed the thing can be got (yena k@rtena
artha@h prâpito bhavati). Pramâ@na then is the similarity of the
knowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which we
assure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is
perceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience.
Yet this later stage is pramâ@naphala and not pramâ@na which
consists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other associations),
and which determines the attitude of the perceiver towards
the perceived object. The pramâ@na therefore only refers
to the newly-acquired knowledge (anadhigatâdhigant@r) as this is
of use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the objective
world. This account of perception leaves out the real
epistemological question as to how the knowledge is generated
by the external world, or what it is in itself. It only looks to
the correctness or faithfulness of the perception to the object and
its value for us in the practical realization of our ends. The
question of the relation of the external world with knowledge as
determining the latter is regarded as unimportant.
411
The Yogâcâras or idealistic Buddhists take their cue from
the above-mentioned Sautrântika Buddhists, and say that since
we can come into touch with knowledge and knowledge alone,
what is the use of admitting an external world of objects as the
data of sensation determining our knowledge? You say that
sensations are copies of the external world, but why should you
say that they copy, and not that they alone exist? We never come
into touch with objects in themselves; these can only be grasped
by us simultaneously with knowledge of them, they must therefore
be the same as knowledge (sahopalambhaniyamât abhedo
nîlataddhiyo@h); for it is in and through knowledge that external
objects can appear to us, and without knowledge we
are not in touch with the so-called external objects. So it is
knowledge which is self-apparent in itself, that projects itself in
such a manner as to appear as referring to other external objects.
We all acknowledge that in dreams there are no external
objects, but even there we have knowledge. The question
why then if there are no external objects, there should be so
much diversity in the forms of knowledge, is not better solved
by the assumption of an external world; for in such an assumption,
the external objects have to be admitted as possessing the
infinitely diverse powers of diversely affecting and determining
our knowledge; that being so, it may rather be said that in
the beginningless series of flowing knowledge, preceding knowledge-moments
by virtue of their inherent specific qualities determine
the succeeding knowledge-moments. Thus knowledge
alone exists; the projection of an external word is an illusion of
knowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire
(vâsanâ) associated with it. The preceding knowledge determines
the succeeding one and that another and so on. Knowledge,
pleasure, pain, etc. are not qualities requiring a permanent entity
as soul in which they may inhere, but are the various forms
in which knowledge appears. Even the cognition, "I perceive a
blue thing," is but a form of knowledge, and this is often erroneously
interpreted as referring to a permanent knower. Though
the cognitions are all passing and momentary, yet so long as
the series continues to be the same, as in the case of one person,
say Devadatta, the phenomena of memory, recognition, etc. can
happen in the succeeding moments, for these are evidently illusory
cognitions, so far as they refer to the permanence of the objects
412
believed to have been perceived before, for things or knowledge-moments,
whatever they may be, are destroyed the next
moment after their birth. There is no permanent entity as perceiver
or knower, but the knowledge-moments are at once the
knowledge, the knower and the known. This thoroughgoing
idealism brushes off all references to an objective field of experience,
interprets the verdict of knowledge as involving a knower
and the known as mere illusory appearance, and considers the
flow of knowledge as a self-determining series in successive
objective forms as the only truth. The Hindu schools of thought,
Nyâya, Sâ@mkhya, and the Mîmâ@msâ, accept the duality of soul
and matter, and attempt to explain the relation between the
two. With the Hindu writers it was not the practical utility of
knowledge that was the only important thing, but the nature of
knowledge and the manner in which it came into being were also
enquired after and considered important.
Pramâ@na is defined by Nyâya as the collocation of instruments
by which unerring and indubitable knowledge comes into being.
The collocation of instruments which brings about definite knowledge
consists partly of consciousness (bodha) and partly of material
factors (bodhâbodhasvabhâva). Thus in perception the
proper contact of the visual sense with the object (e.g. jug) first
brings about a non-intelligent, non-apprehensible indeterminate
consciousness (nirvikalpa) as the jugness (gha@tatva) and this later
on combining with the remaining other collocations of sense-contact
etc. produces the determinate consciousness: this is a jug.
The existence of this indeterminate state of consciousness as a
factor in bringing about the determinate consciousness, cannot of
course be perceived, but its existence can be inferred from the
fact that if the perceiver were not already in possession of the
qualifying factor (vis'e@sanajñâna as jugness) he could not have
comprehended the qualified object (vis'i@s@tabuddhi} the jug (i.e.
the object which possesses jugness). In inference (anumâ@na)
knowledge of the li@nga takes part, and in upamâna the sight
of similarity with other material conglomerations. In the case
of the Buddhists knowledge itself was regarded as pramâ@na;
even by those who admitted the existence of the objective world,
right knowledge was called pramâ@na, because it was of the same
form as the external objects it represented, and it was by the form
of the knowledge (e.g. blue) that we could apprehend that the
413
external object was also blue. Knowledge does not determine the
external world but simply enforces our convictions about the external
world. So far as knowledge leads us to form our convictions
of the external world it is pramâ@na, and so far as it determines our
attitude towards the external world it is pramâ@naphala. The
question how knowledge is generated had little importance with
them, but how with knowledge we could form convictions of
the external world was the most important thing. Knowledge
was called pramâ@na, because it was the means by which we
could form convictions (adhyavasâya) about the external world.
Nyâya sought to answer the question how knowledge was
generated in us, but could not understand that knowledge was not
a mere phenomenon like any other objective phenomenon, but
thought that though as a gu@na (quality) it was external like other
gu@nas, yet it was associated with our self as a result of collocations
like any other happening in the material world. Pramâ@na
does not necessarily bring to us new knowledge (anadhigatâdhi-gant@r)
as the Buddhists demanded, but whensoever there were
collocations of pramâ@na, knowledge was produced, no matter
whether the object was previously unknown or known. Even the
knowledge of known things may be repeated if there be suitable
collocations. Knowledge like any other physical effect is produced
whenever the cause of it namely the pramâ@na collocation
is present. Categories which are merely mental such as class
(sâmânya), inherence (samavâya), etc., were considered as having
as much independent existence as the atoms of the four elements.
The phenomenon of the rise of knowledge in the soul was thus
conceived to be as much a phenomenon as the turning of the
colour of the jug by fire from black to red. The element of
indeterminate consciousness was believed to be combining with
the sense contact, the object, etc. to produce the determinate
consciousness. There was no other subtler form of movement than
the molecular. Such a movement brought about by a certain
collocation of things ended in a certain result (phala). Jñâna
(knowledge) was thus the result of certain united collocations
(sâmagrî) and their movements (e.g. contact of manas with soul,
of manas with the senses, of the senses with the object, etc.). This
confusion renders it impossible to understand the real philosophical
distinction between knowledge and an external event
of the objective world. Nyâya thus fails to explain the cause
414
of the origin of knowledge, and its true relations with the objective
world. Pleasure, pain, willing, etc. were regarded as qualities
which belonged to the soul, and the soul itself was regarded
as a qualitiless entity which could not be apprehended directly
but was inferred as that in which the qualities of jñâna, sukha
(pleasure), etc. inhered. Qualities had independent existence
as much as substances, but when any new substances were
produced, the qualities rushed forward and inhered in them. It
is very probable that in Nyâya the cultivation of the art of inference
was originally pre-eminent and metaphysics was deduced
later by an application of the inferential method which gave
the introspective method but little scope for its application,
so that inference came in to explain even perception (e.g. this is
a jug since it has jugness) and the testimony of personal psychological
experience was taken only as a supplement to corroborate
the results arrived at by inference and was not used to criticize it
[Footnote ref 1].
Sâ@mkhya understood the difference between knowledge and
material events. But so far as knowledge consisted in being the
copy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from
the objects themselves; it was even then an invisible translucent
sort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external
objects possessed. But the fact that it copies those gross objects
makes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same substances
though in a subtler form as that of which the objects were
made. But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed the
form of the objects with which it came in touch, was probably
thus a subtler combination of the same elementary substances
of which matter was made up, yet there was in it another element,
viz. intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterly
different from material combinations. This element of intelligence
is indeed different from the substances or content of
the knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like a
stationary light, "the self," which illuminates the crowding,
bustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form in
accordance with the objects with which it comes in touch. This
light of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation in
consciousness as the "I," the changeless entity amidst all the
fluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge. How this
element of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamañjarî on pramâ@na.]
415
relates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it up
into itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult point
of the Sâ@mkhya epistemology and metaphysics. The substance
of knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape of
knowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence (puru@sa)
when it appears as conscious. The forming of the buddhi-shape
of knowledge is thus the pramâ@na (instrument and process of
knowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapes
is criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by the
external objects (svata@h-prâmâ@nya and svata@h-aprâmâ@nya). The
pramâ@na however can lead to a pramâ or right knowledge only
when it is intelligized by the puru@sa. The puru@sa comes in touch
with buddhi not by the ordinary means of physical contact but
by what may be called an inexplicable transcendental contact.
It is the transcendental influence of puru@sa that sets in motion
the original prak@rti in Sâ@mkhya metaphysics, and it is the same
transcendent touch (call it yogyatâ according to Vâcaspati or
samyoga according to Bhik@su) of the transcendent entity of
puru@sa that transforms the non-intelligent states of buddhi into
consciousness. The Vijñânavâdin Buddhist did not make any
distinction between the pure consciousness and its forms (âkâra)
and did not therefore agree that the âkâra of knowledge was
due to its copying the objects. Sâ@mkhya was however a realist
who admitted the external world and regarded the forms as
all due to copying, all stamped as such upon a translucent substance
(sattva) which could assume the shape of the objects.
But Sâ@mkhya was also transcendentalist in this, that it did not
think like Nyâya that the âkâra of knowledge was all that knowledge
had to show; it held that there was a transcendent element
which shone forth in knowledge and made it conscious. With
Nyâya there was no distinction between the shaped buddhi and
the intelligence, and that being so consciousness was almost like
a physical event. With Sâ@mkhya however so far as the content
and the shape manifested in consciousness were concerned it was
indeed a physical event, but so far as the pure intelligizing element
of consciousness was concerned it was a wholly transcendent
affair beyond the scope and province of physics. The rise of
consciousness was thus at once both transcendent and physical.
The Mîmâ@msist Prabhâkara agreed with Nyâya in general
as regards the way in which the objective world and sense contact
416
induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a
unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower
and the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations,
for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals
things—the direct apprehension that should be called the pramâ@na.
Pramâ@na in this sense is the same as pramiti or pramâ,
the phenomenon of apprehension. Pramâ@na may also indeed
mean the collocations so far as they induce the pramâ. For
pramâ or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists,
but it manifests itself differently under different circumstances.
The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific
attitude that is generated in us with reference to the objective
world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge,
and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the
objective field (sa@mvâdin). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeterminate)
means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely
a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as Nyâya
holds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes
the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as
represented by memory [Footnote ref 1].
Prabhâkara rejected the Sâ@mkhya conception of a dual element
in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (cit) and
a material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as an
unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the
knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend
upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (pradars'akatva)
external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension
(anubhûti) has of prompting us to action in the external world;
knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its
self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart
from its self-revealing character Prabhâkara did not enquire.
Kumârila declared that jñâna (knowledge) was a movement
brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producing
consciousness (jñâtatâ) of objective things. Jñâna itself
cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement
necessary for producing the jñâtatâ or consciousness of things.
Movement with Kumârila was not a mere atomic vibration, but
was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the
first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next
moment, was called savikalpa.]
417
was sometimes the result. Jñâna was a movement and not the
result of causal operation as Nyâya supposed. Nyâya would
not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it
would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities,
such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment
of a physical movement. Kumârila accords the same
self-validity to knowledge that Prabhâkara gives. Later knowledge
by experience is not endowed with any special quality
which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the
previous movement. For what is called sa@mvâdi or later testimony
of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more [Footnote ref 1]. The
self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we
can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is
the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circumstances
leading to cognition of things that is called jñâna [Footnote ref 2].
Here Kumârila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge
as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was
beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.
The idealistic tendency of Vijñânavâda Buddhism, Sâ@mkhya,
and Mîmâ@msâ was manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique
character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in
touch. But Vijñânavâda denied the external world, and thereby
did violence to the testimony of knowledge. Sâ@mkhya admitted
the external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge
and pure intelligence; Prabhâkara ignored this difference,
and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge
was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and
the known, Kumârila however admitted a transcendent element
of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness,
but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question
remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of
knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects,
how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be
regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative,
either referring to one's being prompted to the objective
world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the
suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyaratnamâla, svata@h-prâmâ@nya-nir@naya.]
[Footnote 2: See Nyâyamañjari on Pramâ@na, S'lokavârttika on
Pratyak@sa, and Gâgâ Bha@t@ta's Bha@t@tâcintama@ni on Pratyak@sa.]
418
uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether
any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge
and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded
as the real. But the question was not asked, whether
there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth,
the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable, reality. This
philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the
Hindu mind.
Vedânta Literature.
It is difficult to ascertain the time when the Brahma-sûtras
were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the
other Indian systems, even of the S'ûnyavâda Buddhism (of course
according to S'a@nkara's interpretation), they cannot have been
written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in
supposing that they were written some time in the second century
B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gau@dapâda revived the monistic
teaching of the Upani@sads by his commentary on the Mâ@n@dûkya
Upani@sad in verse called Mâ@n@dûkyakârikâ. His disciple Govinda
was the teacher of S'a@nkara (788—820 A.D.). S'a@nkara's commentary
on the Brahma-sûtras is the root from which sprang
forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedântism of great
originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Ânandagiri, a
disciple of S'a@nkara, wrote a commentary called Nyâyanir@naya,
and Govindânanda wrote another commentary named Ratna-prabhâ.
Vâcaspati Mis'ra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote
another commentary on it called the Bhâmati. Amalânanda
(1247—1260 A.D.) wrote his Kalpataru on it, and Apyayadik@sita
(1550 A.D.) son of Ra@ngarâjadhvarîndra of Kâñcî wrote his
Kalpataruparimala on the Kalpataru. Another disciple of S'a@nkara,
Padmapâda, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it
known as Pañcapâdikâ. From the manner in which the book is
begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary
on the whole of S'a@nkara's bhâsya, but it ends abruptly at the
end of the fourth sûtra. Mâdhava (1350), in his S'a@nkaravijaya,
recites an interesting story about it. He says that Sures'vara received
S'a@nkara's permission to write a vârttika on the bhâsya.
But other pupils objected to S'a@nkara that since Sures'vara was
formerly a great Mîmâ@msist (Ma@n@dana Misra was called Sures'vara
after his conversion to Vedântism) he was not competent to write
419
a good vârttika on the bhâ@sya. Sures'vara, disappointed, wrote
a treatise called Nai@skarmyasiddhi. Padmapâda wrote a @tîkâ
but this was burnt in his uncle's house. S'a@nkara, who had once
seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapâda wrote it down.
Prakâs'âtman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapâda's Pañcapâdikâ
known as _Pañcapâdikâvivara@na. _Akha@n@dânanda wrote
his Tattvadîpana, and the famous N@rsi@mhâs'rama Muni (1500)
wrote his Vivara@nabhâvaprakâs'ikâ on it. Amalânanda and
Vidyasâgara also wrote commentaries on Pañcapâdikâ, named
Pañcapâdikâdarpa@na and Pañcapâdikâ@tîkâ respectively, but
the Pañcapâdikâvivara@na had by far the greatest reputation.
Vidyâra@nya who is generally identified by some with Mâdhava
(1350) wrote his famous work Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha [Footnote ref 1],
elaborating the ideas of Pañcapâdikâvivara@na; Vidyâra@nya
wrote also another excellent work named Jîvanmuktiviveka on
the Vedânta doctrine of emancipation. Sures'vara's (800 A.D.)
excellent work Nai@skarmyasiddhi is probably the earliest independent
treatise on S'a@nkara's philosophy as expressed in his
bhâ@sya. It has been commented upon by Jñânottama Mis'ra.
Vidyâra@nya also wrote another work of great merit known as
Pañcadas'î, which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in
verse on Vedânta. Another important work written in verse on
the main teachings of S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya is Sa@mk@sepas'arîraka,
written by Sarvajñâtma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been
commented upon by Râmatîrtha. S'rîhar@sa (1190 A.D.) wrote
his Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya, the most celebrated work on the
Vedânta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly
after S'rîhar@sa, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an
independent work on Vedânta dialectic known as Tattvadîpikâ
which has also a commentary called Nayanaprasâdinî written
by Pratyagrûpa. S'a@nkara Mis'ra and Raghunâtha also wrote
commentaries on Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya. A work on Vedânta
epistemology and the principal topics of Vedânta of
great originality and merit known as Vedântaparibhâ@sâ was
written by Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra (about 155OA.D.). His son
Râmak@r@snâdhvarin wrote his S'ikhâma@ni on it and Amaradâsa his
Ma@niprabhâ. The Vedântaparibhâ@sâ with these two commentaries
forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental
principles of Vedânta. Another work of supreme importance
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Narasi@mhâcârya's article in the Indian Antiquary,
1916.]
420
(though probably the last great work on Vedânta) is the
Advaitasiddhi of Madhusûdana Sarasvatî who followed Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra.
This has three commentaries known as Gau@dabrahmânandî,
Vi@t@thales'opadhyâyî and Siddhivyâkhyâ. Sadânanda
Vyâsa wrote also a summary of it known as Advaitasiddhisiddhântasâra.
Sadânanda wrote also an excellent elementary work
named Vedântasâra which has also two commentaries Subodhinî
and Vidvanmanorañjinî. The Advaitabrahmasiddhi of Sadânanda
Yati though much inferior to Advaitasiddhi is important, as it
touches on many points of Vedânta interest which are not dealt
with in other Vedânta works. The Nyâyamakaranda of Ânandabodha
Bha@t@târakâcâryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very
well, as also some other important points of Vedânta interest.
Vedântasiddhântamuktâvalî of Prakâs'ânanda discusses many of
the subtle points regarding the nature of ajñâna and its relations
to cit, the doctrine of d@r@stis@r@stivâda, etc., with great clearness.
_Siddhântales'a by Apyayadîk@sita is very important as a summary
of the divergent views of different writers on many points of
interest. Vedântatattvadîpikâ and Siddhântatattva are also good
as well as deep in their general summary of the Vedânta system.
Bhedadhikkâra of Nrsi@mhâs'rama Muni also is to be regarded as
an important work on the Vedânta dialectic.
The above is only a list of some of the most important Vedânta
works on which the present chapter has been based.
Vedânta in Gau@dapâda.
It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of
the Vedânta thought as contained in the Brahma-sûtras without
making any reference to the commentary of S'a@nkara or any
other commentator. There is reason to believe that the Brahma-sûtras
were first commented upon by some Vai@s@nava writers who
held some form of modified dualism [Footnote ref 1]. There have been more
than a half dozen Vai@s@nava commentators of the Brahma-sûtras
who not only differed from S'a@nkara's interpretation, but also
differed largely amongst themselves in accordance with the
different degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of
their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretation
was the only one that was faithful to the sûtras and to
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall
deal with the systems expounded by the Vai@s@nava commentators of the
Brahma-sûtras.]
421
the Upani@sads. Should I attempt to give an interpretation
myself and claim that to be the right one, it would be only
just one additional view. But however that may be, I am
myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the
Brahma-sûtras were probably more faithful to the sûtras than the
interpretations of S'añkara.
The S'rîmadbhagavadgîtâ, which itself was a work of the
Ekânti (singularistic) Vai@s@navas, mentions the Brahma-sûtras as
having the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons [Footnote ref 1].
Professor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophical
sûtras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism
found in the Brahma-sûtras are not with regard to the Vijñâna-vada
of Vasubandhu, but with regard to the S'ûnyavâda, but he regards
the composition of the Brahma-sûtras to be later than Nâgârjuna.
I agree with the late Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@shana in holding that
both the Yogâcâra system and the system of Nâgârjuna evolved
from the Prajñâpâramitâ [Footnote ref 2]. Nâgârjuna's merit
consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support
of S'unyavâda; but so far as the essentials of S'unyavâda are
concerned I believe that the Tathatâ philosophy of As'vagho@sa
and the philosophy of the Prajñâpâramitâ contained no less.
There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nâgârjuna were
better known to the Hindu writers than the Mahâyâna sûtras.
Even in such later times as that of Vâcaspati Mis'ra, we find
him quoting a passage of the S'âlistambha sûtra to give an account
of the Buddhist doctrine of pratîtyasamutpâda [Footnote ref 3].
We could interpret any reference to S'ûnyavâda as pointing to
Nâgârjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods
were referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference in
the Bhagavadgîtâ to the Brahma-sûtras clearly points out a date
prior to that of Nâgârjuna; though we may be slow to believe such
an early date as has been assigned to the Bhagavadgîtâ by Telang,
yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back
as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part
of the second century B.C. The Brahma-sûtras could thus be
placed slightly earlier than the date of the Bhagavadgîtâ.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: "Brahmasûtrapadais'caiva hetumadbhirvinis'cita@h"
Bhagavadgîtâ. The proofs in support of the view that the
Bhagavadgîtâ is a Vai@s@nava work will be discussed in the 2nd
volume of the present work in the section on Bhagavadgîtâ and
its philosophy.]
[Footnote 2: Indian Antiquary, 1915.]
[Footnote 3: See Vâcaspati Mis'ra's Bhâmatî on S'a@nkara's bhâsya on
Brahma-sûtra, II. ii.]
422
I do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict with
this supposition. The fact that we do not know of any Hindu
writer who held such monistic views as Gau@dapâda or S'a@nkara,
and who interpreted the Brahma-sûtras in accordance with those
monistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists
had been writing commentaries on the Brahma-sûtras, goes to
show that the Brahma-sûtras were originally regarded as an
authoritative work of the dualists. This also explains the fact that
the Bhagavadgîtâ, the canonical work of the Ekânti Vai@s@navas,
should refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous
to Gau@dapâda who attempted to give an exposition of the
monistic doctrine (apart from the Upani@sads), either by writing
a commentary as did S'a@nkara, or by writing an independent
work as did Gau@dapâda. I am inclined to think therefore that
as the pure monism of the Upani@sads was not worked out in a
coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it
was dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form
of dualism which was already developing in the later days of
the Upani@sads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such
Upani@sads as the S'vetâs'vatara, and the like. The epic S'a@mkhya
was also the result of this dualistic development.
It seems that Bâdarâya@na, the writer of the Brahma-sûtras,
was probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his commentator
S'a@nkara. Gau@dapâda seems to be the most important
man, after the Upani@sad sages, who revived the monistic tendencies
of the Upani@sads in a bold and clear form and tried to
formulate them in a systematic manner. It seems very significant
that no other kârikâs on the Upani@sads were interpreted,
except the Mân@dûkyakârikâ by Gau@dapâda, who did not himself
make any reference to any other writer of the monistic
school, not even Bâdarâya@na. S'a@nkara himself makes the confession
that the absolutist (advaita) creed was recovered from
the Vedas by Gau@dapâda. Thus at the conclusion of his commentary
on Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, he says that "he adores by
falling at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of his
adored, who on finding all the people sinking in the ocean made
dreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out of kindness for all
people, by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his great
churning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heart
of the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal
423
gods [Footnote ref l]." It seems particularly significant that S'a@nkara
should credit Gau@dapâda and not Bâdarâya@na with recovering the
Upani@sad creed. Gau@dapâda was the teacher of Govinda, the
teacher of S'a@nkara; but he was probably living when S'a@nkara
was a student, for S'a@nkara says that he was directly influenced by
his great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning, self-control
and modesty of the other pupils of Gau@dapâda [Footnote ref 2]. There is
some dispute about the date of S'a@nkara, but accepting the date proposed
by Bha@n@darkar, Pa@thak and Deussen, we may consider
it to be 788 A.D. [Footnote ref 3], and suppose that in order to be able to
teach S'a@nkara, Gau@dapâda must have been living till at least 800 A.D.
Gau@dapâda thus flourished after all the great Buddhist
teachers As'vagho@sa, Nâgârjuna, Asa@nga and Vasubandhu; and
I believe that there is sufficient evidence in his kârikâs for thinking
that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that
the teachings of the Upani@sads tallied with those of Buddha.
Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his kârikâs he
says that he adores that great man (dvipadâm varam) who by knowledge
as wide as the sky realized (sambuddha) that all appearances
(dharma) were like the vacuous sky (gaganopamam [Footnote ref 4]. He
then goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (des'ita)
that the touch of untouch (aspars'ayoga—probably referring to
Nirvâ@na) was the good that produced happiness to all beings,
and that he was neither in disagreement with this doctrine nor
found any contradiction in it (avivâda@h aviruddhas'ca).
Some disputants hold that coming into being is of existents,
whereas others quarrelling with them hold that being (jâta)
is of non-existents (abhûtasya); there are others who quarrel
with them and say that neither the existents nor non-existents
are liable to being and there is one non-coming-into-being
(advayamajâtim). He agrees with those who hold that there
is no coming into being [Footnote ref 5]. In IV. 19 of his
kârikâ he again says that the Buddhas have shown that there was
no coming into being in any way (sarvathâ Buddhairajâti@h paridîpita@h).
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, Anandâs'rama
edition, p. 214.]
[Footnote 2: Anandâs'rama edition of S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on Gau@dapâda's
kârikâ, p. 21.]
[Footnote 3: Telang wishes to put S'a@nkara's date somewhere in the 8th
century, and Ve@nkates'vara would have him in 805 A.D.-897 A.D., as he
did not believe that S'a@nkara could have lived only for 32 years.
J.R.A.S. 1916.]
[Footnote 4: Compare Lankâvatâra, p. 29, Katha@m ca gaganopamam.]
[Footnote 5: Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, IV. 2, 4.]
424
Again, in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (vastuvâdi),
who since they found things and could deal with them and
were afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken of
origination (jâti). In IV. 90 he refers to agrayâna which we
know to be a name of Mahâyâna. Again, in IV. 98 and 99
he says that all appearances are pure and vacuous by nature.
These the Buddhas, the emancipated one (mukta) and the leaders
know first. It was not said by the Buddha that all appearances
(dharma) were knowledge. He then closes the kârikâs with an
adoration which in all probability also refers to the Buddha [Footnote ref
1].
Gau@dapâda's work is divided into four chapters: (i) Âgama
(scripture), (2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4)
Alâtas'ânti (the extinction of the burning coal). The first chapter is
more in the way of explaining the Mâ@n@dûkya Upani@sad by
virtue of which the entire work is known as Mâ@n@dûkyakârikâ.
The second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive parts
of Gau@dapâda's work, not particularly connected with the Mâ@n@dûkya
Upani@sad.
In the first chapter Gau@dapâda begins with the three apparent
manifestations of the self: (1) as the experiencer of the
external world while we are awake (vis'va or vais'vânara âtmâ),
(2) as the experiencer in the dream state (taijasa âtmâ), (3) as the
experiencer in deep sleep (su@supti), called the prâjña when there
is no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness and pure
bliss (ânanda). He who knows these three as one is never
attached to his experiences. Gau@dapâda then enumerates some
theories of creation: some think that the world has proceeded
as a creation from the prâ@na (vital activity), others
consider creation as an expansion (vibhûti) of that cause
from which it has proceeded; others imagine that creation is
like dream (svapna) and magic (mâyâ); others, that creation
proceeds simply by the will of the Lord; others that it proceeds
from time; others that it is for the enjoyment of the Lord
(bhogârtham) or for his play only (kri@dârtham), for such
is the nature (svabhâva) of the Lord, that he creates, but he
cannot have any longing, as all his desires are in a state of fulfilment.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Gau@dapâda's kârikâ IV. 100. In my translation I have not
followed S'a@nkara, for he has I think tried his level best to explain
away even the most obvious references to Buddha and Buddhism in
Gau@dapâda's kârikâ. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning directly as
Gau@dapâda's kârikâs seemed to indicate. I have followed the
same principle in giving the short exposition of Gau@dapâda's
philosophy below.]
425
Gau@dapâda does not indicate his preference one way or the
other, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (ad@r@s@ta),
unrelationable (avyavahâryam), ungraspable (agrâhyam), indefinable
(alak@sa@na), unthinkable (acintyam), unspeakable (avyapades'ya),
the essence as oneness with the self (ekâtmapratyayasâra),
as the extinction of the appearance (prapañcopas'ama),
the quiescent (s'ântam), the good (s'ivam), the one (advaita)
[Footnote ref 1]. The world-appearance (prapañca) would have ceased
if it had existed, but all this duality is mere mâyâ (magic or illusion),
the one is the ultimately real (paramârthata@h). In the second chapter
Gau@dapâda says that what is meant by calling the world a
dream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither exists
in the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the
present. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearance
has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams
things are imagined internally, and in the experience that we
have when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside,
but both of them are but illusory creations of the self.
What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the
moment of perception only; external objects are supposed to
have two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived,
and when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere
imagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and that
which appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary
productions in association with the sense faculties. There is first
the imagination of a perceiver or soul (jîva) and then along with
it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external
world. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake,
so the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms.
There is neither any production nor any destruction (na nirodho,
na cotpatti@h), there is no one who is enchained, no one who is
striving, no one who wants to be released [Footnote ref 2]. Imagination
finds itself realized in the non-existent existents and also in the sense
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Compare in Nâgârjuna's first kârikâ the idea of
prapañcopas'amam s'ivam. Anirodhamanutpâdamanucchedamas'âs'vatam
anekârthamanânârthamanâgamamanirgamam ya@h pratîtyasamutpâdam
prapañcopas'amam s'ivam des'ayâmâva sambuddhastam vande vadatâmvaram.
Compare also Nâgârjuna's Chapter on Nirvâ@naparîk@sâ,
Pûrvopalambhopas'ama@h prapañcopas'ama@h s'iva@h na kvacit kasyacit
kas'cit dharmmo buddhenades'ita@h. So far as I know the Buddhists
were the first to use the words prapañcopas'aman s'ivam.]
[Footnote 2: Compare Nâgârjuna's k@arikâ, "anirodhamanutpâdam" in
Mâdhyamikav@rtti, B.T.S., p. 3.]
426
of unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (advaya)
is false; it is only the oneness (advayatâ) that is good. There
is no many, nor are things different or non-different (na nânedam
…na p@rthag nâp@rthak) [Footnote ref 1]. The sages who have transcended
attachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the
Vedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all
appearance (nirvikalpa@h prapañcopas'ama@h_), the one [Footnote ref 2].
In the third chapter Gau@dapâda says that truth is like the
void(âkâs'a) which is falsely concieved as taking part in birth
and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; but
howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from
âkâs'a. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams
(svapna) and mâyâ (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed
upon the one (advaita) by mâyâ. The truth is immortal, it cannot
therefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All
birth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposition
of mâyâ upon it [Footnote ref 3]. One mind appears as many in the dream,
as also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the
mind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearless
state, the extinction of all sorrow, final ceasation. Thinking everything
to be misery (du@hkham sarvam anusm@rtya) one should stop
all desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any
birth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken
the mind (citta) into its final dissolution (laya) and pacify it
when distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects
when it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (sukham) and by
wisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless
and still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction;
when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect
Brahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come into
being, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (sarvajña).
In the fourth chapter, called the Alats'ânti, Gau@dapâda further
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Compare _Mâdhyamikakârikâ, B.T.S., p.3 anekârtham
anânârtham, etc.]
[Footnote 2: Compare Lankâvatârasûtra, p.78,
Advayâsamsâraparinirvâ@nvatsarvadharmâ@h tasmât tarhi mahâmate
S'unyatânutpâdâdvayani@hsvabhâvalak@sa@ne yoga@h kara@niya@h;
also 8,46, Yaduta svacittavi@sayavikalpad@r@s@tyânavabodhanât vijñânânâm
svacittad@r@s@tyamâtrânavatâre@na mahâmate vâlaprthagjanâ@h
bhâvâbhâvasvabhâvaparamârthad@r@s@tidvayvâdino bhavanti.]
[Footnote 3: Compare Nâgârjuna's kârikâ, B.T.S. p. 196, Âkâs'am
s'as'as'@r@ngañca bandhyâyâ@h putra eva ca asantas'câbhivyajyante
tathâbhâvena kalpanâ, with Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, III. 28, Asato
mâyayâ janma tatvato naiva jâyate bandhyâputro na tattvena mâyâya
vâpi jâyate.]
427
describes this final state [Footnote ref l]. All the dharmas
(appearances) are without death or decay [Footnote: ref 2].
Gau@dapâda then follows a dialectical form of argument which
reminds us of Nâgârjuna. Gau@dapâda continues thus: Those who
regard kâra@na (cause) as the kâryya (effect in a potential form)
cannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (aja), for it
suffers production; how can it be called eternal and yet changing?
If it is said that things come into being from that which has no
production, there is no example with which such a case may be
illustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from that
which has itself suffered production. How again can one come to a
right conclusion about the regressus ad infinitum of cause and
effect (hetu and phala)? Without reference to the effect there
is no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect.
Nothing is born either by itself or through others; call it either
being, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth,
neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature
(svabhâvatah), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannot
be said to have a production. All experience (prajñapti) is
dependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and there
would be none of the afflictions (sa@mkles'a) that we suffer. When
we look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be
dependent, but when we look at them from the point of view of
reality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (citta)
does not come in touch with objects and thereby manifest
them, for since things do not exist they are not different from
their manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particular
case that the mind produces the manifestations of objects while
they do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for in
present, past, and future the mind never comes in touch with
objects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations.
Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are
ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are
really traversing the reason of vacuity (khe), for all production
is but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn is
perceived as being born, the essence then is the absence of
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The very name Alâta@sânti is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare
Nâgârjuna's kârikâ, B.T.S., p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the
S'ataka.]
[Footnote 2: The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance or
entity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini,
"Codanâlak@sa@nah arthah, dharmah." Dharma is determined by the injunctions
of the Vedas.]
428
production, for it being of the nature of absence of production it
could never change its nature. Everything has a beginning and
an end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like
a magical or illusory elephant (mâyâhastî) and exists only as far
as it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus
the appearance of production, movement and things, but the one
knowledge (vijñâna) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness
(avastutva), the cessation (s'ântam). As the movement of
burning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is the
movement (spandita) of consciousness that appears as the perceiving
and the perceived. All the attributes (e.g. straight or
curved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality it
does not possess them; so also all the appearances are imposed
upon consciousness, though in reality they do not possess
them. We could never indicate any kind of causal relation
between the consciousness and its appearance, which are therefore
to be demonstrated as unthinkable (acintya). A thing
(dravya) is the cause of a thing (dravya), and that which is not
a thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but all
the appearances are neither things nor those which are not
things, so neither are appearances produced from the mind
(citta) nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long as
one thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle of
existence (sa@msâra), but when that notion ceases there is no
sa@msâra. All things are regarded as being produced from a
relative point of view only (sa@mv@rti), there is therefore nothing
permanent (s'âs'vata). Again, no existent things are produced,
hence there cannot be any destruction (uccheda). Appearances
(dharma) are produced only apparently, not in reality; their
coming into being is like mâyâ, and that mâyâ again does not
exist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out of
seeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible.
As in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all
appearances. That which appears as existing from an
imaginary relative point of view (kalpita sa@mv@rti) is not
so in reality (para-mârtha), for the existence depending on
others, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all not
a real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do exist
and not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving or
steady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded.
429
It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the
Mâdhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nâgârjuna's kârikâs and
the Vijñânavâda doctrines, as found in La@nkâvatâra, that it is
needless to attempt to prove it, Gau@dapâda assimilated all the
Buddhist S'ûnyavâda and Vijñânavâda teachings, and thought that
these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upani@sads.
It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long
as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and
for the teachings which he believed to be his. Gau@dapâda took
the smallest Upani@sads to comment upon, probably because he
wished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitations
of the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truth
that he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggested
that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable
vijñâna or vacuity would hold good of the highest âtman of the
Upani@sads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the
Upani@sad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upani@sads
guaranteed in detail the truth of Gau@dapâda's views it was left
for his disciple, the great S'a@nkara, to examine and explain.
Vedânta and S´a@nkara (788-820 A.D.).
Vedânta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be
the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upani@sads and
summarized in the Brahma-sûtras of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads
form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is
therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mîmâ@msâ or the
Mîmâmsâ (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished
from the Mîmâ@msâ of the previous part of the Vedas and the
Brâhma@nas as incorporated in the Pûrvamîmâ@msâ sûtras of
Jaimini. Though these Brahma-sûtras were differently interpreted
by different exponents, the views expressed in the earliest commentary
on them now available, written by S'a@nkarâcârya, have
attained wonderful celebrity, both on account of the subtle and
deep ideas it contains, and also on account of the association of the
illustrious personality of S'a@nkara. So great is the influence of the
philosophy propounded by S´a@nkara and elaborated by his illustrious
followers, that whenever we speak of the Vedânta philosophy
we mean the philosophy that was propounded by S'a@nkara. If
other expositions are intended the names of the exponents have
to be mentioned (e.g. Râmânuja-mata, Vallabha-mata, etc.), In this
430
chapter we shall limit ourselves to the exposition of the Vedânta
philosophy as elaborated by S'a@nkara and his followers. In S'a@nkara's
work (the commentaries on the Brahma-sûtra and the ten
Upani@sads) many ideas have been briefly incorporated which as
found in S'a@nkara do not appear to be sufficiently clear, but are
more intelligible as elaborated by his followers. It is therefore
better to take up the Vedânta system, not as we find it in S'a@nkara,
but as elaborated by his followers, all of whom openly declare
that they are true to their master's philosophy.
For the other Hindu systems of thought, the sûtras (Jaimini
sûtra, Nyâya sûtra, etc.) are the only original treatises, and no
foundation other than these is available. In the case of the
Vedânta however the original source is the Upani@sads, and
the sûtras are but an extremely condensed summary in a
systematic form. S'a@nkara did not claim to be the inventor or
expounder of an original system, but interpreted the sûtras
and the Upani@sads in order to show that there existed a connected
and systematic philosophy in the Upani@sads which was also
enunciated in the sûtras of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads were a
part of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by the
Hindus. If S'a@nkara could only show that his exposition of them
was the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon the
highest authority would be accepted by all Hindus. The most
formidable opponents in the way of accomplishing his task were
the Mîma@msists, who held that the Vedas did not preach any
philosophy, for whatever there was in the Vedas was to be
interpreted as issuing commands to us for performing this or
that action. They held that if the Upani@sads spoke of Brahman
and demonstrated the nature of its pure essence, these were mere
exaggerations intended to put the commandment of performing
some kind of worship of Brahman into a more attractive form.
S'a@nkara could not deny that the purport of the Vedas as found
in the Brâhma@nas was explicitly of a mandatory nature as declared
by the Mîmâ@msâ, but he sought to prove that such could
not be the purport of the Upani@sads, which spoke of the truest
and the highest knowledge of the Absolute by which the wise
could attain salvation. He said that in the karmak@n@da—the
(sacrificial injunctions) Brâhma@nas of the Vedas—the purport of
the Vedas was certainly of a mandatory nature, as it was intended
for ordinary people who were anxious for this or that pleasure,
431
and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute
truth, but the Upani@sads, which were intended for the wise who
had controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly
joys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahman
as the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas
were intended for two classes of persons. S'a@nkara thus did not
begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and
psychological analysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to show
by textual comparison of the different Upani@sads, and by reference
to the content of passages in the Upani@sads, that they
were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he
understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that
the uncontradicted testimony of all the Upani@sads was in favour
of the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and
apparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of the
texts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prak@rti, etc. of the
Sâ@mkhya. He had also to interpret the few scattered ideas
about physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the
Upani@sads consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In order
to show that the philosophy of the Upani@sads as he expounded it
was a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections that
his opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to
criticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to
be self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of the
Upani@sads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and
wrong. This he did not only in his bhâsya on the Brahma-sûtras
but also in his commentaries on the Upani@sads. Logic with him
had a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aid
which it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the
Upani@sad texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted
testimony of the Upani@sads as the absolute truth.
His disciples followed him in all, and moreover showed in great
detail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradicted
either in perceptual experience or in rational thought, and that
all the realistic categories which Nyâya and other systems
had put forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They also
supplemented his philosophy by constructing a Vedânta epistemology,
and by rethinking elaborately the relation of the mâyâ,
the Brahman, and the world of appearance and other relevant
topics. Many problems of great philosophical interest which
432
had been left out or slightly touched by S'a@nkara were discussed
fully by his followers. But it should always be remembered that
philosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be taken
as but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening our
faith in the truth revealed in the Upani@sads. The true work of
logic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsetting
the instructions of the Upani@sads is logic gone astray. Many
lives of S'a@nkarâcârya were written in Sanskrit such as the
S'a@nkaradigvijaya, S'a@nkara-vijaya-vilâsa, S'a@nkara-jaya,
etc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700
and 800 A.D. in the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father S'ivaguru
was a Yajurvedi Brâhmin of the Taittirîya branch. Many miracles
are related of S'a@nkara, and he is believed to have been the
incarnation of S'iva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year and
became the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing in
a mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came over
to Benares and thence went to Badarikâs'rama. It is said that
he wrote his illustrious bhâ@sya on the Brahma-sûtra in his twelfth
year. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten Upani@sads.
He returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided to
travel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of other
schools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went to
meet Kumârila, but Kumârila was then at the point of death, and
he advised him to meet Kumârila's disciple. He defeated Ma@n@dana
and converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He then
travelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywhere
he established his Vedânta philosophy, which from that time forth
acquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life of
India.
S'a@nkara carried on the work of his teacher Gaudapâda and
by writing commentaries on the ten Upani@sads and the Brahma-sûtras
tried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one which
was intended to be preached in the Upani@sads and the Brahma-sûtras
[Footnote: 1]. Throughout his commentary on the Brahma-sûtras,
there is ample evidence that he was contending against some
other rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held
that the Upani@sads partly favoured the Sâ@mkhya cosmology
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The main works of S'a@nkara are his commentaries (bhâ@sya) on
the ten Upani@sads (Îs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mu@ndaka, Mâ@n@dûkya,
Aitareya, Taittirîya, B@rhadâra@nyaka, and Chândogya), and on the
Brahma-sûtra.]
433
of the existence of prak@rti. That these were actual textual
interpretations of the Brahma-sûtras is proved by the fact that
S'a@nkara in some places tries to show that these textual constructions
were faulty [Footnote ref 1]. In one place he says that others (referring
according to Vâcaspati to the Mîmâ@msâ) and some of
us (referring probably to those who interpreted the sûtras and
the Upani@sads from the Vedânta point of view) think that the
soul is permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposed
to the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unity
of the self (âtmaikatva) that this S'ârîraka commentary of
mine is being attempted [Footnote ref 2]. Râmânuja, in the introductory
portion of his bhâ@sya on the Brahma-sûtra, says that the views of
Bodhâyana who wrote an elaborate commentary on the Brahma-sûtra
were summarized by previous teachers, and that he was
following this Bodhâyana bhâ@sya in writing his commentary. In
the Vedârthasa@mgraha of Râmânuja mention is made of Bodhâyana,
Tanka, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bhâruci as Vedântic authorities,
and Dravi@dâcâryya is referred to as the "bhâ@syakâra" commentator.
In Chândogya III. x. 4, where the Upani@sad cosmology
appeared to be different from the Vi@s@nupurana cosmology, S'a@nkara
refers to an explanation offered on the point by one whom
he calls "âcâryya" (atrokta@h parihârah âcâryyaih) and Ânandagiri
says that "âcâryya" there refers to Dravi@dâcâryya. This Dravi@dâcâryya
is known to us from Râmânuja's statement as being a
commentator of the dualistic school, and we have evidence here
that he had written a commentary on the Chândogya Upani@sad.
A study of the extant commentaries on the Brahma-sûtras of
Bâdarâya@na by the adherents of different schools of thought
leaves us convinced that these sûtras were regarded by all as
condensations of the teachings of the Upani@sads. The differences
of opinion were with regard to the meaning of these sûtras and
the Upani@sad texts to which references were made by them
in each particular case. The Brahma-sûtra is divided into four
adhyâyas or books, and each of these is divided into four chapters
or pâdas. Each of these contains a number of topics of discussion
(adhikara@na) which are composed of a number of sûtras, which
raise the point at issue, the points that lead to doubt and
uncertainty, and the considerations that should lead one to favour
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See note on p. 432.]
[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on the Brahma-sûtras, I. iii. 19.]
434
a particular conclusion. As explained by S'a@nkara, most of these
sûtras except the first four and the first two chapters of the
second book are devoted to the textual interpretations of the
Upani@sad passages. S'a@nkara's method of explaining the absolutist
Vedânta creed does not consist in proving the Vedânta to
be a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, but
in so interpreting the Upani@sad texts as to show that they all agree
in holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be the
only truth. In Chapter I of Book II S'a@nkara tries to answer
some of the objections that may be made from the Sâ@mkhya
point of view against his absolutist creed and to show that some
apparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not present
any real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refute
the Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Nyâya-Vais'e@sika, the Buddhist, Jaina, Bhâgavata
and S'aiva systems of thought. These two chapters and
his commentaries on the first four sûtras contain the main points
of his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showing
that the conclusion of the sûtras was always in strict agreement
with the Upani@sad doctrines. Reason with S'a@nkara never
occupied the premier position; its value was considered only
secondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding
of the revealed scriptures, the Upani@sads. The ultimate truth cannot
be known by reason alone. What one debater shows to be
reasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what he
shows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater.
So there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logic
and argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be found
in the Upani@sads; reason, discrimination and judgment are all to
be used only with a view to the discovery of the real purport
of the Upani@sads. From his own position S'a@nkara was not thus
bound to vindicate the position of the Vedânta as a thoroughly
rational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend on
its rationality but on the authority of the Upani@sads. But what
was true could not contradict experience. If therefore S'a@nkara's
interpretation of the Upani@sads was true, then it would not contradict
experience. S'a@nkara was therefore bound to show that
his interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience.
If he could show that his interpretation was the only interpretation
that was faithful to the Upani@sads, and that its apparent
contradictions with experience could in some way be explained,
435
he considered that he had nothing more to do. He was not writing
a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the
whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upani@sads and not
simply a system spun by a clever thinker, which may erroneously
appear to be quite reasonable, Ultimate validity does not belong
to reason but to the scriptures.
He started with the premise that whatever may be the reason
it is a fact that all experience starts and moves in an error which
identifies the self with the body, the senses, or the objects of the
senses. All cognitive acts presuppose this illusory identification,
for without it the pure self can never behave as a phenomenal
knower or perceiver, and without such a perceiver there would
be no cognitive act. S'a@nkara does not try to prove philosophically
the existence of the pure self as distinct from all other
things, for he is satisfied in showing that the Upani@sads describe
the pure self unattached to any kind of impurity as the ultimate
truth. This with him is a matter to which no exception can be
taken, for it is so revealed in the Upani@sads. This point being
granted, the next point is that our experience is always based
upon an identification of the self with the body, the senses, etc. and
the imposition of all phenomenal qualities of pleasure, pain, etc.
upon the self; and this with S'a@nkara is a beginningless illusion.
All this had been said by Gau@dapâda. S'a@nkara accepted Gau@dapâda's
conclusions, but did not develop his dialectic for a positive
proof of his thesis. He made use of the dialectic only for the
refutation of other systems of thought. This being done he
thought that he had nothing more to do than to show that his
idea was in agreement with the teachings of the Upani@sads. He
showed that the Upani@sads held that the pure self as pure being,
pure intelligence and pure bliss was the ultimate truth. This
being accepted the world as it appears could not be real. It must
be a mere magic show of illusion or mâyâ. S'a@nkara never tries
to prove that the world is mâyâ, but accepts it as indisputable.
For, if the self is what is ultimately real, the necessary conclusion
is that all else is mere illusion or mâyâ. He had thus to
quarrel on one side with the Mîmâ@msâ realists and on the other
with the Sâ@mkhya realists, both of whom accepted the validity
of the scriptures, but interpreted them in their own way. The
Mîmâ@msists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be
interpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action,
436
or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that
the Upani@sads being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted
as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of
actions. The description of Brahman in the Upani@sads does not
therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman,
but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as
possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman
should be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a
nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would
then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates.
S'a@nkara could not agree to such a view. For his main point was
that the Upani@sads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman.
No meditation or worship or action of any kind was required;
but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when
the truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the
ultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas,
the karmakâ@n@da (those dealing with the injunctions relating
to the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior
types of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upani@sads,
the jñânakâ@n@da (those which declare the nature of ultimate
truth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who
had transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, and
who had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly
joy. Throughout his commentary on the Bhagavadgîtâ S'a@nkara
tried to demonstrate that those who should follow the injunctions
of the Veda and perform Vedic deeds, such as sacrifices,
etc., belonged to a lower order. So long as they remained in
that order they had no right to follow the higher teachings of
the Upani@sads. They were but karmins (performers of scriptural
duties). When they succeeded in purging their minds of all
desires which led them to the performance of the Vedic injunctions,
the field of karmamârga (the path of duties), and wanted
to know the truth alone, they entered the jñânamârga (the way
of wisdom) and had no duties to perform. The study of Vedânta
was thus reserved for advanced persons who were no longer
inclined to the ordinary joys of life but wanted complete
emancipation. The qualifications necessary for a man intending
to study the Vedânta are (1) discerning knowledge about what is
eternal and what is transitory (nityânityavastuviveka), (2)
disinclination to the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world or of
437
the after world (ihâmutraphalabhogavirâga), (3) attainment of
peace, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep concentration
and faith (s'amadamâdisâdhanasampat) and desire for salvation
(mumuk@sutva). The person who had these qualifications should
study the Upani@sads, and as soon as he became convinced of the
truth about the identity of the self and the Brahman he attained
emancipation. When once a man realized that the self alone
was the reality and all else was mâyâ, all injunctions ceased to
have any force with him. Thus, the path of duties (karma) and
the path of wisdom (jñâna) were intended for different classes of
persons or adhikârins. There could be no joint performance of
Vedic duties and the seeking of the highest truth as taught in
the Upani@sads (jñâna-karma-samuccayâbhâva@h). As against the
dualists he tried to show that the Upani@sads never favoured any
kind of dualistic interpretations. The main difference between
the Vedânta as expounded by Gau@dapâda and as explained by
S'a@nkara consists in this, that S'a@nkara tried as best he could to
dissociate the distinctive Buddhist traits found in the exposition
of the former and to formulate the philosophy as a direct
interpretation of the older Upani@sad texts. In this he achieved
remarkable success. He was no doubt regarded by some as a
hidden Buddhist (pracchanna Bauddha), but his influence on
Hindu thought and religion became so great that he was regarded
in later times as being almost a divine person or an
incarnation. His immediate disciples, the disciples of his disciples,
and those who adhered to his doctrine in the succeeding
generations, tried to build a rational basis for his system in a
much stronger way than S'a@nkara did. Our treatment of S'a@nkara's
philosophy has been based on the interpretations of Vedânta
thought, as offered by these followers of S'a@nkara. These interpretations
are nowhere in conflict with S'a@nkara's doctrines, but
the questions and problems which S'a@nkara did not raise have
been raised and discussed by his followers, and without these one
could not treat Vedânta as a complete and coherent system of
metaphysics. As these will be discussed in the later sections,
we may close this with a short description of some of the main
features of the Vedânta thought as explained by S'a@nkara.
Brahman according to S'a@nkara is "the cause from which
(proceeds) the origin or subsistence and dissolution of this world
which is extended in names and forms, which includes many
438
agents and enjoyers, which contains the fruit of works specially
determined according to space, time, and cause, a world which is
formed after an arrangement inconceivable even by the (imagination
of the) mind [Footnote ref 1]." The reasons that S'a@nkara adduces for the
existence of Brahman may be considered to be threefold: (1) The
world must have been produced as the modification of something,
but in the Upani@sads all other things have been spoken of
as having been originated from something other than Brahman,
so Brahman is the cause from which the world has sprung into
being, but we could not think that Brahman itself originated from
something else, for then we should have a regressus ad infinitum
(anavasthâ). (2) The world is so orderly that it could not have
come forth from a non-intelligent source. The intelligent source
then from which this world has come into being is Brahman.
(3) This Brahman is the immediate consciousness (sâk@si) which
shines as the self, as well as through the objects of cognition
which the self knows. It is thus the essence of us all, the self,
and hence it remains undenied even when one tries to deny it,
for even in the denial it shows itself forth. It is the self of us all
and is hence ever present to us in all our cognitions.
Brahman according to S'a@nkara is the identity of pure intelligence,
pure being, and pure blessedness. Brahman is the self of
us all. So long as we are in our ordinary waking life, we are
identifying the self with thousands of illusory things, with all that
we call "I" or mine, but when in dreamless sleep we are absolutely
without any touch of these phenomenal notions the nature of our
true state as pure blessedness is partially realized. The individual
self as it appears is but an appearance only, while the real truth
is the true self which is one for all, as pure intelligence, pure
blessedness, and pure being.
All creation is illusory mâyâ. But accepting it as mâyâ, it
may be conceived that God (Îs'vara) created the world as a mere
sport; from the true point of view there is no Îs'vara who creates
the world, but in the sense in which the world exists, and we all
exist as separate individuals, we can affirm the existence of
Îs'vara, as engaged in creating and maintaining the world. In
reality all creation is illusory and so the creator also is illusory.
Brahman, the self, is at once the material cause (upâdâna-kâra@na)
as well as the efficient cause (nimitta-kâra@na) of the world.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's commentary, I.i. 2. See also Deussen's System of
the Vedânta.]
439
There is no difference between the cause and the effect, and the
effect is but an illusory imposition on the cause—a mere illusion
of name and form. We may mould clay into plates and jugs and
call them by so many different names, but it cannot be admitted
that they are by that fact anything more than clay; their transformations
as plates and jugs are only appearances of name and
form (nâmarúpa). This world, inasmuch as it is but an effect
imposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existent
(vyavahârika) as mere objects of name and form (nâmarûpa), but
the cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality(pâramârthika)
[Footnote ref 1].
The main idea of the Vedânta philosophy.
The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedãnta philosophy
as taught by the @S'a@kara school is this, that the ultimate
and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as
many in different individuals. The world also as apart from
us the individuals has no reality and has no other truth
to show than this self. All other events, mental or physical,
are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable
truth underlying them all is the self. While other
systems investigated the pramanas only to examine how far
they could determine the objective truth of things or our attitude
in practical life towards them, Vedãnta sought to reach
beneath the surface of appearances, and enquired after the final
and ultimate truth underlying the microcosm and the macrocosm,
the subject and the object. The famous instruction of
@S'vetaketu, the most important Vedânta text (mahâvâkya) says,
"That art thou, O S'vetaketu." This comprehension of my self
as the ultimate truth is the highest knowledge, for when this
knowledge is once produced, our cognition of world-appearances
will automatically cease. Unless the mind is chastened and purged
of all passions and desires, the soul cannot comprehend this
truth; but when this is once done, and the soul is anxious for
salvation by a knowledge of the highest truth, the preceptor
instructs him, "That art thou." At once he becomes the truth
itself, which is at once identical with pure bliss and pure intelligence;
all ordinary notions and cognitions of diversity and of the
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: All that is important in S'a@nkara's commentary of the
Brahma-sûtras has been excellently systematized by Deussen in his
System of the Vedanta; it is therefore unnecessary for me to give any
long account of this part. Most of what follows has been taken from
the writings of his followers.]
440
many cease; there is no duality, no notion of mine and thane; the
vast illusion of this world process is extinct in him, and he shines
forth as the one, the truth, the Brahman. All Hindu systems believed
that when man attained salvation, he became divested of all
world-consciousness, or of all consciousness of himself and his interests,
and was thus reduced to his own original purity untouched
by all sensations, perceptions, feelings and willing, but there the
idea was this that when man had no bonds of karma and no desire
and attachment with the world and had known the nature of
his self as absolutely free and unattached to the world and his
own psychosis, he became emancipated from the world and all
his connections with the world ceased, though the world continued
as ever the same with others. The external world was a reality
with them; the unreality or illusion consisted in want of true
knowledge about the real nature of the self, on account of which
the self foolishly identified itself with world-experiences, worldly
joys and world-events, and performed good and bad works accordingly.
The force of accumulated karmas led him to undergo
the experiences brought about by them. While reaping the fruits
of past karmas he, as ignorant as ever of his own self, worked
again under the delusion of a false relationship between himself
and the world, and so the world process ran on. Mufti (salvation)
meant the dissociation of the self from the subjective psychosis
and the world. This condition of the pure state of self was regarded
as an unconscious one by Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and Mîma@msâ,
and as a state of pure intelligence by Sâ@mkhya and Yoga. But
with Vedânta the case is different, for it held that the world as
such has no real existence at all, but is only an illusory imagination
which lasts till the moment when true knowledge is acquired.
As soon as we come to know that the one truth is the self, the
Brahman, all our illusory perceptions representing the world as
a field of experience cease. This happens not because the connections
of the self with the world cease, but because the appearance
of the world process does not represent the ultimate and
highest truth about it. All our notions about the abiding
diversified world (lasting though they may be from beginningless
time) are false in the sense that they do not represent the real
truth about it. We not only do not know what we ourselves
really are, but do not also know what the world about us is.
We take our ordinary experiences of the world as representing
441
it correctly, and proceed on our career of daily activity. It is no
doubt true that these experiences show us an established order
having its own laws, but this does not represent the real truth.
They are true only in a relative sense, so long as they appear to
be so; for the moment the real truth about them and the self is
comprehended all world-appearances become unreal, and that one
truth, the Brahman, pure being, bliss, intelligence, shines forth as
the absolute—the only truth in world and man. The world-appearance
as experienced by us is thus often likened to the
illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; for the moment
the perception appears to be true and the man runs to pick
it up, as if the conch-shell were a real piece of silver; but
as soon as he finds out the truth that this is only a piece of
conch-shell, he turns his back on it and is no longer deluded
by the appearance or again attracted towards it. The illusion
of silver is inexplicable in itself, for it was true for all purposes
so long as it persisted, but when true knowledge was
acquired, it forthwith vanished. This world-appearance will also
vanish when the true knowledge of reality dawns. When false
knowledge is once found to be false it cannot return again.
The Upani@sads tell us that he who sees the many here is
doomed. The one, the Brahman, alone is true; all else is but
delusion of name and form. Other systems believed that even
after emancipation, the world would continue as it is, that
there was nothing illusory in it, but I could not have any
knowledge of it because of the absence of the instruments by
the processes of which knowledge was generated. The Sâ@mkhya
puru@sa cannot know the world when the buddhi-stuff
is dissociated from it and merged in the prak@rti, the Mîmâ@msâ
and the Nyâya soul is also incapable of knowing the world
after emancipation, as it is then dissociated from manas. But
the Vedânta position is quite distinct here. We cannot know
the world, for when the right knowledge dawns, the perception
of this world-appearance proves itself to be false to the
person who has witnessed the truth, the Brahman. An illusion
cannot last when the truth is known; what is truth is known to
us, but what is illusion is undemonstrable, unspeakable, and
indefinite. The illusion runs on from beginningless time; we do
not know how it is related to truth, the Brahman, but we know
that when the truth is once known the false knowledge of this
442
world-appearance disappears once for all. No intermediate link
is necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of buddhi or
manas, but just as by finding out the glittering piece to be a conch-shell
the illusory perception of silver is destroyed, so this illusory
perception of world-appearance is also destroyed by a true
knowledge of the reality, the Brahman. The Upani@sads held
that reality or truth was one, and there was "no many" anywhere,
and S'añkara explained it by adding that the "many" was merely
an illusion, and hence did not exist in reality and was bound
to disappear when the truth was known. The world-appearance
is mâyâ (illusion). This is what S'añkara emphasizes in expounding
his constructive system of the Upani@sad doctrine.
The question is sometimes asked, how the mâyâ becomes associated
with Brahman. But Vedânta thinks this question illegitimate,
for this association did not begin in time either with
reference to the cosmos or with reference to individual persons.
In fact there is no real association, for the creation of illusion
does not affect the unchangeable truth. Mâyâ or illusion is no
real entity, it is only false knowledge (avidyâ) that makes the
appearance, which vanishes when the reality is grasped and found.
Mâyâ or avidyâ has an apparent existence only so long as it
lasts, but the moment the truth is known it is dissolved. It is
not a real entity in association with which a real world-appearance
has been brought into permanent existence, for it only has
existence so long as we are deluded by it (prâtîtika-sattâ).
Mâyâ therefore is a category which baffles the ordinary logical
division of existence and non-existence and the principle of excluded
middle. For the mâyâ can neither be said to be "is" nor
"is not" (tattvânyatvâbhyâm anirvacanîyâ). It cannot be said that
such a logical category does not exist, for all our dream and
illusory cognitions demonstrate it to us. They exist as they are
perceived, but they do not exist since they have no other independent
existence than the fact of their perception. If it has
any creative function, that function is as illusive as its
own nature, for the creation only lasts so long as the error lasts.
Brahman, the truth, is not in any way sullied or affected by association
with mâyâ, for there can be no association of the real with the empty,
the mâyâ, the illusory. It is no real association but a mere appearance.
443
In what sense is the world-appearance false?
The world is said to be false—a mere product of mâyâ. The
falsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involved
in the category of the indefinite which is neither sat "is"
nor asat "is not." Here the opposition of the "is" and "is not"
is solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is "is
not," since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, and
has its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledge
dawns. It is not therefore "is not" in the sense that a "castle in
the air" or a hare's horn is "is not," for these are called tuccha,
the absolutely non-existent. The world-appearance is said to be
"is" or existing, since it appears to be so for the time the state of
ignorance persists in us. Since it exists for a time it is sat (is),
but since it does not exist for all times it is asat (is not). This
is the appearance, the falsehood of the world-appearance (jagat-prapañca)
that it is neither sat nor asat in an absolute sense. Or
rather it may also be said in another way that the falsehood of
the world-appearance consists in this, that though it appears to
be the reality or an expression or manifestation of the reality, the
being, sat, yet when the reality is once rightly comprehended, it
will be manifest that the world never existed, does not exist,
and will never exist again. This is just what we find in an illusory
perception; when once the truth is found out that it is a conch-shell,
we say that the silver, though it appeared at the time of
illusory perception to be what we saw before us as "this" (this
is silver), yet it never existed before, does not now exist, and
will never exist again. In the case of the illusory perception of
silver, the "this" (pointing to a thing before me) appeared as
silver; in the case of the world-appearance, it is the being (sat),
the Brahman, that appears as the world; but as in the case when
the "this" before us is found to be a piece of conch-shell, the
silver is at once dismissed as having had no existence in the "this"
before us, so when the Brahman, the being, the reality, is once
directly realized, the conviction comes that the world never
existed. The negation of the world-appearance however has no
separate existence other than the comprehension of the identity
of the real. The fact that the real is realized is the same as that
the world-appearance is negated. The negation here involved
refers both to the thing negated (the world-appearance) and the
444
negation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when the
conviction of the negation of the world is also regarded as false
(for if the negation is not false then it remains as an entity different
from Brahman and hence the unqualified monism fails), then this
reinstates the reality of the world-appearance; for negation of the
world-appearance is as much false as the world-appearance itself,
and hence on the realization of the truth the negative thesis,
that the world-appearance does not exist, includes the negation
also as a manifestation of world-appearance, and hence the only
thing left is the realized identity of the truth, the being. The
peculiarity of this illusion of world-appearance is this, that it
appears as consistent with or inlaid in the being (sat) though it
is not there. This of course is dissolved when right knowledge
dawns. This indeed brings home to us the truth that the world-appearance
is an appearance which is different from what we
know as real (sadvilak@sa@na); for the real is known to us as
that which is proved by the prama@nas, and which will never
again be falsified by later experience or other means of proof.
A thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted;
but since at the dawn of right knowledge this world-appearance
will be found to be false and non-existing, it cannot be regarded
as real [Footnote ref l]. Thus Brahman alone is true, and the
world-appearance is false; falsehood and truth are not contrary entities
such that the negation or the falsehood of falsehood will mean truth.
The world-appearance is a whole and in referring to it the
negation refers also to itself as a part of the world-appearance
and hence not only is the positive world-appearance false, but
the falsehood itself is also false; when the world-appearance is
contradicted at the dawn of right knowledge, the falsehood itself
is also contradicted.
Brahman differs from all other things in this that it is self-luminous
(svaprakâs'a) and has no form; it cannot therefore be the
object of any other consciousness that grasps it. All other things,
ideas, emotions, etc., in contrast to it are called d@rs'ya (objects of
consciousness), while it is the dra@s@tâ (the pure consciousness
comprehending all objects). As soon as anything is comprehended as
an expression of a mental state (v@rtti), it is said to have a form and
it becomes d@rs'ya, and this is the characteristic of all objects of
consciousness that they cannot reveal themselves apart from being
manifested as objects of consciousness through a mental state.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Advaitasiddhi, Mithyâtvanirukti.]
445
Brahman also, so long as it is understood as a meaning of the
Upani@sad text, is not in its true nature; it is only when it shines
forth as apart from the associations of any form that it is svaprakâs'a
and dra@s@tâ. The knowledge of the pure Brahman is devoid of any
form or mode. The notion of d@rs'yatva (objectivity) carries with
it also the notion of ja@datva (materiality) or its nature as
non-consciousness (ajñânatva) and non-selfness (anâtmatva) which
consists in the want of self-luminosity of objects of consciousness.
The relation of consciousness (jñâna) to its objects cannot be
regarded as real but as mere illusory impositions, for as we shall
see later, it is not possible to determine the relation between
knowledge and its forms. Just as the silver-appearance of the
conch-shell is not its own natural appearance, so the forms in
which consciousness shows itself are not its own natural essence.
In the state of emancipation when supreme bliss (ânanda) shines
forth, the ânanda is not an object or form of the illuminating
consciousness, but it is the illumination itself. Whenever there
is a form associated with consciousness, it is an extraneous illusory
imposition on the pure consciousness. These forms are different
from the essence of consciousness, not only in this that they
depend on consciousness for their expression and are themselves
but objects of consciousness, but also in this that they are all
finite determinations (paricchinna), whereas consciousness, the
abiding essence, is everywhere present without any limit whatsoever.
The forms of the object such as cow, jug, etc. are limited
in themselves in what they are, but through them all the pure
being runs by virtue of which we say that the cow is, the jug is,
the pot is. Apart from this pure being running through all the
individual appearances, there is no other class (jâti) such as
cowness or jugness, but it is on this pure being that different
individual forms are illusorily imposed (gha@tâdîkam sadarthekalpitam,
pratyekam tadanubiddhatvena pra@tîyamânatvât). So
this world-appearance which is essentially different from the
Brahman, the being which forms the material cause on which it
is imposed, is false
(_upâdânani@s@thâiyaniâbhâvapratiyogitvalak@sa@namithyâtvasiddhi@h
—as Citsukha has it).
The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena.
The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception
of silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly
illusions is called prâtibhâsika, as they are contradicted by other
446
later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never
contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called vyavahârika
(from vyavahâra, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our
practical movements). So long as the right knowledge of the
Brahman as the only reality does not dawn, the world-appearance
runs on in an orderly manner uncontradicted by the accumulated
experience of all men, and as such it must be held to be true.
It is only because there comes such a stage in which the world-appearance
ceases to manifest itself that we have to say that from
the ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance is
false and unreal. As against this doctrine of the Vedânta it is
sometimes asked how, as we see the reality (sattva) before us,
we can deny that it has truth. To this the Vedânta answers
that the notion of reality cannot be derived from the senses, nor
can it be defined as that which is the content of right knowledge,
for we cannot have any conception of right knowledge without
a conception of reality, and no conception of reality without a
conception of right knowledge. The conception of reality comprehends
within it the notions of unalterability, absoluteness, and
independence, which cannot be had directly from experience,
as this gives only an appearance but cannot certify its truth.
Judged from this point of view it will be evident that the true
reality in all our experience is the one self-luminous flash of
consciousness which is all through identical with itself in all its
manifestations of appearance. Our present experience of the
world-appearance cannot in any way guarantee that it will not
be contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all
experience is the being (sat) and not its forms. This being that
is associated with all our experience is not a universal genus nor
merely the individual appearance of the moment, but it is the
being, the truth which forms the substratum of all objective events
and appearances (ekenaiva sarvânugatena sarvatra satpratîti@h).
Things are not existent because they possess the genus of being
(sat) as Nyâya supposes, but they are so because they are themselves
but appearance imposed on one identical being as the basis
and ground of all experience. Being is thus said to be the basis
(adhi@s@thâna) on which the illusions appear. This being is not
different with different things but one in all appearances. Our
perceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as a
guarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them
447
could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and s'ruti (scriptures)
did not point the other way. Perception can of course invalidate
inference, but it can do so only when its own validity
has been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner.
But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance,
for our present perceptions cannot prove that these
will never be contradicted in future, and inference and s'ruti are
also against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance
cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted
by inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception
in this case is contradicted by inference and we have
hence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend
(upajîvya) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such
dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely
valid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained by
proper examination and enquiry (parîk@sâ), which may convince
us that there is no error in it. True it is that by the universal
testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and
realization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved
beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality.
But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with
any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never
be contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vedânta also
admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the
world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it
cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when
to the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to
exist. The experience, observation, and practical utility of the
objects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will
never be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of the
world-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedânta inference
that the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself
to be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as
one dawns in us. The testimony of the Upani@sads also contradicts
the perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold
aspect.
Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is
false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation
between the consciousness (d@rk) and the objects of consciousness
(d@rs'ya). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of
448
connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been
so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its
connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine
any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for
it can neither be contact (sa@myoga) nor inherence (samavâya);
and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no
other. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness,
but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot
be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect
like the jñâtatâ of Mîmâ@msâ is produced upon the object, for such
an effect is not admissible or perceivable in any way; nor can
objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us)
associated with the object as Prabhakâra thinks, for there are
many things which are the objects of our consciousness but not
considered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean
that the thing is the object of the thought-movement (jñâna-kâra@na)
involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference
to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects
of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is
not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement?
Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own
forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though
this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of
inference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does
not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever
way we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately
and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also
seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting
between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be
admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all
nothing but illusory.
Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness
yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted
even by Vedânta that this can only take place through specific
sense-contact and particular mental states (v@rtti) or modes; but
if that be so why not rather admit that this can take place
even on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifold
external world without? The answer that the Vedânta gives to
such a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has
not to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one
449
flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness;
so it is not possible that the external reality should have to
pass through any process before consciousness could arise; what
happens is simply this, that the reality (sat) which subsists in all
things as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its
veil is removed by association with the v@rtti (mental mould or
state). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates
everything with which it comes into relation. Such an illumination
of objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous
if there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the
reality is hidden by the veil of ajñâna (nescience). This veil is
removed as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a
mental mould or v@rtti, and as soon as it is removed the thing
shines forth. Even before the formation of the v@rtti the illusory
impositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively,
but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by ajñâna which is
removed by the action of the corresponding v@rtti; and as soon as
the veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The
action of the senses, eye, etc. serves but to modify the v@rtti of the
mind, and the v@rtti of the mind once formed, the corresponding
ajñâna veil which was covering the corresponding specific part of
the world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of the
object which was already present, being divested of the veil, shows
itself forth. The illusory creations were there, but they could not
be manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as the
veil is removed by the action of the v@rtti the light of reality shows
the corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itself
is the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated but
ever exists; errors of perception (e.g. silver in the conch-shell)
take place not because the do@sa consisting of the defect of the
eye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributed
to the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because it
generated a wrong v@rtti. It is because of the generation of the
wrong v@rtti that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion
"this is silver" as when we mistake the conch-shell for the silver,
it is the cit, consciousness or reality as underlying the object
represented to us by "this" or "idam" that is the basis (adhi@s@thâna)
of the illusion of silver. The cause of error is our nescience or
non-cognition (ajñâna) of it in the form of the conch-shell, whereas
the right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-shell. The
450
basis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in my
mental state (v@rtti), so that the illusion is not of the form
that the "knowledge is silver" but of "this is silver." Objective
phenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expression
of illumination of them as states of knowledge is made
through the cit being manifested through the mental mould or
states. Without the v@rtti there is no illuminating knowledge.
Phenomenal creations are there in the world moving about as
shadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one cit or reality,
but this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these forms
when the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removed
by their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification
(v@rtti). It is sometimes said that since all illumination of
knowledge must be through the mental states there is no other
entity of pure consciousness apart from what is manifested
through the states. This Vedânta does not admit, for it holds
that it is necessary that before the operation of the mental
states can begin to interpret reality, reality must already be
there and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness. Had
there been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge,
the validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has to
be admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous reality
untouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which are
material and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminous
consciousness that seems to assume diverse forms
in connection with diverse kinds of associations or limitations
(upâdhi). It manifests ajñâna (nescience) and hence does not by
itself remove the ajñâna, except when it is reflected through any
specific kind of v@rtti. There is of course no difference, no inner
and outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousness
which is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenal
appearances of the objective world, and the consciousness that
manifests itself through the mental states. There is only one
identical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basis
of the phenomena as well, is their interpreter by a reflection
through the mental states or v@rttis.
The phenomena or objects called the drs'ya can only be determined
in their various forms and manifestations but not as
to their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an entity of
any relation such as sa@myoga (contact) or samavâya (inherence)
451
between them and the pure consciousness called the d@rk; for the
truth is this, that the d@rk (perceiver) and the d@rs'ya (perceived)
have one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are but
illusory creations on it.
It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological
illusion such as "this is silver," the knowledge of "this" as a thing
is only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived
as a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-shell are not
noticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure
consciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristics
of any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any
illusion as the piece of conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere
"this" can be. The answer of Vedânta is that when the Brahman
stands as the ground (adhi@s@thâna) of the world-appearance its
characteristic as sat or real only is manifested, whereas its special
character as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather it
may be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possible
because the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealed
to us in our objective consciousness; when I say "the jug is,"
the "isness," or "being," does not shine in its purity, but only as
a characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion.
In all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shines
forth in association with the manifold objects, and therefore the
Brahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is made
possible. It is again objected that since the world-appearance
can serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real and
not illusory. But the Vedânta points out that even by illusory
perceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusory
perception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snake
could do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreams
may be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physical
functions and organs of a man. So it is that the past impressions
imbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficient
to account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions produced
in actual waking life account for the dream creations.
According to the good or bad deeds that a man has done in
previous lives and according to the impressions or potencies
(sa@mskâra) of his past lives each man has a particular kind of
world-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannot
affect the formation of the illusory experience of the other. But
452
the experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjective
creation for each individual, for even before his cognition the
phenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowable
state of existence (svena adhyastasya sa@mskârasya
viyadâdyadhyâsajanakatvopapatte@h tatpratîtyabhâvepi tadadhyâsasya
pûrvam sattvât k@rtsnasyâpi vyavahârikapadârthasya
ajñâtasattvâbhyupagamât). It is again sometimes objected that illusion
is produced by malobserved similarity between the ground (adhi@s@thâna)
and the illusory notion as silver in "this is silver," but
no such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance.
To this Vedânta says that similarity is not an indispensable
factor in the production of an illusion (e.g. when a
white conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eye
through the influence of bile or pitta). Similarity helps the production
of illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressions
or memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well be
done by ad@r@s@ta—the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds.
In ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion of
this world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits no
other do@sa (defect) than the avidyâ (nescience) which constitutes
the appearance. Here avidyâ is the only do@sa and Brahman is the
only adhi@s@thâna or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, the
self-luminous as the adhi@s@thâna, the illusory creations could not
have been manifested at all The cause of the direct perception
of illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the adhi@s@thâna.
Hence where the adhi@s@thâna is hidden by the veil of avidyâ, the
association with mental states becomes necessary for removing
the veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous adhi@s@thâna.
As soon as the adhi@s@thâna, the ground, the reality, the blissful
self-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear.
The disappearance of the phenomena means nothing
more than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman.
The Definition of Ajñâna (nescience).
Ajñâna the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is
beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (anâdibhâvarupatve
sati jñânanivartyatvam). Though it manifests itself
in all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of
perception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no
beginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which
453
is beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive
(bhâvarûpa) it can very well constitute the essence of negation
(abhâva) too, for the positivity (bhâvatva) does not mean here the
opposite of abhâva (negation) but notes merely its difference from
abhâva (abhâva-vilak@sa@natvamâtram vivak@sitam). Ajñâna is not
a positive entity (bhâva) like any other positive entity, but it is
called positive simply because it is not a mere negation (abhâva).
It is a category which is believed neither to be positive in the
ordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is different
both from position as well as from negation. It is sometimes
objected that ajñâna is a mere illusory imagination of the moment
caused by defect (do@sa) and hence it cannot be beginningless
(anâdi); but Vedânta holds that the fact that it is an imagination
or rather imposition, does not necessarily mean that it is merely
a temporary notion produced by the defects; for it could have
been said to be a temporary product of the moment if the ground
as well as the illusory creation associated with it came into being
for the moment, but this is not the case here, as the cit, the
ground of illusion, is ever-present and the ajñâna therefore being
ever associated with it is also beginningless. The ajñâna is the
indefinite which is veiling everything, and as such is different
from the definite or the positive and the negative. Though it is
beginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to have
a beginning or not to have it does not in any way determine
whether the thing is subject to dissolution or not for the dissolution
of a thing depends upon the presence of the thing which
can cause it; and it is a fact that when knowledge comes the
illusion is destroyed; it does not matter whether the cause which
produced the illusion was beginningless or not. Some Vedântists
however define ajñâna as the substance constituting illusion, and
say that though it is not a positive entity yet it may be regarded
as forming the substance of the illusion; it is not necessary that
only a positive entity should be the matter of any thing, for what
is necessary for the notion of a material cause (upâdâna) is this,
that it should continue or persist as the same in all changes of
effects. It is not true that only what is positive can persist in
and through the effects which are produced in the time process.
Illusion is unreal and it is not unnatural that the ajñâna which
also is unreal should be the cause of it.
454
Ajñâna established by Perception and Inference.
Ajñâna defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor
negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions
as "I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else,"
or "I do not know what you say," or more particularly "I had
been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything." Such
perceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics,
and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative.
It may be objected that the perception "I do not know" is not
the perception of the indefinite, the ajñâna, but merely the negation
of knowledge. To this Vedânta says that had it been the
perception of a negation merely, then the negation must have
been associated with the specific object to which it applied.
A negation must imply the thing negatived; in fact negation
generally appears as a substantive with the object of negation
as a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation.
But the perception "I do not know or I had no knowledge" does
not involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any
specific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectless
ignorance. Such an indefinite ajñâna is positive in the sense that
it is certainly not negative, but this positive indefinite is not positive
in the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive,
for it is merely the characterless, passive indefinite showing itself
in our experience. If negation meant only a general negation,
and if the perception of negation meant in each case the perception
of a general negation, then even where there is a jug on
the ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on the
ground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there.
Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the
negation of all specific things; similarly a general negation without
any specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest
itself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledge
is thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the
latter is present the former cannot be, but the perception "I do
not know" can persist, even though many individual objects be
known to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of "I do
not know" is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is
rather better to say that it is the perception of a different category
namely the indefinite, the ajñâna. It is our common experience
455
that after experiencing the indefinite (ajñâna) of a specific type
we launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to be
admitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from the
perception of mere negation. The character of our perceiving
consciousness (sâk@si) is such that both the root ajñâna as well
as its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as represented
in mental states (v@rtti-jñâna), are comprehended by it.
Of course when the v@rttijñâna about a thing as in ordinary
perceptions of objects comes in, the ajñâna with regard to it is
temporarily removed, for the v@rttijñâna is opposed to the ajñâna.
But so far as our own perceiving consciousness (sâk@si-caitanya)
is conceived it can comprehend both the ajñâna and the jñâna
(knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things show
themselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known or
as unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends all
positives either as indefinite ajñâna or as states of knowledge
or as specific kinds of ajñâna or ignorance, but it is unable to
comprehend a negation, for negation (abhâva) is not a perception,
but merely the absence of perception (anupalabdhi). Thus when
I say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousness
with reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of a
negation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised from
the Nyâya point of view that since without the knowledge of a
qualification (vis'e@sana) the qualified thing (vis'i@s@ta) cannot be
known, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousness
without the object being known first. To this Vedânta
replies that the maxim that the qualification must be known
before the qualified thing is known is groundless, for we can as
well perceive the thing first and then its qualification. It is not
out of place here to say that negation is not a separate entity,
but is only a peculiar mode of the manifestation of the positive.
Even the naiyâyikas would agree that in the expression "there
is no negation of a jug here," no separate negation can be accepted,
for the jug is already present before us. As there are distinctions
and differences in positive entities by illusory impositions, so
negations are also distinguished by similar illusory impositions
and appear as the negation of jug, negation of cloth, etc.; so all
distinctions between negations are unnecessary, and it may be
accepted that negation like position is one which appears as many
on account of illusory distinctions and impositions. Thus the
456
content of negation being itself positive, there is no reason to
object that such perceptions as "I do not know" refer to the
perception of an indefinite ajñâna in consciousness. So also the
perception "I do not know what you say" is not the perception
of negation, for this would require that the hearer should know
first what was said by the speaker, and if this is so then it is
impossible to say "I do not know what you say."
So also the cognition "I was sleeping long and did not
know anything" has to be admitted as referring to the perception
of the indefinite during sleep. It is not true as some say that
during sleep there is no perception, but what appears to the
awakened man as "I did not know anything so long" is only an
inference; for, it is not possible to infer from the pleasant and
active state of the senses in the awakened state that the activity
had ceased in the sleep state and that since he had no object of
knowledge then, he could not know anything; for there is no
invariable concomitance between the pleasant and active state of
the senses and the absence of objects of knowledge in the immediately
preceding state. During sleep there is a mental state
of the form of the indefinite, and during the awakened state it is
by the impression (sa@mskâra) of the aforesaid mental state of
ajñâna that one remembers that state and says that "I did not
perceive anything so long." The indefinite (ajñâna) perceived in
consciousness is more fundamental and general than the mere
negation of knowledge (jñânâbhâva) and the two are so connected
that though the latter may not be felt, yet it can be inferred from
the perception of the indefinite. The indefinite though not definite
is thus a positive content different from negation and is perceived as
such in direct and immediate consciousness both in the awakened
state as well as in the sleeping state.
The presence of this ajñâna may also be inferred from the
manner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in consciousness,
as this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousness
which was not known or rather known as indefinite before we
say "I did not know it before, but I know it now." My present
knowledge of the thing thus involves the removal of an indefinite
which was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, just
as the first streak of light in utter darkness manifests itself by
removing the darkness[Footnote ref 1]. Apart from such an inference its
existence
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Pañcapâdikâvivara@na, Tattvadîpana, and
Advaitasiddhi.]
457
is also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman
does not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If there
was no ajñâna to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself
in its fullness. Again had it not been for this ajñâna there would
have been no illusion. It is the ajñâna that constitutes the substance
of the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regarded
as constituting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as it
is unchangeable. This ajñâna is manifested by the perceiving
consciousness (sâk@si) and not by the pure consciousness. The
perceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which
reflects itself in the states of avidyâ (ignorance).
Locus and Object of Ajñâna, Aha@mkâra, and Anta@hkara@na.
This ajñâna rests on the pure cit or intelligence. This cit or
Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not
opposed to the ajñâna or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed
to the ajñâna and destroys it only when it is reflected through the
mental states (v@rtti). The ajñâna thus rests on the pure cit and not
on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to
produce the notion of ego "aham" or the individual soul. Vâcaspati
Mis'ra however holds that the ajñâna does not rest on the pure cit
but on the jîva (individual soul). Mâdhava reconciles this view of
Vâcaspati with the above view, and says that the ajñâna may be
regarded as resting on the jîva or individual soul from this point of
view that the obstruction of the pure cit is with reference to the jîva
(Cinmâtrâs'ritam ajñânam jîvapak@sapâtitvât jîvâs'ritam ucyate
Vivara@naprameya, p. 48). The feeling "I do not know" seems
however to indicate that the ajñâna is with reference to the perceiving
self in association with its feeling as ego or "I"; but this
is not so; such an appearance however is caused on account of
the close association of ajñâna with anta@hkara@na (mind) both of
which are in essence the same (see Vivara@naprarneyasa@mgraha,
p. 48).
The ajñâna however does not only rest on the cit, but it has
the cit as its visaya or object too, i.e. its manifestations are
with reference to the self-luminous cit. The self-luminous cit is
thus the entity on which the veiling action of the ajñâna is noticed;
the veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminous
character, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career on
the part of the cit, nor by stopping its relations with the vi@saya,
458
but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit
seems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it does
not shine (nâsti na prakâs'ate iti vyavahâra@h) or rather there is no
appearance of its shining or luminosity. To say that Brahman is
hidden by the ajñâna means nothing more than this, that it is
such {tadyogyatâ) that the ajñâna can so relate itself with it that
it appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other
states of ajñâna-consciousness in experience. Ajñâna is thus
considered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It
is opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel
it. The action of this ajñ@ana is thus on the light of the reality
which it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved
by the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not
only with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness
but also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss;
so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our
pleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure cit
is indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting the
essence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there
is only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal
experiences of pleasure. The ajñâna is one, but it seems to obstruct
the pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it
may be said that the ajñâna has many states as constituting the
individual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the
diverse individual objects of experience. These states of ajñâna
are technically called tulâjñâna or avasthâjñâna. Any state of
consciousness (v@rttijñâna) removes a manifestation of the ajñâna
as tulâjñâna and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.
The most important action of this ajñâna as obstructing the
pure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstrated
in the notion of the ego or aha@mkâra. This notion of aha@mkâra
is a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and other
associations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.;
it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed
in the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand
limitations, characters, and associations. This illusory creation of
the notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each set
of previous false impositions determining the succeeding set of
impositions and so on. This blending of the unreal associations
held up in the mind (anta@hkara@na) with the real, the false with
459
the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the anta@hkara@na taken
as the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion
of the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns,
there are two entities of the ball and the fire fused into one,
so, here also when I say "I perceive", there are two distinct elements
of the self, as consciousness and the mind or antahkarana fused
into one. The part or aspect associated with sorrow, materiality,
and changefulness represents the anta@hkara@na, whereas that which
appears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self.
Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and other
unreal.
We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhâkara
sought to repudiate. Prabhâkara did not consider the self to be
self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought
(tripu@ti), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the
object of knowledge, and the self. He further said, that the
analogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball
and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the
anta@hkara@na are never separately experienced, and we can
never say that these two are really different, and only have an
illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (anubhava)
is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and
like it does not require the assistance of anything else for the
fulfilment of its purpose. But the Vedânta objects to this saying
that according to Prabhakara's supposition, it is impossible to
discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If
knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as
well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge
are indeed one and the same. Kumârila thinks this thought
(anubhava), to be a movement, Nyâya and Prabhâkara as a
quality of the self [Footnote ref 1]. But if it was a movement like other
movements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a
substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of
a thing, if all pervasive, then it would illuminate everything,
if of medium size, it would depend on its parts for its own
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: According to Nyâya the âtman is conscious only through
association with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(cit).
Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable
collocations. Thus, Nyâyamañjarî in refuting the doctrine of
self-luminosity {svaprakâs'a) says (p.432)
_sacetanas'citâ yogâttadyogena vinâ ja@da@h
nârthâvabhâsadanyaddhi caitanya@m nâma manma@he.]
460
constitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality
of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily
to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what
else could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the
self, the âtman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts any
of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else.
The self is thus the same as vijñâna, the pure consciousness,
which is always of itself self-luminous [Footnote ref 1].
Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages,
waking or sleeping, yet aha@mkâra is absent during deep sleep.
It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels "I slept
happily and did not know anything"; yet what happens is this,
that during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na and the aha@mkâra are
altogether submerged in the ajñâna, and there are only the
ajñâna and the self; on waking, this aha@mkâra as a state of
anta@hkar@na is again generated, and then it associates the perception
of the ajñâna in the sleep and originates the perception
"I did not know anything." This aha@mkâra which is a mode
(v@rtti) of the anta@hkara@na is thus constituted by avidyâ, and is
manifested as jñânas'akti (power of knowledge) and kriyâs'akti
(power of work). This kriyâs'akti of the aha@mkâra is illusorily
imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to
be an active agent in knowing and willing. The aha@mkâra
itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or v@rtti of
the anta@hkara@na, and as such the aha@mkâra of a past period can
now be associated; but even then the v@rtti of anta@hkara@na,
aha@mkâra, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of
the anta@hkara@na. The same anta@hkara@na is called manas in its
capacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of
knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2]. When
the pure cit shines forth in association with this anta@hkara@na, it is
called a jîva. It is clear from the above account that the ajñâna
is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But
it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support
it (âs'raya); its own nature as the ajñâna or indefinite is perceived
directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating
the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamakaranda, pp. 130-140, Citshkha and
Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha, pp. 53-58.]
[Footnote 2: See Vedânta-paribhâ@sâ, p. 88, Bombay edition.]
461
these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself
through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in
the anta@hkara@na, and the light of the real shines forth through
these states. The anta@hkara@na of which aha@mkâra is a moment,
is itself a beginningless system of ajñâna-phenomena containing
within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as
merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the
jîva or individual soul began his career.
Anirvâcyavâda and the Vedânta Dialectic.
We have already seen that the indefinite ajñâna could be
experienced in direct perception and according to Vedânta there
are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous
Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter
has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by
which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all
the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is
different from the category of the positive and the negative, has
only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the
true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can
be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character
as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed
order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names,
all these are originated by this avidyâ, ajñâna or mâyâ is indeed
hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all
these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is
said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence
beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle
and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything
else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly
appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only
seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except
pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason.
It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the
objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and
false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must
show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All
categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to
be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before
us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are
462
examined, and one cannot make such assertion about them as
that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our
fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by
S'rîhar@sa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible
within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete
account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality.
I shall give here, only one example.
Let us take the examination of the notion of difference
(bheda)from Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya. Four explanations are
possible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be
perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience
(svarûpa-bheda) as Prabhâkara thinks; (2) the difference
between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other
(anyonyâbhâva), as some Naiyâyikas and Bhâ@t@tas think; (3) difference
means divergence of characteristics (vaidharmya) as the
Vais'e@sikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality
in itself like the p@rthaktva quality of Nyâya. Taking the first
alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth
represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their
mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the
cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic
of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated
into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive
in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug?
i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by
the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference
from something else, it is expected that something else such
as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also
be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if
the perception of "difference" between two things has penetrated
together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction
becomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what
we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from
something else, and if that thing from which the difference is
perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an
entity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents
its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug,
then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference
from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth
itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that
463
the jug only indicates a term from which difference
is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible,
for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent
of any association of its difference from other things,
and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If
it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation
to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference
from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty
comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the
cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of
the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would
also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but
identity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character
of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other,
but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to
ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have
not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything
might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation
between these two, then that relation would require another
relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again
require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it
may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference
to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are
viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference.
But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely
different from the perception of difference. It should also be
noted that the notion of difference is also different from the
notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say
that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say
that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear
as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth.
The notion of a jug does not require the notions of other things
for its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is different
from the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which is
the same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that the
difference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, and
not merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. This
shows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of the
thing perceived.
Again, in the second alternative where difference of two
463
things is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, we
find that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is not
in the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the same
difficulty arises; for when I say that the absence or negation of
jug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also the
residence of the absence of jug in the cloth would require
that the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reduce
difference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in the
cloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical cloth
itself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot be
explained. If this mutual negation (anyonyabhâva) is explained
as the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness in
the jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such quality
in jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded;
and there is no such quality in them that they can be treated as
identical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in cloth
we might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, for
clothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absence
of jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness
in the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the third
alternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics
(vaidharmya), then the question arises whether the
vaidharmya or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergence
as can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; if
the answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endless
vaidharmyas progressing ad infinitum. If the answer is in the
negative then there being no divergence between the two divergences
they become identical, and hence divergence of characteristics
as such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms of
things are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes the
other, then apart from the differences—the natural forms—the
things are reduced to formlessness (ni@hsvarûpatâ). If natural forms
(svarûpa) mean special natural forms (svarûpa-vis'e@sa) then as the
special natural forms or characteristics only represent difference,
the natural forms of the things as apart from the special ones
would appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that there
is no such quality as p@rthaktva (separateness) which can explain
differences of things, for there also the questions would arise as
to whether separateness exists in different things or similar ones
or whether separateness is identical with the thing in which it
exists or not, and so forth.
465
The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and
dialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chapters
of Kathâvatthu. In the great Mahâbha@sya on Pâ@nini by Patañjali
also we find some traces of it. But Nâgârjuna was the man who
took it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all
its subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to prove
that everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was
non-existent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable and
self-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was
only the void (s'ûnya). S'a@nkara partially utilized this method in
his refutations of Nyâya and the Buddhist systems; but S'rîhar@sa
again revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after
having criticized the most important notions and concepts of our
everyday life, which are often backed by the Nyâya system, sought
to prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that we
cannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of
all possible definitions that the Nyâya could give necessarily led
to the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not
exist though they appeared to do so; the Vedântic contention
was that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite ajñâna
produces only appearances which when exposed to reason show
that no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in other
words the world-appearance, the phenomena of mâyâ or ajñâna,
are indefinable or anirvacanîya. This great work of S'rîhar@sa
was followed by Tattvadîpikâ of Citsukha, in which he generally
followed S'rîhar@sa and sometimes supplemented him with the
addition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method of
Vedânta thus followed on one side the method of S'ûnyavâda in
annulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the other
Vijñânavâda Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating character
of knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminous
ultimate reality.
The Theory of Causation.
The Vedânta philosophy looked at the constantly changing
phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the
root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects.
The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused
by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents,
as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved
466
and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered
insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedãnta had before
it. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded
certain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of
phenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set.
In fact the concept of causation and production had in it
something quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiry
after the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental and
primary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at the
present moment when we wished to know what was the cause of
the jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effect
was only a more complex form of manifestation, what is the
ground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? If
apart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representation
of the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariably
present at an antecedent point of time, the effect springs
forth into being, we find that we are just where we were before,
and are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. The
Nyãya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in a
general way in associating certain groups of things of a particular
kind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeeding
moment as being relevant pairs of which one being present the
other also has a probability of being present, but can do nothing
more than this. It does not answer our question as to the nature
of cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensable
condition for the cause. But time, according to Nyãya,
is one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceived
as antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and these
again involve succession; thus the notions of succession of time
and of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutually
dependent upon each other (anyonyâs'raya) neither of these can
be conceived independently. Another important condition is
invariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariable
antecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present as
an antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman's
house, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. If it
means such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect,
it becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contributing
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are
always present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.]
467
to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence
and nothing more. If invariability means the existence of
that at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also
it fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presence
of the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it
is said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associated
with its accessory factors, then also the question remains
the same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause.
Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a
plurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that which
happening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannot
also be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particular
cause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect that
from a special kind of cause we can without fail get a special
kind of effect (cf. Vâtsyâyana and Nyâyamañjarî), for out of the
same clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate,
etc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, then
the question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; does
it mean the factors themselves or something else above them? On
the former supposition the scattered factors being always present
in the universe there should always be the effect; if it means
something else above the specific factors, then that something always
existing, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation
(sâmagrî) be defined as the last movement of the causes
immediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the
relation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible.
Moreover if movement is defined as that which produces
the effect, the very conception of causation which was required
to be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involved
in the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce
its effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically
inconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out
the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable
series of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristics
of the effects are indescribable and indefinable ajñâna of mâyâ,
and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in
themselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all
carved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and
some day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the pure
being, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon
468
which all appearances being imposed they appear as real. The
true cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through
all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon
it of ajñâna or avidyâ. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that
is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates,
etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere
appearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory. The one truth
is the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is
being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being
imposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what
is called the satkâryavâda or more properly the satkâra@navâda
of the Vedânta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing,
and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this
much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being
which alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the
being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called
the vivarttavâda as distinguished from the sâ@mkhyayogapari@nâmavâda,
in which the effect is regarded as the real development
of the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a
different kind of being from the cause it is called vivartta but
when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called
pari@nâma (kâra@nasvalak@sa@nânyathâbhâva@h pari@nâma@h tadvilak@sa@no
vivartta@h or vastunastatsamattâko'nyathâbhâva@h pari@nâma@h
tadvi@samasattâka@h vivartta@h). Vedânta has as much to object
against the Nyâya as against the pari@nâma theory of causation
of the Sâ@mkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality,
and actuality—all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the
light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate
things and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality
however though phenomena are not identical with the cause,
they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (Tadabhedam
vinaiva tadvyatireke@na durvacam kâryyam vivartta@h).
This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the
world, the different followers of S'a@nkara Vedânta in explaining
the cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the
mâyâ, ajñâna or avidyâ, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes
on them both. Thus Sarvaj@nâtmamuni, the writer of
Sa@nk@sepa-s'ârîraka and his followers think that the pure Brahman
should be regarded as the causal substance (upâdâna) of the
world-appearance, whereas Prakâs'âtman Akhan@dânanda, and
469
Mâdhava hold that Brahman in association with mâyâ, i.e. the
mâyâ-reflected form of Brahman as Îs'vara should be regarded
as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance
is an evolution or pari@nâma of the mâyâ as located in Îs'vara,
whereas Îs'vara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others
however make a distinction between mâyâ as the cosmical factor
of illusion and avidyâ as the manifestation of the same entity
in the individual or jîva. They hold that though the world-appearance
may be said to be produced by the mâyâ yet the
mind etc. associated with the individual are produced by the
avidyâ with the jîva or the individual as the causal matter
(upâdâna). Others hold that since it is the individual to whom
both Îs'vara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is better
rather to think that these are all manifestations of the jîva in
association with his avidyâ or ajñâna. Others however hold that
since in the world-appearance we find in one aspect pure being
and in another materiality etc., both Brahman and mâyâ are to
be regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causal
matter, upâdâna and mâyâ as the entity evolving in pari@nâma.
Vâcaspati Mis'ra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of
the world-appearance through mâyâ as associated with jîva.
Mâyâ is thus only a sahakâri or instrument as it were, by which
the one Brahman appears in the eye of the jîva as the manifold
world of appearance. Prakâs'ânanda holds however in his Siddhânta
Muktâvalî that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffected
even as illusory appearance, and is not even the causal
matter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in the
phenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is the
product of mâyâ, which is both the instrumental and the upâdâna
(causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergences
of view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affect
the principal Vedânta text that the only unchangeable cause is
the Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have only
a temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word mâyâ
was used in the @Rg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power and
wonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlying
it was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it began
to be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the B@rhadâra@nyaka,
Pras'na, and Svetâs'vatara Upani@sads the word means magic. It
is not out of place here to mention that in the older Upani@sads
470
the word mâyâ occurs only once in the B@rhadâra@nyaka and once
only in the Pras'na. In early Pâli Buddhist writings it occurs
only in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhagho@sa
uses it in the sense of magical power. In Nâgârjuna and the Lankâvatâra
it has acquired the sense of illusion. In S'a@nkara the
word mâyâ is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principle
of creation as a s'akti (power) or accessory cause, and as the
phenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance.
It may also be mentioned here that Gau@dapâda the teacher
of S'a@nkara's teacher Govinda worked out a system with the help
of the mâyâ doctrine. The Upani@sads are permeated with the
spirit of an earnest enquiry after absolute truth. They do not
pay any attention towards explaining the world-appearance or
enquiring into its relations with absolute truth. Gau@dapâda asserts
clearly and probably for the first time among Hindu thinkers, that
the world does not exist in reality, that it is mâyâ, and not reality.
When the highest truth is realized mâyâ is not removed, for it is
not a thing, but the whole world-illusion is dissolved into its own
airy nothing never to recur again. It was Gau@dapâda who compared
the world-appearance with dream appearances, and held that objects
seen in the waking world are unreal, because they are capable
of being seen like objects seen in a dream, which are false and
unreal. The âtman says Gau@dapâda is at once the cognizer and
the cognized, the world subsists in the âtman through mâyâ.
As âtman alone is real and all duality an illusion, it necessarily
follows that all experience is also illusory. S'a@nkara expounded
this doctrine in his elaborate commentaries on the Upani@sads
and the Brahma-sûtra, but he seems to me to have done little
more than making explicit the doctrine of mâyâ. Some of his
followers however examined and thought over the concept of
mâyâ and brought out in bold relief its character as the indefinable
thereby substantially contributing to the development of
the Vedânta philosophy.
Vedânta theory of Perception and Inference [Footnote ref 1].
Pramâ@na is the means that leads to right knowledge. If
memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra and his son Râmak@r@s@na worked out a
complete scheme of the theory of Vedântic perception and inference.
This is in complete agreement with the general Vedânta metaphysics.
The early Vedântists were more interested in demonstrating the illusory
nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory.
It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as
worked out by Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra he was largely indebted to the Mîmâm@sâ
school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamâna s'abda and
anupalabdhi also Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra accepted the Mîmâm@sâ view. The
Vedantins, previous to Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra, had also tacitly followed
the Mîmâm@sâ in these matters.]
471
pramâ@na is to be defined as the means that leads to such right
knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge
(pramâ) in Vedânta is the knowledge of an object which has not
been found contradicted (abâdhitârthavi@sayajñânatva). Except
when specially expressed otherwise, pramâ is generally considered
as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired
(anadhigata) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections
are sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a
few minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive
moments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired
in the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedânta
considers that so long as a different mental state does not arise,
any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as
remaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive
one thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a
series of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledge
of the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledge
of the preceding moments, for so long as any mental
state has any one thing for its object it is to be considered as
having remained unchanged all through the series of moments.
There is of course this difference between the same percept of a
previous and a later moment following in succession, that fresh
elements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though
the content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned
remains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses
though the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed.
When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state
representing the book is not changed every second, and hence
there can be no such supposition that I am having separate mental
states in succession each of which is a repetition of the previous
one, for so long as the general content of the mental state remains
the same there is no reason for supposing that there has been any
change in the mental state. The mental state thus remains the
same so long as the content is not changed, but though it remains
the same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneous
472
addition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of the
external world should be regarded as right knowledge until the
absolute is realized.
When the anta@hkara@na (mind) comes in contact with the
external objects through the senses and becomes transformed as
it were into their forms, it is said that the anta@hkara@na has
been transformed into a state (v@rtti) [Footnote 1]. As soon as the
anta@hkara@na has assumed the shape or form of the object of its
knowledge, the ignorance (ajñâna) with reference to that object is
removed, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness
(cit) shows the object which was so long hidden by
ignorance. The appearance or the perception of an object
is thus the self-shining of the cit through a v@rtti of a form
resembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-supposes
that by the action of ajñâna, pure consciousness or being
is in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite of
the cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is
but the transformation of ignorance (ajñâna), the former cannot
manifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance
they are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. The
diversified objects of the world are but transformations of
the principle of ajñâna which is neither real nor unreal. It
is the nature of ajñâna that it veils its own creations. Thus
on each of the objects created by the ajñâna by its creating
(vik@sepa) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (âvara@na) capacity.
But when any object comes in direct touch with anta@hkara@na
through the senses the anta@hkara@na becomes transformed into
the form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veil
on that particular ajñâna form—the object, and as the self-shining
cit is shining through the particular ajñâna state, we
have what is called the perception of the thing. Though there is
in reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet the
ajñâna has created such illusory distinctions as individual souls
and the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space,
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Vedânta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The
same anta@hkara@na, according to its diverse functions, is called mânâs,
buddhi, aha@mkâra, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called
mânâs, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As
presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness aha@mkâra, and as
producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications
or states (v@rtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special
kind of modification of ajñâna as anta@hkara@na).]
473
etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary
and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajñâna forms
so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the
subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on
the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation
(abheda) of the subjective consciousness with the objective
consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the
specific mental states
(tattadindriyayogyavi@sayâvacchinnacaitanyâbhinnatvam
tattadâkâravi@sayâvacchinnajñânasya tattadams'e pratyak@satvam).
This union in perception means that the objective has at that
moment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of
the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the anta@hkara@na
is called jîvasâk@si.
Inference (anumâna), according to Vedânta, is made by our
notion of concomitance (vyâptijñâna) between two things, acting
through specific past impressions (sa@mskâra). Thus when I see
smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke
with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I
infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and
the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance
revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between
the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is
generated by the perception of two things together, when no
case of the failure of concomitance is known (vyabhicârâjñâna)
regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether
subjective, the Vedântist does not emphasize the necessity
of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (bhûyodars'anam
sak@rddars'anam veti vis'e@so nâdara@nîya@h). Vedânta is
not anxious to establish any material validity for the inference,
but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of
concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the
concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory
instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedânta whether this
concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases.
The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance
(anvayavyâpti) that the Vedânta allows. So the
Vedânta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyâya
supported, viz. anvayavyatireki (by joining agreement in presence
with agreement in absence), kevalânvayi (by universal agreement
where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and
474
kevalavyatireki (by universal agreement in absence). Vedânta
advocates three premisses, viz. (1) pratijña (the hill is fiery);
(2) hetu (because it has smoke) and (3) d@rs@tânta (as in the
kitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyâya maintained [Footnote
ref 1]. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedânta as
being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the
one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false,
we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (Brahmabhinnam
sarvam mithyâ Brahmabhinnatvât yedevam tadevam yathâ s'uktirûpyam).
First premiss (pratijñâ) all else excepting Brahman is false; second
premiss (hetu) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss
(dr@s@tânta) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch [Footnote
ref 2].
Âtman, Jîva, Îs'vara, Ekajîvavâda and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda.
We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous
(_svayamprakâs'a). But what does this mean? Vedânta
defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but
is yet immediate and direct with us (avedyatve sati
aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam). Self-luminosity thus means the
capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness
without in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever
anything is described as an object of consciousness, its character
as constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not
be present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another.
This makes it dependent on some other such entity which can
produce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all its
objects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for
its manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug,
the cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousness
to manifest it, then that might again require another, and
that another, and so on ad infinitum (anavasthâ). If consciousness
did not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation,
then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he
had seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness
(anubhûti) manifests itself and thereby maintains the appearance
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Vedanta would have either pratijñâ, hetu and udâharana, or
udâhara@na, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyâya, viz.
pratijña, hetu, udâhara@na, upanaya and nigamana.]
[Footnote 2: Vedântic notions of the pramâna of upamana, arthapatti,
s'abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mîmâm@sâ view, do not
require to be treated here separately.]
475
of all our world experience. This goes directly against
the jñâtatâ theory of Kumârila that consciousness was not immediate
but was only inferable from the manifesting quality
(jñâtatâ) of objects when they are known in consciousness.
Now Vedânta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness
is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object
of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in
consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it
is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The
self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is
never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the
perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association
comprehended under the term aha@mkâra (ego). The real self is
identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness.
This real self called the âtman is not the same as the jîva or
individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences
of worldly life. Îs'vara also must be distinguished from this
highest âtman or Brahman. We have already seen that many
Vedântists draw a distinction between mâyâ and avidyâ. Mâyâ
is that aspect of ajñâna by which only the best attributes
are projected, whereas avidyâ is that aspect by which impure
qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are
more of a creative, generative (vik@sepa) type, whereas in the latter
veiling (âvara@na) characteristics are most prominent. The relation
of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with mâyâ and
avidyâ (also called ajñâna) was believed respectively to explain the
phenomenal Îs'vara and the phenomenal jîva or individual. This
relation is conceived in two ways, namely as upâdhi or pratibimba,
and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is
like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image,
though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes
the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The
sun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the
impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may
be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of
water and yield different kinds of images possessing different
characteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenally
have all the appearance of reality. The other conception
of the relation is that when we speak of âkâs'a (space) in the jug
or of âkâs'a in the room. The âkâs'a in reality does not suffer
476
any modification in being within the jug or within the room. In
reality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (avachinna)
within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited
by the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the
âkâs'a limited within it will remain as separate from the âkâs'a
limited within the room.
Of the Vedântists who accept the reflection analogy the followers
of N@rsi@mhâs'rama think that when the pure cit is reflected
in the mâyâ, Îs'vara is phenomenally produced, and when in the
avidyâ the individual or jîva. Sarvajñâtmâ however does not
distinguish between the mâyâ and the avidyâ, and thinks that
when the cit is reflected in the avidyâ in its total aspect as cause,
we get Îs'vara, and when reflected in the anta@hkara@na—a product
of the avidyâ—we have jîva or individual soul.
Jîva or individual means the self in association with the ego
and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels,
suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jîva also three
stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na
is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajñâna and the
jîva in this state is called prâjña or ânandamaya. In the dream-state
the self is in association with a subtle body and is called
taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a
subtle and gross body is called vis'va. So also the self in its pure
state is called Brahman, when associated with mâyâ it is called
Îs'vara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as
controlling them, it is called hira@nyagarbha; when with the gross
elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virâ@t
puru@sa.
The jîva in itself as limited by its avidyâ is often spoken of
as pâramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and
the ego in the waking states as vyavahârika (phenomenal), and
when in the dream states as dream-self, prâtibhâ@sika (illusory).
Prakâs'âtmâ and his followers think that since ajñâna is one
there cannot be two separate reflections such as jîva and Îs'vara;
but it is better to admit that jîva is the image of Îs'vara in the
ajñâna. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with mâyâ is
Îs'vara, and this when again reflected through the ajñâna gives
us the jîva. The manifestation of the jîva is in the anta@hkara@na
as states of knowledge. The jîva thus in reality is Îs'vara and
apart from jîva and Îs'vara there is no other separate existence of
477
Brahma-caitanya. Jîva being the image of Îs'vara is thus dependent
on him, but when the limitations of jîva are removed
by right knowledge, the jîva is the same Brahman it always was.
Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the
avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possible
of things which have colour, and therefore jîva is cit limited (avacchinna)
by the anta@hkara@na (mind). Îs'vara is that which is beyond
it; the diversity of anta@hkara@nas accounts for the diversity
of the jîvas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are
not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining
or comprehending the relation of Îs'vara and jîva. In the
Vedânta system Îs'vara has but little importance, for he is but a
phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more
powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of
us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and
both jîva and Îs'vara are but illusory impositions on it. Some
Vedântists hold that there is but one jîva and one body, and
that all the world as well as all the jîvas in it are merely his
imaginings. These dream jîvas and the dream world will
continue so long as that super-jîva continues to undergo his
experiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary
individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary
salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of
the imaginary jîvas. The cosmic jîva is alone the awakened jîva
and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the
doctrine of ekajîva (one-soul).
The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some
Vedântists that there are many individuals and the world-appearance
has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person
creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective
datum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception
of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a
rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and
agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen
the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and
there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory
perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no
corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must
be distinguished from the normal Vedânta view which holds
that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these
478
are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently
and have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparison
with the truth or reality which is ever the same constant
and unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance.
According to the other view phenomena are not
objectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that
the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the
perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion
occurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist
before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion,
and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is therefore
called the theory of d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda, i.e. the theory that the
subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there
are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions.
In the normal Vedânta view however the objects of
the world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with
which the subjective perceptions are created. The objective
phenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of ajñâna,
but still these phenomena of the ajñâna are there as the common
ground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objective
epistemology whereas the d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda has no proper
epistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined
by his own subjective avidyâ and previous impressions as modifications
of the avidyâ. The d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda theory approaches
nearest to the Vijñânavâda Buddhism, only with this difference
that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being
Vedânta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable
reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary
perceptions are but impositions on it.
The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that
both are modifications of ajñâna. It is indeed difficult to
comprehend the nature of ajñâna, though its presence in consciousness
can be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism
all our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and
become self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedânta explains
the reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these
indefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes
of the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continue
from beginningless time consists in this, that the real in
its full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse
479
that we get of it is always through manifestations of forms
and names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable,
incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under
certain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real,
and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a
positive being which is undeniable. This positive being is only
the highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms
and names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or a
cup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being
apart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that
is imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have
being in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually misattributing
the characteristics of the unreal forms—the modes of
ajñâna and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our
experience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us to
conceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajñâna.
Moreover such is the nature of ajñânas that they are knowable
only by a false identification of them with the self-luminous
Brahman or âtman. Being as such is the highest truth, the
Brahman. The ajñâna states are not non-being in the sense of
nothing of pure negation (abhâva), but in the sense that they are
not being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being,
the ajñâna, and this illumination means nothing more than a
false identification of being with non-being. The forms of ajñâna
if they are to be known must be associated with pure consciousness,
and this association means an illusion, superimposition, and
mutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness these
cannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alone
that is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the ajñâna
states in themselves as apart from the âtman we fail in a dilemma,
for knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, and
when it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thus
apart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no other
kind of its existence is known to us. If ajñâna had been a non-entity
altogether it could never come at all, if it were a positive
entity then it would never cease to be; the ajñâna thus is a
mysterious category midway between being and non-being and
undefinable in every way; and it is on account of this that it is
called tattvânyatvâbhyâm anirvâcya or undefinable and undeterminable
either as real or unreal. It is real in the sense that it is
480
a necessary postulate of our phenomenal experience and unreal
in its own nature, for apart from its connection with consciousness
it is incomprehensible and undefinable. Its forms even while they
are manifested in consciousness are self-contradictory and incomprehensible
as to their real nature or mutual relation, and
comprehensible only so far as they are manifested in consciousness,
but apart from these no rational conception of them can be
formed. Thus it is impossible to say anything about the ajñâna
(for no knowledge of it is possible) save so far as manifested in
consciousness and depending on this the D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâdins asserted
that our experience was inexplicably produced under the influence
of avidyâ and that beyond that no objective common ground
could be admitted. But though this has the general assent of
Vedânta and is irrefutable in itself, still for the sake of explaining
our common sense view (pratikarmavyavasathâ) we may
think that we have an objective world before us as the common
field of experience. We can also imagine a scheme of things and
operations by which the phenomenon of our experience may be
interpreted in the light of the Vedânta metaphysics.
The subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as the
âtman, the one highest reality, secondly as jîva or the âtman as
limited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiated
from the âtman, but âtman is regarded as identical with the psychosis
thus appearing as a living and knowing being, as jîvasâk@si or
perceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the jîva comprehends,
knows, or experiences; thirdly the anta@hkara@na psychosis or
mind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidyâ manifestations,
just as the outer world objects are exterior centres of
avidyâ phenomena or objective entities. The anta@hkara@na is not
only the avidyâ capable of supplying all forms to our present experiences,
but it also contains all the tendencies and modes of
past impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. The
anta@hkara@na is always turning the various avidyâ modes of it into
the jîvasâk@si (jîva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), and
these are also immediately manifested, made known, and transformed
into experience. These avidyâ states of the anta@hkara@na
are called its v@rttis or states. The specific peculiarity of the
v@rttiajñânas is this that only in these forms can they be superimposed
upon pure consciousness, and thus be interpreted as states of consciousness
and have their indefiniteness or cover removed. The
481
forms of ajñâna remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled only
so long as they do not come into relation to these v@rttis of
anta@hkara@na, for the ajñâna can be destroyed by the cit only in the
form of a v@rtti, while in all other forms the ajñâna veils the cit
from manifestation. The removal of ajñâna-v@rttis of the anta@hkara@na
or the manifestation of v@rtti-jñâna is nothing but this, that
the anta@hkara@na states of avidyâ are the only states of ajñâna
which can be superimposed upon the self-luminous âtman
(adhyâsa, false attribution). The objective world consists of the
avidyâ phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivity
consists in this that avidyâ in this form cannot be superimposed
on the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. These
avidyâ phenomena may be regarded as many and diverse, but in
all these forms they serve only to veil the cit and are beyond
consciousness. It is only when they come in contact with the avidyâ
phenomena as anta@hkara@na states that they coalesce with the
avidyâ states and render themselves objects of consciousness or
have their veil of âvara@na removed. It is thus assumed that in
ordinary perceptions of objects such as jug, etc. the anta@hkara@na
goes out of the man's body (s'arîramadhyât) and coming in
touch with the jug becomes transformed into the same form,
and as soon as this transformation takes place the cit which
is always steadily shining illuminates the jug-form or the jug.
The jug phenomena in the objective world could not be manifested
(though these were taking place on the background of
the same self-luminous Brahman or âtman as forms of the highest
truth of my subjective consciousness) because the ajñâna phenomena
in these forms serve to veil their illuminator, the self-luminous.
It was only by coming into contact with these phenomena
that the anta@hkara@na could be transformed into corresponding
states and that the illumination dawned which at once revealed
the anta@hkara@na states and the objects with which these states or
v@rttis had coalesced. The consciousness manifested through the
v@rttis alone has the power of removing the ajñâna veiling the
cit. Of course there are no actual distinctions of inner or outer,
or the cit within me and the cit without me. These are only of
appearance and due to avidyâ. And it is only from the point of
view of appearance that we suppose that knowledge of objects
can only dawn when the inner cit and the outer cit unite together
through the anta@hkara@nav@rtti, which makes the external objects
482
translucent as it were by its own translucence, removes the ajñâna
which was veiling the external self-luminous cit and reveals the
object phenomena by the very union of the cit as reflected
through it and the cit as underlying the object phenomena. The
pratyak@sa-pramâ or right knowledge by perception is the cit, the
pure consciousness, reflected through the v@rtti and identical with
the cit as the background of the object phenomena revealed by
it. From the relative point of view we may thus distinguish three
consciousnesses: (1) consciousness as the background of objective
phenomena, (2) consciousness as the background of the jîva
or pramâtâ, the individual, (3) consciousness reflected in the v@rtti
of the anta@hkara@na; when these three unite perception is effected.
Pramâ or right knowledge means in Vedânta the acquirement
of such new knowledge as has not been contradicted by
experience (abâdhita). There is thus no absolute definition of
truth. A knowledge acquired can be said to be true only so long
as it is not contradicted. Thus the world appearance though it
is very true now, may be rendered false, when this is contradicted
by right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus the
knowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true
absolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousness
which is never contradicted in any experience at any time. The
truth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding out
whether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experience
or not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is to
be regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will be
contradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized.
The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated
by a false identification of anta@hkara@na transformations as
pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated
the perceptions, "I am happy," or "I am sorry." In continuous
perception of anything for a certain time as an object
or as pleasure, etc. the mental state or v@rtti is said to last in the
same way all the while so long as any other new form is not
taken up by the anta@hkara@na for the acquirement of any new
knowledge. In such case when I infer that there is fire on the
hill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the anta@hkara@na
v@rtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matter
of inference, for the anta@hkara@na v@rtti cannot be in touch with the
fire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of
483
mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as
inference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquired
perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is
odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal
wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it
to be odoriferous. Vedânta does not admit the existence of the
relation called samavâya (inherence) or jâti (class notion); and
so does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the
other class called inference, and holds that both perception and
inference are but different modes of the transformations of the
anta@hkara@na reflecting the cit in the corresponding v@rttis. The
perception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the anta@hkara@na
v@rtti transformed into the form of an object with which it is
in contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity of
the cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception in
the subjective aspect is regarded as the identity of the subjective
cit with the objective cit. This identity of course means that
through the v@rtti the same reality subsisting in the object and
the subject is realized, whereas in inference the thing to be inferred,
being away from contact with anta@hkara@na, has apparently
a different reality from that manifested in the states of consciousness.
Thus perception is regarded as the mental state representing
the same identical reality in the object and the subject by
anta@hkara@na contact, and it is held that the knowledge produced
by words (e.g. this is the same Devadatta) referring identically
to the same thing which is seen (e.g. when I see Devadatta
before me another man says this is Devadatta, and the knowledge
produced by "this is Devadatta" though a verbal (s'âbda)
knowledge is to be regarded as perception, for the anta@hkara@na
v@rtti is the same) is to be regarded as perception or pratyak@sa.
The content of these words (this is Devadatta) being the same
as the perception, and there being no new relationing knowledge as
represented in the proposition "this is Devadatta" involving the
unity of two terms "this" and "Devadatta" with a copula, but
only the indication of one whole as Devadatta under visual perception
already experienced, the knowledge proceeding from
"this is Devadatta" is regarded as an example of nirvikalpa
knowledge. So on the occasion of the rise of Brahma-consciousness
when the preceptor instructs "thou art Brahman" the
knowledge proceeding from the sentence is not savikalpa, for
484
though grammatically there are two ideas and a copula, yet
from the point of view of intrinsic significance (tâtparya) one
identical reality only is indicated. Vedânta does not distinguish
nirvikalpa and savikalpa in visual perception, but only in s'âbda
perception as in cases referred to above. In all such cases the
condition for nirvikalpa is that the notion conveyed by the
sentence should be one whole or one identical reality, whereas
in savikalpa perception we have a combination of different
ideas as in the sentence, "the king's man is coming" (râjapuru@sa
âgacchatî). Here no identical reality is signified, but what is
signified is the combination of two or three different concepts [Footnote
ref 1].
It is not out of place to mention in this connection that
Vedânta admits all the six pramâ@nas of Kumârila and considers
like Mîmâ@msâ that all knowledge is self-valid (svat@ah-pramâ@na).
But pramâ has not the same meaning in Vedânta
as in Mîmâ@msâ. There as we remember pramâ meant the
knowledge which goaded one to practical action and as such
all knowledge was pramâ, until practical experience showed the
course of action in accordance with which it was found to be
contradicted. In Vedânta however there is no reference to action,
but pramâ means only uncontradicted cognition. To the definition
of self-validity as given by Mîmâ@msâ Vedânta adds another
objective qualification, that such knowledge can have svata@h-prâmâ@nya
as is not vitiated by the presence of any do@sa (cause
of error, such as defect of senses or the like). Vedânta of course
does not think like Nyâya that positive conditions (e.g. correspondence,
etc.) are necessary for the validity of knowledge,
nor does it divest knowledge of all qualifications like the
Mîmâ@msists, for whom all knowledge is self-valid as such. It
adopts a middle course and holds that absence of do@sa is a necessary
condition for the self-validity of knowledge. It is clear that
this is a compromise, for whenever an external condition has to
be admitted, the knowledge cannot be regarded as self-valid,
but Vedânta says that as it requires only a negative condition
for the absence of do@sa, the objection does not apply to it, and it
holds that if it depended on the presence of any positive condition
for proving the validity of knowledge like the Nyâya,
then only its theory of self-validity would have been damaged.
But since it wants only a negative condition, no blame can be
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Vedântaparibhâ@sâ and S'ikhâma@ni.]
485
attributed to its theory of self-validity. Vedânta was bound to
follow this slippery middle course, for it could not say that the
pure cit reflected in consciousness could require anything else
for establishing its validity, nor could it say that all phenomenal
forms of knowledge were also all valid, for then the world-appearance
would come to be valid; so it held that knowledge
could be regarded as valid only when there was no do@sa
present; thus from the absolute point of view all world-knowledge
was false and had no validity, because there was the
avidyâ-do@sa, and in the ordinary sphere also that knowledge was
valid in which there was no do@sa. Validity (prâmâ@nya) with
Mîmâ@msâ meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to
practical action in accordance with it, but with Vedânta it meant
correctness to facts and want of contradiction. The absence of
do@sa being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate the
correctness of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].
Vedânta Theory of Illusion.
We have already seen that the Mîmâ@msists had asserted that
all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (yathârthâ@h
sarve vivâdaspadîbhûtâ@h pratyayâ@h pratyayatvât). Even
illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the
distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and
the thing remembered (e.g. silver). But Vedânta objects to this,
and asks how there can be non-distinction between a thing which
is clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? If it is
said that it is merely a non-perception of the non-association (i.e.
non-perception of the fact that this is not connected with silver),
then also it cannot be, for then it is on either side mere negation,
and negation with Mîmâ@msâ is nothing but the bare presence of the
locus of negation (e.g. negation of jug on the ground is nothing but
the bare presence of the ground), or in other words non-perception
of the non-association of "silver" and "this" means barely
and merely the "silver" and "this." Even admitting for argument's
sake that the distinction between two things or two ideas
is not perceived, yet merely from such a negative aspect no one
could be tempted to move forward to action (such as stooping
down to pick up a piece of illusory silver). It is positive
______________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Vedântaparibhâ@sâ, S'ikhâma@ni, Ma@niprabhâ and Citsukha
on svata@hprâma@nya.]
486
conviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical
movement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfect
perception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated
and comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silver
appears to be like true silver before me and this generates the
movement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. For
the appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us
to behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. Thus
I may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite
this similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as
if it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mîma@msâ position
may be defined it fails [Footnote ref l]. Vedânta thinks that the illusion
is not merely subjective, but that there is actually a phenomenon
of illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects;
the difference in the two cases consists in this, that the illusion
is generated by the do@sa or defect of the senses etc., whereas the
phenomena of external objects are not due to such specific do@sas.
The process of illusory perception in Vedanta may be described
thus. First by the contact of the senses vitiated by do@sas a
mental state as "thisness" with reference to the thing before me
is generated; then in the thing as "this" and in the mental state
of the form of that "this" the cit is reflected. Then the avidyâ
(nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presence
of the do@sa, and this disturbance along with the impression of
silver remembered through similarity is transformed into the
appearance of silver. There is thus an objective illusory silver
appearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental state
generated by its contact with the illusory silver. These two
transformations, the silver state of the mind and external phenomenal
illusory silver state, are manifested by the perceiving consciousness
(sâk@sicaitanya). There are thus here two phenomenal transformations,
one in the avidyâ states forming the illusory objective silver
phenomenon, and another in the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti or mind state.
But in spite of there being two distinct and separate phenomena,
their object being the same as the "this" in perception, we have
one knowledge of illusion. The special feature of this theory of
illusion is that an indefinable (anirvacanîya-khyâti) illusory silver
is created in every case where an illusory perception of silver
occurs. There are three orders of reality in Vedânta, namely the
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[Footnote 1: See Vivara@na-prameya-sa@mgraha and Nyâyamakaranda on
akhyâti refutation.]
487
pâramârthika or absolute, vyavahârika or practical ordinary
experience, and prâtibhâsika, illusory. The first one represents
the absolute truth; the other two are false impressions due
to do@sa. The difference between vyavahârika and prâtibhâsika
is that the do@sa of the vyavahârika perception is neither discovered
nor removed until salvation, whereas the do@sa of the
prâtibhâsika reality which occurs in many extraneous forms (such
as defect of the senses, sleep, etc.) is perceived in the world of
our ordinary experience, and thus the prâtibhâsika experience
lasts for a much shorter period than the vyavahârika. But just
as the vyavahârika world is regarded as phenomenal modifications
of the ajñâna, as apart from our subjective experience and
even before it, so the illusion (e.g. of silver in the conch-shell) is
also regarded as a modification of avidyâ, an undefinable creation
of the object of illusion, by the agency of the do@sa. Thus in the
case of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silver
is created by the do@sa in association with the senses, which is
called the creation of an indefinable (anirvacanîya) silver of illusion.
Here the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the same
but the avidyâ of anta@hkara@na suffers modifications (pari@nâma)
on account of do@sa, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation.
The illusory silver is thus vivartta (appearance) from the point
of view of the cit and pari@nâma from the point of view of
avidyâ, for the difference between vivartta and pari@nâma is, that
in the former the transformations have a different reality from
the cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it),
while in the latter case the transformations have the same reality
as the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the same
stuff as the avidyâ whose transformations it is). But now a
difficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due to
a coalescing of the cit underlying the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti as modified
by do@sa and the object—cit as underlying the "this" before
me (in the illusion of "this is silver"), then I ought to have the
experience that "I am silver" like "I am happy" and not that
"this is silver"; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes place
in connection with my previous notion as "this," the form of
the knowledge also is "this is silver," whereas in the notion
"I am happy," the notion of happiness takes place in connection
with a previous v@rtti of "I." Thus though the coalescing
of the two "cits" is the same in both cases, yet in one case the
488
knowledge takes the form of "I am," and in another as "this is"
according as the previous impression is "I" or "this." In dreams
also the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perception
of silver in the conch-shell. There the illusory creations are
generated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are
imposed upon the cit. The dream experiences cannot be regarded
merely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the
form that "I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc." and not
that "I remember the chariots." In the dream state all the senses
are inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there,
but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space,
time, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit. The objection that
since the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought to
last even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought
to continue even in waking life, does not hold; for in the waking
stages the anta@hkara@na is being constantly transformed into different
states on the expiry of the defects of sleep, etc., which were
causing the dream cognitions. This is called niv@rtti (negation)
as distinguished from bâdha (cessation). The illusory creation of
dream experiences may still be there on the pure cit, but these
cannot be experienced any longer, for there being no do@sa of
sleep the anta@hkara@na is active and suffering modifications in
accordance with the objects presented before us. This is what is
called niv@rtti, for though the illusion is there I cannot experience
it, whereas bâdha or cessation occurs when the illusory creation
ceases, as when on finding out the real nature of the conch-shell
the illusion of silver ceases, and we feel that this is not silver, this
was not and will not be silver. When the conch-shell is perceived
as silver, the silver is felt as a reality, but this feeling of reality
was not an illusory creation, though the silver was an objective
illusory creation; for the reality in the s'ukti (conch-shell) is
transferred and felt as belonging to the illusion of silver imposed upon
it. Here we see that the illusion of silver has two different kinds
of illusion comprehended in it. One is the creation of an indefinable
silver (anirvacanîya-rajatotpatti) and the other is the attribution
of the reality belonging to the conch-shell to the illusory
silver imposed upon it, by which we feel at the time of the illusion
that it is a reality. This is no doubt the anyathâkhyâti
form of illusion as advocated by Nyâya. Vedânta admits that
when two things (e.g. red flower and crystal) are both present
489
before my senses, and I attribute the quality of one to the other
by illusion (e.g. the illusion that the crystal is red), then the illusion
is of the form of anyathâkhyâti; but if one of the things is not
present before my senses and the other is, then the illusion is not
of the anyathâkhyâti type, but of the anirvacanîyakhyâti type.
Vedânta could not avoid the former type of illusion, for it believed
that all appearance of reality in the world-appearance
was really derived from the reality of Brahman, which was self-luminous
in all our experiences. The world appearance is an
illusory creation, but the sense of reality that it carries with it
is a misattribution (anyathâkhyâti) of the characteristic of the
Brahman to it, for Brahman alone is the true and the real, which
manifests itself as the reality of all our illusory world-experience,
just as it is the reality of s'ukti that gives to the appearance of
silver its reality.
Vedânta Ethics and Vedânta Emancipation.
Vedânta says that when a duly qualified man takes to the
study of Vedânta and is instructed by the preceptor—"Thou
art that (Brahman)," he attains the emancipating knowledge,
and the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory.
The qualifications necessary for the study of Vedânta are (1)
that the person having studied all the Vedas with the proper
accessories, such as grammar, lexicon etc. is in full possession of
the knowledge of the Vedas, (2) that either in this life or in another,
he must have performed only the obligatory Vedic duties (such
as daily prayer, etc. called nitya-karma) and occasionally obligatory
duty (such as the birth ceremony at the birth of a son,
called naimittika-karma) and must have avoided all actions for
the fulfilment of selfish desires (kâmya-karmas, such as the
performance of sacrifices for going to Heaven) and all prohibited
actions (e.g. murder, etc. ni@siddha-karma) in such a
way that his mind is purged of all good and bad actions (no
karma is generated by the nitya and naimittika-karma, and as
he has not performed the kâmya and prohibited karmas, he has
acquired no new karma). When he has thus properly purified
his mind and is in possession of the four virtues or means of
fitting the mind for Vedânta instruction (called sâdhana) he
can regard himself as properly qualified for the Vedânta instruction.
These virtues are (1) knowledge of what is eternal
490
and what is transient, (2) disinclination to enjoyments of this
life and of the heavenly life after death, (3) extreme distaste for
all enjoyments, and anxiety for attaining the means of right knowledge,
(4) control over the senses by which these are restrained
from everything but that which aids the attainment of right
knowledge (dama), (a) having restrained them, the attainment
of such power that these senses may not again be tempted towards
worldly enjoyments (uparati), (b) power of bearing extremes
of heat, cold, etc., (c) employment of mind towards the attainment
of right knowledge, (d) faith in the instructor and
Upani@sads; (5) strong desire to attain salvation. A man possessing
the above qualities should try to understand correctly
the true purport of the Upani@sads (called s'rava@na), and by
arguments in favour of the purport of the Upani@sads to
strengthen his conviction as stated in the Upani@sads (called
manana) and then by nididhyâsana (meditation) which includes
all the Yoga processes of concentration, try to realize the truth
as one. Vedânta therefore in ethics covers the ground of
Yoga; but while for Yoga emancipation proceeds from understanding
the difference between puru@sa and prak@rti, with Vedânta
salvation comes by the dawn of right knowledge that Brahman
alone is the true reality, his own self [Footnote ref 1]. Mîmâ@msâ asserts
that the Vedas do not declare the knowledge of one Brahman to be the
supreme goal, but holds that all persons should act in accordance
with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of good
and the removal of evil. But Vedânta holds that though the
purport of the earlier Vedas is as Mîmâ@msâ has it, yet this
is meant only for ordinary people, whereas for the elect the
goal is clearly as the Upani@sads indicate it, namely the attainment
of the highest knowledge. The performance of Vedic
duties is intended only for ordinary men, but yet it was
believed by many (e.g. Vâcaspati Mis'ra and his followers) that
due performance of Vedic duties helped a man to acquire a
great keenness for the attainment of right knowledge; others
believed (e.g. Prakâs'âtmâ and his followers) that it served to
bring about suitable opportunities by securing good preceptors,
etc. and to remove many obstacles from the way so that it became
easier for a person to attain the desired right knowledge.
In the acquirement of ordinary knowledge the ajñânas removed
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[Footnote 1: See Vedântasâra and _Advaitabrahmasiddhi.]
491
are only smaller states of ajñâna, whereas when the
Brahma-knowledge dawns the ajñâna as a whole is removed.
Brahma-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also a
state of knowledge, but such is its special strength that when
this knowledge once dawns, even the state of knowledge which
at first reflects it (and which being a state is itself ajñâna
modification) is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed,
only the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in its
own true light. Thus it is said that just as fire riding on a piece
of wood would burn the whole city and after that would burn
the very same wood, so in the last state of mind the Brahma-knowledge
would destroy all the illusory world-appearance and
at last destroy even that final state [Footnote ref l].
The mukti stage is one in which the pure light of Brahman
as the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss
shines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes as
illusory nothing. As all being of the world-appearance is but
limited manifestations of that one being, so all pleasures also
are but limited manifestations of that supreme bliss, a taste
of which we all can get in deep dreamless sleep. The being
of Brahman however is not an abstraction from all existent
beings as the sattâ (being as class notion) of the naiyâyika, but
the concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousness
and pure bliss is always identical with itself. Being (sat) is pure
bliss and pure consciousness. What becomes of the avidyâ during
mukti (emancipation) is as difficult for one to answer as the
question, how the avidyâ came forth and stayed during the world-appearance.
It is best to remember that the category of the
indefinite avidyâ is indefinite as regards its origin, manifestation
and destruction. Vedânta however believes that even when the
true knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for a
while, if the individual's previously ripened karmas demand it.
Thus the emancipated person may walk about and behave like
an ordinary sage, but yet he is emancipated and can no longer
acquire any new karma. As soon as the fruits due to his ripe
karmas are enjoyed and exhausted, the sage loses his body and
there will never be any other birth for him, for the dawn of
perfect knowledge has burnt up for him all budding karmas of
beginningless previous lives, and he is no longer subject to any
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[Footnote 1:Siddhântales'a.]
492
of the illusions subjective or objective which could make any
knowledge, action, or feeling possible for him. Such a man is
called jîvanmukta, i.e. emancipated while living. For him all
world-appearance has ceased. He is the one light burning alone
in himself where everything else has vanished for ever from the
stage [Footnote ref 1].
Vedânta and other Indian Systems.
Vedânta is distinctly antagonistic to Nyâya, and most of
its powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it.
S'a@nkara himself had begun it by showing contradictions and
inconsistencies in many of the Nyâya conceptions, such as the
theory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of samavâya,
the conception of jâti, etc [Footnote ref 2]. His followers carried it to
still greater lengths as is fully demonstrated by the labours of
S'rîhar@sa, Citsukha, Madhusûdana, etc. It was opposed to Mîmâ@msâ so
far as this admitted the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika categories, but agreed
with it generally as regards the pramâ@nas of anumâna, upamiti,
arthâpatti, s'abda, and anupalabdhi. It also found a great supporter
in Mîmâ@msâ with its doctrine of the self-validity and self-manifesting
power of knowledge. But it differed from Mîmâ@msâ
in the field of practical duties and entered into many elaborate
discussions to prove that the duties of the Vedas referred only to
ordinary men, whereas men of higher order had no Vedic duties
to perform but were to rise above them and attain the highest
knowledge, and that a man should perform the Vedic duties
only so long as he was not fit for Vedânta instruction and
studies.
With Sâ@mkhya and Yoga the relation of Vedânta seems to
be very close. We have already seen that Vedânta had accepted
all the special means of self-purification, meditation, etc., that
were advocated by Yoga. The main difference between Vedânta
and Sâ@mkhya was this that Sâ@mkhya believed, that the stuff of
which the world consisted was a reality side by side with the
puru@sas. In later times Vedânta had compromised so far with
Sâ@mkhya that it also sometimes described mâyâ as being made
up of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Vedânta also held that according
to these three characteristics were formed diverse modifications
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Pañcadas'î.]
[Footnote 2: See S'a@nkara's refutation of Nyâya, S'a@nkara-bhâ@sya, II.
ii.]
493
of the mâyâ. Thus Îs'vara is believed to possess a mind of pure
sattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted in
Vedânta in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as Sâ@mkhya
held it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that mâyâ was
believed to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, it
was indefinable and indefinite, and in its nature different from
what we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantial
nothing, a magic entity which had its being only so long
as it appeared. Prak@rti also was indefinable or rather undemonstrable
as regards its own essential nature apart from its manifestation,
but even then it was believed to be a combination of
positive reals. It was undefinable because so long as the reals
composing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belonged
to it with which it could be defined. Mâyâ however was undemonstrable,
indefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was a
separate category of the indefinite. Sâ@mkhya believed in the
personal individuality of souls, while for Vedânta there was only
one soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the mâyâ
transformations. There was an adhyâsa or illusion in Sâ@mkhya
as well as in Vedânta; but in the former the illusion was due
to a mere non-distinction between prak@rti and puru@sa or mere
misattribution of characters or identities, but in Vedânta there
was not only misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinable
creation. Causation with Sâ@mkhya meant real transformation,
but with Vedânta all transformation was mere appearance.
Though there were so many differences, it is however easy to
see that probably at the time of the origin of the two systems
during the Upani@sad period each was built up from very similar
ideas which differed only in tendencies that gradually manifested
themselves into the present divergences of the two systems.
Though S'a@nkara laboured hard to prove that the Sâ@mkhya
view could not be found in the Upani@sads, we can hardly be
convinced by his interpretations and arguments. The more
he argues, the more we are led to suspect that the Sâ@mkhya
thought had its origin in the Upani@sads. Sâ'a@nkara and his
followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from
the Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the s'ûnya
of Nâgârjuna. It is difficult indeed to distinguish between
pure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts of
S`a@nkara to the self-luminosity of the Vijñânavâda Buddhism
494
can hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truth
in the accusations against S'a@nkara by Vijñâna Bhik@su and
others that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led to
think that S'a@nkara's philosophy is largely a compound of
Vijñânavâda and S'ûnyavâda Buddhism with the Upani@sad
notion of the permanence of self superadded.